V. Development of Rule of Law and the Institutions of Democratic Governance

V(d) DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Introduction | Village/Residents' Committee Elections | Local People's Congresses | Selection of Local Party and Government Officials

FINDINGS

• China has an authoritarian political system controlled by the Communist Party. Party organizations formulate all major state policies before the government implements them. The Party dominates Chinese legislative bodies such as the National People's Congress and fills important government positions at all levels by an internal selection process. China lacks meaningful elections for significant political positions.
• Chinese authorities have introduced limited elements of political participation at the lowest levels of government to enhance their ability to govern. These elements include direct elections for village and residents committees, local people's congress elections, and some popular input into the selection of low-level government and Party officials. The Party controls these selection and electoral processes by screening, and often selecting, the candidates.
• Chinese citizens are attempting to use the limited political space created by official reforms to protect their rights and interests, but Party officials and local governments often suppress these efforts, leading to social unrest.

Introduction

Since the 1980s, Chinese leaders have introduced and pursued limited policies to encourage popular participation in local political institutions. These include village and residents' committees (VCs, RCs), local people's congresses (LPCs), and various systems allowing some popular input into the selection of lower-level government and Party officials. Chinese leaders introduced these reforms to enhance the Party's ability to govern, limit the power of individual cadres, and improve China's international image, among other policy goals.¹ Such reforms partially check the behavior of local officials, since they must consider public opinion in addition to the demands of their superiors.²

The Party has refused, however, to compromise the principle of Party control over all key political institutions and policies. Central authorities also suppress local reforms that cross boundaries that they have set, such as direct popular elections for township government leaders.³⁹ Party officials channel political participation into outlets that the Party can monitor and control.⁴ Without free and open public participation, implementation of certain reforms remains piecemeal and pro forma.⁵

The Party has initiated these political reforms to strengthen Party rule by co-opting popular political participation, rather than pursuing it as an independent good. The official communique´ of the Communist Party's 4th Plenum in September 2004 emphasized this goal, stating that the Party should:

continue to enforce and improve the existing practices of democratic recommendation and democratic evaluation of officials, multi-candidate competitive selections for official posts, opinion solicitation prior to appointment of new officials, and voting by all members of a Party committee (rather than arbitrary decisionmaking by committee heads).⁶

The focus on recommendation rather than nomination, selection rather than election, and decisionmaking by all members of a Party committee, rather than by representative vote, indicates the Party's intent to use popular participation as a utilitarian tool of governance, rather than as a stepping stone to representative democracy.⁷

The impact of political reforms at the local level has been limited. In some cases, reforms have produced competitive elections for local office and have exposed citizens to electoral processes.⁸ Reforms have also created limited public forums for local residents to challenge some local government actions⁹ and created popular expectations for changes in other areas, such as cadre recruitment.¹⁰ Limited public participation and continued tight Party control, however, generate problems and conflict in the Chinese political system.¹¹ Organizations having some popular legitimacy, such as directly elected village committees, frequently clash with Party officials and higher-level governments.¹² In September 2005, township authorities suppressed a popularly elected recall committee in Taishi village, Guangdong province, that was part of a citizen effort to use national election laws to remove the village committee head.¹³ Without independent political organizations or open campaigning, some candidates rely on clan ties to win elections.¹⁴ The refusal of central officials to allow meaningful citizen political participation above the lowest levels of the political system blocks the expansion of political freedom while generating internal tensions.

Village/Residents' Committee Elections

The Chinese government has attempted to reinvigorate local governance by supporting the direct election of VCs since the 1980s and urban RCs since the 1990s.¹⁵ After local experiments with VC elections in the early 1980s, the central government formally approved them in a 1987 experimental law.¹⁶ With support from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) officials and grassroots efforts by rural residents, direct VC elections spread nationally during the 1990s.¹⁷ Since 1998, national law has required direct elections to select VC members, although this requirement has not been implemented everywhere.¹⁸ Urban RC elections only developed recently, despite prior 1989 legislation permitting local experiments in direct RC elections. In 1999, MOCA organized a pilot project for holding direct RC elections in 12 selected cities.¹⁹ The reform has been extended and major urban centers such as Beijing and Shanghai have held direct RC elections.²⁰ Guangxi province adopted a province-wide requirement for direct RC elections in 2002.²¹

VC and RC elections remain subject to Party and government controls. Party authorities and township governments control electoral procedures by using county election leadership groups and village election commissions to supervise election proceedings, certify lists of candidates, and approve the results.²² Election committee members often are designated by existing village committee heads or appointed by township governments. Heads of village election committees generally must be Party members.²³ According to one study of local elections in Jilin province, 66 percent of officials surveyed said that the village Party secretary himself headed their local election committee.²⁴ As one Chinese scholar noted, this "Party-controlled system not only facilitates the intervention of the village Party secretary in the electoral process, but it also suppresses the inclination of villagers to actively participate in the elections."²⁵

