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CECC 2003 Annual Report

Free Flow of Information

Overview

Under the Chinese Constitution, Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the press, in practice the government continues to suppress freedom of expression in a manner that directly contravenes not only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but also the Chinese Constitution.(142) In China, only those with government authorization may legally gather news(143) or engage in publishing,(144) and the government continues to detain and imprison individuals who publish criticisms of the Communist Party, the central government, or their policies. Chinese authorities continue to cite Karl Marx and Mao Zedong to justify these repressive policies as necessary and inevitable extensions of Communist ideology, while ignoring the writings of these individuals that criticized similar policies when their own publications were the targets of censorship.(145)

Despite barriers to access to the means of publication and the dangers inherent in publishing sensitive information, members of China's "free-speech elite" are able to express concerns and criticism regarding the government with less fear of punishment than the average Chinese citizen. This group is composed of senior government and Communist Party leaders, those with the patronage of such leaders and, to a lesser extent, academics. The operative principle could be expressed as follows: the degree to which the government is willing to tolerate criticism of its leaders and policies is contingent upon the size and nature of the audience and the ideological credentials of the speaker. For example, Chinese and Western academics convened a conference on the death penalty in January 2003, and some months later, a spirited debate ensued in the Chinese media. Centered on the review and approval process for death penalty cases, the debate in the press featured analytical articles by legal experts from Chinese universities.(146) However, the Chinese government tolerates such debates only as long as they occur in private discussions, closed academic conferences, government-authorized publishing outlets, or other forums where the government does not feel there is any threat of public participation that it cannot control.(147) Authorities continue to silence debates if they begin to take on a life of their own, and refuse to recognize the right of the average Chinese citizens to publish their opinions on political issues in forums that are free from government censorship.(148)

Certain groups and individuals who are unable to obtain government authorization to publish manage to put out books and periodicals on a small scale, but this is possible only through subterfuge and violating Chinese law (for example, by stamping publications as "not for external distribution," or by purchasing book numbers that licensed publishers illegally offer for sale). These private publishers are therefore subject to the threat of closure and arrest each time they exercise their right to freedom of expression.

The spread of the Internet and the introduction of capitalist market forces to the publishing industry have resulted in more sources of information becoming available to the citizens of China. While still state-controlled, China's media are becoming increasingly vigorous. Chinese authorities have also announced that they are considering privatizing most government publications.(149) Depending on how it is implemented, this proposal could represent a first step toward relative editorial independence for China's domestic media. At present, however, the government's practices of replacing editorial and managerial personnel, shutting down entire publications, imprisoning journalists and writers for expressing political opinions, and blocking access to information it does not control demonstrates that editorial control over all politically sensitive reporting remains a top priority, and that it will not tolerate articles critical of the local government unless the author portrays the Communist Party and the central government in a generally positive light.(150)

Chinese authorities employ three tools to hinder the free flow of information and suppress freedom of expression: prior restraints, monitoring and jamming of communications, and selective enforcement of broad and vague national security laws. The past year has seen Chinese authorities make extensive use of each of these tools.

Prior Restraints

The term "prior restraint" refers to a system in which the government may deny a person the use of a forum for expression in advance of the actual expression. Such systems are rare in representative democracies with respect to print media and the Internet. Before the Chinese Communist Party came to power its official newspaper described prior restraints on publishing as "fascist."(151) Today, however, Chinese authorities employ extensive prior restraints over print and Internet media.

Rulers have recognized for centuries that prior restraints are effective in silencing dissent.(152) One of the most effective forms of prior restraint, and the form preferred by Chinese authorities, is to allow only authorized persons to publish.(153) The requirement of obtaining and maintaining authorization creates barriers to entry, and means that Chinese authorities control who gets to speak (by refusing to grant authorization) and keep their fingers on an "onoff switch" with respect to an entire publication (by maintaining the ability to revoke authorization and silence the speaker completely).

Chinese law states that the government directly controls the amount, structure, distribution, and coordination of all publishing in the country, and that only authorized government-sponsored entities may engage in publishing:
  • No one may publish a newspaper, periodical, book, or any other publication without government authorization and sponsorship;
  • Periodicals and Web sites may only publish news acquired from government-authorized sources;
  • No one may engage in the publication, production, copying, importing, wholesale, retail, or renting of audio-visual products without authorization;
  • No one may operate a facility to print or copy publications without authorization;
  • No one may import publications without authorization;
  • No one may exhibit imported publications without authorization; and
  • No one may publish, produce, import, or distribute magnetic, optical, or electronic media containing drawings, writing, sound, or pictures without authorization.(154)
The Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department sends out regular bulletins to editors informing them which topics are forbidden.(155) For example, in July, Xinhua reported that Shenzhen's Administration for Press and Publication had issued "Measures for Publishing Orientation Warning Work" specifying how authorities may require editors and managers of publications exhibiting inappropriate political orientation to undergo "critical education" and possibly reassignment.(156) More recently, in August reports emerged that Chinese authorities had issued a list of "three topics that cannot be mentioned" (san bu neng ti) to media outlets and academic institutions prohibiting the publication of articles on, or academic discussion of, constitutional amendments, political reform, and the Tiananmen Square crackdown.(157)

