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The CECC has prepared the following HTML version of its 2006 Annual Report for the readers' convenience. If you would like to view the official Government Printing Office text of the Annual Report, please refer to the Adobe Acrobat PDF or Plain Text Format versions. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 2006 ANNUAL REPORT V. Monitoring Compliance with Human RightsV(a) Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression Findings
Government Censorship in China Government censorship in China, while not total, is pervasive and highly effective, and denies Chinese citizens the freedom of the press guaranteed to them in the Chinese Constitution.1 As 13 Chinese scholars, lawyers, and editors wrote in a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao after the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) shut down a popular news weekly in February 2006, the CPD "manipulates and controls the range of speech, and it has become the sole criterion for measuring truth."2 Another group, composed of 13 former senior government, Party, and news media officials, wrote in an open letter regarding the same event that the CPD has "stripped away freedom of speech in order to quash public opinion."3 The Chinese government has imprisoned journalists who provide news to foreigners, such as Zhao Yan, Shi Tao, and Ching Cheong. Editors of publications that criticize government policies, such as Yang Bin of the Beijing News and Li Datong of the China Youth Daily, have been dismissed. The government blocks the Web sites and radio and television broadcasts of foreign news organizations, such as those of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Asia, and the Voice of America. In 2005, the government banned dozens of newspapers and confiscated almost one million "illegal" political publications. Beginning in May 2005, the government blocked the Commission's Web site from being viewed in China. The heads of government and Party agencies responsible for enforcing China's media regulations emphasize press control, not press freedom:
Despite pervasive censorship, state control of domestic news media is now less severe than before the "reform and opening up" period began in the late 1970s. Modern telecommunications technologies such as the Internet, cell phones, and satellite broadcasts allow Chinese citizens access to more information sources, both state-controlled and non-state-controlled. More information is also available as a result of a dynamic domestic newspaper and book publishing industry. China also has a thriving underground publishing industry, and citizens may easily purchase many banned books from unlicensed publishers and retailers.8 By forcing unlicensed publishers to break the law, however, the government erodes respect for intellectual property rights and the rule of law because illegal publishers are also de facto copyright violators (the illegal works are "pirated," and authors cannot collect royalties on them) and must bribe officials to keep operating. Chinese leaders and officials maintain that citizens enjoy freedom of the press, and that government restrictions on that freedom conform to international standards.9 While the Party does not screen content before publication to the same degree as in the past, the government continues to impose administrative restrictions on who may publish and what they may publish ("prior restraints") that do not conform to the international human rights standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).11 These standards require the elimination of registration systems for the print media that grant government agencies the discretion to approve, deny, or rescind licenses based on the political and financial qualifications of the applicant ("licensing schemes").12 These standards also prohibit government restrictions on the publication of political and religious ideas and information, other than restrictions that are both prescribed by law and necessary to protect an important state interest ("content-based restrictions"). As two Chinese legal scholars noted in their study of the ICCPR: This principle [that the ICCPR prohibits prior restraints] requires that government power may not be employed to suppress expressive activities before they are carried out, and no licensing measures or ideological content restrictions may be imposed on speech, books, periodicals, or radio or television programs prior to their dissemination, publication, distribution, or broadcast.13 The Chinese government imposes a strict licensing scheme on all newspaper, magazine, and book publishing and printing (public and private, for-profit and non-profit). The government uses this licensing scheme, as well as post-publication punishments, to enforce content-based restrictions that include prohibitions on the publication of political opinion and religious literature. These content-based restrictions on political opinion and religious literature are neither prescribed by law nor necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. Government and Party leaders state that these restrictions are intended to protect the ideological and political dominance of the Party. Government Licensing for Print MediaArticle 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that people enjoy the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The Chinese government's licensing scheme for print media does not conform to international standards for freedom of the press. Although no absolute international standard prescribes what constitutes freedom of the press, international human rights standards set forth a minimum prerequisite: no legal system can be said to respect freedom of the press if it subjects the print media to any prior restraint through a licensing scheme. In 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression issued a joint declaration saying that licensing schemes are unnecessary and subject to abuse.14 Many nations, both developed and developing, have abolished licensing schemes for the print media. For