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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT III. Monitoring Compliance With Human RightsIII(e) FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIONFINDINGS
Increased Government Control of Political Speech Chinese citizens face increased government regulation and suppression of their freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are guaranteed in China's Constitution.1 Over the past year public security authorities have detained or imprisoned over two dozen journalists, editors, and writers, including Zhao Yan, a researcher for the New York Times, and Ching Cheong, a reporter with the Singapore Straits Times. Officials have confiscated hundreds of thousands of publications for having illegal political content, banned hundreds of newspapers and magazines for publishing without government authorization, and shut down one quarter of the private Web sites in China for failing to register with the government. In May 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded Chinese newspaper editor Cheng Yizhong the Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize. The Chinese government prohibited Cheng from attending the award ceremony (in the previous year, government and Party officials detained Cheng, had him dismissed from his job, and expelled him from the Party). In an acceptance speech, read in his absence at the ceremony, Cheng said: Terror is everywhere. Lies are everywhere. We have been deceiving ourselves further and further down this path. I believe that in the near future, we will look back and find this insane and absurd episode to be absolutely unthinkable. If we accept the prevalent evil as normal, we will be co-conspirators in our own oppression.2 China's leaders hope to generate economic growth by harnessing domestic consumer demand for information and entertainment, but at the same time they expend significant human, legal, technical, and financial resources to ensure that commercialization of China's media does not diminish the government's ability to manipulate public opinion. Government agencies have consolidated control over all forums of political discourse by censoring newspapers, magazines, television news broadcasts, radio, Web sites carrying news and information, and, most recently, personal Web pages. When unable to block opinions with which they disagree, Chinese authorities have employed government and Party personnel to channel and direct public opinion surreptitiously. Government and Party Use of the Media to Control Public Opinion The Communist Party uses "political techniques to effectively regulate and control all types of mass media," according to a report published by Xinhua and the State Council Information Office.3 These techniques include allowing only state-sponsored media to publish or broadcast news, criminalizing unlicensed journalism, and requiring news editors to provide politically sensitive news stories to Party and government censors for vetting.4 According to the same report, the Party uses its authority over the news media to "steer public opinion" and "create conformity among the increasingly diverse thoughts and perspectives" in China's society. The Party achieves this goal by requiring news media to publish stories that praise central Party and government policies and portray central Party and government officials as working for the best interests of ordinary citizens.5 For example, when Chinese authorities issued regulations in March 2005 that restricted who may engage in journalism, media outlets such as Xinhua (which is controlled by the State Council) and the People's Daily (which is owned and operated by the Communist Party) began a propaganda campaign to deflect claims that the regulations interfered with freedom of expression. Xinhua, the People's Daily, and other state run media claimed that the regulations were needed to stop unethical journalists and allow ethical journalists to protect the public.6 The same campaign portrayed Western news media, particularly U.S. news media, as corrupt and government-controlled.7 The Party considers journalists to be its agents, and uses them to investigate provincial and local officials.8 If a journalist writes an article about corruption or a natural or man-made disaster, an editor may publish it, provided it shows that the situation has been resolved in a manner that reflects well on the Party, or that otherwise conforms to a particular official's agenda.9 The government and the Party, acting through the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the Central Propaganda Department, respectively, prohibit editors from publishing stories that would tarnish the image of the central government, the top leadership, the Party, or their policies.10 Instead, editors must treat such politically sensitive stories as internal intelligence reports, and forward them to relevant officials.11 There is some variation among local news media as to what censors deem "politically sensitive,"12 but central authorities move quickly to silence anyone they perceive as threatening their control over political discourse. For example, in early September 2004, a publication of the Southern Group (whose editors are known, and have been imprisoned, for testing government and Party censors) published a story that listed 50 Chinese citizens who were "activists who advise society and participate in public affairs."13 After the Liberation Daily (a publication of Shanghai's Communist Party Committee) criticized the concept of "public intellectuals" as intended to "drive a wedge between the intellectuals and the Party," 14 officials moved against Chinese intellectuals who had disagreed in public with the government or the Party. The campaign against public intellectuals resulted in at least seven detentions, censorship of the term "public intellectuals," and the blacklisting of several prominent social commentators.15 In another example of Chinese authorities silencing "public intellectuals," in May 2005 the government abruptly and without explanation ordered the cancellation of an academic conference organized by Fordham University and the China University of Political Science and Law.16 Participants at the conference, entitled "Constitutionalism and Political Democratization in China¡ªan International Conference," had planned to discuss sensitive topics such as "The Different Meanings of Democracy," "Democratization and Constitutionalism: China in Comparative Perspective," "Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy: Is China a Problem Case? " and "Which Path Should We Choose Toward Chinese Democracy? " Scheduled speakers included Western and Chinese experts well-known in China for doing work in sensitive areas, such as migrant labor and criminal defense.17 A People's Daily editorial published during the government crackdown on public intellectuals illustrates the attitude of Chinese authorities that likely contributed to their cancellation of the conference: [W]hat has not changed is that Western hostile forces are trying to carry out their planned conspiracy to westernize and divide us, what has not weakened is the influence of various types of anti-Marxist trends of thought, and what has not stopped is the corrosive effect of corrupt capitalist thinking and feudalism's vestigial ideology.18 The government and the Party are concerned that Chinese citizens have increased access to foreign news sources through satellite broadcasts, the Internet, and cellular phones, which may dilute the Party's control over public opinion.19 Senior officials portray the Internet as "a battlefield for the Communist Party's propaganda ideology work" that must either be occupied or lost to "Western countries, headed by the United States."20 The Party has said it must win the battle for Internet propaganda supremacy, otherwise "not only will it influence China's image and investment environment, but more importantly, it will influence the image of the Party and the government."21 In the past year the Party has improved its ability to silence and control political discussion on the Internet. Until recently, authorities have focused on blocking information from outside China and silencing critical Web sites inside China. While their efforts have been effective, the government recognizes that it cannot silence all politically sensitive information that it finds objectionable. For example, Chinese citizens wishing to express themselves without submitting to government censorship resort to posting articles on foreign Web sites and issuing "open letters" in the hope they will be published outside China. Internet users in China then circulate these materials. Authorities call this practice "re-infiltration," and have said it threatens their control over public opinion.22 Among their reactions has been to train and employ "Internet propagandists" to pose as ordinary Internet users and post opinions and information on the Internet to "guide" public opinion in the direction the government desires.23 Government use of the news media to control public opinion was particularly evident during periods of heightened political sensitivity in late 2004 and during 2005:
