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Source: -See Summary (2010-08-19 ) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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Source: -See Summary (2010-07-25 / English) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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• Disruptions in the microblogging services of at least four major Chinese Web portals - Sina, Sohu, NetEase, and Tencent. Microblogging services at these sites were reportedly suspended for maintenance, or switched to testing (or beta) mode, according to a July 16 New York Times (NYT)article. A July 15 South China Morning Post article (subscription required) said that "beta version generally means that the system is still unstable and might need maintenance for some time." Microbloggers at Sina, which reportedly has 20 million users, discovered that links to foreign-based Web sites would not work, the NYT article said. Sohu's microblogging site went offline for maintenance from July 9-12, and users were unable to conduct searches or link to sites other than Sohu, NYT reported.
  
  According to the NYT article, employees at two of the Web portals said "the latest tweaking was in response to direct pressure from Chinese Internet authorities to bolster their systems for monitoring content." A July 15 report in Shanghai's Oriental Morning Post cited unnamed industry insiders as saying the latest measures were the result of pressure from regulators. According to a July 14 Reuters article, company sources told the news agency that tightening government restrictions were the cause.
  
  NYT reported that other employees at the companies denied any tightening of control by saying that the services had continuously undergone testing from their inception, although the NYT article said "they had no clear explanation for why they had not noted so previously." A source at Sina who refused to be named told Global Times that the reversion to testing mode had nothing to do with government pressure, according to a July 15 article.
  
  A survey of reports on the issue found that virtually all sources refused to be named (or were not named) and that government officials could not be reached for comment, reflecting the opaque environment in which Chinese officials regulate and censor the Internet. (See also July 15 articles in Associated Press (via Washington Post) and South China Morning Post (SCMP, subscription required).)
  
  
  
• Requirement that the microblogging services delete posts and user accounts that touch upon sensitive political issues or pornography. The July 15 SCMP article reported on the deletion demands, quoting one insider as saying, "We believe this round of control is just a warning [to all portals]." Another SCMP article on July 17 reported that mainland microblogging sites also were asked recently to impose greater self-discipline, and that microblog searches now displayed fewer results and, in the case of sensitive topics, sometimes no results. The July 15 Associated Press article reported that dozens of blogs for prominent rights advocates and bloggers were suddenly shut down, including those of rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and legal expert Xu Zhiyong. The July 16 NYT article said that the rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan had one of his blog posts removed within five minutes.
  
  
  
• Targeting of journalists' microblogs. The July 17 SCMP article reported that Sina's microblog service had been ordered to verify the accounts of journalists at traditional media outlets. Verifying which accounts belong to journalists will make such microblogs easier to monitor, according to a media analyst cited in the article.

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-20 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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• Bishop Du Jiang of Bameng diocese, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) (AsiaNews, 4/08). Despite appointing Du, authorities placed him under home surveillance soon thereafter. See below for details.


• Bishop Meng Qinglu of Hohhot diocese, IMAR (Union of Catholic Asian News, 4/19)


• Bishop Shen Bin of Haimen diocese, Jiangsu province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 4/21)


• Bishop Cai Bingrui of Xiamen diocese, Fujian province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 5/10)


• Bishop Han Yingjin of Sanyuan diocese, Shaanxi province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 6/24)


• Bishop Xu Jiwei of Taizhou diocese, Zhejiang province (Washington Post, 7/14)


• Bishop Yang Xiaoting of Yan'an diocese, Shaanxi province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 7/15)

• Public security officials are believed to continue holding unregistered bishops Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang in custody in unknown locations. The two bishops have been missing since 1996 and 2001, respectively.


• Authorities have kept Bishop An Shuxin of Baoding diocese, Hebei province under surveillance even after he agreed to join the CPA, according to an October 29, 2009, AsiaNews report. Authorities detained An in an unknown location from 1996 to 2006 and have kept him under surveillance since his release in 2006.


• At the October 10, 2009, funeral of Bishop Lin Xili, unregistered bishop of Wenzhou diocese, Zhejiang province, authorities forbid displays that would portray Lin as a recognized bishop. According to an October 15, 2009, AsiaNews report, authorities prohibited those in attendance from displaying a picture of Lin with a mitre and pectoral cross, clothing his body in bishop's robes, and referring to Lin as a "bishop."


