FINDINGS

• The Chinese government continues to detain and imprison Chinese citizens arbitrarily for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and belief.
• Coerced confessions, lack of access to defense counsel, law enforcement manipulation of procedural rules, pervasive presumption of guilt by law enforcers, judges, and the public, and extra-judicial influences on courts continue to undermine the fairness of the criminal process in China.
• Chinese criminal justice organs launched a coordinated campaign in 2003 and 2004 to improve public relations and assuage public anger over some common law enforcement abuses. The campaign has set a more positive overall tone for defendant rights and produced some limited practical results. However, lack of professionalism in many law enforcement agencies and courts, public pressure on the government to address rising crime rates, and leadership efforts to maintain Party power and social stability are likely to limit the impact of these initiatives in the short term. 
• Chinese scholars, judges, and officials are looking to foreign models as they debate key reforms to China’s criminal justice system and are actively seeking exchange with foreign counterparts on criminal justice issues.
  

Crime rates in China have generally been on the rise in recent years.³⁹ To address this problem, law enforcement and judicial officials continued China’s "strike hard" anti-crime campaign in late 2003 and 2004.40 Traditionally, "strike hard" campaigns have been intense national crackdowns of fixed duration associated with unusually harsh law enforcement tactics, quick trials, and violations of criminal procedure.41 Officially launched in April 2001, the current campaign appears to have evolved into a lower-intensity but permanent feature of the political landscape.42 Within this overall "strike hard" framework, prosecutors and public security agencies launch periodic crackdowns targeting certain locales or particular crimes.43 Chinese scholars and lawyers have expressed concern that efforts to meet law enforcement targets during such crackdowns have led to wrongful convictions.44

The Party maintains "strike hard" activities in part because it believes that anti-crime campaigns are popular with the public and enhance Party legitimacy. Public complaints about police inefficiency and the handling of several notable criminal cases in the last year suggest significant popular dissatisfaction with the performance of law enforcement agencies and courts.45 The public also seems to have a limited appetite for procedural protections that result in lenient treatment for criminals.46 Numerous polls suggest that the general public rates security as a major concern and supports tough measures to address crime.47 Thus, while past experience indicates that "strike hard" campaigns have done little to stem the rising tide of crime and corruption in China,48 the Party perceives them as necessary to maintain legitimacy and satisfy popular demand for strong action.49

National Chinese crime statistics offer a mixed picture of law enforcement trends in 2003. According to official sources, Chinese courts handled a total of 735,535 criminal cases in 2003, an increase of 1.2 percent over 2002.50 Reflecting the leadership’s stated concern with official crime, law enforcement agencies and courts highlighted efforts to combat corruption. Prosecutors claim to have opened investigations of 43,490 individuals for abuse of power and dereliction of duty in 2003.51 People’s courts report that they adjudicated nearly 23,000 cases involving official crime in the same period.52 Officially, the number of violent crimes and corruption cases decreased slightly in 2003.53 Public security officials recently admitted, however, that only 42 percent of 4.39 million reported crimes were solved last year,54 and many reports suggest that crime is on the rise in specific regions. As such, official claims that the "strike hard" campaign has reduced crime rates should be evaluated with caution.

Political Crimes

The Chinese Constitution recognizes the rights to freedom of assembly, expression, and association.55 The Chinese government, however, routinely exploits vaguely defined crimes to detain and charge individuals for the non-violent exercise of these rights.56 Victims of this practice include Chinese citizens who lead peaceful labor protests, attempt to form political parties, exercise their religious beliefs, post articles on the Internet relating to political reform, or petition for redress of their grievances.57 Chinese prosecutors often charge these individuals with crimes such as "endangering state security," 58 "subversion," 59 or, in the case of Tibetans and Uighurs, "inciting splittism," 60 even if their acts are non-violent and pose no threat to the state. For example, essayist Luo Yongzhong was sentenced to three years in prison last year for "incitement to subversion" and "attacking the socialist system" after posting essays on the Internet criticizing Jiang Zemin’s "Three Represents" theory.61

The definition of crime in the PRC Criminal Law conveys the continued political orientation of the Chinese criminal justice system:

A crime refers to an act that endangers the sovereignty,territorial integrity and security of the State, splits the State, subverts the State power of the people’s democratic dictatorship and overthrows the socialist system, undermines public and economic order, violates State-owned property, property collectively owned by the working people, or property privately owned by citizens, infringes on the citizens’ rights of the person, their democratic or other rights, and any other act that endangers society and is subject to punishment according to law.62

A significant number of individuals, including Yao Fuxin, Xiao Yunliang, Rebiya Kadeer, Tenzin Deleg, Su Zhimin, and others continue to serve long prison sentences for political offenses. Chinese authorities released several notable political prisoners over the past year, including Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, Phuntsog Nyidron, and Liu Di,63 but authorities also initiated a new wave of arrests and convictions of Internet essayists, legal advocates, journalists, religious adherents, and other political activists. Over the past year, authorities also held numerous individuals incommunicado, and without any apparent legal basis, for peacefully expressing their political views.64 For a discussion of new arrests and convictions for political crimes, see Section III(c)-Freedom of Religion, Section III(d)-Freedom of Expression, and Section VI-Tibet. While noting significant difficulties in determining the number of individuals currently imprisoned for political crimes, several credible analysts estimate that it is somewhere in the range of 10,000 to 25,000.65

Although the National People’s Congress (NPC) removed the crime of "counterrevolution" from the PRC Criminal Code in 1997 and replaced it with the crime of "endangering state security," 66 approximately 500 individuals convicted of "counterrevolution" before 1997 remain imprisoned in China.67 Under a 1997 Supreme People’s Court (SPC) notice that has been applied in practice to counterrevolutionary prisoners, individuals convicted of "endangering state security" are much less likely than other prisoners to receive sentence reductions and parole.68 Observers had hoped that China would make some progress last year on parole and sentence reductions for prisoners serving time for "counterrevolutionary crimes," arguing that many of these prisoners were convicted for acts that would no longer be considered crimes.69 However, despite foreign governmental and non-governmental overtures on this issue, the Chinese government has refused to re-evaluate its position.70

Arbitrary Detention

The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention identifies a detention as arbitrary (1) when there is clearly no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty (for example when individuals are kept in detention after the completion of their prison sentences or despite an amnesty law applicable to them, or in violation of domestic law or relevant international instruments); (2) when individuals are deprived of their liberty because they have exercised the rights and freedoms guaranteed in certain provisions of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR) or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and (3) when noncompliance with the standards for a fair trial set out in the UNDHR and other relevant international instruments is sufficiently grave as to make a detention arbitrary.71 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "[a]nyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power" and "[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful."72

Arbitrary detention in China takes a number of forms, including detention and incarceration for non-violent political and religious expression, illegal extended detention that violates China’s own procedural laws, and detention that in practice is not subject to prompt judicial review, including incommunicado detention, disappearances and detentions during short-term security sweeps, and forms of administrative detention such as re-education through labor, forced psychiatric commitment, and forced commitment for drug detoxification.

Law enforcement authorities often hold criminal suspects and defendants in pre-trial detention for periods exceeding those permitted by Chinese law and international human rights norms and standards. In some cases, they also detain defendants for long periods after trial while courts decide on a judgment. This practice often contravenes provisions in the PRC Criminal Procedure Law that require judgments to be rendered no more than two and one-half months after prosecution. The following cases are selected examples of extended detention in late 2003 and 2004:

• Dissident Yang Jianli waited from August 2003 until May 2004 for a court to hand down a judgment after his trial on charges of illegal entry into China and espionage. Before his trial, Yang was held for nearly 15 months in pre-trial detention, much of it incommunicado. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled that his detention was arbitrary and violated international law.73
• The Beijing Intermediate People’s Court did not hand down a judgment in the evidence fabrication case of defense lawyer Zhang Jianzhong until December 2003, nearly 11 months after his trial. Before his trial, Zhang was held in detention for nearly ten months, the first two incommunicado.74
• In November 2003, authorities released Internet dissident Liu Di after she spent more than a year in detention. Liu had written several Internet articles critical of the government and the Party. Police held her on suspicion of subversion, but prosecutors rejected the case after a year for lack of evidence and never filed formal charges against her.75

In the spring of 2003, Chinese courts and law enforcement agencies launched a major public campaign to eliminate "illegal extended detention,"76 which Chinese authorities have identified as a major source of public discontent with the criminal justice system.77 Frustrated by lack of progress, law enforcement and court officials intensified the campaign in the fall of 2003, setting time limits for the resolution of extended detention cases and issuing a joint notice on rectifying the problem of extended detention.78 The notice provided tacit acknowledgement of many of the common abuses of detention limits that outside observers have long criticized.79 Throughout the campaign, domestic media reported on sometimes shocking instances of extended detention, including the case of a farmer who had been in custody for 28 years but had never been formally charged with a crime.80 The significant media effort to promote the campaign has given suspects and their families some official basis to protest extended detention in individual cases.

In March 2004, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) and the SPC reported that they had handled nearly 30,000 cases of extended detention at all stages of the criminal process and cleared nearly all outstanding cases.81 Both also announced new reporting and control systems designed to prevent future extended detention cases.82 Statistics on the number of extended detention cases that have been cleared are impossible to verify, and at least one credible Chinese observer told Commission staff that contrary to media reports, there are still many outstanding cases.83 Nevertheless, the observer noted a belief that government efforts are sincere. Authorities appear to have made some genuine progress in addressing the procedural issue, although not always with favorable substantive results. For example, two of the most well-known cases of extended detention, those of Yang Jianli and Zhang Jianzhong, were brought to a conclusion in 2003 with guilty verdicts. Despite these developments, extended detention problems continued in sensitive criminal cases throughout last year, and arbitrary administrative detentions and security sweeps continued as they have in previous years.

Public security has continued to arbitrarily detain or restrict the personal freedom of activists, petitioners, and other perceived security threats in the past year, particularly during important public functions or sensitive anniversaries. For example, during the NPC meetings in March 2004, security authorities reportedly rounded up vagrants and petitioners and held them in a Beijing stadium without any apparent legal basis.84 In other cases, local police met petitioners who traveled to Beijing for the NPC meetings at train and bus stations and forcibly repatriated them to their home provinces.85 Similar detentions were reported before the meeting of the Party Central Committee in September 2004.86 The NPC meetings, the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, and the Central Committee meeting also brought a disturbing series of arbitrary detentions of dissidents and activists. For example, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, who last year helped to expose the SARS crisis and who wrote a letter in February 2004 calling on authorities to reassess the official verdict on Tiananmen, was detained for nearly seven weeks beginning on June 4.87 During the Tiananmen anniversary, authorities also placed other activists and dissidents, including Ding Zilin, Zhang Xianling, Yin Min, Huang Jinping, Hu Jia, and Liu Xiaobo, under house arrest or otherwise restricted their freedom of movement.88 None of these individuals were charged with a crime or brought before a judge for review of the lawfulness of their detention or the restrictions imposed on them.

Under China’s administrative detention system, public security officials have the power to send individuals for "re-education through labor" (laojiao, or RETL) for terms of up to three years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. This system violates internationally recognized human rights norms for numerous reasons: (1) suspects are not entitled to a court trial and in practice public security officials serve as investigator, prosecutor, and judge, subject to only minimal judicial oversight that is rarely applied; (2) the definition of offenses subject to RETL are vague and easily manipulated by police to silence individuals exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly; (3) RETL detention terms can be longer than those for similar offenses prosecuted under the formal criminal justice system; and (4) the legal basis for RETL is questionable because an administrative regulation established the system, while the PRC Legislation Law requires all restrictions on personal freedom to be established pursuant to national law.89 Some critics also highlight the fact that RETL detainees are subject to forced labor. [See Section III(b)-Protection of Internationally Recognized Labor Rights-Forced Labor].