example, the constitutions of many countries, including those of Brazil and South Korea, explicitly prohibit licensing schemes.15 In other countries, such as the United States and India, the right to publish without first having to obtain government authorization is protected through a combination of constitutional and court-made law.16 In those countries with registration requirements, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, the government does not have the discretion to refuse registration.17 The Chinese government, like a number of governments in other countries, including Ethiopia,18 Iran,19 Jordan,20 Syria,21 Uzbekistan,22 and Yemen,23 imposes a strict licensing scheme on the print media.24 No one may legally publish a book, newspaper, or magazine in China unless they have a license from the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP).25 Chinese law requires that every book, newspaper, and magazine have a unique serial number, and the GAPP maintains exclusive control over the distribution of these numbers.26 GAPP officials have explicitly linked the allotment of book numbers to the political orientation of publishers.27 The Chinese government's licensing scheme includes substantive conditions on who may publish. To obtain a license to publish news, applicants must have a government sponsor.28 Although the average annual income in China is less than 10,000 yuan (US$1,250),29 the government also restricts the right to publish to those who can afford to invest at least 300,000 yuan (US$37,500) in registered capital.30 The Chinese government says that its licensing scheme is necessary to regulate the publishing market,31 but such reasoning does not conform to international human rights standards.32 Chinese authorities banned 79 newspapers and periodicals and seized 169 million publications in 2005.33 From 2003 to 2005, the government canceled the registrations of 202 news bureaus and shut down 73 others.34 Other examples of the government using its licensing authority to violate citizens' freedom of the press in the past year include:
New rules governing the publication of newspapers and magazines in China went into effect in December 2005.42 In addition to restricting the right to publish newspapers and magazines to government licensees, the rules also establish post-publication content screening and review systems. The rules require provincial-level GAPP offices to submit regular written reports to the GAPP and conduct annual "verification and examination" reviews. The rules stipulate that publishing, printing, and distribution enterprises may not provide services to any newspaper or magazine unless they have passed the previous year's inspection. The rules also require each newspaper and magazine publisher to submit regular reports to the GAPP, as well as annual "self-examination reports" with copies of its most recently published editions. The rules require the GAPP to assess the "publishing quality" of newspapers and magazines, and empower it to take the following actions against any publisher whose contents it deems incorrect or in violation of regulations:
The Chinese government's press licensing scheme also extends to the Internet. According to the state-run media: Since 1996, 14 agencies, including the Central Propaganda Department, State Council Information Office, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Culture, and the General Administration of Press and Publication have participated in the administration of the Internet, have promulgated nearly 50 laws and regulations, and have put together the world's most extensive and comprehensive regulatory system for Internet administration. One scholar who specializes in researching Internet Law [said] China's emphasis on, and effectiveness of administration over, the problem of Internet security is "rare in this world."43 The government requires all Web sites in China to be either licensed by, or registered with, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).44 Web sites that fail to register or obtain a license may be shut down and their operators fined.45 As part of the registration process, the MII requires anyone who posts news on a Web site to confirm that the Chinese government has authorized him or her to do so.46 According to the OpenNet Initiative, "In large measure, the registration regulation is designed to induce website owners to forego potentially sensitive or prohibited content, such as political criticism, by linking their identities to that content. The regulation operates through a chilling effect."47 In August 2005, the state-controlled news media reported that over 700,000 Web sites had registered,48 and that authorities had shut down a "large number of Web sites," using "specialized software to render them inaccessible."49 In December 2005, the MII issued a notice to Internet service providers saying, "The campaign to rectify unregistered Web sites has entered a period of severe sanctions," and demanded they shut down all unregistered Web sites.50 In September 2005, the MII and the State Council Information Office promulgated new rules tightening the government's control over Internet news services.51 These rules prohibit anyone from using the Internet to post or transmit news reports or commentary relating to politics and economics, or military, foreign, and public affairs, without a government license. Chinese authorities used these rules to shut down at least five Web sites before the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which concluded in March 2006.52 The MII crackdown coincided with a similar crackdown on the Internet by branches of China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in major cities.53 Throughout 2005 and 2006, public security bureaus in cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and Chongqing ordered Web sites to register with public security authorities or be shut down. In addition, in December 2005, the MPS promulgated new rules54 requiring Internet portals, Web sites, Web logs ("blogs"), and hosting services to record and retain any content