Chinese authorities are encouraging China's television and Internet news outlets, all of which are government sponsored, to increase their ability to influence public opinion abroad regarding China.29 Chinese authorities are also trying to increase their influence over bodies responsible for setting policies for Internet governance.30 For example, in March 2005, Zhao Houlin, a former telecommunications official in the Chinese government, and currently director of the International Telecommunication Union's Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, said: "Today the management by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) [is something that] people consider to be management by the United States, by one government. People definitely want to see some changes."31 In June 2005, an article in China's state-run press rationalizing that country's crackdown on private Web sites cited a Chinese delegate to the United Nation's Working Group on Internet Governance, Hu Qiheng, as saying she hopes China's Internet governance experience can act as a lesson for global Internet governance.32 No one may legally publish a book, newspaper, magazine, news Web site, or Internet publication in China without significant registered capital, a government sponsor, and government authorization.33 The government has the authority to revoke any publisher's license and force it to cease publishing.34 Those who violate Chinese publishing regulations are subject to heavy fines and long prison terms.35 Senior officials at the GAPP advocate this "rule by law" approach as a means to control public opinion.36 The Party and the government are increasingly using the law as a weapon to silence political speech that they believe may "provoke trouble," or "confuse public opinion."37 Three events in the past year highlight that Chinese authorities value control of political discourse over the freedom of the press guaranteed in China's Constitution. First, the Chinese government cracked down on Internet expression. According to state-run media, China's government has "put together the world's most extensive and comprehensive regulatory system for Internet administration,"38 and has "perfected a 24-hour, real-time situational censorship mechanism for Internet publishing content."39 Throughout 2005, authorities shut down private Web sites because of their political content.40 In March 2005, government agencies began enforcing a four-year-old regulation requiring all private Web sites to register with the Ministry of Information Industry and disclose whether their sites include restricted content such as news and cultural information.41 Some localities also began enforcing a 1997 regulation requiring private Web sites to register with public security bureaus.42 As part of these new enforcement procedures, the Ministry of Information Industry and public security bureaus have deployed software to locate and block Web sites that failed to register,43 and so far have censored tens of thousands of private Web sites.44 Second, in the past year Chinese government agencies promulgated several regulations to ensure that the government and the Party retain their control over journalists and editors. While the government claims these regulations are necessary to address problems caused by a "minority of news gatherers and editors,"45 in fact, the new regulations allow the government to determine who may engage in journalism, what their political orientation must be, and when they must submit to government and Party censorship:
Finally, in June 2005, the Hong Kong press reported that Party propaganda officials had issued a directive restricting "extra-territorial reporting,"51 a practice in which a domestic newspaper publishes a critical investigative report on events in another area of China that local news media have been prevented from reporting. A Chinese media professor called extra-territorial reporting "the best hope for liberalizing the news media," and one report cited unnamed Chinese editors and analysts as saying the ban had dealt a serious blow to investigative reporting.52 In addition to cracking down on Web sites, journalists, and extraterritorial reporting, Chinese authorities continue to enforce and enact laws that impose extensive administrative licensing requirements on all news media. As the number of news publications in China has grown, so has the scope of government regulation and repression:
China's leaders also strictly control who may publish books and impose harsh regulatory and criminal penalties to deter individuals from attempting to engage in private publishing. The government requires that all books published in China have serial numbers and that officials regulate who may publish by exercising exclusive control of the distribution of these numbers.62 In March 2005, new regulations became effective that prohibit the publication, and allow the confiscation, of any book that "harms the honor of China," "propagates superstition," or "disturbs social order." The regulations also empower the GAPP to strip violators of their authorization to publish.63 While these provisions are less vague than those of the regulations they supersede, the new language echoes provisions in China's national security laws that is used to imprison journalists and authors. Chinese authorities restrict the activities of foreign journalists64 and try to prevent foreign news media from investigating stories that might harm the image of the government and the Party.65 These restrictions are designed in part to protect the Party's image abroad, but the primary concern is that Chinese citizens will learn information from foreign news sources that is censored in China. According to one GAPP official "various enemy forces strongly coordinate with each other, and take those things that cannot be published domestically abroad to be published, and then these once again infiltrate domestically."66 Recent examples of Chinese authorities attempting to discourage the free flow of information to and from China include:
The Chinese government continues to implement measures it claims will allow citizens increased access to government information. Officials say that initiatives such as requiring government spokespersons to respond to press inquiries and legal safeguards of journalists' right to investigate officials prove that the government respects freedom of expression.71 The state-run media's discussion of the advantages of open government is a positive development, but the measures adopted by the government do not protect freedom of expression for ordinary citizens. Instead, they impose a duty on a group that speaks on behalf of the government (spokespersons) to be more forthcoming with a group whose work may be censored by the government (journalists). As noted above, the Party requires editors to treat politically sensitive reporting as internal (neibu) information and forward it to relevant officials rather than publish it. Therefore, unless the government lifts current restrictions on news reporting, the Party will be the primary beneficiary of these measures, since the increased responsiveness of spokespersons will allow Party officials to better use journalists to monitor provincial and local governments. In 2004, the Commission noted that some news media in China are being operated as commercial enterprises, and that the government is allowing limited private and foreign participation in some aspects of periodical and book production and distribution. This trend continues,72 but Chinese authorities say that these reforms are limited to "cultural" publications,73 and have moved to close loopholes that foreign businesses had been using to provide radio, television, film, periodical, and book content to China's citizens.74 Moreover, the Party will continue to have a leadership role in enterprises with private investment,75 and Party officials have no plans to relax editorial control over publishers76 and journalists.77 Although the Chinese government generally tightened restrictions on expression and dissent over the past year, officials continued to allow Chinese publications to report selectively on corruption and other information that in previous decades would have been deemed too embarrassing or threatening to government or Party officials. For example, during the Nie Shubin and She Xianglin controversies [see Section III(b)¡ªRights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants], Chinese news media published articles criticizing problems in the criminal