Despite these problems, public security agencies have expanded their use of RETL over the past decade. Regulations on RETL issued in 2002 include new offenses not contained in earlier RETL regulations,90 and the number of RETL detainees has risen. According to several estimates, the number of RETL detainees fluctuated between 150,000 and 200,000 in the early to mid-1990s, but between 1999 and 2002 the number detained ranged from 270,000 to 300,000.91 Scholars attribute the increase in the number of RETL detainees to rising crime rates, which have increased burdens on the formal criminal justice system, and steady growth in the number and size of social protests and disturbances in China.92 Some observers also note that the gradual expansion of defendant rights in the formal criminal justice system encourages police to rely more heavily on administrative detention.93 Finally, the government has used RETL in its repression of Falun Gong adherents and Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.94 Chinese observers and U.S. scholars believe that between 2 percent and 10 percent of RETL detainees are political detainees.95

In response to a rising tide of public, scholarly, and official criticism and a petition to the NPC Standing Committee challenging the legality of RETL, Chinese authorities appear to be trying to improve public perceptions of RETL and bolster the legal basis for maintaining it.96 Press reports over the past year have highlighted government initiatives to institute professional and educational training programs in RETL centers, permit spousal visits, and establish a hearing system for RETL cases with legal representation for detainees.97 The NPC is also working on a national law called the "Law on Correcting Unlawful Acts." The draft law reportedly introduces reforms to systematize the existing web of local RETL regulations, eliminate outdated RETL offenses, make the definition of remaining RETL offenses less vague, and address the concern that some RETL terms are longer than those for similar acts prosecuted in the criminal justice system.98 Drafters are also reportedly debating provisions that would give judges, rather than public security officers, the power to hand down RETL sentences.99 Other pending legislation would eliminate RETL as a form of punishment for selected categories of minor public order offenses.100 These developments suggest that the government intends to reform rather than eliminate RETL, at least in the near term.101 According to Commission sources, significant reform of the RETL system is likely.

Forced psychiatric detention

Law enforcement authorities have the power to forcibly commit individuals to psychiatric facilities (ankang).102 Ankang centers are intended for the custody and treatment of mentally ill offenders, but they have also been used to detain mentally sound individuals who have angered or antagonized authorities. The use or threat of ankang to punish dissidents continued in 2004. For example, human rights activist Wang Wanxing continues to be detained in an ankang center for unfurling a banner in Tiananmen Square in 1992. His wife has never been given a documented diagnosis of his mental condition.103 In June 2004, authorities reportedly threatened to commit human rights and AIDS activist Hu Jia to a mental institution for his continued efforts to commemorate the Tiananmen demonstrations.104 The use of ankang for political detentions raises human rights concerns similar to those noted above with respect to other forms of administrative detentions.

In June 2003, the State Council repealed a controversial form of administrative detention called custody and repatriation (C&R) after a young university graduate named Sun Zhigang was mistakenly detained in the system and beaten to death in custody. Under C&R, public security officials had the power to detain anyone without an identification card, temporary residence permit, or work permit and forcibly repatriate them to their place of registered residence. The system was used to detain indigents, migrants, petitioners, and political activists and was associated with a host of abuses.105 In August 2003, civil affairs bureaus nationwide began to convert the former C&R detention centers into voluntary aid centers tasked with providing temporary housing and social services to indigents and beggars. As of March 2003, Ministry of Civil Affairs officials reported that 931 of the aid centers nationwide had received a total of 250,000 visits.106

Although officials report some challenges in changing the mentality of staff accustomed to administering the coercive C&R system, research and visits by Commission staff, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest that the new aid system is largely voluntary.107 Police in several cities have complained that the repeal of C&R has hampered their ability to combat crime.108 Although restrictions on migrants remain in place, government authorities have made efforts to ease some such controls in the past year [see Section III(f)-Freedom of Residence and Travel].109 The detention and forced repatriation of petitioners during the NPC meetings in March 2004 suggests, however, that public security officials have other methods at their disposal to detain individuals who in the past may have been subjected to C&R.

Torture and Abuse in Custody

Despite legal prohibitions on torture110 and recent campaigns to address law enforcement abuses, torture remains common in China.111 In the wake of the widely publicized case of Sun Zhigang [see Repeal of the custody and repatriation system above], Chinese media have reported on numerous cases of torture and coerced confessions.112 Foreign media, NGOs, and Falun Gong affiliates also reported on the widespread use of torture.113 Forms of torture identified in such reports include beatings, electric shock, and the suspension or shackling of limbs in painful positions.114 According to Chinese reports, official abuses including torture resulted in the deaths of 460 people and serious injuries to 117 people in the first ten months of 2003.115 A recent SPP investigation uncovered more than 4,000 cases of official abuse between 2001 and 2003, including cases involving torture and coerced confessions.116 The number of torture and abuse cases is likely much higher than indicated by these domestic statistics.117

The Chinese government made some public efforts to combat the practice of torture in the past year. In an effort to soothe public anger over law enforcement abuses, senior government leaders and law enforcement officials continued to condemn torture in public statements and launched several campaigns to root out abusive police and prosecutors.118 These campaigns resulted in a number of well-publicized prosecutions of law enforcement officials for torture.119 Public security scholars have also discussed the limited utility of torture as an investigative technique in professional exchanges and in scholarly writings.120 On the regulatory front, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a new regulation in the fall of 2003 that prohibits the use of torture as an investigative tool in administrative cases.121 Although some reports described the new provision as an "exclusionary rule" for administrative cases, the provision only states that evidence obtained illegally may not form the basis of a verdict, not that courts must disregard it altogether.122 While the new regulation is a welcome development, this has long been the technical rule in Chinese criminal cases.123 In July 2004, the MPS issued another new regulation with the stated purpose of cracking down on interrogation abuses and rectifying the interrogation process.124 Under the new regulation, police chiefs are to be demoted and responsible officers dismissed if a person subject to interrogation commits suicide or dies of abuse or other "unnatural" causes.125 Some local governments also introduced limited initiatives to address torture.126

Chinese sources acknowledge that the problem of torture is rooted less in a lack of formal prohibitions than in prevailing law enforcement attitudes and an inability or unwillingness to enforce existing laws and regulations. A recent article in China’s Legal Daily concludes that the problem persists because many law enforcement officials continue to believe that torture is appropriate if the goal is to uncover evidence or crack down on crime.127 Prosecutors and courts often ignore such abuses,128 and illegally obtained evidence is not excluded in Chinese trials.129 Consequently, prosecutors and public security officials have few disincentives to engage in abusive practices. As a U.S. political scientist concluded at a Commission roundtable, limited improvements on torture may be possible under the current system, but "China, like most authoritarian systems, lacks the institutions to create self-generating or self-sustaining monitoring of law enforcement abuses, or to generate effective political pressure for reform." 130

Theo van Boven, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, has long negotiated with the Chinese government for permission to make an investigative visit to China. For a number of years, the U.S. government has asked the Chinese government to accept van Boven’s terms and schedule a visit. In March 2004, probably to head off potential support for a U.S.-sponsored resolution on China at the annual U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting, the Chinese government announced that it had agreed to a visit by van Boven.131 In June 2004, however, China postponed the visit until later in the year, citing the need for additional preparations and the difficulty of coordinating the visit among different local governments and authorities.132

"Harvesting" of Organs from Executed Prisoners

Several new reports of "organ harvesting" from executed prisoners surfaced in 2004. A leading Chinese transplant surgeon told a Hong Kong newspaper that organ harvesting continues and called it "a stain on the history of medical practice in China."133 The Lanzhou Morning News reported that the parents of an executed man sued the Dunhuang Detention House because authorities refused to return the corpse of their executed son. According to the report, the man’s organs had been removed. The court accepted the facility administrator’s word that the prisoner had donated his organs voluntarily, even though the official did not produce a document or other written evidence showing that the prisoner had done so. "To patch up a quarrel," the court awarded the family the amount it had spent hiring people to bring a coffin to the place of execution.134

According to Chinese reports, central government authorities are drafting a national law that establishes rules for organ transplants. Chinese sources are unclear whether this law will address the issue of involuntary organ donations from executed prisoners.135 Local legislation on organ donation enacted in Shenzhen last year did not address this issue.136

Under Chinese law, defendants have the right to hire an attorney,137 but national law only guarantees pro bono legal defense if a defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is blind, deaf, or mute.138 In other cases where defendants cannot afford legal representation, courts may appoint defense counsel or the defendant may apply for legal aid, but the law does not guarantee free legal representation.139 Chinese authorities are taking steps to improve access to legal aid, but funds are limited and the system provides applicants with lawyers in only a small percentage of cases [See Section V(c)-Access to Justice].140 Nationwide, only about one-third of Chinese criminal defendants have legal representation.141 The rate of representation is even lower in many rural areas.142

Chinese defense attorneys face numerous obstacles in representing their clients. Under the Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese defendants in theory have the right to meet with counsel after their first interrogation, or from the day they are subject to detention or arrest, to obtain evidence in possession of the prosecution, and to cross-examine prosecution witnesses at trial.143 In practice, law enforcement authorities frequently undermine or ignore these and other rights.144 Authorities often delay responding to requests by lawyers to see their clients, refuse such requests outright, or impose unreasonable restrictions on client access.145 In some cases, defense attorneys are only granted one or two meetings with defendants, sometimes only hours prior to trial, making it virtually impossible for the attorneys to mount an adequate defense.146 Defense attorneys also face numerous obstacles in collecting evidence or gaining access to evidence that the prosecution holds. Witnesses often do not appear in court, undermining the right of cross-examination. Often, all defense lawyers can do in the face of such obstacles is to plead for lenient treatment. Chinese officials acknowledged many of these problems in several articles published in the past year.147 Chinese defense attorneys indicate that their work environment has not improved significantly in the past year and that many of the problems described above have persisted.148

Some defense attorneys who represent their clients too aggressively face harassment and prosecution. Authorities have prosecuted defense lawyers on questionable corruption charges or threatened to revoke their licenses.149 In other cases, they have accused aggressive lawyers of "evidence fabrication." In December 2003, for example, defense lawyer Zhang Jianzhong was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for violating Article 307 of the PRC Criminal Code, a provision on evidence fabrication.150 Many observers questioned the basis for the charges and believe that Mr. Zhang was targeted for his vigorous defense work.151 A China Daily editorial published in April 2004 acknowledged that some lawyers face such intimidation, noting that Article 306, another provision on evidence fabrication, is "abused sometimes by police officers and procurators to retaliate against attorneys who have frustrated their case against the accused." 152

The Chinese government has begun to take some limited but positive steps to address the concerns of defense attorneys and their clients. In December 2003, for example, the SPP released a new set of regulations designed to improve conditions for defense attorneys.153 The provisions included specific time limits within which prosecutors must arrange meetings with clients and a requirement that prosecutors act on defense lawyer complaints and respond to requests for evidence.154 In March 2004, Chinese media announced that the NPC is likely to repeal Article 306 of the Criminal Law.155 Official statements on the key role of defense attorneys provided a welcome acknowledgment of the need for meaningful representation of criminal defendants.156 So far, however, the practical impact of these steps appears to be limited. The new SPP provisions on client access do not apply to cases investigated by public security,157 and defense lawyers complain that prosecutors have manipulated the new rules or ignored them altogether.158

Criminal courts in China rarely acquit defendants. According to official statistics, the conviction rate in Chinese criminal courts exceeded 99 percent in 2003.159 Chinese lawyers and scholars warn that lack of professionalism and legal competence on the part of some law enforcement and court personnel, a prevailing presumption of guilt, and political factors contribute to the high conviction rate.160 Defendants who appeal their convictions face limited prospects for reversal. Lower courts often seek guidance from higher courts regarding legal issues in cases before them, particularly in sensitive cases. Consequently, many lower court judgments already reflect the view of higher court judges, undermining the purpose of appellate review [see Section V(d)-China’s Judicial System]. Perhaps because of the limited prospects for success, only roughly 15 percent of criminal defendants exercise their right to appeal.161 In the rare case that a defendant is acquitted, Chinese law provides little finality. Prosecutors may appeal acquittals or request adjudication supervision from higher courts until they obtain a guilty verdict. In fact, they have an incentive to do so, since acquittals may result in official liability for wrongful detention and arrest under China’s State Compensation Law.162

The length, openness, and scheduling of Chinese criminal trials also raise questions about the fairness of the trial process. Chinese criminal trials sometimes last only a matter of hours and rarely more than a day, even when they involve sensitive or complex issues or a possible death sentence.163 Despite rules requiring criminal trials to be open to the public, authorities often restrict access to the courtroom or invoke exceptions involving "state secrets" in order to keep trials closed.164 Finally, authorities sometimes create obstacles that make it difficult for defense lawyers to represent their clients properly at trial. In the case of Internet dissident Du Daobin, for example, court authorities announced the trial date only three days before the trial. The court refused to reschedule the trial after Du’s defense lawyer notified it that he could not appear in court on that day, forcing the lawyer to submit only a written defense.165 Du’s other attorney, who was court-appointed, reportedly refused to appear in court unless Du agreed to plead guilty to a subversion charge.166

Chinese lawyers and scholars complain that courts often hand down guilty verdicts in criminal cases without adequate evidence.167 Documents from several high-profile criminal cases decided in the past year provide examples of the questionable evidence on which convictions are sometimes based.

