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• Freedom of Expression
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Source: -See Summary (2012-05-15 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-15
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=174495

◦ Apply for verification and approval from the BIIO before applying for a telecommunications business license. (Article 6)
◦ Prevent the creation of fake microblog accounts. (Article 7(7))
◦ Restrict users from transmitting harmful information and promptly report to public security authorities any activity that “violates security management” or is “suspected to be criminal.” (Article 7(8))
◦ Establish a mechanism to verify information content and supervise the production, reproduction, publication, and transmission of microblog content. (Article 8)

◦ Register microblog accounts using authentic identity information. (Article 9)
◦ Refrain from registering under the false or replicated identity of a resident, business, or organization.

◦ Endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts state power, harms national honor or interests, or incites ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination. (Article10(2)-10(4))
◦ Violates state religious policy or propagates "cult or feudal superstitions." (Article 10(5))
◦ Spreads rumors, disturbs public order, or undermines social stability (Article 10(6))
◦ Incites illegal gatherings, parades, demonstrations, or gathers a mob to disturb public order. (Article 10(9))
◦ Discusses activities in the name of illegal civic organizations. (Article 10(10))

Source: -See Summary (2012-03-07 / English) | Posted on: 2012-05-10		more ...
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• Yuan Weijing. Chen Guangcheng's wife. Currently with Chen Guangcheng at Chaoyang Hospital in Beijing. Yuan reportedly faces restrictions on freedom of movement and has had to "pass security checks before being allowed out to buy food for the family" (RFA, 8 May 12).


• Chen Kerui and Chen Kesi. Chen Guangcheng's eleven-year-old son and six-year-old daughter. Currently with Chen Guangcheng and Yuan Weijing at Chaoyang Hospital in Beijing (RFA, 8 May 12).


• Wang Jinxiang. Chen Guangcheng's 78-year-old mother. Chen reported that she remained confined in his home in Shandong province, and that she suffers from ill health (Metro Nieuws, 9 May 12). Chen and Yuan have expressed concerns about leaving her behind (Daily Beast, 8 May 12).


• Chen Guangfu. Chen Guangcheng's older brother. Authorities detained Chen Guangfu on April 26 following a clash with police in his home (CHRD, 1 May 12). Authorities released him on May 7 (VOA, translated by China Aid Association, 7 May 12). Chen Guangfu reportedly remains under close police surveillance and is forbidden to leave his village or make any phone calls (RFA, 8 May 12).


• Chen Kegui. Chen Guangcheng's nephew, Chen Guangfu's son. Chen Guangcheng has continued to raise specific concerns about the situation of Chen Kegui, who is allegedly facing charges of "intentional homicide." Chen Kegui reportedly clashed with officials when they invaded his home after discovering Chen Guangcheng had escaped. A lawyer who volunteered to defend Chen Kegui reported that at least one official was injured during the confrontation, but no one was killed (AP, via CBS, 10 May 12). Chen Kegui is currently held at the Yinan County Detention Center in Shandong province where he has reportedly been beaten (RFA, 8 May 12).


• Ren Zongju. Cheng Guangcheng's sister-in-law, Cheng Guangfu's wife, and Chen Kegui's mother. Ren was reportedly detained and then released pending trial on charges of "harboring a criminal," Chen Kegui (RFA, 8 May 12).


• Liu Fang. Chen Guangcheng's niece-in-law, Chen Kegui's wife. Chen reported that officials had taken Liu into custody after she attempted to hire a lawyer (RFA, 8 May 12). Chen later reported to Voice of America, however, that Liu was missing and that officials were searching for her to get her signature (VOA, in Chinese, 9 May 12). Information on Liu's current whereabouts appears to be unavailable.


• Chen Guangcun. Chen Guangcheng's cousin. Officials reportedly took Chen Guangcun and his son into custody on April 28, 2012. Information on his current whereabouts appears to be unavailable (Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 1 May 12).


• Chen Hua. Chen Guangcheng's cousin. Chen Guangcun's son. Officials reportedly took Chen Hua and his father into custody on April 28, 2012. Information on his current whereabouts appears to be unavailable (CHRD, 1 May 12).

• He Peirong. Nanjing-based human rights advocate. Played a key role in transporting Chen Guangcheng from Shandong province to Beijing following his escape. State security personnel reportedly took He from her home in Nanjing "to assist with investigations" (Reuters, 7 May 12). She was interrogated in a hotel for seven days and has now returned home, where she is "allowed to move about freely" (NYT, 8 May 12). On May 10, He posted on her Twitter account that she is not accepting interviews with the media (Twitter, 10 May 12).


• Guo Yushan. Beijing-based scholar and human rights advocate. Authorities initially detained him for 50 hours following Chen's escape and released him on April 30 (LA Times, 1 May 12). A French journalist posted on Twitter on May 1 that he had spoken with Guo, who stated he was not allowed to grant interviews to foreign journalists (Twitter, 1 May 12). Guo reportedly has remained in contact with Chen following his release (WP, 3 May 12).


• Jiang Tianyong. Beijing-based lawyer. Authorities reportedly ordered Jiang to leave Beijing on May 8 and instructed him to notify the police prior to his return. Jiang had previously reported that security personnel beat him after he attempted to visit Chen at the hospital, damaging his hearing. Authorities permitted him to seek medical treatment on May 7 for the injuries he sustained during the beating. The doctor that examined Jiang, however, reportedly refused to record the injury (NYT, 8 May 12).


• Hu Jia. Beijing-based human rights advocate. Authorities detained Hu Jia on April 27 and held him for 24 hours for questioning regarding Chen Guangcheng's escape (LA Times, 1 May 12). Hu Jia has not posted on his Twitter account since April 30. The Commission has not observed additional news reports on his present situation.


• Zeng Jinyan. Beijing-based human rights advocate, wife of Hu Jia. Zeng stated in a May 2 post on her Twitter account that state security guards were following her when taking her daughter to school and that she was being placed under house arrest (Twitter, 2 May 12). Zeng has subsequently posted that security personnel continue to prevent her from leaving her home, and that authorities continue to deny her requests to pursue a master's degree at a Hong Kong university (Twitter, 4 May 12, 5 May 12, 8 May 12; Daily Beast 8 May 12). Zeng Jinyan's most recent Twitter post indicated that she would be cutting herself off from all technology for ten days (Twitter, 8 May 12).


• Liu Yanping. Associate of Beijing-based artist and human rights advocate Ai Weiwei. Authorities reportedly detained Liu when she attempted to bring a birthday cake to Chen Guangcheng's son at Chaoyang hospital on May 4. Liu reported on her Twitter account that authorities released her after 9 hours (Twitter, 4 May 12).

Source: -See Summary (2012-05-10 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-10
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=174353

• The regulations require that journalists "use authoritative sources, news, or verifiable facts; [and] must not compile and distribute news based on unverified rumors and other non-first hand materials." (Article 1(4))


• The regulations require journalists to produce at least two sources for any news reports that involve criticism and to ensure that news reports are “true, objective, and accurate." (Article 1(5))


• The regulations require that "News agencies must strictly regulate news gathering processes, establishing, and improving the review system for publications and broadcasts..." (Article 2(1))


• The regulations require that news agencies strictly employ an open system for receiving publicly available documents and Internet information and not directly use unverified information and mobile phone messages. (Article 2(3))


• The regulations require that news agencies establish a sound mechanism for receiving public reports, complaints, inspections, disposal procedures, and feedback. (Article 3(1))


• The regulations require that news agencies improve their systems of accountability for "fake" (xujia) or "false" (shishi) reports. (Article 3(3))


• The regulations state that journalists who "compile and distribute false information that is harmful to national or public interests" and those that "publish inaccurate reports with adverse social impacts" shall be given a warning, in accordance with existing laws and regulations. If "the circumstances are serious," the journalist may not be able to engage in news editing or production for five years; if the infringement is criminal, the journalist may be held criminally responsible and may not be able to engage in news editing or production permanently. (Article 4(2))

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-08 / English) | Posted on: 2012-05-08		more ...
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• Investigate and prosecute local officials that have abused him and his family members;
• Ensure the safety of his family members;
• Investigate and punish corruption in general in China, and specifically in connection with his confinement, in accordance with the law.

Source: -See Summary (2012-04-27 / English) | Posted on: 2012-04-27		more ...
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• On November 22, 2011, 1,000 workers reportedly went on strike at a Jingmo Electronics Corporation factory in Shenzhen in response to overtime demands by management and the decision to require mandatory overnight overtime shifts. Workers reportedly also had grievances concerning unsafe working conditions, mass layoffs of older workers, a lack of benefits, and verbal abuse by managers. (CLW, 23 November 11)


• On November 28, 2011, taxi drivers in Liaocheng city, Shandong province, protested in response to government-instituted fare adjustments and problems relating to illegal taxi operations. Authorities reportedly forcibly took into custody several taxi drivers who were planning to petition, questioned them, and released them six hours later, after pressuring them to sign a pledge not to "cause trouble." (People's Daily, 12 December 11)


• In late November 2011, more than 100 retail workers blockaded a British-owned Tesco in Jinhua city, Zhejiang province, in a protest over wages and layoff compensation terms. Workers at Tesco reportedly became concerned that the store would shut down earlier than previously stated and asked management to "pay them the overtime they were due and terminate their contracts so they would receive wages immediately." (Guardian, 30 November 11)


• Starting on November 28, 2011, workers at Singapore-owned Hi-P International electronics factory in Shanghai went on strike over layoffs due to the company's decision to relocate manufacturing to Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu province. Workers demanded compensation for layoffs and accused the factory of violating labor standards including long workdays and unreasonable overtime demands. Workers claimed that public security officials beat some of them earlier during the protests. (Associated Press, via Huffington Post, 2 December 11; Reuters, 2 December 11; related CECC analysis)


• In early January 2012, hundreds of migrant construction workers gathered at a highway construction firm's office in Hubei province, demanding 200 million yuan (approximately US$32 million) in unpaid wages. (China Internet Information Center, via Shanghai Daily, 21 January 12)

Source: -See Summary (2012-03-22 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-27
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=172064

Source: -See Summary (2012-03-29 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=172436

• Organizations that diagnose occupational diseases may not refuse workers' requests for diagnoses (Art. 44).


• Workers who cannot prove a working relationship with their employer may apply to local civil affairs bureaus for medical assistance (Art. 62).


• Employers must submit information about workers' work history and history of contact with health hazards in the workplace, information that is necessary for diagnosing occupational diseases (Art. 48).


• Organizations that diagnose occupational diseases may inspect workplaces in order to collect information about occupational health hazards, or those organizations may propose that the government conduct inspections of workplaces. Employers may not refuse or interfere with those inspections (Art. 48).

• The amended law requires employers to invest sufficient funds to ensure the prevention and control of occupational diseases. The amended law prohibits employers from misusing those funds, and it places liability on the employer if insufficient investment in occupational health causes a "negative result" (Art. 22).


• The amended law requires employers and healthcare organizations to report cases and suspected cases of occupational disease in a timely manner to the government, and it requires the government to handle the cases according to the law (Art. 51).


• The amended law increases the maximum penalty for employers who cause harm to workers' health by not following the amended Occupational Disease Law from 300,000 yuan (approximately US$47,130) to 500,000 yuan (approximately US$78,550) (Art. 78).

Source: -See Summary (2012-03-12 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=171414

• Authorities asserted that beginning in 1998, Zhu engaged in activities associated with the "illegal" China Democracy Party (CDP) that "harmed national security," but did not assert that those activities disrupted public order or advocated or incited violence. The court's judgment did not provide details about those activities or explain how they endangered national security.


• Authorities cited as evidence Zhu's 2010 and 2011 fundraising activities on behalf of Chinese democracy activists and his statements explaining those activities, including one statement titled "2010 New Year Fundraising Brief Explanation." The court's judgment claims that Zhu raised funds on behalf of "criminals that had harmed national security and their families," and that Zhu's explanatory statements posted overseas "incited hostility towards state power and the socialist system in our country." The court's judgment, however, did not indicate who benefited from the fundraising activities or provide details of their "criminal" acts, nor did it provide evidence of the hostility caused by Zhu's statement.


• Authorities noted 21 articles, 8 recordings, and 4 videos dated from September 2009 onward and posted on overseas Web sites in which Zhu "fabricated malicious rumors and slandered our country's state power, inciting people to change (the regime) and seize political power." The court highlighted in its judgment a few of Zhu's statements that reportedly were recorded and transcribed by overseas organizations, including, "[v]icious political power is the common enemy of the Chinese people. This must change, [we] must give back to the people the power forcibly seized from them" (Sound of Hope, via Aboluo Net on January 23, 2011). Authorities did not indicate how this statement incited subversion. Zhu's statements apparently referred to limiting government authority because he followed the statements noted above with the sentence "[we] cannot use public authority to infringe upon an individual's right to religious freedom or infringe upon an individual's basic political rights."


• Authorities asserted that on February 18 and March 2, 2011, Zhu Yufu utilized the Internet to send information to more than 50 people, encouraging them to invite family and friends to gather illegally in the city square to "initiate a Jasmine Revolution similar to that in Tunisia" and "incite people to subvert state power in our country." Authorities noted that among the three documents Zhu sent out on February 18 to a number of people was a poem, entitled "It's Time," which included the line "[i]t's time to head to the Square and make your choice." (See this January 31, 2012, Human Rights in China statement that includes an English translation of the poem by A. E. Clark.)

Source: -See Summary (2012-03-06 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=171151

"What that means is that in some circumstances, some of these people might become refugees, and for different reasons. The most frequent reason—when we deal with this problem not only here but all over the world—is when there is a risk of deportation back to their countries of origin and this is associated with the risk of persecution in those areas covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention. In those situations, these people become what are called 'refugees sur-place.' And they become people in need of protection that will, of course, justify our intervention. That was obviously at the very core of our discussions."

• On February 24, 2012, UNHCR urged all parties concerned to find a viable humanitarian solution in the case of a group of North Koreans who were arrested in China in early February, according to a statement released by UNHCR.
• On February 27, 2012, South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Bong-hyun delivered a keynote speech at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Geneva, in which he "implicitly urged the Chinese government to honor its international obligations" not to repatriate refugees if they face persecution (Chosun Ilbo, 29 February 12). (For a video of the keynote speech, see the UNHRC Web site here.)
• On March 9, 2012, in a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed U.S. opposition to the repatriation of North Korean refugees: "We urge every country to act according to international obligations. ... We believe that refugees should not be repatriated and subjected once again to the dangers that they fled from. The treatment of North Korean refugees is an issue on which we have ongoing engagement with our partners, both in Korea and in China. We had Ambassador Davies raise our concerns about the North Korean refugees detained in China with senior Chinese officials when he was last in China in February." (U.S. Department of State Web site.)
• On March 12, 2012, Ambassador Robert King, the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues, shared concerns of Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, over the North Korean refugees:　"[W]e share the Special Rapporteur's deep concerns about the plight of refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We urge the DPRK to end the punishment and imprisonment of North Koreans who have sought asylum abroad as well as their family members." (U.S. Department of State Web site.)
  
• On March 12, 2012, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK expressed concern at a session of the UN Human Rights Council over the safety and protection of "asylum-seekers" and called on all states "to adhere to the principle of non-refoulement" and their obligation of providing international protection to asylum-seekers (Yonhap News Agency, 13 March 12). (For the video, see the UNHRC Web site here.)
• On March 14, 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told "related-countries" that he would like to see the issue of forced repatriation resolved through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Chosun Ilbo, 16 March 12). Ban said that he had conveyed his concerns to member states and "sought cooperation as best I can in my position."

Source: -See Summary (2012-02-22 / English) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=170440

• Technology and Innovation. China confirmed that foreign investors will not need to transfer technology or establish domestic Chinese brands in order to participate in China's new energy vehicle (NEV) industry, and would be eligible for subsidies on the same basis as Chinese companies. The NEV sector was listed as one of seven "strategic emerging industries" in China's 12th Five-Year Plan (Chapter 10), to be nurtured into "pillar industries." On the issue of creating Chinese brands, the JCCT commitment may have come too late. According to a report of November 22 in China Trade Extra, Chinese authorities previously had been withholding approval of U.S. automakers' projects in China unless they agreed to establish a domestic Chinese brand new energy vehicle. The report continues, "As a result, nearly all major foreign automakers except Ford have already agreed to produce a domestic [Chinese] NEV brand."



• IPR. Every JCCT since 2004 has included commitments by China to improve its IPR protection in light of rampant piracy in China. These commitments have ranged from the general, such as China's commitment at the 2004 JCCT to "significantly reduce" levels of infringement and make greater use of criminal penalties, to the specific, such as the 2005 commitment to post an IPR ombudsman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC. (For details, see the US-China Business Council's document, "China's JCCT Commitments, 2004–10.") This year, China reported establishing a high-level leadership mechanism, headed by Vice Premier Wang Qishan, to head IPR enforcement in China, and committed to move forward on ensuring that Chinese government bodies at all levels use licensed software. As noted on page 86 of the U.S. Trade Representative's 2011 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, China is obligated under the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO "to protect and enforce the intellectual property rights held by U.S. and other foreign companies and individuals." However, "China has continued to demonstrate little success in actually enforcing its laws and regulations in the face of challenges created by widespread counterfeiting, piracy and other forms of infringement."



• Agriculture. Unlike previous JCCTs, China did not make any major commitments concerning agricultural market access. According to a November 21 press release by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the parties agreed to "expand discussion" and to move toward making progress in certain areas.



• Strategic, Newly Emerging Industries. As noted above, the 12th Five-Year Plan includes a chapter on strategic emerging industries. According to the Commerce Department's trade fact sheet, China "assured the United States that it will provide a fair and level playing field for all companies, including U.S. companies," in these industries. The fact sheet notes that China will be investing $1.5 trillion in these industries over the next five years.

Source: -See Summary (2012-02-13 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=169899

• Rights protections for persons living with mental disabilities. The October draft retains language from the June draft prohibiting infringement of the rights to human dignity and personal safety of persons living with mental illness. The October draft also retains language calling for the legal protection of the rights of persons with mental disabilities to privacy and access to education, work, medical treatment, and material assistance from the state and society. (Article 4) Such rights are provided for in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), which China signed in March 2007 and ratified in August 2008. (See, e.g., Articles 22, 24, and 25-28.)



• Codified standards for diagnosis and treatment. The October draft retains language that tasks the department of health administration under the State Council with determining a set of standards for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. (Article 21)



• Regulation of the power to diagnose and commit individuals. The October draft retains language mandating that diagnosis be performed by a practicing psychiatrist and, in cases of involuntary admittance, that two or more psychiatrists diagnose the individual and provide a written copy of the diagnosis within 72 hours. (Article 24) These measures could reduce conflict of interest and undue influence. Article 12(4) of the CRDP requires that States Parties include safeguards that ensure, among other things, that "measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity ... are free of conflict of interest and undue influence ...." However, the October draft's treatment of independent review of a diagnosis still appears to fall short of international standards, as discussed under "Remaining Areas of Concern" below.

• Omission of "endangering public safety" and "disrupting social order" as basis for involuntary commitment. Article 27 of the June draft provided for a person to be involuntarily committed if the individual was "in danger of harming himself, endangering public safety or the personal safety of others, or disturbing public order," among other criteria. The October draft (Article 25) does not retain the phrases "endangering public safety" or "disturbing public order" as permissible criteria for involuntary commitment. Both domestic and international experts had criticized the inclusion of the phrases "endangering public safety" and "disrupting social order" in the June draft due to their vague nature and their potential for misinterpretation as support for the official misuse of psychiatric detention to quell dissent. (Aizhixing, via Blogspot, 24 June 11; China Law & Policy interview with mental disability law expert and New York Law School Professor Michael Perlin, 24 October 11).



• "Patient assessment" now factored into procedures for involuntary commitment. While the June draft (Article 28) mentioned that only "diagnosis" (zhenduan) was necessary for determining that an individual should be confined against his or her will, the corresponding provision in the October draft added an additional requirement. The revised language (Article 25) states that an individual diagnosed with a mental disability must also undergo an assessment of his condition in order to be involuntarily committed. Professor Perlin had discussed the need for such language in his October 24 China Law & Policy interview, presumably prior to reviewing the October draft.



• Process of appeal for involuntary commitment expanded and more clearly outlined than in June draft. In Articles 29-32, the June draft provided procedures by which an individual or his family may seek recourse if they disagree with a decision of involuntary commitment. The October draft (Articles 26, 27, and 32) provides even greater detail on these procedures, with added language specifying such items as:




1. Persons who request an independent review to contest a diagnosis must do so within three days from the initial diagnosis (October draft, Article 26).


2. An independent review must be conducted by two doctors who are different from those who provided the initial diagnosis (October draft, Article 26).


3. Both drafts provide for an evaluation by a "mental disability judicial evaluation" entity, by request, to contest an independent review. The October draft allows for a second judicial evaluation, by request, after the initial one, and mandates that in cases in which the conclusions of the two judicial evaluations differ, the second shall be considered correct (October draft, Articles 26 and 27). Under provisions in the June draft (Articles 30-32), a single judicial evaluation of the doctors' independent review was the final step one could take in contesting involuntary commitment.


4. Doctors tasked with providing an independent review or persons providing a judicial evaluation must visit the individual in person to interview him (October draft, Articles 27, 32).

• No provision for mandatory independent review. While, as discussed above, in cases of involuntary commitment, persons may request an independent review (fuzhen) of an initial diagnosis (October draft, Article 27), this provision places the burden on the individual or representing party to make the request, as opposed to making such a review automatic. Article 12(4) of the CRDP requires that "measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity ... are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body."



• No provision for the appointment of legal counsel. Neither draft provides for the appointment of legal counsel during any part of the review process outlined above. The June draft did mention that the judicial entity in charge of providing an evaluation after an independent review should call in a legal expert to participate (Article 30), but this language appears to have been omitted from the October draft. In an open letter to the NPCSC, a group of five Chinese citizens who claim to have experienced wrongful institutionalization noted the lack of provision for legal representation during the appeal process (China Daily, 16 November 11), as did public health advocacy group Aizhixing in their June 24 report. Article 12(3) of the CRDP requires that "States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access to persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity."



• Indefinite involuntary commitment. Neither the June nor the October draft appears to place limits on the length of time a person may be involuntarily institutionalized. Aizhixing raised this concern in their June 24 report, calling for a "set time limit for forced hospitalization and treatment." Professor Perlin also raised this issue in his October 24 China Law & Policy interview, and indicated concern about whether "indefinite commitment without clear judicial review passes muster under the international human rights law." Article 12(4) of the CRDP requires States Parties to provide safeguards to prevent official abuse, and in doing so, to "ensure that all measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity ... are proportional and tailored to the person's circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body."



• No provision for an individual's right to refuse medication. Neither the June nor the October draft appear to have included language regarding an individual's right to refuse medication. Professor Michael Perlin raised concern about this omission, calling it a "huge issue" (China Law & Policy, 24 October 11).

Source: -See Summary (2012-02-10 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=169832

• Workers may raise concerns with enterprise mediation committees if they believe there is a problem with an enterprise's implementation of a contract, a collective contract, a labor statute, or an enterprise's internal labor regulations. Mediation committees then have an obligation to verify the content of the complaint and either coordinate with the enterprise to rectify the problem or give an explanation to the workers (Art. 4).


• The Provisions further clarify the process of "consultations" (xieshang). For example, they specify that if one party does not respond to a request for consultations within five days, it will be considered unwilling to engage in consultations (Art. 10). The Provisions also stipulate that the parties can specify a length of time for consultations (Art. 10) and that an agreement reached through consultations is binding (Art. 11).


• Under the Provisions, enterprise mediation committees are responsible for publicizing labor laws, regulations, and policies in the workplace (Art. 16(1)).

• Dongguan city, Guangdong province (Financial Times, 18 November 11, subscription required; CNN, 25 November 11)


• Shanghai municipality (Associated Press, 2 December 11, reprinted in Huffington Post; Reuters, 2 December 11)


• Huzhou municipality, Zhejiang province (Reuters, 8 December 11)


• Chengdu city, Sichuan province (China Labor Watch, 4 January 12; Want China Times, 6 January 12)

• In remarks printed in the Party-controlled People's Daily (26 December 11, in Chinese), Shen Weichen, an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Deputy Head of the Party Central Propaganda Department, said, "Harmony in enterprises is the foundation of social harmony, and harmony in labor relations is the crux of harmony in enterprises."


• Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Party Secretary for Shanghai municipality, reportedly said that "establishing harmonious labor relations are important for social harmony, stability, and progress…" (Liberation Daily, 20 January 12, in Chinese).


• A guiding opinion from the Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security stated that "the ability to appropriately settle [labor] disputes… directly affects social harmony and stability" (13 December 11).


• A press release on the Web site of the Luhe district, Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, Office of the Leading Small Group on Governing the District According to the Law said that a Nanjing court's handling of a major labor dispute case showed the court's "dynamic judicial ideas in… maintaining social harmony and stability" (31 December 11).

Source: -See Summary (2012-02-01 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=169333

1. By September, authorities had removed proposed language in Article 22 which stated that "the national government should assess the environmental performance of local governments," and that the MEP "in conjunction with State Council supervisory agencies will meet with relevant responsible government officials from provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities and circulate nationally the names of local governments that do not meet environmental targets."


2. Authorities removed language from Article 23 contained in the February draft, which reportedly stated that governments at all administrative levels would report to people's congresses at the same level regarding their progress toward achieving environmental targets and accept supervision from the congresses.


3. Authorities also removed language regarding official assessment of fines on a daily basis for enterprises that do not rectify illegal polluting behavior within a specified time frame, which weakens the incentive for compliance.

Source: -See Summary (2012-01-27 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
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Source: -See Summary (2012-01-27 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
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Source: -See Summary (2012-01-10 ) | Posted on: 2012-04-20
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The chairmen of the bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China today called on Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to take concrete steps to improve human rights and the rule of law in China.

"It is our fervent hope that Vice President Xi can reverse the course of his predecessors and usher in positive changes in China. But we remain extremely concerned, as the run-up to Vice President Xi becoming the next leader of China has been accompanied by one of the worst crackdowns in recent memory," said Representative Chris Smith, Chairman of the Commission. "Beyond that, China's oppression of house churches, censorship of the Internet, and one-child policy continue unabated."

"As China's likely next leader, Vice President Xi has a unique opportunity to improve relations with the United States," said Senator Sherrod Brown, Cochairman of the Commission. "But in order to win the respect of the American people, Vice President Xi must make every effort to ensure China plays by the rules, abides by its international obligations, and guarantees the fundamental rights of all its citizens."

Vice President Xi, who is expected to assume President Hu Jintao's leadership positions in the Communist Party and government in 2012 and 2013, arrived in the United States on February 13.

Both Smith and Brown expressed concern over the government's treatment of human rights activists and called for an end to a government crackdown that began in February 2011.

"The well-known activists Gao Zhisheng and Chen Guangcheng have endured some of the most brutal conditions imaginable, and the alarming lack of access to them by diplomats, concerned citizens, and their families raises serious questions about their health and safety. We call on Vice President Xi to do all he can to ensure their safety and secure their immediate release," said Chairman Smith.

