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• In 2005, the Dalai Lama increased his efforts to explain that he does not seek Tibetan independence from China. The Dalai Lama's envoys traveled to China for a fifth round of dialogue with Chinese officials in February 2006, relaying a request to Chinese leaders to permit the Dalai Lama to visit China. Tibetans could benefit from full implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, but the lack of local self-government in Tibetan autonomous areas of China creates mistrust in the dialogue and demonstrates that authorities are not implementing this law.

• The Chinese government favors accelerating implementation of development initiatives, especially the Great Western Development program, that already erode Tibetan culture and heritage. The Qinghai-Tibet railway began passenger service in July 2006, increasing Tibetan concerns about the railway's potential effects on Tibetan culture and the environment. Education levels among Tibetans are much lower than those of ethnic Han Chinese, undermining the ability of Tibetans to compete for employment and other economic advantages in an emerging market economy that attracts an increasing number of Han.

• The Chinese government strictly limits the rights of Tibetans to exercise the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly. Communist Party political campaigns promote atheism and strengthen government efforts to discourage Tibetan aspirations to foster their unique culture and religion. Chinese authorities have punished Tibetans, such as Jigme Gyatso, a former monk imprisoned in 1996 who is serving a 17-year sentence and Choeying Khedrub, a monk serving a life sentence since 2000, for peaceful expressions and non-violent actions that officials believe could undermine Party rule. The Commission's Political Prisoner Database listed 103 known cases of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment as of August 2006, a figure that is likely to be lower than the actual number of Tibetan political prisoners. Based on sentence information available for 70 of the current prisoners, the average sentence is approximately 10 years and 11 months.

Introduction

The Chinese government and the Communist Party give economic development in Tibetan areas of China a higher priority than protecting basic human rights such as the freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly. Chinese officials provide economic statistics¹ to demonstrate Tibetan progress, but Tibetans continue to struggle with poverty, suffer from inadequate education, and face a growing number of better-educated ethnic Han who travel to Tibetan areas and compete for jobs and other economic benefits. The government can strengthen China's ethnic and national unity by improving the implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and by ensuring that Tibetans can manage their affairs, become equal competitors with their neighbors, and preserve their unique cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage.²

The Status of Discussion Between China and the Dalai Lama

U.S. government policy on Tibet recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties³ in other provinces to be a part of China.⁴ The State Department's annual Report on Tibet Negotiations detailed the U.S. government's steps to encourage Chinese officials to "enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives leading to a negotiated agreement on Tibet."⁵ The Report described the Dalai Lama as someone who "represents the views of the vast majority of Tibetans," and expressed encouragement that Chinese officials invited the Dalai Lama's envoys to visit China in February 2006 (2005 visits also cited). The Report states, "The Administration believes that dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives will alleviate tensions in Tibetan areas and contribute to the overall stability of China." The Report notes, however, that "the lack of resolution of these problems leads to greater tensions inside China and will be a stumbling block to fuller political and economic engagement with the United States and other nations."⁶

In 2005, the Dalai Lama increased his efforts to explain that he does not seek Tibetan independence from China. During a religious teaching in India in January 2006, the Dalai Lama spoke to some 9,000 Tibetans who traveled from Tibetan areas of China to be among the estimated 90,000 attendees.⁷ In his closing remarks, the Dalai Lama told them that he does not seek Tibetan independence, and that he is working for a solution based on the Middle Way Approach⁸ and within the existing Chinese constitutional framework.⁹ He urged Tibetans returning to China to tell other Tibetans about the importance of his approach for ensuring genuine autonomy for Tibetans.¹⁰