Media outlets that fail to obey mandates like the aforementioned examples are subject to closure, and their editors, managers, and reporters to dismissal:
  • In November 2002, Jin Minhua, an editor with Shenzhen Zhoukan, was fired at the behest of the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department after the paper published an article depicting Hu Jintao as a puppet of Jiang Zemin.(158)
  • In March 2003, Chinese authorities suspended publication of the 21st Century World Herald after it published an article referring to democracy in China as "fake" democracy.(159)
  • In April 2003, Chinese authorities replaced the editor-in-chief of the politically cutting-edge Southern Weekend with a senior official from Guangdong's Communist Party Propaganda Department.(160)
  • In June 2003, Chinese authorities shut down the Beijing Xinbao and fired some editorial staff after the paper printed an essay criticizing the National People's Congress.(161)
China's prior restraint system not only allows authorities to exercise these "negative" controls over the media by prohibiting people from publishing and forbidding the publication of objectionable articles, but it also enables the government to suppress freedom of expression through "positive" controls, by dictating to editors what they must print. The government exercises these positive controls by requiring senior editorial staff to receive political indoctrination, and by convening regular meetings with editors and issuing bulletins to inform them of what stories they must carry and how certain issues must be portrayed.(162) In the weeks before the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the government demonstrated that it is both willing and able to force publications to print what it demands when it required popular Internet portals such as Sohu.com to display banners praising the Party and celebrating the Party Congress in lieu of paid advertising.(163)

SARS provided a tragic example of how China's prior restraint system allows the government to suppress freedom of expression and prevent China's media from reporting on matters of public concern. This system impedes the free flow of information in a way that threatens the well-being of Chinese citizens and, as China has chosen to participate increasingly in global affairs, everyone with whom they interact.(164)

In December 2002, health care workers in Guangdong Province began noticing people coming in with "atypical pneumonia," and by early January 2003 people were already engaged in panic buying at drug stores because of rumors of a "mystery epidemic."(165) But the same government-controlled newspapers that first broke the story in early January devoted most of their coverage to stories with headlines claiming "The Appearance of an Unknown Virus in He Yuan is a Rumor" and articles quoting government claims that "there is no epidemic."(166) Chinese authorities did not begin to allow reporting on the crisis until the disease began killing people in Hong Kong, where there is little direct government restraint on the free flow of information. Even then, the government-controlled Chinese media continued to insist that everything was under control for several weeks.

In response to their cover-up and mishandling of the SARS crisis, Chinese authorities did dismiss some senior officials and enact regulations to discourage provincial and local officials from concealing information from the central government. However, these reforms were not intended to relax the government's control over the media or the free flow of information to the general public. Rather, the goal was to increase the flow of information to central authorities in Beijing, control how the press reported on the matter, and prevent private citizens from publishing opinions regarding the government's handling of the crisis.(167) For example, although admissions that authorities mishandled the SARS crisis appeared in some Chinese newspapers, criticism was limited to local officials and "the media," while the central government was portrayed as coming to the rescue of the people.(168) It remained forbidden to discuss the lack of a free press or the role that the Communist Party, the central government, and the censorship and media control systems they have established played in allowing SARS to spread unchecked for so long.(169)

The following events further illustrate how the SARS crisis has not resulted in any meaningful relaxation of the Chinese government's control over the reporting of politically sensitive news:
  • In April 2003, authorities in Beijing arrested a person for sending messages saying that an "undiagnosed contagious disease was spreading in Beijing," on the grounds that he was spreading rumors and that "Beijing had never had the spread of any 'mysterious illness.'"(170)
  • In April 2003, two editors at Xinhua were fired for publishing a document about SARS.(171)
  • In April 2003, Chinese authorities removed the editor-in-chief of Southern Weekend, a publication known for addressing politically sensitive topics, and replaced him with Zhang Dongming, a former Director of News Media at the Propaganda Department in Guangdong, who some observers in China consider partly responsible for the initial SARS cover-up.(172)
  • In May 2003, China blacked out a CNN interview that was critical of the government's handling of the SARS crisis.(173)
  • In June 2003, Chinese authorities blocked distribution of an issue of Caijing magazine that discussed the government's handling of the SARS crisis. Although it was reported that Caijing editors claimed that the failure to distribute the issue was the result of logistical problems, censors repeatedly blocked attempts by Commission staff to post questions such as "Has Caijing been censored?" on government-controlled Internet bulletin boards.
  • In July 2003, the Propaganda Department issued a notice to at least one television station prohibiting it from inviting academics to discuss the government's handling of the SARS crisis.(174)
Monitoring, Jamming, and Blocking of Information

