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Statement by
The Acting Assistant Professor, Religious Studies, Stanford University Dr. Jacqueline Armijo
to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
July 24, 2003
I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to share my
knowledge of the history and contemporary situation of the Muslim peoples of
China. This knowledge is based on more than twenty years of research on
this highly important, but neglected topic, and more than seven years lived in
China.[i]
With a Muslim population conservatively estimated at twenty
million, China today has a larger Muslim population than most Arab countries,
and yet little is known about this community. Of China’s 55 officially
recognized minority peoples, 10 are primarily Muslim: the Hui, Uighur, Kazak,
Dongxiang, Kirghiz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan, and Tatar. The largest
group, the Hui, are spread throughout the entire country, while the other nine
live primarily in the northwest. I will begin by concentrating on the Hui,
and then address the situation of the Uighurs of Xinjiang.[ii]
Shortly after the advent of Islam in the seventh century, there
were Muslims in China, for sea trade networks between China and Southwest
Asia had existed for centuries. Small communities of Muslim traders and
merchants survived for centuries in cities along China’s southeast coast.
This early interest in China as a destination for Muslim travelers is reflected
in the famous hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, ‘Utlub al-’ilm wa law fi Sin,
“seek knowledge, even unto China.”
Although Muslim communities were established in China as early
as the seventh century, it was not until the thirteenth century, during the Yuan
dynasty, that tens of thousands of Muslims from Central and Western Asia settled
in China. Most of the Hui population today are descendants of these early
settlers. Despite centuries of relative isolation from the rest of the
Islamic world, the Muslims in most regions of China have managed to sustain a
continuous knowledge of the Islamic sciences, Arabic, and Persian. Given
extended periods of persecution combined with periods of intense government
efforts to legislate adoption of Chinese cultural practices and norms,[iii] that Islam should have survived,
let alone flourished, is an extraordinary historical phenomenon. Although
some scholars have attributed the survival of Muslim communities in China to
their ability to adopt Chinese cultural traditions, when asked themselves,
Chinese Muslims usually attribute their survival to their strong faith and God’s
protection.
In 1644, the Qing dynasty was established, marking the
beginning of a period of unparalleled growth and expansion, both in terms of
territory and population. Travel restrictions were lifted, and the Muslims
of China were once again allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and study in
the major centers of learning in the Islamic world. During this period several
Hui scholars studied abroad and upon their return they started a movement to
revitalize Islamic studies by translating the most important Islamic texts into
Chinese and thus making them more accessible.
However, despite the opportunities for travel and study that
arose during this period, the Qing dynasty also represented a period of
unparalleled violence against the Muslims of China. As reform movements
led by Muslims who had studied overseas spread, conflicts arose between
different communities. In several instances the government intervened,
supporting one group against another, leading to an exacerbation of the
conflict, outbreaks of mass violence and the eventual slaughter of hundreds of
thousands of Muslims, and several rebellions.
One of the most common stereotypes of the Muslims is that they
are an inherently violent people. In order to show how such prejudices
evolve I would like to briefly summarize the events leading up to the slaughter
of as many as 750,000 Muslims in southwest China in the 1870s. During the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China experienced a massive population
explosion resulting in millions of Han Chinese moving into the frontier
regions. As more immigrants moved into Yunnan province along the southwest
frontier, there were increasing clashes with the indigenous peoples, and the Hui
who had settled there in the thirteenth century and whose population is
estimated to have been one million. The Han settlers, not unlike white
settlers throughout much of colonial history, did not view the local peoples as
full humans, and citizens with equal rights under the law. In a series of
disputes between these immigrants and the Hui, local Han Chinese officials (who
themselves were not local residents), repeatedly decided to support their fellow
Han Chinese against the local residents. The Muslims sent envoys to
Beijing seeking justice to no avail. Fighting escalated and after a government
led massacre of the Muslim population of the provincial capital Kunming, a
Chinese Muslim scholar started a rebellion and in 1856 established an
independent Islamic state centered in northwest Yunnan. The state survived
for almost 16 years, and the Muslims worked closely together with other
indigenous peoples. However, following the quelling of other major
rebellions, the Chinese Emperor ordered his troops to concentrate their efforts
on Yunnan; the massacres that ensued wiped out the majority of Muslims in the
region. Estimates of the percentage killed range from 60 to 85%, and more
than a century later, their population has still not recovered its original
number. Another consequence of the rebellion was a series of government
regulations severely restricting the lives of Muslims.[iv] From a Han Chinese perspective, the insistence on
the part of the Muslims to fight for their rights even against overwhelming
odds, was a sign of violent tendencies, rather than a desire for justice
regardless of the consequences.