The Dalai Lama's envoys traveled to China for a fifth round of dialogue with Chinese officials in February 2006.¹¹ Special Envoy Lodi Gyari¹² and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen did not travel to the TAR or one of the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) in other provinces, as they did during previous trips to China.¹³ Instead, they visited the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region to observe "the situation" in one of the other five provincial-level ethnic autonomous regions, and to meet with Zhu Weiqun, the deputy head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD). Gyari explained that as a result of the visit, "today there is a better and deeper understanding of each other's position and the fundamental differences that continue to exist in the position held by the two parties." A Tibetan government-in-exile representative told reporters in July 2005 that the most fundamental difference is over "the definition of Tibet," and explained, "While China sees Tibet as the area included under the Tibet Autonomous Region, Tibetans claim a much larger area¹⁴ where the culture and language are Tibetan."¹⁵

After the envoys returned to India, the Dalai Lama focused his annual March 10 statement¹⁶ entirely on the dialogue, emphasizing his commitment to the dialogue process and expressing his wish to visit China. He summarized his position by saying, "I have only one demand: self-rule and genuine autonomy for all Tibetans, i.e., the Tibetan nationality in its entirety. This demand is in keeping with the provisions of the Chinese Constitution, which means it can be met."¹⁷ The Dalai Lama stated that his envoys relayed a request to Chinese leaders to permit him to visit China as a religious pilgrim. "As well as visiting the pilgrim sites, I hope to be able to see for myself the changes and developments in the People's Republic of China," he said.¹⁸

Tashi Wangdi, the Dalai Lama's representative to the Americas, told a Commission roundtable in March 2006 that the Chinese government's basic concern is the "unity, territorial integrity, and economic health of the country." A resolution of the Tibetan issue would contribute to China's national interests, he said, and if the Dalai Lama were to visit China, it would be a "win-win situation" for the Chinese leadership:

The Middle Way Approach adopted by His Holiness will in fact reinforce and strengthen all this. . . . One of the most effective ways of creating the right atmosphere is through personal contact and face-to-face meetings. It is with this in mind His Holiness the Dalai Lama had conveyed to the Chinese government through his envoys his wish to visit some of the holy Buddhist pilgrimage sites in China.¹⁹

The Tibetan government-in-exile's March 10, 2006, statement declared support for the Dalai Lama's policy, and described Tibetans as "one of China's 55 minority nationalities."²⁰ The statement noted that "before 1951 [Tibetans] all lived together in small, compact groups in a contiguous chain," and argued that administrative unity of that territory is necessary to protect Tibetan culture:

In essence, we have always said that the need to have genuine autonomy for the three provinces of Tibet or the entire Tibetan people is the basic principle. We cannot compromise on this principle. . . . Because of these reasons,²¹ we have proposed the need to have unification of all the Tibetans, with the status of genuine autonomy. This demand is in accordance with Marxist and Leninist principles and the provisions of the Chinese Constitution.

Chinese officials say that the Dalai Lama's proposal to combine existing areas of Tibetan autonomy²² and implement genuine autonomy is not consistent with the Chinese Constitution and laws. Lhagpa Phuntsog (Laba Pingcuo), Secretary General of the China Tibetology Research Center and former Vice Chairman of the TAR, told reporters in May 2006 that the Dalai Lama had raised two principal issues, "greater Tibet" and "real autonomy." He said that the Dalai Lama's demands "don't match the history of Tibet," and that changing the status quo would not accord with the Chinese Constitution or the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL).²³ Sun Yuxi, the Chinese Ambassador to India, told reporters in October 2005 that the Dalai Lama's request for a legal system "something like that of Hong Kong," is not possible, and that a "larger Tibet, [that would] include part of four more Chinese provinces," is "technically not acceptable."²⁴ In July 2006, Wu Yingjie, the Vice Chairman of the TAR government, rejected the Dalai Lama's objective that a Tibetan autonomous area should have a democratically elected government, according to a Hong Kong news media report.²⁵ According to Wu, the Dalai Lama has said²⁶ that if he returns to China, the Chinese government should create a greater Tibet and allow democracy within it. Wu said that it is not possible for the Chinese government to accept the Dalai Lama's conditions, and that Tibetans enjoy prosperity under Party leadership and are reluctant to see the Dalai Lama return.²⁷