• In May 2004, a Beijing court convicted U.S. dissident Yang Jianli of espionage. The evidence that the prosecution presented appears to have been based almost entirely on Yang’s "confession" that his U.S.-based advocacy group had contacts with a Taiwan organization and provided minor grants to researchers in mainland China. The Ministry of State Security had internally classified the Taiwan organization as an "espionage organization." The prosecution does not appear to have provided any independent evidence that Yang’s behavior constituted espionage as a matter of law or that he intended to commit the crime of espionage.168
• In October 2003, a Shanghai court convicted lawyer Zheng Enchong on charges of "illegally providing state secrets to entities outside of China." Zheng sent handwritten notes and an "internal" Xinhua news advisory on local labor and property protests to the New York-based organization Human Rights in China. The prosecution repeatedly did not produce the handwritten notes in court. A public security official classified the information contained in the materials as "state secrets," despite the fact that both the information on the protest and the news advisory were publicly available.169
• California businessman Jude Shao continues to serve a 16-year sentence for falsely issuing value added tax receipts and for tax evasion, despite evidence demonstrating that the tax was paid, a March 2004 audit report to support this finding, and a report on the case by a panel of criminal law experts that raises serious questions about the evidentiary basis for Shao’s conviction.170 According to advocates for the defense, authorities held Shao incommunicado before his trial. His defense attorney, who was hired only ten days prior to trial, was not permitted to meet with him and was not allowed to review the evidence against Shao before the trial. To date, Chinese courts have refused to accept Shao’s petitions for retrial based on new exculpatory evidence.

Convictions in many cases appear to be based almost entirely on defendant confessions, despite the prevalence of coerced confessions and legal provisions stating that a confession may not be the sole basis for a conviction.171 In recent years, mainland Chinese and Hong Kong media have reported on numerous cases of defendants convicted and even sentenced to death on the basis of coerced confessions or questionable evidence.172 Even in the absence of physical coercion, high conviction rates encourage defendants to confess in the hope of receiving more lenient treatment.173

Courts are subject to a number of external influences in deciding cases.174 Local governments exercise influence over judicial work through their control of judicial appointments, salaries, and court finances. Party Political-Legal Committees also supervise the work of the courts and can influence or decide the outcome of trials, particularly in major or sensitive cases.175 In one example that became public last year, an official legal newspaper announced the verdict in an extortion case that had not yet been tried after it received a Party circular on the case.176 In another instance, a Shenyang court commuted the death sentence of notorious mafia boss Liu Yong after finding that the confession of a key government witness in his trial had been coerced. In response to a flood of public outrage over the decision, the SPC retried the case and reinstated the death sentence, reportedly under direct orders from the Party Political-Legal Committee and despite the opposition of several SPC judges.177 Government or Party leaders sometimes feel compelled to interfere in criminal case decisions in response to public and media pressure for convictions. While such public pressure has provided a check on corruption and government misconduct in some cases, in the Liu Yong case and others it has given rise to concerns about mob justice.

Capital Punishment

The PRC Criminal Law includes 68 capital offenses ranging from murder to bribery and embezzlement.178 Recent judicial interpretations and NPC amendments to the Criminal Law appear to have increased the number of capital offenses by authorizing application of the death penalty in certain cases involving acts of terrorism or the unlawful use of toxic chemicals.179 Although some Chinese scholars have called for the abolition of the death penalty,180 polls and anecdotal evidence suggest that popular support for capital punishment in China continues to remain strong, and officials continue to view the death penalty as an effective deterrent against crime and corruption.181 Some scholars have argued that China should consider abolishing the death penalty for economic crimes as a first step.182

The Chinese government considers the number of death sentences it carries out each year to be a state secret.183 Amnesty International compiled published reports on 1,060 executions in 2002 but cautioned that the Chinese media report only a fraction of all executions.184 In early 2004, the China Youth Daily cited an NPC delegate as stating that China executes nearly 10,000 criminals annually.185 Although the delegate’s statement could be interpreted in different ways,186 this number is consistent with several other estimates of the annual number of executions in China, including an internal Chinese figure referenced in the book The Fourth Generation (Disidai).187 According to a recent report, Luo Gan, head of the national Party Political-Legal Committee, has "quietly" ordered Chinese judicial authorities to reduce the number of executions.188 Some Chinese scholars question whether the directive will have much practical effect in the context of China’s continuing "strike hard" campaign.189

Both Chinese scholars and international observers continue to express concern about China’s system of death penalty review. While the Criminal Procedure Law requires the SPC to review all death sentences, the SPC has delegated this power in cases involving murder, rape, and a number of other crimes to provincial high people’s courts.190 In the 300 death penalty cases it did review in 2003, the SPC changed the original sentence or ordered retrials in 118 cases.191 The specter of wrongful executions that such high reversal rates raise, along with questions about the legality and appropriateness of the SPC’s delegation of power, has sparked considerable debate in Chinese legal circles.192 In response, Chinese media reported in March 2004 that the NPC and SPC are actively considering proposals to return the power of review in all death penalty cases to the SPC.193 To deal with the heavy caseload that the SPC would face if such a reform were approved, the proposal reportedly calls for the SPC to hire up to 200 new judges and to establish branch offices in several regional districts to conduct the reviews.194 Chinese sources suggest that the proposal is in part an effort to blunt international criticism of China’s human rights record.195

Domestic Chinese media carried extensive reports on law enforcement and judicial reforms over the past year. In addition to the reforms noted above, police, prosecutors, courts, and penal institutions launched a series of initiatives with the stated purpose of improving transparency and information exchange, enhancing citizen supervision of law enforcement, addressing corruption and abuse in the criminal justice system, and improving the image of penal institutions.

• Police, prosecutors, and courts began holding regular press conferences, appointed press spokespersons, established points of public inquiry, and instituted information disclosure systems and hotlines for complaints.196
• The SPP established a new system of citizen supervisors designed to monitor cases and address complaints about the conflict of interest inherent in the procuratorate’s dual role as prosecutor and supervisor of the legal process.197 In June 2004, the SPP also announced new disciplinary punishment rules for prosecutors.198
• The MPS launched several drives to address misconduct and official abuse in the police force.199 In January 2004, the MPS announced that it had fired 387 police and investigated or prosecuted 988 police for misconduct, fired 11,000 for lack of qualifications, and transferred an additional 34,000 unqualified police personnel to new jobs. In April 2004, the MPS announced a training campaign for remaining officers.200
• In December 2003, SPC President Xiao Yang announced that courts had disciplined a total of 972 court workers for misconduct following a sweep of the judicial system. One hundred and four of the individuals were convicted of crimes.201
• Ministry of Justice (MOJ) officials announced a review of the nation’s penal system and a series of new prison reform initiatives, including seminars on protecting prisoner rights, mechanisms to solicit prisoner complaints, and new work and education benefits.202
• In May 2004, the SPP, the MOJ, and the MPS announced a crackdown on human rights abuses in the nation’s prisons and corruption in the parole and sentence reduction process.203 The SPP reported in September 2004 that the investigation into the matter revealed more than 13,900 cases in which sentences had been illegally reduced.204
• The SPP claimed that it had uncovered 4,029 human rights violations, including torture, coerced confessions, illegal detentions, election tampering, and other abuses, and vowed to continue its investigation for another year.205
• Scholars, legislators, and criminal justice officials are reportedly working on a set of joint regulations on evidence exchange206 and drafting major revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law.207

These and other reforms are part of what appears to be a coordinated government campaign to improve the public image of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. Government officials launched the campaign in mid-2003, in part as a response to public anger over several well-publicized cases of law enforcement abuse in early 2003, which they interpreted as a sign of general public frustration with law enforcement misconduct and corruption.208 The initiatives also give President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao an opportunity to demonstrate progress on citizen rights and the fight against corruption as they seek to bolster their populist image.209

Chinese scholars, law enforcement personnel, lawyers, and judges continued a spirited discussion of criminal justice reform in 2004 through conferences, scholarly and general media publications, online forums, and legal exchanges.210 Scholars and officials also continued to demonstrate an interest in foreign legal models, engaging in numerous legal exchange programs with foreign counterparts on a broad range of criminal justice issues. These exchanges included conferences on criminal defense, capital punishment, constitutional protection in criminal procedure, pre-trial discovery, plea bargaining, and other subjects. In one such program in the spring of 2004, U.S. lawyers and legal scholars conducted a mock evidence suppression hearing for 300 prosecutors at Beijing’s National Prosecutors College.211 In another, criminal justice scholars from 68 countries met in Beijing in September 2004 to discuss juvenile justice, corruption, criminal procedure, and other criminal law issues.212 Reform-minded Chinese scholars interviewed by Commission staff encouraged more such exchanges, noting that the programs have had a positive impact and are an important way to encourage further reform of the criminal justice system.213 Foreign observers monitoring the reform process agreed, noting that the upcoming amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law present an important opportunity to impact the direction of reform through legal exchange.214

Implications of Criminal Justice Developments and Prospects for Further Reform

Events over the past year illustrate the complex nature of criminal justice reform in China. The government’s reform initiatives on extended detention, defense lawyers, human rights abuses, and other issues are positive steps. On a rhetorical level, these initiatives and the official statements accompanying them set a tone more conducive to the protection of suspect and defendant rights. They also provide important political cover for defendant complaints in individual cases and for efforts by reformers to push for broader structural changes in the criminal justice system. As continued discussion and legal exchange make clear, many dedicated scholars, judges, and officials recognize the need for reform of China’s criminal justice system and are pushing for additional reforms, albeit within the boundaries set by the leadership.

Despite some incremental improvements, however, the immediate practical impact of these initiatives appears to be limited. Although Commission sources have expressed cautious optimism about some reform measures, the continued problems described in this section suggest that implementation of these reforms remains uneven at best. These implementation problems will likely continue for several reasons. First, law enforcement and the courts are under conflicting public and government pressures. The public is angry about law enforcement abuses and corruption in the criminal justice system, but also wants the government to ensure public safety and deal with the growing crime problem. Second, the leadership’s commitment to reform seems to be limited, and the government continues to manipulate procedural protections when expedient in sensitive or major criminal cases. Such acts undermine official statements on the need for a more even balance between the power of the state and the rights of criminal defendants and respect for human rights. Finally, continued arbitrary detentions, controls on judicial independence, and the leadership’s apparent reluctance to dismantle the RETL system call into question the Party’s commitment to broader reforms. Thus, while the leadership will likely have to deliver some concrete improvements in order to maintain its legitimacy, such improvements are likely to be incremental.

Notes to Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants

39 Josephine Ma, "Falun Gong Still Biggest Threat, Says Minister," South China Morning Post, 03 August 04 (FBIS, 3 August 04) (citing Central Party School article which identified "rapid increase in crime" as a major threat to social stability). See also Randall Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire: Well-Intentioned but Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in China," 98 Northwest University Law Review 991, 1049 (2003). For examples of reports on rising crime rates in 2003, see Chow Chungyan, "Guangdong Blames Crime Surge on Migrants," South China Morning Post, 22 July 04 (FBIS, 22 July 04); Leu Siew Ying, "Extra Police for Crime-hit Guangzhou," South China Morning Post, 9 September 03 (FBIS, 9 September 03); "Official Crime Rate Still High in China," Xinhua, 22 December 03 (FBIS, 22 Dec 03); Chow Chungyan, "More Police Promised As Crime Rate Soars 57 percent in Shenzhen," South China Morning Post, 14 January 04 (FBIS, 14 January 04); Leu Siew Ying, "Guangzhou Police Rue Passive Role on Migrants," South China Morning Post, 8 October 04, <www.scmp.com>; Shi Jiangtao, "Rethink Police Vagrancy Powers," South China Morning Post, 13 January 04 (FBIS, 13 January 04); Josephine Ma, "Falun Gong Still Biggest Threat, Says Minister," South China Morning Post, 03 August 04 (FBIS, 3 August 04).