that news providers post on their Web sites, as well as the time it was posted. Finally, the Chinese government instituted a licensing scheme for journalists in 2005,55 even though such schemes are incompatible with international human rights standards for freedom of the press.56 In January 2005, the GAPP issued two new regulations limiting "lawful" news gathering and editorial activities to government-licensed journalists.57 In March 2005, the GAPP, Central Propaganda Department, and State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) jointly issued new rules specifying that journalists and editors must "support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, support the socialist system . . ., respect the Party's news propaganda discipline, [and] protect the interests of the Party and the government."58 SARFT used its authority to accredit television hosts to shut down the television show of well-known economist Lang Xianping (also known as Larry Lang) in February 2006 on the grounds that he lacked required government certification.59 Restrictions on Political and Religious Publishing The Chinese government's restrictions on the publication of political opinion and religious literature do not conform to international human rights standards for freedom of the press and freedom of religion. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the same article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provide that people enjoy the right to publish "information and ideas," and the ICCPR adds "of all kinds." International human rights standards permit restrictions on the press, provided they are prescribed by law and are necessary to prevent the dissemination of speech that is obscene or defamatory, or that poses a realistic threat to national security, or that is false and threatens public order.60 The Chinese government's restrictions on the press are not clearly prescribed in national law. In addition, the government uses discretionary and extralegal powers to restrict the publication of information and ideas that conflict with the Party's political and religious orthodoxy or that threaten its control over political and religious ideology. National media regulations include vague and sweeping prohibitions on the publication of material that "harms the honor or the interests of the nation,"61 "spreads rumors,"62 or "harms the credibility of a government agency."63 The Criminal Law punishes acts said to constitute "rumor mongering" to incite subversion or the overthrow of the socialist system with sentences of up to five years' imprisonment.64 Nothing in Chinese law specifies what constitutes the "interests of the nation," a "rumor," or "harming credibility." Chinese laws and regulations provide lists of what may be deemed a state secret, but these lists are broad and vague, encompassing essentially all matters of public concern.65 Moreover, Chinese law does not require the government to show that anyone committing any of these acts knew that the materials they published fell into one of these categories.66 Finally, Chinese courts do not require the government to show that the publication of the materials in question caused, or could have caused, any negative effect on the national interest.67 Government agencies responsible for implementing and interpreting national security do not balance government interests against a citizen's right to freedom of the press, and instead consistently interpret laws in favor of the government. In recent years, more than 70 percent of all cases of criminal disclosure of state secrets were the result of a "faulty understanding of state secrets."68 None of the 17 or more central government and Party agencies responsible for enforcing and interpreting national security and state secrets laws as they relate to freedom of the press has provided any public guidance about when it will or will not censor publications or pursue criminal complaints against publishers.69 In 2004, the Chinese government shut down 338 publications for publishing "internal" information.70 In addition, the Chinese judiciary is not independent from Party control and does not issue instructive opinions in criminal trials (see discussion of Huang Qi below). [For more information on the Chinese judiciary, see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice.] The Chinese government does not articulate content-based restrictions in statutes and court judgments, but instead relies upon detaining writers, indoctrinating journalists, and banning publications to encourage companies, institutions, and individuals to "choose" not to publicize views that a government official might deem politically unacceptable.71 An example of the Chinese government's indifference to freedom of the press is the case of Huang Qi. The Chengdu Intermediate People's Court sentenced Huang to five years' imprisonment in May 2003 for inciting subversion by operating a Web site that included articles on democracy and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests. The court's decision did not provide examples of any subversive language, and made no attempt to show that the articles on the Web site had caused, or were likely to cause, a threat to China's national security. Moreover, the court did not place any constitutional limitations on the authority of the government to criminalize certain types of speech, or balance the need to protect national security with Huang Qi's right to freedom of expression.72 Another example of the Chinese government's opaque national security content-based restrictions occurred in October 2003, when a Shanghai court sentenced Zheng Enchong to three years' imprisonment for "illegally providing state secrets to an entity or individual outside China." Zheng faxed a copy of a Xinhua news report to a U.S. NGO to get it published abroad.73 In rejecting Zheng's appeal, the Shanghai High People's Court said that, while the document in question included no markings indicating it was a "state secret," Zheng "should have known" that it was a state secret because it had been published in a Xinhua