Structural problems continue to limit both the fairness of VC and RC elections and the independence of these institutions. Migrants often remain excluded from local elections, particularly where the allocation of local land rights is at stake.²⁶ Regulations limit the ability of candidates to conduct many campaign activities.²⁷ Despite MOCA efforts to limit their use, proxy voting and floating ballot boxes call into question the fairness of many VC and RC elections.²⁸ As MOCA officials acknowledge, current law does little to protect the electoral rights of Chinese citizens.²⁹ Many local governments delegate administrative tasks to VCs and RCs and control them by fiat.³⁰

Central authorities have not permitted direct elections beyond local levels in order to prevent any challenge to Party control. In 2000, central government officials suppressed efforts in Sichuan province to organize direct elections for a township government, which is one level above the village level.³¹ Unlike the 1990s, when they actively supported VC elections, MOCA officials currently appear less inclined to support expansion of urban RC elections. MOCA officials say that only 10 percent of all RCs nationwide are currently chosen through direct elections, and expanding that percentage will depend on the interest of local authorities.³² Some local governments have made RC elections a long-term priority. According to the five-year development plan issued by the Shenzhen government in February 2005, at least 70 percent of municipal RCs are to be chosen through direct election by 2010.³³

Despite these limitations, some Chinese officials are working to ensure a degree of transparency and openness in VC and RC elections. One study conducted in Fujian province found that village representative assemblies controlled selection of the electoral commission in 75.6 percent of the villages surveyed.³⁴ Nationally, MOCA officials are seeking revisions to existing laws governing RCs and VCs and have hosted hearings calling for greater RC and VC independence. MOCA officials also advocate greater flexibility for candidates to campaign for office.³⁵

Local People's Congresses

The authority of local people's congresses (LPCs), the legislative branch of local government, has grown since the early 1990s, in part as a result of Party decisions to enlarge their role. LPCs have also expanded their power by exercising their right to supervise and review the actions of local governments and courts.³⁶ LPCs appraise and criticize local officials, require government agencies to respond to requests for information, and form special commissions to investigate issues of public concern.³⁷ LPCs also increasingly use public hearings (codified under the 2000 Legislation Law) as a means to solicit public views on pending legislation.³⁸

Although relatively more powerful than in the past, LPCs remain handicapped by infrequent meetings, biases against rural and migrant populations, a lack of resources, and continuing Party control over important decisions.³⁹ County and township LPC delegates serve five-year terms but meet in annual plenary sessions lasting only a few days.⁴⁰ Real LPC authority resides in two leadership groups, the standing committee and the presidium.⁴¹ Membership in both of these groups is tightly controlled. For example, previous LPC leaders generally select LPC presidium members in advance and vet their choices with local Party authorities.⁴² LPC membership discriminates against migrants and rural residents. Under national law, rural LPC deputies represent four times as many constituents as their urban counterparts.⁴³ Voter registration requirements often inhibit migrants from voting in their places of actual residence, although some localities have undertaken initiatives to reduce these barriers.⁴⁴

The government and Party have ensured that LPCs do not develop into fully representative legislative bodies. Township LPCs have been directly elected since 1953, and county LPCs since 1979, but these elections remain subject to regulatory controls and direct Party interference. Party leaders see electoral reform as a threat to their control. For example, during a brief flirtation with political reform in 1979–80, authorities relaxed LPC election rules to allow a degree of competition and campaigning.⁴⁵ In the ensuing 1980 elections, student and democracy activists used this leeway to debate political issues and challenge government authority. Chinese authorities responded with a general crackdown on elections and adopted restrictive amendments to relevant laws that removed the competitive, democratic elements from LPC elections.⁴⁶

Officials employ a variety of techniques to limit the democratic nature of LPC elections. Election laws allow the Party and the mass organizations that it controls to submit lists of approved cadres for LPC positions.⁴⁷ While election laws permit groups of 10 or more voters to nominate LPC candidates, nomination procedures often raise obstacles to independent candidates, thus ensuring that only Party-nominated candidates survive the nomination process and reach the election.⁴⁸ Election regulations impose very short deadlines for holding elections. Official candidate lists need only be released five days before the election,⁴⁹ limiting a candidate's opportunity to campaign for voter support. Practices commonly associated with election fraud, such as the use of floating ballot boxes and proxy voting, plague many LPC elections.⁵⁰

