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Congressional-Executive Commission on China

The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg
The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality

1.      Introduction

On January 26, 2003 the official Xinhua New Agency website reported that PRC authorities had executed Tibetan Lobsang Dondrub (Chinese: Luorang Dengzhu) that day.[1]  Although executions are commonplace in the PRC, three issues make Lobsang Dondrub’s case particularly disturbing:

• The execution of Lobsang Dondrub was carried out in haste and may have profound implications for any retrial of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche[2] (Chinese: A’an Zhaxi), a Tibetan religious leader currently under sentence of death for the same crimes attributed to Lobsang Dondrub;
• Lobsang Dondrub’s case was carried out in a manner which may have violated the laws of the People’s Republic of China; 
• PRC authorities had assured a U.S. government delegation headed by Lorne Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and including Assistant Attorney-General Ralph Boyd[3] and Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John Hanford, that the Supreme People’s Court would undertake a “lengthy” judicial review of Lobsang Dondrub’s death sentence.  They failed to fulfill this commitment.  Instead PRC authorities executed Lobsang Dondrub a few hours after his death sentence was approved by a Sunday session of the Sichuan Province Higher People’s Court.[4]

2.      Basic Background On The Execution Of Lobsang Dondrub And The Case Against Tenzin Deleg

2.1.     The Background Acknowledged By Official Chinese Sources

On April 3, 2002 an explosion occurred in central Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, causing at least 12 injuries.  Lobsang Dondrub was detained “promptly” while “fleeing the scene.”[5]  The detention of Tenzin Deleg took place later.[6]  The Chengdu blast was the last in a series of explosions which began in January 2001 and resulted in one death.[7]

PRC authorities claim that both men confessed to the charges.[8]  According to the Director of the Ganzi TAP judiciary Tenzin Deleg “accepted his responsibility in five of the six explosions.”[9]  Xinhua reported that Tenzin Deleg hired two lawyers to represent him in the trial, while the court appointed two lawyers to represent Lobsang Dondrub after he “did not entrust a counsel for his defense.”[10]  The Ganzi People’s Intermediate Court held a closed trial on November 29, 2002, and on December 2, 2002 sentenced Lobsang Dondrub to death, and Tenzin Deleg to death with a two year reprieve, for their role in the bombings.[11]  That court also found Lobsang Dondrub guilty of “inciting the split of the country” and illegally possessing firearms and ammunition, and Tenzin Deleg guilty of incitement to separatism.[12]

On December 16-17, 2002, PRC authorities assured a U.S. government delegation that the Supreme People’s Court would review Lobsang Dondrub’s and Tenzin Deleg’s death sentences if and when an appeals hearing reaffirmed the original verdicts and sentences.  Lobsang Dondrub’s sentence was approved by the Sichuan Province Higher People’s Court on Sunday, January 26.  He was executed that same day, without the PRC government having met its commitment to the U.S. delegation. 

2.2.     Additional Background According to Unofficial Sources

Tenzin Deleg and at least four other monks were taken into detention on April 7, 2002, four days after Lobsang Dondrub’s detention.  Shortly before his detention, Tenzin Deleg learned that police were trying to link him to Lobsang Dondrub, a development he considered as ominous.[13]

Published and confidential reports allege that PRC authorities denied both men access to visitors and legal counsel,[14] and subjected them to coercive methods of interrogation including beating and torture during the “investigation” phase of detention at the Kangding Police Detention Center.  Tenzin Deleg maintains that he did not confess to any of the charges against him;[15] unofficial sources have maintained that Lobsang Dondrub refused to confess, but no independent confirmation is available to verify this.  During Tenzin Deleg’s sentencing, which was attended by two of his family members, he reportedly declared the trial unfair, rejected all charges against him, and proclaimed his innocence before being removed from the court.[16]  Tenzin Deleg appealed his conviction; Lobsang Dondrub is not known to have done so.[17]

During the ensuing weeks police apprehended Tibetan residents of Nyagchu County who were raising funds to pay for Tenzin Deleg’s legal defense or who were otherwise seen as being closely linked to Tenzin Deleg.  In addition to Lobsang Dondrub, Tenzin Deleg and the four monks detained with them, at least six other Tibetans have been reported detained, bringing the total to at least twelve.[18] 

The Tibetan separatist movement has been overwhelmingly non-violent, and this is the first case in the post-Mao era in which Tibetans have been convicted of separatism as well as bombing.  Based on conversations with provincial officials, it is clear that the PRC government is trying to equate separatism and terrorism.