process and recommending reforms to the criminal justice system as a whole. In another example, the China Youth Daily published a strongly worded report and editorial criticizing local officials in a Jiangxi town for rounding up local indigents in violation of national regulations and leaving them in a remote area in the middle of winter. China has a thriving underground publishing industry, and banned books, such as the "Survey of the Chinese Peasantry," are easily purchased from unlicensed publishers and retailers.78 By forcing unlicensed publishers to become criminals, however, the government is eroding respect for intellectual property and rule of law, as these illegal publishers are also de facto copyright violators (the illegal works are "pirated," since authors cannot collect royalties on them) and must bribe corrupt officials in order to keep operating. Some of the government's restrictions on freedom of expression, such as the prohibition on publishing news without prior government authorization, are stated explicitly in laws. Relevant laws and regulations, however, do not provide clear guidance about what kind of political or religious expression is illegal. For example, regulations prohibit publishing or disseminating anything that "harms the honor of China," but no legislative or judicial guidance exists to guide publishers as to what constitutes a violation of this prohibition. Instead, Chinese authorities rely upon detaining writers, indoctrinating publishers, and banning publications to encourage companies, institutions, and individuals to "choose" not to use certain words or publicize certain views that a government official might deem politically unacceptable. According to the editor of a major Chinese magazine noted for publishing critical articles without being shut down, "[w]e go up to the line¡ªwe might even push it. But we never cross it."79 Chinese citizens who cross the line and fail to censor themselves are detained by public security officials or dismissed from their jobs:
Chinese journalists seem to be increasingly chafing at government restrictions on press freedom. As an editor of one of China's largest newspapers put it: "Although one must submit to controls, one must nevertheless try to achieve something meaningful."86 In order to do so, however, journalists and editors must adopt techniques to circumvent government and Party censors. The aforementioned editor went on to say: When something cannot be criticized, the reporter approaches it from a complimentary angle. They don't write about accidents, they write about rescuing people. They don't write about thieves running rampant, they write about police heroism in capturing criminals. When they cannot write news, they write editorials. If they cannot discuss an issue in their locale, then they approach the issue in the context of another place. In the end, if they fail completely, they can always pass on the story (or the actual report) to another media [outlet], wait for them to publish it, and reprint the story.87 Universities in China also censor themselves.88 In April 2005, the Shanghai Evening Post reported how Internet forums at several universities "used relatively strict supervision, [and] set up specific screening mechanisms for harmful information" when anti-Japanese demonstrations were taking place in several cities in China:
Internet and software companies must either employ censorship technologies in their products or risk a government order to close. For example, although no Chinese law or regulation forbids specific words, companies such as Tencent and MSN embed a list of banned words and phrases, including "freedom" and "democracy," in their Internet applications.90 The China-based search engines of Yahoo! and MSN filter results for searches relating to the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and human rights. Google designed its Chinese-language news aggregation service so that users in China cannot view materials from dissident news Web sites that Chinese authorities have blocked. Monitoring, Jamming, and Blocking of Information The government continues to restrict Chinese citizens' access to political information from sources outside of China that the government cannot control, influence, or censor. The central government attempts to block radio broadcasts by Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the BBC. China's laws restrict satellite dish ownership,91 and regulations require foreign news broadcasters to send all their satellite feeds through government-controlled channels. Foreign newspapers may be distributed only at foreign hotels and to "authorized subscribers."92 In October 2004, SARFT issued regulations prohibiting joint ventures from producing programs on "political news."93 In March 2005, SARFT issued an interpretive notice on these regulations limiting foreign companies to investing in a single joint venture, saying: [W]e must control the contents of all products of joint ventures in a practical manner, understand the political inclinations and background of foreign joint venture parties, and in this way prevent harmful foreign ideology and culture from entering the realm of our television program production through joint investment and cooperation.94 Chinese officials seem especially concerned that Chinese citizens may gain increased access to information on the Internet that the Party and government cannot censor. In January 2005, the official journal of the Party Central Committee published an article calling on authorities to "strengthen supervision of international Internet gateways; filter out foreign, external Web sites that provide harmful information that threatens state security, disrupts social stability, and spreads obscene content; and adopt diplomatic and legal measures to attack these Web sites."95 Chinese agencies block the Web sites of many human rights, educational, political, and news-gathering institutions without providing public notice, explanation, or opportunity for appeal. According to a study by researchers at Harvard University, Cambridge University, and the University of Toronto, Chinese authorities operate "the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world" to prevent access to "sensitive" religious or political material on the Internet. The report also stated that authorities utilize "a complex series of laws and regulations that control the access to and publication of material online."96 Government monitoring is highly visible in its regulation of Internet cafes:
In September 2005, a human rights NGO that focuses on freedom of expression reported that Yahoo!'s Hong Kong subsidiary had complied with a request from Chinese authorities to furnish account information for the journalist Shi Tao.101 A Chinese court cited that information as one piece of evidence used to convict Shi of disclosing state secrets to a foreigner.102 Yahoo! responded that its local country sites must operate within the laws, regulations and customs of the country in which they are based.103 Political Detentions, Harassment, and Selectively Enforced National Security Laws Chinese officials continue to detain Chinese citizens who criticize them and their policies, and the Committee to Protect Journalists has dubbed China "the world's leading jailer of journalists."104 The Commission welcomes the release over the past year of several political prisoners, but regrets that during the same period Chinese security and judicial authorities detained or imprisoned dozens of individuals for exercising their right to peacefully express their political beliefs. The following list names some individuals that Chinese authorities have detained and imprisoned during the past year for exercising their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression:
