The CECC has prepared the following HTML version of its 2006 Annual Report for the readers' convenience. If you would like to view the official Government Printing Office text of the Annual Report, please refer to the Adobe Acrobat PDF or Plain Text Format versions.

Government Censorship in China | Government Licensing for Print Media | Restrictions on Political and Religious Publishing | Not Prescribed by Law | Political Speech | Religious Speech | Ideological Uniformity

• Government censorship, while not total, is pervasive and highly effective, and denies Chinese citizens the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed to them in the Chinese Constitution. The government has imprisoned journalists who provide news to foreigners, such as Zhao Yan, Shi Tao, and Ching Cheong. Editors of publications that criticize government policies, such as Yang Bin of the Beijing News and Li Datong of the China Youth Daily, have been dismissed. The government blocks the Web sites and radio and television broadcasts of foreign news organizations, such as those of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Asia, and the Voice of America. In 2005, the government banned dozens of newspapers and confiscated almost one million "illegal" political publications. Beginning in May 2005, the government blocked the Commission's Web site from being viewed in China.

• Modern telecommunications technologies such as the Internet, cell phones, and satellite broadcasts allow Chinese citizens access to more information sources, both state-controlled and non-state-controlled. But government restrictions on news and information media, including on these new information sources, do not conform to international human rights standards for freedom of expression. The Chinese government imposes a strict licensing scheme on news and information media that includes oversight by government agencies with discretion to grant, deny, and rescind licenses based on political and economic criteria. The Chinese government's content-based restrictions include controls on political opinion and religious literature that are not prescribed by law, and whose primary purpose is to protect the ideological and political dominance of the Communist Party.

• The government's restrictions on religious literature do not conform to international human rights standards. Only government-licensed printing enterprises may print religious materials, and then only with approval from both the provincial-level religious affairs bureau and the press and publication administration. In addition to confiscating religious publications, the Chinese government also has fined, detained, and imprisoned citizens for publishing, printing, and distributing religious literature without government permission. Cai Zhuohua, a house church pastor in Beijing, and two of his family members were imprisoned in 2005 for printing and giving away Bibles and other Christian literature. In Anhui province, house church pastor Wang Zaiqing was arrested in May 2006 on the same charges.

Government Censorship in China

Government censorship in China, while not total, is pervasive and highly effective, and denies Chinese citizens the freedom of the press guaranteed to them in the Chinese Constitution.¹ As 13 Chinese scholars, lawyers, and editors wrote in a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao after the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) shut down a popular news weekly in February 2006, the CPD "manipulates and controls the range of speech, and it has become the sole criterion for measuring truth."² Another group, composed of 13 former senior government, Party, and news media officials, wrote in an open letter regarding the same event that the CPD has "stripped away freedom of speech in order to quash public opinion."³

The Chinese government has imprisoned journalists who provide news to foreigners, such as Zhao Yan, Shi Tao, and Ching Cheong. Editors of publications that criticize government policies, such as Yang Bin of the Beijing News and Li Datong of the China Youth Daily, have been dismissed. The government blocks the Web sites and radio and television broadcasts of foreign news organizations, such as those of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Asia, and the Voice of America. In 2005, the government banned dozens of newspapers and confiscated almost one million "illegal" political publications. Beginning in May 2005, the government blocked the Commission's Web site from being viewed in China. The heads of government and Party agencies responsible for enforcing China's media regulations emphasize press control, not press freedom:

• Liu Yunshan, director of the CPD, told attendees at the National Propaganda Directors Seminar in August 2005 that they should increase their supervision of the media, impose content controls earlier in the editorial process, and coordinate the application of administrative, economic, legal, ideological, and other controls.⁴ In a speech to the same group the previous year, Liu said that no change to the role of the news media as the mouthpiece of the Party, or the Party's supervision of the media, would be tolerated.⁵

• Long Xinmin, Director of the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), said in a speech to the National Press and Publication Directors Conference in December 2005 that Party leaders had ordered press and publication officials to increase their administration of press and publishing. Long said that the key was to strengthen the leadership of the Party and establish a "grand cadre" of "politically strong" press and publication workers.⁶

• Liu Yuzhu, head of the Ministry of Culture's Market Department, wrote in the January 2005 edition of Seeking Truth, the official journal of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, that Web sites located in foreign countries such as the United States represent a threat to China's political structure. He encouraged increased censorship of foreign Web sites and called on domestic Web site operators to step up their self-censorship.⁷

Despite pervasive censorship, state control of domestic news media is now less severe than before the "reform and opening up" period began in the late 1970s. Modern telecommunications technologies such as the Internet, cell phones, and satellite broadcasts allow Chinese citizens access to more information sources, both state-controlled and non-state-controlled. More information is also available as a result of a dynamic domestic newspaper and book publishing industry. China also has a thriving underground publishing industry, and citizens may easily purchase many banned books from unlicensed publishers and retailers.⁸ By forcing unlicensed publishers to break the law, however, the government erodes respect for intellectual property rights and the rule of law because illegal publishers are also de facto copyright violators (the illegal works are "pirated," and authors cannot collect royalties on them) and must bribe officials to keep operating.

Chinese leaders and officials maintain that citizens enjoy freedom of the press, and that government restrictions on that freedom conform to international standards.⁹ While the Party does not screen content before publication to the same degree as in the past, the government continues to impose administrative restrictions on who may publish and what they may publish ("prior restraints") that do not conform to the international human rights standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹⁰ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).¹¹ These standards require the elimination of registration systems for the print media that grant government agencies the discretion to approve, deny, or rescind licenses based on the political and financial qualifications of the applicant ("licensing schemes").¹² These standards also prohibit government restrictions on the publication of political and religious ideas and information, other than restrictions that are both prescribed by law and necessary to protect an important state interest ("content-based restrictions"). As two Chinese legal scholars noted in their study of the ICCPR:

This principle [that the ICCPR prohibits prior restraints] requires that government power may not be employed to suppress expressive activities before they are carried out, and no licensing measures or ideological content restrictions may be imposed on speech, books, periodicals, or radio or television programs prior to their dissemination, publication, distribution, or broadcast.¹³

The Chinese government imposes a strict licensing scheme on all newspaper, magazine, and book publishing and printing (public and private, for-profit and non-profit). The government uses this licensing scheme, as well as post-publication punishments, to enforce content-based restrictions that include prohibitions on the publication of political opinion and religious literature. These content-based restrictions on political opinion and religious literature are neither prescribed by law nor necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. Government and Party leaders state that these restrictions are intended to protect the ideological and political dominance of the Party.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that people enjoy the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The Chinese government's licensing scheme for print media does not conform to international standards for freedom of the press. Although no absolute international standard prescribes what constitutes freedom of the press, international human rights standards set forth a minimum prerequisite: no legal system can be said to respect freedom of the press if it subjects the print media to any prior restraint through a licensing scheme. In 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression issued a joint declaration saying that licensing schemes are unnecessary and subject to abuse.¹⁴ Many nations, both developed and developing, have abolished licensing schemes for the print media. For example, the constitutions of many countries, including those of Brazil and South Korea, explicitly prohibit licensing schemes.¹⁵ In other countries, such as the United States and India, the right to publish without first having to obtain government authorization is protected through a combination of constitutional and court-made law.¹⁶ In those countries with registration requirements, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, the government does not have the discretion to refuse registration.¹⁷

The Chinese government, like a number of governments in other countries, including Ethiopia,¹⁸ Iran,¹⁹ Jordan,²⁰ Syria,²¹ Uzbekistan,²² and Yemen,²³ imposes a strict licensing scheme on the print media.²⁴ No one may legally publish a book, newspaper, or magazine in China unless they have a license from the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP).²⁵ Chinese law requires that every book, newspaper, and magazine have a unique serial number, and the GAPP maintains exclusive control over the distribution of these numbers.²⁶ GAPP officials have explicitly linked the allotment of book numbers to the political orientation of publishers.²⁷ The Chinese government's licensing scheme includes substantive conditions on who may publish. To obtain a license to publish news, applicants must have a government sponsor.²⁸ Although the average annual income in China is less than 10,000 yuan (US$1,250),²⁹ the government also restricts the right to publish to those who can afford to invest at least 300,000 yuan (US$37,500) in registered capital.³⁰ The Chinese government says that its licensing scheme is necessary to regulate the publishing market,³¹ but such reasoning does not conform to international human rights standards.³²