Chinese authorities have not provided any information about the evidence underlying the convictions, the manner in which such evidence was obtained, what if any evidentiary links exist between the explosions and Lobsang Dondrub or Tenzin Deleg, or what evidence would support the existence of any conspiracy between the two men.

3.      Will Lobsang Dondrub’s Execution Frustrate Tenzin Deleg’s Ability To Receive A Fair Retrial?

According to Tenzin Deleg, two Beijing officials visited him on January 7-8 and assured him that his case would be retried in the Sichuan Higher People’s Court.[19]  Several important issues are relevant to this retrial, for example the link between Lobsang Dondrub and Tenzin Deleg, any evidence which characterizes that link, and the manner in which that evidence was obtained.  All these are matters which Lobsang Dondrub could have illuminated, had PRC authorities not executed him mere hours after they rejected his appeal.

Unofficial reports contend that the real complaint PRC authorities have against Tenzin Deleg may be his years of religious and social activism, and his stubborn devotion to the Dalai Lama.  One piece of evidence that supports this contention is that, even though Lobsang Dondrub was accused of copying pro-independence leaflets and scattering them at each blast site, Tenzin Deleg’s sentence for “incitement to split the country” was the longer of the two, 14 years as compared to 12.[20]

PRC authorities have not provided any evidence that Tenzin Deleg has engaged in any activities that violate PRC law.  Although Tenzin Deleg does have a well-established history of renovating monasteries and supporting the Dalai Lama’s religious views, he has no record of encouraging political protest and has denied any involvement in leafleting (or bombing).  Tibet Information Network (TIN) has monitored Tibetan political protest and imprisonment since 1988 and has not received any report of a political incident or detention at any facility associated with Tenzin Deleg.

Given the lack of hard evidence to support claims that Tenzin Deleg engaged in illegal conduct, PRC authorities may have relied upon other sources of information.  It is here that Lobsang Dondrub enters the picture.  Although we know little about Lobsang Dondrub, we do know that he was related to Tenzin Deleg, and that he had tried to live as a monk in Tenzin Deleg’s monastery.  We also know that Tenzin Deleg himself expelled Lobsang Dondrub from the monastery.  A confidential and unconfirmed report explains (with notable vagueness) that Lobsang Dondrub was banished for misconduct including engaging in unacceptable business activities.[21]  The same confidential and unconfirmed report says that Lobsang Dondrub departed amicably.  Nevertheless, expulsions from monasteries are uncommon and Tibetans, particularly those in rural areas where residents generally maintain a more traditional lifestyle, view them as a serious matter.

The expulsion may attain special significance when considered in the context of missing information; for example: whether the “business” involved financial transactions conducted on behalf of the monastery or Tenzin Deleg; whether Lobsang Dondrub’s business or financial activity attracted the interest of interrogators as they sought to link the men; whether, perhaps under painful duress, Lobsang Dondrub may have implicated the man who expelled him; whether the two men maintained any relationship after the expulsion; or how they viewed one another.

In addition to the expulsion and all the unanswered questions, there are two pieces of evidence which indicate that PRC authorities may have relied upon Lobsang Dondrub to build their case against Tenzin Deleg.  First was a statement by the Director of the Ganzi TAP judiciary, in which he implied that PRC authorities believe there was a conspiracy between Lobsang Dondrub and Tenzin Deleg.  Director Zhao told Radio Free Asia, “All these bombs were works of [Lobsang Dondrub] and all the expenses were paid by [Tenzin Deleg].”[22]  The second is an extraordinary tape recording Tenzin Deleg made in his jail cell on January 18:

Around that time, one of my friends called me and asked if [Lobsang Dondrub] was my relative.  Then I became suspicious that something serious was going on.  When I heard about the explosions and [Lobsang Dondrub], I suspected that I might be wrongly accused and arrested—that I might become a scapegoat.[23]

Another recent and disturbing development is that the January 26 Xinhua report stated that the Higher People’s Court hearing in Chengdu was closed “because some of the defendants’ criminal acts were related to state secrets.”  This fact was not reported in the Chinese versions of the Xinhua report, only in the English version, and no previous PRC news reports had mentioned that the cases involved state secrets.  Now that PRC authorities have invoked laws concerning state secrets, they may keep the curtain drawn on Tenzin Deleg’s case.