• According to a January 4, 2010, AsiaNews report, authorities prevented displays of official bishop's insignia during the January 2010 funeral of unregistered bishop Yao Liang, prohibited the publication of obituaries, and only allowed three priests to attend. Yao was an octogenarian released from detention less than a year before his death, according to a January 5, 2010, New York Times report.


• In March 2010, authorities in the Mindong diocese of Fujian province detained unregistered priests Luo Wen and Liu Maochun for organizing religious camps for Catholic university students, according to reports from the Union of Catholic Asian News (3/11, 3/23). Authorities released Luo on March 18, 2010; the Commission has observed no reports that Liu has been released.


• According to an April 8, 2010, AsiaNews report, authorities placed Bishop Du Jiang of Bameng diocese in the IMAR under home confinement on the same day that the state-controlled church installed him in his office. The CPA insisted that he attend his official installation ceremony together with Ma Yinglin, an officially recognized bishop whom the government installed in 2006 without approval from the Holy See. Du stated publicly that he was forced to attend the ceremony with Ma, and authorities subsequently placed Du under home confinement.


• Public security officers in Tangshan city, Hebei province detained unregistered priest Wang Zhong on July 24, 2010, as Wang was leaving Jidong Prison after completing a three-year sentence, according to a July 28, 2010, CathNews China report. Members of Wang's family and congregation who were awaiting his release witnessed the officers put Wang into a police car as he attempted to walk out of the prison gates. In July 2007, Wang had organized a ceremony to consecrate a new church registered with the government in Hebei, according to a November 22, 2007, AsiaNews report. In November 2007, a court in Hebei sentenced him to three years in prison for organizing an illegal meeting and using an official parish seal without permission from the authorities. According to Wang's defense attorney, cited in the AsiaNews report, authorities had approved the consecration ceremony. The attorney described the seal as internal church property.

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-19 ) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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1. In a May 17 interview with Radio Free Asia, the founder of the Beijing-based public health advocacy group Aizhixing said that his group is on the brink of closure because of the SAFE regulations. Aizhixing was forced to terminate its services in Kunming and to reduce financial support to other groups, but the most difficult challenge remains paying rent and salaries, he said. He also stated in the April 11 issue of Asia Week (Yazhou Zhoukan) that even if all goes smoothly, getting the grant agreement notarized alone can cost several thousand U.S. dollars, and take at least three months.


2. The Beijing Yirenping Center, a Beijing-based NGO dedicated to fighting discrimination against people infected with communicable diseases, has also been facing difficulties since the SAFE rules became effective. According to a May 27 Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) article, the group relies on foreign donations for 80 percent of its funding. The center's managing partner said that his organization is on the verge of being "starved" of funds, and that this year it has had to cut back its three planned training sessions to one, and reduce its legal aid work to just providing legal consulting. On May 20, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Center has been unable to get funding from the National Endowment for Democracy between November and May, and has been forced to stay open "by borrowing money from friends on a personal basis." The same article also mentioned that about a dozen NGOs also reported that they were unable to comply with the new requirements set forth in the SAFE rules. The Global Times quoted on May 19 the center's managing partner as saying that "more than 100,000 yuan is locked up in our foreign exchange account, and some cases have been postponed for lack of funds."

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-19 ) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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• Consular Notification and Access Violations. Under Article 35(2) of the U.S.-PRC Consular Convention of 1980 Chinese officials were supposed to notify U.S. officials "no later than" four days after "any form of detention" of a U.S. national. In Dr. Xue's case, however, Chinese officials waited three weeks before acknowledging to U.S. officials that Dr. Xue was being held by the Ministry of State Security, according to the Cohen op-ed. Furthermore, the op-ed noted that Chinese officials did not allow American officials to visit with Dr. Xue until the 32nd day of his detention. Article 35(4) of the convention states that officials shall be able to meet with their national "at the latest" two days after notification of the detention.


• Torture Allegations. Dr. Xue reportedly showed American consular officials burn marks on his arms made by investigators, according to the AP article. The op-ed said that police coerced Dr. Xue into "signing false documents," and that in May 2008 an officer injured Dr. Xue by throwing a glass ashtray at his head.