40 See, e.g., Zhu Daqiang, "China Goes All Out to Safeguard Social Stability," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 24 December 03 (FBIS, 24 December 03)(noting that a recent execution had "demonstrated China’s determination to intensify the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign"); "Chinese Courts to Go on ‘Striking Hard’ Serious Crimes," Xinhua, 10 March 04 (FBIS, 10 March 04)(claiming that "Chinese courts in 2004 will adhere to the principle of ‘striking hard,"); and Zhang Qizhi and Shen Lutao, "At National Conference on Work of Comprehensive Management of Public Security, Luo Gan Stresses: Do an Earnest Job in Work of Investigating, Ascertaining, and Handling Contradictions and Disputes and Create a Harmonious and Stable Social Environment for Reform and Development," Xinhua, 12 June 04 (FBIS, 12 June 04)(citing Zhou Yongkang, Minister of Public Security, as urging departments to implement the "strike hard" principle).

41 Susan Trevaskes, "Courts on the Campaign Path in China: Criminal Court Work in the ‘Yanda 2001’ Anti-Crime Campaign," 42 Asian Survey 673-93 (September/October 2002); Craig S. Smith, "Chinese Fight Crime With Torture and Executions," New York Times, 9 September 01, <www.nytimes.com>.

42 An August 2003 article in the People’s Daily argues that that the leadership should transform "strike hard" from a periodic campaign into a continuously applicable general principle, suggesting that this change is intentional. Du Yonghao, "Strike Hard Should Embody the Sprit of Rule of Law" [Yanda geng ying tixian fazhi jingsheng], People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], 25 August 03, <www.people.com.cn>. See also, Yu Bin, "New Arrangements for Public Security Prevention and Control," Outlook [Liaowang], 9 February 04 (FBIS, 18 February 04).

43 For examples of references to localized or periodic crackdowns, see Zhang Changfeng, "Public Security Work Should Adhere to the Guiding Ideology of ‘Waging an Active War,"’ Security Studies [Gongan yanjiu], 10 December 2003 (FBIS, 9 October 03); Zheng Caixiong, "Guangdong Solves Thousands of Crimes," China Daily, 29 March 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>; "China Set to Crack Down on Muslim Northwest," Reuters, 24 September 03.

44 Shi Jiangtao, "Legal Scholars Have Diverse Interpretations of Figures," South China Morning Post, 11 March 04 (FBIS, 11 March 04). According to Xinhua, Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang ordered police to stop using arrest quotas in July 2003. "Zhou Yongkang Tells Police to End Arrest Quotas, Shed Business Interests," Xinhua, 31 July 03 (FBIS, 31 July 03).

45 According to public security officials in one major city, recent increases in the number of vagrants and beggars on the streets have led to public complaints that police are not doing their jobs effectively. Commission Staff Interview. The number of indigents increased following the repeal of a controversial form of administrative detention called custody and repatriation that police had often employed to detain such individuals. [See infra, Arbitrary Detention-Repeal of the Custody and Repatriation System]. In Beijing, 66 percent of respondents in an online survey expressed dissatisfaction with police, while only 2 percent approved of the work of judicial departments. "Poll Shows Overwhelming Numbers of Beijingers ‘Dissatisfied’ with Government," Agence France-Presse, 21 November 03 (FBIS, 21 November 03). Reactions to several notable cases illustrate the level of public frustration with law enforcement.

46 In the fall of 2003, a Shenyang court commuted the death sentence of notorious mafia boss Liu Yong after finding that the confession of a key government witness had been coerced. In response to a flood of public outrage over the decision, the Supreme People’s Court retried the case and reinstated the death sentence, which was carried out immediately. Legal scholars lamented that the case had "set reform of the criminal justice system back 10 years." John Pomfret, "Execution Reveals Party’s Grip on China," Washington Post, 23 December 03, <www.washingtonpost.com>; Yan Xizao, "Investigation Vital To Rebuild Confidence," China Daily, 22 December 03, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>.

47 Trevaskes, "Courts on the Campaign Path in China," 673-93; Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire," 1049.

48 Trevaskes, "Courts on the Campaign Path in China," 687-90. Chinese scholars who have studied past campaigns conclude that they have had little impact on crime rates. Craig S. Smith, "China’s Efforts Against Crime Make No Dent," New York Times, 26 December 01, <www.nytimes.com>.

49 For an interesting domestic discussion of the problems faced by public security and concerns about the deteriorating relationship between law enforcement agencies and the public, see Yu Bin, "New Arrangements for Public Security Prevention and Control."

50 Supreme People’s Court Work Report, 19 March 04.

51 Supreme People’s Procuratorate Work Report, 19 March 04. According to the report, 18,515 "major" cases of corruption, embezzlement, and bribery were investigated in 2003. 9,720 administrative law enforcement and judicial personnel and 14,844 employees of state-owned enterprises were investigated for corruption. 1,408 state employees were investigated for abuses of power such as torture, illegal extended detention, and interfering in elections, and 7,160 state employees were investigated for dereliction of duty and abuse of power that resulted in safety-related incidents.

52 SPC Work Report, March 2004.

53 "Serious Crimes in China in 2003 Are Down Compared to Last Year [2003 nian zhongguo yanzhong xingshi fanzui anjian bi qiannian yousuo jianshao]," Xinhua, 23 February 04,<www.xinhuanet.com>; "Corruption, Bribery Cases Drop 2.2 Percent Over 2003," People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], 8 January 04, <www.peopledaily.com.cn>.

54 "Dismal Record of China’s Police Force Made Public," Agence France-Presse, 12 June 04 (FBIS, 12 June 04). The official blamed poor investigation work, rising crime rates, official corruption, and new restraints on police as factors.

55 PRC Constitution, art. 35.

56 Crimes of endangering state (or national) security are found in the PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, and 28 December 02, arts. 102-113. The most notable are Article 105, which prohibits organizing, plotting, or carrying out a scheme to subvert state power or overthrow the socialist system or inciting others to do the same, and Article 103, which prohibits organizing, plotting, or carrying out a scheme to split the state or undermine the unity of the country or inciting others to do the same.

57 A recent article published by the Central Party School reportedly ranked Falun Gong, ethnic, and religious activities ahead of terrorism and the rapid increase in crime as threats to social stability. Josephine Ma, "Falun Gong Still Biggest Threat, Says Minister."

58 PRC Criminal Law. Articles 101-113 deal with "endangering state security."

59 Ibid., art. 105.

60 Ibid., art. 103.

61 Jilin Province, Changchun City Intermediate People’s Court, Criminal Judgment in the Case of Luo Yongzhong, 14 October 03 (on file with the Commission).

62 PRC Criminal Law, art. 13.

63 Wang Youcai, a founding member of the China Democracy Party, was serving a 12-year sentence for "endangering state security." He was released on medical parole and flown to the United States in March 2004. Phuntsog Nyidron, one of the "singing nuns of Lhasa," was serving a sentence for "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement." She was released on medical parole and flown to the United States in February 2004. Liu Di, the "stainless steel mouse," had been held in detention for more than one year in connection with a series of Internet essays she had written. In November 2003, prosecutors ordered her released on the grounds of insufficient evidence for prosecution.

64 See infra, Arbitrary Detention: Disappearances, Security Sweeps, and House Arrests.

65 Commission Staff Correspondence. For the estimate of one such analyst, see After the Detention and Death of Sun Zhigang: Prisons and Detention in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 27 October 03, Testimony of James Dulles Seymour, Senior Research Scholar, East Asia Institute, Columbia University. Note that this estimate is highly qualified by a variety of unknowns and uncertainties.

66 For the removal of the crime of counterrevolution from the PRC Criminal Code, see Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Wrongs and Rights: A Human Rights Analysis of China’s Revised Criminal Law, December 1998, 2930, 41-45.

67 Commission Staff Interview.

68 Supreme People’s Court, Notice on "Regulations on Certain Concrete Practical Questions Related to Sentence Reduction and Parole," [Zuigao renmin fayuan yinfa "Guanyu banli jianxing, jiajie anjian juti yingyong falu ruogan wenti de guiding" de tongzhi], issued 29 October 97. Under the 1997 Notice, sentence reduction and parole for all cases involving crimes of "endangering state security" are to be "strictly handled." Although the notice superceded a 1991 SPC notice that required sentence reduction and parole for crimes of "counterrevolution" to be "strictly handled," the SPC argues that because the crime of endangering state security is equivalent to the crime of counterrevolution, the new notice should continue to apply to individuals serving sentences for counterrevolution. Commission Staff Interviews.

69 The corollary to this argument is that the SPC notice on "strictly handling" sentence reduction and parole for crimes of endangering state security should not be applied to prisoners convicted of a crime that no longer exists.

70 Commission Staff Interviews.

71 United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet #26, The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs26.htm#IV>. The Working Group’s mandate "extends to deprivation of freedom either before, during or after the trial (a term of imprisonment imposed following conviction), as well as deprivation of freedom in the absence of any kind of trial (administrative detention). The Group also regards as forms of detention measures of house arrest and rehabilitation through labor, when they are accompanied by serious restrictions on liberty of movement."

72 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9(3) and 9(4).

73 Philip P. Pan, "China Gives Prison Term To Dissident Based in U.S.," Washington Post, 14 May 04, <www.washingtonpost.com>. For a discussion of Yang’s pre-trial detention, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2003 Annual Report, October 2003, 17.

74 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Zhang Jianzhong Case Update, March 2004, <www.cecc.gov>; Congressional Executive Commission on China, Defense Lawyers Turned Defendants, Zhang Jianzhong and the Criminal Prosecution of Defense Lawyers in China, 27 May 03.

75 "Recently Released PRC Dissident Liu Di Told Not the Meet With Foreign Journalists," Agence France-Presse, 1 December 03 (FBIS, 1 December 03); "Held for Over a Year, Procuratorate Rejects Public Security Bureau Position for Lack of Evidence," World Journal [Shijie ribao], 7 November 03, <www.worldjournal.com>.

76 Chinese official sources define "illegal extended detention" as the detention of criminal suspects and defendants by law enforcement agencies or courts beyond domestic statutory time limits for handling criminal cases.

77 "China’s Public Prosecutors Crack Down on Illegal Prolonged Detention," Xinhua, 22 July 03 (FBIS, 22 July 03); Zhu Daqiang "China Moves Against Extended Detention," China News Agency [Zhongguo xinwen she], 3 August 03 (FBIS, 3 August 03).

78 Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Strictly Enforcing the Criminal Procedure Law and Rectifying Extended Detention in Practice [Zuigao renmin fayuan, zuigao renmin jianchayuan, gonganbu guanyu yange zhixing xingshi susongfa, qieshi jiufang chaoqi jiya de tongzhi], issued 11 November 03. Supreme People’s Court, Notice on Issues Related to Clearing Cases of Extended Detention [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu qingli chaoqi jiya anjian youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 29 July 03. Authorities publicly expressed frustration with the persistence of the extended detention problem, which they blamed on lack of legal consciousness on the part of police, prosecutors, and judges. Cui Zhenping, "Two Yuan Jointly Answer Reporters Questions on the ‘Notice on Rectifying Extended Detention,"’ [Liang yuan yibu jiu ‘jiufang chaoqi jiya tongzhi’ da jizhe wen], People’s Court Daily[Fayuan ribao], 12 November 03.

79 Among other things, the Notice prohibits manipulating criminal provisions on "supplementary investigation" and withdrawals of prosecution or jurisdiction transfers to extend detention in "disguised form," calls on law enforcement organs to make full use of provisions on bail and residential surveillance where time limits for detention have expired by investigation or adjudication is incomplete, and stresses that defendants must be released if a crime cannot be proven or a judgment cannot be reached within the legal time limits. Note, however, that investigators and courts may apply to the SPC or SPP for an "interpretation" of the Notice in complex or foreign-related cases or cases involving the crime of endangering state security.