Party officials use local election committees to maintain direct control over LPC elections. Formalized in a 1983 NPC directive, but never incorporated into national election laws, election committees determine voter eligibility, issue candidate lists, conduct elections, and report the results.⁵¹ Party-led county election leadership groups direct local election committees⁵² and are headed by township Party secretaries. Election committee members are often themselves candidates for LPC seats.⁵³ Thus, election committees often have an interest in limiting competition and in assuring that LPCs remain relatively passive. Rules granting election committees nearly unlimited discretion in how to select final candidates facilitate this result.⁵⁴ Election committees often resort to screening processes that are neither transparent nor democratic to narrow the candidate field to an acceptable few.⁵⁵ As the NPC Legal Affairs Office has noted, these procedures "easily lead in practice to behind-the-scenes manipulation of elections."⁵⁶ Chinese scholars have criticized such practices, noting that "[c]ontrols and limitations on LPC candidate nominations ensure that individuals nominated by LPC presidiums win, and that candidates nominated by the Party win. Organizational tactics and outright illegal conduct in handling LPC candidate nominations have in practice meant that many township LPC elections lack any democratic nature. . . ."⁵⁷

The practices used to elect LPC members discriminate against individuals who run as independent candidates. During the 2003 Beijing district LPC elections, for example, 23 independent candidates attempted to run under the independent nomination procedure.⁵⁸ These candidates included scholars and activists who had gained notoriety for their challenges to government policies.⁵⁹ Only two were actually elected.⁶⁰ Government restrictions prevented candidates from independently making public speeches and meeting the voters.⁶¹ Local electoral commissions used designated groups of voters to screen potential candidates, preventing many independent candidates from appearing on the ballot.⁶²

In October 2004, the NPC amended the LPC election law, introducing several minor reforms.⁶³ The amended law expressly allows electoral commissions to use primary elections to narrow the candidate list.⁶⁴ The amended law also permits the electoral commission itself to organize public events to allow the candidates to respond to questions from the public.⁶⁵ These reforms create a vaguely defined zone of authorized political participation in LPC elections that future reformers might use to press for greater accountability. Both reforms resulted from pressure by local activists in the 2003 LPC elections.⁶⁶

Despite these positive changes, the 2004 amendments represent only a small step towards making China's LPC elections more competitive and democratic. The reforms merely reintroduce electoral processes, such as limited campaign events and open primaries, that Chinese authorities had abolished after the 1980 elections discussed above. Moreover, many provincial regulations already permitted these electoral processes.⁶⁷ The reforms do not address the deeper structural problems of continued Party domination of LPC electoral systems, such as Party control of nomination procedures and electoral commission discretion over candidate lists.⁶⁸

Selection of Local Party and Government Officials

Party organizations use internal elections to fill leadership positions. Local Party committees must submit proposed lists of candidates to higher authorities for clearance before holding such elections. Candidates must undergo background checks for political reliability. Party authorities frequently convene small groups of Party members in advance to elicit their views about candidates, using this information to narrow the candidate list. This process ensures that the election is merely a ratification of the Party leadership's choices.⁶⁹

Since the early 1990s, many Chinese localities have experimented with more open forms of Party elections.⁷⁰ One system in wide use for selecting village Party secretaries is an open primary system in which both Party and non-Party members are allowed to nominate candidates. Voting in the Party election, however, is limited to Party members alone.⁷¹ A 2004 experiment in Sichuan province relied on a weighted election to generate two final candidates for village Party secretary. The votes of local Party members counted for 50 percent of the total, local officials for 25 percent, and other citizens in the village for the remaining 25 percent. Village Party members then selected the ultimate winner.⁷²

In recent years, other localities have adopted similar techniques for the selection of low-level government officials.⁷³ Despite official claims to the contrary, their actual democratic nature remains limited. Officials retain the power to decide the final outcome. For example, in 2004, Jiangsu province chose 295 officials, ranging from county government heads to the deputy chief of the provincial development commission, through a "public nomination/public selection" procedure. Actual public participation included only passive observation of candidate speeches and minimal input by chosen officials and citizens into the selection process.⁷⁴

These reforms are an effort to improve the Party's governance of society by permitting limited public participation and do not indicate an underlying commitment to democracy. As one Chinese commentator noted, "these reforms are an improvement, but remain but a transitional mechanism. [They] are not actually a reform of the political system, but merely an internal, technical adjustment of the system of cadre management."⁷⁵

Notes to Section V(d)—Democratic Governance and Legislative Reform

1 Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China" in Elections and Democracy in Greater China, eds. Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 104–6, 109–10, 119– 20, 124–5.