• Criminal Procedure Law Violations. The Ministry of State Security transferred Dr. Xue to the Beijing State Security Bureau detention house on February 4, 2008, and he was formally arrested on April 11, according to the op-ed. Assuming February 4 is the date Dr. Xue was formally detained, officials violated Article 69 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) by not formally arresting him within the 37-day limit. Based on the op-ed, another period of more than seven months passed before state security officials forwarded the case to prosecutors sometime around December 2008. Articles 124, 126, and 127 of the CPL appear to place a seven-month limit on this period. Six months passed between December 2008 and Dr. Xue's indictment in May 2009, according to the op-ed. Articles 138 and 140 of the CPL would appear to limit this period to three-and-a-half months.
  
  The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court held the first hearings in Dr. Xue's trial in July 2009, according to AP, meaning the court had agreed to accept the case before this date. Article 168 of the CPL says a court has up to two-and-a-half months after accepting a case to pronounce a judgment, and Article 166 allows for one-month postponements if prosecutors request supplementary investigations. Cohen said prosecutors had requested two postponements, which would have placed the outer limit between the court's accepting the case and pronouncing the judgment at four-and-a-half months. The judgment was not pronounced until July 2010. As the op-ed noted: "As winter turned to spring, [the court] ran out of legal grounds for further delays and no longer attempted explanation."


• Access to Counsel Violations. According to the op-ed, authorities denied Dr. Xue access to counsel for more than a year.

• Retroactive Classification. It was only after the transaction took place that officials classified the information as a state secret, according to a July 4 Dui Hua article.


• Commercial Information as State Secret. The line between commercial information and state secrets is blurry under Chinese law. The state secrets law currently in effect provides wide latitude for officials to declare information a state secret, including "secrets in national economic and social development," "secrets concerning science and technology," and "other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department." Cohen said that in Dr. Xue's case "there was no meaningful way to clarify the line between common, commercial information and state secrets." The blurring of commercial information and state secrets is especially problematic when dealing with SOEs. For example, Jiang Jiemin, General Manager of CNPC, the SOE that controls PetroChina, said in June 2010 that oil is an "important strategic asset," and that the company's work to protect its secrets bears on China's national security and social stability, according to the company's Web site. Chinese regulations make explicit that some commercial secrets of SOEs shall be considered state secrets. In March 2010, SASAC issued Interim Provisions on the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central Enterprises, Article 3 of which requires central-level SOEs to protect "the operating information and technical information which belongs within the scope of state secrets." According to SASAC's Web site, CNPC is a central-level SOE and is thus subject to this requirement. In addition, according to an April 30 21st Century Business Herald article, since SOEs, especially central SOEs, have "a certain administrative rank," they may themselves possess the power to declare information a state secret.
  
  Dr. Xue's case follows another case involving the Anglo-Australian mining firm Rio Tinto. In July 2009 four employees of that firm were charged with stealing state secrets shortly after Rio Tinto pulled out of a proposed $19.5 billion deal with a major state-owned firm. The charges were reduced to commercial bribery and commercial secrets infringement the following month.


• Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review. In criminal cases involving state secrets, Chinese courts do not have the power to question an agency's classification of information as a state secret, according to a 2007 Human Rights in China report on China's state secrets system. Furthermore, in cases where endangering national security is alleged, such as cases involving the charge of inciting subversion, courts make little to no assessment of the actual harm to national security. In Dr. Xue's case, the July 6 WSJ article reported that the court provided few details regarding the damage the transaction caused to China's national security.

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-15 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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Source: -See Summary (2010-07-14 / English) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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1. Xie Zhiqiang, a professor at the Central Party School, wrote in its official Study Times newspaper on June 30 that China's minimum wage system "plays an extremely important role" in ensuring workers earn a liveable wage, and urged governments at all levels to raise and enforce minimum wage standards.


2. Xinhua wrote on June 23 that "now in some areas of China a wave of pay raises has appeared. This appeal [for higher wages] is overdue, and it is a reasonable one that should be made in step with economic globalization."


3. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce said at a press conference on June 12 that recent rises in minimum wages in coastal cities "are in line with the changing trends in the overall national economic and industrial policies," and that more workers should "enjoy the fruits of economic growth."


4. Yu Faming, a senior official at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, said that although pay hikes will bring some challenges in the near term, they will be beneficial for employment in the long term.

1. A top official at the state-run ACFTU, while not referring directly to the strikes, reasserted the Party-led unions' position as the representative and protector of workers' legal rights, and their role in maintaining social stability.