Chinese authorities banned 79 newspapers and periodicals and seized 169 million publications in 2005.³³ From 2003 to 2005, the government canceled the registrations of 202 news bureaus and shut down 73 others.³⁴ Other examples of the government using its licensing authority to violate citizens' freedom of the press in the past year include:

• In August 2005, GAPP officials in Luliang city, Shanxi province, banned the Luliang Weekly, shut down its editorial department, and dismissed its staff. Officials imposed these sanctions because the weekly had been published without government authorization, and "the articles it carried were mostly negative reports, which severely violated relevant national regulations, and which had an adverse effect on society."³⁵

• In September 2005, the Hunan provincial government shut down the news bureaus of four publications established without government permission.³⁶

• Also in September 2005, the Chinese government reported that no illegal political materials had been published in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region city of Wuhai since 2002.³⁷ The report attributed the city government's "success" in part to a rigorous training regime for publishers and printers and the fact that authorities had closed 12 illegal printing enterprises. The report said officials conducted daily inspection tours and surprise raids to stop unauthorized publications from entering or leaving the city.

In addition to these administrative measures, Chinese authorities have used Article 225 of the Criminal Law, which defines operating a publishing business without government permission as an illegal business activity,³⁸ to fine and imprison publishers:

• In January 2004, authorities in Anhui province sentenced two men to prison terms of nine and seven years for publishing collections of love poems.³⁹

• In September 2004, a court in Xinxiang county, Henan province sentenced Wang Lelan, a farmer who had purchased two printing presses, to five years' imprisonment and an 8,000 yuan (US$1,000) fine for publishing "illegal books" such as "China's Top Level" and "Confidential Exclusive News."⁴⁰

• In August 2005, a court in Beijing sentenced the head of the Beijing representative office of Hong Kong's Credit China International Media Group Limited to three years' imprisonment for publishing the magazine "Credit China" without government authorization.⁴¹

New rules governing the publication of newspapers and magazines in China went into effect in December 2005.⁴² In addition to restricting the right to publish newspapers and magazines to government licensees, the rules also establish post-publication content screening and review systems. The rules require provincial-level GAPP offices to submit regular written reports to the GAPP and conduct annual "verification and examination" reviews. The rules stipulate that publishing, printing, and distribution enterprises may not provide services to any newspaper or magazine unless they have passed the previous year's inspection. The rules also require each newspaper and magazine publisher to submit regular reports to the GAPP, as well as annual "self-examination reports" with copies of its most recently published editions. The rules require the GAPP to assess the "publishing quality" of newspapers and magazines, and empower it to take the following actions against any publisher whose contents it deems incorrect or in violation of regulations:

• order it to cease publication and distribution;

• order it to retract entire editions;

• order supervising and sponsoring government agencies to "rectify" the publisher;

• revoke its publishing license.

The Chinese government's press licensing scheme also extends to the Internet. According to the state-run media:

Since 1996, 14 agencies, including the Central Propaganda Department, State Council Information Office, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Culture, and the General Administration of Press and Publication have participated in the administration of the Internet, have promulgated nearly 50 laws and regulations, and have put together the world's most extensive and comprehensive regulatory system for Internet administration. One scholar who specializes in researching Internet Law [said] China's emphasis on, and effectiveness of administration over, the problem of Internet security is "rare in this world."⁴³

The government requires all Web sites in China to be either licensed by, or registered with, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).⁴⁴ Web sites that fail to register or obtain a license may be shut down and their operators fined.⁴⁵ As part of the registration process, the MII requires anyone who posts news on a Web site to confirm that the Chinese government has authorized him or her to do so.⁴⁶ According to the OpenNet Initiative, "In large measure, the registration regulation is designed to induce website owners to forego potentially sensitive or prohibited content, such as political criticism, by linking their identities to that content. The regulation operates through a chilling effect."⁴⁷ In August 2005, the state-controlled news media reported that over 700,000 Web sites had registered,⁴⁸ and that authorities had shut down a "large number of Web sites," using "specialized software to render them inaccessible."⁴⁹ In December 2005, the MII issued a notice to Internet service providers saying, "The campaign to rectify unregistered Web sites has entered a period of severe sanctions," and demanded they shut down all unregistered Web sites.⁵⁰

In September 2005, the MII and the State Council Information Office promulgated new rules tightening the government's control over Internet news services.⁵¹ These rules prohibit anyone from using the Internet to post or transmit news reports or commentary relating to politics and economics, or military, foreign, and public affairs, without a government license. Chinese authorities used these rules to shut down at least five Web sites before the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which concluded in March 2006.⁵²

The MII crackdown coincided with a similar crackdown on the Internet by branches of China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in major cities.⁵³ Throughout 2005 and 2006, public security bureaus in cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and Chongqing ordered Web sites to register with public security authorities or be shut down. In addition, in December 2005, the MPS promulgated new rules⁵⁴ requiring Internet portals, Web sites, Web logs ("blogs"), and hosting services to record and retain any content that news providers post on their Web sites, as well as the time it was posted.

Finally, the Chinese government instituted a licensing scheme for journalists in 2005,⁵⁵ even though such schemes are incompatible with international human rights standards for freedom of the press.⁵⁶ In January 2005, the GAPP issued two new regulations limiting "lawful" news gathering and editorial activities to government-licensed journalists.⁵⁷ In March 2005, the GAPP, Central Propaganda Department, and State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) jointly issued new rules specifying that journalists and editors must "support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, support the socialist system . . ., respect the Party's news propaganda discipline, [and] protect the interests of the Party and the government."⁵⁸ SARFT used its authority to accredit television hosts to shut down the television show of well-known economist Lang Xianping (also known as Larry Lang) in February 2006 on the grounds that he lacked required government certification.⁵⁹

Restrictions on Political and Religious Publishing

The Chinese government's restrictions on the publication of political opinion and religious literature do not conform to international human rights standards for freedom of the press and freedom of religion. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the same article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provide that people enjoy the right to publish "information and ideas," and the ICCPR adds "of all kinds." International human rights standards permit restrictions on the press, provided they are prescribed by law and are necessary to prevent the dissemination of speech that is obscene or defamatory, or that poses a realistic threat to national security, or that is false and threatens public order.⁶⁰ The Chinese government's restrictions on the press are not clearly prescribed in national law. In addition, the government uses discretionary and extralegal powers to restrict the publication of information and ideas that conflict with the Party's political and religious orthodoxy or that threaten its control over political and religious ideology.

Not Prescribed by Law

National media regulations include vague and sweeping prohibitions on the publication of material that "harms the honor or the interests of the nation,"⁶¹ "spreads rumors,"⁶² or "harms the credibility of a government agency."⁶³ The Criminal Law punishes acts said to constitute "rumor mongering" to incite subversion or the overthrow of the socialist system with sentences of up to five years' imprisonment.⁶⁴ Nothing in Chinese law specifies what constitutes the "interests of the nation," a "rumor," or "harming credibility." Chinese laws and regulations provide lists of what may be deemed a state secret, but these lists are broad and vague, encompassing essentially all matters of public concern.⁶⁵ Moreover, Chinese law does not require the government to show that anyone committing any of these acts knew that the materials they published fell into one of these categories.⁶⁶ Finally, Chinese courts do not require the government to show that the publication of the materials in question caused, or could have caused, any negative effect on the national interest.⁶⁷

Government agencies responsible for implementing and interpreting national security do not balance government interests against a citizen's right to freedom of the press, and instead consistently interpret laws in favor of the government. In recent years, more than 70 percent of all cases of criminal disclosure of state secrets were the result of a "faulty understanding of state secrets."⁶⁸ None of the 17 or more central government and Party agencies responsible for enforcing and interpreting national security and state secrets laws as they relate to freedom of the press has provided any public guidance about when it will or will not censor publications or pursue criminal complaints against publishers.⁶⁹ In 2004, the Chinese government shut down 338 publications for publishing "internal" information.⁷⁰ In addition, the Chinese judiciary is not independent from Party control and does not issue instructive opinions in criminal trials (see discussion of Huang Qi below). [For more information on the Chinese judiciary, see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice.]