Although the SARS crisis has resulted in Chinese authorities encouraging the flow of government-controlled information, the past year has seen no easing of the government's blocking the flow of information that it does not control. Chinese authorities continue to attempt to block Voice of America and Radio Free Asia shortwave radio transmissions directed into China. In a statement made before a Commission roundtable in December 2002, a representative of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) said that the BBG has filed complaints of "harmful interference" with the International Telecommunications Union monthly since August 2000. China first acknowledged receipt of the complaints in July 2002, and again acknowledged the complaints in August 2002. Failure to acknowledge complaints is itself a violation of ITU radio regulations.(175)

> The Chinese government restricts who can legally receive satellite television broadcasts and restricts individual ownership of satellite receivers. Chinese viewers often ignore these restrictions and install illegal receivers to view foreign broadcasts.(176) While authorities have allowed limited legal distribution of some foreign channels to some households in Guangdong Province, national distribution is limited to luxury hotels and foreign compounds. Authorities have also begun requiring that all foreign satellite television broadcasts be distributed through a government-owned and operated platform, which has enabled more fine-tuned censorship of foreign television broadcasts.(177) For example, in June 2003, Chinese authorities cut CNN's broadcast into China just as a Hong Kong lawmaker began to criticize proposed anti-subversion legislation and resumed the broadcast once the interview was over.(178)

Chinese authorities continue to block human rights, educational, political, and news Web sites without providing the public notice, explanation, or opportunity for appeal.(179) Chinese law requires U.S. Internet service providers operating in China to comply with Chinese government controls on Internet content and to cooperate with Chinese authorities in the enforcement of Chinese law. Some in the United States have expressed concern that Chinese authorities are using technologies developed by U.S. companies as part of this effort.(180) Chinese officials have publicly admitted that the government has established a national firewall to prevent Chinese citizens from accessing certain types of content.(181) Studies conducted by the Commission staff and others indicate that the firewall is used primarily to block political content, not obscenity or junk mail. Tests performed by the Commission staff indicate that the Chinese government continues to manipulate Internet communications in the following manner:
  • Attempting to access prohibited Web sites results in either a gateway timeout or "Page Cannot Be Displayed" message. Chinese authorities continue to block sites such as Google¡¯s cache (which would allow people to view "snapshots" of sites taken by Google, and thereby view Web pages which were otherwise blocked), the Alta Vista search engine, BBC (Chinese), VOA and those of most human rights organizations critical of the Chinese government (including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in China, China Labor Bulletin, the Dui Hua Foundation, and Reporters Without Borders).
  • Searching for certain sensitive terms, such as "Falun Gong," on search engines regulated by the Chinese government yields results (which do not deviate from the official government position), while searches for the same terms on search engines not regulated by the Chinese government, such as Google, results in the Internet browser being temporarily disabled.
  • Attempting to send e-mails from China to well-known dissidents using an Internet browser interface results in the browser being temporarily disabled.
Chinese Internet users are generally able to access English-language news from major Western news media outlets through the national firewall, but Chinese authorities actively block Chinese language news Web sites whose contents they are unable to control. For example, tests performed by the Commission staff indicate that while Internet users could access the BBC and Radio Canada Web sites in English, the Chinese versions were inaccessible.

Over the past year, Chinese authorities continued their policy of increasing the extent of Internet censorship during politically sensitive times. For example, Chinese authorities blocked access to foreign news Web sites (even sites available only in English such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and CNN) during the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 and the 10th National People's Congress in March 2003.

Chinese authorities are becoming increasingly sophisticated in how they censor the Internet and admit to developing technologies that will both enable more targeted censoring and notify government officials as soon as any person tries to access such Web sites. Specifically, officials claim to be prepared to deploy technologies that will allow them to automatically and precisely block Web pages based, not on specific words, but on the actual viewpoint of the author. In February 2003, state-sponsored academic researchers in China announced that they already developed such technology for a "Falun Gong Content Examination System." Using this system if an article contains pro-Falun Gong information, it is designated as "black." If the system determines an article criticizes or opposes Falun Gong, it is designated as "red." Articles dealing with Buddhism, qigong, and health care are designated as "neutral." The system can be installed on personal computers, servers, and at national gateways, so that as soon as a user tries to visit a Web page that is pro-Falun Gong, the system can filter the page and immediately notify authorities.(182)

> Tests performed by Commission staff indicate that systems providing this type of increasingly fine-tuned censorship have already been deployed at some Internet cafes. Specifically, Web pages containing sensitive content on sites that are otherwise accessible begin loading, but before they are completely visible the page is replaced by a message informing the user that the content the user is trying to access is forbidden. The browser is then automatically redirected to a government-authorized general interest Web site, but the user is not told why the site was prohibited or to whom an appeal should be submitted to have the prohibition removed.

Internet bulletin board systems (BBSs) continue to provide a glimpse at how Chinese authorities would like to shape the Internet. As one Chinese government agency put it: "[BBSs such as the one operated by the official People's Daily] represent the degree of freedom of expression the people of China have."(183) Chinese law requires all BBSs to be licensed, all articles to be constantly monitored, and all inappropriate articles to be taken down. "Internet police" monitor domestic BBSs,(184) and BBS providers must keep a record of all content posted on their Web site, the time it was posted, and the source's IP address or city name.