Chinese government officials express interest in continuing the dialogue, but blame the Dalai Lama for the lack of substantive progress, claiming that he is attempting to "split the motherland."²⁸ China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the U.S. Congress on September 14, 2006, of sending a "severely wrong signal to the 'Tibet-independence' forces"²⁹ after the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill the previous day authorizing the Dalai Lama to receive the Congressional Gold Medal.³⁰ After the Dalai Lama's envoys visited China in February, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang told reporters that the Dalai Lama "steals his way to this or that corner of the world" in order to "split our motherland."³¹ Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of the TAR government, however, recognized the envoys' visit in frank remarks to reporters in Beijing on March 6: "We cannot call the talks negotiations now. They are just dialogue, or contact, but the channels for communication have always been smooth. . . . We will have further discussions in [the] future. But we haven't yet reached the stage of substantive negotiations."³²

Tibetans could benefit from full implementation of the REAL, but the lack of local self-government in Tibetan autonomous areas of China creates mistrust in the dialogue and demonstrates that authorities are not implementing this law. The REAL asserts in its Preamble that the practice of autonomy "reflects the state's full respect for and guarantee of ethnic minorities' right to administer their internal affairs."³³ Article 7 of the REAL, however, requires that local autonomous governments "place the interests of the state as a whole above all else and actively fulfill the tasks assigned by state organs at higher levels."³⁴ A 2004 Harvard University study of autonomy in Tibetan areas of China considered a compilation of 161 laws and regulations, and found that poor implementation negates the value of autonomy legislation and erodes the rule of law.³⁵ A University of Hong Kong professor pointed out in March 2006 that regional ethnic autonomy is "very restricted" because "Beijing can override it through either legislation or administrative decisions."³⁶ "Today, the concept is valued primarily for speeding up economic and industrial development, which itself threatens the cultures and languages of minorities," according to the professor's article.

The central government and Party defend the regional ethnic autonomy system, asserting that it is successful. A February 2005 State Council White Paper declared that regional ethnic autonomy is "a correct solution to the issue of ethnic groups," and that more than 50 years of implementation prove that the system is "immensely successful."³⁷ At a meeting chaired by President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao in August 2005, the Politburo considered "Tibet work in the new century" and declared that "the ethnic regional autonomy system has been continually consolidated and perfected, and the people of all ethnic groups fully enjoy their rights as masters of the country."³⁸

Some Tibetans reject the Dalai Lama's offer to resolve the issue within the framework of the Chinese Constitution and autonomy, and their willingness to speak out is increasing. For example, the chairman of the oldest Tibetan advocacy group in the United States told a Commission roundtable in March 2006 that the dialogue has not resulted in "any tangible progress."³⁹ He said that he believes most Tibetans want independence, but they support the Middle Way Approach because of their high regard for the Dalai Lama. He warned that Chinese leaders may be mistaken if they expect the Tibet issue to fade away after the Dalai Lama passes away:

Rather than the issue dying away, there is a greater likelihood that the issue will destabilize, with future generations of very frustrated Tibetans resorting to other means to bring freedom to Tibet. The role and the position of the Dalai Lama has been a great stabilizer for the Tibetan community, the Free Tibet Movement, and even the world.⁴⁰

The Chinese government portrays as terrorists some Tibetans living outside of China who call for independence,⁴¹ but has not provided evidence for this designation. In February 2004, a Chinese public security journal described the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), a pro-independence NGO based in India that claims 20,000 members worldwide,⁴² as "the extremists among the new generation of the Dalai Lama group."⁴³ The article claimed, "It can be said that every violent terrorist activity that took place in the Tibetan regions was intricately connected with extremist organizations such as the TYC."⁴⁴ An August 2005 article in China's Tibet magazine charged that "[TYC] diehards stick to 'Tibetan independence,' stand for violence, and work hand-in-glove with international terrorists to form terrorist organizations in India."⁴⁵