The Chinese government does not articulate content-based restrictions in statutes and court judgments, but instead relies upon detaining writers, indoctrinating journalists, and banning publications to encourage companies, institutions, and individuals to "choose" not to publicize views that a government official might deem politically unacceptable.⁷¹ An example of the Chinese government's indifference to freedom of the press is the case of Huang Qi. The Chengdu Intermediate People's Court sentenced Huang to five years' imprisonment in May 2003 for inciting subversion by operating a Web site that included articles on democracy and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests. The court's decision did not provide examples of any subversive language, and made no attempt to show that the articles on the Web site had caused, or were likely to cause, a threat to China's national security. Moreover, the court did not place any constitutional limitations on the authority of the government to criminalize certain types of speech, or balance the need to protect national security with Huang Qi's right to freedom of expression.⁷²

Another example of the Chinese government's opaque national security content-based restrictions occurred in October 2003, when a Shanghai court sentenced Zheng Enchong to three years' imprisonment for "illegally providing state secrets to an entity or individual outside China." Zheng faxed a copy of a Xinhua news report to a U.S. NGO to get it published abroad.⁷³ In rejecting Zheng's appeal, the Shanghai High People's Court said that, while the document in question included no markings indicating it was a "state secret," Zheng "should have known" that it was a state secret because it had been published in a Xinhua publication called "Internal Selections." Xinhua is a government agency that reports directly to the State Council, and if an article included information that was a state secret, Xinhua had both the authority and the legal obligation to have it classified.⁷⁴ Instead, Xinhua officials labeled the article "internal," and according to the Shanghai High People's Court, officials with the local state secrets bureau had it "certified" as a state secret after Zheng was detained.⁷⁵ Stories from "Internal Selections," however, are freely available on Party Web sites, including those of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee.⁷⁶

The case of Zhao Yan, a researcher for the New York Times, is a more recent example. Authorities detained Zhao in September 2004 for "illegally providing state secrets to an entity or individual outside China." Sources said the "state secret" was information that former President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had offered to resign as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. His resignation was later reported in the official press.⁷⁷ [See Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, for a discussion of Zhao's arbitrary and extended detention.]

Chinese courts cannot consider Chinese citizens' constitutional right to freedom of the press in subversion and state secrets trials [see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice--Constitutional Review]. Some cases have been reported, however, in which a court found insufficient evidence to hold a trial on the charges brought against a defendant. Such decisions are the result of international pressure rather than an interest in upholding the rights of the accused. For example, Chinese authorities detained Liu Di (also known as the "Stainless Steel Mouse") in November 2002 after she posted a series of essays on the Internet discussing political reform and criticizing the Party. They released her in November 2003 without charges following widespread international pressure.

The Chinese government also uses indoctrination as an extralegal means of restricting publishing of political opinions and religious literature. A January 2006 General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) report described an example of press indoctrination, saying that in 2005 the government carried out on-the-job training of Party officials holding leadership positions at news publishers, and "deeply and meticulously performed worker and staff ideological and political work" in order to "safeguard stability and unity."⁷⁸ Xinhua reported in May 2006 that the government and the Party expect Chinese journalists to be "politically strong" and "strictly disciplined."⁷⁹ The All China Journalists Association held a conference in April 2006 to study and implement the Party's propaganda campaign on "Socialist Glory and Shame."⁸⁰ The state-run news media reported that conference participants expressed a desire to reject "capitalist liberalism" and to accept "serving the general work of the Party and the nation" as the "sacred mission" of journalists.⁸¹ Western news media have reported that the Beijing Municipal Information Office, an agency that reports to the Central Propaganda Department, summons executives from a dozen Internet news Web sites every Friday morning to attend a meeting. Chen Hua, Director of the Internet Propaganda Management Department, usually runs this meeting. According to one Western news report, "[Chen] or one of his colleagues tells the executives what news they should keep off their sites and what items they should highlight in the week ahead."⁸²

The Chinese government and the Party often carry out censorship through informal and opaque procedures that are not subject to legal oversight or restraint. For example, according to Wang Yi, a law professor in Sichuan province, public security officials in Beijing had his Web site shut down by calling an employee of the Chinese Internet company Blogchina at home and ordering him to do it.⁸³

Chinese authorities used similar extralegal measures to censor two of China's most popular publications. The first incident occurred in December 2005, when the Party removed editor-in-chief Yang Bin and two deputy editors at the Beijing News, as part of an effort to curb that newspaper's aggressive reporting style.⁸⁴ Central Propaganda Department director Liu Yunshan had told officials at an April 2005 meeting that "[t]he South has a newspaper that disgusts a lot of officials in the North, and the North has a paper that disgusts a lot of officials in the South."⁸⁵ An unnamed source told a Western news magazine that the "northern paper" was the Beijing News, and a Beijing News editor noted that so many cadres had traveled to Beijing to complain about the paper that it was under "heavy" pressure to conform to new restrictions on "extra-territorial" investigative reporting.⁸⁶ In December 2005, propaganda officials singled out the Beijing News for criticism at a meeting where it was decided that "metropolitan newspapers" such as the Beijing News should "strengthen Party control" and obey propaganda officials.⁸⁷ Officials have said that the Beijing News "committed errors in the orientation of opinion," and Liu Yunshan concluded that the Beijing News' "problems" must be "fundamentally resolved."

A second example of official circumvention of the law to silence critics occurred in January 2006, when Party officials ordered the China Youth Daily (CYD) to suspend publication of its Freezing Point weekly because it had published an essay on Chinese history textbooks that officials claimed contradicted historical facts, violated news propaganda discipline, harmed the national sentiments of the Chinese people, harmed the image of the CYD, and had a detrimental social influence.⁸⁸ The officials also ordered the CYD Publishing House to submit a report criticizing Li Erliang, CYD editor-in-chief, and Li Datong, editor-in-chief of the Freezing Point weekly. On February 16, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Qin Gang defended the Party's decision.⁸⁹ On the same day, the Communist Party Youth League Publishing House Party Committee announced the conditions under which Freezing Point would resume publication. The CYD was required to dismiss Li Datong from his position as editor-in-chief, and Lu Yuegang from his position as deputy editor. In addition, it had to publish an essay in the first issue of the re-launched Freezing Point weekly that would refute the earlier objectionable essay.⁹⁰

Government and Party intimidation, harassment, and imprisonment of writers and journalists create a chilling effect on freedom of speech that results in self-censorship. For instance, Internet and software companies in China must either employ censorship technologies in their products or risk a government order to close. Although no Chinese law or regulation forbids specific words, companies such as Tencent and MSN embed a list of banned words and phrases in their Internet applications, including "freedom" and "democracy."⁹¹ Chinese search engines such as Baidu, and the China-based search engines of Yahoo!, MSN, and Google filter search results, including those relating to the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and human rights. A senior corporate official from Google testified to the House Committee on International Relations in February 2006 that one of the factors leading to the company's decision to filter search results for its China-based service was:

Many queries, especially politically sensitive queries, were not making it through to Google's servers. And access became often slow and unreliable, meaning that our service in China was not something we felt proud of. Even though we weren't doing any self-censorship, our results were being filtered anyway, and our service was being actively degraded on top of that. Indeed, at some times users were even being redirected to local Chinese search engines.⁹²

Google designed its Chinese-language news aggregation service so that users in China cannot view materials from dissident news Web sites that Chinese authorities have blocked. Google has said that it will not deploy e-mail and blogging services in China because the company cannot meet its own standards for the privacy and security of users' sensitive information.⁹³

The Party and the government are seeking to expand self-censorship by instituting "industry self-discipline." During an August 2005 speech, Liu Yunshan called on propaganda officials to "merge propaganda work into the self-supervision of mass groups and professional organizations," and said that requiring professional organizations to "tightly integrate professional discipline and restraint with professional moral restraint" will allow employees to "voluntarily" accept government supervision. In April 2006, 14 major Internet portals, including Sina.com, Sohu.com, Baidu.com, and Yahoo!'s Chinese Web site, issued a joint proposal calling for the Chinese Internet industry to censor harmful information, spread the ideas of President Hu Jintao, and voluntarily accept government supervision.⁹⁴ Shortly after the Internet portals issued their proposal, Internet information providers and industry groups throughout China made similar announcements.