BBSs use software to automatically block posts containing blacklisted words and also use human monitors to block and remove articles posted with content that they deem politically unacceptable.(185) It is possible to watch as users on government-controlled BBSs debate with the censor about whether or not a given post should be allowed. In one case, a Commission staff member observed a user successfully persuade a censor to allow his post because, even though the title sounded like it was praising the U.S. multi-party system, in fact, it was a long essay about the dangers inherent in such a system. Commission staff regularly observe censors removing posts that are either too critical of the government, or that might be acceptable by themselves but have generated too many responses critical of the government. BBSs that become known for allowing cutting-edge postings on politically sensitive topics routinely disappear from the Internet altogether.(186)

Selectively Enforced National Security Laws

Chinese national security laws do not clearly define the scope of freedom of expression, and the Communist Party and the Chinese government exploit these vague and broad regulations to silence Chinese citizens who would criticize them and their policies. Chinese law requires that anyone intending to disclose information relating to state secrets, national security, or the nation's leaders get prior government authorization. The law then defines these terms to encompass all forms of information pertaining to politics, economics, and society.(187) Therefore, anyone who publishes or passes on information regarding such matters without prior authorization has violated the law, regardless of the content of the writings.(188) In other words, Chinese authorities employ the country's broad and vague national security laws as another form of prior restraint.

In November 2002, Amnesty International published a report detailing 33 cases of individuals detained or imprisoned for national security-related charges in connection with the unauthorized publication of articles on the Internet.(189) Reports from U.S. and international NGOs such as the Digital Freedom Network, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders, and Human Rights in China indicate that Chinese authorities regularly detain and imprison professional and freelance journalists and writers based on accusations that their writings violate national security laws.(190) For example:
  • In November and December 2002, authorities detained several people who had signed an open letter calling for political reform prior to the 16th Party Congress.(191)
  • In February 2003 a court in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region sentenced Tao Haidong to 7 years in prison for using the Internet to publicize "reactionary" essays that "willfully smeared and vilified the leaders of the Party and the nation." (192)
  • In May 2003, Huang Qi, a computer engineer, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for subversion and incitement to overthrow the government based on his alleged involvement with a Web site intended to assist people in locating relatives who had disappeared in the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.(193)
  • Also in May 2003, Jin Haike, Xu Wei, Yang Zili, and Zhang Honghai, members of an informal discussion group, were given prison sentences of between 8 and 10 years for publishing articles on the Internet expressing opinions such as "The democracy currently implemented in China is fake democracy" and "End the elderly persons' government, establish a youthful China." (194)
  • In July 2003, the official People's Daily carried a report that police in Henan had subjected a 15-year-old to administrative punishment for posting an article on an Internet bulletin board that "made insinuations regarding the Party and the government." According to the report, it was necessary to punish the child "in order to safeguard respect for the law and ensure the healthy development of the Internet."(195)
Chinese authorities have failed to make public any information indicating that these individuals (or most of those currently detained or imprisoned for their writings) did anything more than express opinions or provide a forum for others to express their opinions. Government authorities have not shown the public that these people have committed any acts, or advocated the commission of any acts, that violated any law or otherwise represented a threat to the national security of China. Rather, the only "crime" that has been shown to have occurred was the unauthorized publication of articles that expressed opinions inconsistent with, or critical of, the leaders and policies of the Communist Party and the central government.

China's legislative bodies continue to enact broad and conflicting regulations that hold out the threat of sanctions for anyone who commits such vaguely defined breaches as spreading rumors, offending the honor of China, or "jeopardizing social stability." (196) The example of the 15-year-old in Henan clearly illustrates how Chinese authorities use selectively enforced laws to encourage selfcensorship: reports of the incident by the state-controlled media did not specify what the child wrote, nor did it specify the "administrative punishment," which in China can include prolonged imprisonment. This legal system hangs over the citizens of China like a sword of Damocles, and as long it remains in place, for every person who chooses to speak out and is detained, many more will choose the cautious path and not speak at all.