publication called "Internal Selections." Xinhua is a government agency that reports directly to the State Council, and if an article included information that was a state secret, Xinhua had both the authority and the legal obligation to have it classified.74 Instead, Xinhua officials labeled the article "internal," and according to the Shanghai High People's Court, officials with the local state secrets bureau had it "certified" as a state secret after Zheng was detained.75 Stories from "Internal Selections," however, are freely available on Party Web sites, including those of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee.76 The case of Zhao Yan, a researcher for the New York Times, is a more recent example. Authorities detained Zhao in September 2004 for "illegally providing state secrets to an entity or individual outside China." Sources said the "state secret" was information that former President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had offered to resign as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. His resignation was later reported in the official press.77 [See Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, for a discussion of Zhao's arbitrary and extended detention.] Chinese courts cannot consider Chinese citizens' constitutional right to freedom of the press in subversion and state secrets trials [see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice--Constitutional Review]. Some cases have been reported, however, in which a court found insufficient evidence to hold a trial on the charges brought against a defendant. Such decisions are the result of international pressure rather than an interest in upholding the rights of the accused. For example, Chinese authorities detained Liu Di (also known as the "Stainless Steel Mouse") in November 2002 after she posted a series of essays on the Internet discussing political reform and criticizing the Party. They released her in November 2003 without charges following widespread international pressure. The Chinese government also uses indoctrination as an extralegal means of restricting publishing of political opinions and religious literature. A January 2006 General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) report described an example of press indoctrination, saying that in 2005 the government carried out on-the-job training of Party officials holding leadership positions at news publishers, and "deeply and meticulously performed worker and staff ideological and political work" in order to "safeguard stability and unity."78 Xinhua reported in May 2006 that the government and the Party expect Chinese journalists to be "politically strong" and "strictly disciplined."79 The All China Journalists Association held a conference in April 2006 to study and implement the Party's propaganda campaign on "Socialist Glory and Shame."80 The state-run news media reported that conference participants expressed a desire to reject "capitalist liberalism" and to accept "serving the general work of the Party and the nation" as the "sacred mission" of journalists.81 Western news media have reported that the Beijing Municipal Information Office, an agency that reports to the Central Propaganda Department, summons executives from a dozen Internet news Web sites every Friday morning to attend a meeting. Chen Hua, Director of the Internet Propaganda Management Department, usually runs this meeting. According to one Western news report, "[Chen] or one of his colleagues tells the executives what news they should keep off their sites and what items they should highlight in the week ahead."82 The Chinese government and the Party often carry out censorship through informal and opaque procedures that are not subject to legal oversight or restraint. For example, according to Wang Yi, a law professor in Sichuan province, public security officials in Beijing had his Web site shut down by calling an employee of the Chinese Internet company Blogchina at home and ordering him to do it.83 Chinese authorities used similar extralegal measures to censor two of China's most popular publications. The first incident occurred in December 2005, when the Party removed editor-in-chief Yang Bin and two deputy editors at the Beijing News, as part of an effort to curb that newspaper's aggressive reporting style.84 Central Propaganda Department director Liu Yunshan had told officials at an April 2005 meeting that "[t]he South has a newspaper that disgusts a lot of officials in the North, and the North has a paper that disgusts a lot of officials in the South."85 An unnamed source told a Western news magazine that the "northern paper" was the Beijing News, and a Beijing News editor noted that so many cadres had traveled to Beijing to complain about the paper that it was under "heavy" pressure to conform to new restrictions on "extra-territorial" investigative reporting.86 In December 2005, propaganda officials singled out the Beijing News for criticism at a meeting where it was decided that "metropolitan newspapers" such as the Beijing News should "strengthen Party control" and obey propaganda officials.87 Officials have said that the Beijing News "committed errors in the orientation of opinion," and Liu Yunshan concluded that the Beijing News' "problems" must be "fundamentally resolved." A second example of official circumvention of the law to silence critics occurred in January 2006, when Party officials ordered the China Youth Daily (CYD) to suspend publication of its Freezing Point weekly because it had published an essay on Chinese history textbooks that officials claimed contradicted historical facts, violated news propaganda discipline, harmed the national sentiments of the Chinese people, harmed the image of the CYD, and had a detrimental social influence.88 The officials also ordered the CYD Publishing House to submit a report criticizing Li Erliang, CYD editor-in-chief, and Li Datong, editor-in-chief of the Freezing Point weekly. On February 16, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Qin Gang defended the Party's decision.89 On the same day, the