2 Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections—Research on the System of Township LPC Elections" [Gongxuan yu zhixuan—xiangzhen renda xuanju zhidu yanjiu], (Beijing: China Social Science Publishing Press, 2000), 301–2.

3 John Pomfret, "Taking on the Party in Rural China: Reformer Risks Livelihood for Direct Elections," Washington Post (Online), 27 September 03.

4 Directly elected village committees, for example, remain heavily controlled by Party organizations. One Fujian survey revealed that 66 percent of village committee heads are party members, while 55 percent of village committee members are. Wu Miao, "A Quantitative Analysis of the Quality of Village Committee Elections" [Cunweihui xuanju zhiliang de lianghua fenxi], in Silent Revolution [Wusheng de geming], ed. Yawei Liu (Xi'an: Northwest University Press, 2002), 114–5.

5 Shi Yonghong, "Some Jiangsu Bureaus Heavily Engage in 'Advertising Their Accomplishments' " [Jiangsu bufen danwei da da "zhengji guanggao"], Beijing News (Online), 15 December 04.

6 CCP Central Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening the Party's Construction and Ability to Rule [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding], issued 19 September 04.

7 For a different translation of the above quote which makes the point in a slightly different fashion, see China's State Control Mechanisms and Methods, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 14 April 05, Written Statement submitted by Richard Baum, Director of the UCLA Center for Chinese Studies.

8 Village Elections in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 July 02, Written Statement submitted by Yawei Liu, Associate Director, The Carter Center's China Village Elections Project; International Republican Institute, Village Elections in China: Progress, Problems and Prospects, January 2001.

9 Li Lianjiang, "The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China," 43 Asian Survey 648 (2003); "Elections and Popular Resistance in Rural China," 16 China Information 89 (2002).

10 Xiang Jiquan, "The Practical Basis and Effects of China's Village Autonomy" [Zhongguo cunmin zizhi de shijian jichu he chengxiao], in Silent Revolution, 312–3.

11 In addition to the examples discussed in the text, continued reliance of village officials on higher-level discretionary funding, mixed with heightened village autonomy, often leads to greater financial mismanagement. Lily Tsai, "The Dangers of Decentralization: Fiscal Mismanagement and Informal Institutions in Rural China," 3 April 05, 1 (draft manuscript on file with the Commission).

12 Edward Cody, "An Unusual Sort of Democracy: Allegations of Party Vote-Buying Surround Village Election in China," Washington Post (Online), 20 June 05; John Ruwitch, "People Clash With Party in China Village Poll," Reuters (Online), 7 June 05.

13 Chairman of the Taishi Village Impeachment Committee Has Resigned," [Taishi cun bamian weiyuanhui zhuren cizhi], Radio Free Asia, 20 September 05.

14 See, e.g., Wang Haiyan, "Her Election and His Defeat" [Ta de dangxuan yu ta de luoxuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 17 December 03; Robert L. Moore, "Don't Count Out China's Communists, Despite Village Elections, Party Maintains Power," Orlando Sentinel (Online), 27 June 05.

15 Village and residents committees (VCs and RCs) are the lowest level of governance in Chinese rural and urban areas, underneath township (xiang/zhen) or street committees (jiedaochu). VCs and RCs serve as tools of top-down social control. They keep tabs on local residents, provide information to local police, and monitor compliance with government policies such as birth control and taxation requirements. However, VCs and RCs also operate as community institutions addressing local needs. They provide basic social services, mediate civil disputes, and offer a forum for residents to address local problems. Anne Thurston, United State Institute for Peace, "Muddling Toward Democracy, Political Change in Grassroots China," August 98, 18; Allan Choate, The Asia Foundation, "Local Governance in China, Part II, An Assessment of Urban Residents Committees and Municipal Community Development," November 1998, 8–9, 16–25. Chinese authorities began to experiment with VC and RC elections as a means to address governance challenges posed by social and economic changes in the 1980s and 1990s. See O'Brien and Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State," 104–6, 109–10; Li Fan, "The Launch of Reforms for Direct Elections of Chinese Urban Community Residents' Committees" [Zhongguo chengshi shequ juweihui zhijie xuanju gaige de qidong: 1998–2003] in Electoral Reform of Urban Community in China [Zhongguo chengshi shequ zhijie xuanju], ed. Li Fan, (Xi'an: Northwest University Press, 2003), 7–8.

16 PRC Organic Law on Village Committees (Trial), enacted 24 November 87, art. 9

17 O'Brien and Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State," 111–20.

18 PRC Organic Law on Village Committees, enacted 4 November 98, art. 11; Village Democracy in China, Staff Roundtable of Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Written Statement of Anne Thurston, Associate Professor of China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies; O'Brien and Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State," 120–2.