Additional information on these cases and others is available on the Commission's Political Prisoner Database [see Section IV¡ªPolitical Prisoner Database]. In addition to detaining and imprisoning those who speak out against them, Chinese authorities continue to monitor activists and order them not to speak to the press.105 An illustrative case is the government's treatment of Dr. Jiang Yanyong. Authorities detained Jiang in June 2004, and although they released him the following month, for several months afterward officials prohibited him from speaking with reporters, traveling overseas, and attending activities at the invitation of foreign groups or individuals.106 During the visit of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the eighth European Union-China Summit in late August and early September 2005, Chinese authorities placed human rights activists Liu Xiaobo, Zhang Zuhua, Liu Di, and Hu Jia under 24-hour police surveillance107 and raided the offices of Chinese Rights Defenders, an informal grouping of activists and dissidents.108 Notes to Section III(e)¡ªFreedom of Expression1 See, e.g., Public Intellectuals in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 05, Written Statement submitted by Merle Goldman, Professor Emerita of Chinese History, Boston University and Executive Committee Member, Fairbank Center for East Asia Research, Harvard University: In fact, there has been a contraction of public space for political discourse since Jiang Zemin announced he would step down from his last position as head of the state military commission in the fall 2004 and Hu gained full power over the government. The Hu leadership has cracked down on a number of people who use the Internet or publish their own websites to discuss political issues. A number of cyber-dissidents have been imprisoned as a warning to others as to how far they can go in discussing political reforms on the Internet. Independent intellectuals who speak out on controversial issues have been briefly detained as well. 2 Cheng Yizhong, "Acceptance Speech by Laureate of UNESCO/Guillermo Cano, Cheng Yizhong: Hold on to Common Sense Amid Terror and Lies" [Cheng Yizhong huo shijie xinwen ziyou jiang daxieci: zai kongbu he huangyan zhong jianchi changshi], 28 April 05, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 29 April 05. 3 "How to Tightly Control Public Opinion, Increase Abilities to Guide Public Opinion" [Zenyang laolao bawo yulun daoxiang, zengqiang yindao yulun de benling], Xinhua (Online), 14 December 04. Much of the Party and government rhetoric and policymaking in this regard in the last year can be traced to a speech given by Liu Yunshan, member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, secretary of the Secretariat, and director of the Central Propaganda Department, on September 22, 2004, at the National Propaganda Directors Seminar, and subsequently published in the October 16 edition of Seeking Truth under the title "Earnestly Study and Implement the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee; Strive to Increase the Party's Ability to Lead Ideological Work" [Renzhen xuexi guanche shiliu jie si zhong quanhui jingshen; n¨¹li tigao dang lingdao yishi xingtai gongzuo de nengli]: In order to consolidate the guiding position of Marxism, it is necessary to ensure the leadership of the Party in ideological work. . . No matter what changes occur in the situation or the environment, there can be no change in the Party's control over ideology. It is necessary to insist on the principle that the Party controls the cadres, to strengthen the building of the leadership ranks in ideological agencies and work units, and to grasp the work and leadership of news publishing, radio and television, and the cultural arts and philosophical and social sciences firmly within the hands of those loyal to Marxism. It is necessary to establish an awareness that this is a battlefield, and that people have a responsibility for defending this territory. The thought and culture battlefield is the primary vehicle and dissemination channel of ideology, and if Marxist thought does not occupy it, then all kinds of non-Marxist, and even anti-Marxist, thought will occupy it. See also "Liu Yunshan: Deepen Education of 'Three Kinds of Study,' Enhance Skills to Guide Public Opinion" [Liu yunshan: shenhua sanxiang xuexi jiaoyu huodong, zengqiang yindao yulun benling], Xinhua, 26 December 04, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 26 December 04: "Liu Yunshan stressed: Party committees at all levels, especially the propaganda departments, should conscientiously strengthen and improve the Party's leadership over journalistic and propaganda work. . . ." 4 Ji Weimin, "Public Opinion Supervision: A Right? A Tool? A Duty? " [Yulun jiandu: Quanli? Gongju? Zeren?], Study Times, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 25 March 05. 5 "How to Tightly Control Public Opinion, Increase Abilities to Guide Public Opinion," Xinhua: In China, journalism constitutes one of the major parts of the Party's enterprises, the news media is the mouthpiece of the Party and the people, and must be under the leadership of the Party. In its thought, the news must take Marxism as its guide, must maintain a high degree of unanimity with the central Party with Comrade Hu Jintao as the Secretary; . . . in its organization it must insist on the Party's leadership of news work, ensure that leaders of news organizations at all levels firmly grasp in their hands loyalty to Marxism, and loyalty to the Party and the people. 6 See, e.g., Zhao Shi, "Establish Systematic Protections for the Good Image of the Media" [Shuli xinwen meiti lianghao xingxiang de zhidu baozheng], People's Daily, 8 April 05, 11. 7 Ling Yan, "The Essence of Western Freedom of Expression and the Mission of Our Country's Journalism" [Xifang xinwen ziyou de benzhi yu woguo xinwen shiye de shiming], Red Flag Manuscript, reprinted in People's Daily, 6 April 05, 9: For a long time, some comrades have had some incorrect areas in their ideology, owing to the fact that they either do not have a concept of the true meaning of press freedom, or they do not fully understand the way the news business operates in the world today. These incorrect areas manifest themselves in two main ways. The first way is to blindly worship Western press freedom, and always believe that the West is a press freedom paradise. The second way is to think that press freedom means you get to report whatever you want, and report any way you want, and to have a complete lack of restrictions on press freedom. See also Hou Jianmei, "Shedding Light on the Inside Story of the U.S. Government News Making" [Meiguo zhengfu paozhi xinwen neimu baoguang], Beijing Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 18 March 05; Qi Zijian, "The New York Times Reveals the Inside Story: U.S. Media Enjoys Freedom of Speech Like This" ["Niuyue shibao" jie neimu: mei meiti ruci xiangshou "xinwen ziyou"], Xinhua (Online), 22 March 05. 8 "Journalist Accreditation Cards: Legal Rights to Be Protected, Illegal and Unethical Behavior to Be Sanctioned" [Jizhezheng: hefa quanyi shoudao baohu, weigui weiji jiang bei zhongfa], Xinhua (Online), 16 February 05: "[N]ews reporters are a new force in the work of propagandizing public opinion, and all of their news gathering and editing activities relate to insisting on correct guidance of public opinion . . . and will always be the subject of high-level attention from the government and the Communist Party." See also Interim Rules for the Administration of Those Employed as News Reporting and Editing Personnel [Xinwen caibian renyuan guanli de guiding], issued 22 March 05, art. 2, requiring that journalists and editors "carry out China's foreign policies." 9 Commission Staff Interview. 10 "[Newspapers] shall not select articles that contradict the guiding policies of the Party and the nation." Notice Regarding Further Strengthening the Administration of Selection of Articles for Newspapers and Periodicals [Guanyu jiyibu jiaqiang baokan zhaizhuan gaojian guanli de tongzhi], issued 25 February 05, art. 1. Authorities describe this policy as public opinion "guidance," "steering," and "supervision." These are, however, different names for the same policy. Ji Weimin, "Public Opinion Supervision: A Right? A Tool? A Duty? ": In fact, currently public opinion supervision and media supervision are considered to be one and the same. . . While it is the media that acts as the critic in exercising the public opinion supervision function, the media's major critical reports must usually receive instructions or permission from their managing government agency, and public opinion supervision texts are generally perceived as being the opinion of a government or Party organization at one level or another. . . [P]ublic opinion supervision is an extension of, or supplement to, the authority of the Party and the government. See also "Right to Protect and Right to Benefit of Public Opinion Supervision" [Yulun jiandu zhuti de weiquan yu yongquan], China Journalist, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 16 September 04: "The implementation of proper supervision of public opinion must be carried out in a manner that benefits the Party's line, direction, and policies . . . and encourages the strengthening of the people's faith in the Party and the government." 11 Wang Xiaojie, "Confirming the Position of Party Papers, Expanding the Function of Party Papers" [Mingque dangbao dingwei, tuozhan dangbao gongneng], Journalistic Front, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 1 December 04: Regarding providing policy reference material to the Party and the government, the primary means is [for reporters] to go through media investigation and research in order to provide Party and government agencies with information they do not possess or are neglecting (and for that portion [of the information] that it is not convenient to make public, it can be provided in the form of internal reference). See also: Interim Rules on Chinese Communist Party Internal Supervision [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei jiandu tiaoli (shixing)], promulgated 17 February 04:"Under the leadership of the Party, the news media shall, in accordance with relevant regulations and procedures, utilize internal notices or public reports, and give free rein to functions of public opinion supervision." 