Communist Party Youth League Publishing House Party Committee announced the conditions under which Freezing Point would resume publication. The CYD was required to dismiss Li Datong from his position as editor-in-chief, and Lu Yuegang from his position as deputy editor. In addition, it had to publish an essay in the first issue of the re-launched Freezing Point weekly that would refute the earlier objectionable essay.90 Government and Party intimidation, harassment, and imprisonment of writers and journalists create a chilling effect on freedom of speech that results in self-censorship. For instance, Internet and software companies in China must either employ censorship technologies in their products or risk a government order to close. Although no Chinese law or regulation forbids specific words, companies such as Tencent and MSN embed a list of banned words and phrases in their Internet applications, including "freedom" and "democracy."91 Chinese search engines such as Baidu, and the China-based search engines of Yahoo!, MSN, and Google filter search results, including those relating to the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and human rights. A senior corporate official from Google testified to the House Committee on International Relations in February 2006 that one of the factors leading to the company's decision to filter search results for its China-based service was: Many queries, especially politically sensitive queries, were not making it through to Google's servers. And access became often slow and unreliable, meaning that our service in China was not something we felt proud of. Even though we weren't doing any self-censorship, our results were being filtered anyway, and our service was being actively degraded on top of that. Indeed, at some times users were even being redirected to local Chinese search engines.92 Google designed its Chinese-language news aggregation service so that users in China cannot view materials from dissident news Web sites that Chinese authorities have blocked. Google has said that it will not deploy e-mail and blogging services in China because the company cannot meet its own standards for the privacy and security of users' sensitive information.93 The Party and the government are seeking to expand self-censorship by instituting "industry self-discipline." During an August 2005 speech, Liu Yunshan called on propaganda officials to "merge propaganda work into the self-supervision of mass groups and professional organizations," and said that requiring professional organizations to "tightly integrate professional discipline and restraint with professional moral restraint" will allow employees to "voluntarily" accept government supervision. In April 2006, 14 major Internet portals, including Sina.com, Sohu.com, Baidu.com, and Yahoo!'s Chinese Web site, issued a joint proposal calling for the Chinese Internet industry to censor harmful information, spread the ideas of President Hu Jintao, and voluntarily accept government supervision.94 Shortly after the Internet portals issued their proposal, Internet information providers and industry groups throughout China made similar announcements. The state-run media portrayed the Internet portals' participation as spontaneous and voluntary, but both the GAPP and State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) have either used or advocated the use of "self-discipline" agreements and other informal methods to control the press in China. For example, in April 2006, GAPP Director Long Xinmin wrote that the government should establish an administrative system for newspapers and magazines characterized by Party leadership, government administration, and industry self-discipline.95 In September 2005, SARFT issued a notice saying that radio announcers and television hosts would "voluntarily" obey professional ethical standards that SARFT had issued in December 2004.96 International human rights standards obligate the Chinese government to respect the rights of its citizens to publish political ideas or opinions, even when they are critical of the government.97 Chinese government and Party officials have said, however, that they will not tolerate the publication of political ideas or opinions with which they disagree:
The State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) issued "propaganda priorities" in 2005 that said broadcasters should "refuse all incorrect ideological and political perspectives and expression."101 The GAPP has said that it will shut down publications with "severe political errors,"102 and in 2005, the Chinese government confiscated 996,000 publications because of their political content.103 Regulations require that everything published in China must adhere to Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory104 and prohibit the publication of anything that violates the propaganda discipline of the Party105 or contradicts the guiding policies of the Party.106 In addition, Chinese law requires that books and essays about Party and national government leaders must be "solemn and discreet," and their point of view must conform to the spirit of various Party documents.107 To enforce these ideological restrictions, Chinese regulations require that publishers submit to the GAPP and the Central Propaganda Department a list of any "important topic selections" that they plan to publish.108 Only publishing houses that the GAPP specifically approves may publish works about government and Party leaders, foreign relations, religion, the history of the People's Republic of China, and the history of the People's Liberation Army.109 In February 2005, a GAPP official warned in a report: If publishers are careless about strictly screening topic selection, then serious orientation and quality problems will occur. . . . Therefore, publishers' screening of the selection of topics is not merely a professional matter, but rather is a serious political responsibility. Therefore, topic selection screening is a political system.110 The GAPP report also said that publishers must carry out registration procedures for all