All of this, as well as additional information provided in the chronology attached as Appendix 1 to this memorandum, suggests that the rush to execute Lobsang Dondrub hours after the Sichuan Higher People’s Court approved his death sentence, may have a profound impact on Tenzin Deleg’s ability to receive a fair retrial.  Tenzin Deleg now faces the prospect of a closed retrial in front of the same Higher People’s Court which ordered the execution of his most crucial defense witness on the same day it denied Tenzin Deleg’s original appeal.

4.      The Debate Over Whether Lobsang Dondrub’s Execution Violated PRC Law

4.1.     PRC Law and the “Xiafang” System

PRC law unequivocally requires that all death sentences (other than those which are commuted for two years) must be approved by the Supreme People’s Court:

Except for judgments made by the Supreme People’s Court according to law, all sentences of death shall be submitted to the Supreme People’s Court for approval.  Sentences of death with suspension of execution may be decided or approved by a high people’s court.[24]

PRC Criminal Law, Article 48

Death sentences are to be approved by the Supreme People’s Court.

The review of death sentence cases by the Supreme People’s Court and the review of death sentence cases with suspension of execution by a higher people’s court shall be conducted by a collegial panel composed of three judges.[25]

PRC Criminal Procedure Law, Articles 199 and 202

Currently, however, the Supreme People’s Court employs a mechanism known as xiafang (“send down”) to shift authority for approving certain death sentences to a lower level.[26]  The history of the xiafang system goes back to February 1980, when the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a decision requiring the Supreme People’s Court to assign to the Higher People’s Courts its authority to review and approve death penalty sentences in cases of murder, robbery, rape, arson and other crimes which severely jeopardized public security.[27]  In 1981, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued its Decision Regarding Certain Issues with Death Penalty Case Review, which stated that from 1981 through 1983, it would not be necessary to report death penalty sentences to the Supreme People’s Court for review for crimes of murder, robbery, rape, bombing, arson, poisoning, interfering with the water supply or damaging communication, power or other facilities.

The foregoing decisions expired in 1983, and the xiafang system as currently implemented is based upon three documents:  the Organic Law of the People’s Courts (the “Organic Law”), and the Supreme People’s Court’s Notice Regarding Entrusting to the Higher People’s Courts the Authority to Review and Approve Certain Death Penalty Cases (the “1983 Notice”) and Notice Regarding Authorizing Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts to Review and Approve Certain Death Penalty Cases (the “1997 Notice”).

As originally enacted in 1979, the Organic Law required that the Supreme People’s Court review and approve all death sentences (other than those imposed by that Court).  But in 1983 it was amended to provide the following caveat:

The Supreme People’s Court may, when it deems it necessary, authorize higher people’s courts of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government to exercise the authority to approve cases involving the imposition of death sentences for homicide, rape, robbery, causing explosions and others gravely endangering public security and disrupting social order.[28]

In that year, the Supreme People’s Court also issued the 1983 Notice, which entrusted to the provincial, autonomous region and independent municipality Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts the right to exercise the authority to review and approve death penalty sentences for murder and other crimes that seriously jeopardize public security and social order.

The timing of these two directives was not accidental: the stated purpose for initiating the xiafang system was to facilitate accelerated rates of execution during China’s first, and most brutal, “Strike Hard” campaign (yanda).[29]  An Amnesty International report refers to the many thousands of executions during the 1983 campaign as “a byword in Chinese legal circles for the worst abuses of the legal system.”

The Supreme People’s Court issued a new directive in 1997 to coincide with the revisions of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law.  The 1997 Notice (a complete translation of which is attached as Appendix 2) reaffirmed the xiafang principles established in the Organic Law and the 1983 Notice, but expanded the range of offenses which were required to be reported to the Supreme People’s Court for review and approval to include corruption, bribery, and other crimes that “disturb the order of the socialist market economy.”