Footnotes

142: See arts. 19, 19, and 35, respectively.
143: See, e.g., Zhao Xianglin, "A Web site in the City Posts News Without Authorization and is Ordered to Adjust and Reform," [Shiqu yi wangzhan shanzi dengzai xinwen beile ling zhengdun] FSOnline [Foshan zaixian] (online edition of the Foshan Daily), 10 September 2002, (2 September 2003). In December 2002, Chinese authorities announced that they would institute a national licensing system for reporters, see "Who is Qualified to be a Reporter? Different Reflections on the Media's Reporting on Various Aspects of Society" [Shei you zige dang jizhe-Meiti shilu shehui geshi duici butong fanying], People's Daily [Renmin wang], 9 January 2003, (14 August 2003), and Shanghai has already put such a licensing system in place, see "Shanghai Holds the First Journalist Qualification Examination, Questions May Stymie Older Journalists" [Shanghai shouci jizhe zige kaoshi] Southern Net [Nanfang Wang], (14 August 2003), citing Cai Yan, China Youth Daily [Qingnian bao], 23 December 2002.
144: For a list of legal provisions relating to these and other restrictions on freedom of expression in China, see http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/PRCLaws.pdf
145: See, e.g., Karl Marx, "Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates," Rheinische Zeitung, May 1842:
"The free press is the ubiquitous vigilant eye of a people's soul, the embodiment of a people's faith in itself, the eloquent link that connects the individual with the state and the world, the embodied culture that transforms material struggles into intellectual struggles and idealizes their crude material form....It is the censored press that has a demoralizing effect....The government hears only its own voice, it knows that it hears only its own voice, yet it harbors the illusion that it hears the voice of the people, and it demands that the people, too, should itself harbor this illusion."
Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1840/free-press/index.htm (14 August 2003). See also Mao Zedong, "Discussions on United Government," [Lunlian he zhengfu] in "Mao Zedong Makes the Government Report to the Seventh Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party" [Mao Zedong zuoqi da zhengzhi baodao], 24 April 1945:
"We believe that the following demands are appropriate, and are the minimum acceptable:. . . We demand the elimination of all reactionary orders that suppress such things as the people's speech, press, assembly, association, thought, belief and personal freedoms, and that the people be able to obtain meaningful free rights."
Available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5099/20010426/ 452703.html (14 August 2003).
146: For a summary of this discussion see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Topic Paper, "The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality," 10 February 2003.
147: For example, unlike the death penalty conference discussed above, the Internet Society of China's 2002 Annual Conference held in November, 2002 in Shanghai and attended by Commission staff, was open to the press and the public. There was no discussion, much less debate, of freedom of expression as it relates to the Internet. One session was billed as having an "open forum," where audience members could question leaders of China's Internet industry. However, the open forum consisted of the moderator calling on a reporter from China's state owned media, who asked the panel: "When do you think the Spring of China's Internet will begin?" After several panel members responded, the moderator immediately declared the open forum over, even though 20 minutes remained before the session was scheduled to end.
148: For example, although the Chinese government encourages the state controlled media to engage in targeted reporting on corruption, it will not tolerate similar criticisms from private individuals. See, e.g., "An Employee is Detained [by 'Internet police'] for Rumormongering for Exposing the Corruption of a Superior [Wangshang helu lingdao 'fubai' yi yuangong zaoyao bei juliu]," People's Daily [Renmin wang], 5 September 2003 (citing the Chu Tian Metropolitan Daily [Chutian dushibao]), (5 September 2003).
149: See, e.g., "The Province Commences the Work of Province-Wide Rectification of Party and Government Agency Publications Abusing and Misusing Authority in Distribution," [Wo sheng kaizhan quansheng zhili dangzheng bumen baokan sanlan heli yongzhi quanfaxing gongzuo], Hubei Press and Publication Net [Hubei xinwen chuban wang], 7 August 2003, (28 August 2003).
150: See, e.g., Zhang Jiahou, "A Marxist View of the Press and 'Supervising Public Opinion'" [Makesi zhuyi xinwen guanyu xinglun jiandu] Hubei Media Net [Hubei zhuan mei wang], 25 August 2002, (14 August 2003):
"When reporters write articles supervising public opinion, they must bang the drum and shout on behalf of the Party and the people, and certainly may not take the side of a single person or a small group of people and try to gain benefit for themselves in the name of supervising public opinion."
See also Dong Qiang, "Chen Liangyu Emphasizes Needs to Ensure Implementation of Central Committees' Demand in Shanghai; Municipal Party Committee Convenes Standing Committee Meeting to Specifically Study Ways to Rectify Unorganized, Indiscriminate Press and Publications Distribution," [Chen Liangyu qiangdiao quebao zhongyang yaoqie zai benshi dedao guanqie luoshi zhili sanlan tanpai faxing], translated in FBIS, Doc. CPP20030729000046, citing Shanghai Liberation Daily [Shanghai jiefang ribao], 28 July 2003:
"We should combine the launch of the special rectification drive with the strengthening of the party's supervision over the press and publications. We should always unswervingly uphold the nature of media as the mouthpiece of the Party and people, always uphold the Party's supervision over newspapers and periodicals, and always adhere to the correct direction in guiding public opinion."
151: "Destroy Fascist Publishing Laws," [Dadao faxicsi de chubanfa], Chongqing Xinhua Daily [Xinhua ribao], 29 June 1946:
"Modern democratic countries like England and the United States simply have nothing like publishing laws formulated to gag freedom of the press. In a publishing law, to adopt requirements that newspapers and periodicals must not only apply and register, but most also obtain permission in order to engage in distribution under a so-called special permit system; only fascist countries have this sort of evil."
152: See, e.g., John Milton, "A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England," Areopagitica (1644).
153: Another form of prior restraint is judicial injunction. One political commentator explained the distinction between government censorship and judicial injunction as follows:
"The censor has no law but his superiors. The judge has no superiors but the law. The judge, however, has the duty of interpreting the law, as he understands it after conscientious examination, in order to apply it in a particular case. The censor's duty is to understand the law as officially interpreted for him in a particular case. The independent judge belongs neither to me nor to the government. The dependent censor is himself a government organ. In the case of the judge, there is involved at most the unreliability of an individual intellect, in the case of the censor the unreliability of an individual character."
Karl Marx, "Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates," Rheinische Zeitung, May, 1842, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1840/free-press/index.htm (14 August 2003).
154: See http://www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/PRCLaws.pdf for a list of Chinese laws and regulations in this area.
155: See, e.g., Wu Xuecan (former editor of the official People¡¯s Daily Foreign Edition), "Let Everyone Become a Censor: The CCP's Multifaceted Media Control" [Rang meige ren dou biancheng jianchayuan], VIP Reference [Da cankao], 12 March 2002, http://www.bignews.org/20020312.txt (14 August 2003); Congressional-Executive Commission on China Open Forum Roundtable on Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, 10 March 2003, Testimony and written statement of Chen Yali; and Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Beijing in a Rear-Guard Battle Against a Newly Spirited Press," New York Times, 15 September 2002, A1.
156: See Wei Xiaowei, "Shenzhen Establishes a Publication Orientation Warning Mechanism" [Shenzhen jianli chuban daoxiang yu jingji zhi], Gansu Xinhua (29 August 2003) (citing the China Press and Publication Daily [Zhongguo xinwen chuban bao]).
157: See, e.g., "The Central Government Prohibits the Domestic Media from Discussing Constitutional Reforms" [Zhongyang jin neidi zhuan meiti zhenggai xiuxian] 21 August 2003, Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, (22 August 2003).
158: "Shenzhen Editor Sacked over Article Satirizing Hu," The Straits Times, 26 November 2002. Available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/Weekly2002/11.26.2002/China2.htm (14 August 2003).
159: John Pomfret, "Chinese Newspaper Shut After Call for Reform," Washington Post, 14 March 2003, (14 August 2003).
160: Richard McGregor, "China Moves to Control Liberal Paper," Financial Times, 4 May 2003, (5 May 2003).
161: "A Beijing Newspaper is Censored for Criticizing the Government," [Beijing yi jia baozhi piping zhengfu zaojin], BBC.com, Chinese edition, 16 June 2003, (citing a report in the Hong KongWenHui Bao), (15 August 2003).
162: See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China Open Forum Roundtable on Media Freedom in China, 24 June 2002, Transcript of He Qinglian, former journalist in the PRC:
"One of these subjects [that the government does not allow to be reported] is criticism of individual Chinese leaders. Also, matters relating to foreign affairs that the government does not wish foreigners to know about. Every couple of months there were a dozen or more different kinds of materials that were not to be discussed at all. One is not permitted to criticize the national economic policy or to discuss matters relating to Tibet, Taiwan, or Xinjiang, or about the Cultural Revolution. There were many such regulations."
Available at http://frWebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107lhouselhearings&docid=f:81228.wais (18 August 2003). For an example of such a regulation, see The Communist Party Propaganda Department and the General Administration on Press and Publication Issue a Notice Demanding that Book Publishing Work Welcome the 16th Party Congress in a Practical Manner, [Zhong xuanbu xinwen chuban zong shufachu tongzhi yaoqiu qieshi zuohao huanjie shiliu da tushu chuban gongzuo], issued 18 March 2002, www.bjppb.gov.cn/xwcbrx/2002-03-1802.htm (18 August 2003).
163: "China Sites Count Cost of Cyber-Control," CNN, 4 November 2003 (15 August 2003).
164: For example, by impeding the efficiency of the WHO's Global Public Health Information Network, an electronic surveillance system that actively trawls the World Wide Web looking for reports of communicable diseases and communicable disease syndromes in electronic discussion groups, on news wires and elsewhere on the Web.