12 For example, in June 2005, officials in a Zhejiang province township had banned the sale of the May edition of Rural Youth magazine because of an article criticizing local officials. The Sun newspaper of Hong Kong reported that Rural Youth's May edition included an article entitled "Treasuring the Land that We Rely Upon for our Existence" that revealed how officials in Shangyu municipality's Lihai township abused their authority to give away and sell state-owned land at low prices to commercial developers. Following the magazine's publication, no copies were available from magazine vendors, and a Shangyu government official said that subscribers did not receive their copies. " 'Rural Youth' Silenced for Exposing the Inside Story of Illegal Land Sales" ["Nongcun qingnian" yin jielu feifa shoudi neimu zao fengsha], Radio Free Asia (Online),22 July 05. Also in June, someone removed pages from its sister publication, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, that were distributed in the Da Gang township. The removed pages included an article that reported about people from Long Gu village in Da Gang petitioning for the return of land requisitioned by the township's real estate development company. " 'Southern Metropolitan Daily' Suspected of Being Maliciously Bought Up in Panyu Dagang, Two Sections Removed That Reported on Illegal Property Confiscations" ["Nanfang dushibao" zai panyu dagang yi zaoeyi shougou; baodao weigui zhengdi de liang ban be chouzou], Southern Daily (Online), 22 June 05. 13 "List of '50 Public Intellectuals Who Influence China' " ["Yingxiang zhongguo gonggong zhishi fenzi wushi ren" mingdan], Southern People Weekly, reprinted in Sohu (Online), 9 September 04; 'Who Are the 'Public Intellectuals' ? " [Shei shi gonggong zhishi fenzi?], Southern People Weekly, reprinted in Sohu (Online), 7 September 04. 14 Ji Fangping, "Seeing Through the Appearance To Perceive the Essence¡ªAn Analysis of the theory of 'Public Intellectuals' " [Touguo biaoxiang kan shizhi¡ªxi "gonggong zhishi fenzi" lun],Liberation Daily, 15 November 04, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 25 November 04, 9. 15 For more information on this campaign, see Public Intellectuals in China, Testimony and Written Statements of Perry Link, Professor of Chinese Language and Literature, Princeton University; Merle Goldman, Professor Emerita of Chinese History, Boston University and Executive Committee Member, Fairbank Center for East Asia Research, Harvard University; and Hu Ping, Chief Editor, Beijing Spring. 16 Joseph Kahn, "China Calls Off Rights Conference," New York Times (Online), 18 May 05. 17 Commission Staff Correspondence. 18 Jin Qiang, "Firmly Grasp the Initiative on Ideology Work" [Laolao zhangwo yishi xingtai gongzuo de zhudao quan], People's Daily, 23 November 04, 9. 19 Liu Yixing, "Zhu Hong of the State Administration of Radio Film and Television Interpreting the New Regulations on the Introduction of Foreign Television Programs" [Guojia guangdian zongju zhuhong jiedu dianshi yinjin yu hezuo xin guiding], China Radio Film ∓ Television, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 4 November 04, Zhu Hong, the head of China's State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, discussing the "Broadcast Administration Regulations on the Introduction of Foreign Television Programs." Foreign current event news programs cannot be introduced . . . news propaganda programs are the mouthpiece of the Communist Party and the government, and shoulder the responsibility of spreading the Party's voice to every household, and China's voice around the world. Therefore we must keep news and other programs that embody ideology firmly within our grasps. . . .Following [government] approval, foreign television programs may only be used as source materials, and cannot be broadcast in their entire, original condition. . . . [Broadcasters] should pay attention to the orientation of programs' general values, as well as their particulars, and filter out words and scenes that are not suited to China's situation . . . . 20 Yu Xiao, "Creating Strong Press on the Internet: There Is Politics on the Internet, There Is Competition on the Internet" [Yingzao wangshang yulun qiangshi: wangshang you zhengzhi, wangshang you jiaoliang], People's Daily, 8 December 04, 4: However, the Internet is not tranquil. . . . Both at home and abroad there are hostile influences and people with ulterior motives who are using the Internet to make us "divided" and "westernized." They disseminate fake information, spread reactionary speech, and even employ Internet writers to write about socially hot topics and sensitive news to fool Internet users and misguide public opinion. . . . If we do not move to capture the ideological battlefield, others will occupy it. See also Chen Kexiang, Xiang Keyuan, "Inhibiting the Negative Influences of 'Internet Emotional Public Opinions' " [Ezhi "wangluo qingxuxing yulun" fumian yingxiang], Guangming Net,19 April 05: [The Internet] has already become a means employed by enemy forces to carry out psychological warfare. Relevant information demonstrates that some enemy forces surreptitiously employ Internet experts and writers as "hired guns," inflame the emotions on the Internet, seduce some people who do not understand the situation into wrongdoing, spread negative emotions, all in order to give rise to social chaos and create social instability. See also Liu Yuzhu, "Actively Responding to the Challenge of the Internet Era" [Jiji yingdui wangluo shidai de tiaozhan], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 January 05: Western countries, headed by the United States, have occupied an advantageous position with respect to the spread of the Internet, and they dump on China massive amounts of information of all kinds, including their political models, value systems, and lifestyles, in order to oppose and edge out socialist values. In particular, the so-called religious culture and the culture which spreads pornography and violence are stealthfully influencing the audience's sentiment and value judgments. . . . [T]his kind of "cultural invasion" conducted via the Internet is extremely dangerous, as it threatens the independence and existence of the national culture, and even shakes the foundation of the nation and the state. In order to safeguard our cultural security, we must have a full understanding of, and actively prepare against, this. 21 Zhao Jie, "Do Not Vilify the Internet, It Is Necessary to Emphasize Forming Online Positive Public Opinion" [Bu yao yaomohua hulianwang, yao xingcheng wangshang zhengmian yulunde qiangshi], Wen Hui Bo, 12 November 04, reprinted in People's Daily, 6 December 04, 9. 22 "GAPP Book Office Responsible Person Work Report for Previous Year on National Book Publishing Administration Work" [Zongshu tushusi fuzeren tongbao qunian quanguo tushuchuban guanli gongzuo], Press and Publication (Bureau) of Guangdong Web site, 24 February 05; see also Yu Xiao, "Creating Strong Press on the Internet: There Is Politics on the Internet, There Is Competition on the Internet": "Just as we have taken the initiative to emphasize that the work of newspapers, television, and radio must have a firm grasp on propaganda ideology work, we must also build up the emphasis on Internet public opinion propaganda. . . ." 23 See, e.g., Cao Junwu, "Suqian: Leading Internet Public Opinion in Practice" [Suqian: yingdao wangluo yulun shijian], Southern Weekend, 19 May 05, 5; Chen Ming, Yang Guowei, and Chen Qiaoge, "Outlook Magazine: China's Internet Expression's Current Situation and Press Guidance" [Zhongguo wangluo yulun xianzhuang ji yulun yindao], Outlook, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 2 September 04; Zheng Baowei, "Grasp the Art of Mastering and Guiding Public Opinion: Raise the Quality of Responding to and Resolving Public Opinion Crises" [Zhangwo jiayu he yindao yulun de yishu, tigao yingdui he huajie yulun weiji de shuiping], Journalist Monthly (Online), 1 February 05. 24 Josephine Ma, "University Chat Room Shut Ahead of Meeting," South China Morning Post(Online) 16 September 04. 25 "News Black-Out on Death of Former Top Leader Zhao Ziyang," Radio Free Asia (Online),28 January 05. 26 "China Tightens Internet Security During Imminent Plenary NPC Meeting," Xinhua (Online), 1 March 05. 