Some Tibetans, especially the younger generation, are questioning the non-violent message of Buddhist philosophy. TYC President Kalsang Phuntsok acknowledged in December 2005 that "a huge section of the Tibetan youth community" believes that the Tibetan independence movement "is like any other movement:"

There is no reason for us to restrain ourselves just because we are Buddhist or just because we have a leader of His Holiness's stature. . . . [We] have a youth section which is not so much influenced by the Buddhist philosophy. They are very much attracted by the movements which are going on all over the world, mostly violence-infested movements, and people see they are achieving results. They look around everywhere, whether it's Israel or Palestine or the Middle East--these give them every reason to believe in every [violent] movement that is being waged on this Earth.⁴⁶

A senior broadcaster for the Voice of America summarized the complexities of the outlook for dialogue at a March 2006 Commission roundtable:

Cumulatively, these disparate variables have had the effect of creating conditions more favorable to a strategy of engagement for Beijing. But while it seems likely that China will, for the time being, continue to pursue talks with the Dalai Lama, it seems equally unlikely that the two parties can expect to begin discussing matters of substance under present circumstances. . . . [T]he question now for Beijing is whether its deferral of substantive negotiations risks forgoing an historic opportunity to reach a lasting solution on the dispute over Tibet.⁴⁷

Culture, Development, and Demography

The Chinese government favors accelerating implementation of development initiatives, especially the Great Western Development program (GWD),⁴⁸ that already erode Tibetan culture and heritage. Minister Li Dezhu of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) described GWD in 2000, the first year of implementation, as "the necessary choice for solving China's nationality problems under the new historical conditions."⁴⁹ He pointed out that GWD will integrate ethnic minorities into the mainstream of "marketization and socialization," saying, "[E]ach nationality will become more strongly unified with each day under the centripetal force . . . of the large family of the Chinese nation." Implementation of programs such as GWD encourages Han migration into Tibetan and other ethnic areas, a movement that Li described as a westward flow of "human talent" that would result in "clashes and conflicts" between ethnic groups. Li warned that clashes must be "handled well," or there would be a detrimental effect on national unity and social stability.⁵⁰

The Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) provides local autonomous governments the right to modify or cancel the implementation of higher-level laws and regulations,⁵¹ but the central government overrides the rights of local governments by passing laws that ensure implementation of central government policies such as GWD. Li said in 2000 that the state "must use legal methods to provide legal guarantees for the implementation of these policies, and safeguard implementation [of GWD] with laws and regulations."⁵² A March 2004 State Council paper called on the government to "speed up the pace of law-making as it pertains to the development of the West, to provide a legislative guarantee for the development of the West."⁵³ In March 2006, Wang Jinxiang, Vice Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission and Deputy Director of the State Council Office of the Leading Group for Western Region Development, said that the National People's Congress is preparing a draft law that "aims to create a favorable legal environment and support for a smooth implementation of the western region development program."⁵⁴ If enacted, this law would be the first national law created solely for the development of a single region, according to Wang.

Senior government and Party officials emphasized the importance of hastening the implementation of development policies when they attended a September 2005 ceremony in Lhasa marking the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the TAR.⁵⁵ Jia Qinglin, a Politburo Standing Committee member, led the delegation and told an assembly of Party cadres in Lhasa that the pace of change in the TAR must be quickened from "accelerated development" to "development by leaps and bounds."⁵⁶ Jia listed priorities that include boosting rural Tibetan living standards and income, increasing infrastructure construction, and consolidating the TAR's ties with China's populous east, along with the political objective of cracking down on expression and activity that the Party characterizes as "separatist and sabotaging activities."⁵⁷ The latter descriptions can apply to peaceful expressions of devotion to the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan complaints about Chinese policies. Authorities in Lhasa tightened security before the anniversary and detained as many as 10 Tibetans,⁵⁸ including Sonam,⁵⁹ a monk employed at the Potala Palace, and Sonam Gyalpo,⁶⁰ a Lhasa tailor who had video and printed material in his home featuring the Dalai Lama.