165: Huang Liqi, "Incident Resulting from Rumors of an Unknown Virus, Heyuan City Citizens Fight to Buy Antibiotics" [Shi yin chuanwen chuxian weiming bingdu, Heyuan shimin zhenggou kangshengsu], Jinyang Net [Jinyang wang] (the online version of the Yangcheng Evening News [Yangcheng wan bao]), 3 January 2003 (15 August 2003). Government-controlled media stated that people in Guangdong began coming down with SARS in November of 2002. See "What Can We Do to Defeat SARS?" [Women kao shenma zhansheng "fedian?"], Southern Weekend [Nanfang zhoumou], 24 April 2003, (15 August 2003).
166: "Heyuan City Citizens go to Guangzhou in Panic Buying of Antibiotics" [Heyuan ren gua Guangzhou qianggou kangshengsu], Jinyang Net [Jinyang wang] (the online version of the Yangcheng Evening News [Yangcheng wanbao]), 5 January 2003, (15 August 2003); "The Appearance of an Unknown Virus in Heyuan is a Rumor" ["Heyuan xian weiming bingdu" shi yaoyan], Jinyang Net [Jinyang wang] 9 January 2003, (15 August 2003).
167: For example, in the same month the Ministry of Health issued a notice requiring government departments to concienciously report incidents of unknown infectious diseases to the Ministry, several provincial and municpal governments issued a notice threatening Internet users who "distorted facts" or "spread rumors" regarding SARS with criminal prosecution. Compare Notice Regarding Strengthening Work on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases [Guanyu jiaqiang chuanranbing zhi gongzuo de tongzhi], art. 4, issued 13 May 2003, with Notice Regarding Strictly Prohibiting Utilizing the Internet to Produce or Transmit Harmfull or False Information [Guanyu yanjin liyong hulianwang zhizuo, chuanbo youhai he bushi deng xinxi de gonggao], issued 3 May 2003 by the Shanghai Municipal Government Coordination Working Group Focusing on the Elimination and Rectification of Harmfull Information on the Internet. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable, Dangerous Secret: SARS and China's Health Care System, Testimony and written statement of Bates Gill: For the time being, it appears the mainland's initial denial and slow response to the SARS outbreak characterizes a political environment where individual initiative is discouraged and social stability is protected above other interests, to the detriment of social safety. http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/051203/index.php (2 September 2003).
168: See, e.g., "Editorial: Sharing Health Info with the Public," China Daily, 27 August 2003, (27 August 2003): The outcome would have been hard to imagine, had Beijing not shared information with the public and the rest of the world and ordered a nationwide mobilization. But on the other hand, had local and national health authorities acted more resolutely and shared information with the public in a more timely manner, the epidemic may well have been contained within the borders of Guangdong Province, where SARS was first reported in China. See also, Ray Cheung, "Investigative Newspaper's Virus Reports 'Are Being Censored,'" South China Morning Post, 9 May 2003, www.scmp.com, and "China Gags SARS Talk on Net," South China Morning Post, 7 April 2003, www.scmp.com, citing AFP Beijing; Xue Baosheng, "Valuable Lesson for Government to Learn," China Daily, 6 June 2003, (15 August 2003); Shu Xueshan, "A Test for Government and the Media" [Kaoyan zhengfu yu meiti], Jinyang Net [Jinyang wang] (the online version of the Yangcheng Evening News [Yangcheng wanbao]), 15 February 2003, (15 August 2003).
169: For a detailed discussion of the role of information control in the spread of SARS, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Topic Paper "Information Control and Self-Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS," 7 May 2003.
170: "An Individual Spreading Rumors that 'An Unknown Epidemic is Spreading in Beijing' is Arrested" [Wangshang sanbu "Beijing you buming jiqing yanman" yaoyanzhe beibu], People's Daily [Renmin wang], 23 April 2003, citing the Beijing Youth Daily [Beijing Qingnian bao] (15 August 2003).
171: "Two Chinese Editors Sacked Over Confidential SARS Document," South China Morning Post, 29 April 2003, www.scmp.com, citing Agence France-Presse, Beijing.
172: Richard McGregor, "China Moves to Control Liberal Paper," Financial Times, 4 May 2003, (5 May 2003).
173: "China censors CNN SARS Report," CNN, 15 May 2003, (2 September 2003).
174: "Media and Academics 'Gagged by Officials' over SARS," South China Morning Post, 2 July 2003, www.scmp.com.
175: Congressional-Executive Commission on China Open Forum Roundtable on Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, 9 December 2002, Testimony, written statement, and transcript of Joan Mower.
176: Regulations for the Management of Ground Satellite Television Broadcasting Receptors [Weixing dianshi guangbo di mianjie shoushe shi guanli guiding], issued 5 October 1993, art. 2; Detailed Implementing Regulations for the Management of Ground Satellite Television Broadcasting Receptors [Weixing dianshi guangbo dimianjie shoushe shi guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 2 March 1994, art. 6.
177: Interim Measures Concerning the Examination, Approval and Regulation of Transmission of Foreign Satellite Television Channels in China [Jingwai weixingdian shipin daoluo dishen piguan lizhanxing guiding], issued 26 December 2001.
178: "CNN Broadcast to China Cut," USA Today, 30 June 2003, (15 August 2003), citing Associated Press.
179: See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable, China's Cyber-Wall: Can Technology Break Through?, 4 November 2002, testimony and written statements of Avi Rubin, Co-founder, Publius, a Web publishing system that resists censorship and provides publishers with anonymity; Bill Xia, President, Dynamic Internet Technology Inc.; Lin Hai, computer scientist from Shanghai, served 2 years in prison for distributing Chinese e-mail addresses to a dissident on-line magazine; Paul Baranowski, chief architect for the Peekabooty project, which seeks to bypass censorship of the World Wide Web.