4.2.     The Debate Within China on the Legality of the “Xiafang” System

During the past year many legal practitioners and scholars in China have questioned the legitimacy of the xiafang system.  To quote a Higher People’s Court judge: “[r]eview procedures were prescribed in the legislative process, but the Supreme People’s Court’s entrusting the provincial level Higher People’s Courts does not, from a structural perspective, comport with these procedures.”[30] 

This debate began in July of last year when a lawyer was able to avert his client’s death by persuading a Supreme People’s Court judge to call the official supervising the execution on his cell phone just four minutes before the execution was to take place.[31]  The incident sparked nationwide media coverage and debate about the review and approval process for death penalty cases.  One article featured analysis by five legal experts from three Chinese universities: Beijing University Law School, People’s University Law School, and China University of Political Science and Law.  They were “unanimous in their belief that the biggest problem exposed by this case is the fact that the death penalty review system, as currently implemented, exists in name only.”[32]

Legal experts in China have complained that a conflict exists between the Criminal Procedure Law’s requirement that the Supreme People’s Court review and approve all death penalty sentences, and the Organic Law’s and 1997 Notice’s delegation of this review authority to the Higher People’s Courts.  They have also pointed out five reasons why this conflict should be resolved in favor of the more centralized and unified review called for under the Criminal Procedure Law.

First, these experts argue that the current death penalty review system is unconstitutional.  Citing remarks attributed to a Beijing University Law School professor, one Chinese newspaper has pointed out that:

[T]he Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law stipulate that only the Supreme People’s Court may exercise death penalty review and approval authority.  Therefore, the stipulation under the Organic Law of the Supreme People’s Court that the death penalty review and approval authority may be delegated to Higher Courts at the Provincial Level directly contradicts the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law.  Actually these laws are of completely different force.  On the one hand, the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law were passed by the National People’s Congress, and are the basic laws of the nation.  On the other hand, the Organic Law of the Supreme People’s Court was only passed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and is just an ordinary law of the nation.  The force of the latter law is clearly less than the former two.  It is without a doubt unconstitutional behavior for an ordinary law to contravene a basic law.[33]

The second complaint which members of the Chinese legal community have made is that ignoring the clear requirement of the Criminal Procedure Law not only violates the legal structure specified in the PRC Constitution, but also fails to comport with the democratic principles espoused in that same document:

[T]he Criminal Law was enacted by the National People’s Congress, and was passed by over 2,000 elected representatives, whereas the Organic Law of the Courts was only enacted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and was passed by only 100 appointees, and the status of a law correlates directly with the body that enacted it, so one would have to believe that the Criminal Law trumps the Organic Law of the Courts.[34]

The third basis on which law professors in China have objected to the xiafang system is that the provisions which originally authorized the system, found in the 1983 Organic Law, have been superceded by subsequent legislation which is clearly contrary to those provisions:

[A]ccording to the principal of “the new law surpasses the old law,” any conflicts between the 1997 Criminal Law and the 1983 Organic Law of the Courts regarding review and approval of the death penalty should of course be resolved by implementing the later-enacted Criminal Law, because as time progresses, the newer law more accurately reflects the will of the people.[35]

The Supreme People’s Court was no doubt aware of this problem when it issued the 1997 Notice to coincide with the revisions of the Criminal Procedure Law in 1996 and the Criminal Law in 1997.  But as noted above, under the PRC Constitution, a Supreme People’s Court notice cannot trump those basic laws which were enacted by the highest legislative authority in the country.

The fourth issue legal scholars in China have pointed to is that by putting the authority to review and approve death sentences in the hands of the same courts which will hear that person’s appeal of the underlying verdict, the Supreme People’s Court has undermined the very reason for which it was initially entrusted with death penalty review in the first place:

If Higher People’s Courts enjoy the authority to review and approve certain death penalty cases, in those cases the review and approval of the penalty and the determination of the appeal necessarily will be merged into one [decision], as it is impossible for a single adjudication committee to reach different outcomes [on the review and on the appeal].  The goal of preventing wrongful executions will therefore be difficult to achieve.[36]

Finally, at least one law professor in China has pointed out that “pursuant to relevant international human rights provisions, those countries which retain the death penalty shall have death penalty sentences issued by the nation’s highest judicial authority.”[37]

In light of all these criticisms, why does the Supreme People’s Court continue to employ the xiafang system?  It would be untrue for PRC authorities to argue that the original reasons for implementing the system – the 1983 “Strike Hard” campaign – still exists.  It would also be politically dangerous for them to claim that the original purpose of the 1983 campaign – to kill as many undesirables as quickly as possible[38] – outweighs the primacy of the nation’s Constitution. 