19 Li Fan, "The Launch of Reforms for Direct Elections of Chinese Urban Community Residents' Committees," 10–1.

20 Ibid., 12, 16–21; Fu Jianfeng, "Direct Elections for Urban Residents Committees: Ningbo Style" [Chengshi shequ zhixuan de ningbo moshi], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 5 December 03.

21 Li Fan, "The Launch of Reforms for Direct Elections of Chinese Urban Community Residents' Committees," 13.

22 County election leadership groups supervise village election work. They are comprised of county-level party, LPC, and government officials. MOCA officials are participants, but not heads, of these groups. Shanxi Provincial Civil Affairs Bureau Notice Regarding the Issuance of the "Shanxi Provincial Village Committee Election Rules" (Trial) [Shanxi sheng minzhengting guanyu yinfa "shanxisheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju guicheng (shixing)" de tongzhi], issued 10 October 99, chapter 1, art. 2(2). 2005 Shanxi provincial regulations state that MOCA officials should "guide" (zhidao) the election process, but that local Party organizations should play the "core leadership role" (lingdao hexin zuoyong). Shanxi Provincial Village Election Rules (Shanxi zheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], issued 29 July 05, arts. 6, 8.

23 Shanxi rules provide that outgoing village committee heads are generally responsible for nominating the heads of village election committees. If the former head is unable to serve, the township government is responsible for selecting the person who will head the nomination process for village election committee heads. The rules also provide that the head of the village election committee should be the village party secretary or other party member with a high degree of local respect. Ibid., chap. 1, art. 2(3).

24 Sun Long and Tong Zhihui, "Procedural Guidance and the Regularization of Village Committee Elections" [Chengxu yindao yu cunweihui xuanju de guifanhua], in Silent Revolution, 75. Another Chinese scholar notes, "[T]here is almost an unwritten rule that not only is the head of the election committee the village party secretary, but village party members serve as a matter of course as members of the election commission. . . ." Wu Miao, "A Quantitative Analysis of the Quality of Village Committee Elections," 121.

25 Wu Miao, "A Quantitative Analysis of the Quality of Village Committee Elections," 121. As one Chinese academic noted, "Experience reveals that pursuing democratic supervision . . . without democratic [VC and RC] elections results in a number of problems. Under this system, the "democracy" experienced by residents is an incomplete, passive democracy . . . . While it may appear on the surface that there are reforms, the active participation of residents can't be achieved. . . ." largely because residents can sense the uselessness of elections. Li Fan, "The Launch of Reforms for Direct Elections of Chinese Urban Community Residents' Committees," 37.

26 Some local municipal regulations permit migrants lacking local hukou to register to vote in RC elections. Beijing Municipal Residence Committee Election Measures [Beijing shi jumin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], issued 26 April 00, art. 12. Some draft amendments to national laws governing RC elections would extend voting rights to individuals lacking a local hukou, but possessing a fixed place of abode in municipal areas. Others would limit the franchise based on hukou identification alone. Lai Haoning, "Outsiders Should Receive The Right to Participate in Residents Committees Elections" [Wailai ren ying huo juweihui canxuan zige], Beijing News (Online), 18 December 04. Foreign observers have noted resistance of local residents to enfranchising migrants and allowing them to participate in decisions regarding the allocation of revenues generated by collectively owned land. International Republican Institute, Election Observation Report—Fujian Province, May 2003, 14–5.

27 See, e.g., Zhejiang Provincial Village Committee Election Measures [Zhejiang sheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], issued 22 October 99, amended 17 September 04, art. 22 (charging the village electoral commission with organizing campaign speeches, and requiring candidates wishing to make public speeches to request permission of the electoral commission). Observers have recommended allowing more campaigning for VC and RC elections. International Republican Institute, Election Observation Report—Fujian Province, 3.

28 MOCA Notice Regarding Carrying Out the Work of 2005 Village Committee Elections [Minzheng bu guanyu zuohao 2005 nian cunweihui huanjie xuanju gongzou de tongzhi], issued 18 January 05, art. 3; Zhejiang Provincial Village Committee Election Measures, art. 23–4.

29 Liu Weitao, "China's Village Committees Will Generally Hold Direct Elections This Year, MOCA Officials Explain" [Woguo cunweihui jinnian pupian shixing zhixuan minzhengbu jiedu], People's Daily (Online), reprinted on the Ministry of Justice Web site (Online), 31 January 05.

30 See, e.g., Wang Yijun, "Overloaded With Responsibilities, Unclear Powers, Organic Law of Residents Committees Will Be Amended" [Zhineng chaozai zhiquan youxian, chengshi juweihui zuzhifa xiuding], Ministry of Justice Web site (Online), 28 January 05.