80 The man, a farmer from Guangxi, had initially been detained in 1974 on suspicion that he possessed an "enemy" leaflet. "Chinese Peasant Detained Without Charges for 28 Years," Agence France-Presse, 26 June 03 (FBIS, 26 June 03), citing Southern Weekend [Nanfang zhoumo]. A public security investigation found 64 cases involving extended custody that exceeded three years. "All of the Extended Custody Cases in the Public Security System Rectified in 2003" [2003 nian gongan xitong suoyou chaoqi jiya anjian quanbu dedao jiuzheng], Xinhua, 20 January 04, <www.xinhua.org>.

81 SPC Work Report, March 2004; SPP Work Report, March 2004. The SPP reported that it had handled 25,181 cases of extended detention. The SPC reported that it had handled 4,100 cases of extended detention involving 7,658 individuals. It is possible that there is some overlap between the cases handled by the SPC and the SPP. The SPC claimed that a few cases of extended detention remained unresolved for "legal reasons." A January report in Xinhua suggested that there were still 91 outstanding cases. "Except for 91 Cases, All Cases of Extended Detention Have Been Cleared Up," [Chu 91 jian anjian wai, quanguo suoyou chaoqi jiya anjian ruqi xingli wanbi], Xinhua, 1 January 04, <www.news.xinhuanet.com>.

82 SPC Work Report, March 2004; SPP Work Report, March 2004.

83 Commission Staff Interview.

84 Commission Staff Interviews. See also "China Rounds Up Disgruntled Petitioners, Herds Them to Gym and Stadium," Agence France-Presse, 9 March 04 (FBIS, 9 March 04); Human Rights in China Press Release, "Dissidents Detained and Beaten as NPC Opens," 5 March 04; Josephine Ma, "Petitioners Rounded Up in Police Raids," South China Morning Post, 11 March 04, <www.scmp.com>.

85 Joe McDonald, "China Mobilizes to Silence Dissent," Associated Press, 11 March 04; Ralph Jennings, "PRC Police Block National Complaint Office," Kyodo World News Service, 10 March 04 (FBIS, 10 March 04).

86 Matt Pottinger, "Petitioning Beijing," Wall Street Journal, 10 September 04, A11; Human Rights in China Press Release, "Massive Crackdown on Petitioners in Beijing," 8 September 04.

87 For an overview of Jiang’s activities, see "SARS Whistleblower Urges Reassessment of Tiananmen Massacre," South China Morning Post, 8 March 04, <www.scmp.com>. His letter urging an official reassessment of the verdict on the Tiananmen demonstrations is available at <http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/chinadn/en/archives/002276.html#more>. Jiang and his wife went missing on June 1. Chan Siusin, "Joint Appeal for Doctor’s Release," South China Morning Post, 11 June 04, <www.scmp.com>. His wife was released on June 16 and Jiang was released in late July. According to Commission sources, Jiang was taken by public security to an undisclosed location for "discussions" regarding his June 4 activism.

88 Ralph Jennings, "China Police Lodge Troublemakers at Resorts to Foil Protests," Kyodo World Service, 11 March 04 (FBIS, 11 March 04); Human Rights in China Press Release, "Mass House Arrests Before June 4," 28 May 04; Audra Ang, "Dissidents Detained as Tiananmen Anniversary Approaches," South China Morning Post, 28 May 04; "Leading AIDS Activist and Tiananmen Dissident Roughed Up by Chinese Police," Agence France-Presse, 2 June 04 (FBIS, 2 June 04). Some dissidents were instructed to leave Beijing or their home cities, prevented from moving freely, or otherwise harassed.

89 Jonathan Hecht, "Reforming Re-education Through Labor," October 2003 (draft manuscript on file with the Commission); Veron Mei-ying Hung, "Improving Human Rights in China: Should Re-Education Through Labor Be Abolished," 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 303 (2003). But see Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire," 1010-1046 (note that Peerenboom disputes the basis for these contentions and argues that in many cases, RETL detainees would be worse off in the formal criminal justice system). Although re-education through labor subjects in theory have the legal right to request judicial review of their detention by a people’s court under the PRC Administrative Litigation Law, such review rarely takes place in practice. Hung, "Improving Human Rights in China," 317-23.

90 Hecht, "Reforming Re-education Through Labor."

91 After the Detention and Death of Sun Zhigang, Written Statement of James D. Seymour, Senior Research Scholar, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Hecht, "Reforming Re-education Through Labor"; Hung, "Improving Human Rights in China," 303; Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire," 999.

92 Hecht, "Reforming Re-education Through Labor." For an excellent study on the growing number of social protests in China, see Murray Scott Tanner, "China Rethinks Unrest," 27 Washington Quarterly 137 (2004).

93 Commission Staff Interview.

94 Philip Pan, "Easing of Penal System Part of Change in China," Washington Post, 18 January 04, <www.washingtonpost.com>. According to one government source cited by Pan, a subcommittee on reforming RETL suspended its work after the government’s campaign against Falun Gong was launched in 1999.

95 Hecht, "Reforming Re-education Through Labor."

96 In the fall of 2003, six members of the Guangdong CPPCC Provincial Committee reportedly submitted a proposal questioning the legality of the RETL system and calling for it to be abolished in Guangdong. Guo Guosong, "Members of the CPPCC Guangdong Provincial Committee Point Out that the Country’s Re-education Through Labor System Lacks Legal Basis," Southern Weekend [Nanfang zhoumo], 4 September 03 (FBIS, 8 September 03). According to one Commission source, legal scholars filed a petition with the NPC Standing Committee last year arguing that regulations on RETL should be repealed as unconstitutional. Reportedly, the NPC Standing Committee denied the petition and authorities barred the Chinese media from reporting on it. In another instance, the South China Morning Post reported that dissident Li Guotao was detained in September 2004, prior to the Party Central Committee meeting in Beijing, for organizing a petition drive calling for the abolition of RETL. Bill Savadove, "Petition Sees Dissident Put Under House Arrest," South China Morning Post, 14 September 04, <www.scmp.com>. For RETL reform discussions, see also "Several Problems in the Reform of Judicial Administration" [Sifa xingzheng gaige de ruogan falu¨ wenti], Legal Daily [Fazhi ribao], 12 August 04, <www.legaldaily.com.cn>.

97 See, e.g., "Husbands and Wives of Laojiao Detainees Can Enjoy the Pleasure of Being Fish in Water," [Laojiaosuo nei fuqi ke xiangyu shuihuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily [Nanfang dushibao], 22 October 03, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>; Liang Jie, "Preliminary Results Achieved in Special Work for Re-education Through Labor" [Laojiao you tese gongzuo chujian chengxiao], Guangming Daily [Guangming ribao], 17 November 03, <www.gmw.com.cn>; "Beijing Public Security Organs Hold the Country’s First Public Question and Answer for a Re-Education through Labor Subject" [Beijing gonganju zai guonei shouci duini laojiaoren juxing gongkai lingxun], Xinhua, 5 September 03, <www.news.xinhuanet.com>. In August 2003, the Ministry of Public Security issued regulations reforming the procedures for handling RETL and other administrative detention cases. Regulations on Procedures for Public Security Handling of Administrative Cases [Gongan jiguan banli xingzheng anjian chengxu guiding], issued 26 August 03, art. 26.

98 "Standardizing the Re-Education Through Labor System: The NPC Drafts a New Law" [Guifan laojiaozhi: renda qicao xinfa], World Journal [Shijie ribao], 9 March 04, <www.worldjournal.com>; "The Re-Education Through Labor System Is to Be Transformed in a Major Way" [Laojiao zhidu jiang zuo zhongda biange], Southern Metropolitan Daily [Nanfang dushibao], 8 March 04, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>.

99 Pan, "Easing of Penal System Part of Change in China."

100 According to both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong reports, the Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee of the NPC is considering a new "Law on Security Administration Punishments" to replace the 1987 Security Administration Punishment Regulations. "China is Mulling Over the Abolition of Re-education Through Labor," Tai Yang Pao, 29 July 04 (FBIS, 30 July 04); Li Yan, "Security Punishments Expected to Abolish Re-education Through Labor," [Zhian chufa youwan quxiao laojiao], Southern Metropolitan Daily [Nanfang dushibao], 28 July 04, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>. The State Administration Punishment Regulations permit authorities to detain individuals for up to 15 days for a wide variety of minor public order offenses. PRC Security Administration Punishment Regulations [Zhian guanli chufa tiaoli], issued 5 September 86. Some violators may be subject to RETL under the regulations and local rules for repeat offenders.

101 Enshrining RETL in a national statute, as opposed to an administrative regulation, would undermine the arguments that the domestic legal basis for RETL is flawed. At least one Western China scholar argues that calls for repeal are misguided. Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire," 991. Others note that if the new law provides RETL detainees with rights to judicial review, legal representation, and other protections that are in theory afforded to criminal defendants, it would still be a significant positive step. Commission Staff Interview.

102 CECC, 2003 Annual Report, Section III(a).

103 Commission Staff Interview.

104 Human Rights in China, Forced Psychiatric Treatment Threatened for AIDS Activist Hu Jia, 9 June 04; Chan Siusin, "Activist Fears Being Put in Mental Home," South China Morning Post, 11 June 04, <www.scmp.com>.

105 See CECC, 2003 Annual Report, Sections III(e) and V(e), for a discussion of custody and repatriation and the reasons for its repeal.

106 Approximately 80 percent of the aid centers are converted C&R centers, while 20 percent are newly constructed. In several large cities such as Shanghai and Chengdu, civil affairs departments have established a network of small feeder centers in the city center and larger facilities on the city outskirts. The feeder centers accept aid recipients and transfer them to the larger centers if they want to receive housing and aid there. Commission Staff Interviews.

107 Pan Congwu, "Four Big Problems Vexing Aid Stations" [Si da nanti kunrao jiuzhuzhan], China Legal Publicity [Zhongguo pufa wang], 18 August 04, <www.legalinfo.gov.cn>. For increases in indigent populations, see also Li Xueju (Minister of Foreign Affairs), "New Social Relief System To Emphasize Voluntary Acceptance of Assistance, Put Equal Stress on Aid and Management," Seeking Truth [Qiushi], 1 April 04 (FBIS, 15 April 04); Pan Haixia, "Beggars Can’t be Choosers of Shelters," China Daily, 12 January 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>; Josephine Ma, "Beijing Ponders How to Tackle Surge in Beggars," South China Morning Post, 9 October 03, <www.scmp.com>; Shi Jiangtao, "Rethink Police Vagrancy Powers." Some civil affairs officials complain that one of the biggest problems with the new aid system is that of repeat and ineligible visitors and acknowledge the growing number of indigents. Commission Staff Interviews. For a contrary view on the new aid measures, see American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization, Section 301 Petition before the United States Trade Representative, 34.

108 Li Xueju, "New Social Relief System To Emphasize Voluntary Acceptance of Assistance, Put Equal Stress on Aid and Management"; Leu Siew Ying, "Guangzhou Police Rue Passive Role on Migrants"; Shi Jiangtao, "Rethink Police Vagrancy Powers." According to officials in some Chinese cities, the begging problem has become so pervasive that the public is criticizing police and aid centers for failing to do their jobs. Commission Staff Interview; Pan Congwu, "Four Big Problems Vexing Aid Stations." Although some Chinese newspapers expressed concern about a backlash and the possibility that C&R would be re-instituted in a different form, Chinese scholars and officials expressed confidence that the old system of coercive repatriation would not be re-instated. Commission Staff Interviews.

109 Public security officials in at least one major Chinese city told Commission staff that even unregistered migrant laborers are largely being left alone unless they commit crimes. Commission Staff Interview.