In fact, the only explanation PRC authorities have offered is equally disturbing: the PRC government executes so many people that the Supreme People’s Court simply does not have the resources to review all of the cases.  As one Supreme People’s Court senior judge observed:

The Supreme People’s Court does not have the ability to take charge of the review of all these cases.  The personnel and material resources are seriously inadequate to do all of this.  There are only 600 people in the entire high court, and 60 percent of those are carrying out the work of sentencing.  Just looking at the criminal court alone, there are only four court rooms suitable for collegiate panels, and one of these is dedicated to investigation enquiries, and the remaining three courtrooms have to be used by four or five people each.  The dossier for one large case can be enormous, and each person must look at it, make notes and return it to the presiding judge.  The rules state that in order for their to be a quorum for the examination and approval committee there must be at least 7 of the 11 primary presiding judges present, so figure it will take a week to handle each case - how are you going to be able to administer all of the many cases in the country?  You couldn’t finish it if everyone at the court worked around the clock.[39]

Nevertheless, legal scholars in China have pointed out that the decision to retain Article 48 of the Criminal Law through the 1996 revision was considered and deliberate.[40]  Considering this fact, and the five arguments cited above, it is disturbing that the execution of Lobsang Dondrub may be the result of a lack of administrative capacity which has given rise to a system that operates in violation of the laws and principles of the government responsible for protecting his rights.

5.      PRC Authorities Failed To Fulfill Their Commitment To The U.S. To Ensure A Thorough Review Of Lobsang Dondrub’s Case

Under current law, the events leading up to Lobsang Dondrub’s execution probably could not have followed any course other than the one they did.  As noted above, Xinhua’s January 26 report on the case states that some of the acts for which Lobsang Dondrub and Tenzin Deleg were convicted involved state secrets.  Under the 1997 Notice, the Supreme People’s Court requires that all death penalty sentences involving state security be provided to it for review.  The charges that apply to both men are causing explosions and inciting separatism, but the report did not specify which charge was associated with state secrets.

If the state secrets are related to the blasts, the offence which brought the death sentences, and if the explosions were therefore an offense against state security, then Lobsang Dondrub’s case should have been reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court.  But the Higher People’s Court has given no indication that this is the case.  Although an official Chinese spokesperson has referred to the bombs as a “terrorist”[41] attack, the law treats them as a crime against public—not state—security.  In contrast, a slip of paper expressing independence aspirations, but posing no physical threat of any kind to anyone or anything, is treated as a grave danger to state security.[42]  If the charge that gave rise to the death sentence in Lobsang Dondrub’s case did not involve state secrets and state security, then the Higher People’s Court was not legally required (at least, not under the current xiafang system, the questionable legality of which is discussed above) to send it to the Supreme People’s Court.

In spite of this, news of Lobsang Dondrub’s execution came as a grim surprise to many, including U.S. government officials, because in December 2002 Lorne Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, met with counterparts in Beijing for a session of bilateral human rights dialogue.  He raised the cases of Lobsang Dondrub and Tenzin Deleg.  In that meeting, which included officials from the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Justice, Craner and his delegation were repeatedly assured that the Supreme People’s Court would review the death sentences if and when the appeals hearing reaffirmed the original verdict and sentence, and that the process would be “lengthy.”  PRC authorities provided similar assurances to other governments, including the European Union.

Either the Supreme People’s Court did not ensure that the Sichuan Higher People’s Court submitted Lobsang Dondrub’s death sentence for review, or the Supreme People’s Court informed the Sichuan Higher People’s Court of its intent to review the case, and the notice went unheeded.  In either case, PRC authorities failed to fulfill their commitment to the U.S. government.