The state-run media portrayed the Internet portals' participation as spontaneous and voluntary, but both the GAPP and State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) have either used or advocated the use of "self-discipline" agreements and other informal methods to control the press in China. For example, in April 2006, GAPP Director Long Xinmin wrote that the government should establish an administrative system for newspapers and magazines characterized by Party leadership, government administration, and industry self-discipline.⁹⁵ In September 2005, SARFT issued a notice saying that radio announcers and television hosts would "voluntarily" obey professional ethical standards that SARFT had issued in December 2004.⁹⁶

Political Speech

International human rights standards obligate the Chinese government to respect the rights of its citizens to publish political ideas or opinions, even when they are critical of the government.⁹⁷ Chinese government and Party officials have said, however, that they will not tolerate the publication of political ideas or opinions with which they disagree:

• Liu Binjie, a deputy director of the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), has said that political publications are the highest priority target for the Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force.⁹⁸

• Shi Feng, another GAPP deputy director, complained in an October 2005 speech that some newspapers and periodicals in China have exhibited "political orientation problems," by "denying the leading position of Marxism," "violating the Party line," and "openly smearing the Party's leaders."⁹⁹

• Officials have said that it is necessary to "strike hard at" and "tightly seal up and investigate" political publications that "spread political rumors and create ideological chaos."¹⁰⁰

The State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) issued "propaganda priorities" in 2005 that said broadcasters should "refuse all incorrect ideological and political perspectives and expression."¹⁰¹ The GAPP has said that it will shut down publications with "severe political errors,"¹⁰² and in 2005, the Chinese government confiscated 996,000 publications because of their political content.¹⁰³ Regulations require that everything published in China must adhere to Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory¹⁰⁴ and prohibit the publication of anything that violates the propaganda discipline of the Party¹⁰⁵ or contradicts the guiding policies of the Party.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Chinese law requires that books and essays about Party and national government leaders must be "solemn and discreet," and their point of view must conform to the spirit of various Party documents.¹⁰⁷

To enforce these ideological restrictions, Chinese regulations require that publishers submit to the GAPP and the Central Propaganda Department a list of any "important topic selections" that they plan to publish.¹⁰⁸ Only publishing houses that the GAPP specifically approves may publish works about government and Party leaders, foreign relations, religion, the history of the People's Republic of China, and the history of the People's Liberation Army.¹⁰⁹ In February 2005, a GAPP official warned in a report:

If publishers are careless about strictly screening topic selection, then serious orientation and quality problems will occur. . . . Therefore, publishers' screening of the selection of topics is not merely a professional matter, but rather is a serious political responsibility. Therefore, topic selection screening is a political system.¹¹⁰

The GAPP report also said that publishers must carry out registration procedures for all selections relating to politics, the military, security, foreign affairs, religion, ethnicities, and "other sensitive issues." In addition, the report also noted that it is illegal to publish anything on these topics that has not been reported to, and approved by, authorities.

New rules governing the publication of newspapers and periodicals that went into effect in December 2005¹¹¹ include requirements that these publications must "adhere to Marxism-Leninism," "follow correct guidelines of public opinion and publication orientation," and foster a "good atmosphere for building socialism with Chinese characteristics." The rules also require newspapers and periodicals to obey unspecified "relevant regulations" when publishing articles that relate to "important state policies" and ethnic and religious affairs.

SARFT requires screenplays that depict major historic events and important leaders and their families to be approved by both the government and the Party.¹¹² SARFT issued regulations in April 2006¹¹³ that removed the previous requirement that television producers obtain government approval for dramas, but programs relating to modern Chinese history must still have government approval.¹¹⁴ In addition, anyone wishing to film television programs with content relating to "important or sensitive political issues, the military, foreign affairs, the Party's United Front, religion, ethnicities, the administration of justice, public security, education, and famous people" must first request an "opinion" from the relevant department at the provincial level or higher.

Government and Party intolerance of the independent political views of citizens is particularly apparent before and during government and Party plenary meetings and some national holidays. In the weeks before the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which concluded in March 2006, Chinese officials took the following measures (in addition to the Web site closings that were described previously):

• The Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force held a teleconference in January 2006 and notified relevant agencies that they should "purify the publishing market" and be on duty 24 hours per day during the plenary sessions.¹¹⁵

• Officials in Zhongshan city, Guangdong province, issued a circular calling on local customs, traffic, press and publications officials, and commercial agencies, to step up their enforcement measures against "harmful information," including illegal political publications.¹¹⁶

• Officials in Henan province launched a crackdown on political publications and Falun Gong materials to "ensure the health and stability of the publications market" during the plenary sessions.¹¹⁷

During the last year Chinese authorities have continued to silence writers, journalists, and Web sites for expressing political ideas or opinions with which they disagree. In October, an Anhui court upheld Zhang Lin's sentence of five years' imprisonment for subverting state power in connection with articles he posted on the Internet and a radio interview he gave.¹¹⁸ Chinese authorities detained and imprisoned several others, including Yang Tianshui, Guo Qizhen, and Li Yuanlong for publishing articles on foreign Web sites criticizing the government and the Party.¹¹⁹ During the run-up to the annual plenary sessions, Chinese authorities shut down the Aegean Sea [Aiqinhai] Web site, as well as four other sites that had complained on behalf of local workers.¹²⁰ In June, authorities shut down two of China's major Internet portals, Sina.com and Sohu.com, for several days to allow the Internet portals to upgrade their censorship capabilities after authorities found that the Internet portals failed to filter certain key words deemed politically harmful.¹²¹ In July, the Beijing Communications Administration shut down the "Century China" Web site, a popular Internet discussion forum for commentary on political, historical, and cultural issues.¹²² In August, authorities shut down the "Polls" Web site and revoked its license after the Web site posted a poll asking visitors whether the General Secretary of the Communist Party should be chosen from among several candidates in differential voting.¹²³

Religious Speech

International human rights standards protect the printing and distribution of religious literature as a fundamental human right.¹²⁴ The Chinese government asserts that its protection of freedom of religious belief "is basically in accordance with the main contents of [relevant] international documents and conventions," and that everyone in China "should have the freedom to compile and distribute printed materials pertaining to religion or belief."¹²⁵ Only government-licensed printing enterprises may print such materials, however, and then only with approval from the provincial-level religious affairs bureau and a certificate of approval from the press and publication administration.¹²⁶ Printing enterprises in China may print religious publications for in-house use by customers, but the printing enterprise must first receive approval from provincial-level religious and publishing authorities.¹²⁷ Non-religious publications only require printing approval from publishing authorities at the county level.¹²⁸ Publishing regulations mandate government authorization and screening of books and news reports that mention religious issues.¹²⁹ [See Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion.]

Chinese authorities confiscated 4.62 million items of Falun Gong and "other cult organization propaganda material" in 2005.¹³⁰ This included the confiscation of 9,860 printed materials in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region that were either illegal publications of a religious nature, Falun Gong materials, or publications related to "feudal superstitions."¹³¹ In addition, authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region confiscated 54 "Dalai Lama splittist group reactionary publications."¹³²

In addition to confiscating religious publications, the Chinese government also has fined, detained, and imprisoned citizens for publishing, printing, and distributing religious literature without government permission. In November and December 1999, officials detained and arrested Jiang Sunian, an unregistered Catholic priest from Wenzhou diocese in Zhejiang province who had published hymnals.¹³³ Officials charged Jiang with illegal publishing.¹³⁴ In April 2000, a court convicted Jiang under Article 225 of the Criminal Law, assessed a fine of 270,000 yuan (US$32,000), and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. Officials released Jiang in December 2003.¹³⁵ In November 2005, a Beijing court sent Cai Zhuohua, a pastor of six house churches in Beijing, and two of his family members to prison under Article 225 of the Criminal Law for printing and giving away Bibles and other Christian literature without government permission.¹³⁶ In Anhui province, house church pastor Wang Zaiqing was arrested in May 2006 on the same charges.