2. The ACFTU also put out an emergency notice on June 4 calling for increased efforts to establish Party-led unions in foreign and privately run enterprises, which employ 70-80 percent of Chinese industry workers according to Tang Jun, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.


3. Ding Gang, a senior editor at the People's Daily, cited an International Labor Organization study in the Global Times to argue that "a highly centralized wage system is equally helpful in enhancing competitiveness" when compared with a loose wage system.


4. On June 11, a Worker's Daily editorial stated that pay raises in Zhejiang, Shanghai, Liaoning, and Jiangsu could all be attributed to the government-organized collective consultation system.

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-14 ) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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reporting was extremely difficult because locals did not want to be interviewed. I was told there were clear directives that residents should not be speaking with foreign journalists and that all local tour guides had been issued guidelines to report journalists to the local police. This has been borne out by the experience of other journalists who have tried to work in Kashgar over the past year. It's a marked turnabout from conditions before the riots, when Kashgar was relatively open to reporters and locals [talked] with journalists without extreme fear of reprisals. That's no longer the case.

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-09 ) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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[It] should be said that the most fundamental law of our country is the Constitution; the Constitution also clearly stipulates that the People's Republic of China implements the rule of law and establishes a socialist country ruled by law. However, this type of "strike hard" [campaign] often occurs outside of rule of law and legal provisions—and may even breach the boundaries of the law to carry out a crackdown on crime.

Source: -See Summary (2010-07-08 ) | Posted on: 2010-08-19
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Source: -See Summary (2010-06-13 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-30
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• Strengthening Oversight of Mosques, Religious Activities in Aqsu. The Aqsu municipal government in Aqsu district reported on strengthening implementation of and refining its "two systems" program of maintaining regular government contact with mosques and religious figures, according to a January 26 report from the Aqsu municipal government Web site. Measures include monitoring conditions at religious venues on a daily basis and formulating measures to pre-examine sermons. Aqsu district has launched a nine-month work project targeting "illegal religious activities," according to a May 18 Tianshan Net report. For more reports from Aqsu district on examining and "standardizing" the content of sermons, see a September 4, 2009, report from Yiganqi township (via Aqsu municipal government Web site) and April 20, 2010, report from Shayar county (via Xinjiang Kunlun Net, also reprinted in Uyghur Online). For more information on the "two systems" as implemented in another locality in the XUAR, see April 9, 2009, measures on the "two systems" posted on the Zepu (Peyziwat) county, Zepu Town government Web site.


• Restrictions on Students' Freedom of Religion. As part of steps to "strengthen ethnic unity" and "safeguard social stability" on school campuses, authorities in Nilka county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing "responsibility agreements" to prevent students from entering religious venues and participating in "illegal religious activities," according to a May 20 report from the Ili Party Committee Organization Department Web site. Concrete steps include ensuring students do not fast [a practice observed during the Muslim holiday of Ramadan], enter mosques or other venues during religious services, or wear clothes with a "religious hue." In addition, the report said that the county education bureau launched a campaign that brought teachers into students' homes to teach issues such as ethnic unity, state policy toward religion, and the "Six Forbiddens" for students. The "Six Forbiddens" refer to forbidding students from believing in religion, participating in religious activities, fasting, wearing clothes with a "religious hue," viewing or listening to audio-video products with "reactionary content," and disseminating "separatist thought" in any form, according to information posted August 31, 2009, on the Chapchal county, Ili, government Web site.
  
  In addition, the Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in the XUAR adopted rules, effective September 2009, that include restrictions on children's and teacher's religious freedom, according to a report from the Bayingol Prefecture News Office (via Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture government Web site, August 27, 2009). The rules forbid elementary school students and teachers from "believing in religion," and forbid all students and teachers from participating in religious activities or wearing clothes with a "religious or superstitious hue," among other acts. People who violate the rules will receive "education" and be "severely dealt with," according to a preface to the rules.