During the communists rise to power in the 1940s, many
Muslims agreed to support them in exchange for guarantees of religious
freedom. Although in the early years of the PRC these promises were
respected, during subsequent political campaigns, culminating with the Cultural
Revolution (1966 - 1976), the Muslims of China found their religion outlawed,
their religious leaders persecuted, imprisoned and even killed, and their
mosques defiled, if not destroyed.[v]
In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the
Muslims of China lost no time in rebuilding their devastated communities.
Throughout China, Muslims began slowly to restore their religious institutions
and revive their religious activities. Their first priority was to rebuild
their damaged mosques thereby allowing communities to create a space in which
they could once again pray together, but also so that the mosques could reassert
their role as centers of Islamic learning. Over the next two decades
mosques throughout most of the country organized classes for not only girls and
boys, and young adults, but also for older men and women who had not had the
opportunity to study their religion. Beginning in the late 1980s and
continuing to the 1990s Islamic colleges have also been established throughout
most of China.
Within China, when asked how to explain the recent resurgence
in Islamic education, community members cite two main reasons: a desire to
rebuild that which was taken from them, and the hope that a strong religious
faith would help protect Muslim communities from the myriad of social problems
presently besetting China in this day and age of rapid economic
development. Chinese Muslim studying overseas reiterate the need to equip
themselves and their communities for their future in a state which seems to be
ideologically adrift.[vi]
After many years of living in China and interviewing religious
teachers and students, I am convinced that these studies have an overwhelmingly
positive influence on Chinese society. Older Muslims are finally
able to study their religious traditions, and young people are able to learn the
guiding moral traditions of Islam, including a respect for the state and its
laws. As both of my daughters attended the public Hui preschool in Kunming
for several years, I can attest to the extraordinary degree to which the
teachers promoted civic responsibility and community values.
Moreover, Muslim religious leaders have been able to assist in
the national government’s efforts to stem the increasing number of rural
households who are sacrificing their children’s education, particularly their
daughters’, as recent economic reforms have resulted in school fees that are
crippling families incomes. Imams have worked together with the All-China
Women’s Federation to remind peasants in rural areas of their religious
obligation within Islam to educate all their children. Women have also
played a very active role in the revival of Islamic education, both as students
and as teachers. The women are well aware of the importance of educating
girls, for as one said to me, “educate a man, educate an individual; educate a
women, educate a nation.”
The Muslims’ emphasis on education, both secular and religious,
is not a surprise. As other minority groups who have survived the
vicissitudes of state persecution over time, they have learned that the only
thing that cannot be taken away from them is their education.
Consequently, Muslims in China have always be overrepresented among teachers,
professors and college graduates.
At present the government still maintains very strict control
on all aspects of public religious practice and education throughout
China. The government controls the faculty, student and curriculum of
Islamic schools. It controls the appointment of imams in mosques, and
decides which ones will be allowed to lead prayers at the Friday services.
I will now turn to the situation of Muslims in Xinjiang.
Conditions in Xinjiang
Although Muslims throughout China face a variety of challenges
and are the subject of a wide range of discriminatory actions, the situation for
the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang is unprecedented in its severity, surpassing
even the repressive policies facing the Tibetans. Muslims that hold
official positions, including faculty at the universities are forbidden to carry
out any religious activity in public. They are not allowed to attend
mosque, fast during Ramadan, or in any other way respect their religious
traditions in public. There are signs on mosques refusing entry to anyone
under 18 years of age. Islamic education outside the one officially
controlled school is forbidden.
The state has conflated the practice of Islam with separatist
activity and completely overreacted in its illegally prohibiting almost all
forms of Islamic education and public religious practice. Large numbers of
Muslims in Xinjiang have been thrown in jail and sentenced without public
trial. And an untold number have been executed for accused political
crimes.
Once the overwhelming majority in Xinjiang, Uighurs and other
Muslim peoples will soon be outnumbered by Han Chinese immigrants. And
although the government is committed to spending millions of dollars on
development projects there, the primary beneficiaries in virtually every major
industrial and development project, have been the immigrant Han Chinese
population, and often with tremendous negative environmental impact on the
region.
Specific policy recommendations
All Muslims should have the freedom to practice their
religion, and all parents should have the freedom to bring their children with
them to mosque.
All Muslims should have the freedom to take part in
Islamic studies classes, and pursue a deeper understanding of their
religion.
All schools in predominantly minority areas should be
allowed to teach the cultural traditions and history of the minority people
there. At present the curricula of all primary and secondary schools in
China are controlled at the national level, and minority peoples are not allowed
to study their own history and culture.[vii]
The current quota of only 2,000 people being allowed to
make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca should be increased to at least 20,000
(which is the normal amount that would be allowed using the Saudi calculation of
one hajj visa for every 10,000 Muslims in a given country); and there should be
no age restrictions (presently only people 60 and older are allowed to make the
pilgrimage).