During the last year Chinese authorities have continued to detain people who express religious ideas or opinions which they consider incorrect. Chinese authorities detained documentary filmmaker Hao Wu for 140 days after they discovered him shooting a documentary about China's unregistered house churches.¹³⁷ In July 2006, authorities shut down two blogs maintained by the popular Tibetan poet and writer Oezer, which she believed was a response to her posting a photograph of the Dalai Lama.¹³⁸ In August 2006, authorities detained journalist Zan Aizong for one week after he posted reports on foreign Web sites about detentions of Protestants who were protesting the destruction of a church in Xiaoshan city, Zhejiang province.¹³⁹

Ideological Uniformity

International human rights standards prohibit content-based restrictions on the press except those necessary to protect the rights and reputations of others and to meet the requirements for morality, national security, and public order in a democratic society.¹⁴⁰ The Chinese government and the Communist Party exceed these allowances, however, and control and censor the press to impose ideological uniformity. In one of his first speeches as head of the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), Long Xinmin told officials attending a national conference in December 2005 to "maintain a high degree of uniformity with the political ideology of the Party Central Committee under Comrade Hu Jintao as Secretary, and insist on never wavering from Marxism as the guiding principle of press and publication work."¹⁴¹ Liu Yunshan called on propaganda officials to leverage the advantage provided by the large circulation and distribution of the state-run news media to guide public opinion in an "intimate, natural, quiet, and unobtrusive manner."¹⁴² Shi Feng has said that investigative reporting must "serve the work of the Party and the government."¹⁴³ In September 2005, the Guangming Daily published an editorial saying:

[I]rresponsible expression online easily brings with it ideological confusion, and creates a severe challenge for college students' political ideological education. An important and pressing question for university political ideological education is how to use positive and healthy ideological culture to capture the Internet battlefield and prevent people with ulterior motives from using the Internet to disseminate incorrect ideology and information, and resist infiltration by enemy forces and cult organizations.¹⁴⁴

Government and Party leaders also have said that they intend to co-opt modern communications technologies such as the Internet and mobile communications, and have called on officials to ensure that their propaganda reaches newly emerging social groups.¹⁴⁵ Liu Yunshan noted that Chinese society is becoming increasingly complex as it shifts from one dominated by people employed in state-run enterprises to one in which more and more people work for private enterprises.¹⁴⁶ Given this shifting demographic, Liu said that Party propagandists must "expand the targets of propaganda work" to new groups, such as young intellectuals, and "troubled" groups, such as unemployed workers, migrant workers, and farmers who have lost their land.¹⁴⁷ The Party also focuses political propaganda on Chinese youth. In late 2005, the Party journal Seeking Truth called on Party cadres to focus on guiding the organization of college student groups,¹⁴⁸ and the Guangming Daily published an editorial saying that schools should work to form "united and positive online public opinion" by organizing "ranks of online commentators."¹⁴⁹ Some Chinese universities have also instituted student-run monitoring groups to remove offensive content, including political dissent, from university Internet forums.¹⁵⁰

In December 2004, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) issued ethical guidelines requiring television editors, reporters, and hosts to be loyal to, and carry out the work of, the Party.¹⁵¹ Later the same month, SARFT announced that it would require television stations to increase control over what television interviewers say on the air, and only broadcast programs that "comply with propaganda discipline" produced by government-licensed production companies and screened by relevant officials.¹⁵² In March 2005, the Central Propaganda Department, the GAPP, and SARFT jointly issued regulations requiring news reporting and editing personnel to support the leadership of the Party, focus on "correct propaganda" as their guiding principle, and have a firm grasp of "correct guidance of public opinion."¹⁵³ In April 2005, SARFT issued "Interim Implementation Rules for Administration of Those Employed as Radio and Television News Reporters and Editors," saying: "It is necessary to instruct news reporting and editing personnel to strengthen their political consciousness."¹⁵⁴ In September 2005, SARFT issued a notice requiring television announcers and hosts to increase their study of political theory, improve their political character and political proficiency, guide people with correct public opinion, passionately love the motherland, serve the greater interests of the work of the Party and the government, and implement the Party's "line, principles, and policies."¹⁵⁵ The same month, SARFT also issued a notice warning that reports relating to politics and government policies must be handled carefully to avoid "problems." In addition, to "ensure the correct guidance of public opinion," radio and television broadcasters must receive approval from SARFT before making any "large-scale live broadcast reports of significant events . . . especially those live broadcast reports of activities chaired by central leading cadres."¹⁵⁶ The notice also requires all broadcasters to be sensitive to "political" issues and to screen live broadcasts to "ensure their orientation is correct."

The government and the Party remain concerned that Chinese citizens have increased access to foreign sources of information that may dilute the Party's control over public opinion. Senior officials portray the news and information media as a battlefield for the Party's propaganda work that must either be occupied or lost to Western countries. For example, Liu Yunshan has called on Party propagandists to learn how to open to the outside world but prevent "Western enemy forces" from using their "economic and technical superiority to carry out ideological infiltration and cultural expansion" in order to "Westernize and divide" China.¹⁵⁷ Shi Feng has said the government must not abandon the battlefield of public opinion, and has complained that, despite strict government prohibitions on private and foreign investment in newspaper and periodical publishing, people continue to "illegally enter the newspaper and periodical publication domain," and that illegal publishers are a "serious threat" to the Party's ability to use propaganda to influence ideology.¹⁵⁸

The Supreme People's Court also supports censorship to prevent Chinese citizens from having access to "foreign" political ideas. In 1998, the same year it issued a judicial interpretation expanding the scope of Article 225 of China's Criminal Law to include unauthorized publishing,¹⁵⁹ it warned China's judges, "Foreign enemy forces are using publishing as a channel to carry out infiltration and aggravation of our ideology and culture, and there are numerous publications with political problems circulating within the country's borders."¹⁶⁰

The Chinese government attempts to prevent its citizens from having access to uncensored political ideas and information by banning the general distribution of foreign newspapers, news magazines, and television news programs, and by restricting the ability of foreign news agencies to distribute news domestically. In November 2005, Shi Zongyuan, then Director of the GAPP, said that Chinese authorities had halted plans to allow foreign newspapers to print in China because of concerns raised by the recent "color revolutions" in former Soviet republics.¹⁶¹ Also in 2005, the GAPP introduced internal restrictions on foreign magazines, limiting approvals to science and technology publications.¹⁶² In October 2004, SARFT issued regulations prohibiting joint ventures from producing programs on "political news."¹⁶³ In March 2005, SARFT issued an interpretive notice on these regulations that further limits foreign companies to investing in a single joint venture, saying:

[W]e must control the contents of all products of joint ventures in a practical manner, understand the political inclinations and background of foreign joint venture parties, and in this way prevent harmful foreign ideology and culture from entering the realm of our television program production through joint investment and cooperation.¹⁶⁴

In September 2006, Xinhua issued new rules prohibiting foreign news agencies from distributing news to Chinese citizens without government permission.¹⁶⁵ The new rules require foreign news agencies to be licensed by Xinhua and to submit all articles to a government-approved agency for distribution.¹⁶⁶ The new rules give Xinhua the authority to select the news and information that foreign news agencies release, and to delete any information that the government has banned.¹⁶⁷ [For information on the commercial implications of the new rules, see Section VII(d)--Commercial Rule of Law and the Impact of the WTO.]

To prevent Chinese citizens from using television and radio to access ideas and opinions that may conflict with the Party line, the government jams programming offered by the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The government also has enacted regulations that restrict private satellite dish ownership and only permit foreign television news from broadcasters that are "friendly" to China and that offer their programs through government-controlled channels.¹⁶⁹ In August 2005, SARFT issued three notices restricting Chinese citizens' access to foreign television and radio content.¹⁶⁶ In April 2006, SARFT issued a circular¹⁷⁰ repeating the restrictions on the dissemination of foreign news reports that were first put in place in 2002.¹⁷¹ Both circulars prohibit local television stations from using news footage taken from foreign satellite programs and require them to use only international news reports provided by China Central Television and China Radio International. The new circular said these restrictions are required to "ensure correct orientation of public opinion," because some foreign wire services and news media have distributed international news to local television stations with "blatant political intentions." The circular calls on television regulators to "firmly establish political consciousness" and "increasingly bring the administration of international news within the administration of propaganda work."