selections relating to politics, the military, security, foreign affairs, religion, ethnicities, and "other sensitive issues." In addition, the report also noted that it is illegal to publish anything on these topics that has not been reported to, and approved by, authorities. New rules governing the publication of newspapers and periodicals that went into effect in December 2005111 include requirements that these publications must "adhere to Marxism-Leninism," "follow correct guidelines of public opinion and publication orientation," and foster a "good atmosphere for building socialism with Chinese characteristics." The rules also require newspapers and periodicals to obey unspecified "relevant regulations" when publishing articles that relate to "important state policies" and ethnic and religious affairs. SARFT requires screenplays that depict major historic events and important leaders and their families to be approved by both the government and the Party.112 SARFT issued regulations in April 2006113 that removed the previous requirement that television producers obtain government approval for dramas, but programs relating to modern Chinese history must still have government approval.114 In addition, anyone wishing to film television programs with content relating to "important or sensitive political issues, the military, foreign affairs, the Party's United Front, religion, ethnicities, the administration of justice, public security, education, and famous people" must first request an "opinion" from the relevant department at the provincial level or higher. Government and Party intolerance of the independent political views of citizens is particularly apparent before and during government and Party plenary meetings and some national holidays. In the weeks before the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which concluded in March 2006, Chinese officials took the following measures (in addition to the Web site closings that were described previously):
During the last year Chinese authorities have continued to silence writers, journalists, and Web sites for expressing political ideas or opinions with which they disagree. In October, an Anhui court upheld Zhang Lin's sentence of five years' imprisonment for subverting state power in connection with articles he posted on the Internet and a radio interview he gave.118 Chinese authorities detained and imprisoned several others, including Yang Tianshui, Guo Qizhen, and Li Yuanlong for publishing articles on foreign Web sites criticizing the government and the Party.119 During the run-up to the annual plenary sessions, Chinese authorities shut down the Aegean Sea [Aiqinhai] Web site, as well as four other sites that had complained on behalf of local workers.120 In June, authorities shut down two of China's major Internet portals, Sina.com and Sohu.com, for several days to allow the Internet portals to upgrade their censorship capabilities after authorities found that the Internet portals failed to filter certain key words deemed politically harmful.121 In July, the Beijing Communications Administration shut down the "Century China" Web site, a popular Internet discussion forum for commentary on political, historical, and cultural issues.122 In August, authorities shut down the "Polls" Web site and revoked its license after the Web site posted a poll asking visitors whether the General Secretary of the Communist Party should be chosen from among several candidates in differential voting.123 International human rights standards protect the printing and distribution of religious literature as a fundamental human right.124 The Chinese government asserts that its protection of freedom of religious belief "is basically in accordance with the main contents of [relevant] international documents and conventions," and that everyone in China "should have the freedom to compile and distribute printed materials pertaining to religion or belief."125 Only government-licensed printing enterprises may print such materials, however, and then only with approval from the provincial-level religious affairs bureau and a certificate of approval from the press and publication administration.126 Printing enterprises in China may print religious publications for in-house use by customers, but the printing enterprise must first receive approval from provincial-level religious and publishing authorities.127 Non-religious publications only require printing approval from publishing authorities at the county level.128 Publishing regulations mandate government authorization and screening of books and news reports that mention religious issues.129 [See Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion.] Chinese authorities confiscated 4.62 million items of Falun Gong and "other cult organization propaganda material" in 2005.130 This included the confiscation of 9,860 printed materials in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region that were either illegal publications of a religious nature, Falun Gong materials, or publications related to "feudal superstitions."131 In addition, authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region confiscated 54 "Dalai Lama splittist group reactionary publications."132 In addition to confiscating religious publications, the Chinese government also has fined, detained, and imprisoned citizens for publishing, printing, and distributing religious literature without government permission. In November and December 1999, officials detained and arrested Jiang Sunian, an unregistered Catholic priest from Wenzhou diocese in Zhejiang province who had published hymnals.133 Officials charged Jiang with illegal publishing.134 In April 2000, a court convicted Jiang under Article 225 of the Criminal Law, assessed a fine of 270,000 yuan (US$32,000), and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. Officials released Jiang in December 2003.135 In November 2005, a Beijing court sent Cai Zhuohua, a pastor of six house churches in Beijing, and two of his family members to prison under Article 225 of the Criminal Law for printing and giving away