The government is making it increasingly difficult for
Muslims to receive a passport, thereby limiting their ability to take part in
the hajj, study overseas, and take part in business activities. Religious
belief should not be used as a reason for denying an individual a passport.
Over the past decade, throughout China mosques and
Muslim neighborhoods dating back centuries have been destroyed as a result of
real estate and public development projects. Efforts should be made,
ideally through international organizations like UNESCO, to protect Muslim
neighborhoods and preserve historic mosques as national heritage sites.
These communal spaces are of fundamental importance to the survival of these
communities.
Muslims in official and public roles should not be
coerced into publicly renouncing their religious obligations, for example being
forced to eat during daylight hours during Ramadan, the month of fasting.
Remove ethnicity from national id cards as it leads to
discrimination in employment, housing, and traveling.
Recommendations specific to Xinjiang
The government should allow Uighurs and other
indigenous peoples to freely study and learn their own languages and
history.
The decision to discontinue the use of the Uighur
language at all universities in Xinjiang should be rescinded. According to
numerous reports, last summer thousands of books in the Uighur language were
burned by government officials in Xinjiang.
Although Radio Free Asia broadcasts in Uighur, VOA does
not.
The US should support the establishment of local
non-political NGOs by indigenous peoples to promote economic, educational and
public health development projects.
Conclusion
At the present time many Muslims in China continue to hope and
pray that the US government will use its influence to persuade the Chinese state
to uphold its moral and international obligations to allow for the freedom of
religion and the survival of indigenous cultures. Recent actions by the US,
including the decision to acquiesce to Beijing’s labeling a small obscure
Uighur group, the ETIM (Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement) as a “terrorist
organization,” have done much to undermine Chinese Muslims’ faith in the US as
protector of basic human rights.
And although there are numerous reports made by the Chinese
state, and often repeated in the Western press that radical separatism is a
common desire in Xinjiang, in fact in dozens of conversations, spanning 20 years
now, I have never heard a Uighur call for violent attacks on the Chinese
state. They have spoken with an increasing despair that they simply be
allowed to practice their religion, continue to use their language in their
studies, and uphold their traditional cultural practices, as citizens of China.
I entreat our government to encourage the Chinese state to
uphold the basic rights of the Muslims in China. Current repressive
tactics not only undermine the Muslims rights to pass on their religious and
moral values and cultural practices to their children, they also undermine the
Muslims’ trust in the Chinese government.
In conclusion, although maintaining their religious beliefs and
practices over the centuries has been a continual challenge, Muslims in China
have always been confident of their identities as both Muslims and
Chinese. Although many have presumed that these identities were somehow
inherently antagonistic, the survival of Islam in China for over a millennium
belies these assumptions. Islamic and Chinese values have both proven to
be sufficiently complementary and dynamic to allow for the flourishing of Islam
in China, and God willing, it will continue to.
[i] I first
studied in Beijing from 1982 - 83 while an undergraduate, and returned in 1993
to complete my doctoral dissertation on the early history of Islam in
China. I subsequently worked as a consultant on HIV/AID prevention
projects, and minority education projects.
[ii]
According to the 2000 China national census, the Hui population of China is
approximately 9.2 million and the Uighur population is 8.6 million. The
other Muslim populations are: Kazak 1.3 million; Dongxiang 400,000; Kyrgyz
171,000; Salar 90,000; Tajik 41,000; Uzbek 14,000;
Baonan 13,000; and Tatar 5,000.
[iii]
During the early part of the Ming period (1368-1644) China’s cosmopolitan and
international initiatives gave way to a period of conservatism and the
redirection of imperial resources toward domestic issues and projects. During
this period numerous laws were passed requiring “foreigners” to dress like
Chinese, adopt Chinese surnames, speak Chinese, and essentially in appearance,
become Chinese. Despite these restrictions and requirements, the Muslims
of China continued to actively practice their faith and pass it on to their
descendants. By the end of the Ming dynasty there were enough Chinese
Muslim intellectuals that were thoroughly educated in the classical Confucian
tradition, that several scholars developed a new Islamic literary genre:
religious works on Islam written in Chinese that incorporated the vocabulary of
Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist thought.
[iv]
Muslims were no longer allowed to live within city walls, were restricted to
certain occupations, and in most cases lost all their personal property,
businesses, farm land, and communal property, such as schools and mosques.
[v] During
this period all worship and religious education were forbidden, and even simple
common utterances such as insha’allah (God willing), or
al-hamdulillah (thanks be to God) could cause Muslims to be
punished. Despite the danger, Muslims in many parts of China continued
their religious studies in secret.
[vi] Over
the past decade an increasing number of Chinese Muslims have decided to pursue
their religious studies at Islamic universities overseas.
[vii]
Outside of Xinjiang, Chinese Muslims are able to offer classes for preschool
students, and in after school programs and summer programs for older
children.
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