"The impact of the major crackdown that began in February 2011 has amounted to silencing a significant number of China's most outspoken dissidents for years to come," said Cochairman Brown. "Instead of making China more free, China's expanding trade relations through China's membership in the WTO appear to have given China's leaders greater confidence to trample on the rights of its citizens and dash any hopes for democratic reform."

In the past two months, three democracy advocates-Chen Wei, Chen Xi, and Li Tie-received heavy prison sentences, joining a growing list of Chinese citizens sentenced to nine or more years in prison for peaceful political dissent. That list includes 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and democracy advocates Guo Quan, Liu Xianbin, and Xie Changfa. Another democracy advocate, Zhu Yufu, was just sentenced to seven years in prison for pro-democracy activities, including a poem and other writings that allegedly "incite subversion."

Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown noted at least 20 Tibetan self-immolations reported to have taken place since March 2011, ongoing repression against Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and controls on freedom of religion.

"Officials have refused to address the underlying repressive policies against Tibetans' religion, culture, and language that have likely contributed to this unprecedented tragedy. Instead, they reportedly have fired on Tibetan protesters, tightened security even further, and closed off Tibetan areas to the outside world," said Chairman Smith. "Vice President Xi should protect the freedom of religion and spiritual belief of all those in China, whether they be Buddhists, Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, or Falun Gong practitioners."

"Instead of condemning the Dalai Lama, Vice President Xi should recognize that the Dalai Lama remains the best hope for restoring stability to Tibet and guaranteeing the genuine autonomy that is the right of Tibetans," said Cochairman Brown. "Vice President Xi should end discrimination against Uyghurs, allow them to practice their religion freely, and stop the harassment of Rebiya Kadeer, her family, and other peaceful Uyghur activists."

Smith and Brown continued to note troubling signs that call into question China's commitment to commercial rule of law and worker rights.

They noted that the WTO recently decided that Chinese restrictions on raw material exports violate WTO rules. "The WTO decision on raw materials is just further evidence of the Chinese government's willingness to cheat and game the system at the expense of our companies and our workers," said Chairman Smith.

The chairs also observed recent high-profile reports about the Foxconn manufacturing company detailing horrific conditions at Chinese factories, including dangerous work environments, long hours, and low wages. "The reports underscore the need for China to allow workers effective and independent labor representation, and for the Chinese government, domestic Chinese companies, and multinational companies to do much more to improve China's poor worker safety record," said Cochairman Brown.

The Commission's chairs call on Vice President Xi to take the following concrete steps:

• Release all political prisoners and guarantee all Chinese citizens the freedom of expression, religion, and assembly to which they are entitled under international human rights standards, including Articles 18, 19, and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
  
  
• Amend China's Criminal Law to remove vaguely worded crimes used to punish peaceful political and religious activity and ensure that anticipated revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law do not "legalize" enforced disappearances that put Chinese citizens at risk of torture or abuse.
  
  
• End unfair trading practices, such as currency manipulation, industrial policies, and the use of quotas and subsidies, that are inconsistent with China's commitments to the World Trade Organization and incompatible with the rule of law.
  
  
• Pursue policies that protect the fundamental rights of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minorities, including their cultural, linguistic, and religious rights, and engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
  
  
• Reevaluate China's population planning laws and regulations to bring them into conformity with international standards and cease all coercive measures to implement these policies.
  
  
• Improve conditions for Chinese workers and allow them to organize independent unions.

Source: -See Summary (2012-02-14 ) | Posted on: 2012-02-14
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Source: -See Summary (2012-01-17 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Source: -See Summary (2012-01-06 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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• 2011 Crackdown Update: Ding Mao, Chen Wei, and Ran Yunfei (November 15, 2011)
• Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers (May 3, 2011)
• Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering "Jasmine Revolution" (March 22, 2011)
• Authorities Censor Access to Information on Middle East and Chinese "Jasmine" Protests (March 22, 2011)
• Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance, Section II—Criminal Justice, and Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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2009: One self-immolation; non-fatal.


February 27. Tashi (or Tabe, Tapey), age 24; Kirti Monastery; Aba county, Aba T&QAP; "detained" in a military hospital in Aba prefecture. See, e.g., Phayul, 17 December 11; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 27 February 09; Free Tibet (FT), 27 February 09; Xinhua, 5 March 09, reprinted in China Daily.

2011: Twelve self-immolations; seven reported fatal.


1. March 16. Phuntsog, age 20 or 21; monk, Kirti Monastery; deceased. See, e.g., ICT, 17 March 11; Radio Free Asia (RFA), 17 March 11; Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China Daily.

2. August 15. Tsewang Norbu, age 29; monk, Nyitso Monastery; Daofu county, Ganzi TAP; deceased. See, e.g., RFA, 15 August 11; Xinhua, 15 August 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center; FT, 16 August 11.

3, 4. September 26. Lobsang Kalsang, age 18, and Lobsang Konchog, age 18; monks, Kirti Monastery; both hospitalized. See, e.g., RFA, 26 September 11; ICT, 26 September 11; Xinhua, 26 September 11, reprinted in China Daily.

5. October 3. Kalsang Wangchug, age 17; monk, Kirti Monastery; hospitalized. See, e.g., ICT, 3 October 11, 11 October 11; FT, 3 October 11.

6, 7. October 7. Choephel, age 19, and Khayang, age 18; former monks, Kirti Monastery; both deceased. See, e.g., RFA, 7 October 11; ICT, 7 October 11; Xinhua, 8 October 11, reprinted in China Daily; FT, 17 October 11.

8. October 15. Norbu Dradul, age 19; former monk, Kirti Monastery; status and location unknown. See, e.g., RFA, 15 October 11; Phayul, 15 October 11; ICT, 16 October 11.

9. October 17. Tenzin Wangmo, age 20; nun, Dechen Choekorling Nunnery; Aba county; deceased. See, e.g., Voice of America, 17 October 11; Phayul, 17 October 11; New York Times, 17 October 11.

10. October 25. Dawa Tsering, age in 30s; monk, Gepheling Monastery; Ganzi county, Ganzi TAP; hospitalized but refused treatment and released. See, e.g., Phayul, 25 October 11; ICT, 28 October 11; RFA, 8 November 11.

11. November 3. Palden Choetso (or Choesang), age 35; nun, Gaden Choeling Nunnery; Daofu county; deceased. See, e.g., RFA, 3 November 11; Phayul, 3 November 11; Xinhua, 3 November 11 (translated in OSC, 5 November 11); ICT, 4 November 11.

12. December 1. Tenzin Phuntsog, age 46; former monk of Karma Monastery located in Gama (Karma) township, Changdu county, TAR; current resident of Gama, married, father of three children; deceased. See, e.g., RFA, 1 December 11, 8 December 11; Phayul, 9 December 11; Xinhua, 2 December 11, reprinted in China Daily; ICT, 1 December 11.

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24		more ...
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• Chinese citizen attempts to visit Chen Guangcheng. An increasing number of Chinese citizens have attempted—at times in large groups—to visit Chen's home in 2011 only to encounter beatings and detentions. These include:
  
  
  • Internet activist He Peirong (see January 12 post on Free Chen Guangcheng blog);
  
  
  • Journalist and activist Li Jianjun and two other individuals (see October 26 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report);
  
  
  • Rights advocate Liu Shasha and several companions (see September 19 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report; October 5 RFA report; and October 28 Agence France-Presse report);
  
  
  • Rights defender Mao Hengfeng and a group of 36 other rights defenders and "netizens" (see October 31 Human Rights in China report); and
  
  
  • Author Murong Xuecun, newspaper columnist Wang Xiaoshan, digital web director Zhang Enchao, Hu Zhongqiang, and a woman identified as "Nuola" (see Murong Xuecun's account published in the Guardian on November 11).
  
  
• Foreign journalist attempts to visit Chen Guangcheng. Teams from media outlets including the New York Times, CNN, Le Monde, Radio France Internationale, and Le Nouvel Observateur attempted to visit Chen’s village in early 2011 and were roughed up, threatened with bricks, or had equipment seized or destroyed. (See March 11 CECC Analysis.)


• U.S. government efforts to raise Chen’s case. Several U.S. government officials issued statements in late 2011 regarding Chen’s detention, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (November 10, via AFP) and U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke (December 10). (See also a November 6 Global Post report, discussing Gary Locke’s September letter to the Chinese government regarding Chen Guangcheng.) The Congressional-Executive Commission on China held a hearing on November 1 (statement of Representative Chris Smith, Chairman; statement of Representative Tim Walz, Ranking Member), and Chairman Smith and Senator Sherrod Brown, Cochairman, issued a joint statement on November 1.


• Protest in Hong Kong. Hong Kong rights advocates protested before the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government on November 11, urging the Chinese government to release Chen ahead of his 40th birthday on November 12. (See November 11 RFA report.)


• Ongoing advocacy campaigns. Chinese citizens and civil society organizations as well as international organizations have set up advocacy campaigns on the Internet to raise awareness of and express solidarity for Chen. These campaigns include Dark Glasses: Portrait, Free Chen Guangcheng Civic Action (as discussed in a November 11 CHRD report, pp. 8-10); a “Free Chen” petition organized by Shanghai rights advocate Feng Zhenghu and signed by more than 370 people in Shanghai (see October 20 RFA report); and the Chen Guangcheng Sunglasses Freedom Campaign (see the Women’s Rights Without Frontiers Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-21 / English) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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• Officials in Shangcheng county, Henan province arrested popular farmer leader Hong Maoxuan on August 4, 2011, on the suspicion of "obstructing official business," for an incident that occurred 10 years prior, reportedly to prevent him from running in the local election (CHRD, 6 September 11 and 1 September 11, via Blogspot). In that incident, he and other villagers protested against official corruption. At the time, officials did not detain him.
• Authorities in Beijing have taken various potential candidates on "vacation" to tourist resorts outside of the city and prevented some from communicating with others (RFA, 21 October 11). Guizhou officials took similar actions, including detaining Chen Xi from October 19 to October 25, during which time the deadline for accepting candidate nominations passed (CHRD, 9 November 11, 25 October 11, and 6 November 11 via Blogspot, and 2 November 11). Authorities reportedly arrested Chen Xi on November 29, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power." Officials reportedly cited Chen’s writings promoting human rights and democracy as reasons for the charge (CHRD, 21 December 11).

• A local election committee in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, disallowed Liang Shuxin, a Party member and Internet forum executive at Tianya, from becoming a candidate because the committee announced they wanted a female worker who was not a Party member as a candidate. The committee later removed the restriction, but Liang Shuxin was not included on the ballot (New York Times, 31 October 11). This example illustrates that language regarding congresses being "broadly representative" in Article 6 of the Election Law may be flexible enough to allow officials to disallow a nomination based on an individual's ethnicity, gender, or occupation. This language seems to contradict language in Article 3 stating anyone with political rights over the age of 18 may run in an election.
• In the cases of two Beijing professors, one received thousands of nominations and another received hundreds, but they were unable to become official candidates because their employers either refused to accept their nomination forms or determined their nominators were invalid (CHRD, 31 October 11, via Blogspot).
• Officials in Acheng District, Harbin city, Heilongjiang province, told one potential “independent candidate” that no more than 10 nominators must come in person to the election office at a specified time with their household registration, national identity cards, and employer identification cards to make their nominations, according to the October 31 CHRD article.

• Officials in Qingyang district, Chengdu city, Sichuan province, threatened and started following the mother of Li Shuangde when he posted an article on the Internet explaining why he wanted to run for the local people's congress (CHRD, 19 November 11, via Blogspot). In addition, the son of Sichuan-based author Li Chengpeng lost a company’s financial support for his tennis playing after Li declared his intent to run in local people's congress elections in Wuhou district, Chengdu, according to the October 31 CHRD article.
• After Shanghai writer and business executive Xia Shang declared his candidacy for Shanghai Jing'an District National People's Congress representative, he was not only forced to participate in official "consultations," but his company was ordered to undergo a special inspection. Due to governmental pressure, Xia chose to drop out of the elections, according to the October 31 CHRD article.
• In late October 2011, those responsible for elections at the Beijing Foreign Language University obstructed the official nomination of professor Qiao Mu by various means: telling some student nominators to switch their nominations, threatening some students with "thought work" if Qiao received over 10 nominations, and threatening to prevent students from joining the Communist Party if Qiao were to become an official candidate, according to the October 31 CHRD article.

• Beijing officials reportedly gave an order to propaganda authorities on September 26, 2011, to censor news of independent candidates (New York Times, 31 October 11).
• Officials reportedly posted election signs and lists of candidates in concealed locations, such as on the back of a boiler or in a backstreet alley. They also reportedly tore down election signs (CHRD, 14 December 11), deleted election-related microblog and other online postings, and suspended some potential candidates' microblog accounts (CHRD, 31 October 11, 5 November 11, via Blogspot; RFA, 7 November 11; and Voice Of America, 8 November 11).
• Authorities pressured organizers to cancel election education meetings or have attempted to prevent the public from attending them (CHRD, 2 October 11, via Blogspot).

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-19 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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• Authorities in the town of Tekes, Tekes County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, carried out a 7-day campaign of lectures on "illegal" and permitted religious activities at venues including weddings within the town, according to a September 15 report on the Tekes Party Building Web site. Authorities reported promoting "healthy" religious outlooks and that townspeople responded to the call to curb "underground" scripture study, private religious students, "illegal" religious publications, women veiling their faces, and men wearing "abnormal" large beards.
• In Hejing County, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, an official reported at a meeting of 550 households receiving a minimum level of guaranteed social welfare support (dibao jiating) that women wearing veils, young men with large beards, and guardians of minors who illegally enter mosques would not enjoy this social welfare support, according to a September 16 report from the Hejing government Web site. The official added that if such people were found to be receiving benefits, this support would be immediately cut off.
• A report from the Ili Prefectural Agricultural Machinery Bureau described outstanding "problems" in a local community and residential district, including people with a "pronounced religious consciousness" and those who have been discovered to wear "Arab dress and adornment," according to a September 24 report from the bureau's Web site. The report called for dealing with such people through door-to-door lectures by cadres, people's police, and work groups on promoting a lifestyle of "positive healthy civilization." The report also called for scoping out beard wearers and people previously punished for participating in illegal religious activities and subjecting them—along with other groups—to "inspection and control." (See a December 15 Reuters report for information on a similar campaign elsewhere in Ili.)
• In the town of Xinyuan (Künes) in Xinyuan county, Ili, authorities registered the names of women wearing veils or "abnormal" clothes and men with large beards, as part of campaigns in the town and county against "illegal religious activities," according to an October 20 report on the Xinyuan county government Web site. The report noted the numbers of people who refused to cooperate, as well as those who signed contracts with authorities agreeing to remove veils, shave, or stop wearing "abnormal" clothing.
• The weather bureau in Yutian (Keriye) county, Hoten district, reported carrying out a campaign, in accordance with countywide measures to address face veiling, calling on bureau staff and their friends and family not to wear clothing with a "pronounced religious hue" and to "resolutely stop face veiling," according to an October 27 report on the XUAR Weather Bureau Web site.
• See also a report from the XUAR Women's Federation (via Kunlun Net, September 3), noting continuing implementation of a regionwide campaign to "Let Beautiful Hair Flutter, Let Beautiful Faces Be Revealed" and a September 23 report on the Shule (Kashgar Yéngisheher) county, Kashgar district, government Web site, on local implementation of this campaign.

• In October, authorities in Kashgar municipality held a training class for büwi within one township, calling on them to contribute to state-led campaigns and political goals, and reported "going a step further in strengthening management" of the women, according to an October 24 report on the Kashgar Municipal Government Web site.
• A September 8 report from the Yengisar County Government Web site, in Kashgar district, described strengthening "management" (guanli) of büwi, holding regular interviews with them, and increasing communication among measures to "bring into play" the role of büwi and prevent women from participating in "illegal religious activities."

• The XUAR Transportation Department reported in a November 14 posting on its Web site that at the end of October, transportation officials throughout the region had investigated and prosecuted 20 cases of "illegal publications," including cases involving 4,386 copies of "illegal religious publications." According to the report, transportation authorities in the region will increase their oversight of the transport of publications as part of the region's work to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications."
• The Organization Department of the Urumqi Municipal Party Committee described one Urumqi neighborhood's work to "capture the ideological and moral battlefield" of minors in the community by continuing to ban "illegal religious activities" and by investigating and stopping the spread of publications that propagate such activities, along with ethnic separatism and other topics deemed forbidden, according to a November 7 report from the Committee, via Kunlun Net.

Source: -See Summary (2011-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Source: -See Summary (2011-10-25 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Source: -See Summary (2011-10-25 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Source: -See Summary (2011-10-19 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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• China's Constitution in principle gives citizens the right to "criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary…" and "[n]o one may suppress such complaints, charges and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens making them" (Article 41).
• The State Council's 2005 Regulations on Letters and Visits (Xinfang Tiaoli) (English) (Chinese), also stipulate that citizens have the right to make reports or complaints without retribution (Articles 1-3).
• On June 25, 2010, Chinese officials issued a revision to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision that stipulates personal information about whistleblowers should be kept confidential and their rights protected in accordance with measures established by the State Council (Article 6). Further, it stipulates that it is a crime to release information about an informant or the circumstances of an informant's report, subject to punishment and criminal liability will be pursued (Article 46).

• In July 2011, court officials in Tengzhou city, Shandong province rejected an appeal by journalist Qi Chonghuai, known for his official corruption exposés and who had already completed four years in prison on charges of extortion and blackmail following posting stories online about the alleged corrupt practices of municipal government officials (Human Rights in China, 28 July 11). The Tengzhou city Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to eight additional years on the charge of embezzlement, according to the July 28 HRIC press release.
• Authorities in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province continue to harass anti-corruption advocate Guo Yongfeng, who officials released from a reeducation through labor facility in August 2011, after he had served 1 year and 9 months. Officials sentenced Guo with "obstructing public affairs," likely in relation to Guo’s alleged involvement in organizing petitions calling for an end to corruption and his role in establishing an unregistered citizens’ group called Citizens' Association for Government Oversight, which sought to monitor alleged official corruption. (Deutsche Welle, 5 September 11 and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 29 January 09, via Boxun).

• Provision Regarding Implementation of the Responsibility System for Construction of an Honest Party and a Clean Government (2010) (Chinese Text), which is a general provision to promote official accountability.
• The Supreme People's Court reportedly issued three new regulations to address corruption in the judicial system (China Daily, 9 February 11).
• "Three Public Expenses" policy, which requires government departments to make public their expenditures on overseas trips, public relations activities, and vehicles (Xinhua, 7 April 11 and People's Daily Foreign Edition, via Legal Daily, 7 April 11).
• Regulation on Economic Responsibility Audits for Chief Leading Cadres of the Party and the Government and Executives of State-Owned Enterprises, which seeks to reduce corruption by improving the management and supervision of Party, government, and state-owned enterprises' finances and investments. (Xinhua, 8 December 10). Authorities will reportedly use the results of audits in decisions about official appointments and removals (People's Daily, 9 December 10).

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-19 / English) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Source: -See Summary (2011-10-13 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Reincarnation is what happens when someone takes rebirth after the predecessor's passing away; emanation is when manifestations take place without the source's passing away.

• The 11th Panchen Lama. Chinese authorities declared the Dalai Lama's May 14, 1995, recognition of six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama to be "illegal and invalid" and have held him and his parents incommunicado in one or more unknown locations since May 17, 1995. On November 29, 1995, Luo Gan, State Councilor and Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee's Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Xinhua, 15 November 02), was the most senior government and Party official presiding over a ceremony that selected another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, by using the Qing golden urn (Xinhua, 29 November 95 (translated in OSC)). In April 1997, a Chinese court imprisoned Chadrel Jampa Trinle, a Rinpoche and trulku who led the search for the reincarnation, to six years' imprisonment on charges of "plotting to split the country" and "leaking state secrets" (the names of boys under consideration) to "separatist forces abroad" (the Dalai Lama) (Xinhua, 7 May 97, reprinted in World Tibet Network; Tibet Radio, 4 November 95 (translated in OSC)). No details on Chadrel Rinpoche's location or well-being have been available since his reported release in early 2002 (New York Times, 21 February 02). (See CECC 2008 Annual Report, 189.)

• Trulkus guide their own reincarnations. "[The] person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth . . . . It is particularly inappropriate for Chinese communists, who explicitly reject even the idea of past and future lives, . . ., to meddle in the system of reincarnation . . . ."
• Tibetan Buddhists will not accept continued Party interference. "Such brazen meddling contradicts [Communist] political ideology and reveals their double standards. Should this situation continue in the future, it will be impossible for Tibetans and those who follow the Tibetan Buddhist tradition to acknowledge or accept it."
• Around 2025, time to decide the future of Dalai Lamas. "When I am about ninety I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other [Tibetan Buddhists], and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not." (The Dalai Lama was born in 1935 (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography")).
• Organization named to lead the search. "If it is decided that . . . there is a need for the Fifteenth Dalai Lama to be recognized, responsibility . . . will primarily rest on . . . the Dalai Lama’s Gaden Phodrang Trust." (The Commission has not observed information about the Trust or references to it that predate the statement.)
• Written instructions will guide the search. "[Officers of the Trust] should seek advice and direction from [certain Tibetan Buddhist leaders and other entities] and carry out the procedures of search and recognition in accordance with past tradition. I shall leave clear written instructions about this."

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-04 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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• Gheyret Niyaz, a journalist and Web editor in Urumqi, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court on July 23, 2010, to 15 years' imprisonment for "leaking state secrets." Prosecutors in court cited essays by Gheyret Niyaz addressing economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs. Sources also connected the prison sentence to interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to foreign media after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that were critical of aspects of government policy in the XUAR.
• Gulmira (Gulmire) Imin, a Uyghur Web site administrator and government employee, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court on April 1, 2010, to life in prison for "splittism, leaking state secrets, and organizing an illegal demonstration." Authorities alleged she was involved in organizing demonstrations that took place in the XUAR on July 5, 2009.
• Memetjan Abdulla, a Uyghur journalist and Web site administrator, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court to life in prison on April 1, 2010. The sentence is in apparent connection to an announcement he translated that called on Uyghurs to hold demonstrations in July 2009 and in connection to interviews he gave to foreign journalists.
• Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli, Web site administrators, received prison sentences of 10, 5, and 3 years, respectively, in July 2010 for "endangering state security." Sources connected the cases to their Web sites not deleting postings about hardships in the XUAR and, in one instance, permitting the posting of announcements for the July 2009 demonstration.
• Nurmemet Yasin, a Uyghur writer, was sentenced by the Bachu (Maralbeshi) County People's Court in Kashgar district to 10 years in prison on February 2, 2005, for "inciting racial hatred or discrimination." (Some sources have reported that the sentence was for "inciting splittism.") He was sentenced after writing a story about a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom.
• Tursunjan Hezim, a Uyghur Web site administrator, was sentenced by the Aksu Intermediate People's Court in July 2010 to seven years' imprisonment. Precise charges are not known, but the sentence is in apparent connection to Tursunjan Hezim's Web site on Uyghur history and culture and came during a period in which authorities cast blame on Uyghur Web sites for allegedly contributing to unrest during demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009.

Source: -See Summary (2011-09-06 ) | Posted on: 2012-01-24
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• Tightened surveillance. Authorities reportedly assigned three teams of 22 security personnel to keep watch over the family home. Officials also reportedly installed additional surveillance devices, including floodlights around the family's home that are removed from sight during the daytime, and surveillance cameras trained on their home and nearby street intersections.



• Restricted access to communication channels. Authorities reportedly cut off Internet and telephone access in the home and installed equipment in neighboring homes to block the family's cell phone signal.



• Restricted movement and access to basic supplies. Officials reportedly place a lock on the family's door at night to prevent them from escaping while those charged with guarding them sleep on the front stoop. Chen said officials have not permitted anyone to enter or leave the home, except for his 76-year-old mother, whom Yuan describes as in poor health. The family, therefore, has limited ability to purchase food and supplies and relies on home-grown produce.



• Restrictions involving the couple's children. When Chen and Yuan's young son, Chen Kerui, accidentally injured himself with a kitchen knife while staying at Yuan's parents' home, officials did not permit the couple to visit him in the hospital. In addition, their young daughter, Chen Kesi, reportedly has encountered difficulty attending school.



• Prohibited access to medical care. Officials reportedly have prevented Chen Guangcheng from seeking medical care for recurring diarrhea. According to a Chinese Human Rights Defenders report (January 14, 2009) quoting Yuan, Chen developed the ailment while in prison in July 2008 and has since become emaciated and frail.



• Restricted privacy. Officials illegally enter the home at will, without notice. Yuan described one instance in which security personnel even followed family members into the restroom.

Source: -See Summary (2011-02-22 / English) | Posted on: 2011-12-21
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Source: -See Summary (2011-11-01 ) | Posted on: 2011-11-01		more ...
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• Drongdru, sentenced on August 29 to 11 years' imprisonment (Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China Daily): possibly Zhongzhou (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11); Lobsang Tsondru (RFA, 29 August 11); Tsundue (Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), 29 August 11).
• Tsering Tenzin, sentenced on August 30 to 13 years' imprisonment (Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily): possibly Zerang Zhade (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11); Lobsang Tenzin and Tsering Gyamo-kha (RFA, 30 August 11); Tsering Tamding (TCHRD, 30 August 11).
• Tenchum, sentenced on August 30 to 10 years' imprisonment (Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily): possibly Ladan (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11); Lobsang Tenzin and Nagten (RFA, 30 August 11); Tenzin (TCHRD, 30 August 11). RFA, like ICT (31 August 11), reported that both monks sentenced on August 30 are named Lobsang Tenzin. A conflated form of Lobsang Tenzin can be "Loten," similar to "Ladan."

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-27 ) | Posted on: 2011-10-18
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Source: -See Summary (2011-08-25 ) | Posted on: 2011-10-18
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Source: -See Summary (2011-10-13 ) | Posted on: 2011-10-13
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• Students, Teachers Forbidden from Fasting. As XUAR authorities continue to enforce harsh controls over children's freedom of religion, including curbs unseen elsewhere in China, local authorities have described a range of steps to prevent children from observing Ramadan and from participating in other religious activities. "Indulging" or "letting students alone" to fast during Ramadan is among 23 acts defined as "illegal religious activities" in the XUAR. (See Item 5 in a copy of the "Autonomous Region Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities," via the Chinggil (Qinghe) county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, government Web site, posted February 25, 2008.) Authorities also have applied curbs to teachers.
  
  Authorities in Toghraqliq township, Qiemo (Cherchen) county, Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, convened an "ideological education meeting" for students and teachers ahead of Ramadan and called on teachers to regularly visit students' homes and understand their "ideological state," to ensure no students under 18 enter mosques, and to strictly prohibit fasting, according to an August 4 report on the Qiemo County Government Web site (cached). Authorities also called on students to take part in a campaign called "little hands guiding big hands," whereby students convey Party policy to their parents and "contribute their strength" to the township's "social and political stability." Authorities in Mandanbulaq township, Jinghe (Jing) county, Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, visited local elementary schools in advance of the holiday and called for "leading" students not to "participate in religious activities, such as Ramadan and religious services," according to a June 30 report on the Bortala Government Web site. In Bole (Bortala) municipality, Bortala, authorities called for carrying out "propaganda and education" toward Muslim students and for "resolutely stopping" the phenomenon of minor-age Muslim students entering mosques, according to a July 20 report on the Bortala Government Web site. An elementary school in Mekit county, Kashgar district, described plans for holding a meeting to "mobilize" teachers, staff, and students not to fast, according to an August 5 report on the Mekit County Government Web site. (Original link redirects to incorrect site. See a reprint via Uyghur Online.) Authorities also noted plans to carry out education in atheism, according to the report. Authorities in Yengiyer township, Yengisar county, Kashgar district, called for teachers to visit students' homes during Ramadan to convey state policy and provide information on the "harms" of fasting, according to an August 4 report on the Yengisar County Government Web site. They also called for "resolutely examining and putting a stop to" students and teachers participating in "unlawful activities" such as fasting, entering religious venues, and participating in "underground scripture study sites."