• Campaign against Scarves and Beards in Kucha. Authorities in Hanikatamu township in Kucha, Aqsu district, held a campaign in May to detect items such as "illegal publications," "illegal propaganda materials," and "bizarre" clothing, steps that an official connected to battling against "illegal religious activities" and separatists, according to a May 6 report on the Kucha Party Construction Web site (cached page). Some residents and officials, including a visiting delegation of county and district officials, took part in a public event to destroy confiscated items, which included 34 scarves, 42 items of clothing, and 53 books. The article described the steps as effectively attacking "religious fanaticism" and changing "outmoded thinking" regarding "bizarre" apparel worn by some women in Hanikatamu and "big beards" worn by some young men. Radio Free Asia (RFA) interviewed an official from Hanikatamu township, who affirmed that authorities had recently called on young people not wear scarves or beards. (See the interview in a June 9 article). Other localities within Kucha also reported carrying out campaigns against "illegal propaganda materials," including religious materials. (See cached pages, originally posted June 2 and June 4, from the Kucha Party Construction Web site.)
  
  
• Discriminating Against Religious Job Candidates. Government offices in Turpan district and Shule (Qeshqer Yengisheher) county issued job advertisements for teachers and members of a performing arts troupe, respectively, that required that candidates "not believe in a religion" and "not participate in religious activities." See a September 11, 2009, posting on the Xinjiang Education Department Web site and March 5 posting on the Kashgar Personnel Bureau Web site. Article 12 of the PRC Labor Law states that job applicants shall not face discrimination in job hiring based on factors including religious belief, and the PRC Civil Servant Law does not bar religious adherents from government work.


• Detentions of Religious Believers. Authorities in a village in Dadamtu township, Yining (Ghulja) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, detained three adult siblings and one sibling's spouse--Zulpiye, her brothers Extem and Tashpolat, and Tashpolat's wife Shemshiban--starting on July 7, 2009, in reported connection to their religious activities, according to May 13 and 26 Radio Free Asia (RFA) reports. Their father reported that authorities alleged Zulpiye had provided religious instruction to neighborhood women and that they detained his other children in connection to religious books they had read. He also reported that authorities criticized his children for wearing religious dress and for allegedly undercutting the authority of state-appointed imams. Information on the charges and trials, if any, against the group—three of whom are reportedly held at a detention center within Ili and a fourth whose whereabouts are not known—is not available.
  
  At another village within Dadamtu township, authorities detained Setiwaldi Hashim, his son Qasimjan Setiwaldi, son-in-law Tursunjan, nephew Abdurahman Osmanjan, Sultan Tursun, and his wife Helime on July 15, 2009, according to accounts by relatives of Setiwaldi Hashim and Sultan Tursun in the May 26 RFA report. A relative said authorities accused Setiwaldi Hashim of providing unauthorized religious instruction but the relative did not know the precise charges against Setiwaldi Hashim at trial. Authorities released Helime after 40 days. The current status of the remaining people in detention remains unknown.
  
  Authorities reportedly detained 32 women in a Quran study group in Bachu (Maralbéshi) county, Kashgar district, around early June, according to June 7 and 8 reports from Radio Free Asia. Authorities said the women were engaged in "illegal religious activities" and formally detained two of the women, releasing the others after fining them, according to the reports. A government article describing events in Bachu, linked to in the June 7 RFA article, appears to have been removed from the Internet.

Source: -See Summary (2010-06-08 / English) | Posted on: 2010-07-13
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Source: -See Summary (2010-07-09 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-11
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• the Chinese government's support for news on the Internet to provide citizens with "abundant news information."


• the presence of lively exchanges on China's Internet and "a huge quantity of BBS posts and blog articles" that would be "hard to imagine in any other country." (Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) are online discussion forums or message boards—see People's Daily Strong Country Forum for an example.)


• figures such as China's 220 million bloggers and the more than 3 million posts daily on BBSs, news Web site comment pages, and blogs.


• the government's encouragement of citizens' use of the Internet to supervise officials, including the establishment of informant Web sites by the Supreme People's Court, the Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and other government and Party entities to allow citizens to report on corrupt officials.

Discussion of government policies and political debate; reporting on human rights, government activities, and corruption in government; engaging in election campaigns, peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy; and expression of opinion and dissent, religion or belief, including by persons belonging to minorities or vulnerable groups.

Source: -See Summary (2010-06-16 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-11
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Source: -See Summary (2010-06-16 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-11
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1. Starting on May 21, 2010, about 1,900 workers at a Honda-owned auto-parts factory in Foshan city, Guangdong province, went on strike to demand higher wages, as detailed in a May 28 New York Times article.