110 PRC Criminal Law, arts. 247-248; PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 43.

111 According to Murray Scot Tanner, an American political scientist who tracks domestic reporting and debate on public security and in particular on the issue of torture, torture is a problem that "even many [Chinese] law enforcement officials concede is pervasive." After the Detention and Death of Sun Zhigang: Prisons and Detention in China, CECC Roundtable, Testimony and Written Statement of Murray Scot Tanner. One recent Procuratorial Daily article, while noting that only a "minority" of investigators participate in torture, nonetheless called it a "chronic disease" that elicited "serious negative reaction from the populace." Fu Kuanzhi, "The Three Factors That Must be Present to End the Extortion of Confessions Through Torture" [Jujue xingxun bigong xu jubei san ge yinsu], Procuratorial Daily [Jiancha ribao], 11 August 04, <www.jcrb.com.cn>.

112 See, e.g., Cheng Honggen, "Former Deputy Director of a Sub-bureau Under the Hebei City Public Security Bureau Gets a 13-Year Jail Term on Charges of Torturing and Causing the Death of a Person," Xinhua, 16 May 04 (FBIS, 17 May 04); "A Wenzhou ‘Criminal Sentenced to Death’ Who Sat in Jail For Eight Years Wants State Compensation" [Wenzhou yi "sixingfan" chuzuo ba nian dajian tichu yao guojia peichang], Xinhua, 14 April 03, <www.xinhuanet.com>; "Chongqing Resident Obtains 130,000 in State Compensation for Wrongful Murder Judgment and Seven Years in Prison" [Chongqing yi shimin bei cuopan sharenzui fuxing qi nian huo guojia peichang shisanwan], Procuratorial Daily [Jiancha ribao], 10 November 03, <www.jcrb.com.cn>; Irene Wang, "Police Officers Jailed Over Torture Deaths," South China Morning Post, 17 December 03, <www.scmp.com> (citing a story in a Shenyang paper describing the death of two detainees); Chen Lei, "Dialing 110 Unexpectedly Invites Fatal Accident; Bengbu’s Barbarous Patrolmen Publicly Beat to Death Man Making Police Report," China News Service, 29 August 03 (FBIS, 29 August 03); Chen Hong, "Police, Prosecutors Have Image Problem," China Daily, 22 July 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>.

113 See, e.g., "Chinese Police Officer Gets Death for Killing, Secretly Burying Detainee," Agence France-Presse, 26 June 04 (FBIS, 26 June 04); Wang Chien-min, "Reflecting on Prisoner Abuse by US Forces, Beijing Will Strictly Investigate Savage Torture," Asia Weekly [Yazhou zhoukan], 30 May 04 (FBIS, 20 May 04); Chan Siu-sin, "Injured Man’s Family Seeks Payout," South China Morning Post, 21 November 03, <www.scmp.com>; "Deceased Tibetan Monk Leaves Letter Detailing ‘Torture’ by Chinese Jailers," Agence France-Presse, 7 October 03 (FBIS, 7 October 03); Chi Shuo-ming, "Case Outside Disputed Case of British Espionage Involving Xinhua News Agency," Asia Weekly [Yazhou zhoukan], 30 May 04 (FBIS, 28 May 04); Amnesty International, Executed According to Law-The Death Penalty in China, 17 March 04; Irene Wang, "New Twist in Convicted Killers’ Fight for Justice," South China Morning Post, 7 August 04, <www.scmp.com>. Falun Gong affiliates actively report on alleged cases of torture. See, e.g., "62 Cases of Falun Gong Practitioners Killed from Torture, Abuse Reported in April and May 2004," Falun Dafa Information Center, 9 June 04, <www.faluninfo.net>; "Death of 25 Falun Gong Practitioners Verified in March," Falun Dafa Information Center, 20 April 04, <www.faluninfo.net>; "30 Torture and Severe Abuse-Related Deaths of Falun Gong Practitioners Reported in February," Falun Dafa Information Center, 25 March 04, <www.faluninfo.net>; "64 Falun Gong Deaths from Torture in China Reported in Three Months," Falun Dafa Information Center, 12 February 04, <www.faluninfo.net >.

114 Ibid. For an alleged castration case, see Chan Siu-sin, "Injured Man’s Family Seeks Payout," South China Morning Post, 21 November 03, <www.scmp.com>.

115 "Violations of Law by Administrative Law Enforcement Officials Result in More Than 650 Million Yuan in Losses and 460 Deaths" [Xingzheng zhifa renyuan fanzui zaocheng sunshi 6.5 yi duo yuan siwang 460 ren], Xinhua, 10 October 03, <www.xinhuanet.com>.

116 Chan Siusin, "Authorities Responsible for 4,000 Cases of Abuse," South China Morning Post, 27 May 04, <www.scmp.com>.

117 Commission Staff Interview.

118 See infra, Reform Initiatives and Public Discussion of the Criminal Justice System.

119 Chen Honggen, "Former Deputy Director of a Sub-bureau"; "Guangdong Baishi Police Substation Ordered to Pay 56,000 Yuan in Compensation for Extorting a Confession from Art Student Through Torture" [Guangdong baishi paichusuo xingxun bigong yixiao xuesheng bei panpei 5.6 wan yuan], Information Times [Xinxi shibao], 15 November 03, reprinted in <www.sohu.com>.

120 Murray Scot Tanner, "Shackling the Coercive State: China’s Ambivalent Struggle Against Torture," Problems of Post-Communism XV, No. 5 (September/ October 2000), 13-30. After the Detention and Death of Sun Zhigang, Testimony and Written Statement of Murray Scot Tanner; Commission Staff Interview.

121 Regulations on Procedures for Public Security Handling of Administrative Cases [Gongan jiguan banli xingzheng anjian chengxu guiding], issued 26 August 03, art. 26. Local governments also announced new measures against torture.

122 Article 26, clause 2 of the new regulation states, "It shall be strictly forbidden to extort confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit, or other unlawful means. Evidence obtained through unlawful measures may not be taken as the basis for determining a case."

123 Supreme People’s Court, Interpretation on Several Issues Regarding Implementation of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu zhixing zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 29 June 98.

124 Provisions on Application of Continuing Interrogations by Public Security Organs [Gongan jiguan shiyong jixu panwen guiding], issued 12 July 04. For a description of the new regulations, see Xin Wen, "The Ministry of Public Security Promulgates ‘Provision on the Application of Continuing Interrogations by Public Security Agencies," Ministry of Public Security, 3 August 04(FBIS, 11 August 04); and Zhang Weina, "If a Person Being Interrogated Commits Suicide the People’s Police Officer Directly Responsible Must Be Dismissed" [Bei panwenren zisha yao kaichu zhijie zeren minjing], China Court Net [Zhongguo fayuan wang], 4 August 04, <www.chinacourt.org.cn>.

125 Provisions on Application of Continuing Interrogations by Public Security Organs, art. 39.

126 See, e.g., "Zhejiang: Public Security Officers Who Extort Confessions Through Torture in Handling Cases to be Dismissed Without Exception" [Zhejiang: Gongan minjing zai ban’an guocheng zhong xingxun bigongzhe yi lu kaichu], Xinhua, 22 September 03, <www.xinhuanet.com>.

127 Yan Yang, "Why It Is So Difficult to Convict Someone for Extorting Confessions Through Torture," [Xingxun bigong weihe nanyi xingzui], Legal Daily [Fazhi ribao], 23 October 03, <http:/ /news.china.com>. A similar discussion based on comments by Chinese judges and scholars maybe found in Wang Chien-min, "Reflecting on Prisoner Abuse by US Forces." One Chinese scholar quoted in this article refers to the "stinking bean curd" theory of torture that is prevalent in Chinese judicial circles. This type of bean curd "stinks but tastes good when you eat it." Law enforcement officials may view torture as unseemly, but they find it useful and like the results.

128 Yan Yang, "Why It Is So Difficult to Convict Someone for Extorting Confessions Through Torture."

129 Fu Kuanzhi, "The Three Factors That Must be Present to End the Extortion of Confessions Through Torture."

130 After the Detention and Death of Sun Zhigang, Testimony and Written Statement of Murray Scot Tanner.

131 "China Lets UN Rights Expert Visit Detention Centers," Wall Street Journal, 31 March 04, <www.wsj.com>.

132 "UN Rights Expert’s Visit Postponed," Xinhua, 16 June 04 (FBIS, 16 June 04).

133 "Shanghai Seeks to Curb Illegal Organ Trade," South China Morning Post, 17 January 2004, <www.scmp.com>.

134 "Gansu Prisoners on Death Row Forced to ‘Donate’ Organs," Tai Yang Pao, 24 September 03 (FBIS, 24 September 03) (citing the Lanzhou Morning News). The Dunhuang case is significant as a judicial recognition of rules relating to organ harvesting. In 1984, the Chinese government issued the "Temporary Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses of Organs from the Corpses of Executed Prisoners." These regulations provided for the use of organs of executed criminals if no one claims the corpse, the family consents to the use of the corpse, or the executed criminal voluntarily donates his organs, but stipulated that, "Where the executed criminal has volunteered to have his corpse provided to a medical treatment unit for use, there should be a formal written certificate or record signed by the criminal and deposited at the people’s court where it can be inspected." Temporary Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses of Organs from the Corpses of Executed Prisoners [Guanyu liyong sixing zuifan shiti huo shiti qiguan de zanxing guiding], issued 9 October 84, clause 3.

135 "Law Urged on Organ Transplant," China Net [Zhongguo wang], 15 November 03, <http:/ /china.com.cn>; "Shanghai Seeks to Curb Illegal Organ Trade," South China Morning Post, 17 January 04, <www.scmp.com>.

136 "Shenzhen: First Domestic Regulations Passed on the Donation and Transplantation of Human Organs" [Shenzhen: Guonei shoubu renti ziguan sunxian yizhi tiaoli huo tongguo], People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], 22 September 03, <www.people.com.cn>.

137 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, art. 33. 138 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, art. 34; Regulations on Legal Aid [Falu yuanzhu tiaoli], issued 16 July 03, art. 12.

139 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, art. 34; Regulations on Legal Aid, chapter 2.

140 In 2002, 180,000 out of a total 600,000 applicants for all types of cases were granted legal aid. Yan Ting, "New Regulation Standardizes Legal Aid," South China Morning Post, 1 August 03, <www.scmp.com>. According to official statistics, courts appointed counsel for 77,199 criminal defendants in 2003 (11,864 blind, deaf, or mute defendants, 28,868 minor defendants, 24,052 defendants facing the death penalty, and 12,415 other defendants). Legal aid organizations approved applications for an additional 8,991 criminal defendants. Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Center, 2003 Annual Report on Legal Aid Work [2003 Falu yuanzhu gongzuo nianbao], January 2004, 25. The total number of legal aid applications for 2003 is not available. However, official statistics indicate that courts nationwide imposed sentences on 933,967 criminal defendants in 2003. SPC Work Report, March 2004. For a detailed description of legal aid in China, see Section V(c)-Access to Justice and Legal Aid.

141 The Legal Daily, a newspaper published by the Ministry of Justice, reported in January 2003 that the percentage of criminal defendants represented by counsel dropped from 40 percent in 1996 to 30 percent in 2001. Cha Qingjiu, "Lawyers Turn Pale at the Mention of Defending Criminal Suspects-Worries Arising from the Decreasing Percentages of Criminal Cases with Defense Lawyers [Lu¨ shi tan xingbian er sebian, xingshi anjian bianhu lu xiajiang zhi you]," Legal Daily [Fazhi ribao], 13 January 03, <www.legaldaily.com.cn>. A professor at the National Judicial College confirms that in many courts, fewer than 30 percent of criminal defendants are represented by counsel. Wang Jin, "Are Defense Lawyers Able to Enjoy ‘Special Rights,"’ [Xingshi lu¨ shi nengfou hengshou ‘tequan’] Beijing Youth Daily [Beijing qingnianbao], 22 May 01. Surprisingly, the percentage of criminal defendants represented by counsel dropped between 1996 and 2002, even as the number of attorneys in China increased by over 20 percent.

142 Commission Staff Interviews; Wang Jin, "Are Defense Lawyers Able to Enjoy ‘Special Rights"’ (noting that in some areas, the percentage of defendants represented by counsel is as low as 10 percent). According to Minister of Justice Zhang Fusen, 206 counties in China do not have a single lawyer at all. Li Weiwei, "206 Counties in My Country Do Not Have a Single Lawyer" [Wo guo 206 ge xian meiyou yiming lu shi], Xinhua, 23 March 04, <www.chinacourt.org>.At a recent national meeting of Chinese justice officials, one commentator identified lack of access to lawyers in rural and minority areas as an especially pressing problem. "Several Problems in the Reform of Judicial Administration," Legal Daily.