31 Linda Jakobsen, "Local Governance: Village and Township Direct Elections," in Governance in China, ed. Jude Howell (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 108–10. Other localities have experimented with forms of electoral participation in the selection of township officials, although the extent of citizen participation in these has been carefully controlled. Ibid., 110–3.

32 "Transcript of MOCA Basic-Level Governance and Community Development Bureau Chief Zhang Chengfu Online Discussion With Citizens" [Minzheng bu jiceng zhengquan he shequ jianshe si sizhang Zhang Chengfu yu wangyou zai xian jiaoliu shilu], Ministry of Civil Affairs (Online), 14 January 2005.

33 Notice of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee and Shenzhen Municipal People's Government Regarding the Issuance of "2005–2010 Plan for Shenzhen Municipal Community Construction" [Zhonggong shenzhen shiwei, shenzhen renmin zhengfu guanyu yinfa "Shenzhen shi shequ jianshe faguihua gangyao 2005–2010 nian" de tongzhi], Shenzhen Municipal Government (Online), issued 18 February 05, art. 4(3)(1).

34 Wu Miao, "A Quantitative Analysis of the Quality of Village Committee Elections," 103–4.

35 Liu Weitao, "MOCA: Election Activities Which Have Not Been Expressly Prohibited By Law Do Not Necessarily Constitute Electoral Corruption" [Minzheng bu: fal wei mingque jinzhi de xingwei bushu huixuan], People's Daily (Online) 26 January 05.

36 Young Nam Cho, "Symbiotic Neighbor or Extra-Court Judge? " 176 China Quarterly 1068, 1070–73 (2003). This expanded activism is sometimes a mixed blessing. LPCs often use their power of review to interfere in the decisions of the institutionally weaker courts (via the process of individual case supervision), rather than challenge those of politically more powerful local governments. Ibid.; see also CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 81.

37 Young Nam Cho, "From 'Rubber Stamps' to 'Iron Stamps': The Emergence of Chinese Local People's Congresses as Supervisory Powerhouses," 171 China Quarterly 724, 731–37 (2002).

38 Hearings are expressly authorized under article 34 of the PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00. According to statistics provided by one Chinese scholar, from 2000 to 2004, 24 provincial LPCs held 38 hearings regarding legislation. Cai Dingjian, "The Current State of Legislative Hearings and Proposals For Improvement" [Lifa tingzheng de xianzhuang ji gaijin yijian], Legal Daily (Online), 4 May 05. On September 27, 2005, the National People's Congress (NPC) held its first public legislative hearing on a draft amendment to raise the minimum taxable income. Authorities chose 20 participants (including both academics and migrant workers) from nearly 5,000 applicants. Cary Huang, "A Small Step Toward Transparent Lawmaking." South China Morning Post (Online), 28 September 05.

39 Young Nam Cho, "From 'Rubber Stamps' to 'Iron Stamps,' " 735–9.

40 Ibid. Prior to 2004, township elections were on a three-year cycle, while county elections operated on a five-year cycle. Zhao Lei and Meng Nuo, "NPC Standing Committee Passes Amendments to Election and Organic Laws" [Quanguo renda changweihui tongguo xuanjufa he defang zuzhifa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua, reprinted in Red Net (Online), 27 October 04.

41 Standing committees conduct LPC work when the LPC is not in plenary session. Presidiums control the operating of the LPC when it is in plenary session. Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 303. LPC standing committees also meet relatively infrequently, in bimonthly sessions of only one or two days each. Young Nam Cho, "From 'Rubber Stamps' to 'Iron Stamps,' " 735–9.

42 Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 303.

43 PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, amended 2 December 86, amended 28 February 95, amended 27 October 04, art. 12.

44 As one Chinese scholar has pointed out, local requirements that migrants must return to their place of hukou registration to obtain voter registration authorization often deters migrants from voting in local elections. Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 154. This is exacerbated by relatively short deadlines for voter registration. For one recent local initiative to protect migrant voting rights, see Amendment to the Implementing Regulations for Beijing City District, County, Township, National Minority Township, and Town LPC Elections [Beijing shi qu, xian, xiang, minzuxiang, zhen renmin daibiao dahui daibiao xuanju shishi xize de xiuzheng'an], issued 5 September 03. Note that at least one recent set of provincial regulations has taken a particularly liberal stance, allowing migrant voters to register to vote in their place of residence upon merely presenting their identity card. Decision of the Anhui Provincial LPC Standing Committee on amending the "Anhui Provincial LPC Election Implementing Regulations" [Anhui sheng renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai "Anhui sheng geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju xize" de jueding], issued 21 April 05, art. 25.