Chinese officials attempt to prevent citizens who use the Internet from gaining access to ideas and opinions that the government and Party cannot censor. In February 2006, Liu Zhengrong, Deputy Chief of the Internet Affairs Bureau of the State Council Information Office, said Chinese citizens can access the Web freely, except for "a very few" foreign Web sites that are blocked because their contents mostly involve pornography or terrorism.¹⁷² According to one study, however, Chinese authorities operate "the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world" to prevent access to "sensitive" religious and political material on the Internet.¹⁷³ The central government blocks the Web sites of foreign news providers such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, and of human rights advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in China, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Since May 2005, the Chinese government has prevented its citizens from accessing the Commission's Web site.

Notes to Section V(a)--Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression

1 Article 35 of China's Constitution states: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration."

2 "Open Letter From 'Freezing Point' Writers to National People's Congress Standing Committee" [Bingdian zhoukan bufen zuozhe zhi zhengzhiju changwei de gongkaixin], Boxun (Online), 18 Feb 06.<"冰点"周刊部分作者 致政治局常委的公开信 | www.cecc.gov> The signatories included Cui Weiping, a professor at the Beijing Film Academy; He Weifang, a law professor at Peking University; and Qin Hui, a history professor at Tsinghua University.

3 "Joint Declaration Concerning the 'Freezing Point' Incident" [Guanyu bingdian shijian de lianhe shengming], Epoch Times (Online), 14 February 06.<2006年1月24日,《冰点》终被中宣部假手团中央的宣传机关下令停刊整顿.这是中国新闻界的重大历史性事件. | www.cecc.gov> The signatories included Zhu Houze, former head of the Central Propaganda Department; Li Rui, former secretary to Mao Zedong; Li Pu, former Deputy Director of the Xinhua News Agency; Zhang Sizhi, former Vice Chair of the Beijing Lawyers Association; Hu Jiwei, former editor-in-chief of the People's Daily; and Zhong Peizhang, former head of the China Youth Daily Group.

4 Liu Yunshan, "In Accordance With the Requirements of Building a Socialist and Harmonious Society: Deepen, Broaden, and Innovate Propaganda Ideological Work" [Anzhao goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui yaoqiu shenhua tuozhan chuangxin xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 October 05.<按照构建社会主义和谐社会要求 深化拓展创新宣传思想工作 |www.qsjournal.com.cn>

5 Liu Yunshan, "Earnestly Study and Implement the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Strive to Increase the Party's Ability to Lead Ideological Work" [Renzhen xuexi guanche shiliu jie si zhong quanhui jingshen nuli tigao dang lingdao yishi xingtai gongzuo de nengli], Seeking Truth (Online), 16 October 04.<认真学习贯彻十六届四中全会精神 努力提高党领导意识形态工作的能力 |www.cecc.gov>

6 "Long Xinmin: Forcefully Promote the Glorious Development of the News Publishing Industry" [Long Xinmin: dali cujin xinwen chubanye fanrong fazhan], People's Daily (Online), 31 December 05;<龙新民：大力促进新闻出版业繁荣发展 |media.people.com.cn> "Censorship Agency Gets New Director, Calls for 'Uniformity' of Political Ideology," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 14.<www.cecc.gov>

7 Liu Yuzhu, "Actively Responding to the Challenge of the Internet Era" [Jiji yingdui wangluo shidai de tiaozhan], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 January 05.<积极应对网络时代的挑战 |www.qsjournal.com.cn>

8 Antoaneta Bezlova, "Big Brother's Book Ban Blues," The Hong Kong Standard (Online), 28 May 05;<www.thestandard.com.hk> "Piracy: A Page Hard to Turn for Regulators," Xinhua (Online), 23 May 05.<news.xinhuanet.com>

9 "Senior Chinese Government, Party, and Business Leaders Deny Internet Censorship," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 10;<www.cecc.gov> "Wen Jiabao: It Is Necessary to Learn How to Handle the Social Contradictions of the New Age" [Wen Jiabao: yao xuehui chuli xinshiqi de shehui maodun], Xinhua (Online), 14 March 06;< 温家宝：要学会处理新时期的社会矛盾 | news.xinhuanet.com> Zhao Huanxin, "Regulation of Internet In Line With World Norms," China Daily (Online), 15 February 06;<www.chinadaily.com.cn> "SCIO--China's Regulation of the Internet Complies With International Standards" [Guo Xinban: Zhongguo guanli hulianwang fuhe guoji tongxing zuofa], Xinhua (Online), 15 February 06;<国新办：中国管理互联网符合国际通行做法 |news.xinhuanet.com> "China Denies Arrest of Any Individual for Releasing Online Comment," Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 15 February 06;<english.people.com.cn> "China Denies Harsh Internet Censorship," Xinhua (Online), 14 February 06;<news.xinhuanet.com> "CPPCC Delegate Zhou Jinfeng Calls for Greater Regulation of the Internet" [Zhengxie weiyuan Zhou Jinfeng: Hulianwang youxiao guanli xu youpoyouli], Beijing News, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 8 March 06.<政协委员周晋峰：互联网有效管理需有破有立 |media.people.com.cn> See also "Liu Binjie: China Is One of the World's Countries Richest in Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press," People's Daily (Online), 2 November 03, which states: "Currently China is one of the world's countries richest in freedom of speech and freedom of publication. Those outside of China who make claims about China's news, expression, and press are completely without support."<柳斌杰：中国是世界上言论出版自由最充分的国家之一 |www.people.com.cn> See also State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004, People's Daily (Online), 13 April 05, which states: "Citizens' freedom of information, of speech and of the press is protected by law."<english.people.com.cn>

10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48 [hereinafter UDHR]. Article 19 of the UDHR states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76 [hereinafter ICCPR]. China has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment as recently as April 13, 2006, in its application for membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China's top leaders have previously stated on three separate occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in a September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress on Law, in statements by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour, and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before the French National Assembly.

Article 19 of the ICCPR states: "1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."

12 Before the Chinese Communist Party came to power, Party officials, and earlier, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, wrote that requiring the news media to obtain government permission to publish is inconsistent with freedom of the press. See, e.g., "Smash Fascist Publishing Laws" [Dasui faxisi de chubanfa], Xinhua Daily, 29 June 46, reprinted in Comment-cn.net (Online), 20 February 06, which states: "Modern democratic countries like England and the United States simply have nothing like publishing laws formulated to gag freedom of the press. In a publishing law, to adopt requirements that newspapers and periodicals must not only apply and register, but must also obtain permission in order to engage in distribution under a so-called special permit system; only fascist countries have this sort of evil."<打碎法西斯式的出版法 | www.comment-cn.net> See also Mao Zedong's Government Work Report to the Seventh National People's Congress--Discussion of United Government [Mao Zedong zuo qi da zhengzhi baogao--lun lianhe zhengfu], 24 April 45, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 26 April 01,<毛泽东作七大政治报告——《论联合政府》 | past.people.com.cn> which states: "We believe that the following demands are appropriate, and furthermore represent the very minimum. . . . We demand the elimination of all reactionary laws that suppress the rights of the people to expression, the press, assembly, association, ideology, belief and personhood, and allowing the people to obtain full freedoms and rights." See also Karl Marx, "Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates," Rheinische Zeitung, Nos. 135, 139, May 1842, which states: "It is the censored press that has a demoralizing effect. . . . The government hears only its own voice, it knows that it hears only its own voice, yet it harbors the illusion that it hears the voice of the people, and it demands that the people, too, should itself harbor this illusion. Freedom of the press will certainly not be achieved by a crowd of official writers being recruited by you from your ranks."<www.marxists.org> See also, "The Condition of England: II The English Constitution," Frederick Engels, written March 1844, first published in Vorworts!, No. 80, 5 October 1844, wherein Engels defines freedom of the press as "the right that any man may publish his opinion without hindrance and without the previous permission of the government."<www.marxists.org>