• Government Workers Barred From Observing Holiday. Authorities have continued to forbid government employees from observing Ramadan, in some cases also imposing curbs on their family members. Authorities at the Yutian (Keriye) County Agricultural Bureau, Hoten district, called for each work unit to strengthen "management" of bureau staff and retired workers and to guarantee they "don't believe in religion, attend religious activities, or fast," according to an August 3 report on the Agricultural Bureau's Web site. They also called for ensuring family members do not "engage in, join, or participate" in "illegal religious activities," participate in "underground scripture study sites," or fast during Ramadan. Authorities also called for work units to send cadres to mosques every day during Ramadan to inspect certain prayer times. At a meeting on upholding stability and safety, the Kashgar District Meteorology Bureau called on all Bureau cadres and staff, "especially Party member cadres," to stress "science" and "civilization," and not join in religious activities like Ramadan, according to an August 4 report on the XUAR Meteorology Bureau Web site. The Kashgar District Agricultural Bureau called for holding "education in atheism" during Ramadan for cadres in the district's bureaus, according to an August 3 report on the Xinjiang Agricultural Department Web site. Authorities in Urumqi reportedly told officials there not to observe the fast in order to preserve their health for work needs, according to a July 28 Radio Free Asia article. The article also reported orders barring Party members and their families from observing Ramadan or going to mosques.


• Orders for Restaurants To Stay Open. Some local governments have ordered or pressured restaurants to continue operations during Ramadan, a period when some eating establishments traditionally close during the day. In Jiashi (Peyziwat) county, Kashgar, authorities reported they would inspect restaurants to ensure the "political stability of the county" during Ramadan and not permit "any restaurant to stop operations for any reason," according to a July 28 report on the Jiashi County Government Web site. In Oyyaylaq township, Qiemo, Bayingol, officials reported they would send inspection teams to restaurants and "deal in accordance with regulations" with any eating establishment that closed "without cause," while "severely dealing with" anyone who "forced" others to close, according to an August 5 report on the Qiemo County Government Web site (cached, apparently updated August 10). Authorities in Zepu (Poskam) county, Kashgar, convened a "mobilization meeting" on the "normal operations" for the restaurant industry during Ramadan, according to a July 28 article (cached) on the Zepu County Government Web site. The county head "encouraged" (guli) ethnic minority-run restaurants to continue "normal operations" during Ramadan, pledged tax breaks for restaurants that stayed open, and said authorities would shut down restaurants that "operated irregularly without cause" during Ramadan and revoke their licenses for one year. A September 11 Los Angeles Times report from Kashgar said that local directives led restaurants to make "token gestures" to stay open.


• Increased Controls Over Mosques and Religious Personnel. Local authorities have described taking a range of measures to increase supervision of mosques and religious personnel during Ramadan. In Wassheri township, Ruoqiang (Chaqiliq) county, Bayingol, township authorities held a meeting for religious personnel in advance of Ramadan and called on them to convey "propaganda and education" to religious believers, told them to help the Party and government convey the "real truth" and "essence" of the reported attack in Hoten in July, and called on them to maintain vigilance over their own conduct and over religious venues, according to a July 29 report on the Ruoqiang County Government Web site. Authorities also told religious personnel they were responsible for "dissuading" (quanzu) any students, teachers, or Party members found to be fasting and told religious leaders they would be "severely dealt with" if found "inciting" a student to fast. Authorities in Tatirang township, Qiemo, described promoting a range of measures to strengthen control over religious personnel and venues, according to an August 5 report on the Qiemo County Government Web site (cached). Measures included "seriously implementing" a system of fixed contact with religious venues and a system of "chatting and making friends" with religious personnel; strengthening a system of legal responsibility for religious venues; enhancing training of religious personnel; and taking "effective measures" to stop "illegal activities" such as "underground scripture studies," taking on private religious students, and organizing religious activities that go beyond the locality.

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-08 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-10-11
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Source: -See Summary (2011-08-31 ) | Posted on: 2011-08-31
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Source: -See Summary (2011-08-22 ) | Posted on: 2011-08-22
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• March 16: Self-immolation. Monk Phuntsog of Kirti Monastery, age 20 or 21 according to international media and advocacy group reports, reportedly set himself on fire at about 4 p.m. on March 16, 2011, near an Aba market area to protest the fatal shooting on the same date in 2008 of at least 10 Tibetans during a protest [and some rioting], according to same-day reports by Radio Free Asia (RFA, 16 March 11), International Campaign for Tibet (ICT, 16 March 11), and Phayul (16 March 11). China's official media cited an Aba county government spokesman who provided the monk's name as Rigzin Phuntsog, his age as 16, and noted that he had "a history of epilepsy" and had become a Kirti monk in 2005 (Xinhua, 17 March 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center). Xinhua did not explain whether officials deemed the alleged "history of epilepsy" to be relevant to the self-immolation. Phuntsog reportedly shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's long life as he burned, and security officials allegedly kicked and beat him as they extinguished the flames (ICT, 17 March 11; RFA 16 March 11, Phayul 16 March 11). Tibetans "intervened and managed to take Phuntsog away from the police" and returned him to the monastery (ICT, 17 March 11). Later that night, monks took Phuntsog to the county hospital after the government gave them "permission" to do so, according to an RFA source (RFA, 17 March 11). China's official media acknowledged "hours of negotiation," but asserted that the government waited for permission from the monks to move Phuntsog (Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). He died at about 3 a.m. on Thursday, March 17, according to media and advocacy group reports (RFA, 17 March 11; ICT, 17 March 11), or "early Thursday morning," according to official media (Xinhua, 17 March 11, reprinted in China Daily). Chinese media cited a hospital official who stated that a post-mortem examination of Phuntsog turned up no evidence of wounds consistent with a police attack on him (Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). After seeking and receiving official permission, on March 18 Kirti management conducted a funeral service and cremation for Phuntsog (ICT, 18 March 11).
  
  
  Questions posed by the Xinhua report of age 16. If, according to the March 17 Xinhua report (reprinted in China Internet Information Center), "Rigzin Phuntsog" was 16 years old in 2011, then he would have been age 10 when he became a Kirti monk in 2005. If, however, the Xinhua report was mistaken and Rigzin Phuntsog was age 16 in 2005, when he joined Kirti, then he would turn 22 during 2011—an age similar to international media and advocacy group reports. According to Article 27 of the Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries, which took effect on November 1, 2010 (available in Chinese on the Central People's Government Web site), students in scripture study classes must "generally" be over age 18. It is unclear what type of activity "Rigzin Phuntsog" may have engaged in at Kirti if he was age 16 in 2011, or if his status as a minor would have any effect on the prosecution of other Kirti monks who could face "intentional homicide" charges linked to his self-immolation, as reported below.


• March 19-21: More PAP arrive; education on "patriotic religion" starts. On March 19, the day after Phuntsog's cremation, People's Armed Police (PAP) and public security officials began to converge on Kirti in substantial numbers, halted normal monastic activity, and placed the monastery under tight security (RFA, 22 March 11; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), 11 April 11). Security personnel reportedly did not permit monks to leave the monastery’s premises without written permission from monastic and government officials, or to move about the monastery, and allegedly beat monks who did not remain in their rooms. On March 21, provincial-, prefectural-, and county-level Party and government officials launched a political education program in Kirti called "patriotic religion" (RFA 22 March 11).


• April 9: Hundreds more PAP; work starts on barbed wire, walls, to seal off monastery. On April 9, approximately 800 additional PAP arrived at Kirti and tightened security further, sealing off traffic access to the monastery and prohibiting most pedestrian entry and exit (RFA, 12 April 11; TCHRD, 11 April 11). PAP manning monastery entrances refused to allow Tibetans to bring in food for the monks (a Buddhist custom toward monks and nuns), reportedly resulting in a food shortage. Authorities directed the installation of barbed wire to seal off portions of the monastery's perimeter that were not already closed, then workers completed construction of a concrete "boundary wall" to prevent entry or exit except at three gates manned by security officials and PAP (Phayul, 19 April 11; ICT, 11 April 11, updated 12 April 11; TCHRD, 11 April 11).


• April 12: Decision to send monks aged 18-40 away for "education." On April 12, authorities reportedly announced that monks between the ages of 18 and 40 would be taken from the monastery to other locations to undergo "patriotic education" (ICT, 11 April 11, updated 12 April 11; ICT, 13 April 11; RFA, 14 April 11). Local Tibetans who were aware of the government's intentions rushed to block access to the monastery by "around 40" buses carrying PAP (RFA, 14 April 11; TCHRD, 13 April 11; ICT, 9 May 11). PAP allegedly beat some of the Tibetans and allowed police dogs to attack them, resulting in injuries, but the Tibetans maintained their position and the confrontation ended a few hours later without the PAP buses entering the monastery (RFA, 14 April 11; ICT, 13 April 11; ICT, 11 April 11).


• April 21-22: PAP remove 300 monks for "mass legal education." Around 9 p.m. on April 21, PAP and public security officials went from room to room at Kirti and forced at least 300 monks onto buses or trucks that took them to locations that may have been in Wenchuan (Lunggu), Mao (Maowun), and Li (Tashiling) counties in Aba prefecture, and Dujiangyan city in Chengdu municipality (RFA, 22 April 11; ICT, 22 April 11; Phayul, 22 April 11). PAP and police allegedly beat some Tibetans in a group of about 200 who attempted to block removal of the monks from the monastery, resulting in the deaths of 2 elderly Tibetans, serious injuries to some, and brief detention of most of the others. The Aba county police chief later claimed there had been no clash, no injuries, and no deaths (Xinhua, 30 April 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center). On April 22, the Aba County People's Government issued a notice stating that "mass legal education" of Kirti monks would begin immediately in order to maintain "normal religious order" (Xinhua, 22 April 11, 10:04 GMT, translated in OSC; Xinhua, 22 April 11, 13:39 GMT, translated in OSC). The notice included the allegation that some of the Kirti monks "for a long time" had "disturbed the social order," "[damaged] the normal religious order," and "[tarnished] the image of Tibetan Buddhism" by fighting, gambling, drinking, circulating pornography, and using prostitutes (Xinhua, 22 April 11, 10:04 GMT; Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). "Legal education" would compel monks to "study the country's laws and regulations as well as religious disciplines and [precepts]" (Xinhua, 23 April 11). The use of enforced confinement (de facto detention) and coerced participation in a program under the pretext of "education" appear to disregard Article 37 of China's Constitution, which prohibits "[u]nlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens' freedom of the person by detention or other means."


• April 22: "Legal experts" say monks linked to self-immolation suspected of "intentional homicide." Concurrent with the start of "legal education," China's state-run media reported that "local legal experts" described two Kirti monks, referred to in Chinese as Zhongzhou and Da'erji and who allegedly delayed Phuntsog's handover to the hospital, as suspects in a case of "intentional homicide" (guyi sharen) (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11), or "premeditated murder" (Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). The April 22 Xinhua report linked two additional monks, referred to as Ladan and Zerang Zhade, to the self-immolation. The April 23 Xinhua report described security officials' assessment of the self immolation as "a carefully planned and implemented criminal case, which aimed at triggering disturbances." China's Criminal Law, Article 232, provides a minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment and a maximum punishment of execution for "intentional homicide," and a sentence of 3 to 10 years "if circumstances are relatively minor." Article 233 provides three to seven years in prison for "negligently causing death," but not more than three years "if the circumstances are relatively minor."


• June 8-9: MFA dismisses UN concerns over 300 monks’ "disappearance." The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) issued a press release (8 June 11, available on the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Web site) expressing "serious concern" about all persons subjected to enforced disappearance in China, including the 300 monks security personnel allegedly removed from Kirti on April 21. The press release urged the Chinese government to provide information about their "fate and whereabouts" and called on China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. On June 9, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson responding at a scheduled news conference to a question about the Working Group press release asserted that no "forced disappearances" took place at Kirti," according to a BBC report (BBC, 9 June 11). "The relevant local authorities are conducting legal education for the Kirti monastery monks in order to maintain religious order there," the MFA spokesperson said. Based on the BBC report, the spokesperson apparently did not provide any information on the location of the monks, the duration of the "legal education" program, or whether officials kept the monks confined to the program site. The transcript of the press conference (available in Chinese and English on the MFA Web site) did not contain the question about the Kirti monks or the spokesperson's response.


• May-June: Some "disappeared" monks from Qinghai sent home. An unknown but substantial number of monks hailing from Qinghai province who were among the 300 monks removed from Kirti and subjected to "legal education" have been returned to their family homes in Qinghai, according to international media and advocacy group reports issued in late May (ICT, 26 May 11) and June (RFA, 16 June 11). Authorities prohibited monks from Yushu (Yulshul) and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in Qinghai from returning to Kirti, took them back to their Qinghai homes, and released them, according to sources cited in the RFA report. Information on their post-release status and activity is not available. A spreadsheet linked to a TCHRD report (10 June 11) listing 161 of the monks reportedly among those forcibly removed from Kirti contains a total of 139 entries of monks with residences in Yushu or Guoluo TAPs. Only 4 of the 161 entries record a residence in Sichuan province. Commission analysis has not confirmed whether or not every entry on the list represents a unique case.

See a previous CECC analysis titled "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures" for more information on regulatory measures in effect in Aba T&QAP and other TAPs. See sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006 Annual Reports.




Source: -See Summary (2011-06-15 ) | Posted on: 2011-08-17
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UN Group Calls for Immediate Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia

August 12, 2011

In May 2011, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued two opinions declaring that the Chinese government's imprisonment of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo and house arrest of his wife Liu Xia contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The opinions call on Chinese officials to immediately release Liu Xiaobo, immediately end Liu Xia's house arrest, and provide reparations to both persons. Freedom Now, a US-based non-profit organization that filed a petition for the opinions with the Working Group, released the opinions to the public in August 2011.

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (Working Group) adopted two opinions on May 5, 2011, declaring that the Chinese government's deprivation of liberty of prominent Chinese intellectual Liu Xiaobo and his wife Liu Xia contravenes Articles 9, 10, and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and is therefore arbitrary, according to the full text of the opinions made public in an August 1, 2011, Freedom Now press release. Liu Xiaobo, recipient of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, is currently serving an 11-year sentence that is set to expire on June 21, 2020. Liu Xia has been under house arrest since October 2010, shortly after her husband was awarded the Nobel prize. In November 2010, Freedom Now and a team of international human rights experts filed a petition with the Working Group seeking opinions in both cases. Among the Working Group's key findings include:

Chinese officials contravened Liu Xiaobo's Article 19 right to political free speech. Liu was sentenced to 11 years in prison on December 25, 2009, for allegedly "inciting subversion" through his participation in a political reform and human rights document known as Charter 08 and six essays he wrote that were posted on overseas Web sites. The Working Group said Chinese officials argued that their restriction on Liu's right to free speech conformed with a provision in Article 19 of the UDHR that permits restrictions insofar as they are provided by law and necessary to protect, among other things, national security and public order. The Working Group noted, however, that the Chinese government had failed to satisfy "the requirement of proportionality" that restrictions on free speech must meet. "The [Chinese government] has not shown in this case a justification for the interference with Mr. Liu Xiaobo's political free speech," the opinion said. As the Commission has noted in previous analysis, the Chinese court's arguments in Liu's case failed to support the contention that Liu's peaceful advocacy for political reform and human rights through Charter 08 and his writings had threatened China's national security. (See Human Rights in China's English translations of the court verdict and six essays.)

Chinese officials contravened Liu Xiaobo's Article 10 right to a fair trial and Article 9 right to be free from arbitrary detention. The Working Group found that Liu's pre-trial detention constituted a "clear violation of Article 9," noting that authorities had failed to promptly notify Liu of the charges against him or to promptly bring him before a judge. They further noted that authorities held Liu "incommunicado for an extended period" and denied him access to counsel. As for Liu's trial, the Working Group found that it "was organized in a way which constitutes a breach of fairness." The group noted that Liu's defense was limited to 14 minutes, despite the "difficult balancing issues" involved in free speech cases. See previous Commission analysis noting how Chinese officials had initially kept Liu under "residential surveillance" in conditions that violated Chinese law, failed to count that period as time served for purposes of his sentence expiration date, and generally obstructed Liu's defense.

Chinese officials' restrictions on Liu Xia amount to detention and violate Articles 9, 10 and 19. The Working Group said that available information indicated that Liu Xia was under house arrest as a result of the restrictions placed on her movement and her communications and visits with the outside world. The Working Group held that these restrictions amounted to detention and that under Articles 9 and 10 of the UDHR she has the right to know the reasons for the detention and the charges against her. She also has the right to promptly face a judge and the right to counsel, the group said. The Working Group also said that the detention of Liu Xia, who had spoken to non-Chinese media in support of her husband, violates the free speech protections of Article 19.

For further information on how Chinese government and Communist Party restrictions on free speech violate international standards, see Section II-Freedom of Expression, in the 2010 CECC Annual Report. For further information on how officials arbitrarily restrict the liberty of politically-sensitive individuals, see Section II-Criminal Justice, in the 2010 CECC Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-08-11 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-08-12
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Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang

July 12, 2011

Official repression of religion in Xinjiang remains severe. Authorities continue to claim that "illegal religious activities" and "religious extremism" constitute threats to the region's security. Officials have singled out Islamic practices in a number of cases and have maintained a range of curbs over Muslims' religious activities. Recent reports describe continuing campaigns against head scarves, measures to monitor Friday sermons at mosques, and reported imprisonment of a religious leader who refused to abide by government demands regarding a local mosque.

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continue to target "illegal religious activities" and "religious extremism" as threats to the region's stability, maintaining curbs over religious activities undertaken outside of government-approved parameters and singling out Islamic practices in a number of cases. At a December 2010 XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee meeting, attendees called for "resolutely preventing illegal religious activities and striking against religious extremist forces in accordance with law" as part of the region's work to maintain stability, according to a Xinjiang Daily report (via Xinhua, December 8, 2010). Following the meeting, the Party issued opinions on demarcating and preventing "illegal" religious activities in early 2011, which multiple localities reported implementing, according to descriptions of the opinions. (Full text not available. See references in, e.g., an April 24, 2011, report from Buddhism Online and an April 6 report on the Aksu District Government Web site.) Recent reports from XUAR media and government sources detail a range of ongoing efforts to curb religious practices, including broad campaigns against "illegal" religious activities, continuing campaigns against head scarves, measures to monitor Friday sermons at mosques, and reported imprisonment of a religious leader who refused to abide by government demands regarding a local mosque.

Campaign Against "Illegal Religious Activities" in Aksu Township
A township in Xinhe (Toqsu) county, Aksu district, detailed plans for a campaign against "illegal" religious activities stretching from November 2010 to March 2011, according to a report about the campaign posted November 27, 2010, on the Xinhe County Government Web site. The plan said the campaign was aimed at such issues as "using 'propagation of religion' to attack the Party and government," the "dual character" of a "small number of religious personnel" (an apparent reference to state-sanctioned religious leaders who do not abide by government-set parameters for religious practice), and the "problem" and phenomenon of having a "pronounced religious atmosphere" and wearing such things as "bizarre" clothes, veils, and beards. Stages of the campaign included: (1) "education activities" for religious leaders and believers, including "criticism" and "self-criticism"; (2) investigation activities to "ferret out," "fathom," and register students in underground religious classes as well as previously sanctioned religious personnel, and religious believers who have religious knowledge but are "unstable" in their ideology; (3) encouraging the reporting of "illegal" religious activities; and (4) "rectifying" problem areas, including by "severely punishing" people in underground religious classes or who are linked to the classes, in accordance with penalties in local village codes of conduct; using "education" and "transformation" activities for groups such as veiled women, men with large beards, and people with religious knowledge but who are "unstable" in their ideology; and inspecting cultural markets for "illegal" religious publications.

Campaigns Against Veiling and Beards
In addition to the township in Aksu that included veiled women and men with beards in its campaign against "illegal" religious activities, other localities in the XUAR also have carried out campaigns targeting Muslim men with beards and women who wear veils or clothing deemed to carry religious connotations. Under the direction of the Party-controlled XUAR Women's Federation, multiple localities reported continuing a campaign aimed at dissuading women from veiling their hair and faces. As noted in a previous CECC analysis, the federation reported in January 2010 that it had launched the campaign to enable ethnic minority women to "discern what is traditional ethnic dress" and to address why women should "take the initiative to not wear a veil." The Women's Federation in Hoten district reported in January 2011 that it would continue the campaign, "completing education and guidance work" to encourage women to remove their veils while "leading them to uphold a scientific, civilized, and healthy way of life and encouraging them to vigorously participate in productive labor for society," according to a January 27, 2011, report (cached) on the Hoten District People's Government Web site. In Luntai (Bugur) county, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, the local women's federation described continuing the campaign in order to "let even more ethnic minority women realize their own value in participating in society," according to a September 7, 2010, report on the Luntai County Government Web site.

As reported by the Commission in previous analyses (1, 2), in recent years authorities also have described steps to monitor Muslim men with beards or restrict them from having beards, tying the practice to "religious extremism" and "backwardness." Authorities have detailed steps such as having government departments carry out "beard-shavings" directed at young men and using punitive measures including "severe punishment in accordance with law" (yifa yancheng) to deal with men with large beards, as well as women with veils. More recently, management rules in force for the "information corps" in a residential district in Usu city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, included the presence of "people from outside [the district] wearing abnormal large beards or veiling their faces," along with "residents holding extremist religious thoughts" as scenarios requiring immediate reporting, according to a September 18, 2010, report on the Hongqiao Residential District Office Web site. In Kucha county, Aqsu district, authorities identified people with beards or who wear "bizarre" clothes as "key people" for focusing education work to "transform" their ideology, according to a December 6, 2010, speech from the county's education bureau Party Committee Secretary.

Monitoring Sermons
In January 2011, a township in the Qapqal Xibe Autonomous County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing a system for government religious affairs employees to set the schedule for Friday sermons at the township's mosques and for using "religious information gatherers" of "high political consciousness" to provide information on the sermon delivery and the "ideological trends" of mosque attendees, according to a January 7, 2011, report on the Qapqal Xibe Autonomous County Government Web site. In recent years, authorities elsewhere in the XUAR also have reported on systems of monitoring mosques and sermons.

Continued Oversight of Women Religious Specialists
Authorities also have continued to increase oversight of Muslim women religious specialists known as büwi. (For more information, see previous CECC analyses 1, 2.) In February 2011, the women's federation in Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture issued directions to "increase the degree of attention" to büwi. The following month the federation called for successfully "educating and guiding" büwi and making progress in a system of fixed contact between Party members and the women, according to articles posted March 15 and March 30 on the prefecture's women's federation Web site. The township in Xinhe county, Aksu, discussed above, also included büwi among groups to receive "education" and "transformation."

Prison Sentences and Detentions in Shihezi
Authorities in Shihezi municipality detained father and son Muslim religious leaders Qahar Mensur and Muhemmed Tursun on October 1, 2010, on suspicion of "distributing illegal religious works," according to an April 11, 2011, Radio Free Asia report. On April 12, 2011, the Shihezi Intermediate People's Court reportedly sentenced them to 3 years' imprisonment in connection with storing and distributing "illegal religious publications." The publication in question reportedly was an annotated edition of the Quran by 14th-century scholar Ibn Kesir that had official government approval. Sources cited in the RFA article said that authorities were punishing the father and son because Qahar Mensur had refused to comply with government demands, such as bringing government documents into mosques, while he served as muezzin for a mosque.

For more information on religion and conditions in the XUAR, see Section II—Freedom of Religion and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-05-18 ) | Posted on: 2011-07-12
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Authorities Release Prominent Rights Advocate Hu Jia Upon Completion of His Sentence

July 1, 2011

On June 26, 2011, authorities released Hu Jia from prison upon completion of his three-and-a-half year sentence. Hu has been an active advocate on issues including environmental protection, HIV/AIDS, and freedom of expression and movement. He has also expressed public support for rights defenders, including Chen Guangcheng and Guo Feixiong. He was sentenced in 2008 for "inciting subversion of state power." During his time in prison, authorities refused multiple requests for his medical parole. Hu is now home with his wife, Zeng Jinyan, in Beijing and reportedly remains under tight official surveillance.

Hu Jia's Release

Authorities released Hu Jia into the care of his wife, Zeng Jinyan, in the early morning of June 26, 2011, according a New York Times report (26 June 11). On her Twitter page, Zeng Jinyan reported that they would not be able to receive visitors, indicating that numerous security vehicles were stationed outside their home in Beijing. Zeng said that she had returned to Beijing on June 19 after her landlord, citing unidentified pressure, served her a notice of eviction from her apartment in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. According to Zeng, eight security personnel escorted her from the Beijing airport.

Prior Advocacy Efforts and Official Harassment

Hu Jia has been an outspoken advocate on a number of issues including environmental protection and HIV/AIDs. He has also criticized the official mistreatment of other rights defenders including legal advocates Guo Feixiong and Chen Guangcheng. According to the New York Times report, Hu was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize while he was in detention in 2007. When he was in prison in 2008, the European Parliament awarded Hu the Sakaharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. In an effort to control his advocacy efforts authorities harassed, beat, and detained Hu and held him, his wife, and their young daughter in unlawful home confinement on multiple occasions and for varying periods of time since 2005.
• In August 2005, Hu reported that authorities beat him and placed him under house arrest during visits by top United Nations and European Union officials.


• In November 2005, authorities reportedly detained Hu when he attempted to deliver a petition to Vice Premier Wu Yi at an AIDS conference in Henan province.


• In January 2006, authorities placed Hu under surveillance and house arrest and then "disappeared" him until March 28.


• Starting in July 2006, authorities held Hu and Zeng Jinyan under house arrest for at least six months. The couple documented the tight surveillance measures in a home video distributed widely on the Internet.


• In May 2007, authorities again placed Hu and Zeng under house arrest following their attempt to leave the country, as documented in a May 21, 2007, Human Rights Watch report.


• While Hu remained in official custody, authorities continued to subject Zeng and their young daughter to ongoing surveillance and periodic home confinement, in addition to physically harassing and "disappearing" Zeng while Hu remained in official custody, according to Zeng's blog, in addition to reports from Global Voices Advocacy (1 June 08), Chinese Human Rights Defenders (9 August 08), Telegraph (21 February 09), and Agence France-Presse (via Google, 19 November 09, 9 December 10).
Hu Jia's Imprisonment

Authorities detained Hu Jia in December 2007 on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power," a crime under Article 105 of China's Criminal Law. His detention came after he co-wrote a letter titled "The Real China Before the Olympics" (Chinese, English), criticizing the Chinese government for failing to live up to its promise to improve human rights for the Olympics. The detention also followed Hu's testimony via conference call before the European Parliament. Authorities formally arrested Hu in January 2008, and tried him in March 2008 in a trial reportedly marred by criminal procedure violations. On April 3, 2008, authorities sentenced Hu to three and a half years' imprisonment and one year deprivation of political rights for "inciting subversion." While in prison, Hu continued to suffer from a previously contracted case of liver cirrhosis. Despite his family's expressed concerns in 2008 about Hu's medical condition, authorities continued to hold Hu for the full period of his sentence.