27 "Responding to Recent Protest Marches Regarding Japan in Some Places, Ministry of Public Security: Using Internet to Stir Up Protest Marches Forbidden" [Jiu jinqi yixie difang fasheng she ri youxing shiwei huodong, gonganbu: budei liyong wangluo gudong youxing shiwei], Xinhua, 21 April 05, reprinted in People's Daily, 22 April 05, 1. " 'Activists' Claim China Blocking Anti-Japan Websites for May Day Holidays" Agence France-Presse, 2 May 05 (FBIS, 2 May 05); Zheng Qian, "Professors and Mentors Participate in Discussions Online: Shanghai University BBSs Stop Illegal Rumors" [Jiaoshou, daoshi shangwang canyu taolun: Shanghai gaoxiao BBS dujue feifa chuanyan], Shanghai Evening Post (Online), 25 April 05; "Beijing Warns Off Protestors With SMS, Braces for May 4," Associated Press, 2 May 05, reprinted in Taipei Times (Online), 2 May 05. 28 "BBS Contents Illegal, Investigate Operator's Responsibility: Online Postings Need to be Examined Before Distributing" [BBS neirong weigui zhuijiu banzhu zeren: tiewen shangwang xu xianshen houfa], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 2 May 05. 29 In February 2005, SARFT issued a policy statement listing as one of its top 10 priorities for China's non-print media outlets for 2005: "Strengthen the capability and influence of radio, television, and film with respect to propagandizing abroad, and establish a positive perception of China abroad." "Radio and Television Propaganda Work Priorities for 2005," [2005 nian guangbo yingshi xuanchuan gongzuo yaodian], SARFT Web site, 22 February 05; Interim Implementation Rules for Administration of Those Employed as Radio and Television News Reporters and Editors [Guangbo yingshi xinwen caibian renyuan congye guanlide shishi fangan (shixing)], issued 1 April 05, art. 4 (requiring that journalists and editors "observe discipline with respect to propagandizing to foreigners, maintain a high degree of unanimity with the central government's line of action with respect to foreigners, and do not create any static or noise"); see also Lan Tianwei, "The Internet Has Become Our Country's Best Medium for Propagandizing Abroad" [Wanglu yijing chengwei woguo duiwai xuanchuan de zuijia meiti], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 10 November 04. 30 Liu Binjie, "Using Reform as the Motivator to Speed Up Development of Press and Publishing" [Yi gaige we dongli jiakuai xinenchubanye fazhan], China Youth Daily, reprinted in People's Daily (Online) 26 January 05: [T]here only remains the cultural arena where our influence is insufficient. . . . We only need to develop and strengthen our cultural products, increase our cultural competitiveness, and only then can we gain a foothold in the world's cultural market, only then will we be able to allow the world to understand China's culture, and bring into play our culture's influence on international society. 31 Declan McCullagh, "The UN Thinks About Tomorrow's Cyberspace," CNET Networks (Online), 29 March 05. 32 Han Yongjun, "Huang Chengqing: Registration Promotes the Administration of Internet Regulation" [Huang chengqing: beian cujin hulianwang guifan guanli], People's Post and Telecommunication Daily (Online), 1 June 05; see also Elliot Noss, "A Battle for the Soul of the Internet," CNET Networks (Online), 8 June 05. 33 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, art. 11. For example, Chinese authorities confiscated 906 books that Wang Yi had privately printed to give to friends. Wang, an author in China and member of the Independent Chinese PEN Center, filed an administrative appeal with the GAPP to have his right to self-publish respected, but the appeal was rejected. 34 "Vice Director of GAPP Liu Binjie: Firmly Ban Illegal Newspapers and Magazines" [Xinwen chuban zongshu fu shuzhang Liu Binjie: jianjue qudi feifa baokan], China Journalist Net, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 10 May 05. 35 For example, in August 2005, a court in Beijing sentenced the head of the Beijing representative office of a Hong Kong media group to three years imprisonment under Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law for publishing a magazine without a government issued serial number. Li Kui, "Printing and Publishing an Illegal Magazine; Media Group Chief Representative Sentenced to Three Years" [Yinshua chuban feifa qikan; chuanmei jituan shouxi daibiao huoxing 3 nian], Legal Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 11 August 05. Article 225 makes it a crime for anyone to commit "illegal acts in business operation and thus disrupt market order." 36 See, e.g., "Vice Director of GAPP Liu Binjie: Firmly Ban Illegal Newspapers and Magazines," China Journalist Net (calling on GAPP officials to "unceasingly improve our ability to use the law as a means to restrain illegal periodical publishing activities."); Liu Binjie, "Motivated by the Goal of Reform, Speed Up Development in the News Publishing Industry" [Yi gaige wei dongli jiakuai xinwen chubanye fazhan], Youth Journalist, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 26 January 05 ("With regards to marketized media, we must strengthen administrative legislating, and use the law to ensure that the guidance of public opinion and publishing direction are correct."). 37 Zhao Jie, "Do Not Vilify the Internet, It is Necessary to Emphasize Forming Online Positive Public Opinion," 9. 38 Li Liang and Yu Li, "14 Government and Party Agencies Unite to Purify the Internet" [14 buwei lianhe "jinghua" hulianwang], Southern Weekend (Online), 18 August 05. 39 "Realistically Improve Administration; Promote Administration in Accordance with the Law" [Qieshi gaijin guanli; tuijin yifa xingzheng], People's Daily, 21 June 05, 4. 40 Tim Johnson, "China Sees New Breed of Civil Activists Emerge," Knight Ridder, 4 October 04; Fu Qiang, "Nation's First Private Crime Reporting Web Site Existed Only 38 Days: Experts Discuss Three Big Questions" [Quanguo shouge minjian jubaowang jin cun 38 tian: zhuanjia tan san da zhiyi], China Economic Net (Online), 8 September 04. 41 Han Yongjun, "Hurry to Get an 'ID Card' for Your Web Site" [Kuai gei nide wangzhan ling "shenfenzheng"], People's Posts and Telecommunications News, reprinted in China Information Industry (Online), 1 June 05; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Feijingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu beian guanli banfa], issued 8 February 05. 42 "Beijing Public Security Office Demands Virus Web Sites and Medium and Small Web Sites Register With Their Local Offices" [Beijing gonganju yaoqiu bingdu wangzhan ji zhongxiao wangzhan dao shudi beian], Xinhua (Online), 2 June 05. 43 Li Liang and Yu Li, "14 Government and Party Agencies Unite to Purify the Internet." 44 "Major Deadline Arrives for Unregistered Domestic Web Sites; One Quarter Temporarily Shut Down" [Wei beian jingnei wangzhan daxian yizhi; 1/4 wangzhan zhanshi guanbi], Beijing Youth Daily (Online), 1 July 05; see also, "Operators Refuse to Implement Registration; Shandong Shuts Down 404 Internet Web Sites" [Ju bu fuxing beian yean; shandong guanbi 404 jia hulian wangzhan], Qilu Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 18 July 05. 45 "Xinhua Editorial: The Important Regulation Which Regulates the Behavior of Those Engaged in News Reporting and Editing" [Xinhua shiping: guifan xinwen caibian renyuan xingwei de zhongyao zhidu], Xinhua (Online), 22 March 05. 46 "Professional Ethical Standards for China Radio and Television Announcers and Hosts" [Zhongguo guangbo dianshi boyinyuan zhuchiren zhiye daode zhunze], issued 2 December 04; "Professional Ethical Standards for China Radio and Television Editors and Reporters" [Zhongguo guangbo dianshi bianji jizhe zhiye daode zhunze], issued 2 December 04. 47 Notice Regarding Strengthening the Supervision of Radio and Television Discussion Programs [Guanyu jiaqiang guangbo dianshi tanhualei jiemu guanlide tongzhi], issued 10 December 04. 48 Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards [Xinwen jizhezheng guanli banfa], issued 10 January 05; Measures for the Administration of News Bureaus [Baoshejizhezhan guanli banfa], issued 10 January 05. 49 Interim Rules Regarding the Administration of Those Engaged in News Reporting and Editing [Guanyu xinwen caibian renyuan congye guanli guiding], issued 22 March 05. According to one provincial Propaganda Department official, "the promulgation of the Rules makes public the Party's demands regarding news work and those engaged in news work, what news reporters and editors should do and should not do, and what methods and behaviors are incorrect. . . ." "Published Extracts of Speeches at the Forum of the Province's Primary News Work Units to Study the Implementation of the 'Regulations' " [Shengnei zhuyan xinwen danwei xuexi guanche "guiding" zuotanhui shangde fa yan zhaideng], Gansu Daily (Online), 9 May 05. 