The Qinghai-Tibet railway, officially designated as a key GWD project,⁶¹ began passenger service in July 2006, ahead of scheduled completion in 2007,⁶² increasing Tibetan concerns about the railway's potential effects on the Tibetan culture and environment.⁶³ President Hu Jintao inaugurated the railway at a ceremony in Golmud city, Qinghai province. Hu described the railway's completion as "an important expression of the constant increase in the comprehensive national strength of our country," and of "very great significance" to speeding up regional economic and social development and "enhancing ethnic solidarity and consolidating the motherland's frontier defense."⁶⁴ Ragdi (Raidi), an ethnic Tibetan who is a Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) and former Chairman of the TAR People's Congress, described the railway during its first week of operation⁶⁵ as the Tibetan people's "road to heaven," and predicted that it would "have a profound and far-reaching historical significance."⁶⁶ In August, an official announced that the government plans to extend the railway westward from Lhasa to Rikaze, the TAR's second largest city, within three years.⁶⁷

State-run news media reports about the railway's startup rejected assertions that operating the railway will result in increased Han migration into the TAR, or threaten the Tibetan culture and environment. A Xinhua editorial published on July 1 dismissed claims that "an influx of the Han people" would lead to Tibetan "cultural genocide,"⁶⁸ countering that the railway will benefit Tibetans by providing them access to "modern civilization."⁶⁹ Lhasa mayor Norbu Dondrub said the same day, "Tibetan culture will not disappear when there is market demand for it. The Tibetan culture will not have fundamental changes with the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. On the contrary, it has a bright future."⁷⁰ Wu Yingjie, Vice Chairman of the TAR government and head of the provincial Propaganda Bureau,⁷¹ told foreign reporters in July that, "Tibet's unique natural conditions make it impossible for the Han people and other ethnic groups to settle down here,"⁷² a statement that is inconsistent with Chinese census statistics that document the increasing Han population in the TAR.⁷³ Chinese news reports described the passengers expected to use the new railway as tourists, visitors, or travelers. Chairman of the TAR government Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo) acknowledged on July 4 that the railway will bring "a lot of travelers" to the TAR and build the tourism industry, but the railway would not have "a great impact" on the Tibetan environment.⁷⁴ A TAR tourism official announced in May that 4,000 "tourists"⁷⁵ will arrive in Lhasa every day after the railway is operating, and that the railway would bring an additional 400,000 visitors to the TAR during the remainder of 2006.⁷⁶ Official estimates are not available of the number of persons the government expects to arrive by train in Lhasa who will seek employment, conduct business, engage in a professional practice, or remain in the area for other reasons.

As the inauguration date of the 33 billion yuan (US$4.12 billion)⁷⁷ railway approached, Chinese officials and experts disclosed that thawing permafrost on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau could adversely affect operation of the railway, but officials did not warn of any immediate risks. Professor Wu Ziwang, an expert at the Chinese Academy of Sciences frozen soil engineering laboratory,⁷⁸ said in January 2006 that the permafrost layer on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is melting and will continue to deteriorate due to global warming.⁷⁹ "I am worried that after ten years the railroad will be unsafe," he said. In February, Wu observed that faster thawing of the permafrost "might greatly increase the instability of the ground . . . where major projects such as highways or railways run through."⁸⁰ La Youyu, the Deputy Director General of the railway's construction headquarters, disclosed in August 2005 that about 340 miles of track crosses frozen earth that "is vulnerable to climate change" and "will thaw in summer and distend the railway base in winter."⁸¹