For more information on China's imprisonment of rights defenders and online critics, see the CECC 2010 Annual Report and online Political Prisoner Database.





Source: -See Summary (2011-06-30 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-07-01
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Beijing Authorities Harass and Detain Shouwang Church Members

July 1, 2011

Beginning on April 9, 2011, public security officials in Beijing frequently harassed, detained, and restricted the freedom of movement of some members and leaders of the unregistered Beijing Shouwang Church in response to the church's efforts to organize outdoor services every Sunday in Beijing's Haidian district. Shouwang began organizing the services after authorities reportedly pressured its landlords to deny the church access to indoor sites of worship where it had previously met or planned to meet. In one instance, according to overseas reports, uniformed and plainclothes police took into custody over 160 Shouwang members, including clergy. Between April 10 and May 15, authorities reportedly placed a total of approximately 500 members and church leaders under "soft detention" (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home confinement. As of June 5, authorities had taken Shouwang members into custody in connection with nine outdoor services. The incidents of harassment and detention occurred during a time when authorities' sensitivities to members of unregistered Protestant congregations who assemble into large groups or across congregations appeared to have increased, as well as during a broader crackdown against rights defenders, petitioners, artists, Internet bloggers, and others that began in mid-February 2011.

Beijing Authorities Take Into Custody, Confine to Their Homes Congregants and Church Leaders

According to reports from international media and non-governmental organizations, every Sunday beginning on April 10, 2011, public security officials in Beijing have taken into custody members and leaders of the Beijing Shouwang Church in an effort to pressure them to stop meeting. Over 160 were taken into custody in one instance, according to BBC (12 April 11, in Chinese). As of June 5, authorities had taken Shouwang members into custody in connection with nine outdoor worship gatherings. Shouwang, which has approximately 1,000 members, is reportedly one of the largest unregistered church congregations ("house churches") in Beijing (Reuters, 3 April 11). Beginning on April 10, Shouwang began organizing Sunday worship gatherings outdoors after authorities reportedly pressured its landlords to deny the church access to the sites where it had previously been meeting or planned to meet, according to an open letter from Shouwang (27 March 11, in Chinese, via the ChinaAid Association (CAA)).

Officials detained some congregants for a few hours, while they confined others to their homes for weeks. For example, according to Voice of America (VOA) (25 April 11, in Chinese), Shouwang pastor Jin Tianming stated that, on April 24, some congregants were released after as little as five or six hours, but some were still held after approximately 30 hours. During the April 10 detentions, public security officials recorded the names and personal information of detained church members, took their fingerprints, and forced some to "write statements of repentance and personal guarantees," according to the CAA (11 April 11, in English). In addition, according to the Associated Press (AP) (10 April 11, via Yahoo!) and Shouwang (29 May 11, via CAA), on April 9—one day before the first gathering—officials began to confine some church members and leaders to their homes, monitoring their actions and restricting their freedom of movement. According to CAA (24 April 11, in English; 15 May 11, in English) and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (27 April 11), beginning on April 23, officials confined a total of approximately 500 church members to their homes. One hundred reportedly remained confined to their homes as of May 15. As of April 29, Shouwang pastors Jin Tianming, Yuan Ling, Zhang Xiaofeng, and Li Xiaobai, and lay leaders Sun Yi, You Guanhui, and Liu Guan remained confined to their homes, according to the April 29 Shouwang report.

In addition to the detentions and home confinements, authorities in Beijing took other forms of action to pressure participants in the services to stop gathering outdoors. For example, according to CAA (10 May 11, in English), public security officials forcibly returned at least one church member, Hu Jian, to his home province. Within days of Shouwang's first outdoor gathering on April 10, congregants reportedly began to lose their jobs or were evicted from their homes after their employers and landlords came under pressure from authorities. According to reports from AsiaNews (16 May 11) and Shouwang (13 May 11, via CAA, in English), the Shouwang Church reported that 10 congregants lost their jobs and more than 30 were pressured to leave their rented homes.

Harassment and Detentions Occur During Time of Heightened Sensitivity to Unregistered Protestant Congregations

The harassment and detention of members of the Shouwang Church took place during a time when authorities' sensitivities to members of unregistered Protestant congregations who assemble into large groups or across congregations appear to have increased (see a related CECC analysis), as well as during a broader crackdown against rights defenders, petitioners, artists, Internet bloggers, and others that began in mid-February 2011 (see a related CECC analysis). The Commission has not observed any statements from the Chinese government or Communist Party that explicitly acknowledge a link between these factors and the Shouwang events. However, two April 2011 editorials from the Global Times (11 April 11, in English; 26 April 11, in Chinese) that coincide with the broader crackdown warn against "politicizing" religion, and the English-language editorial characterizes the April 10 outdoor worship gathering as a "public disturbance" (the Global Times operates under the People's Daily, the official news media of the Communist Party). The leaders of Shouwang Church insist that their actions are solely for the purpose of religious worship, and not political demonstration, according to Shouwang (4 April 11, in Chinese, via CAA). They say that "[Shouwang] will strive our hardest to avoid having our religious activities be dyed by the colors of politics, but whether or not this can be avoided is not up to us to decide."

Authorities in Beijing have made previous attempts to prevent Shouwang Church members from gathering to worship. For example, authorities in Beijing detained Shouwang pastor Jin Tianming on October 17, 2010, as he led a worship gathering of members of unregistered churches whom authorities had recently stopped from attending an international conference on evangelization in South Africa, set to take place from October 16 to 25 (see a related CECC analysis). According to CAA (2 November 09, in English) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) (9 November 09, in Chinese), on November 2, 2009, nearly 1,000 congregants—and on November 9, 2009, over 700 congregants—met outside to worship after the church's landlord, reportedly under pressure from authorities, refused to renew the church's rental contract (for more information, see the CECC's 2010 Annual Report, p. 109.) Officials placed Jin under "soft detention" on November 8, 2009, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (12 November 09, via Boxun, in Chinese). A January 2011 document from China's State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) that outlines SARA's policies in 2011 calls on authorities to "guide" members of unregistered Protestant congregations to worship in state-controlled churches (see a related CECC analysis), but in recent months, authorities appear to have focused their efforts on stopping Shouwang from meeting. In addition to the recent detentions, an April 11, 2011, article in the South China Morning Post (SCMP) quoted Jin as stating that, in the last 18 months, authorities had forced Shouwang to move 20 times from locations where it had been gathering to worship. In 2009, Shouwang reportedly paid 27 million yuan (approximately US$4 million) to purchase its own place of worship, but the owner, under pressure from the authorities, failed to hand over the keys, according to reports from the New York Times (24 April 11) and AsiaNews (16 May 11). An April 18, 2011, CAA article (in English) reported that since 2009 authorities have prevented Shouwang from purchasing or renting any new properties, as well. According to a report from the World and China Institute (3 September 10, in Chinese), Shouwang applied for registration with the Haidian District Ethnic, Religious, and Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau on May 11, 2006, but the Bureau reportedly refused to provide documentation necessary for registration because Shouwang's pastors had not been confirmed by a municipal patriotic religious association. The basis for the rejection reportedly stemmed from Article 10(4) of the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, which stipulates that a group that is applying for registration must have, among other requirements, "[a] number of full-time staff members corresponding to the organization's professional activities." As pastors not confirmed by a patriotic religious organization, they were deemed not to be appropriate staff members.

Chronology of Events

The following is a chronology of harassment of Shouwang church members between early April and June 5, 2011:

• April 10: Public security officials took into custody for questioning 169 of the more than 200 church members who attended the outdoor service. Officials released most of them by April 11. The day before the gathering, officials placed under "soft detention" Shouwang pastors Jin Tianming, Yuan Ling, and Zhang Xiaofeng, as well as lay leaders Sun Yi, You Guanhui, and Liu Guan. According to China Free Press (13 April 11), authorities placed pastor Li Xiaobai under "soft detention" as of April 12. (BBC, 12 April 11, in Chinese; AP, 10 April 11; CAA, 11 April 11, in English; 16 April 11, in English; RFA, 12 April 11, in Chinese; 13 April 11, in Chinese)


• April 17: Over 100 church members reportedly participated in the outdoor service, and authorities took 47 into custody. Authorities released most church members by April 18; however, it is unclear if all were released. Public security officials took pastor Jin Tianming away the night before and interrogated him for nearly 12 hours before releasing him back into "soft detention" on April 17. Officials took into custody pastor Li Xiaobai—who was already under "soft detention"—and his wife Lu Bingxia that evening and released them a few hours later (authorities released Li back into "soft detention," but sources do not indicate whether his wife was placed under "soft detention"). Officials also took pastor Zhang Xiaofeng—who was already under "soft detention"—into custody for questioning and released him back into "soft detention" at an unspecified time. (AP, 17 April 11, via Yahoo!; CAA, 20 April 11, in English; SCMP, 18 April 11, subscription required)


• April 24: Public security authorities placed under "soft detention" more than 500 people—over half of the congregation—including all lay leaders and members of the church staff and choir. Officials took into custody at least 36 congregants who participated in the outdoor worship gathering on suspicion of participating in an "illegal gathering" and released them all a few hours later. (Wall Street Journal, 25 April 11; CNN, 25 April 11; Baptist Press, 2 May 11; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 27 April 11)


• May 1: Public security officials took into custody at least 32 church members, including 2 children. The Commission has not observed any reports that indicate whether authorities have released these individuals. Domestic security protection officers took into custody Wang Shuangyan, pastor of the Beijing-based New Tree Church, on suspicion of "engaging in illegal gatherings" and released her 48 hours later, after questioning. (VOA, 1 May 11, in Chinese; CAA, 4 May 11, in English)


• May 8: Officials detained at least 15 people who participated in the outdoor worship gathering. Officials released them all within 48 hours, except for 1 church member, Hu Jian, whom officials reportedly held at a police station in Dongsheng district, Beijing, for over 48 hours before ordering him to return to his hometown in Hubei province. (AsiaNews, 9 May 11; CAA, 9 May 11, in Chinese; 10 May 11, in English; 11 May 11, in English)


• May 15: Public security officials took into custody between 16 and 20 church members and released 12 by that evening and the rest by noon on May 16. Authorities also confined approximately 100 to their homes for the weekend. (CAA, 15 May 11; in English; 18 May 11, in English; AsiaNews, 16 May 11)


• May 22: Public security officials took into custody between 25 and 27 church members, including an elderly woman in her 80s and a two-year-old child, and an undetermined number were placed under "soft detention" for the weekend. Twenty-four were released within 12 hours. (SCMP, 23 May 11, subscription required; Guardian, 24 May 11; CAA, 24 May 11, in Chinese)


• May 29: Public security officials took into custody at least 22 church members, and by midnight released 21 members, with the final person released by mid-day on May 30. (CAA, 30 May 11, in Chinese; 1 June 11, in English)


• June 5: Public security officials detained 20 church members and placed dozens under "soft detention" in their homes beginning on June 3. The Commission has not observed reports indicating that any of those detained or placed under "soft detention" have been released. (VOA, 6 June 11, in Chinese; SCMP, 6 June 11, subscription required)
For more information about conditions for China's religious communities, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-06-06 / Free) | Posted on: 2011-07-01
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Top Official Directs Media To Promote July Anniversary of Party's Founding

July 1, 2011

A top Communist Party official has directed Chinese media to promote the 90th anniversary of China's Communist Party, founded on July 1, 1921, saying it is their "common responsibility" to do so. The call, which came on April 22, 2011, was directed not only at media organizations closely aligned with the Party but also more commercially oriented newspapers and online media more generally. The call echoes the official policy of the Chinese government and Party that the domestic media serve as an instrument of the Party.

The director of China's Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department has called on the nation's news media to promote the 90th anniversary of the Party's founding, saying it is their "common responsibility" to do so, according to an April 22 Xinhua article. Liu Yunshan, who is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee, made the comments during an April 22 speech given at a special meeting on "propaganda reporting work" for the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Party. The Communist Party of China was founded on July 1, 1921, according to Xinhua's Web site. Below are Liu's specific instructions (quoted language is Xinhua's reporting of Liu's remarks, for which it is unclear whether they reflect direct quotations or paraphrases of his words):

• For news media in general "doing good propaganda reporting on the 90th anniversary of the Party's founding is the common responsibility of all levels and types of media."


• Central and local Party newspapers and magazines, radio and television stations should "play a leading role" by issuing "special columns, special topic sections, discussions, commentaries, and commemorative essays."


• Evening and metropolitan newspapers should use "vivid stories and moving plots to show the glorious history of the Party's struggles." These newspapers are more commercially-oriented and some have developed reputations for investigative reporting, albeit within the confines of overall Party control.


• Online media "should help the large numbers of netizens [Internet users] to understand the Party's great historical course by publishing special postings, background links, and online interviews."

The role of the news media as an instrument of the Party is enshrined in official policy. Despite current plans to restructure the media industry to enhance its international competitiveness (see, for example, this October 25, 2010, People's Daily article), officials have made clear that any change must strengthen, not weaken, Party control. In a November 2010 speech on the topic of political reform and its relationship to China's news industry, Liu Binjie, Director of the General Administration on Press and Publication, a government agency responsible for regulating the press, said:

Any reform needs to be beneficial to strengthening and improving the Party's leadership over press and publishing work.... Press and publishing system reform needs to firmly grasp the leadership authority of the Party over press and publishing work. ... From beginning to end we must insist on ... no change to the nature of the press and publishing serving as mouthpieces of the Party and the people, no change in the Party's control over the media. (China Press and Publication Online, 17 November 10)

For radio and television stations, which are more tightly controlled than newspapers and online media, the Chinese government announced in January 2011 that it would not allow radio or television stations to privatize, justifying the decision on the grounds of the importance of radio and television to the Party. "Radio and television stations are the Party's important news media and battleground for propagandizing ideology and culture...and propaganda must remain their focus," a spokesperson from the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television is paraphrased as saying in a January 14 Chinanews.com report.

One of the functions the Party expects the media to assume is to "correctly" (zhengque) guide public opinion. In November 2010, Li Changchun, a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, on the occasion of the annual Journalists' Day in China, said "a correct public opinion orientation benefits the Party and the people," and called on the news media to "insist on their responsibility to the Party and people," emphasize "positive propaganda," and "propagandize the Party's positions" (People's Daily, 9 November 10). In recent years, officials have called for propaganda to reflect positively on the Party and to influence public opinion during various high-profile events and incidents, ranging from the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the economic downturn, demonstrations and protests in Tibetan areas and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2008 and 2009, and major earthquakes in 2008 and 2010, among others. The Central Propaganda Department and other government and Party entities also issue more specific and frequent directives to the media on what they can and cannot report on or how to cover particular stories. In January 2011, the International Federation of Journalists released a report documenting more than 80 censorship orders issued by Chinese officials in 2010, outlining Chinese officials' efforts to block information on "public health, disasters, corruption and civil unrest." Chinese officials have also sought to restrict domestic media coverage of recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa (see this CECC analysis for more information).

For more information on how Chinese officials control the news media and how such control conflicts with international standards for free expression, see pp. 66-70 of the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-05-06 / English) | Posted on: 2011-07-01
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Government Interferes With Activities of House Church Networks in Late 2010 and 2011

July 1, 2011

Since late 2010, officials across China have harassed and in some cases detained members of some unregistered Protestant church ("house church") congregations that assemble across multiple congregations in an effort to pressure them to stop meeting. Authorities have harassed and detained members of house church congregations in previous years, but statements from state-controlled media and government sources—coinciding with a broader crackdown against rights defenders, reform advocates, lawyers, petitioners, writers, artists, and Internet bloggers—suggest that authorities' sensitivities to Protestants who worship outside of state-approved parameters have intensified during this period.

Since late 2010, authorities in locations throughout China have used various means to pressure members of house church congregations that assemble across multiple congregations to stop gathering. These include interrupting gatherings and instructing participants to disperse; placing unregistered Protestants under "soft detention," a form of unlawful home confinement; and blocking access to sites of worship. For example, according to the ChinaAid Association (CAA) (30 January 11, in Chinese) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) (31 January 11, in Chinese), on January 30, 2011, public security officials in Beijing pressured members of two unregistered churches, the Sheng'ai Fellowship and Zhu'ai Fellowship, to cancel a planned joint worship gathering. Officials reportedly took into custody several members of the two congregations, including Liu Fenggang, Liang Jinglu, and Wang Ling, and confined several members to their homes, including Gao Hongming, Hu Shigen, Yang Jing, Xu Yonghai, and He Depu. Sources do not indicate if they were released, although an April 23, 2011, CAA article (in English) notes that authorities took Liu Fenggang into custody in April as he traveled from Beijing to Hebei province. In another example, according to CAA (4 March 11, in Chinese; 7 March 11, in English) and RFA (6 March 11, in Chinese; 10 March 11, in Chinese), on March 4, 2011, officials from Suqian city, Jiangsu province, detained unregistered pastor Shi Enhao after he preached at a house church gathering. The officials reportedly instructed him not to travel away from his residence during the March meetings of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a time when officials have typically tightened restrictions on activists and others. Shi is reportedly a vice president of the Chinese House Church Alliance (CHCA), which associates with unregistered Protestant congregations in multiple provinces.

Domestic and International Law

Official interference with worship gatherings, "soft detention," and prevention of access to sites of worship appear to contravene provisions in international law that protect religious practice and peaceful assembly, such as Articles 18 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 18 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed but not yet ratified. In at least one recent case, local authorities reportedly cited China's Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) as a basis for stopping the religious activities of a house church congregation with connections to the CHCA. According to a February 1, 2011, RFA report (in Chinese), an official from the Jianhu County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Yancheng city, Jiangsu province, told RFA that the unregistered Zhongzhuang Church—located in Jianhu—had engaged in an "illegal evangelical event" and that authorities had investigated and dealt with the situation in accordance with the RRA (public security officials and ethnic and religious affairs officials in Jianhu blocked access to the building where members of the church had been meeting). According to CAA (31 January 11, in Chinese), the Zhongzhuang Church leader, pastor Zeng Zhengliang, is also an "important" member of the CHCA. Article 3 of the RRA stipulates that "[t]he State, in accordance with the law, protects normal religious activities, and safeguards the lawful rights and interests of religious bodies, sites for religious activities and religious citizens." However, the RRA excludes unregistered religious groups from the limited state protections that it offers, leaving members of house church congregations at risk of harassment, detention, and imprisonment by authorities. Article 12 of the RRA stipulates that "collective religious activities of religious citizens shall, in general, be held at registered sites for religious activities ... ." House church congregations are unregistered religious groups and therefore cannot register sites of worship. Article 12 of the RRA appears to contravene Article 4 of General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR (available via the Web site of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), which specifies that the freedom to worship extends to the building of places of worship. Members of registered church congregations also are at risk of harassment due to official sensitivities over contact between members of unregistered and registered congregations. For example, according to CAA (29 December 10, in Chinese; 30 December 10, in English), in December 2010, public security officials in Bengbu city, Anhui province, pressured three Protestant congregations—one of which was reportedly a state-sanctioned church congregation—to cancel a joint Christmas service.

Context of the Harassment, Detentions, and Interference in Religious Activities

For years, the Chinese government and Communist Party have interfered in the religious activities of members of Protestant house church congregations that assemble across multiple congregations, but the context of recent cases of harassment, detention, and interference suggests that authorities' sensitivities have intensified toward members of unregistered Protestant congregations who organize religious activities across congregations. CAA's 2010 Annual Report (31 March 11, in English, via Google) attributes heightened official sensitivities to the announcement of the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo and attempts by unregistered Protestants to attend an international evangelization conference in South Africa in late 2010. In addition, cases of interference have continued into the first several months of 2011, during a broader crackdown against rights defenders, reform advocates, lawyers, petitioners, writers, artists, and Internet bloggers. The Commission has not observed statements from the Chinese government or Communist Party that explicitly link interference in the religious activities of house church congregations to these events or that explicitly acknowledge a concerted effort to target house church networks during this period. However, China's State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued a document on January 24, 2011, (available in Chinese via the SARA Web site) outlining its work in 2011 that calls on authorities to "guide" Protestants who "participate in activities at unauthorized gathering places" (house churches) to worship in state-controlled churches (see a related CECC analysis). An article in China Religion (2010, Issue 1, available in Chinese via the SARA Web site)—an official SARA publication—that summarizes the content of a meeting to discuss SARA's work in 2010 did not mention this policy. A January 24, 2011, SARA report (in Chinese via the SARA Web site), however, states that authorities did make efforts to "guide" unregistered Protestants to worship in state-controlled churches in 2010. In addition, two April 2011 editorials from the Global Times (11 April 11, in English; 26 April 11, in Chinese) warn unregistered Protestant congregations not to overstep state-approved parameters in their religious activities. The Global Times operates under the People's Daily, the official Party newspaper. The April 11 editorial states:


Chinese society attaches great importance to harmony, and those with religious beliefs should adhere even more strongly to this harmony. They should not cause any public disturbances through their own religious activities, which will put them at odds with society.... Those house churches that currently have this tendency should thoroughly reflect on the consequences of their gatherings…. It is said that many intellectuals were present [at the April 10 outdoor gathering of members of the unregistered Shouwang Church]. These people benefit from a [sic] orderly society and should not complain blindly.

The April 26 editorial states:


[House churches] have commonly drifted outside society's original religious management system…. [I]t is difficult to "cut them all with one stroke"… if [the actions of house churches] focus on religious belief and highly value not causing conflict with society, if their actions are low key, it will be easy for [house churches] to be understood.


Selected Examples of Interference

The following are selected examples of official interference in the religious activities of members of house church congregations that assemble across multiple congregations since late 2010, in addition to those discussed above:

• According to international media reports, every Sunday beginning on April 10, 2011, public security officials in Beijing took into custody members and leaders of the Beijing Shouwang Church—over 160 in one instance, according to the BBC (12 April 11, in Chinese)—in an effort to pressure them to stop meeting. At the time of this writing, authorities had taken Shouwang members into custody in connection with nine outdoor worship gatherings (see a related CECC analysis for more information).


• According to CAA (10 May 11, in Chinese), the Associated Press (11 May 11, via Yahoo!; 11 May 11, via Washington Post), Deutsche Welle (11 May 11, in Chinese), and RFA (11 May 11, in Chinese) on May 10, 2011, public security officers in Zhengzhou city, Henan province, interrupted a Bible study gathering of members of the CHCA and took into custody 49 people, including Zhang Jili, Zhang Qing'an, Zhang Guangxia, Korean pastor Jin Yongzhe (pinyin name), and Jin's wife Li Sha. According to CAA (16 April 11, in Chinese; 17 April 11, in English; 17 April 11, in Chinese; 23 April 11, in English) and RFA (21 April 11, in Chinese), Zhang Jili, Zhang Qing'an, and Zhang Guangxia were previously detained in April after having contact with CHCA leaders. All but Jin and Li were released as of May 11, according to CAA (11 May 11, in English). According to CAA (26 May 11, in Chinese), authorities had released Jin and Li by May 26.


• According to CAA (23 April 11, in English), on April 23, 2011, authorities in Chengde prefecture, Hebei province, stopped Henan-based house church leader and pastor Zhang Mingxuan, Zhang's wife Xie Fenglan, and Beijing-based pastor Liu Fenggang as they traveled to Beijing to visit churches for Easter. Zhang reportedly is president of the CHCA. Officials reportedly held Zhang and Xie at a police station in Chengde for several hours before moving them to a hotel in Shijiazhuang city, Hebei, where they remained in custody. No further information regarding their whereabouts is available. Earlier in March, according to RFA (10 March 11, in Chinese), authorities in Henan province had forced Zhang to "travel" away from his hometown of Nanyang city, Henan. Reports do not indicate when he was allowed to return.


• According to CAA (29 December 10, in Chinese; 30 December 10, in English), in December 2010, authorities in Jiaozhou city, Shandong province, denied a house church access to the site where it had been meeting. The church is led by Zhan Gang, reportedly a vice president of the CHCA.


• Since November 1, 2010, public security officers in Beijing have prevented Fan Yafeng from leaving his home (see a related CECC analysis for more information). Fan is a prominent legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, house church leader, and director of a non-governmental organization. The CAA 2010 Annual Report states that Fan has played an important role in promoting legal activism among members of house church congregations throughout China.
For more information on conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC's 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-05-05 ) | Posted on: 2011-07-01
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=158893

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Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining Operations

July 1, 2011

Protests occurred in Inner Mongolia between May 23 and May 31, 2011, following two separate confrontations between workers from mining operations (some reportedly Han Chinese) and herders and residents near the mining operations (reportedly including Mongols and at least one Manchu), during which workers reportedly killed a herder and resident. Protesters called on authorities to prosecute the alleged murderers and also called for protecting herders' rights and Mongol culture. Authorities reportedly clashed with protesters in one case and have taken some protesters into detention. Authorities addressed some of the protesters' grievances but did not acknowledge a connection between the protests and official restrictions on Mongol culture. In the aftermath of the protests, security reportedly remains tight.

Introduction
Protests occurred in cities and county-level areas across the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) between May 23 and May 31, 2011, following two separate confrontations in mid-May between workers from mining operations (some reportedly Han Chinese) and herders and residents near the mining operations (reportedly including Mongols and at least one Manchu) who were protesting the mining. In each case, workers from the mining company reportedly killed one person: a Mongol herder killed in the first case and a Manchu resident killed in the second. Following the incidents, Mongols held a series of demonstrations reportedly calling for authorities to prosecute the alleged murderer of the Mongol herder (reports vary on the connection between the protests and the second murder of the Manchu man), as well as protesting government curbs on grasslands use and Mongol culture. Protests reportedly appeared to be peaceful and numbered mostly in the hundreds, though protests on two days reportedly had protesters in the thousands, many of whom were students. Authorities reportedly clashed with protesters in one case and reportedly have taken dozens of protesters into detention, as well as people believed to be involved in organizing the protests.

In the aftermath of the protests, residents in the IMAR reported that security in the region remained tight, with high numbers of security forces stationed in the area and curbs on the Internet and other communication tools. Authorities have acknowledged some of the protesters' grievances in a way unseen during widescale protests and riots in Tibetan areas and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2008 and 2009, but also have cast some blame on activists and overseas groups they deemed to have contributed to social unrest through the protests. Authorities have not acknowledged any connection between the protests and official curbs on Mongol culture. In June, authorities in the IMAR sentenced the suspects in both murder cases. Authorities also announced more economic support for the region, while reporting on steps to convey the government perspective on the protests.