13 Jiao Hongchang and Yao Guojian (professors at China University of Politics and Law), "Freedom of Expression," in A Study on the Issues of Ratifying and Implementing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ["Gongmin quanli he zhengzhi quanli guoji gongyue" pizhun yu shishi wenti yanjiu], ed. Chen Guangzhong (Beijing, China Legal System Publishing, 2002), 388.<《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》批准与实施问题研究>

14 UN Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, "International Experts Condemn Curbs on Freedom of Expression and Control Over Media and Journalists," 18 December 03.<www.unhchr.ch> See also UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, "Report on the Mission to the Republic of Korea," E/CN.4/1996/39/Add.1 (1995), 8: "The Special Rapporteur considers that any system of prior restraint on freedom of expression carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity under international human rights law. Any institutionalization of such restraint adds further weight to this presumption."<www.unhchr.ch>

15 Constitutions of Brazil, art. 5(IX), South Korea, art. 21(2). See also the constitutions of: Austria, art. 13(2), The Netherlands, art. 7(1), and Norway, art. 100.

16 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .," and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that: "[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship." Near v. State of Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).<caselaw.lp.findlaw.com> See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988);<caselaw.lp.findlaw.com> and Lovell v. City of Griffin, GA., 303 U.S. 444 (1938).<caselaw.lp.findlaw.com> Similarly, Article 19(1)(a) of India's Constitution states that all citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of speech and expression, and India's Supreme Court has stated that, "It follows that a citizen for propagation of his or her ideas has a right to publish for circulation his views in periodicals, magazines and journals or through the electronic media . . . ." Supreme Court of India, L.I.C. vs. Professor Manubhai D. Shah, (1992) 3 S.C.C. 637.<judis.nic.in>

17 In Sweden, for example, prior restraints on publications are forbidden by Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the Freedom of the Press Act, which states in part that "no publication shall be subject to scrutiny before printing, nor shall the printing thereof be prohibited." Article 5 of Chapter 5 of the Act requires publishers of periodicals to provide the title and place of printing of the periodical, and its publishing schedule, but the government may only refuse registration if the title of the periodical so closely resembles the title of a periodical for which a publishing license has already been issued that the two may easily be confused. The United Kingdom's Newspaper Libel and Registration Act 1881 requires registration, but under the Companies Act of 1985, registration under the Act is not necessary if the publication is owned by a company that is incorporated under corporate law, if the publication is distributed free of charge, and if it is published at intervals exceeding 26 days.

18 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2005, Ethiopia, 8 March 06.

19 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2005, Iran, 8 March 06.

20 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2005, Jordan, 8 March 06.

21 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2005, Syria, 8 March 06.

22 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2005, Uzbekistan, 8 March 06.

23 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2005, Yemen, 8 March 06.

24 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, ch. 2 (Establishment and Administration of Publishing Units).<出版管理条例 | www.cecc.gov>

25 Notice Regarding Prohibiting the Transmission of Harmful Information and Further Regulating Publishing Order [Guanyu jinzhi zhuanbo youhai xinxi jinyibu guifan chuban zhixu de tongzhi], issued 5 November 01: "No one may establish an entity whose primary purpose is to transmit news information and engage in other news publishing activities without permission from the press and publication administration agency."<关于禁止传播有害信息进一步规范出版秩序的通知 | www.cecc.gov>

26 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing, art. 29.<出版管理条例 | www.cecc.gov>

27 Guangdong Press and Publication Administration (Online), "Responsible Person at the General Administration of Press and Publication Book Office Reports on the Previous Year's National Book Publishing Administration Work" [Zongshu tushusi fuzeren tongbao qunian quanguo tushuchuban guanli gongzuo], 24 February 05 (saying that authorities should use the opinions provided when screening the selection of topics to determine the distribution of book numbers, because this "reduces the risks relating to orientation").<总署图书司负责人通报去年全国图书出版管理工作 | www.gdcopyright.org.cn>

28 Article 11(2) of the Regulations on the Administration of Publishing states that publishing work units must have a sponsoring work unit and a managing work unit recognized by the State Council's publishing administration agency.<出版管理条例 | www.cecc.gov> The "sponsoring work unit" must be a government agency of a relatively high level, and the publishing work unit must answer to its sponsoring work unit and managing work unit. Circular Regarding Issuance of the "Temporary Provisions on the Functions of the Sponsoring Work Unit and the Managing Work Unit for Publishing Work Units" [Guanyu fabu "Guanyu chuban danwei de zhuban danwei he zhuguan danwei zhize de zanxing guiding" de tongzhi], issued 29 June 93, arts. 5-6.<关于出版单位的主办单位和主管单位职责的暂行规定 | www.cecc.gov>

29 Cary Huang, "Incomes Up Over 10pc In Urban, Rural Areas," South China Morning Post (Online), 28 Apr 06.<china.scmp.com>

30 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing, art. 11(4).<出版管理条例 | www.cecc.gov>

31 "China Banning Illegal Publications for Overhauling Publications Market, Official Says," Xinhua (Online), 14 May 05.<news.xinhuanet.com>

32 Communication No. 780/1997, UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/780/1997 (2000)<www1.umn.edu>: "In the absence of any explanation justifying the registration requirements [that prior to publishing and disseminating a leaflet with a print run of 200, the publisher must register the publication with the administrative authorities to obtain index and registration numbers] and the measures taken, it is the view of the Committee that these cannot be deemed necessary for the protection of public order (ordre public) or for respect of the rights or reputations of others. The Committee therefore finds that Article 19, paragraph 2, has been violated in the present case."

33 "Officials Ban Dozens of Papers, Seize Thousands of Political Publications, in 2005," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 6;<www.cecc.gov> Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force (Online), "Inner Mongolia Wuhai City Government Suppression of Unauthorized Political Publications, Firm All-Round Line of Defense" [Neimenggu Wuhaishi jinghua chubanwu shichang si dao fangxian zhu de lao], 11 August 05.<内蒙古乌海市净化出版物市场四道防线筑得牢 | www.cecc.gov>

34 "People's Daily Publishes 2005 Censorship Numbers," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2006, 4;<www.cecc.gov> Sui Xiaofei and Qu Zhihong, "China's Publishing Sector's Glorious Development Must Move From Being a Big Country to a Great Country" [Woguo chubanye fanrong fazhan; yao cong chuban daguo zouxiang qiangguo], People's Daily (Online), 25 March 06.<我国出版业繁荣发展 要从出版大国走向强国 | culture.people.com.cn>

35 Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force (Online), "Luliang City, Shandong Province Bans an Illegal Newspaper [Shandongsheng Luliangshi qudi yi feifa baozhi], 9 August 05.<山西省吕梁市取缔一非法报纸 | www.cecc.gov>

36 Hunan Provincial Government (Online), "Hunan Province Bans Three Illegal News Organizations and Two Illegal Periodicals" [Hunan sheng qudi san ge feifa xinwen jigou yiji liang jia feifa baokan], 9 September 05.<湖南省取缔三个非法新闻机构以及两家非法报刊 | www.cecc.gov>

37 Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force, "Inner Mongolia Wuhai City Government Suppression of Unauthorized Political Publications, Firm All-Round Line of Defense."<内蒙古乌海市净化出版物市场四道防线筑得牢 | www.cecc.gov>

38 Article 225 of China's Criminal Law makes it a crime for anyone to commit "illegal acts in business operation and thus disrupt market order."