Supreme People's Court (SPC) and Party officials opened a conference on June 15 that considered the role the judiciary should play in maintaining social stability following the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway in July.⁸² SPC Vice President Zhang Jun said that the railway has an important role in the GWD program, and that the inauguration of the rail service would create "new demands regarding the work of the courts." He stressed that courts along the rail line, the principal terminals of which are Lhasa and Xining, the capital of Qinghai province, must strengthen their "communication and cooperation" to coordinate efforts to "resolve problems." The courts of both the TAR and Qinghai province must be active participants in the "comprehensive management of public security" to "assure the harmony and stability of the Qinghai-Tibet area, particularly the safe operation of the railroad," Zhang said.⁸³ Wang Yibin, a TAR Communist Party Standing Committee member and the head of the TAR Public Security Bureau, also spoke at the conference and provided specific judicial "requirements" linked to the TAR's "current anti-splittist struggle and public security situation."⁸⁴ The requirements included: increasing the force of "strikes against all categories of criminal activity;" establishing a legal environment that is "favorable to the safety of the railroad;" and protecting the legal rights and interests of workers while "preventing and appropriately handling mass incident work."⁸⁵

Chinese law, government and Party policies, and official statements increase Tibetan concerns that programs such as GWD⁸⁶ and projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway will lead to large increases in Han migration. In an unusual statement, a China Daily report in October 2005 described the government's expectation that the railway will "attract tourists, traders, and ethnic Chinese settlers" to the region.⁸⁷ The implementation provisions of the REAL issued in May 2005 instruct the state to encourage and support "talents of all categories and classes to develop and pioneer in ethnic autonomous areas."⁸⁸ The Provisions require local governments to provide newly arriving "talent" with "preferential and convenient working and living conditions," and to ensure that their dependents and children "enjoy special treatment in employment and schooling."⁸⁹ An opinion paper circulated by the Party Central Committee and the government in July 2005 called for "a large number of trained personnel, especially graduates of schools of higher learning, to go to [grassroots areas, especially the western region] to render meritorious service and make a distinguished career."⁹⁰ The paper advises the state to offer incentives, such as full repayment of academic loans, to graduates who work for an unspecified number of years in "harsh areas."⁹¹

The Chinese government hampers objective study of regional social and economic issues by providing inadequate or misleading information about the number of ethnic Han who live, work, and trade in Tibetan autonomous areas. The Commission's 2005 Annual Report showed that official Chinese census data portray ethnic Han population as decreasing in 10 of 13 Tibetan autonomous areas between 1990 and 2000,⁹² a decline that contradicts the visible changes evident in many Tibetan towns and cities, and raises questions about the reliability of the data.⁹³ Comparing national census data with population data from provincial statistical yearbooks demonstrates that the yearbooks sometimes report even fewer Han in Tibetan areas than the census.⁹⁴ Census data for 2000 reports 158,570 Han in the TAR,⁹⁵ for example, but a TAR annual statistical yearbook reports only 72,122 Han in the TAR in 2000 (less than half the census figure).⁹⁶

A Chinese academic study conducted in Lhasa in 2005 observed that GWD promotes the flow of "a large number of temporary migrants" into the TAR, and leads to increased competition between a "low quality" local Tibetan workforce and incoming (mostly Han) migrant workers.⁹⁷ The authors, Professors Ma Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, examine the migrant population in Lhasa (Tibetan and non-Tibetan), and the role of local authorities in registering and managing the migrant population. The paper concludes that it is difficult to study temporary migrants in the TAR, and that the actual number of temporary migrants is much larger than official records reveal.⁹⁸ The authors explain that temporary migrants keep moving seasonally, and usually try to avoid registering with local authorities in order to escape payment of fees and charges. Local governments are understaffed with inexperienced personnel and cannot keep track of the migrants.⁹⁹