"5-11" and "5-15" Incidents
Late on May 10, 2011, Mongol herders in West (Right) Ujumqin Banner (an administrative area equivalent to a county, transliterated into Mandarin as Xiwuzhumuqin qi), in Xilingol League (an administrative area equivalent to a prefecture, transliterated as Xilinguolei meng) reportedly clashed with workers at a mining company, according to overseas and Chinese government reports. (See, e.g., a May 17 report from the West Ujumqin Banner government Web site (cached), May 19 report from the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC), and May 29 report from the IMAR Public Security Department.) The West Ujumqin report said that herders affected by dust and noise from mining freight vehicles passing through grasslands, including at night, attempted to block passage of the vehicles that evening. The SMHRIC report described the clash as a "day long confrontation" involving over 40 herders and hundreds of mining company workers, after petitioning efforts by the herders reportedly had failed to stop coal trucks from trespassing through the grasslands. The IMAR Public Security Bureau report said the confrontation began during the day, involving nearly 20 herders, and that people's police officers stopped a fight between a herder named Mergen and workers named Li and Lu. Afterward, however, the two workers reportedly hit Mergen with a vehicle, resulting in his death at the scene, according to the report. PSB officials received news of the fight early on May 11 and have labeled the incident the "5-11" case.

On May 15, 2011, residents in Abag Banner (Abaga qi), Xilingol, also clashed with coal mining workers while reportedly attempting to stop mining operations for a second day in a row, according to a May 18 report from the Xilingol Government Web site (cached) and the report from the IMAR Public Security Department. Residents were protesting dust, noise, and water issues connected to the mining operations, according to the reports. Clashes escalated during the day, though some were staved off by police, according to the IMAR Public Security Department, and a forklift driver reportedly hit Yan Wenlong with his vehicle. Yan died at the scene. (Yan is identified by Xinhua, via China Internet Information Center, May 30, as an ethnic Mongol but identified by reports from the Xilingol government, containing more detailed information on Yan, as Manchu. See the May 18 report and a May 26 report (cached). Chinese sources do not identify the residents as herders.) Other people reportedly were injured that day (14 people according to Xinhua, 7 according to the sources from within the IMAR).

Protests Begin May 23
Following the incidents, herders—reportedly in the hundreds—protested in West Ujumqin Banner on May 23. Protests occurred again on May 25, with many student participants, and reportedly continued daily or almost daily through May 31. Reports indicate that protests typically numbered in the hundreds, though the May 25 and 26 protests reportedly numbered in the thousands. Sites of protest included Xilinhot municipality, Xilingol (May 25); Bordered Yellow Banner (Xianghuang qi, Huveed Shar), East (Left) Ujumqin Banners, Xilingol, and Alxa League (Alashan) (May 26); Plain Blue Banner (Zhenglan qi, Shuluun Huh) in Xilingol and Ordos municipality (May 27); Chifeng (Ulanhad )(May 28); and IMAR capital Hohhot (May 30, May 31). For reporting on the protests, see, e.g., reports from the SMHRIC (May 23, May 25, May 26, May 27, May 28, May 29, May 30, June 1, June 4), Reuters (May 27), Agence France-Presse (AFP) (May 25, via Google; May 27, via Sino Daily), and Radio Free Asia (RFA) (May 25, May 26, May 27, June 1).

Reports from the SMHRIC and elsewhere (see, e.g., RFA reports), based on sources in the region and slogans shouted at the protests, connected the events to the May 10 murder of Mongol herder Mergen as well as to broader grievances over official curbs on Mongols' rights, including restrictions on grasslands use. A May 30 New York Times article linked both the May 10 and May 15 alleged murders to the protests, and authorities within the IMAR have cited both events as sources of unrest in the region. (See below for more information on official reactions to the alleged murders and protests.)

Based on reporting on the protests, cited above, protests appeared to be peaceful and some appear to have been dispersed quickly (SMHRIC May 29, NY Times). In some cases, authorities reportedly took people into detention, including more than 30 or 40 people on May 27 (SMHRIC, May 28, May 30; RFA, May 27) and approximately 50 in Hohhot (SMHRIC, June 4, describing a total of at least 90 people from Xilingol and Hohhot who reportedly remained in detention as of that date). Authorities also reportedly took into custody university lecturers and students in the aftermath of the protests, including three teachers who were formally detained (RFA, June 7). According to a June 17 report from SMHRIC, most of "a hundred or more" protesters who were "arrested, detained and beaten," remained in detention as of that report's publication. During the protests, sources reported heavy police presence and intervention in some cases (Reuters, May 27, SMHRIC, May 27; NY Times), and an unconfirmed report said that police drove a car into protesters on May 27, injuring four people (SMHRIC, May 27). Residents inside the IMAR reported on the presence of roadblocks in some areas (AFP, May 27) as well as "martial law" (Reuters, May 27), although this could not be confirmed and may have been used by residents to indicate the heavier security.

Sources cited in multiple overseas reports indicated students at universities and other schools in the IMAR were not allowed to leave campus. (See, e.g., RFA, May 31; AFP, May 30, via Yahoo; SMHRIC, May 30). On May 31, Inner Mongolia Normal University posted a notice requiring students to apply to leave the campus. Earlier, the IMAR Education Department issued a notice to education bureaus in the region noting that under "incitement" from a few people with ulterior motives following the reported murders, some ethnic minority students collectively petitioned out of "desire to understand what really happened," and authorities were able to make most students "understand" the situation, according to a copy of the notice posted May 28 on the Web site of the Inner Mongolia Agricultural University (cached). The notice called for schools to take responsibility for students and organize activities within the schools. Authorities also took other steps to prevent other people from participating. The Xilinhot Civil Affairs Bureau held a meeting for cadres in its bureau, instructing them not to participate in the protests. The meeting also provided information on the "5-11" and "5-15" incidents, called on cadres to grasp "public opinion guidance," and suggested that heads of households carry out "ideology work" directed at their children, according to a May 30 report on the Xilinhot Civil Affairs Bureau Web site.

Response of Government Authorities in China
As authorities curbed protests and increased security in the region, official sources appeared to acknowledge some of the protesters' concerns stemming from the fights and murders earlier in the month, but they did not address broader grievances over curbs on Mongol culture. Authorities also cast blame on people deemed to agitate unrest, including overseas groups. A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson reportedly said that authorities "will respond positively" to the "reasonable claims by the people," according to a June 1 BBC report, but criticized "those overseas trying to play up this incident for ulterior motives..." A May 31 editorial from the Global Times, which operates under the People's Daily, the official news media of the Communist Party, said that "some of [the protesters'] requests" were "reasonable," while stating that the protests were "not a politically driven demonstration" but rather part of "social conflicts" that occur throughout China. The Communist Party head of Xilingol reportedly described the presence of "mass incidents" in the region as "mainly premeditated, organised and instigated by some people both within and outside our borders with ulterior motives," according to a May 30 AFP report, via Yahoo.

In the aftermath of the protests, authorities reportedly continue to enforce a range of security measures, including widescale deployment of armed security and military forces, according to sources and a document cited by overseas media (SMHRIC, June 4; RFA, June 5). The heightened security measures also coincide with the 22nd anniversary of the Chinese government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement.

In addition, authorities prosecuted suspects in both murders. In the "5-11" cases, West Ujumqin public security bureau officers formally arrested two murder suspects, Li Lindong and Lu Xiangdong, on May 21, along with two people suspected of impeding operation of official business. By May 26, the case was under investigation by the Xilingol procuratorate, according to the May 29 report from the IMAR Public Security Department. The Xilingol Intermediate People's Court tried and sentenced Li to death and Lu to life in prison on June 8, according to a Xinhua report from that day (via China Daily). In the "5-15" case, authorities reported that they took "compulsory measures" against 15 people from the mining operations, including 1 person, Sun Shuning, arrested as a murder suspect, 2 criminally detained for intentional injury, and 12 placed in administrative detention on suspicion of picking fights, according to the IMAR Public Security Department report. In addition, authorities "warned" or "reprimanded" five residents who had engaged in "extreme" behavior. The Xilingol Intermediate People's Court tried and sentenced Sun to death on June 21 for the murder of Yan Wenlong, according to a Xinhua report (via Investor's Business Daily, June 21). According to an earlier report from Inner Mongolia Daily, via Northern News, May 28, IMAR Party Secretary Hu Chunhua made reference to both incidents in a meeting reportedly intended to address students' and teachers' uncertainties as to their "understanding" and "ideology" regarding recent events, and he pledged to handle criminal suspects in accordance with the law.

Authorities in the IMAR also pledged to carry out a broader one-month cleanup of mining industries and to shut down mines that infringe on the rights of herding communities, according to a Xinhua report (via China Daily, June 1). According to the May 26 report on the Xilingol government Web site, authorities in Abag Banner said they had closed the mining operations involved in the Yan Wenlong case, would investigate others, and investigate the influence of mining operations on residents' lives. IMAR authorities also pledged 78.8 billion yuan (US$12.2 million) in economic support for the region, including in pastoral areas, in fields such as infrastructure and education, according to a May 29 Xinhua report. The report cited the funding as a means to support projects in the region to raise incomes, as well as resettle herders. The funding builds on existing development programs in the region and educational programs to support minority education. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report for additional information). The following month, at an executive meeting of the State Council on June 15, officials called for steps to promote the region's economic development and environment, as well as to "promote ethnic unity and social stability," according to a June 16 Xinhua report.

Controls over Internet and Press
As protests continued, authorities reportedly tightened controls over social media, searched the residences of Web site administrators, interrogated some bloggers and Internet users, shut down chat rooms, and blocked access to Web sites that mentioned the protests. (See, e.g., SMHRIC, May 27, May 28; Guardian, May 30). Foreign journalists have reported being blocked from reporting in some areas and being harassed or interrogated by authorities (AFP, May 30; Guardian, May 27; Reporters without Borders, May 31). In the aftermath of the protests, SMHRIC reported (June 4) that most Mongolian-language Web sites have been closed or restricted in their functions, while phone communication has been restricted. IMAR residents also reported limited access to the Internet and text messaging (Associated Press, via Kansas City Star, June 1).

Curbs on Grasslands Use
The recent protests have drawn a spotlight on longstanding grasslands policies in the IMAR. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010 and 2009 Annual Reports and related analysis, programs in the IMAR and elsewhere in China have imposed grazing bans, for the stated purpose of improving grasslands ecology, and required some herders to resettle from grasslands and abandon pastoral livelihoods. Scholars have questioned the efficacy of the policies in ameliorating grasslands degradation, while communities affected—including Mongols, Tibetans, and Kazakhs—have reported forced resettlement, inadequate compensation, minimal recourse for grievances, and poor living conditions, along with challenges in upholding traditional pastoral livelihoods and preserving their cultures. Protests connected to grasslands use have taken place in the past in the IMAR (see, e.g., SMHRIC, September 3, 2009). At a State Council meeting on grasslands policy in April 2011, authorities called for "more forceful policy measures" for "speeding up development of pastoral areas, ensuring the state's ecological security, and promoting ethnic unity and border stability," along with "a more vigorous employment policy" for "encouraging herders to change [modes of] production and occupations." In addition, central government authorities launched a system in 2011 to provide new subsidies and awards for abiding by grazing bans, which IMAR authorities reported implementing in May, according to a May 31 People's Daily article. In late 2010, an official in Xilingol stated that authorities would resettle at least 100,000 herders away from grasslands, while allowing 50,000 herders to stay in pastoral areas to "retain the traditional characteristics of the grassland culture," according to a November 6, 2010, Xinhua report.

For more information on conditions in the IMAR, see Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.




Source: -See Summary (2011-06-03 ) | Posted on: 2011-07-01
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=160258

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Ministry of Health Issues Draft Ban on the Use of BPA in Infant Food Containers (Update)

May 24, 2011

On April 20, 2011, the Ministry of Health posted on its Web site a draft document that would ban the import or manufacture of containers for infants' food, including baby bottles, which contain BPA, starting June 1, 2011, and that would ban the sale in China of such products as of September 1, 2011. In January, the Ministry of Health had issued a letter soliciting comments on draft lists of additives and resins used in food packaging materials, which included a ban on BPA in packaging for infant foods. China's proposed ban follows similar bans in the European Union and Canada.

On April 20, 2011, the Ministry of Health (MOH) posted on its Web site a Letter Soliciting Opinions on Announcement Banning the Use of Bisphenol A (BPA) in Infant Food Containers. The letter asks for comments on an attached draft announcement by April 29, and is addressed to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ), the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), and the Food Safety Commission. The announcement, which in its final form would be issued jointly by MOH, MIIT, MOFCOM, SAIC, AQSIQ, and SFDA, states that BPA is widely used in production of chemical products and food-related products, such as food packaging and containers, and that the BPA can leach into the food itself, which may pose a risk to food safety. The draft announcement notes that scientific research had not yet shown the trace amounts of BPA leaking from the products to be harmful, but that infants belong to a special class of persons. Therefore, under the terms of the announcement, the manufacture or import of infant food containers, such as milk bottles, containing BPA would be banned as of June 1, 2011, and the sale of such products in China would not be allowed starting on September 1, 2011.

The April letter follows another MOH letter dated January 31, 2011, soliciting comments on two draft lists of substances (appended to the letter) approved for use in food packaging materials, one list of 196 additives and the other of 116 resins. The Ministry of Health issued the January letter "based on the 'Food Safety Law' and its implementing regulations, and in accordance with the Ministry of Health and seven departments' 'Circular on Launching Work on Food Packaging Materials.'" (See the CECC 2009 Annual Report, pp. 221–223, and 2010 Annual Report, p. 185.) The draft list of 116 allowable resins imposes restrictions on the use of BPA in packaging, limiting the maximum residual amount of BPA in most products used for food packaging. Further, in the list of resins, categories 40, 42, 43, and 44 forbid the use of BPA in packaging material that comes into contact with food meant for consumption by infants, and specifically require that usage must comply with product safety standards. The public comment period on the draft lists closed on March 11, 2011.

According to a March 11 report on the Chinese Web site VJiao.com, which includes reporting from the Chinese newspaper Economic Information Daily, the European ban on BPA in baby bottles prompted a great deal of discussion in China, including in a blog post by a writer of popular science concerning BPA, who openly hinted that trace amounts of BPA in food containers made of polycarbonate plastic (PC), such as teapots, water cups, or baby bottles, can leach out, especially when the containers come into contact with acidic or hot substances. The report noted that news of a European ban on BPA in baby bottles had caused concern among mothers in China. The European Union (EU) has banned the manufacture in the EU of baby bottles containing BPA as of March 1, 2011, and the marketing in, or importing into, the EU of such products as of June 1. (See EU press release concerning the ban.) The same report referred to Canada's 2008 total ban on the use of BPA in any food containers and restrictions on the use of BPA in infant care products in some jurisdictions in the United States. The report notes that the secretary general of China's International Food Packaging Association, Dong Jinshi, had indicated in March that official regulations could be announced before June 1, 2011.

According to a March 2 Beijing News article, most baby bottles in China that are made of PC contain BPA. A Beijing news reporter had visited Beijing markets, and found that many infant food and drinks containers for sale were made of PC, but that the vast majority made in China did not indicate whether they contained BPA. Existing regulations appear to permit, or at least do not prohibit, the use of BPA in these products. The Shanghai Daily, in an April 22 article, reported that some local baby bottle producers in Shanghai had stopped using BPA in baby bottles in March, and that the authorities in Shanghai were prepared to "launch an inspection campaign" to ensure that bottles on the market comply with a ban once it comes into effect.

Currently, 1994 health standards for substances used in food containers and food packaging materials are in effect. The 1994 standards include limits on BPA amounts, but do not specifically address use in infant food containers, according to the March 11 report. The Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection's Chemical Registration Center maintains a list of toxic chemicals subject to import and export restrictions and BPA is not included on the list.

Update—June 9, 2011: The Chinese government has banned the manufacture of infant milk bottles made of polycarbonate and other infant milk bottles containing Bisphenol A (BPA). The Ministry of Health (MOH) announced the ban on May 30 in a post on the MOH Web site titled "Announcement from Six Departments Including the Ministry of Health on Banning the Use of Bisphenol A (BPA) in Baby Bottles." According to the announcement, the ban on the manufacture of such products became effective June 1, 2011, and a ban on the import and sale of such products will be effective starting September 1, 2011. The language used in this notice differs from a previous MOH draft announcement posted April 20, which stated that a ban on the manufacture or import of infant food containers containing BPA would be prohibited starting June 1, and a ban on the sale of such products would be effective starting September 1.
The May MOH announcement also states that:

• beginning September 1, 2011, manufacturers or importers "will be responsible for a recall";


• the use of BPA in food packaging materials and containers other than baby bottles must comply with the relevant existing national food safety standards and regulations;


• manufacturers of food packaging and other containers must comply with the requirements of the MOH announcement, and the relevant industry associations must strengthen the supervision and self-regulation of the industry; and


• bureaus that oversee food safety must increase their enforcement of supervision, strengthen the supervision and inspection of the manufacture of baby bottles, and investigate and punish illegal manufacturing activity that does not comply with the MOH's announcement.
The Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ) released a notice on its Web site on May 31, 2011, indicating that bureaus of quality and technical supervision will revoke the licenses for production of polycarbonate milk bottles. It further stipulates that manufacturers must take responsibility for recalling polycarbonate infant milk bottles and other infant milk bottles that contain BPA in accordance with the MOH announcement.
For Chinese media reports on the ban, see Xinhua (1 June 11) and the Global Times (1 June 11).





Source: -See Summary (2011-04-26 ) | Posted on: 2011-06-09
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Authorities Intensify Harassment of Activists Around 22nd Anniversary of the Chinese Government's Violent Suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement

June 3, 2011

In the lead-up to the 22nd anniversary of the Chinese government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement, authorities in China have stepped up monitoring and intimidation of rights activists, and prevented others from holding a memorial event. These latest developments occur against the backdrop of a broad crackdown against rights defenders, lawyers, artists, and bloggers in what international observers have described as one of the harshest crackdowns in years.

Officials in Beijing and elsewhere in China reportedly interrogated activists, restricted their movements, and warned them not to write articles about the Tiananmen democracy protests, give media interviews, or participate in public gatherings in the period around June 4, according to a report covering June 1-2, 2011, by the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD). These activists included Zha Jianguo, a democracy activist who was interrogated by state security officers on June 1, and Xia Yeliang, an economics professor at Peking University. Beijing police held Zhao Lianhai, a prominent advocate for children poisoned by tainted milk, and his family at a snack shop for several hours before releasing them. When they returned home they reportedly discovered that their electricity had been cut off. CHRD reported that on June 2, others, including the activist and artist Chen Yunfei, were placed under "soft detention," a form of unlawful home confinement. Officials in Guiyang city, Guizhou province reportedly forced dissident Li Renke to travel out of the city and told him that other dissidents in the area had been taken away.

In a June 3 report, CHRD noted additional cases of harassment, including that of Bao Tong, the former aide to Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. CHRD said that state security officers had taken Bao and his wife away on June 1 in Beijing and that their whereabouts were not known. CHRD also said that after a meeting with police in Xian city, Shaanxi province, the democracy activist Yang Hai was forced to take a "tour" (luyou) away from his home.

In a May 23 report, Radio Free Asia (RFA) interviewed an unnamed Beijing activist, who said police called him on May 23 for "a chat." The activist described an increasingly tense environment in Beijing with plainclothes police taking positions at intersections around Tiananmen Square, adding "[the police] have even started extending out to the suburbs." A petitioner surnamed Liu told RFA: "There are a lot of people under surveillance back in their hometowns right now, because it's nearly June 4. I don't know the exact number, but they are being watched by the neighborhood committees, the local security patrols, and the police." On June 2, RFA reported that police in Shanghai dispersed some 200 petitioners dressed in white who attempted to enter a city park to hold a memorial for victims of the crackdown on the Tiananmen protests.

In other developments related to this year's anniversary, Human Rights in China released on May 30, an essay by the Tiananmen Mothers, a group representing Tiananmen victims. The essay said that in February and April 2011 public security officials initiated contact with one victim's family to discuss compensation. The essay noted, however, that the officials "did not speak of making the truth public, carrying out judicial investigations, or providing an explanation for the case of each victim. Instead, they only raised the question of how much to pay, emphasizing that this was meant for that individual case and not for the families in the group as a whole." The Tiananmen Mothers called for "removing all surveillance and personal restrictions imposed upon the June Fourth victims and their families; allowing the families of the dead to mourn their loved ones without interference; and the relevant government departments' providing pure humanitarian assistance to the victims experiencing hardships." In its June 3 report, CHRD said that starting on June 1, two of the Tiananmen Mothers, Ding Zilin and Zhang Xianling, were being held under "soft detention."

These latest detentions have occurred against the backdrop of a broad crackdown against rights defenders, lawyers, artists, and bloggers in what international observers have described as one of the harshest crackdowns in years. "The Chinese government's refusal to take responsibility for the massacre of unarmed civilians in June 1989 laid the foundation for the state impunity behind the current crackdown on dissent," according to a June 1 report by Human Rights Watch.




Source: -See Summary (2011-06-03 ) | Posted on: 2011-06-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=160269

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Ethnic Minority Population Planning Program Expands to More Areas in Xinjiang

June 3, 2011

Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang have expanded a program that rewards ethnic minority couples for having fewer children than permitted under the region's regulation on population planning, now making the program applicable to all counties and cities in Xinjiang where rural ethnic minorities comprise 50 percent or more of the population. The region's regulation on population planning permits rural ethnic minority couples to have up to three children, and the reward program awards couples that forego this maximum number of permitted births. The expansion of the program builds on similar reward systems present throughout China, while intensifying a regional focus on ethnic minority households. In addition to rewarding families that have fewer births, authorities in the XUAR and elsewhere in China also continue to enforce penalties against people who have more children than permitted under population planning requirements.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government has continued to expand a program of rewarding ethnic minority households that have fewer children than allowed under the region's regulation on population and family planning, building on initiatives throughout China to reward fewer births while intensifying a regional focus on ethnic minority households. Among various population planning reward programs in place in the region, a program in place since 2007 has rewarded rural ethnic minority couples that have fewer than the three children permitted under the XUAR Regulation on Population and Family Planning (Article 15), based on a description of the program posted September 4, 2008, on the Zepu (Poskam) county, Kashgar district, government Web site.

The reward program initially applied to three prefecture-level areas in the southern XUAR: Kashgar district, Aqsu district, and the Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture, according to the description. In 2009, authorities expanded the program to 26 additional counties, mainly targeting rural ethnic minority households who already have two children and have "been certified" (lingzheng) as voluntarily foregoing a third birth [shengyu liang tai hou zhudong fangqi di san tai], according to information in a November 2, 2009, Xinhua report and a March 17, 2011, Tianshan Net report. (See also a previous Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis for more information on the 2009 program expansion.) According to the 2011 Tianshan Net report, the program will now apply to all counties or cities where rural ethnic minorities comprise 50 percent or more of the population.

The expansion of the program builds on previous efforts in the XUAR to address population planning work among communities designated as ethnic minorities and to implement programs that reward fewer births. In 2006, the XUAR government reported a rate of population increase that was among the highest in China, noting a "relatively high" birth rate in minority areas as well as a fast growth rate among groups such as migrants. (See a CECC analysis and related January 24, 2006, Tianshan Net report for additional information.) The government reported that year that it would focus the region's population planning work on rural areas in the southern XUAR, which have predominantly ethnic minority populations. The government also pledged to keep the region's population within 22 million people by the end of 2010. According to information from China's 2010 national census, the region's population was 21.81 million by the end of October 2010, an increase of 0.11 percent from the 2000 census, according to an April 29, 2011, Xinhua article. (Nationwide, the population increased by an average 0.57 percent, according to another April 29, 2011, Xinhua article.) The region began pilot work in 2005 to "encourage and reward" compliance with population planning requirements and reported in 2006 on taking the "first steps" in moving from "emphasis on punishing multiple births" to "emphasis on encouraging and rewarding fewer births."

In the XUAR and throughout China, however, authorities continue to enforce regulations that punish non-compliance with population planning requirements, at the same time they implement systems to reward fewer births. (See Section II—Population Planning in the CECC 2010 Annual Report for additional information.) In addition, authorities also have imposed punishments that lack basis in law. In one case from the XUAR in 2008, authorities reportedly planned to require a woman in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture to undergo an abortion against her will for exceeding the number of permitted births under the XUAR Regulation on Population and Family Planning. Although those in violation of the regulation are required to pay "social compensation fees," there is no stipulation in the regulation that pregnancies must be terminated if the fee cannot be paid. Both national law and XUAR legal regulations provide sanctions for government officials who infringe on citizens' rights or abuse their power in carrying out population planning requirements, but it is unclear if local authorities faced penalties for their plans—eventually canceled—to subject the woman to a forced abortion.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on population planning policy, see Section II—Population Planning and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.





Source: -See Summary (2011-04-27 ) | Posted on: 2011-06-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=158385

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Statement of CECC Cochairman Sherrod Brown on the 22nd Anniversary of the Chinese Government's Violent Suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Democracy Protests

June 3, 2011

It has been 22 years since the Chinese government violently suppressed the Chinese people’s wishes for democracy and freedom in and around Beijing's Tiananmen Square on June 3 and 4, 1989. Chinese citizens from all walks of life peacefully demonstrated in Beijing and throughout China for political reform, respect for universal freedoms of speech and assembly, and an end to government corruption. In response, the Chinese government ordered the People’s Liberation Army to put down the demonstrations and to clear the Square by force—lethal force. Estimates of those killed ranged from the hundreds to the thousands, with many more injured and arrested. The Chinese government has suppressed media and online discussion of Tiananmen, denying the Chinese people their right to know and to demand accountability for what happened.

More than two decades later, the Chinese people continue to desire freedom and universal human rights, only to be denied them by the Chinese government. In recent months, Chinese officials launched one of the harshest crackdowns in years against rights defenders, reform advocates, lawyers, petitioners, writers, artists, and Internet bloggers. Those targeted include citizens who support democracy and freedom and who advocated on behalf of victims of earthquakes, disease, and tainted food, and child laborers, persecuted religious groups, and political dissidents.

These courageous citizens deserve our support and I urge the Chinese government to cease harassing, detaining, and “disappearing” such citizens, and to release those detained for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of speech and assembly. I urge the Chinese government to end the harassment and detention of and discrimination against those involved in the 1989 protests and their families, permit Chinese citizens to freely commemorate and share information about Tiananmen, and provide a full public accounting of the government’s actions in 1989. Under China’s international human rights commitments and under Chinese law, Chinese citizens are entitled to the universal freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and religion. The Chinese government should ensure the protection of these rights for which Chinese citizens have struggled for so long, and which they, like all people, so richly deserve.





Source: -See Summary (2011-06-03 ) | Posted on: 2011-06-03
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Ganzi Regulations on "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs" Moving Toward Approval

May 20, 2011

Regulatory measures for "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs" in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, are moving through the legislative process toward approval. According to information available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD), more than half of monastic political detentions in TAPs outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) during the period since March 2008—when Tibetan protests (and some rioting) spread across the Tibetan plateau—have been in Ganzi TAP. A March 2011 report by this Commission demonstrated a correlation between the number of detentions in each TAP on or after March 10, 2008, and the extensiveness of regulatory measures' provisions on punishment. The Commission has not yet located text of the Ganzi regulatory measures online. However, if the correlation found for other TAP regulations remains valid in Ganzi TAP, then Ganzi monks and nuns could face further increases in the repressive application of administrative and criminal punishments. New regulatory measures on "Tibetan Buddhist affairs" already in effect in 7 of the 10 TAPs outside the TAR substantially increase state infringement of "freedom of religious belief" in Article 36 of China's Constitution by subordinating "Tibetan Buddhist affairs" to government regulations that enforce Communist Party policy.