2. On June 1, authorities deployed up to 3,000 police officers "to break up a two-week-long strike at a former state-owned cotton mill in Pingdingshan, Henan [province]," according to a June 4 China Labour Bulletin report. Workers there reportedly demanded higher pay, paid annual leave, and a "fair share of proceeds" from the enterprise's restructuring.


3. On June 3, about 900 workers at the Japanese-owned Brother Industries Company in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, went on strike to demand higher wages and better benefits, according to a June 10 Radio Free Asia report.


4. On June 6, "many hundreds" of workers at the Tieshu Group factory in Suizhou city, Hubei province, blocked a nearby intersection, protesting against management's reported failure to address issues such as pension disputes and the sale of the factory, according to a June 6 Web posting on the Web site Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch.


5. On June 7, striking workers at a Taiwanese-owned rubber factory in Kunshan city, Jiangsu province, clashed with police, according to a June 11 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article. The SCMP article said "[s]cuffles were also reported during a strike at a Taiwanese-owned sports goods factory" in Jiujiang city, Jiangxi province, on June 6.


6. On June 6, a few hundred workers at the Taiwanese-owned Merry Electronics factory in Shenzhen blocked the factory entrance in the morning, and "the crowd eventually grew to more than one thousand, spilling out on to the main road," where they held up banners "demanding higher pay and less strenuous work hours," as a June 8 China Labour Bulletin report noted.


7. On June 8, a Honda spokesperson said in a Wall Street Journal article that "workers at Foshan Fengfu Autoparts walked off the job…, paralyzing production at the plant owned by Japan's Yutaka Giken, a 70%-Honda-owned subsidiary," which produced exhaust pipes for the Japanese car company. Like the strikers at the other Honda plant, the workers were seeking wage increases.


8. A June 11 Ming Pao article, citing information from the Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, chronicled the spread of strikes to other Chinese provinces, including a June 9 incident where about 2,000 workers demanded the management at the Japanese-owned Zongbao Electronics Company in Shanghai to offer higher wages; and, in Zhuhai city, Guangdong province, up to 1,000 workers at a U.S.-owned electronics factory went on strike on June 10 with the same demand.


9. On June 11, strikes took place at a third Honda-affiliated factory; located in Zhongshan city, Guangdong province, this factory produced car locks for Honda. The South China Morning Post detailed in a report that the workers "challenged managers" and demanded higher pay and the right to form independent unions.

A new generation of Chinese workers is finally no longer silent … China's GDP had already multiplied several times … the post-90s generation of migrant workers discovered that they are making about the same amount of money as their father's generation 20 years before. As such, this third generation of workers feels increasingly hopeless, and finds it necessary to use strikes as a method to fight for reasonable treatment.

Do away with the "fake unions"… [the ones] assigned by the local governments, whose paramount interest is to attract foreign investment. … These governments now rent out land to companies and appoint a few local union-ignorant people to run the trade union offices. … The local trade union offices should be put under the jurisdiction of the upper-level union instead of local governments. The ACFTU should allow workers to elect their representatives to their workplace union committees, too, as has happened in a very modest number of firms. Only then can the union branches demonstrably represent workers' interests rather [than] that [of] the employers' or governments'.

The long-term trend is clear. The only way the government can prevent greater social conflict is by giving more power to the workers not less. If workers have the right to negotiate as equals with the boss the chances of disputes turning violent will be greatly reduced. If on the other hand, the government ignores workers' rights and gives the boss free rein, the consequences will be very serious.

Source: -See Summary (2010-06-15 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-11
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Source: -See Summary (2010-06-03 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-11
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• "the current household registration policy has created unequal statuses among urban residents and between urban residents and peasants, constraining the Chinese citizens' freedom of movement";


• freedom of movement is "an inseparable part of human rights and personal freedom";


• even though the first generation of migrant workers labored to develop China's cities, their children still have no way to divest themselves of the status as migrants and must bear the predicament(s) faced by the previous generation, and the cities in which they live remain unwilling to accept them;


• though migrant workers work and pay taxes, just like other urban residents, they are unable to enjoy the same employment opportunities and social services such as medical treatment, education, and elderly care;


• the hukou system is "a breeding ground for corruption," as people have bought and sold hukous in many cities;


• while various cities have launched hukou reform measures, household registration still distresses "innumerable people caught in the trap of having to be on the move constantly";


• at a stage when China is beginning to adjust its internal economic structures to rely more on internal demand and optimizing natural resource use, hukou reform will be good for the people's welfare and also inject more dynamism into China's economy; and,


• the delegates at the "Two Sessions" should use the power that the people granted them and push for the abolishment of the 1958 Household Registration Regulations.