45 Specific changes included: (1) charging LPC standing committees with the responsibility for supervising LPC elections at the county level and higher (previous law had made local governments responsible for supervising such LPC elections, and this change made LPCs somewhat more independent of local government influence); (2) allowing more open nominations, from groups of individuals rather than simply parties and mass organizations; (3) expressly permitting the use of primary elections (yuxuan) as a means to narrow the candidate list; and (4) allowing a degree of freedom for "parties, organizations, and voters" to engage in campaigning. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, arts. 7, 26, 28, 30.

46 See generally Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 193–223. Specific legal changes made in the 1980s to reduce the competitive nature of LPC elections included (1) removing language permitting the use of primaries (yuxuan) to narrow the candidate list, and (2) removing language allowing independent campaign activities. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, as amended 2 December 86, arts. 28 and 30; see also Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 42–9.

47 PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, art. 29.

48 Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 311–7. Election laws restrict the number of total candidates who may appear on the ballot, frequently leading to the elimination of independent candidates. Chinese observers have noted numerous methods by which independent LPC candidates are effectively blocked from competing in LPC elections. These include: 1) limiting the number of independent candidates; 2) imposing short time limitations for nominations (such as a single day); and 3) simply disallowing independently nominated candidates from being placed on the ballot. Ibid., 316.

49 PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, art. 31. Even preliminary candidate lists need be released only 15 days prior to elections.

50 Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 460–1.

51 Relevant Decisions of the NPC Standing Committee Regarding Direct LPC Elections at the County Level and Lower [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xianjiyixia renmin daibiao dahui daibiao zhijie xuanju de ruogan guiding], issued 5 March 83, art. 2.

52 Ibid., art. 1. Chinese authorities have strengthened county control over township elections since the original 1983 regulations. The original regulations merely charged county election committees with the responsibility of "supervising" (zhidao) the work of township-level election committees. Ibid., art. 2. 1986 amendments to the NPC and LPC electoral law changed this relationship, charging county election committees with the responsibility of formally directing the work (lingdao) of local LPC elections, and provincial LPC standing committees with that of supervising (zhidao) township and county LPC elections. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, as amended 2 December 86, art. 7. County-level election leadership groups are the instrument by which county governments carry out this direction, as well as the tool by which county Party organizations organize and monitor lower-level LPC elections. Shi Weimin, Open and Direct Elections, 108–12.

53 One late 1990s study of rural LPC elections found that in nearly every single county surveyed, the local election committee was headed by the corresponding party head. Over half of the members of the election committees were elected to LPC seats. Ibid., 112–7.

54 Certain Regulations of the NPC Standing Committee on Direct Election of Representative to County and Lesser Level People's Congresses [Quanguo remin daibiao dahui changwuweiyuanhui guanyu xianji yixia remin daibiao dahui daibiao zhijie xuanju de ruogan guiding], issued 5 March 83, sect. 2(4).

55 Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 108–123, 311–7.

56 [NPC] Statement Regarding the Draft Amendment to the PRC NPC and LPC Election Law, [Guanyu zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa xiuzheng an 'caoan' de shuoming], issued 23 August 04, reprinted on People's Daily (Online), 23 August 04.

57 ". . . [T]hese 'elections' are better viewed as 'designations' [by higher level officials]. Carrying out 'dictatorship' under the cover of 'democracy' is easy to be uncovered by delegates, and is what LPC delegates are most dissatisfied with." Shi Weimin, Open and Direct Elections, 317.

58 Qin Wen, "Xu Zhiyong: 'Please Believe That Our Electoral Rights Are Real' " [Xu Zhiyong: "Qing xiangxin women de xuanju quan shi zhenshi de"], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 16 December 03. This followed the appearance of articles in the official press encouraging the participation of independent candidates in LPC elections, as well as similar experiments in Shenzhen. Zhao Ling, Wu Chen, and Guang Xunan, "December 19, Beijing Elections" [12 yue 19 ri, Beijing xuanju], Southern Weekend (Online), 11 December 03.

59 Ibid. One candidate received significant media attention as a result of his creation of a "campaign headquarters," staffed in part by students, to assist his election efforts. Lin Chufang, "Quiet Appearance of Individual Campaign Headquarters" [Geren xuanju shiwu bangongshi qiaoran xianshen], Southern Weekend (Online), 30 October 03.