Sichuan People's Congress Standing Committee To Discuss Regulations in Late May

On May 3, 2011, the leadership of the Sichuan People's Congress Standing Committee decided that the Standing Committee would discuss at a May 25 to 27 meeting legislative matters including a report on the Ganzi TAP Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations (Ganzi Regulations), according to a May 4 Xinhua report. The 2011 Sichuan Province People's Congress Legislation Plan, dated February 21 and posted on the Web site of the Sichuan People's Congress Standing Committee on March 31, listed approval of the Ganzi Measures as part of the 2011 agenda. The Commission's March 2011 report noted that in June 2010 the Ganzi People's Congress Standing Committee was considering a report on a draft of the Ganzi Regulations (Ganzi Daily, reprinted in Chinese Buddhism Online). China's Constitution (Article 116) and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Article 19) require an ethnic autonomous prefecture to submit draft regulations for approval to the standing committee of the provincial-level people's congress where the prefecture is located before the regulations can take effect.

Potential Implications for Ganzi TAP Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries and Nunneries

Table 3 in the Commission's March 2011 report demonstrated a correlation between the extensiveness of the regulatory measures' provisions on punishment (detailed in Table 2 of the report) and the number of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus (teachers whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations) known to have been detained or imprisoned in each TAP on or after March 10, 2008. If that correlation remains valid in Ganzi TAP—the site of more than half of Tibetan monastic political detentions outside the TAR since March 2008, based on PPD data as of May 12, 2011—then Ganzi monks and nuns could face further increases in the repressive application of administrative and criminal punishments. (According to PPD data on May 12, of 934 Tibetan political detentions recorded on or after March 10, 2008, 535 were of monks, nuns, teachers, and trulkus. Of those 535, 135 were detained in the TAR and 400 were detained outside the TAR. Of the 400 detained outside the TAR, 205 were detained in Ganzi TAP. PPD data on Tibetan political detention since March 2008 are certain to be far from complete.)

If the structure and content of the Ganzi Regulations are similar to the seven prefectural-level regulatory measures analyzed in the Commission's March 2011 report, the Ganzi Regulations may implement measures that include:
• Increasing the authority of Buddhist Associations (BAs)—institutional links between Tibetan Buddhist institutions and the Chinese government and Party that facilitate the exercise of government and Party authority over Tibetan Buddhist activity;
• Closer monitoring and supervision of each monastery's Democratic Management Committee (DMC)—a monastic group legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey government laws, regulations, and policies;
• Implementing a requirement for DMCs to apply to BAs for a fixed quota on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at a monastery or nunnery;
• Strengthening BA and government control over "religious personnel" who wish to travel for the purpose of religious teaching or study;
• Significant expansion of township-level government authority over monasteries and nunneries;
• Providing to village-level committees a monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role on monastic activity.
Senior Party Official Summarizes the Outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China

In early April 2011, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United Front Work Department, summarized Party policies toward the Tibetan Buddhist religion, monasteries, and nunneries in a manner that reflects the provisions in the recent prefectural regulatory measures (Tibet Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in OSC)):
He expressed his hopes that religious personages and believers will always implement the line, principle, and policies of the Party, unswervingly carry out struggle against the Dalai clique, expose the reactionary essence of Dalai, establish a sound and permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries, and ensure that all activities of monasteries will have rules to follow. In addition, their interpretations of religious doctrines and rules must be line [sic] with social development and progress and ensure that Tibetan Buddhism will actively adapt itself to socialist society.
Zhu is also a principal participant in the formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese government and Communist Party officials that resumed in 2002. The most recent round of dialogue was in January 2010 (CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 219-220). In a May 7, 2011, interview (China Tibet Online, 7 May 11, reprinted on the Web site of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India) Zhu discussed his views on the dialogue and summarized the Party's negative assessment of the Dalai Lama by reiterating a set of "four labels" the Party attributed to the Dalai Lama in 1995. The fourth "label" described the Dalai Lama's effect on what the Party refers to as the "normal order" of Tibetan Buddhism (or here, the "regular religious order"): "the leader of the separatist clique that conspires the independence of Tibet, a ready puppet of the international anti-China forces, the root of social disorder in Tibet, and the biggest obstacle against regular religious order of Tibet Buddhism." Zhu asserted that the Dalai Lama "continued to prove" the Party's allegations and would "die with those 'four labels.'"

For additional information, see sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006 Annual Reports.





Source: -See Summary (2011-05-20 ) | Posted on: 2011-05-20
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Legal Scholar and Religious Freedom Advocate Fan Yafeng Harassed, Kept Under Surveillance

December 9, 2010

Since early October 2010, authorities in Beijing have increased pressure on legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng—who is a signatory of Charter 08—in apparent connection to the heightened monitoring of unregistered Protestant communities surrounding the October 2010 Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization. Public security officers in Beijing have taken Fan into custody for questioning six times since October 12, in at least some of those instances citing "making noise" as the reason. Authorities have reportedly taken measures against Fan that target more than just "noise," however. For example, most recently, they have accused him of "engaging in activities in the name of a social organization," and previously have confiscated copies of a magazine published by a non-governmental organization of which Fan is the director. Public security officers continue to monitor Fan's actions around the clock from outside his home.

On November 24, 2010, public security officers in Beijing took legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng, along with his wife and three-year-old son, into custody from his home for questioning for approximately four-and-a-half hours, according to a November 26 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). A document from the Haidian District Public Security Bureau, Beijing municipality (reprinted in a November 24 ChinaAid (CAA) report) states that authorities took Fan into custody for "engaging in activities in the name of a social organization." Fan is the leader of a house church, and according to reports from ChinaAid (2 November 10, 8 November 10), this incident was the sixth time that public security authorities had him in custody since early October, in some cases interrupting house church gatherings led by Fan in his home. In at least some of these instances, public security officers cited "making noise" as the reason for interrupting the gatherings, according to reports from Radio Free Asia (31 October 10, 18 November 10) and the November 2 CAA report. However, despite citing "noise" disturbances, authorities took other measures that targeted more than just "noise." According to the November 2 CAA report, they confiscated copies of a magazine published by the Holy Mountain Institute, a non-governmental organization of which Fan is the director.

A November 10 South China Morning Post (SCMP) report (subscription required) notes that pressure on Fan—who is a signatory of Charter 08—may have increased as a result of a broader crackdown on supporters of Liu Xiaobo after he was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. In addition, an October 20 RFA report quotes Fan's wife as saying that the recent harassment of Fan may be linked to the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization (Lausanne Congress), an international conference on Protestant evangelization held in Cape Town, South Africa from October 16-25, 2010. The recent harassment of Fan began on October 12—four days after the Nobel Peace Prize announcement and four days before the start of the Lausanne Congress—when a public security officer from the Shuangyushu police station, Haidian district, Beijing municipality and a member of that station's Communist Party political committee visited Fan at his home, according to an October 12 RFA report. They pressured Fan to cancel an interview that he had scheduled with National Public Radio, but he refused. Later that day, a public security officer used force to take Fan into custody. Public security officers now stand continuous watch outside of Fan's home, according to the SCMP report.


For more information about freedom of religion in China and conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (p. 99-100, 108-111). For more information about the Chinese government's recent efforts to prevent members of unregistered Protestant communities from attending the Lausanne Congress, see a related CECC analysis.




Source: -See Summary (2010-11-19 ) | Posted on: 2011-05-11
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Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education

May 10, 2011

The Xinjiang government has accelerated steps to promote "bilingual education," a program that stresses class instruction using Mandarin Chinese, while diminishing or eliminating instruction using "minority" languages, spoken by groups the Chinese government designates as ethnic minorities. At the same time, the government has publicized measures that preserve a degree of instruction using minority languages in the process of implementing "bilingual education." The future role of ethnic minority languages in Xinjiang schools remains uncertain, however, amid a government target to implement Mandarin-focused "bilingual education" in 75 percent of Xinjiang schools by 2015 and achieve a student body proficient in Mandarin by 2020. China's law on regional ethnic autonomy stipulates that "[s]chools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction."

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government accelerated steps to promote Mandarin-centered "bilingual education" in the past year, in accordance with targets set in mid-2010 to universalize "bilingual education" in the region's schools. Following a central government and Communist Party-led Work Forum on Xinjiang in May 2010, which set state objectives for the region's economic and political development, XUAR officials announced that they would "basically universalize" "bilingual education" in XUAR schools by 2015 with the goal that ethnic minority students "basically have a skilled grasp and use" of spoken and written Mandarin by 2020, according to May 28 reports from China News Service (via China Xinjiang) and China Daily. The region's 2010-2020 Education Reform and Development Plan (issued on January 21, 2011, according to a January 22 Tianshan Net report) specifies that the region would "basically universalize" elementary and secondary school "bilingual education" among ethnic minorities to reach a coverage rate of 75 percent by 2015 and over 90 percent by 2020, with a goal that all ethnic minority high school graduates "basically have a skilled grasp and use" of spoken and written Mandarin (Point 14). The plan describes the promotion of "bilingual education" as being of "strategic significance" for goals including "building a new model of socialist ethnic relations" and "promoting cohesion and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu)" (Point 8). According to the plan, the region also will "basically universalize two years of ethnic minority preschool bilingual education by 2012," to cover at least 85 percent of ethnic minority children by that date (Point 14), a target authorities appear to have articulated since 2008 (see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report, pp. 178-179, for more information). By the end of 2009, almost 42 percent of ethnic minority students in the XUAR studied in bilingual classes or studied in longstanding programs that track ethnic minority students directly into Mandarin Chinese schooling, where they have class instruction and tests in Mandarin (minkaohan students).

As noted in previous CECC analyses (1, 2, 3), XUAR authorities have stressed a form of "bilingual education" that centers on instruction using Mandarin, while diminishing the use of minority languages, in some cases eliminating instruction using such languages except in classes devoted specifically to minority-language study. The education plan's focus on achieving Mandarin proficiency for ethnic minority students continues this trend, although the plan also states support for ethnic minority languages as a component of "bilingual education" and support for the right to education using minority languages. (Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) guarantee that ethnic minorities have the freedom to use and develop their own languages. Article 37 of the REAL stipulates that "[s]chools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction.") The plan stipulates that class instruction mainly using ethnic minority languages "may be preserved" during the process of universalizing "bilingual education"—at the same time that schools add classes in Mandarin—and that parents and students may choose which classes to take. The plan also calls for establishing language arts classes in minority languages for ethnic minority students already studying in Mandarin schools and for encouraging native Mandarin speakers to study ethnic minority languages (Point 15). An action plan for promoting bilingual education (estimated date April 2011) specifies preserving class instruction using minority languages as the main medium, "according to needs," while also calling for making Mandarin the language for major basic courses and adding class hours in Mandarin. It also calls for making language arts courses in minority languages required classes in high schools (Point 3(2)). Earlier directives also have made reference to forms of "bilingual education" that keep some instruction in minority languages (see, e.g., information on official promotion of different models of bilingual education as cited in a 2008 XUAR Education Department draft opinion), while stressing "bilingual education" as a means of promoting instruction using Mandarin.

XUAR authorities also have accelerated steps to staff "bilingual" classes and address a shortage of "bilingual" teachers. In late December, the Ministry of Education issued a pilot plan for providing free education to students in teachers colleges in the XUAR, in order to relieve a stated shortage of "bilingual," teachers, according to a description of the program in a December 22, 2010, China News Service article (via Xinjiang News Net). (For additional information about the plan, as earlier reported in a March 3, 2010, Tianshan Net article, see a previous CECC analysis.) XUAR authorities also have increased recruitment of current teachers. The region enlarged the scope of its "specially appointed" teacher recruiting plan in 2010, advertising 5,109 positions and targeting teachers from the XUAR or those from elsewhere in China who have graduated from XUAR schools, according to an October 10, 2010, Tianshan Net report, and a copy of the recruiting announcement posted September 9, 2010, on Tianshan Net. The XUAR had announced plans in 2008 to recruit 15,600 "bilingual" elementary school teachers between 2008 and 2013, and between 2006 and 2010, the region had recruited 22,323 "specially appointed" "bilingual" teachers and preschool "bilingual" teachers, according to a February 22, 2011, People's Daily article. It is unclear if the 2010 recruitment numbers are part of the earlier announced recruitment plan or represent a renewed effort to recruit more teachers.

Based on CECC analysis of the available jobs advertised as part of the region's 2010 "bilingual" teacher recruitment (roster of positions available via download from the announcement), 2,916 positions were advertised simply as "bilingual," 1,884 positions were advertised for classes taught in Mandarin, 236 for classes taught in Uyghur, 65 for classes described as "Uyghur bilingual," and 8 for Kazakh. The recruitment also specifies posts by ethnicity, designating some posts for Han Chinese and others for "ethnic minorities" or members of specified minority groups. (See a related CECC analysis for more information on job recruitment programs in the XUAR that reserve positions for members of specified ethnic groups.) The announcement specifies 2,183 posts for Uyghurs, 1,407 for Han, 1,096 for "ethnic minorities," 173 for Kazakhs, 17 for Kyrgyz, 13 for Han or Hui, 9 for Hui, and 2 for Mongols, while 209 positions are unrestricted by ethnicity.

All positions for the 2010 recruiting are advertised for people under 30 years old. Prior "bilingual" teacher training and recruitment also have focused on using younger teachers, a policy that has impacted career advancement especially for older teachers who lack Mandarin skills. Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported in an April 4, 2011, article on two teachers in Yecheng (Qaghiliq) county, Kashgar district, who lost their jobs in 2004 because they did not speak Mandarin. Authorities reportedly detained the teachers twice, for a total of 35 days, in connection to their petitioning over their job loss, according to the report. Teachers in Toqsun county, Turpan district, reported in November 2010 that education officials planned to test the Mandarin skills of current teaching staff and transfer to non-teaching posts those teachers who do not pass the exam, according to a November 16, 2010, RFA report. RFA reported on December 9 that authorities temporarily set aside the plans after teachers expressed their dissatisfaction and international media covered the story, but they reportedly warned teachers not to convey to the media further information about the plans.

Local governments in the XUAR also have taken other steps to increase the number of "bilingual" teachers in the region. In Tianjin municipality, which has been paired with counties in Hoten district to provide assistance to the area, education authorities recruited students from six universities in the municipality—with a focus on Uyghur students who speak both Uyghur and Mandarin—to take up one-year teaching posts in Hoten following a 1½-month training period in Tianjin, according to an October 8, 2010, report from Xinjiang News Net. The steps allowed Hoten to "realize 'bilingual' instruction" one year earlier than planned, according to the report. Zhejiang province authorities plan to arrange "bilingual" teaching training for 5,000 ethnic minority teachers under 35 years old in Aksu district within the next five years, according to a November 16, 2010, Tianshan Net report. Universities in Beijing, Tianjian, Shanghai, and Nanjing have taken up primary responsibility for training "mainstay" minority "bilingual" teachers, as reported in a December 9, 2010, article on the Xinjiang Education Department Web site. The XUAR also has taken steps to increase the number of "bilingual" preschool teachers in the region. The region plans to recruit over 14,000 "bilingual" teachers between 2010 and 2012, according to a February 14, 2011, Tianshan Net report.

As the number of "bilingual" classes increases, in at least a few reported cases from the XUAR, affected communities voiced opposition and succeeded in maintaining Uyghur-language class instruction. According to a source cited in a December 1, 2010, RFA report, after authorities in Dadamtu township, Yining (Ghulja) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, ordered the township high school to be turned into a bilingual school in 2007, residents expressed their dissatisfaction with the change, and authorities returned to instruction using Uyghur. Elsewhere in Ili, some middle schools in Ghulja municipality reinstated Uyghur grammar classes in 2010, after ending the classes two years earlier. Students, teachers, and parents reportedly opposed the cancellation of the grammar classes, and the issue was raised at the 2009 Ili People's Congress, according to the report.

Authorities also have reported taking some steps to promote ethnic minority language arts classes within Mandarin-focused schools or to train Mandarin-speaking teachers in minority languages, in line with some of the objectives in the 2010-2020 education plan. A pilot project in two prefecture-level areas, described in an August 30, 2010, circular, calls for implementing language arts classes in minority languages for ethnic minority students in longstanding programs to track them directly into Mandarin-language schooling (minkaohan students). On January 31, 2011, the XUAR Education Department issued an opinion and accompanying plan (available via download from the opinion) for providing 320 class hours of instruction in basic "ethnic minority languages" for teachers at "bilingual" preschools who are native Mandarin speakers. Authorities in Hami (Qumul) district reported carrying out "ethnic minority language training" for native Mandarin speakers, along with instruction in "bilingual" teaching, political ideology, and professional ethics, according to a March 31, 2011, report from the XUAR Education Department.

For more information about "bilingual education" and conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.




Source: -See Summary (2011-03-25 ) | Posted on: 2011-05-10
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Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers

May 3, 2011

Chinese authorities have launched a broad crackdown against rights defenders, reform advocates, lawyers, petitioners, writers, artists, and Internet bloggers in what international observers have described as one of the harshest crackdowns in years. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has expressed "serious concern" at the enforced disappearances of numerous Chinese citizens, some of whom remain missing after more than two months with no information regarding the charges against them or their whereabouts, as detailed below. The impetus for the current crackdown is unclear. The timing follows protests in the Middle East and North Africa, the appearance in mid-February of an anonymous online call for "Jasmine Revolution" protests in China, major annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March, and recent official statements stressing the need to maintain social stability.

Chinese authorities have detained, arrested, "disappeared," ordered to serve reeducation through labor, or otherwise harassed numerous rights defenders, political reform advocates, lawyers, petitioners, writers, artists, and Internet bloggers across China since mid-February 2011, according to international human rights groups and Western media.

Disappeared or Missing

The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (Working Group) and international human rights organizations have expressed concern over reports of numerous Chinese citizens having gone missing or disappearing into official custody with little or no information about their charges or whereabouts. In an April 8 press release, the Working Group expressed "serious concern at the recent wave of enforced disappearances that allegedly took place in China over the last few months," adding that it had received "multiple reports of a number of persons having [been] subject to enforced disappearances, including lawyers Teng Biao, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, and Tang Jingling." (See a related April 14 CECC analysis.) The Working Group said, "Enforced disappearance is a crime under international law." The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (list of participants) defines "enforced disappearance" as: "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law" (Article 2).

The non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) said on March 31 that the "Chinese government...has disappeared more than 30." As of April 29, CHRD counted "17 individuals who are still missing...and at high risk of torture or other mistreatment while held illegally incommunicado" (for CHRD's most recent update click here). CHRD and Western media have reported that officials have refused to issue formal detention documents or to provide information to the families of the "disappeared." China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) generally requires officials to notify a person's family of the reasons for that person's detention and whereabouts. Article 64 requires officials to present a detention warrant when detaining someone and to notify the family within 24 hours of the detention. After the detention, officials have up to another 37 days, with extensions, to decide to formally arrest someone and notify the family of the arrest (Article 69). Articles 64 and 71, however, give officials the discretion to bypass these notification requirements if they determine notification would hinder an investigation or if notification is not possible.

Officials took the prominent artist and rights advocate Ai Weiwei into custody in Beijing on April 3, 2011. While state media and central government officials have publicly stated that Ai is being investigated for "economic crimes," an April 21 Los Angeles Times article noted that authorities had "failed to notify his family of his whereabouts or disclose the charges against him." According to the March 31 CHRD article, Beijing-based Internet user Liu Dejun has been missing since February 27. CHRD reported that police officers in Beijing and Wuhan city, Hubei province, have refused to disclose Liu's whereabouts despite requests from the family for such information and after searching Liu's sister's home in Wuhan three times. State security officials in Beijing reportedly took rights defense lawyer Li Fangping into custody on April 29, and police at the Yangfangdian police station in Beijing, where Li's wife reported his case, would not answer questions about his whereabouts, according to a May 2 Reuters article. According to CHRD, some of the persons have been missing for more than 60 days, including human rights lawyers Li Tiantian and Liu Shihui.

Detained or Arrested

A total of 40 persons were reported to have been detained as of April 29, an increase from 26 at the end of March, according to the CHRD reports. Of this number, authorities have arrested 6, ordered 3 to serve reeducation through labor (RTL), and released 23 others, including 18 on bail. Those currently under detention or arrest include prominent writers, democracy advocates, and artists such as Ran Yunfei, Ni Yulan, Ding Mao, Chen Wei, Zhu Yufu, and Wang Lihong. These persons were charged with or suspected of crimes such as "inciting subversion of state power," "economic crimes," "illegal demonstration," or "creating a disturbance." Those detained or arrested have track records of advocacy for democracy and human rights activities and have encountered official abuses in the past.

The abuse of criminal law provisions to punish the peaceful exercise of rights protected under international human rights standards is well-documented in China. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), in a report on its 2004 mission to China (available on the UNWGAD's Country Visits Web page) criticized the Chinese government for using "vague, imprecise or sweeping" criminal law provisions such as "subverting state power" to punish the peaceful expression of the rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In recent years, Chinese authorities have continued to use "inciting subversion" and other criminal provisions to punish peaceful expression, including against Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo (whose 11-year sentence is the longest known for the crime of inciting subversion) and democracy advocate Liu Xianbin (10-year sentence for inciting subversion).

Soft Detention and Other Abuses

According to the March 31 CHRD report, more than 200 people have been subject to "soft detention," a form of unlawful home confinement, and other forms of official abuse, including interrogation, physical assaults, and travel restrictions. An April 4 Radio Free Asia report, for instance, noted that rights advocate Yao Lifa said that police kept him confined to his home every Sunday for seven weeks. An anonymous online "Jasmine Revolution" posting had called for protests every Sunday. CHRD stated "[m]any more activists and netizens have been interrogated about their blogs and Tweets, which mentioned or commented on the 'Jasmine revolution,' or they were questioned about their recent activities and whether they know anything about the organization of these protests." The human rights lawyer Liu Shihui, who is now reportedly missing, told the Guardian that on February 20 unidentified men whom he believed were domestic security personnel beat him as he was leaving his house for one of the "Jasmine" protest sites in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, according to a February 21 article.

Context of Crackdown

The impetus for the current crackdown is unclear. The timing follows protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the appearance in mid-February of an anonymous online call for "Jasmine Revolution" protests in China. In both cases, Chinese officials sought to censor information about the events in the media and online. The Guardian reported that some of the detentions and harassment began within hours of the "Jasmine Revolution" call appearing online (31 March 11). Chinese media also issued articles noting the Middle East and North Africa protests and emphasizing the duty of individual Chinese citizens to uphold stability. The Beijing Daily, for example, issued front page articles on March 5 and 6. The March 6 article warned of "some people in and outside of China with ulterior motives who are using various means to provoke 'street politics,'" adding:

They are using the Internet to manufacture and disseminate false information, inciting illegal gatherings, with the goal of bringing the chaos in the Middle East and North Africa to China, to mess up China. They are flying the banner of democracy, while in reality are engaging in the shady business of disturbing public feeling and destroying social order.

Little is known about the "Jasmine Revolution," but a February 22 statement (via Boxun, Human Rights in China translation) issued by the purported organizers calls for periodic non-violent "strolls" (sanbu) in major cities to oppose government corruption and advocate for issues such as free expression and judicial independence. (The Associated Press reported on April 6 (via Yahoo!) of one group of 20 domestic and overseas Chinese claiming to be behind the call.) Authorities appeared to target some citizens who may have visited designated protest sites and/or shared information about the call for protests on the Internet, criminally detaining and then releasing on bail to await trial human rights advocate Wei Qiang, and ordering the Internet blogger and activist Hua Chunhui to serve reeducation through labor—a form of administrative detention that allows public security officials to detain citizens, without legal proceedings or due process, for up to three years, with the possibility of an extension of up to one year. Other citizens caught in the crackdown had engaged in rights defense activities prior to their disappearance or detention. Before he was taken away, human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong reportedly met with a group of lawyers, news reporters, and rights defenders to discuss providing assistance to the self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng. The crackdown also coincided with the annual March meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing. Officials have typically tightened restrictions on activists and others during these major annual meetings.

The crackdown also comes amid speeches by China's leaders regarding the need to strengthen "social management," including a talk by President Hu Jintao on February 19 during a study session for key leading cadres held at the Central Party School during which he stressed the need to "strengthen and make innovations in social management," according to a February 19 Xinhua article. The Xinhua article paraphrased President Hu as saying the purpose of the session was to "correctly grasp new changes and new characteristics of conditions at home and abroad, [and] to address current prominent problems in social management." (See also a speech at the session given by Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Xinhua, 20 February 11).

In addition, the crackdown comes during official commemoration of 20 years of "comprehensive management of public security" efforts, as described in a March 1 Legal Daily article, which includes the goals of maintaining "social stability," "controlling and reducing major malignant and recurrent" crimes, "decreasing socially repulsive phenomenon" (such as drug addiction), "ensuring public law and order," and providing "a sense of security to the public," according to the Communist Party Central Committee and State Council Decision Concerning Strengthening Comprehensive Management of Public Security issued on February 19, 1991. One Chinese academic called the crackdown part of a "longer term trend," saying the current Hu Jintao administration has become "much more sensitive about social stability" in the past five or six years, and "most of [the measures put in place] will be long-term," according to an April 11 Wall Street Journal report.

International human rights groups are calling the crackdown one of the most severe in years and are noting what appears to be greater official disregard for procedural protections (CHRD, 31 March 11; HRW, 31 March 11; Amnesty, 23 March 11). A March 31 Guardian article quotes Joshua Rosenzweig of the Dui Hua Foundation as saying: "One of the things disturbing about this latest crackdown is how apparently routine it has become for security agents to essentially ignore the legal procedures in their treatment of activists." Other broad crackdowns in recent years followed protests and riots in Tibetan areas that began in March 2008 (see CECC topic paper and pp. 183-204 of the CECC 2008 Annual Report), protests and riots in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in July 2009 (see CECC analysis and pp. 249-253 of the CECC 2009 Annual Report), and the 2008 release of Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China (see p. 48 of the CECC 2009 Annual Report).

See below for a table of select individuals targeted in the current crackdown (updated as of May 2), with links to more detailed information on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database.