50 Interim Implementation Rules for Administration of Those Employed as Radio and Television News Reporters and Editors, art. 4. These rules also state: "With respect to reports on breaking events relating to minorities and minority areas, it is necessary to have a cautious grasp, and ask for instructions from the relevant government agency in a timely manner." See also State Administration of Radio Film and Television Printed and Distributed Notice Regarding Resolutely Strengthening and Improving Radio and Television Public Opinion Supervision Work [Guojia guangdian zongju yingfa guanyu qieshi jiaqiang he gaijin guangbo dianshi yulunjiandu gongzuo de yaoqiu de tongzhi], SARFT (Online), 10 May 05. 51 "General Office of the Communist Party Prohibits Inter-Regional Supervision by Domestic Mass Media" [Zhongban jin neidi chuanmei yidi jiandu], Ming Pao (Online), 13 June 05. 52 Nailene Chou Wiest, "Closing of Loopholes to Further Gag Media," South China Morning Post (Online), 11 June 05. 53 "Cleaning up and Reorganizing Newspaper Magazine Agencies and Reporter Stations Nationwide: 642 Shut Down and Had Licenses Removed" [Quanguo baokanshe jizhezhan qingli zhengdun: tingban zhuxiao 642 jia], Xinhua, 28 September 04, reprinted in People's Daily, 29 September 04, 10. 54 Yuan Xi, "2004 'Anti-Pornography and Anti-Illegal Publications': 200 Million Illegal Publications Confiscated" [2004 Nian "saohuang dafei": 2 yi jian feifa chubanwu bei shoujiao], People's Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 January 05. 55 See, e.g., "Make the Important Points Stand Out, Place Stress on Implementation, Earnestly Protect the Order of the Publication Market (Sichuan)" [Tuchu zhongdian, henzhualuoshi, qieshi weihu chubanwu shichang zhixu (Sichuan)], Sichuan Office on "Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications," 29 December 04, reprinted on National Working Group Office on "Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications" Web site, 29 December 04. 56 "2004 News Publishing Industry Development Report: Further Developing and Flourishing" [2004 nian xinwen chuban ye fazhan baogao: jin yibu fazhan fanrong], Xinhua, 30 January 05, reprinted in People's Daily, 1 February 05, 11. 57 "Eight Departments and Agencies: Maintain the Dignity of the Nation's Territory, Strengthen the Supervision of the Map Market" [Ba bumen: weihu guojia bantu zunyan, jiaqiang ditu shichang jianguan], Xinhua (Online), 27 April 05. 58 Qu Zhihong, "GAPP and Others Publicly Announced 60 Kinds of Illegal Periodicals" [Guojia xinwen chuban zongshu deng gongbu qudi 60 zhong feifa qikan], Xinhua, 28 April 05, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 28 April 05. 59 "Central Authorities Govern Newspapers and Magazines, the Leading Group Dispatched Supervision and Inspection Groups to Investigate 10 Jurisdictions' Newspaper and Magazines Control" [Zhongyang zhili baokan lingdao xiaozu pai jianchazu jiancha shi shengqu baokanzhili], China Journalism Review, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 29 March 04. 60 "China Banning Illegal Publications For Overhauling Publications Market, Official Says," Xinhua (Online), 14 May 05. 61 Qu Zhihong, "Various Illegal Foreign Newspapers and Magazines Will be Banned According to Law" [Duozhong weifa waiwen baokan jiang bei yifa chachu qudi], Xinhua (Online), 28 April 05. In July 2005, several Chinese government agencies issued a joint notice announcing the commencement of a campaign to "investigate, prosecute, and ban" unauthorized foreign language publications. "GAPP and Five Agencies Unite to Investigate, Sanction, and Shut Down Illegal Foreign Language Periodicals" [Xinwen chuban zongshu deng 5 bumen jiang lianhe chachu qudi feifa waiwen baokan], Xinhua (Online), 19 July 05. 62 For detailed information on the regulations governing book publishing, see China's Book Publishing Flowchart on the Commission's Web site. 63 "A New Basis for Book Recalls: Those with an Error Rate Greater Than 0.05 Percent Should Be Recalled Within 30 Days" [Tushu shouhui xin yiju: chacuol da wanfen zhi wu 30 tian nei shouhui], Beijing Star Daily, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 2 March 05. 64 See, e.g., Zhang Yonghua, Pan Hua, and Liu Jia, "Current Situation and Challenges for Foreign Media's Entry into Shanghai" [Jingwai meiti jinru: shanghai de xianzhuang yu tiaozhan], News Journalist, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 7 June 05: [A]dministrative rules regulate the entry and journalistic activities of foreign news agencies residing in China: an approval system is imposed on journalists assigned by foreign news agencies and their resident news bureaus; and when any resident news bureau or its personnel interviews a government bureau or other work unit, it must first apply for permission from the relevant foreign affairs agency. 65 "Hong Kong Reporters Detained in Beijing" [Xianggang jizhe zai Beijing bei koucha], Boxun (Online), 29 January 05; "Chinese Government Bans Two Canadian Journalists with Chinese-Language TV Station," Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 January 05; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, " 'Give Us All Your Notes and Pictures,' " South China Morning Post (Online), 17 April 05; Serena Fang, "Silenced," Frontline (Online), 17 January 05; Edward Lanfranco, "Hebei Incident Shows China's Dark Side," United Press International, reprinted in Washington Times (Online), 19 July 05. 66 "GAPP Book Office Responsible Person Work Report for Previous Year on National Book Publishing Administration Work" [Zongshu tushusi fuzeren tongbao qunian quanguo tushuchuban guanli gongzuo], Press and Publication (Bureau) of Guangdong Web site, 24 February 05. 67 Erik Eckholm, "Aide for Times Revealed Secrets, China Charges," New York Times (Online), 22 October 04; Human Rights in China Press Release, "Update on Zhao Yan Case," September 04. 68 Broadcast Administration Regulations on the Introduction of Foreign Television Programs[Jingwai dianshi yewu yinjin, bochu guanli banfa], issued 23 September 04, art. 15. 69 "Journalist Gets 10 Years in Jail for Leaking Top State Secrets," Xinhua (Online), 30 April 05. 70 Notice of Certain Decisions Regarding Non-Public Investment in Cultural Industries [Guanyu feigongyou ziben jinru wenhua chanyede ruogan jueding], issued 13 April 05; Rules on the Administration of Radio, Film, and Television System's Local Foreign Affairs Work [Guangbo yingshi xitong difang waishi gongzuo guanli guiding], issued 6 July 05; Regulations on the Administration of Commercial Performances [Yingyexing yanchu guanli tiaoli], issued 7 July 05; Measures Regarding Strengthening the Administration of the Importation of Cultural Products [Guanyu jiaqiang wenhua chanpin jinkou guanlide banfa] issued 3 August 05; Certain Opinions Regarding the Introduction of Foreign Investment into the Cultural Domain [Guanyu wenhua lingyu yinjin waizi de ruogan yijian], issued 4 August 05; Notice Regarding Further Strengthening the Administration of Radio and Television Channels [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang guangbo dianshi pindao guanlide tongzhi], issued 4 August 05. 71 "China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004," State Council Information Office White Paper, 13 April 05. 72 "45 Sino-Foreign Cooperative Projects on Periodicals Approved by the General Administration of Press and Publication" [45 ge zhongwai qikan hezuo xiangmu yi huo zongshu pizhun], Media Undo, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 8 September 04. 73 Liu Binjie, "Motivated by the Goal of Reform, Speed Up Development in the News Publishing Industry" [Yi gaige wei dongli jiakuai xinwen chubanye fazhan], Youth Journalist, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 26 January 05. 74 Geraldine Fabrikant, Keith Bradsher, "Media Executives Court China, But Still Run Into Obstacles," New York Times, 29 August 05, C1; Pietro Ventani, "Sex and the City (and China's Media Crackdown)," Asia Times (Online), 27 August 05; "Aiming at Virgin Investment Territory; A Roadmap of the Creative Ways that Foreign Companies Get Into China's Cultural Industry" [Miaoxiang ziben chunudi; waizi qiaoru zhongguo wenhua chanye luxiantu], International Finance News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 2 September 05. 75 "[I]t is necessary to clarify the goal of the reforms, and that is to establish within newspaper and periodical enterprises leadership by Communist Party committees, government administration, industry self discipline, and administrative management systems. . . ." Yang Chiyuan and Cha Guowei, "2005 Observation of Media Reform and Development: Meeting on Direction of Media Reform and Development Was Held, Experts Analyzed Reform Policies and Speculated Media Direction" [2005 chuanmaiye gaige yu fazhan gaoduan guancha: chuanmeiye gaige yufazhan zoushi yantaohui zhao kai, zhuanjia xuezhe jiexi gaige zhengce bamai chuanmei zoushi], Media, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 18 April 05. For example, in April 2005, the People's Daily reported that the GAPP had approved the establishment of China's first media organization using a shareholding system. The report stated the company would be "co-led" by a board of directors and a Communist Party committee. "Our Country's First News Organization With a Complete Stockholding System Established Today in Beijing" [Woguo shoujia zhengti shixinggufanzhi de xinwen jigou zai jing jiepai], People's Daily (Online), 19 April 05. 