Bibles and other Christian literature without government permission.136 In Anhui province, house church pastor Wang Zaiqing was arrested in May 2006 on the same charges. During the last year Chinese authorities have continued to detain people who express religious ideas or opinions which they consider incorrect. Chinese authorities detained documentary filmmaker Hao Wu for 140 days after they discovered him shooting a documentary about China's unregistered house churches.137 In July 2006, authorities shut down two blogs maintained by the popular Tibetan poet and writer Oezer, which she believed was a response to her posting a photograph of the Dalai Lama.138 In August 2006, authorities detained journalist Zan Aizong for one week after he posted reports on foreign Web sites about detentions of Protestants who were protesting the destruction of a church in Xiaoshan city, Zhejiang province.139 International human rights standards prohibit content-based restrictions on the press except those necessary to protect the rights and reputations of others and to meet the requirements for morality, national security, and public order in a democratic society.140 The Chinese government and the Communist Party exceed these allowances, however, and control and censor the press to impose ideological uniformity. In one of his first speeches as head of the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), Long Xinmin told officials attending a national conference in December 2005 to "maintain a high degree of uniformity with the political ideology of the Party Central Committee under Comrade Hu Jintao as Secretary, and insist on never wavering from Marxism as the guiding principle of press and publication work."141 Liu Yunshan called on propaganda officials to leverage the advantage provided by the large circulation and distribution of the state-run news media to guide public opinion in an "intimate, natural, quiet, and unobtrusive manner."142 Shi Feng has said that investigative reporting must "serve the work of the Party and the government."143 In September 2005, the Guangming Daily published an editorial saying: [I]rresponsible expression online easily brings with it ideological confusion, and creates a severe challenge for college students' political ideological education. An important and pressing question for university political ideological education is how to use positive and healthy ideological culture to capture the Internet battlefield and prevent people with ulterior motives from using the Internet to disseminate incorrect ideology and information, and resist infiltration by enemy forces and cult organizations.144 Government and Party leaders also have said that they intend to co-opt modern communications technologies such as the Internet and mobile communications, and have called on officials to ensure that their propaganda reaches newly emerging social groups.145 Liu Yunshan noted that Chinese society is becoming increasingly complex as it shifts from one dominated by people employed in state-run enterprises to one in which more and more people work for private enterprises.146 Given this shifting demographic, Liu said that Party propagandists must "expand the targets of propaganda work" to new groups, such as young intellectuals, and "troubled" groups, such as unemployed workers, migrant workers, and farmers who have lost their land.147 The Party also focuses political propaganda on Chinese youth. In late 2005, the Party journal Seeking Truth called on Party cadres to focus on guiding the organization of college student groups,148 and the Guangming Daily published an editorial saying that schools should work to form "united and positive online public opinion" by organizing "ranks of online commentators."149 Some Chinese universities have also instituted student-run monitoring groups to remove offensive content, including political dissent, from university Internet forums.150 In December 2004, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) issued ethical guidelines requiring television editors, reporters, and hosts to be loyal to, and carry out the work of, the Party.151 Later the same month, SARFT announced that it would require television stations to increase control over what television interviewers say on the air, and only broadcast programs that "comply with propaganda discipline" produced by government-licensed production companies and screened by relevant officials.152 In March 2005, the Central Propaganda Department, the GAPP, and SARFT jointly issued regulations requiring news reporting and editing personnel to support the leadership of the Party, focus on "correct propaganda" as their guiding principle, and have a firm grasp of "correct guidance of public opinion."153 In April 2005, SARFT issued "Interim Implementation Rules for Administration of Those Employed as Radio and Television News Reporters and Editors," saying: "It is necessary to instruct news reporting and editing personnel to strengthen their political consciousness."154 In September 2005, SARFT issued a notice requiring television announcers and hosts to increase their study of political theory, improve their political character and political proficiency, guide people with correct public opinion, passionately love the motherland, serve the greater interests of the work of the Party and the government, and implement the Party's "line, principles, and policies."155 The same month, SARFT also issued a notice warning that reports relating to politics and government policies must be handled carefully to avoid "problems." In addition, to "ensure the correct guidance of public opinion," radio and television broadcasters must receive approval from SARFT before making any "large-scale live broadcast reports of significant events . . . especially those live broadcast reports of activities chaired by central leading cadres."156 The notice also requires all broadcasters to be sensitive to "political" issues and to screen live broadcasts to "ensure their orientation is correct." The government and the Party remain concerned that Chinese citizens have increased