39 "Writing Their Own Poems and Self-Publishing Them, Two 'Poets' Are Convicted" [Ziji xieshi ziji chuban "shiren" bei panxing], People's Daily (Online), 17 January 04.<自己写诗自己出版 两"诗人"被判刑 | www.cecc.gov>

40 "Farming Woman Imprisoned for Illegally Publishing and Printing Books" [Yinzhi feifa tushu huo xing chufajin], China Court Net (Online), 13 September 04.<印制非法图书 获刑并处罚金 | hnfy.chinacourt.org>

41 "Printing and Publishing an Illegal Periodical: Media Group's Chief Representative Sentenced to Three Years' Imprisonment" [Yinshua chuban feifa qikan chuanmei jituan shouxi daibiao huo xing 3 nian], Legal Evening Report, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 11 August 05.<印刷出版非法期刊 传媒集团首席代表获刑3年 | www.cecc.gov>

42 "New Regulations on Newspapers and Magazines Go Into Effect December 1," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 10;<www.cecc.gov> Provisions on the Administration of Newspaper Publishing [Baozhi chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05;<报纸出版管理规定 | www.cecc.gov> Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing [Qikan chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05.<期刊出版管理规定 | www.cecc.gov>

43 "Guangdong Weekly Reports on How Chinese Authorities Have 'United to Purify the Internet'," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2005, 9;<www.cecc.gov> Li Liang and Yu Li, "14 Government and Party Agencies Unite to 'Purify' the Internet" [14 buwei lianhe "jinghua" hulianwang], Southern Weekend (Online), 18 August 05.<14部委联合“净化”互联网 | www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>

44 All commercial Web sites must obtain a government license. Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00.<互联网信息服务管理办法 | www.cecc.gov> All non-commercial Web site operators must register. Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05.<非经营性互联网信息服务备案管理办法 | www.cecc.gov> Because the MII's registration system gives the government discretion to reject an application based on content (i.e., whether the Web site operator intends to post "news," and if so, whether it is authorized to do so), it is qualitatively different from registration which all Web site operators must undertake with a domain registrar, and constitutes a de facto licensing scheme.

45 "MII Reports China's Government Has Met its Goals in Private Web Site Crackdown," CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2005, 5;<www.cecc.gov> "Ministry of Information Industry: Web Sites That Fail to Register May Be Shut Down," CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2005, 3.<未经备案不得从事非经营性互联网信息服务 | www.cecc.gov> According to China's state-run media, the crackdown actually began in July 2004, when authorities launched a "special project" to shut down pornographic Web sites. In November 2004, after the Party issued a document calling for "increasing work on the administration of the Internet," the 14 departments "carried out a large-scale clean up and reorganization of the Internet, and this activity has continued until today." Li Liang and Yu Li, "14 Government and Party Agencies Unite to 'Purify' the Internet."<14部委联合“净化”互联网 | www.nanfangdaily.com.cn> The MII said in a May 30, 2005, announcement posted on its Web site that its authority to launch the campaign was based on the Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00;<互联网信息服务管理办法 | www.cecc.gov> Ministry of Information Industry (Online), "Ministry of Information Industry Organizes and Launches Work on Web Site Collective Registration" [Xinxi chanyebu zuzhi kaizhan wangzhan jizhong bei'an gongzuo], 30 May 05.<信息产业部组织开展网站集中备案工作 | www.mii.gov.cn> These measures became effective in 2000, however, and the MII did not explain what prompted it to issue the Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services in February 2005 or specify how the measures should be enforced.

46 OpenNet Initiative (Online), "OpenNet Initiative: Bulletin 011--Analysis of China's Non-Commercial Web Site Registration Regulation," 22 February 06.<opennet.net>

47 Ibid.<opennet.net> The Opennet Initiative comprises researchers at the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, the Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge, and the Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University.

48 "MII to Monitor Online Content, Sanction Web Sites That Fail to Register," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 2;<www.cecc.gov> "700,000 Web Sites Already Registered: Three Difficulties in Spotting Illegal Web Sites" [Zhongguo yi you 70 wan jia wangzhan bei'an faxian weifa wangzhan you san nandian], Xinhua (Online), 29 December 05.<中国已有70万家网站备案发现违法网站有三难点 | www.xhby.net>

49 "Authorities Begin to Sanction, Permanently Shut Down Web Sites That Failed to Register With the Government," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2005, 1;<www.cecc.gov> Li Liang and Yu Li, "14 Government and Party Agencies Unite to Purify the Internet."<14部委联合“净化”互联网 | www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>

50 "Call for Unregistered Web Sites to Be Shut Down" [Yaoqiu guanbi reng wei bei'an de wangzhan], Boxun (Online), 13 December 05.<中国：要求关闭仍未备案的网站 | peacehall.com> Xinhua reported that Shanghai registered over 150,000 Web sites by October, and that "many" Web sites were shut down for failing to register. "Shanghai Shuts Down 150,000 Illegal Web Sites that Fail to Register" [Shanghai wangzhan yu 15 wan feifa wangzhan bei zanting jieru], Xinhua (Online), 29 December 05.<上海网站逾15万 非法网站被暂停接入 | www.xinhuanet.com> The report also stated that an audit by the Shanghai Communications Administration (SCA) had found that the number of Web sites had increased by 22,000 by December 2005, and a "significant proportion" had not undertaken registration. In response, the SCA contacted the main Internet service providers (defined as anyone who provides "public, shared information to Internet users") in Shanghai, and demanded that they shut down the unregistered Web sites. "MII to Monitor Online Content, Sanction Web Sites That Fail to Register," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 2.<www.cecc.gov>

51 "Government Agencies Issue New Regulations Restricting News Reporting on the Internet," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 4;<www.cecc.gov> Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05.<互联网新闻信息服务管理规定 | www.cecc.gov>

52 These were: "Aegean Sea" [Aiqinhai], "China Worker Net" [Zhongguo gongren wang], "Worker, Farmer, Soldier BBS" [Gong, nong, bing BBS], and "Communist Party People Net" [Gongchandang ren wang]. "Groups Petition Government to Review Constitutionality of Internet News Rules," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 6;<www.cecc.gov> "Petition on Behalf of 'the Aegean Sea Web Site Et. Al. to Repeal Rules on the Administration of Internet News Information Services' " [Yaoqiu chedi feichu "hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding"], Signature Net (Online), 28 March 06.<要求彻底废除《互联网新闻信息服务管理规定》 | www.cecc.gov>

53 The cities included Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Beijing. "Qingdao Internet Police: 30 Percent of Web Sites in the City Are Illegal" [Shi gonganju wang jian zhidui: quanshi wangzhan sancheng shi heihu ewang pingan], Qingdao News (Online), 7 July 05;<市公安局网监支队：全市网站三成是黑户 | www.qingdaonews.com> "Guangzhou Requires Private Web Sites to Register with Police, Receive Government Permission to Post News" [Guangzhou: geren wangzhan xu dao jingfang bei'an kanzai xinwen xu pizhun], Xinhua (Online), 29 April 05;<广州:个人网站须到警方备案 刊载新闻须批准 | www.cecc.gov> "Beijing Requiring Small and Medium Web Sites to Register with Public Security Office" [Beijing gonganju yaoqiu bingdu wangzhan ji zhongxiao wangzhan dao shudi bei'an], Xinhua (Online), 2 June 05.<北京公安局要求病毒网站及中小网站到属地备案 | news.xinhuanet.com> Officials cited provisions of the Measures for the Administration of Security Protection of Computer Information Networks with International Interconnections [Jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang anquan baohu guanli banfa], issued 30 December 97,<计算机信息网络国际联网安全保护管理办法 | www.cecc.gov> as authorizing this registration requirement, but did not explain why the government had chosen to begin enforcing those provisions at that time, when the Measures were enacted in 1997. Circular Regarding Centralized Handling of Internet Web Site Registration [Guanyu jizhong banli hulian wangzhan anquan bei'an de tongzhi], issued 28 April 05, art. 1.<关于集中办理互联网站安全备案的通知 | www.cecc.gov>

54 Provisions on Internet Security Protection Technology Measures went into effect on March 1, 2006. "New Rules to Increase Government Surveillance of Internet News Go Into Effect," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 16;<www.cecc.gov> Provisions on Internet Security Protection Technology Measures [Hulian wang anquan baohu jishu cuoshi guiding], issued 28 December 05.<互联网安全保护技术措施规定 | www.cecc.gov>

55 Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards [Xinwen jizhezheng guanli banfa], issued 10 January 05;<新闻记者证管理办法 | www.cecc.gov>