76 "GAPP: Private Book Companies Cannot Form Private Publishing Houses" [Chubanzongshu: minying shuye buke chengli minying chubanshe], China News Net, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 10 September 04. 77 Liu Binjie, "Motivated by the Goal of Reform, Speed Up Development in the News Publishing Industry": Regardless of how we go about reforming or what organization system we implement, we cannot allow any change in the correct guidance of public opinion. This relates to the problem of strengthening Marxist ideology, it relates to the problem of ensuring the dominant position of Marxist ideology, it relates to the problem of disseminating the Party's primary ideology. What we must first allow for is that we must insist that the Party's primary media remain state owned. 78 Antoaneta Bezlova, "Big Brother's Book Ban Blues," The Hong Kong Standard (Online), 31 May 05. 79 David Barboza, "Pushing (and Toeing) the Line in China," New York Times (Online), 18 April 05. 80 "China: Foreign Affairs Magazine Shuttered after Criticism of North Korea," Committee to Protect Journalists, 22 September 04. 81 "Editor Fired for Advocating China's Reform," United Press International, reprinted in Washington Times (Online), 26 October 04. Authorities later stripped Xiao of his seat on the Guangdong Political People's Consultative Conference. Leu Siew Ying, "Former Editor of 'Tong Zhou Gong Jin' Stripped of Political Post," South China Morning Post (Online), 16 March 05. 82 "Central Propaganda Department Criticized by Name, Beijing University Stopped Jiao Guobiao from Teaching" [Zhongxuanbu dianming piping, beida zanting Jiao Guobiao shouke], Sound of Hope Radio Network, reprinted in Dajiyuan (Online), 9 October 04; "China Fires Media Professor Who Called For Press Freedom," Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 March 05. 83 Philip P. Pan, "China Frees Pioneering Journalist," Washington Post, 28 August 04, A19. 84 "Lawyer for Several Journalists and Cyberdissidents Harassed and Facing a Professional Ban," Reporters Without Borders (Online), 4 March 05. 85 Joseph Kahn, "China Detains 3 Who Criticized Government," New York Times (Online), 14 December 04. 86 Hao Keyuan, "Twelve Big Changes in the Principles of Running a Newspaper" [Banbao linian de shier da bianhua], People's Daily (Online), 25 October 04. 87 Ibid.; see also Edward Cody, "Party Censors Leave Harbin to Speculate on Corruption Scandal," Washington Post, 1 November 04, A13: One stratagem, they said, is to turn off cell phones and tell their secretaries to inform callers the boss is out. Another is to keep a story quiet until 5 p.m., when most censorship bureaucrats leave for home, and then push it into the paper so the news is out by the time censors' advice notices are faxed over the next day. 88 Liu Yuzhu, "Positively Facing the Challenge of the Internet Age" [Jiji yingdui wangluo shidai de tiaozhan], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 January 05: "[W]e should strengthen supervision over telecommunications operators and Internet service providers, and request that they assume the responsibility of inspectors and supervisors. Relevant domestic Web sites should practice strict self-discipline, should not provide obscene and other illegal content, and regularly and timely remove harmful information posted by Internet users." 89 Zheng Qian, "Professors and Mentors Participate in Discussions Online: Shanghai University BBS Stop Illegal Rumors. 90 Charles Hutzler, "China Finds New Ways To Restrict Access To the Internet," Wall Street Journal, 1 September 04. 91 Zhang Song, "Underground Market Full of Chaos and Dishonesty, Why Is It Hard to Administer Private Satellite Installation Despite Existing Laws? " [Dixia shichang youluan youhei, sizhuang weixing dianshi weihe youfa nanzhi?], Economic Information Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 6 December 04. 92 "Foreign Newspapers Will Be Allowed to be Printed in China, Currently No One Has Formally Applied" [Waiguo baozhi jiang huozhun zai hua yinshua, muqian hai meiyou yijia tichu zhengshi shenqing], Beijing News, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 26 November 04. 93 Interim Regulations on the Administration of Sino-Foreign Joint and Cooperative Ventures in Radio and Television Program Production Operating Enterprises [Zhongwai hezi, hezuo guangbo dianshi jiemu zhizuo jingying qiye guanlin zhanxing guiding], issued 28 October 05, art. 12. 94 "New Regulations Surfaced: Foreign Invested Movie, Television, and Media Corporations Can Only Participate in Joint-Ventures" [Xin guiding chutai: waizi yingshi chuanmei zhineng kai yijia hezi gongsi], Shanghai Morning Post, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 7 March 05; Measures on the Administration of Foreign Satellite Television Channel Reception, issued 1 August 04, art. 12. 95 Liu Yuzhu, "Positively Facing the Challenge of the Internet Age" [Jiji yingdui wangluo shidai de tiaozhan], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 January 05. 96 "Internet Filtering in China in 2004¨C2005: A Country Study," OpenNet Initiative (Online), 14 April 05. 97 Xuan Zhaoqiang, "Monitoring and Controlling Internet Cafe Information at Anytime: 'Thousand-Mile-Eyes' System is Available for Jinan Internet Cafe Monitoring" [Suishi jiankong wangba xinxi: Jinan wangba jianguan youle "qianliyan"], Hua Dong News, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 24 January 05. 98 "Shuimu BBS Makes Adjustments to Become an Internal School BBS, Beijing University and Other Higher Education BBS Sites Have Also Already Made Adjustments" [Shuimu BBS tiaozheng wei xiaonei xing, beida deng gaoxiao BBS zhan ye yi tiaozheng], Beijing Times, reprinted in the People's Daily (Online), 19 March 05. 99 "Internet Cafes to Implement Fingerprint Recognition System: Effectively Prevent Underage Children From Entering Internet Cafes" [Wangba jiang tui zhiwen shibie: youxiao fangfan weichengnianren jin wangba], Xinhua (Online), 15 March 05. 100 Zhou Wei, Hu Jinwu, "How Can the Regulation of Internet Cafes Only Involve the Regulation of Cafes and Not the Internet? " [Wangba zhengzhi qineng zhiba bu zhiwang?], Xinhua (Online), 11 October 04. 101 "Information Supplied by Yahoo! Helped Journalist Shi Tao Get 10 Years in Prison," Reporters Without Borders (Online), 6 September 05. 102 Ching-Ching Ni, "Yahoo Accused of Aiding China in Arrest," Los Angeles Times (Online), 8 September 05. 103Shi Tao Written Judgment, Hunan Province Changsha Municipality Intermediate People's Court, Criminal Written Judgment, Changsha Intermediate Criminal Division One, Trial in First Instance Document Number 29 (2005), 27 April 05. 104 "In Imprisoning Journalists, Four Nations Stand Out," Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), 3 February 05. 105 Louise Arbour, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, arrived in Beijing on August 29, 2005 for an official visit. On that day, Chinese police raided the office of the Empowerment and Rights Institute, a legal and human rights advisory group in Beijing. The group's director, Hou Wenzhuo, said that the police came to her home as well, but did not arrest her. Kahn, "Beijing Police Raid Rights Group Office." Also on that day, Liu Xiaobo, president of the Independent Chinese PEN Center, wrote an article saying that since the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights arrived in Beijing, police had been deployed near his house, as well as near the houses of political theorist Zhang Zuhua and author Liu Di (also known as the "Stainless Steel Mouse"). "A High Level Human Rights Official Arrives, and the Police Once Again Take Up Their Posts" [Renquan gaoji guanyuan laile, jingcha you shanggangle], China Information Center Web site, 29 August 05. 106Benjamin Kang Lim, "China Frees SARS Hero," Reuters, 23 March 05; "Jiang Yanyong Still Under House Arrest After Being Released from Prison" [Jiang yanyong huoshi hou chuyu bei ruanjin zhuangtai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 October 04. 107"Chinese Police Beat Up AIDS Activist During UN Rights Visit," Radio Free Asia (Online), 31 August 05. 108Joseph Kahn, "Beijing Police Raid Rights Group Office," New York Times, 30 August 05, A9.
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