143 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 36, 47, 96

144 See CECC, 2003 Annual Report, Section III(a)-Criminal Justice, Access to Counsel; CECC, 2002 Annual Report, Criminal Justice.

145 In the case of dissident Yang Jianli, for example, Chinese officials refused his lawyer’s repeated requests to meet with him until July 2003, a year and a half after his detention. Yang Jianli, Closing Statement in Court, 4 August 03 (on file with the Commission). Alleged spy Chen Yulin was reportedly held for nearly one year before being permitted to meet with his lawyer. Chi Shuoming, "Case Outside Disputed Case of British Espionage Involving Xinhua News Agency," Asia Weekly [Yazhou zhoukan], 30 May 04 (FBIS, 28 May 04). When suspects are permitted to meet with a lawyer, their conversations are often monitored and recorded by authorities.

146 Commission Staff Interviews. In the Yang Jianli case, Yang was only permitted to meet with his defense attorneys three times, and each of these meetings was recorded. Prosecutors had nearly a year and a half to prepare their case against Yang. Yang Jianli, Closing Statement in Court, 4 August 03 (on file with the Commission).

147 See, e.g., "Several Problems in the Reform of Judicial Administration," Legal Daily; "New Rules Enshrine Rights of Lawyers in Criminal Cases," Xinhua, 4 March 04 (FBIS, 5 March 04); "Chinese Procuratorate Moves to Protect the Rights of the Accused," Xinhua, 11 March 04 (FBIS, 11 March 04).

148 Commission Staff Interviews.

149 Commission Staff Interviews; Ping Yu, "Glittery Promise vs. Dismal Reality: The Rule of a Criminal Defense Lawyer in The People’s Republic of China After the 1996 Revision of the Criminal Procedure Law," 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 827 (2002).

150 CECC, Zhang Jianzhong Case Update.

151 CECC, Defense Lawyers Turned Defendants, Zhang Jianzhong and the Criminal Prosecution of Defense Lawyers in China.

152 Xiao Yang, "Scrapping Article 306 Would Make Law Fairer," China Daily, 12 April 04. Chinese judicial officials also publicly acknowledged the problem in August 2004. "Several Problems in the Reform of Judicial Administration," Legal Daily.

153 Provisions on People’s Procuratorates Safeguarding Lawyers Carrying Out Professional Work According to Law During the Criminal Process [Guanyu renmin jianchayuan baozhang lu¨ shi zai xingshi susong zhong yifa zhiye de guiding], issued 30 December 03.

154 For example, the new provisions require prosecutors to inform defense attorneys when a suspect has been detained and of the place of detention, and to "arrange" a meeting between lawyers and clients within 48 hours of a request by either party.

155 Xiao Yang, "Scrapping Article 306 Would Make Law Fairer"; "New Rules Enshrine Rights of Lawyers in Criminal Cases," Xinhua; "Chinese Procuratorate Moves to Protect the Rights of the Accused," Xinhua; "Several Problems in the Reform of Judicial Administration," Legal Daily.

156 See, e.g., Xiao Yang, "Scrapping Article 306 Would Make Law Fairer."

157 Prosecutors conduct initial investigations in only a limited number of cases. This function is usually carried out by public security. The Ministry of Public Security is reportedly drafting a similar set of regulations, but it is unclear when these regulations will be released. "China in Need of More Good Lawyers," Xinhua, 23 March 04 (FBIS, 23 March 04). Several attorneys complained that the regulations have had no impact in practice.

158 For example, prosecutors undermine the spirit of the provision on client access by concluding "arrangements" for a client meeting within 48 hours but setting the actual date for meetings much later. Chinese attorneys suggested to Commission staff that the regulations have not yet had a meaningful impact in practice. Commission Staff Interviews.

159 In 2003, Chinese courts imposed sentences on 933,967 criminal defendants and declared 4,835 defendants not guilty. SPC Work Report, March 2004. A conviction rate of 99 percent raises obvious questions about the fairness of criminal trials. High conviction rates are not uncommon in other parts of Asia. For example, police in Japan report very few suspects who are not convictable, and about 99 percent of those who are prosecuted are convicted. However, defendants in Japan are treated with extraordinary leniency. According to one expert, defendants are often punished with only minor fines, and courts suspend criminal sentences in almost 50 percent of cases. John Owen Haley, Authority Without Power, Law and the Japanese Paradox(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 125-33, 135-38, reprinted in John Henry Merryman, David S. Clark, John Owen Haley, eds. The Civil Law Tradition (Charlottesville: Michie, 1994),1119-21.

160 Shi Jiangtao, "Legal Scholars Have Diverse Interpretations of Figures." One particularly egregious example of the presumption of guilt was described in the Beijing Youth Daily. A criminal named Wang Youen was tried and retried a total of four times for murder. At his third trial, the judge was reported to have asked, "What evidence do you have that you didn’t commit the murder? " Six years after he was first detained, Wang was finally exonerated by the Heilongjiang High People’s Court. Amnesty International, Executed According to Law, (citing "Condemned Prisoner wins 140,000 in compensation," Beijing Youth Daily, 28 April 02).

161 In 2000, for example, people’s courts of first instance nationwide handled a total of 560,111 criminal cases, while courts of second instance handled 86,619 cases (giving a rough appeal rate of approximately 15 percent). 2001 China Law Yearbook [2001 Zhongguo falu nianjian], (Beijing: Legal Press, 2001), 1256, 1258. In 2001, people’s courts of first instance nationwide handled a total of 623,792 criminal cases, while courts of second instance handled 98,157 cases (also a rough appeal rate of approximately 15 percent). 2002 China Law Yearbook [2002 Zhongguo falu¨ nianjian], (Beijing: Legal Press, 2002), 1,238 and 1,240. These figures provide only a rough estimate of the rate of defendant appeals. Not all of the second instance cases handled in a year correspond to first instance cases handled that same year. Moreover, in China, prosecutors have the right to appeal a verdict of not guilty. Chinese law also permits "private prosecutions" in some cases and allows private prosecutors to appeal not guilty verdicts. PRC Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 180-1. Overall, the SPC places the rate of appeal in China at about 12 percent for all cases (civil, criminal, and administrative). "Chinese Grassroots Courts Adjudicate 5.2 Million Cases Each Year," Xinhua, 6 July 04 (FBIS, 6 July 04). In December 2003, dissident Yang Jianli declined to exercise his right to appeal, arguing in a written statement that the process was a sham. "U.S.-Based Dissident Yang Refuses to Appeal Sentence for Espionage Charges," Agence France-Presse, 25 May 04 (FBIS, 25 May 04). In February 2004, serial killer Yang Xinhai waived his right to appeal after an hour-long trial, despite the fact that he had been sentenced to death. "Death for China’s Serial Killer," BBC News, 2 February 04, <www.news.bbc.co.uk>.

162 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 181, 203-207. Although decisions by appeals courts are supposed to be "final," provisions on "adjudication supervision" in the Criminal Procedure Law require people’s courts to retry cases when prosecutors find a "definite error in a legally effective judgment or order" and protest to the court. In fact, China’s State Compensation Law creates a perverse incentive for prosecutors to continue appealing, as a verdict of not guilty may subject them to criminal compensation liability for wrongful arrest and prosecution. State Compensation Law, adopted 12 May 94, art. 15. Chinese scholars have noted this unintended effect of the State Compensation Law. De Hengbei, "An Analysis of Basic Concepts in the Controversy over Seeking the Criminal Liability of Lawyers."

163 There are numerous examples of trials in sensitive or complex cases that lasted only hours or a day, including those of Internet dissident Du Daobin (20 minutes), serial killer Yang Xinhai (one hour), democracy activist He Depu (two hours), entrepreneur Sun Dawu (six hours), Zhang Jianzhong (one day), dissident Yang Jianli (one day), and resident activist and advocate Zheng Enchong (one day). While the length of a trial alone cannot be taken as the sole indicator of fairness, such short trials in key cases, when considered along with the many other problems and statistics raised in this section, suggest that trials are little more than a formality.

164 Under Article 152 of the Criminal Procedure Law, all criminal cases of first instance, except those involving "state secrets," the "private affairs of individuals," or minors, are required to be held in public. If a case is not to be held in public, the court must announce the specific reason at the proceeding. Authorities sometimes restrict access to trials not falling within such exceptions. For example, the trials of Zhang Jianzhong and the officials charged with dereliction of duty in the death of Sun Zhigang were restricted, despite the fact that these cases did not involve state secrets.

165 Human Rights in China Press Release, "Internet Activist Du Daobin Goes to Trial," 17 May 04.

166 Ibid.

167 Shi Jiangtao, "Legal Scholars Have Diverse Interpretations of Figures."

168 City of Beijing, Bureau of National Security Opinion Recommending Prosecution, 4 June 03; Defense Statement in Trial of First Instance of Yang Jianli, 4 August 03 (on file with the Commission).

169 Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate Court, Criminal Judgment in the Case of Zheng Enchong, 28 October 03; Defense Statement in Trial of First Instance of Zheng Enchong, 28 August 03 (on file with the Commission).

170 Shao’s conviction appears to have been based primarily on a Judicial Accounting Audit commissioned by public security, Shao’s alleged confession, and the statements of other witnesses, including two import agents who themselves were implicated in the case. Both Shao and a panel of legal experts have raised compelling questions about the reliability of the Judicial Accounting Audit. Shao denies confessing to any crimes, and the police interrogation record produced at trial reportedly contained no record of his confession. Police have refused to release the original interrogation records. According to the trial court judgment, several witnesses who were also charged with crimes and who implicated Shao were given lenient treatment for their cooperation. Shao maintains that he was prosecuted because he refused to pay bribes to local tax auditors. An extensive collection of documents relevant to the case, including the indictment and the trial court judgment, is on file with the Commission.

171 Under Article 46 of the Criminal Procedure Law, "Confession by the defendant only, without other evidence, cannot be used to determine that the defendant is guilty and to make any sentencing."

172 See, e.g., "A Wenzhou ‘Criminal Sentenced to Death’ Who Sat in Jail For Eight Years Wants State Compensation," Xinhua. In the Wenzhou case, Dong Wenlie was sentenced to death for drug crimes. He reportedly confessed after two days of torture. No witnesses appeared at his trial and no documentary evidence of his crimes was submitted to the court. See also, "Chongqing Resident Obtains 130,000 in State Compensation for Wrongful Murder Judgment and Seven Years in Prison," [Chongqing yi shimin bei cuopan sharenzui fuxing qi nian huo guojia peichang shisanwan], Procuratorial Daily [Jiancha ribao], 10 November 03, <www.jcrb.com.cn> (citing the case of Dong Liming, who was convicted for murder and sentenced to death on questionable evidence and confessions that were later withdrawn), and Pan, "Easing of Penal System Part of Change in China" (citing the case of Li Ping, a migrant worker convicted of murder and sentenced to death on the basis of a confession obtained through torture and later released by authorities); Irene Wang, "New Twist in Convicted Killers’ Fight for Justice," South China Morning Post, 7 August 04, <www.scmp.com>.

173 Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire," 1,034.

174 CECC, 2003 Annual Report, Section V(e).

175 One Chinese legal scholar recently decried the influence of Political-Legal Committees on the judiciary. "Scholar Accuses Political-Legal Committees of Obstructing the Independence of the Judiciary-The Courts Sink to the Level of ‘Prisoners’ and Constitutional Violations Should be Eliminated," Ming Pao, 30 July 03 (FBIS, 30 July 03).

176 John Pomfret, "Child’s Death Highlights Problems in Criminal Justice," Washington Post, 3 July 03, <www.washingtonpost.com>.