6.      Conclusion

The Chinese government’s human rights practices fall far short of internationally accepted standards, and this situation continues to be an obstacle to a healthy bilateral relationship between China and the United States.  The case and laws reviewed in this memorandum illustrate the malfunction of the PRC legal system in its application of the ultimate punishment—the death penalty.

The execution of Lobsang Dondrub, one of two Tibetans charged with causing explosions and inciting separatism in Sichuan Province, took place a few weeks after the Supreme People’s Court assured a senior U.S. official that the national court would undertake a “lengthy” review of the case.  The case did not make it to Beijing, despite the Supreme People’s Court’s commitment, and a provincial Higher People’s Court approved the execution.  The second defendant, Buddhist lama Tenzin Deleg, may face retrial by the same court which sent Lobsang Dondrub to the executioner.  The case illustrates failures in the criminal law, and in the legal process, encountered by individuals charged with a criminal offense.  Now that the Sichuan Higher People’s Court has rejected Tenzin Deleg’s appeal, his best chance for a full, fair, and just hearing is before the Supreme People’s Court.

The case also highlights nationwide problems.  The Supreme People’s Court sidesteps the Criminal Procedure Law’s requirement that review and approval of death sentences “shall be conducted by a collegial panel composed of three judges.”  The most recent reaffirmation of the shortcut was issued by the Supreme People’s Court itself in 1997, when the court reiterated a 1983 law expediting approval of executions by handing most decisions back to the provinces.  The 1997 action aimed to “severely punish in a timely manner” defendants described as “villainous and wicked.”  The priority is speed, not care.

Chinese legal experts are engaged in a pivotal debate on these issues.  Many have expressed their conviction in prominent PRC print and Internet media that shortcuts to execution are not compatible with justice.  Only the National People’s Congress and Supreme People’s Court can meet this life-or-death challenge, and they should do so without delay.

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

Supreme People’s Court Notice Regarding Authorizing Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts to

Review and Approve Certain Death Penalty Cases

September 26, 1997.  Law Issue (1997) No. 24

[Translated by: William A. Farris, Congressional Executive Commission on China]

All provincial, autonomous region and independent municipality Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts:

In an effort to severely punish in a timely manner those villainous and wicked criminal elements who jeopardized public security and social order, on September 7, 1983 this Court issued a notice, in accordance with Article 13 of the amended Organic Law of the People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, authorizing all provincial, autonomous region and independent municipality Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts to review and approve death penalty cases involving murder, rape, armed robbery, bombing and others crimes which jeopardized public security and social order.  Now the fifth meeting of the Eighth National Party Congress has amended the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the amended Criminal Law still contains the following provision: “Except for those adjudicated by the Supreme People’s Court in accordance with the law, all death sentences shall be reported to the Supreme People’s Court for review and approval.”  Considering the current state of public security and the need to timely strike hard at criminals, there is a need to continue to have a portion of the authority to review and approve death penalty cases be exercised by Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts, and to further clarify the scope of death penalty case review and approval by provincial, autonomous region and independent municipality Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts from this day forward.  You are hereby notified as follows:

Beginning when the amended Criminal Law officially becomes effective on October 1, 1997, all appellate and review affirmations of cases with the death sentence by any Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts for Criminal Law Chapter 1 jeopardizing national security crimes, Chapter 3 disturbing the order of the socialist market economy crimes, and Chapter 8 corruption and bribery crimes shall continue to be reported to this Court for review and approval.  This Court, in accordance with Article 13 of the Organic Law of the People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, continues to authorize the provincial, autonomous region and independent municipality Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts to exercise the authority to review and approve cases with the death sentence (other than those adjudicated by this Court or involving foreign affairs) for Criminal Law Chapter 2, 4, 5, 6 (other than drug crimes), 7 and 10 crimes.  However, all death penalty cases involving Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan must continue to be reported to this Court for internal review and approval prior to the initial adjudication.  Except for those Higher People’s Courts which already have authorization to exercise the authority to approve of certain death penalty cases, all other Higher People’s Courts and People’s Liberation Army Military Affairs Courts shall, following affirmation on appeal or review, report death penalty cases for drug crimes to this Court for review.