Education levels among Tibetans are much lower than those of ethnic Han,¹⁰⁰ undermining the ability of Tibetans to compete for employment and other economic advantages in an emerging market economy that attracts an increasing number of Han. Based on 2000 census data, the Tibetan rate of illiteracy (47.55 percent) is more than five times higher than for Han (8.60 percent), while Han reach senior middle school at more than five times the rate of Tibetans (8.83 percent compared to 1.70 percent).¹⁰¹ Ma and Lhundup found similar patterns in their study of migrants in Lhasa: the rate of illiteracy among Tibetan migrants (32.3 percent) was almost 10 times higher than for Han migrants (3.3 percent),¹⁰² and Han migrants were better prepared to secure jobs that require skills learned in junior or senior middle school. Of the migrants surveyed, Han reached junior or senior middle school at about twice the rate of Tibetans: 53.7 percent of Han compared to 26 percent of Tibetans reached junior middle school, and 19.4 percent of Han compared to 9 percent of Tibetans reached senior middle school.¹⁰³ The survey's population sample shows that the advantage Han migrants enjoy in the Lhasa job market is qualitative, based on their education levels, and also quantitative--there were at least four times as many Han migrants in Lhasa as Tibetan migrants.¹⁰⁴

The difference in education levels heightens the barrier that rural Tibetans face, even compared to urban Tibetans, when they seek employment or commercial opportunities in urban centers.¹⁰⁵ Tibetans living in towns and cities reached senior middle school at about 12 times the rate of Tibetans living in rural areas, according to official 2000 census data.¹⁰⁶ Based on the same data, Tibetans with the least access to education--rural Tibetans--outnumbered Tibetan residents of towns and cities by more than five-to-one.¹⁰⁷ The average income of TAR rural residents remains a fraction of urban income, but according to official data the gap has narrowed slightly. In 2000, the average TAR urban per capita income (6,448 yuan) was 4.84 times more than the average rural per capita income (1,331 yuan).¹⁰⁸ In 2005, the average TAR urban per capita income (8,411 yuan) was 4.05 times higher than the average rural per capita income (2,075 yuan).¹⁰⁹

The Chinese government implements policies intended to improve educational and economic opportunities for rural Tibetans,¹¹⁰ especially nomadic herders, but programs require Tibetans to participate on the government's terms. In the first three years of a pasture construction and nomadic settlement program launched in 2001, authorities in the TAR relocated 48,000 nomadic herders and settled them in fixed communities.¹¹¹ A government program to settle nomadic herders, including Tibetans, in Qinghai province placed about 10,000 families in fixed communities by 2005.¹¹² In Gansu province, a program started in the late 1990s to settle nomadic herders in Tibetan autonomous areas settled 7,000 families by 2004 and is expected to be complete in 2009.¹¹³ A U.S. Agency for International Development rangeland expert told a Commission roundtable in March 2004 that in his opinion, despite good government intentions,¹¹⁴ most Tibetan farmers and herders have not been able to participate fully in assessing, planning, and implementing the programs that affect their lives.¹¹⁵

Tibetan Culture and Human Rights

The Chinese government strictly limits the rights of Tibetans to exercise the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly. Communist Party political campaigns promote atheism and strengthen government efforts to discourage Tibetan aspirations to foster their unique culture and religion. Chinese authorities have punished Tibetans for peaceful expressions and non-violent actions that officials believe could undermine Party rule. The downward trend in the number of known Tibetan political prisoners,¹¹⁶ compared to an upward trend that peaked in the mid-1990s,¹¹⁷ suggests that Tibetans are avoiding the risks of direct protest against government policies, and turning to other, sometimes innovative, ways to express and protect their culture.¹¹⁸