177 John Pomfret, "Execution Reveals Party’s Grip on China," Washington Post, 23 December 03, <www.washingtonpost.com>.

178 PRC Criminal Law. Yang Shilong, "How Much Longer Until China Abolishes the Death Penalty" [Zhongguo li feichu sixing haiyou duo yuan?], Huanqiu [Globe], 1 June 04 (an interview with scholar Liu Renwen). According to one recent NGO report, there is some disagreement among scholars on the exact number of capital offenses in China. Amnesty International, Executed According to Law, 10. The majority of offenses for which individuals may be subject to the death penalty are non-violent economic offenses. "Is There a Limit to Deterrence of Corruption? Experts Say We Can Consider Abolishing the Death Penalty for Economic Crimes," [Fubai weishe you xian? Zhuanjia cheng ke kaocha feizhi jingji fanzui sixing], China News Net[Zhongguo xinwen wang], 10 August 04, <www.news.china.com>.

179 Amendment III to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, adopted 29 December 01. Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Interpretation on Several Questions Related to Specific Law to Be Applied in Handling Criminal Cases Involving the Illegal Production, Sale, Transport, and Storage of Strong Rat Poison and Other Prohibited Deadly Chemicals [Zuigao renmin fayuan, zuigao renmin jianchayuan, guanyu banli feifa zhizao, maimai, yunshu, chucun dushuqian deng jinyun judu yuaxueping xingshi anjian juti yingyong falu¨ ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 29 August 03. Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Interpretation on Certain Problems of Concretely Applying the Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Impairment of the Prevention or Control of Outbreaks of Contagious Diseases and Epidemics and Other Disasters [Zuigao renmin fayuan, zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu banli fanghai, kongzhi tufa zhuanranbing yiqing deng zaihai de xingshi anjian juti yingyong falu¨ ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 13 May 03.

180 Yang Shilong, "How Much Longer Until China Abolishes the Death Penalty"; Guo Guangdong, "The Death Penalty: Keep It or Abolish It? " [Sixing: Baoliu? Feichu?], People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], 10 January 03.

181 Peerenboom, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire," 1050 (citing various polls taken between 1995 and 2001 indicating public support for heavy punishments and the death penalty).In December 2002, one scholar tracked messages posted to an Internet chat room in response to media stories about a scholarly conference on the death penalty. According to the scholar, more than 80 percent of the respondents supported the death penalty, while 76 percent called for the number of capital crimes to be increased. Reportedly, only 13 percent of the submissions favored abolishing capital punishment. "Death Row Lawyer Heads China’s Execution Debate," Reuters, 4 February 02, <www.asia.cnn.com>. The strong public outcry in response to the decision by a Shenyang court to change the death sentence of mafia boss Liu Yong also suggests strong support for capital punishment. See supra, China’s "Strike Hard" Anti-Crime Campaign and the accompanying note on the Liu Yong case. For one recent article that reflects mainstream views on the efficacy on the death penalty, see "Death Sentences in Major Corruption Cases Terrify Corrupt Individuals" [Jutan bei pan sixing ran fubazhe danzhan xinjing], Legal Evening News [Fazhi wanbao], 26 August 04. In August 2004, Reuters reported that more than 50 individuals in Xinjiang were executed as part of a government crackdown on separatists and alleged terrorists. John Ruwitch, "China Convicts 50 to Death in ‘Terror Crackdown,"’ 13 September 04. Chinese scholar Liu Renwen contends that public support of the death penalty is problematic, however. If the public were informed about the number of executions and wrongful judgments involving death sentences, experts were allowed to discuss materials and problems related to the death penalty openly, and the public was not constantly bombarded with propaganda about the positive impact of the death penalty, he argues, the public would likely have a different view. Yang Shilong, "How Much Longer Until China Abolishes the Death Penalty."

182 "Is There a Limit to Deterrence of Corruption? Experts Say We Can Consider Abolishing the Death Penalty for Economic Crimes," China News Net. Even senior Chinese officials who oppose abolition of the death penalty now acknowledge that the trend is for capital punishment to be phased out. Commission Staff Interview.

183 "PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Defends Keeping PRC Execution Statistics Secret," Agence France-Presse, 5 February 04 (FBIS, 5 February 04).

184 Amnesty International, Executed According to Law, 1.

185 Huang Yong, "Forty-One National People’s Congress Deputies Submit a Joint Proposal Calling on the Supreme People’s Court To Reclaim the Power To Examine and Approve Death Sentences" [41 daibiao lianming jianyi zuigao renmin fayuan shouhui sixing hezhunquan], China Youth Daily [Zhongguo qingnianbao], 12 March 04. According to the report, the NPC delegate also stated that China executes five times the total in all other countries combined each year.

186 It is possible that the delegate could have been referring to cases in which death sentences were handed down as opposed to cases in which death sentences were actually carried out. Some death sentences are suspended for two years or commuted to life imprisonment.

187 John Kamm of the Dui Hua Foundation estimated in 2003 that there are at least 10,000 executions in China each year. Disidai [The Fourth Generation], a book purportedly written by an internal Chinese government source, cites a Party dossier on Luo Gan as indicating that 15,000 people a year were executed between 1998 and 2002. Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, NYREV, Inc., 2003.

188 Benjamin Kang Lim, "China Security Czar Orders Fewer Executions," Reuters, 9 March

04. Luo is reported to have issued a directive stating that "If it’s possible to execute fewer people, then execute fewer people" and "If it’s possible not to execute people, then don’t execute people." One Chinese expert confirms that while this is the policy on paper, it is not concrete enough to affect practice, particularly in the context of the leadership’s "strike hard" effort.

189 Yang Shilong, "How Much Longer Until China Abolishes the Death Penalty."

190 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality, 10 February 03, 5-10.

191 SPC Work Report, March 2004. According to the work report, of 300 cases involving the review of death sentences, the original sentence was sustained in 182 cases, the sentence was changed in 94 cases, and 24 cases were remanded to lower level courts for retrial. One Chinese scholar reports that the annual rate of reversal for death sentences reviewed by the SPC fluctuates between 20 percent and 29 percent. Yang Shilong, "How Much Longer Until China Abolishes the Death Penalty" (citing Liu Renwen as putting the range from 20 to 29 percent). See also, Pan, "Easing of Penal System Part of Change in China" (citing Chen Xinliang as placing the rate between 25 percent and 30 percent).

192 Yang Shilong, "How Much Longer Until China Abolishes the Death Penalty"; Pan, "Easing of Penal System Part of Change in China."

193 Huang Yong, "Forty-One National People’s Congress Deputies Submit a Joint Proposal," "Response to the Delegates’ Motion to Take Back the Power to Approve Death Sentences: The Supreme People’s Court is Considering Establishing Branch Chambers to Review Death Sentences" [Huiying daibiao shouhui sixing yian: zuigao renmin fayuan kaocha shefenyuan zhuanhe sixing], Southern Metropolitan Daily [Nanfang dushibao], 12 March 04, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>. There is some debate as to whether the SPC can do this unilaterally or whether the NPC Standing Committee must approve the change. "Who Should Determine Whether to Recall the Power of Death Penalty Review" [Shouhui sixing hezhunquan ying shui shuo le suan], Procuratorial Daily [Jiacha ribao], 17 March 04, <www.jcrb.com.cn>. A senior judicial official interviewed by Commission staff indicated that the NPC would have to resolve the issue. Commission Staff Interview.

194 Response to the Delegates’ Motion to Take Back the Power to Approve Death Sentences," Southern Metropolitan Daily; Pan, "Easing of Penal System Part of Change in China."

195 A People’s Court Daily article listed "benefits to China’s international human rights struggle" as one of the four principal reasons the SPC is considering the move to take back review of death sentences. Wang Lianying, "Give the Power to Review and Approve Death Sentences Back to the Supreme People’s Court" [Jiang sixing anjian hezhunquan shouhui zuigao fayuan], People’s Court Daily [Renmin fayuanbao], 12 March 04. This and other reform proposals were announced shortly before the UN Human Rights Commission met in Geneva in April 2004.

196 See, e.g., Chow Chung-yan, "Mainland Police Vow to Open Up to Media," South China Morning Post, 3 January 04; Liu Renwen, "Social Order Information Disclosure System: Public’s Right to Know About Situation," Study Times, 19 January 04 (FBIS, 23 January 04); Sun Chingwen, "Academics Expect CPC Central Committee to Institute Spokesman System," Ta Kung Pao, 12 October 03 (FBIS, 13 October 03); "Supreme People’s Procuratorate Sets Up Spokesman System for Quarterly News Briefings," Xinhua, 23 July 03 (FBIS, 23 July 03); Li Xu, "Beijing Municipal Procuratorate Unveils ‘Extended Custody Reporting Telephone Hotline,"’ Xinhua, 2 August 03 (FBIS, 2 August 03); "China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate Establishes Hotlines to Hear Human Rights Complaints," Xinhua, 27 June 04 (FBIS, 27 June 04).

197 Under the program, citizen supervisors participate in the investigation of cases involving procuratorial misconduct, review case files and charging decisions upon the request of a defendant, submit opinions on the handling of cases, and appeal to higher level procuratorial organs in cases of concern. Wu Huanqing, "3000 Citizen Supervisors Begin Work in 10 Provinces" [3000 ming renmin jianduyuan 10 sheng shanggang], Xinhua, 30 October 03; "200 Cases Are Subjected to Monitoring Procedure by People’s Monitors" [Erbai yu anjian jinru renmin jianduyuan jiandu chengxu], Guangming Daily [Guangming ribao], 12 December 03, <www.gmw.com.cn>. In March 2004, the SPP reported that a total of 4,944 citizen supervisors had handled nearly 500 cases. SPP Work Report, March 2004. One leading defense lawyer critical of other reform efforts expressed optimism about the citizen supervisor program. Commission Staff Interview.

198 Regulations on Disciplinary Measures for Prosecutors [Jianchayuan jilu chufen tiaoli], issued 21 June 04. For a brief introduction to the measures, see "Disciplinary Punishment Rules for Prosecutors," Xinhua, 13 August 04, (FBIS, 13 August 04).

199 In the summer of 2003, Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang launched a campaign to address a backlog of citizen complaints about public security organs and to investigate the "seven major problems in public security." "The Ministry of Public Security Will Concentrate on Settling the Backlog of Seven Major Complaints About Public Security" [Gonganbu jiang jizhong qingli fanying gongan zi da wenti de jubao jiyajian," Xinhua, 13 August 03, <www.xinhuanet.com>. According to official reports, public security organs at all levels dispatched more than 20,000 inspection teams to root out abuses. "China Sacks 387 Policemen for Misconduct in 2003," Xinhua, 15 January 04 (FBIS, 15 January 04).

200 "China Sacks 387 Policemen for Misconduct in 2003"; Chow Chungyan, "Thousands of Rogue Police Officers Sacked," South China Morning Post, 8 January 04, <www.scmp.com>; "PRC State Councilor Zhou Yongkong Calls For Police Force," Xinhua, 9 April 04 (FBIS, 9 April 04).

201 "China Punishes 972 Court Staff for Violating Discipline, Law," Xinhua, 15 December 03 (FBIS, 15 December 03).

202 New initiatives announced include work release programs, legal aid for prisoners, degree equivalency and other professional training, limited remuneration for prison laborers, spousal visits, societal rehabilitation programs, and programs to improve production safety for prison laborers. "In Jail But Helped by Society," Xinhua, 28 December 04 (FBIS, 28 December 04); Verna Yu, "Extension of Community Service Scheme Applauded," South China Morning Post, 30 July 04 (FBIS, 30 July 04); "China Holds First Seminar On Protecting Prisoners’ Rights," Xinhua, 10 September 03 (FBIS, 10 September 03); "China Pays Salary to Prisoners at Labor Camp," Xinhua, 25 September 04, (FBIS, 25 September 04); Alice Yan, "Prison Initiative Gives Ex-Convicts a Helping Hand in Finding Work," South China Morning Post, 27 January 04, <www.scmp.com>; "Work of the Ministry of Justice Unit on Prison Production Safety" [Sifabu bushu jianyu anquan shengchan gongzuo], Legal Daily [Fazhi ribao], 18 February 04,<www.legaldaily.com.cn>; "Legal Assistance Provided to Prisoners in Beijing," Xinhua, 19 March 04 (FBIS, 19 March 04); "Convict ‘Hearings’ Come to China’s Prisons" [Fanren "tingzhenghui" zoujin zhongguo ji