MAIN NAME	BACKGROUND	STATUS	DETAILS
Reported Missing or "Disappeared" (Shizong)
Ai Weiwei	Artist/Rights Advocate	Missing/Disappeared	Taken into custody on April 3 in Beijing.
Gu Chuan	Blogger/Rights Advocate	Released	Taken into custody on February 19 in Beijing. Released on April 22.
Jiang Tianyong	Lawyer	Released	Taken into custody on February 16 in Beijing. Released on April 19.
Li Fangping	Lawyer	Missing/Disappeared	Taken into custody on April 29.
Li Tiantian	Lawyer	Missing/Disappeared	Disappeared in late February or early March.
Liu Anjun	Rights Advocate	Released	Taken into custody on February 18 in Beijing. Released in early April.
Liu Shihui	Lawyer	Missing/Disappeared	Taken into custody on or after February 22 in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province.
Tang Jitian	Lawyer	"Soft Detention"	Taken into custody on February 16 in Beijing. Placed under "soft detention" (including home confinement) in March.
Teng Biao	Lawyer	Released	Taken into custody on February 19 in Beijing. Released on April 29.
Xue Mingkai	Rights Advocate	Missing/Detained?	Taken into custody in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, on February 18. Reports indicate Xue may have been detained, but his whereabouts remain unconfirmed.
Zhou Li	Petitioner/Advocate	Missing/Disappeared	Disappeared on or around March 27.
"Arrests" (Daibu)
Chen Wei	Democracy Advocate	Arrested	Detained on February 19 in Suining city, Sichuan province, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power." Arrested on the same charges on March 28.
Ding Mao	Democracy Advocate	Arrested	Detained on February 19 in Mianyang city, Sichuan province, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power." Arrested on the same charges in mid-March.
Ni Yulan	Lawyer	Arrested	Detained on or around April 7 on suspicion of "creating a disturbance."
Ran Yunfei	Writer/Scholar	Arrested	Detained on February 19 in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, on suspicion of "subversion of state power." Arrested on March 25 on charges of "inciting subversion of state power."
Wang Lihong	Democracy Advocate	Arrested	Detained on March 21. Arrested on charges of "creating a disturbance" on April 20.
Zhu Yufu	Democracy Advocate	Arrested	Detained on March 5 in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power."
Reported Criminally Detained (Xingshi Juliu)
Guo Weidong	Blogger	Detained	Detained on March 10 in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power."
Hua Chunhui	Blogger	RTL	Detained on February 22 in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, on suspicion of "endangering state security." Ordered to serve 18 months of reeducation through labor on or around April 1.
Li Hai	Democracy Advocate	Bail Pending Trial	Detained on February 26 in Beijing on suspicion of "creating a disturbance." Released on bail pending trial on April 6.
Liang Haiyi	Blogger	Detained	Detained on February 21 in Harbin city, Heilongjiang province, on suspicion of "subversion of state power."
Quan Lianzhao	Petitioner	Detained	Detained on February 27 on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power."
Sun Desheng	Rights Advocate	Detained	Detained on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power" in March 2011.
Tan Lanying	Petitioner	Released	Detained on February 21 in Shanghai on suspicion of "gathering a crowd to disturb social order." Released on March 23.
Wei Qiang	Rights Advocate	Bail Pending Trial	Detained on February 26 on suspicion of participating in an "illegal demonstration." Reportedly released on bail to await trial on or about April 30.
Yang Lamei	Petitioner	Released	Detained on February 20 in Shanghai. Released on March 23.
Yang Qiuyu	Rights Advocate	RTL	Detained on March 7 in Beijing on suspicion of "creating a disturbance." Ordered to serve two years of reeducation through labor.
Zhang Jiannan	Web Site Founder	Detained	Detained on March 2 in Beijing on suspicion of participating in an "illegal demonstration."
Zheng Chuangtian	Rights Advocate	Detained	Detained on February 26 in Jieyang city, Guangdong province, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power."
"Soft Detention" (Ruanjin) and Other Travel Restrictions—Illegal Home Confinement, Surveillance, Travel Bans, etc.
Jin Tianming	House Church Pastor	"Soft Detention"	Placed under "soft detention" (including home confinement and restricted communication) in April.





Source: -See Summary (2011-04-25 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-05-03
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=157226

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World Press Freedom Day 2011

May 3, 2011

In 1993, the UN General Assembly proclaimed May 3 to be World Press Freedom Day. The Day has its origins in official statements and Resolutions of the UN General Assembly and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) General Conference, including those listed below. These statements and Resolutions describe international obligations of UN and UNESCO Member States, including China, relating to press freedom:


The General Assembly,…Urges that all countries, organizations of the United Nations system as a whole and all others concerned…should:…Ensure for journalists the free and effective performance of their professional tasks and condemn resolutely all attacks against them….


- UN General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/47/73 (14 December 1992) and A/RES/45/76 (11 December 1990)

…Recognizing that a free, pluralistic and independent press is an essential component of any democratic society,….


- UN Economic and Social Council Documents E/1993/L.30 (20 July 1993) and E/1993/58 (30 April 1993), to which is Annexed UNESCO General Conference 26 C / Resolution 4.3 (6 November 1991)

…it is incumbent upon UNESCO and its Member States to assist in...facilitating and guaranteeing for journalists the freedom to report and the fullest possible access to information.

- UNESCO General Conference 25 C / Resolution 104 (15 November 1989)

1. Consistent with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press is essential to the development and maintenance of democracy in a nation, and for economic development.
2. By an independent press, we mean a press independent from governmental, political or economic control or from control of materials and infrastructure essential for the production and dissemination of newspapers, magazines and periodicals.
3. By a pluralistic press, we mean the end of monopolies of any kind and the existence of the greatest possible number of newspapers, magazines and periodicals reflecting the widest possible range of opinion within the community.

- Declaration of Windhoek (3 May 1991), Endorsed by the UNESCO General Conference

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

- Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948)

The CECC monitors press freedom in China and the Chinese government's compliance with international human rights standards for freedom of expression, including those mentioned above. A selection of recent CECC reports is listed below.

Chinese Police Officials Detain Beijing Artist and Rights Advocate Ai Weiwei (4/12/11)
Uyghur Webmaster Receives Seven-Year Sentence (3/31/11)
Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering "Jasmine Revolution" (3/22/11)
Authorities Censor Access to Information on Middle East and Chinese "Jasmine" Protests (3/22/11)
New Information on Sentences Emerges as Official Information on Xinjiang Trials Remains Limited (1/20/11)
Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets International Standards (12/9/10)
Premier Wen Jiabao Calls Freedom of Speech "Indispensable," Comments Reportedly Censored (11/9/10)
Harassment of Journalists Sparks Outcry in Chinese Press (11/1/10)
Communist Party Seeks To Restrict Already Limited Critical Media Reports (10/18/10)
Xinjiang Court Imposes Prison Sentences on Uyghur Journalist and Webmasters (8/7/10)
Government Appears To Crack Down on Microblogs and Blogs (8/6/10)
Government White Paper on Internet Claims Free Speech Protected (6/25/10)

For additional information, see the CECC's 2010 Annual Report section on Freedom of Expression in China.




Source: -See Summary (2011-04-28 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-05-03
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Chinese Police Officials Detain Beijing Artist and Rights Advocate Ai Weiwei

April 12, 2011

In early April 2011, Chinese authorities detained prominent Beijing-based artist and rights advocate Ai Weiwei as he tried to board a plane to Hong Kong. Based on available reporting, Chinese authorities have not released details on his detention. Ai's detention comes amid a broader crackdown on hundreds of activists, bloggers, and writers in February and March 2011, in a campaign which appears related to official sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as an anonymous online call for "Jasmine Revolution" protests within China.

Chinese Public Security Officials Detain Artist Ai Weiwei in Early April 2011

According to an April 3, 2011, New York Times (NYT) article, Chinese public security officials detained prominent Beijing-based artist and rights advocate Ai Weiwei on April 3, 2011, as he tried to board a plane to Hong Kong at Beijing Capital International Airport, Beijing municipality. NYT reported that Chinese public security officials also detained and later released Ai's wife, nephew, and several employees when authorities raided his art studio in Chaoyang district, Beijing. According to an April 4, 2011, NYT article, public security officials reportedly searched Ai's studio and confiscated property, including laptop computers, hard drives, DVDs, and cameras. Information on the current whereabouts of Ai and his friend Wen Tao, who was reportedly detained the same day, remain unclear, according to an April 6, 2011, Guardian article. On April 7, 2011, Xinhua, the Chinese central government's news agency, reported that police officials were investigating Ai for suspected "economic crimes." The Xinhua article (cached copy available via Google here), however, was removed from the Internet shortly after it was posted. Ai's detention comes amid a broader crackdown on scores of activists, bloggers, and writers in February and March 2011, in a campaign which appears related to official sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as an anonymous online call (in Chinese) for "Jasmine Revolution" protests within China.

Ai Weiwei: Previous Harassment, Abuse, and Detention

Ai Weiwei is internationally known for his artwork and his role among those who designed the "Bird's Nest" stadium for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. As a rights activist and a vocal critic of Chinese government policies, Ai Weiwei has faced harassment, surveillance, and extralegal detention by Chinese authorities. In August 2009, Chengdu public security officials beat Ai and detained him in a hotel room in Chengdu city, Sichuan province, throughout the trial of writer Tan Zuoren. Ai reportedly had traveled to Chengdu to testify at the trial; however, the court repeatedly rejected Tan's lawyers' requests to call witnesses on behalf of their client. According to a November 5, 2010, NYT article, Beijing public security officials placed Ai under "soft detention" (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home confinement, in November 2010, after authorities demolished Ai's Shanghai art studio. Shanghai officials reportedly authorized the extralegal detention after Ai called on his supporters to attend a large-scale event in response to the demolition.

For more information on the arbitrary detention and harassment of human rights defenders in China, see Section III—Access to Justice in the CECC 2010 Annual Report. For information on free speech advocacy by human rights defenders in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.



Source: -See Summary (2011-04-06 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-26
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Chinese Authorities Detain Prominent Human Rights Lawyers

April 14, 2011

Within a span of one week in February 2011, authorities in Beijing municipality and Guangzhou, Guangdong province, detained five prominent human rights lawyers, and, in late February or early March 2011, detained another human rights lawyer in Shanghai, as well. The lawyers remain incommunicado and their current whereabouts are unclear. Their detentions come amid a broader crackdown on scores of advocates, bloggers, and writers that began in February in a campaign that appears related to official sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-called "Jasmine Revolution" protests within China. The underlying reasons for the detention of the lawyers are not clear.

Chinese Authorities Detain Human Rights Lawyers

Chinese authorities reportedly have detained six prominent human rights lawyers—Teng Biao, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, Liu Shihui, Li Tiantian, and Tang Jingling—in late February or early March 2011 in what appears to be part of a broader crackdown against rights advocates, artists, bloggers, and writers. Information on the circumstances surrounding the lawyer detentions is limited—according to foreign media and NGOs the lawyers remain incommunicado and the current whereabouts of at least five of them are not known. A March 11 New York Times (NYT) article noted that the crackdown occurred as an anonymous online call for "Jasmine Revolution" protests within China appeared on a Chinese-language Web site and follows the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The NYT article said critics described the crackdown as one of the harshest in years.

Prominent Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Missing

The following are summaries of each of the lawyers' detentions. For more details, click on the lawyer's name to access case information compiled in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database.

• Tang Jitian—Chinese police detained Beijing-based lawyer Tang Jitian on February 16, after he attended a meeting to discuss the ongoing "soft detention" of the self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng. Authorities reportedly searched Tang's residence. (Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), 2 March 11). His current whereabouts are unclear. Tang is a Beijing-based human rights lawyer that has participated in the rights defense of "sensitive clients, including Falun Gong practitioners. In April 2010, the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau permanently revoked Tang Jitian's lawyer's license in connection to his defense of a Falun Gong practitioner in 2009 (Human Rights in China (HRIC), 7 May 10).



• Teng Biao—Beijing police summoned and detained lawyer and university lecturer Teng Biao on February 19. Police reportedly searched his residence and confiscated property, including two computers, political books, documentaries, and photos of Chen Guangcheng. Public security officials told family members that Teng was being held at the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau. Teng's family did not receive any official notification of detention (HRIC, 23 February 11). Teng is a Beijing-based human rights lawyer and lecturer at China University of Political Science and Law. He acted as legal counsel for Chen Guangcheng in 2006. Authorities previously detained Teng in 2008, in response to his criticism that linked China's human rights conditions to the 2008 Summer Olympics.



• Jiang Tianyong—Police in Beijing detained lawyer Jiang Tianyong on February 19, at his brother's residence (HRIC, 23 February 11). Police officials reportedly searched his residence and confiscated property, including his laptop computer and Internet access card, that evening. His current whereabouts are unclear. Jiang is a Beijing-based human rights lawyer who has represented defendants in "sensitive" cases, including those involving Falun Gong, HIV/AIDS, and human rights advocates. In May 2010, authorities detained Jiang at the Beijing Capital International Airport as he attempted to board a flight to the United States.



• Liu Shihui—Unidentified assailants reportedly beat and injured lawyer Liu Shihui on February 20, while he waited for a bus to People's Park, one of the locations designated as a site for "Jasmine Revolution" protests (CHRD, 23 February 11). According to the March 11 NYT article, authorities detained Liu in Guangzhou, Guangdong province. His whereabouts are unclear. Liu is a Guangzhou-based human rights lawyer. In 2010, authorities failed to renew the professional licenses of several human rights lawyers, including Liu's, during an annual review process.



• Tang Jingling—Public security officials in Guangzhou detained lawyer Tang Jingling on February 22 (HRIC, 23 February 11). His current whereabouts are unclear. Chinese authorities have previously targeted the Guangzhou-based human rights lawyer for his legal work on behalf of Taishi villagers and Chinese legal advocate Guo Feixiong.



• Li Tiantian—According to the March 11 NYT article, authorities detained Shanghai-based lawyer Li Tiantian in February or early March 2011. Her current whereabouts are unclear.

Arbitrary Detentions: Chinese Law and International Legal Standards

International law generally prohibits arbitrary detention. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." According to Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), no one should be subjected to arbitrary and extralegal arrests or detentions: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law." China signed the ICCPR in 1998 and has on multiple occasions expressed its intent to ratify the instrument.

According to Section IV of the May 2000 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be "arbitrary" if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) there is clearly no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual is deprived of his liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed under the UDHR and ICCPR; or (3) there is grave non-compliance with fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international human rights instruments.

While information on the detentions is limited, the detentions may meet the first criteria above for arbitrary detention. The detentions appear to have "no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty" given that the lawyers have been held for weeks without formal charges. Such a situation would appear to be inconsistent with certain Chinese domestic legal protections. Article 37 of China's Constitution, for instance, provides that unlawful detention or deprivation or restriction of personal freedom of citizens by unlawful means is prohibited. According to Article 64 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese authorities are generally required, within 24 hours of the detention, to notify suspect's family members of the reasons for detention and the place of custody, except in instances when such notification would hinder an investigation or when there is no way to notify them. Additionally, the detention of lawyers, including that of Tang Jitian, may meet the second criteria for arbitrary detentions above, if they have been detained in connection to exercising the right of freedom of association, as guaranteed by Article 20 of the UDHR and ICCPR, or freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 19 of the UDHR and ICCPR. The detentions, also, appear to violate the protections established in the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of Principles), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1988 (see UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/43/173). Principle 2 of the Body of Principles provides that, "Arrest, detention or imprisonment shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose."

For more information on Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders, see pp. 193-196 of Section III—Access to Justice in the 2010 Annual Report. For more information on arbitrary detentions, see pp. 92-96 of Section II—Criminal Justice.



Source: -See Summary (2011-03-08 / English) | Posted on: 2011-04-14
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=155690

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Chinese Authorities Prevent Protestants From Attending International Evangelization Conference

December 8, 2010

Chinese authorities have harassed, detained, or prevented from leaving the country approximately 200 Protestants in China who received invitations to attend an international conference on evangelization in South Africa. Organizers of the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization, which was held in Cape Town from October 16-25, 2010, reportedly invited members of China's unregistered Protestant church communities to attend as participants and invited members of China's state-controlled Protestant church communities to attend as observers. The state-controlled church did not send any representatives to the Lausanne Congress, and authorities in various locations throughout China reportedly warned members of unregistered church communities not to attend the Lausanne Congress because their attendance would "endanger state security."

Authorities Intimidate Unregistered Protestants Who Seek To Attend Lausanne Congress

As early as March 2010, authorities at the local level in various locations throughout China began to warn some of the approximately 200 members of unregistered Protestant communities who had received invitations to the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization (Lausanne Congress) not to attend, according to reports from ChinaAid (CAA) (1 September 10) and Ming Pao (11 October 10, reprinted in Yahoo! News Hong Kong). By early August, authorities had closed at least three house churches—located in Wuhan city, Hubei province; Sanmenxia city, Henan province; and Changsha city, Hunan province—in reported connection to their members having received invitations to the Lausanne Congress. According to the Ming Pao report and an October 11 ChinaAid report, by October 11, authorities across China had taken measures against all of the invitees to prevent them from attending the Lausanne Congress, including questioning them, threatening them, stopping them at airports, confiscating their passports, detaining them, or threatening their family members.

According to an October 13 CAA report, on October 13, the Chinese government dispatched approximately 1,000 public security officers to watch for Protestants attempting to leave China through the Beijing Capital International Airport to attend the Lausanne Congress. Within two days, public security officers and customs officials had stopped over 100 Protestants from leaving China to attend the conference, according to a September 15 New York Times report. According to reports from CAA (17 October 10, 18 October 10), on October 17, public security officers in Shunyi district, Beijing municipality, raided a hotel gathering of over 30 house church Protestants who had met for a worship service and Bible study session after being refused exit from China to attend the Lausanne Congress. The officers detained house church pastors Jin Tianming of the Shouwang Church, Jin Mingri of the Zion Church, Fang Bing of the BCD Church, and Li Shengfeng of the Urban Revival Church. According to an October 15 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report, legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng said that only three invitees had been able to leave China to attend the Lausanne Congress by that date, although he did not explain how they were able to leave.

Measures To Restrict Freedom of Movement Contravene International Human Rights Standards

While attempting to stop Chinese Protestants from leaving China to attend the Lausanne Conference, public security and customs authorities reportedly offered various explanations that contravene international human rights standards that protect freedom of movement. According to an October 14 National Public Radio (NPR) report, when house church member Liu Guan tried to leave China on October 10, customs officials at the Beijing airport told him that the State Administration for Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security had notified them that Liu's participation in the Lausanne Congress "threatened state security," an explanation apparently drawn from Article 8(5) of China's Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens (Chinese, English). According to legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng—as cited in two RFA reports (3 August 10, 5 August 10)—anecdotal evidence appears to suggest a broader application of the "state security" provision to rights defenders and citizens. The CECC's 2010 Annual Report (p. 126-127) also notes several examples of this phenomenon over the past year. Fan further observed that Article 8(5) deprives citizens of fundamental rights because it does not provide mechanisms for accountability or for Chinese citizens to seek redress. According to the NPR report, in some other cases, officials told invitees that the Lausanne Congress was "anti-China." Such measures restrict Chinese citizens' right to freedom of movement, which is guaranteed under Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Reactions by the Chinese Government to Lausanne Invitations

According to the NPR report and an October 16 AsiaNews report, the organizers of the Lausanne Congress invited members of China's unregistered Protestant communities to attend as participants, while they only invited members of China's state-controlled church communities to attend as observers. According to the official Web site of the Lausanne Movement, one of the criteria for choosing participants in the Lausanne Congress is "affirmation of the Lausanne Covenant" (via the Lausanne Movement Web site), which stipulates that "evangelism and socio-political involvement" are part of the signatories' duty and encourages them to spread Protestant doctrine throughout the world. Undertaking such a commitment, however, could conflict with China's legal framework for the management of religion. For example, Article 12 of China's Regulation on Religious Affairs stipulates that religious activities should take place in state-approved sites of worship, should be organized by state-approved sites of worship or religious organizations, and should be conducted by state-approved religious personnel.

According to the NPR report and an October 14 CAA report, spokesman Ma Zhaoxu of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) provided a statement to NPR that said the Lausanne Congress organizers did not issue an official invitation to China's state-controlled Protestant church—which the statement reportedly referred to as the "lawful representative of Protestants in China"—as well as of having "secret communications" with members of China's unregistered Protestant communities. In the October 14 CAA report, Liu Tongsu, a pastor at an unregistered church, argued that the MFA statement implies that Protestant communities not affiliated with the government are not lawful, which appears to contradict the guarantee of the "freedom of religion" in China's Constitution (Article 36 of China's Constitution states that "[c]itizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief"), an argument reiterated in an October 15 open letter to Chinese authorities (English translation available via CAA, 18 October 10) by Chinese invitees to the Lausanne Congress. Liu also points out that the communication between the Lausanne Congress organizers and unregistered Chinese Protestant communities was completely open, and that the MFA's characterization of that communication as "secret" suggests that the government has the authority to deem "secret" any communication that does not occur within state-controlled parameters.

Public Security Authorities Detain Prominent Christian Rights Advocates

In addition to the pastors detained in Beijing, discussed above, authorities targeted several other prominent members of China's unregistered Protestant communities. For example, according to an October 12 RFA report, on October 12, public security officers from the Shuangyushu police station in Haidian district, Beijing municipality, took into custody legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng, a member of an unregistered Protestant church, after he refused to cancel an interview with Radio Free Asia, injuring Fan's thumb in the process. According to an October 20 RFA report, on October 20, public security officers briefly took Fan from his home again. Fan's wife connected the incident to events surrounding the Lausanne Congress. In another incident, according to an October 15 CAA report and an October 16 Boxun report, on October 15, public security officers took into custody unregistered church pastor Wang Yi at the Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport as he attempted to leave for the Lausanne Congress. The officers reportedly released him that evening but took his passport and reportedly used force in the process of taking him into custody.

For more information about freedom of religion in China and conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (p. 99-100, 108-111). For more information about Chinese citizens who have been barred from leaving China, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement in the 2010 Annual Report (p. 125-127) and a related CECC analysis.



Source: -See Summary (2010-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-13
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State Administration for Religious Affairs Outlines Restrictive Religious Policies for 2011

April 12, 2011

In January 2011, China's State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued a document outlining the main points for SARA's work in 2011. The document calls for the continuation of measures that would maintain extensive government supervision and control over religious communities. Examples include calling for authorities to "guide" unregistered Protestants to worship in state-sanctioned churches, continuing policies to deny Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to make bishop appointments, and bolstering rules that require Muslims who wish to make overseas pilgrimages to do so as part of official groups that impose political requirements on participants.

On January 24, 2011, China's State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) released a document (available in Chinese via the SARA Web site) that outlines policies for SARA's work in supervising and managing China's religious communities in 2011. The document calls for a number of measures that would continue to restrict freedom of religion for Chinese citizens and further submit religious communities to the supervision and control of the Party and government. The document lists among its goals "to comprehensively implement the Party's basic policy on religion" and "to deeply implement the Regulation on Religious Affairs" (as discussed in the CECC 2010 Annual Report, pages 99-100, the Regulation on Religious Affairs contains provisions that restrict the religious freedom of China's state-sanctioned religious communities and condition some legal protections on government oversight or approval). The document also lists among its goals "to create a good social environment in order to implement the targets and tasks of [China's] 12th Five-Year Plan" (available in Chinese via Xinhua). The 12th Five-Year Plan directly addresses religious policy once and ties it to economic development by calling on authorities to "exhibit" the "positive role" of religious communities in "promoting economic and social development." In addition, an October 25, 2010, article in the People's Daily—the official news media of the Party—describes economic development as the "main line" of the 12th Five-Year Plan.

"Guiding" Unregistered Protestants To Worship in State-Controlled Churches

The document calls on authorities to "guide" Protestants who "participate in activities at unauthorized gathering places" (sometimes called "house churches") to worship in state-controlled churches. As a January 24, 2011, Xinhua report (in English) notes, SARA does not specify how it will "guide" Protestants to registered venues of worship, but in some cases, authorities have harassed, intimidated, detained, or imprisoned Protestants in China who do not worship in state-controlled churches, and a report on SARA's religious work in 2010 (available in Chinese via the SARA Web site) notes that authorities "guided" unregistered Protestants to worship in registered churches in 2010. In particular, authorities appear to have increased pressure on unregistered Protestants in China since Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2010 (see a related CECC analysis on the harassment and detention of legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng).

International Religious Exchanges

The document also calls on authorities to promote international religious exchanges, but the government continues to take steps to prevent interactions between Chinese and foreign religious communities that do not conform to government and Party policy. For example, in December 2010, Chinese authorities harassed, detained, or prevented from leaving the country approximately 200 Protestants in China who received invitations to attend an international conference on evangelization in South Africa. China reportedly warned members of unregistered church communities not to attend the Lausanne Congress because their attendance would "endanger state security" (see a related CECC analysis for more information). The SARA document calls for "helping" the state-controlled Islamic Association of China (IAC) strengthen its management of overseas pilgrimages. Authorities in China allow Muslims to undertake overseas pilgrimages only under the auspices of the IAC, which imposes political requirements on participants (see pages 105-107 of the CECC 2010 Annual Report and pages 126-127 and 130 of the CECC 2009 Annual Report for more information). The SARA document also calls on authorities to "strengthen the management of collective religious events by foreigners within [China's] borders and resist foreign forces using religion to conduct infiltration activities [against China]." In January 2011, SARA director Wang Zuo'an reportedly linked efforts to promote international religious exchanges in 2011 with "expand[ing] the influence of [China's] concept of religious harmony" (Xinhua, 10 January 11, in Chinese), highlighting the politicized aspects of such proposed exchanges.

The Relationship Between Catholics in China and the Holy See

The SARA document also continues to call for the promotion of "independence" for Catholics in China and for the "autonomous" selection and ordination of bishops in China. Under the principle of the "independent, autonomous, self-managing church"—enshrined in the Charters of the Catholic Patriotic Association (Art. 3, available in Chinese via the SARA Web site) and the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China (Art. 3, available in Chinese via the SARA Web site)—the Chinese government denies Catholics in China the freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See to select bishops in China. The Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) makes all bishop appointments in China, although in some cases the CPA has tolerated approval from the Holy See for bishops also approved by the CPA (see pages 101-102 of the CECC 2010 Annual Report for more information on China's policies regarding bishop appointments). According to international media reports, in November 2010, authorities ordained bishop Guo Jincai, who did not have the approval of the Holy See, and forced some bishops to attend the ordination ceremony against their will; in December 2010, authorities then reportedly forced some bishops to attend the eighth National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives in Beijing against their will (see a related CECC analysis for more information).

Tibetan Buddhist Temples

In addition, the SARA document calls on authorities to "seriously implement the Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries" (National Measures), which, if implemented as stipulated, would establish greater and more detailed control over what the government refers to as "Tibetan Buddhist affairs" (see a related CECC analysis for more information).


For more information about conditions for China's religious communities, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-03-18 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-13
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Hukou Reform in Chengdu Municipality

March 31, 2011

The government of Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province initiated household registration (hukou) reform in November 2010 that seeks to eliminate the rural-urban hukou divide. China's hukou system classifies Chinese citizens as either rural or urban hukou holders, and local governments may restrict access to some social services based on the hukou classification. Rural hukou holders who live in urban areas are most affected by the classification. The Chengdu reform aims to unify all residents who currently hold a local hukou under a single identification system based on residents' actual place of residence. If successfully implemented, the reform could allow greater access to social services for some current rural hukou holders. The Chengdu hukou reforms also appear to be intended in part to make more rural land available for development.

In November 2010, Chengdu municipality issued the Opinions Regarding the Unification of Chengdu Urban and Rural Hukou To Achieve Freedom of Movement. According to the Opinions, the current hukou system will be unified by 2012 into a single identification system based on persons' place of residence for purposes of concentrated community relocation (jijuzhu or nongcun jizhong juzhu), marriage and population control, employment, taxes, creditworthiness, and social benefits (shehui baoxian). If successfully implemented, the Chengdu reform could supplant the hukou system established in 1958 that has been a major barrier to obtaining social benefits for some rural hukou holders living in Chengdu's urban areas.