An example of Tibetan cultural expression, and of the Dalai Lama's influence on Tibetans, emerged after the Dalai Lama told thousands of Tibetans gathered in January 2006 at a religious teaching in India,¹¹⁹ "I am ashamed and don't feel like living when I see all those pictures of people decorating themselves with skins and furs."¹²⁰ He specifically referred to fur trim from rare and endangered animal species that some Tibetans use to decorate traditional garments. "Neither use, sell, or buy wild animals, their products or derivatives," he instructed the attendees. In February and March 2006, Tibetans in Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces responded by conducting campaigns to collect and burn fur stripped from garments.¹²¹ Security officials detained and questioned the Tibetan organizers of at least two events and then released them, apparently without charge.¹²² At an event in March, the organizers took care to avoid provoking authorities,¹²³ but participants openly displayed their devotion to the Dalai Lama.¹²⁴ Police monitored the scene, but did not detain or question any participants, or prevent the Tibetans from burning the fur.¹²⁵

Chinese authorities carried out 24 known political detentions of Tibetans in 2005, an increase compared to the 15 such detentions in 2004, according to information available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) as of August 2006. Of the political detentions in 2005, 10 took place in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), 8 in Qinghai province, and 6 in Gansu province. None of the known political detentions of Tibetans in 2005 took place in Sichuan province, although Sichuan was the location of the largest number of new cases from 2001-2004.¹²⁶ In January 2006, a court in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu province sentenced Tibetan monks Dargyal Gyatso and Jamyang Samdrub, and nuns Choekyi Drolma, Tamdrin Tsomo, and Yonten Drolma to up to three years' imprisonment for displaying and distributing letter-sized posters critical of the Chinese government.¹²⁷ The nuns are the first nuns known to be imprisoned in Gansu province since this period of Tibetan political activism began in 1987.¹²⁸

The Commission welcomed the decision by Chinese authorities to permit nun Phuntsog Nyidron to travel to the United States in March 2006 to receive medical treatment.¹²⁹ Lhasa authorities imprisoned her for more than 14 years for participating in a peaceful political demonstration, and then for secretly recording songs that criticized the Chinese government's rule of Tibetans while she was in prison.¹³⁰ In another development, the Lhasa Intermediate People's Court commuted Bangri Chogtrul's sentence from life imprisonment for "splittism"¹³¹ to a fixed term of 19 years in July 2003, and then reduced his sentence by an additional year in November 2005, according to a February 2006 NGO report.¹³² The same court sentenced Nyima Choedron, Bangri Chogtrul's wife, to 10 years' imprisonment on the same charge in September 2000, and subsequently reduced her sentence twice, by 18 months in 2002 and 1 year in 2004. Officials released her on February 26, 2006, after commuting the final year of her sentence.¹³³ No new developments were reported in the cases of prisoners Ngawang Phuljung (a monk serving a 19-year sentence since 1989), Choeying Khedrub (a monk serving a life sentence since 2000), or Tenzin Deleg (a lama imprisoned in 2002, serving a life sentence). (See Section VI--Tibet of the CECC 2005 Annual Report for more information about these cases.)

Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported after his visit to China in late 2005 that TAR authorities opened Qushui Prison, near Lhasa, in April 2005 for male prisoners serving sentences longer than 15 years, as well as prisoners sentenced as a "principal" criminal when more than one person commits a "joint crime."¹³⁴ NGO reports of Tibetan political prisoners in Qushui Prison have confirmed few by name, although according to a Commission staff analysis about 25 political prisoners, most of them transferred from Lhasa's TAR Prison (Drapchi), are likely to be imprisoned in Qushui Prison.¹³⁵

Nowak interviewed three Tibetan political prisoners at Qushui Prison: Jigme Gyatso¹³⁶ (a former monk imprisoned in 1996 who is serving a 17-year sentence), Bangri Chogtrul,¹³⁷ and Lobsang Tsultrim¹³⁸ (a monk serving a 14-year sentence since 1995). Each prisoner recounted his personal experience of beating, torture, or other abuse during imprisonment. Jigme Gyatso reported that authorities extended his 15-year sentence by an additional 2 years after he shouted slogans in March 2004 calling for the Dalai Lama's long life.¹³⁹ The prisoners told Nowak that conditions in Qushui Prison are harsher than those in TAR Prison, and they said that imprisoned monks are forbidden to pray.¹⁴⁰