60 Qin Wen, "Xu Zhiyong: 'Please Believe That Our Electoral Rights Are Real.' "

61 In the case of one independent candidate, these included formal official approvals for the placement of posters, a bar on campaign contributions, and limits on the ability of campaign volunteers and staff to assist the candidates. Lin Chufang, "Quiet Appearance of Individual Campaign Headquarters." Election authorities also refused to allow him to independently organize events to meet voters. Local election officials required him to submit written requests in advance regarding such meetings, and barred the media from attending. For an insider's look at his campaign, see the summary written by one of his student staff participants, Zhu Sihao, "An Initial Exploration in the System of Voter Small Groups" [Xuanmin xiaozu zhidu chutan], Heavenly Teahouse, reprinted in China Elections (Online), 5 May 04.

62 Numerous tactics are detailed in Zhu Sihao, "An Initial Exploration in the System of Voter Small Groups." For example, the LPC election law requires that independent candidates receive the nomination of 10 voters to be placed on the final ballot. The local election commission interpreted this to mean that 10 voters in a particular voter "small group" (out of the 153 in his district) select independent candidates through filling out a form on the spot. Combined with the tight restrictions on campaigning and the control of the voter "small groups" by their heads, this limited the ability of one such candidate to mobilize support in different areas of the district to meet the nomination requirement.

63 PRC Electoral Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses.

64 Ibid., art. 31.

65 Ibid., art. 33. In contrast, prior law had only instructed an electoral commission to determine a final candidate list and introduce candidates to the voters, leaving it unclear as to whether electoral commissions could organize primary elections or general meet-the-candidate events. Ibid., arts. 31 and 33. Although many local authorities commonly rely on "selection" and "discussion" by Party or township officials to determine LPC candidates, Chinese scholars noted that some localities increasingly used open primaries during the 1990s to determine final candidate lists. Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 454–5.

66 Commission Staff Interview.

67 Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 69–70.

68 PRC Electoral Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, art. 29. More meaningful reform might involve eliminating the discretionary power of electoral commissions entirely, by making the use of primaries mandatory, rather than permissive, in determining the final slate of candidates. This step would appear to be a logical extension of the NPC legal affairs bureau's own suggestion that the introduction of primaries (yuxuan) in the 2004 amendments is a necessary step towards controlling the problems of "behind-the-scenes manipulation of elections" (anxiang congzuo) raised by existing electoral procedures. "NPC to Take Up Election Law Amendment Draft" [Quanguo renda shenyi xuanjufa xiuzhengan], Chinanews (Online), 23 August 04.

69 Beijing Party Organization Bureau Notice Regarding Opinions on the Implementation of Electoral Work Procedure and Related Items in Beijing Basic-Level Party Committees [Guanyu jingqu jiceng danwei dangwei huanjie xuanju gongzuo chengxu ji youguan shixiang de shishi yijian de tongzhi], issued 9 April 04, arts. 2–7; "Township (Town) Party Committee Electoral Work Procedure" [Xiang (zhen) dangwei huanjie xuanju gongzuo chengxu], Yuanjiang County Party Organization Bureau (Online), art. 8; Shi Weimin, "Open and Direct Elections," 22.

70 Li Lianjiang, "The Two-Ballot System in Shanxi Province: Subjecting Village Party Secretaries to a Popular Vote," 42 China Journal 103 (1999).

71 Ibid. This system allows ordinary villagers to weed out candidates they particularly dislike or distrust, but allows Party members to decide the ultimate winner.

72 He Zhongping, "The Case of Huazhuang, Sichuan: Directly Elected Village Party Secretaries Must 'Pass Three Tests' " [Sichuan huazhuang ge'an: zhixuan cunzhishu "guo san guan"], 21st Century Business Daily (Online), 1 September 04.

73 Guo Xiaojun, "Open Competition for the Director Position, Organizational Nominations are the Majority" [Gongkai jingzheng zhengju zuzhi tuijian zui duo], Beijing News (Online), 31 May 05; Wang Ying, "Lanzhou Experiment of 'Citizens Evaluating Officials' " [Lanzhou "minping guan" shiyan], 21st Century Business Herald (Online), 26 January 05.

74 Fan Lixiang, "Jiangsu's Direct Broadcast of Official Selections: The Latent Pressure of Public Nomination/Public Selection" [Jiangsu zhibo xuanguan: gongtui gongxuan zhengfaqian guize], 21st Century Business Herald (Online), 29 September 04. The selection process for the deputy chief position relied on progressive elimination of candidates in multiple stages process, including open nominations, graded public speeches, Party background evaluations, and internal voting on candidates. Public speeches of the candidates were broadcast live and evaluated by selected graders, as well as a designated audience of 150 officials and citizens. Audience evaluation of the candidates comprised 20 percent of the candidate's grade for that event. Ibid.

75 Zhang Tao, "Public Nomination/Public Election: A Technical Adjustment Within the System" [Gongtui gongxuan: tizhi nei de jishu xing tiaozheng], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 10 December 03.