180: See, e.g., "CIC Press Conference: Corporate America's Role in China's Building of an 'E-Police' State," 17 June 2003, (8 September 2003).
181: Larry X. Wu, "[W]e have our own understanding of what is a limitation of the freedom of speech. So we do use techniques to block certain Web sites...." Second Secretary for Science and Technology at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Washington, DC, quoted in Patrick Di Justo "Does the End Justify the Means?" Wired.com, 18 March 2003, (15 August 2003). See also Keith J. Winstein, "China Blocks MIT Web Addresses," The Tech, 22 November 2002, Volume 122, Number 58, (28 August 2003): "A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington...confirmed that China was blocking access to MIT Web sites, but said neither he nor his colleagues in China knew why it was imposed."
182: "Phonetics Institute Achieve Advance in Computer Language Comprehension Technology," [Shengxuesuo jisuanji yuyan lijie jishu qude jinzhan] Announcement on the Phonetics Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences Web site, 18 February 2003, (28 August 2003).
183: China Internet Network Information Center [Zhongguo hulianwang luxin xizhongxin], "China Internet 2002 Annual Report" [Zhongguo hulian wanglu 2002 nianjian], (15 August 2003).
184: See, e.g., "15 Year Old Youth Making Reactionary Expression on the Internet is Subject to Administrative Punishment" [15 sui shaonian wangshang fabu fandong yanlun shou chufa], People's Daily [Renmin wang], 10 July 2003.
185: For a thorough study of how BBSs in China are censored, see Reporters Without Borders, " Living Dangerously on the Net: Censorship and Surveillance of Internet Forums," 12 May 2003, (15 August 2003).
186: For example, one Internet forum that the Commission has been monitoring first went down in early July 2003, saying it was "under malicious attack." It came back up for a short period at the end of July, with the moderator citing "content problems" as one of the possible reasons for the site having been taken down, and warning posters that "...'[Forum name]' warmly welcomes you to join, provided you observe the principles of 'a united motherland, harmony between peoples, and obedience of the law.'" Cases where the government has shut down BBSs for political content include "Sleepless Night" [Bumei zhiye], and "Study and Thought" [Xue er si]. See also Kathy Chen, "China Cracks Down on Growing Debate Over Political Reform," The Wall Street Journal, 24 September 2003, (24 September 2003) (discussing how in September 2003 Chinese authorities ordered four Web sites that posted articles on political and constitutional reforms to close because the sites - www.caosy.com, www.libertas2000.net, www.xianzheng.net, and www.cc-forum.com - were not registered and did not have business licenses).
187: See, e.g., Rules for the Protection of Secrets in News Publishing [Xinwen chuban baomi guiding], issued 13 June 1992, art 15: Anyone wishing to provide a foreign news publishing organization a report or publication with contents that relate to the nation's government, economy, diplomacy, technology or military shall first apply to their unit or their supervising organ or unit for examination and approval. See also Law on the Protection of State Secrets [Baoshou guojia mimifa], issued 25 April 1990, art 8.
188: See, e.g., "If a Nanny Can Disclose State Secrets, Then Average Citizens Should Raise Their Awareness of Preserving Secrets" [Baomu jingran toulu guojia jimi, baixin yexu tigao baomi yishi], People's Daily [Renmin wang], 5 September 2003, (citing the Guangzhou Daily [Guangzhou ribao]), emphasizing how anyone from Internet users to garbage collectors can run afoul of China's state secrets legislation. For a more detailed discussion of China's state secrets and national security laws, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Topic Paper, "Information Control and Self-Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS," 7 May 2003.
189: " People's Republic of China: State Control of the Internet in China," Amnesty International Document: ASA 17/007/02, (15 August 2003).
190: See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, "2003 Annual Report: China," (15 August 2003); Committee to Protect Journalists, "Attacks on the Press in 2002: China," (15 August 2003).
191: See, e.g., China Detains Dissident over Reform Call, CNN.com, 9 January 2003, (9 January 2003).
192: Wang Shulin, "Xinjiang Hears Case of Incitement of Subversion Against the State" [Xinjiang shenli yilie shandong dianfu guojia zhengquanan], China Court Web [Fayuan hulianwang], 16 February 2003, (15 August 2003).
193: The accounts of the accusations against Huang Qi are based on copies of official government documents made available by his supporters at (19 May 2003 - now defunct).
194: The accounts of the accusations against these individuals are based on copies of official government documents available at http://peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2003/04/200304291247.shtml (19 May 2003).
195: "15-Year-Old Youth Making Reactionary Expression on the Internet is Subject to Administrative Punishment" [15 sui shaonian wangshang fabu fandong yanlun shou chufa], People's Daily [Renmin wang], 10 July 2003, (15 August 2003).
196: See, e.g., "Congressional-Executive Commission on China Selected Legal Provisions of the People's Republic of China Affecting the Free Flow of Information," available at http:// www.cecc.gov/pages/selectLaws/PRCLaws.php.
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