access to foreign sources of information that may dilute the Party's control over public opinion. Senior officials portray the news and information media as a battlefield for the Party's propaganda work that must either be occupied or lost to Western countries. For example, Liu Yunshan has called on Party propagandists to learn how to open to the outside world but prevent "Western enemy forces" from using their "economic and technical superiority to carry out ideological infiltration and cultural expansion" in order to "Westernize and divide" China.157 Shi Feng has said the government must not abandon the battlefield of public opinion, and has complained that, despite strict government prohibitions on private and foreign investment in newspaper and periodical publishing, people continue to "illegally enter the newspaper and periodical publication domain," and that illegal publishers are a "serious threat" to the Party's ability to use propaganda to influence ideology.158 The Supreme People's Court also supports censorship to prevent Chinese citizens from having access to "foreign" political ideas. In 1998, the same year it issued a judicial interpretation expanding the scope of Article 225 of China's Criminal Law to include unauthorized publishing,159 it warned China's judges, "Foreign enemy forces are using publishing as a channel to carry out infiltration and aggravation of our ideology and culture, and there are numerous publications with political problems circulating within the country's borders."160 The Chinese government attempts to prevent its citizens from having access to uncensored political ideas and information by banning the general distribution of foreign newspapers, news magazines, and television news programs, and by restricting the ability of foreign news agencies to distribute news domestically. In November 2005, Shi Zongyuan, then Director of the GAPP, said that Chinese authorities had halted plans to allow foreign newspapers to print in China because of concerns raised by the recent "color revolutions" in former Soviet republics.161 Also in 2005, the GAPP introduced internal restrictions on foreign magazines, limiting approvals to science and technology publications.162 In October 2004, SARFT issued regulations prohibiting joint ventures from producing programs on "political news."163 In March 2005, SARFT issued an interpretive notice on these regulations that further limits foreign companies to investing in a single joint venture, saying: [W]e must control the contents of all products of joint ventures in a practical manner, understand the political inclinations and background of foreign joint venture parties, and in this way prevent harmful foreign ideology and culture from entering the realm of our television program production through joint investment and cooperation.164 In September 2006, Xinhua issued new rules prohibiting foreign news agencies from distributing news to Chinese citizens without government permission.165 The new rules require foreign news agencies to be licensed by Xinhua and to submit all articles to a government-approved agency for distribution.166 The new rules give Xinhua the authority to select the news and information that foreign news agencies release, and to delete any information that the government has banned.167 [For information on the commercial implications of the new rules, see Section VII(d)--Commercial Rule of Law and the Impact of the WTO.] To prevent Chinese citizens from using television and radio to access ideas and opinions that may conflict with the Party line, the government jams programming offered by the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The government also has enacted regulations that restrict private satellite dish ownership and only permit foreign television news from broadcasters that are "friendly" to China and that offer their programs through government-controlled channels.169 In August 2005, SARFT issued three notices restricting Chinese citizens' access to foreign television and radio content.166 In April 2006, SARFT issued a circular170 repeating the restrictions on the dissemination of foreign news reports that were first put in place in 2002.171 Both circulars prohibit local television stations from using news footage taken from foreign satellite programs and require them to use only international news reports provided by China Central Television and China Radio International. The new circular said these restrictions are required to "ensure correct orientation of public opinion," because some foreign wire services and news media have distributed international news to local television stations with "blatant political intentions." The circular calls on television regulators to "firmly establish political consciousness" and "increasingly bring the administration of international news within the administration of propaganda work." Chinese officials attempt to prevent citizens who use the Internet from gaining access to ideas and opinions that the government and Party cannot censor. In February 2006, Liu Zhengrong, Deputy Chief of the Internet Affairs Bureau of the State Council Information Office, said Chinese citizens can access the Web freely, except for "a very few" foreign Web sites that are blocked because their contents mostly involve pornography or terrorism.172 According to one study, however, Chinese authorities operate "the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world" to prevent access to "sensitive" religious and political material on the Internet.173 The central government blocks the Web sites of foreign news providers such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, and of human rights advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in China, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Since May 2005, the Chinese government has prevented its citizens from accessing the Commission's Web site. Notes to Section V(a)--Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression 1 Article 35 of China's Constitution states: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." |