The Opinion sets forth 12 articles covering a range of topics concerning the unification of the hukou system. For example:

• Although not affirmatively stated in the Opinion, the Chengdu government has made it clear that the unified registration system is not currently premised on rural residents giving up their contracted land (chengbao di) in exchange for urban hukou;


• A unified system of unemployment benefits (Art. 2), social insurance (Art. 3), and housing assistance programs (Art. 4);


• Implementation of equal access to compulsory education, allowing students to enroll in public schools where they reside (Art. 7).
The Chengdu reform is the latest effort by the government to address disparity based on hukou , especially in the area of education. In recent years, local governments have instituted polices intended to reform the hukou system. The key provisions of these reforms allow rural hukou holders who meet specified criteria (which usually include income, education, and special skills) to acquire urban hukou. Such reforms are aimed at attracting elite rural hukou holders with wealth and education to urban areas.

The Chengdu reform differs from previous hukou reforms in that it seeks to include all residents who currently hold a local hukou. However, the reform's key feature of allowing rural hukou holders to maintain their contracted land is a temporary provision. It is meant to ease the rural-to-urban transition, according to statements made by Qin Daihong, the deputy director of Chengdu city's coordination committee to the Global Times. According to a December 3, 2010, Economic Observer article, "… although it is clear that the current hukou reform does not call for rural residents to give up their land and rural property, as soon as they settle down into urban areas, their land and properties will need to be dealt with sooner or later."

One of the driving forces behind the Chengdu hukou reform appears to be the need for more land for urbanization. According to the Global Times article, "the ultimate goal of reform, is to engineer a smooth and advanced urbanization process"—meaning more rural land must be made available for economic and industrial development. However, according to the Economic Observer, Chengdu rural residents have been reluctant to move to urban areas, not allowing rural land to be freed up for urbanization—only 200 rural residents have moved voluntarily thus far. The current situation appears to be at odds with the goals of the hukou reform. It is unclear what consequences, if any, rural hukou holders might encounter should they decide to stay on rural land.


For more information on hukou, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement in the CECC 2010 Annual Report and also see this CECC issue paper.



Source: -See Summary (2011-03-03 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-12
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Uyghur Webmaster Receives Seven-Year Sentence

March 31, 2011

A new report indicates that a court in Xinjiang sentenced Uyghur Webmaster Tursunjan Hezim to seven years' imprisonment in July 2010. The charges against him are not known, but his sentence follows the detention and imprisonment of several other Web site administrators and staff after demonstrations and riots in Xinjiang in July 2009. Authorities accused some Web sites of contributing to unrest. Tursunjan Hezim ran a Web site that addressed Uyghur history and culture, topics that have come under official scrutiny and censorship in Xinjiang.

The Aqsu Intermediate People's Court in Aqsu municipality, Aqsu district, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), sentenced Uyghur Web site administrator Tursunjan Hezim (Hézim) to seven years' imprisonment in July 2010, according to a March 6, 2011, Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. Authorities did not notify his family of the charges, according to a source cited in the report, but the sentence follows the detention and imprisonment of several other Web site administrators and staff (1, 2) after demonstrations and riots in the XUAR starting on July 5, 2009. Authorities detained and imprisoned the Web site workers in apparent connection to announcements on the Internet calling for a demonstration on July 5, 2009, and to online articles and interviews critical of Chinese government policy in the XUAR. Public security officers in Aqsu initially detained Tursunjan Hezim after the July 5, 2009, events, after which time his whereabouts were unknown, according to a source cited in the RFA report and a July 24, 2010, World Uyghur Congress press release. His subsequent trial reportedly was closed, according to the RFA report. Information on the location where he is serving his sentence is unavailable.

A former teacher reportedly dismissed from a post teaching high school history in 2006, Tursunjan Hezim ran the Web site Orkhun, which focused on Uyghur history and culture, according to the RFA article. As documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, in 2008 authorities temporarily shut down the Bulletin Board Service (BBS) of the Web site—along with the BBSs of some other Uyghur sites—during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games and closed down the Web site, along with other sites, following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.

Information is not available on what content on the Web site, if any, is connected to Tursunjan Hezim's case. While the July 2009 events brought Uyghur Web sites under a new level of scrutiny, historical and cultural topics connected to the XUAR have long faced official oversight and censorship. Chinese authorities have censored analyses of the region's history, for example, that conflict with state-sanctioned narratives of the XUAR, including official histories describing the region as a part of China for two millennia. (For more information, see the CECC 2009 Annual Report, p. 147.) As part of a regionwide "patriotic education campaign" in the region to "ardently love the great motherland and build a glorious homeland," authorities in the XUAR will focus on education on the history of Xinjiang, along with the history of "ethnic development" and the "evolution of religion," in the latter half of 2011, according to a December 28, 2010, Xinjiang Daily report. Authorities also have imposed official interpretations of the region's cultural heritage, including in a recent submission to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to inscribe the Uyghur meshrep on UNESCO's List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.

For more information on other Web site workers detained following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi, see recent CECC analysis (1, 2) and political prisoner records for Memetjan Abdulla, Gulmira Imin, Gheyret Niyaz, Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, Nureli, Muhemmet, Obulqasim, Xeyrinisa, Xalnur, and Erkin. For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.




Source: -See Summary (2011-03-07 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-12
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Court Sentences Labor Lawyer and Advocate to Three Years' Imprisonment

March 31, 2011

A court in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin to three years' imprisonment in October 2010 for "gathering a crowd to disrupt social order." Zhao had been detained since August 2009 prior to his sentencing. Authorities initially detained Zhao for his work in organizing and attempting to establish a labor organization that reportedly would monitor the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, seek to expose corruption, and advocate for fair compensation for workers.

The Xi'an Municipal New City District Court in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin to three years' imprisonment on October 19, 2010, for "gathering a crowd to disrupt social order," according to an October 27, 2010, statement released by Zhao's lawyer, Li Jinsong (see a February 25, 2007, New York Times profile on Li). Prior to his sentencing, Zhao had been in detention since August 19, 2009, when public security officers in Xi'an removed Zhao from his home and held him at the city's Xincheng district public security bureau (PSB) detention center for "gathering a crowd to disrupt social order," according to an August 27, 2009, Radio Free Asia article. The CECC Political Prisoner Database has more details on Zhao's case.

Background on Zhao's Case

In April 2009, Zhao organized workers at state-owned enterprises (SOE) in Xi'an to establish the Shaanxi Union Rights Defense Representative Congress (Congress), an organization that, according to the China Study Group, was "tasked with overseeing and monitoring SOE restructuring"; China Labor News Translations also described Zhao's organization as "critical of the Chinese [state-run] trade union's failure to represent the interests of state sector employees in restructured and/or privatized enterprises" (China Study Group, October 25, 2010; China Labor News Translations, January 10, 2011). For more information on these topics, see previous CECC analysis on (1) worker representation in China, as well as (2) a proposal in Guangdong province to grant workers the right to collective wage negotiations.

In his efforts to form the Congress, Zhao reportedly organized 20 labor activists to represent the interests of about 300 workers from SOEs in the area, according to a September 8, 2010 Radio Free Asia article. Authorities detained Zhao on August 19, 2009; earlier in the day, he reportedly had met with workers at three state-owned hotels in Xi'an that were in the process of being restructured—the Dongfang Grand Hotel, Xi'an Hotel, and Tangcheng Hotel—and offered the workers legal advice (China.com, September 3, 2010). Based on the statement that Zhao's lawyer released, Zhao had "received an invitation to provide legal consultation to the staff" at the three hotels and had "received a warm welcome from everybody."

In August 2010, while Zhao was in detention, his wife, Deng Youxia, died after having suffered from Lupus, an autoimmune disease, according to the September 8, 2010 RFA report. According to both RFA and China Labor News Translations, authorities refused repeated requests by Zhao's relatives to permit him to visit his wife.

Reactions to Zhao's Detention and Sentencing

Fellow workers, academics, and labor advocates reacted to Zhao's detention and subsequent sentencing with skepticism and indignation. On October 21, 2010, 53 academics at universities in China and abroad signed a statement, titled "Statement From Academics at Home and Abroad: Zhao Dongmin is Not Guilty, but Rather Has Performed a Great Service!" calling Zhao's sentencing "a great mockery of the rule of law!" As Zhao was someone who reportedly "work[ed] within the official Party structures," the scholars stated that his arrest "aroused intense concern and extreme indignation from every society" (China Labor News Translations, January 10, 2011; Statement, October 21, 2010).

In the statement, the scholars also defended Zhao's actions by referencing China's Constitution and laws. They identified Zhao's work to defend the rights of workers, his "so-called crime," as something that was protected under Article 35 of the PRC Constitution, which guarantees the "freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." They also cited a legal textbook that pointed out that "if the masses are dissatisfied with a government department ... and they assemble together and go to demonstrate or present a petition at the relevant office ... these actions cannot be resolved by treating them as 'assembling a group to disrupt social order.'" The scholars stated that Zhao's action posed no harm to society, and that his "words and deeds protect the order of socialist society, and should be honored."

An October 20, 2010, China Worker article reported that a group of college and high school students had planned to join a "working class rally in support of Zhao Dongmin" on October 17, 2010, two days before Zhao's sentencing, but local authorities, reportedly "surprised" by the planned gathering, dispatched school officials to the rally location and brought the students back to their respective campuses.

Organization and Mobilization

Officials in Xi'an appeared particularly concerned with Zhao's ability to organize and mobilize large groups of workers at SOEs in the area, his efforts in creating organizations "that can link up a large geographical area," as well as the network of support that he enjoyed among workers, fellow advocates, and academics (see China Labor News Translations, January 10, 2011, for more details).

The statement that Zhao's attorney, Li Jinsong, released on October 27, 2010, also available in English, included the document that the Shaanxi Province Federation of Trade Unions filed with the Xi'an Municipal PSB detailing the potential danger that Zhao's work posed to "social stability." The document, titled "Shaanxi Province Federation of Trade Unions Reporting Documents," and included in its entirety in the statement by Li, under the title "Sunshine is the Best Disinfectant and Antiseptic," read:


Since April [2010], the core members of [Zhao Dongmin's group] have been using the internet from behind the scenes to incite people in society to take actions. From orchestrating behind the scenes they have emerged to center stage, and their activities have become more frequent and have increased in intensity to the extent of becoming a potentially influential force. They have incited people with different interests and grievances "to use struggle methods to form a grand alliance between the working classes from across different industries, regions, nationalities and ages, and an alliance of the peasantry." They aim to "use reforming enterprises' workers and staff congresses as an entry point to recapture from corrupt officials the right of workers and peasants to be masters of their own house." Zhao Dongmin and others have also openly stated that they would organize even larger "legal mass gatherings" during particular memorial dates and places. Their political plot is crystal clear.


[Zhao Dongmin and others] have conducted illegal activities in the name of "setting up the Preparatory Shaanxi Enterprises (and public services) Union Rights Defence Representative Congress" by collecting signatures, exchanging visits, distributing propaganda pamphlets, developing affiliated groups and branches, travelling to the capital to petition, posting distorted propaganda on the internet etc. Moreover they have schemed to organize workers who were laid off by enterprise restructuring, retirees and society's idlers to stage repeated mass visits to the provincial government and the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions. They have seriously disrupted the normal workings of party and government organs and have become a huge potential danger to social stability. They have made use of problems in society, including using old and frail enterprise retirees as cannon fodder to pressure the government. They have stirred up extreme delusions and fanned the flames in an extremely outrageous manner. If resolute measures are not adopted, they will grow into a threatening force and are very likely to wreak even greater havoc to social stability.

For more information on Zhao's case as well as those of other political prisoners in China, please visit the CECC Political Prisoner Database. Additional analysis on worker rights in China is available in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.





Source: -See Summary (2011-02-15 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-04-12
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Job Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang

March 31, 2011

Hiring practices that discriminate against Uyghurs and other groups by reserving positions exclusively for Han Chinese have continued in Xinjiang in the past year. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China found recent job recruiting announcements that reserved some or all positions for Han, in contravention of provisions in Chinese law. The jobs include both civil service positions and industry jobs advertised on government Web sites. A new training program reportedly provides jobs for non-Han college graduates who participate in training classes elsewhere in China, but the program does not address barriers to employment due to discriminatory job hiring practices. Uyghurs and other non-Han groups in Xinjiang—all of whom the Chinese government designates as "ethnic minorities"—comprise roughly 60 percent of Xinjiang's population.

Hiring practices that discriminate against non-Han groups have continued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). As documented by the CECC in recent years (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), job recruitment announcements from the region have reserved positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil servant posts, state-owned enterprises, and private-sector jobs, including those advertised on government Web sites. The practices contravene provisions in Chinese law that forbid discrimination. The restrictions accompany other discriminatory requirements, present in some job recruitment programs elsewhere in China, based on factors such as sex and age. (See Section II—Worker Rights in the CECC 2010 Annual Report for additional information.)

Recent job announcements include civil service positions as well as industry jobs advertised on local government Web sites. Among the recent announcements are job postings that reserve high-level or skilled positions exclusively for Han workers. A recent government document from the XUAR (discussed below) addresses unemployment among ethnic minority college graduates through a new training program, but the document does not reference restrictive job recruitment practices as a barrier to the employment of minority graduates. Recent job postings include:
• An announcement for teaching positions for the 2011 year at a middle school in Hoten district—a locality the announcement describes as 96.3 percent Uyghur and 3.5 percent Han—advertised all 20 open positions for Han, according to a copy of the announcement posted March 2, 2011, on Teacher Recruiting Net. In addition to specifying "Han" as the required ethnicity, the announcement separately specifies "Mandarin" as the language used in the teaching positions, indicating that ethnicity is not a proxy for perceived language ability but an independent factor in job recruitment.
• Civil servant recruitment for county-level discipline inspection and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open positions for Han Chinese, leaving 93 positions unrestricted by ethnicity and reserving the remaining 38 positions for Kazakhs, Uyghurs, Hui, Kyrgyz, and unspecified "ethnic minorities," according to a job announcement posted September 16, 2010, on the Xinjiang Personnel Testing Center Web site.
• A job announcement for a hospital in Urumqi municipality advertised for 28 positions in late 2010, all of which were reserved for Han, according to an announcement posted November 26, 2010, on the Graduate School of Lanzhou University Web site. Thirty of the positions were reserved for students with graduate study.
• A job recruitment announcement for the Xinjiang Youpai Energy Company, posted February 21, 2011, on the Web site of the Fukang municipal government, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, specified that all 56 openings for engineers and other skilled workers were reserved for Han, of which 55 were designated for Han men 45 years old or below.
• All 109 open positions at the Nilka County Shenda Industries in Nilka, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, advertised for workers with junior high and vocational school degrees, were reserved for Han men, according to a February 16, 2011, announcement posted on the Nilka county Labor and Social Security Office Web site.
• Of 72 positions available at the Xinjiang Nanfang Mining Industries, the 12 positions requiring higher education were reserved for Han men, according to a job announcement posted February 16, 2011, on the Nilka county Labor and Social Security Office Web site.
The announcements follow an opinion on employment promotion, issued by the XUAR government and Party Committee in October 2009, that calls for enterprises registered in the XUAR and other enterprises contracted to work there to recruit no fewer than 50 percent of workers from among the local population (Part 2.2). The opinion also promotes "recruiting more ethnic minorities to the extent possible" (Part 2.2) and providing equal opportunities for employment (Part 3). In addition, employers are instructed to guarantee a fixed proportion of positions for ethnic minorities as part of work to increase recruitment of college graduates and prioritize graduates from the XUAR (Part 1.5). Information on cases of adherence to the opinion remains limited.

In January 2011, several XUAR government and Party offices issued an opinion on sending ethnic minority university graduates to training in areas engaged in counterpart support relationships with the region, under which provinces and municipalities elsewhere in China are matched with localities within the XUAR to provide monetary, personnel, and other assistance in XUAR development efforts. Citing concerns about employment pressures on the region's stability and economic development (Part 1), the opinion outlines plans for a program to train unemployed college graduates from the XUAR in provinces and municipalities involved in counterpart support with the region, with ethnic minority graduates and women constituting no less than 80 and 60 percent, respectively, of the participants. The program will dispatch 22,000 students within the next two years for periods of training from one to two years (Part 2), after which successful trainees will take up set posts (Part 5(2)). The government has arranged posts in state-run institutions and state-owned enterprises within the XUAR, though trainees may remain in counterpart support areas and may find their own employment, according to March 25 and 26, 2011, Xinhua reports (March 26 report via China Daily). The program was launched on March 24, according to the March 25 report. The opinion outlining the parameters of the program states its usefulness in "transforming ideas," promoting "good sentiments" among the ethnicities, strengthening a "sense of identification toward the Chinese nation" (zhonghua minzu), and promoting social stability and "ethnic assimilation" (minzu ronghe) (Item 1). The opinion does not address barriers to employment due to job recruiting practices that reserve positions for Han.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2011-03-16 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-11
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Recent Developments in Judicial Reform

March 31, 2011

The Supreme People's Court has issued several documents seeking to regulate the judiciary in recent months. These include two documents that set forth judicial code of ethics, two regulations that attempt to limit undue influence on the courts, and one opinion that concerns the relationship between higher and lower level courts in conducting trial work.

Code of ethics—In December 2010, The Supreme People's Court issued two documents concerning judges' conduct, the Model Judicial Behavior Code and the Basic Code of Professional Conduct for Judges. Both documents took effect immediately and superseded earlier versions. The Model Judicial Behavior Code contains 96 articles and sets forth model behavior for judges covering the time period from case acceptance to enforcement of judgment. It also provides guidance in areas such as interaction with the media, maintaining professional demeanor while dealing with interpersonal conflict (maodun) with other people, activities outside of work, and travel. The Basic Code of Professional Conduct for Judges contains 30 articles and sets forth five key principles in seven chapters: "loyalty to the administration of justice," "judicial fairness," "judicial honesty," "striving to achieve justice for the people," and "defend the image of the judiciary." The following summarizes some key changes in the revised documents as compared with the earlier versions they supersede:

The Model Judicial Behavior Code

• Article 1 requires judges to be loyal to the Party and contains new language on "maintaining the same line of thought and action as the Party's Central Committee," and "not to go against the core policies of the Party and the country, in words or deeds";


• Articles 90 through 93 add the supervisory role of higher courts, political departments within each court, and punishment for violating the Model Code;


• The revised version removes reference that appeared in the earlier version (Chapter 3) to "independent adjudication according to law, without the interference from administrative organs, societal groups, and individuals."
The Basic Code of Professional Conduct for Judges

• Articles 4 through 7 contain new references requiring "loyalty to the Party, loyalty to country, loyalty to the people, and loyalty to the law in order to build and defend a socialist system with Chinese characteristics," and to " abide by political regulations, guard the state's secrets and trial work secrets, not engage in activities that are detrimental to the country's interests and judicial authority, and not give or publish speeches that are detrimental to the country's interests and judicial authority."


• Article 8 maintains the same reference as the 2001 version to "the principle of judicial independence according to law ..., [that is] free from interference from administrative organs, societal groups, and individuals."
Attempts to limit undue influence —In February 2011, the Supreme People's Court issued two regulations intended to limit improper influence on the courts: Provisions Regarding the Prevention of Interference With Casework by Internal Court Personnel (summary only), and Trial Implementation of Provisions Regarding Professional Avoidance (huibi) of Trial Judges and Court Leadership When a Spouse or Child Practices as a Lawyer. According to a summary released by the Supreme People's Court, the prevention of interference provisions prohibit court personnel from conducting private meetings with parties, their relatives, and legal representatives, whose case is being adjudicated by the court. The provisions also prohibit current and retired court personnel from forwarding documents, inquiring, or interceding on behalf of the parties. The Trial Implementation of Provisions Regarding Professional Avoidance of Trial Judges and Court Leadership When a Spouse or Child Practices as a Lawyer requires the court leadership (fayuan lingdao ganbu) and some trial judges to remove themselves in professional settings when a spouse or child practices as a lawyer in the jurisdiction they oversee. Article 4 requires judges and court leadership personnel who fall within the parameters of the provisions to initiate a job transfer within 6 months, and for the transfer to be completed within 12 months. The efficacy of the new regulation remains unclear as it does not include limitations on the procuratorate, public security personnel, spouses, or children who work as legal advisers (falu guwen) for enterprises, friends, and relatives, or anyone else who shares a close relationship with the parties or the court.

• Article 3 sets forth four instances when basic and intermediate people's courts can request instructions from higher level courts in writing in (1)"major, difficult, and complex cases"; (2) "a new category or type of case"; (3) "cases with pervasive legal implications and applicability"; and (4) "when a case is not suitable to be tried in the court that has proper jurisdiction."


• Article 6 prohibits "in principle" the court of second instance from remanding a case based on unclear facts and insufficient evidence, when the court of first instance has fully investigated the facts.


• Article 8 delineates that the Supreme People's Court provides "guidance" (zhidao) to lower and specialized courts through trying cases, judicial interpretations, publications of guiding cases (zhidaoxing anli), conferences, and training. Article 9 sets forth a similar provision for the provincial high courts in relationship to lower provincial courts.

Source: -See Summary (2011-02-17 ) | Posted on: 2011-03-31
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Source: -See Summary (2011-02-10 / English) | Posted on: 2011-03-31
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• Transportation Routes Inspected. At a transportation inspection point in Toqsun county, Turpan district, on January 31, 2011, staff inspecting a passenger discovered "suspicious items" that authorities later determined were "illegal religious publications" consisting of 13 Uyghur-language and 74 Arabic-language items, according to a February 22, 2011, report on the XUAR Transport Department Web site. At the January 14 regionwide meeting on censorship work, discussed above, an official called for strengthening control over the transportation of published items. A spokesperson from the World Uyghur Congress said that authorities were carrying out regular searches of vehicles transporting Uyghur-language materials as part of broader efforts to censor materials amid protests in the Middle East, according to a February 22, 2011, Radio Free Asia article.


• Urumqi Books Contain "Serious Political Errors." According to a review of censorship activities in 2010, in January authorities in Urumqi tracked down over 500 copies of a book from a Beijing publisher that contained "serious political errors," a February 10, 2011, Tianshan Net article reported. In June 2010, authorities reportedly confiscated more than 30,000 publications shipped from Beijing to Urumqi, according to the same report. The items included not only pirated and pornographic items but also 146 items "suspected of being of a political or a religious nature."


• "On-the-spot Takeovers" of Illegal Religious, Political Materials. Authorities in counties and cities directly under the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture reported launching a campaign during the New Year's holiday and Chinese New Year in early February, with a focus on "illegal" political and religious materials and "reactionary propaganda material," according to a February 11, 2011, report on Xinjiang Culture Net. Sites found to have the illegal items would be "dealt with severely" and with "on-the-spot takeovers," the report said. Authorities also placed focus on audio-visual materials, including items on a list handed down from national and XUAR authorities, again with emphasis on political and religious items. Earlier, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and sources interviewed by Radio Free Asia reported in December 2010 on campaigns in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture and Kashgar district to close down Uyghur bookstores and publishers in Kashgar and confiscate audio-visual materials in Ili, according to a December 3 Radio Free Asia report. Authorities reportedly detained five people in connection to religious videos and charged four people for recording and possessing CDs with "overseas enemy propaganda," according to the report. The WUC spokesperson also said that on February 22, 2011, public security officials in Urumqi detained Halmurat Imin, a 23-year-old Uyghur man, in connection to DVDs reportedly in his possession. Authorities accused him of "illegal collection of reactionary propaganda DVDs" and suspected "endangerment of state security," according to February 28 articles from Radio Free Asia (English, Chinese).


• Quran Study Guides Confiscated. Authorities in the Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture described launching a series of operations in late 2010 and early 2011 to inspect "cultural markets," according to a February 17, 2011, report on the Bortala People's Government Rule of Law Office Web site. One of the operations focused not only on pirated materials but also on "illegal political and religious materials." In one operation, authorities reported confiscating items including "A Guide to Studying the Quran" and "The Light of Faith."


• Publications that "Fabricate Ideological Chaos" Targeted. In January 2011, authorities in Turghun township, Burultoqay county, Altay district, Ili, carried out an inspection of "audio-visual and publication markets," focusing especially on religious and political publications, including items that "propagate political rumors, fabricate ideological chaos, destroy social stability, harm unification of the country, or incite ethnic separatism," and "propaganda items of cult organizations like Falun Gong," according to a January 14 report on the Altay Party Construction Web site.

Source: -See Summary (2011-02-24 ) | Posted on: 2011-03-31
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=154868

Source: -See Summary (2011-02-08 ) | Posted on: 2011-03-25
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Source: -See Summary (2011-02-15 ) | Posted on: 2011-03-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=154369

• Chinese search engines and the Twitter-style microblog sites for Sina, Tencent, and Sohu reportedly blocked searches for the Chinese words for "Egypt," "Libya," "Tunisia," and "democracy" (PC World, 29 January 11; Reporters Without Borders, 23 February 11).


• Also blocked were references to the Chinese "Jasmine Revolution" appeal and searches for "Jasmine" and related terms (Wall Street Journal, 22 February 11).


• The Sina search engine reportedly blocked searches for Jon Huntsman, the U.S. Ambassador to China, after he was spotted at one of the proposed sites of the Jasmine gatherings in Beijing's Wangfujing shopping district (Radio Free Asia, 25 February 11).


• People in China reported having difficulty sending text messages that included words related to the Chinese Jasmine protests, including "Wangfujing" (Wall Street Journal, 22 February 11).


• Internet users in China reported being unable to access the job networking site LinkedIn after messages about the Jasmine protests began appearing there (South China Morning Post, 26 February 11, subscription required).


• A clip of President Hu Jintao singing a song containing the word "Jasmine" appeared to have been removed from Youku and Tudou, two popular video sites (South China Morning Post, 2 March 11, subscription required).


• Censors also removed from microblog sites U.S. Embassy posts regarding U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's mid-February speech on Internet freedom (Wall Street Journal, 17 February 11). In her speech (via U.S. State Department), Secretary Clinton referred to China on several occasions and noted that Tunisia's online censorship was similar to China's but that Tunisia's attempt to control political content on the Internet while promoting online economic activity was unsustainable. Among the posts reportedly removed was a question posted by Ambassador Huntsman asking Chinese users whether they agreed with Secretary Clinton's statement that "freedoms to assemble and associate also apply in cyberspace."
  

Source: -See Summary (2011-03-04 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-03-23
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=155424

Source: -See Summary (2011-03-10 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-03-23
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=155830

Source: -See Summary (2011-01-11 ) | Posted on: 2011-03-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=152889

• New regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs took effect in a total of seven Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) located in three provinces: Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Hainan (Tsolho) TAP, Haibei (Tsojang) TAP, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, and Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP in Qinghai province; Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP in Sichuan province; and Diqing (Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.


• In addition to the seven regulatory measures in effect, two more were in the legislative process: Yushu (Yulshul) TAP in Qinghai, and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP in Sichuan.


• The Commission has not located information on whether or not Gannan (Kanlho) TAP in Gansu province is preparing a regulation on Tibetan Buddhist affairs.