• Agricultural Minister Han Changfu writes in a February 1 People's Daily essay calling on the central government to make the necessary policy and administrative preparations as more migrants become urban residents. Han explains that the new generation of migrant workers, born after 1990, have certain characteristics that set them apart from the previous ones: many of them have never laid down roots, have at least a junior high school education, are the only child in the family, and are more likely to demand equal access to employment and social services - and even equal political rights - in the cities.


• Political and Legislative Affairs Committee Secretary Zhou Yongkang, writing in a February 16 Qiushi Magazine essay entitled "Deeply Advance Resolving Social Contradictions, Renewing Social Management, and Clean and Just Enforcement in Order To Provide More Powerful Legal Protection for Sound and Speedy Economic and Social Developments," references the need to accelerate reform of the hukou management system and make efforts to resolve the challenges facing migrant workers including employment, residency, obtaining medical treatment, and child education.


• Premier Wen Jiabao, during a February 27 online chat with Web users, reportedly said that China would advance reforms of the hukou system for the new generation of migrant workers, according to a March 2 Global Times article.

I have a firm conviction that legislation that disregards the dignity and freedom of the people will ultimately land on the rubbish heap of history. I hope that this system ultimately will be abolished. When the time comes I believe that many people will burst into tears from happiness and run around spreading the news.

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-15 ) | Posted on: 2010-07-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=137617

Source: -See Summary (2010-05-13 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-13
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Source: -See Summary (2010-05-06 / English) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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Source: -See Summary (2010-06-04 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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Source: -See Summary (2010-05-14 / English) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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(1) the information must relate to "state security and national interests";
(2) it must have been determined to be a state secret "in accordance with legally defined procedures"; and
(3) knowledge of it must be restricted to a defined scope of personnel for a defined length of time.

Source: -See Summary (2010-05-06 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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• In Nansha and Luogang Districts, rural hukou holders will receive unified hukous within one year;


• in Baiyun, Panyu, and Huadu Districts, the timeline will be within three years;
and

• in county-level cities Zengcheng and Conghua, the timeline will be within five years.

Source: -See Summary (2010-05-06 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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Source: -See Summary (2010-05-05 / English) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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• those who continue to petition regarding issues that authorities already have deemed to be "closed"


• those who have signed an agreement to "stop complaints and end appeals" (tingfang xisu) but who have continued nonetheless to petition higher level authorities


• those who violate National Xinfang Regulations or other laws and regulations by "bypassing immediate levels" to take their complaints to higher administrative levels and engaging in "abnormal petitioning"

1. those "who are or are suspected of engaging in activities that endanger state security"


2. those "who participate in or are suspected of engaging in cult organization activities"


3. those "suspected of being on the run because of involvement in a crime"


4. those "criminally punished" for past violent criminal acts specified in the announcement


5. those "criminally punished for being engaged in, participating in, covering up, or coordinating terrorist activities"


6. those "criminally punished or detained for engaging in, participating in, covering up, or coordinating drug dealing"

Source: -See Summary (2010-04-30 / English) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=140222

Source: -See Summary (2010-04-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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Source: -See Summary (2010-04-15 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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• Legal Protection and State Oversight. Article 6 stipulates that venues' property and income enjoy legal protection and includes the same protections as the RRA against seizure, looting, and other forms of infringement by any organization or individual. Under Article 7, the government office with which the venue is registered exercises "guidance and supervision" (zhidao he jiandu) over the venue's financial affairs. The Financial Affairs Measures include penalties for venues that violate the provisions (Article 38), but do not include sanctions for government agencies that abuse their power in implementing financial oversight.
• Financial Management System. Several provisions outline the parameters of maintaining a "financial affairs management system" (caiwu guanli zhidu) within religious venues and the requirements for handling finances. Articles 4 and 5 require venues to have a financial affairs management system led by a "financial affairs management group" (caiwu guanli xiaozu). Under Article 8, venues must keep "truthful and complete" accounting books in accordance with the PRC Accounting Law and the Non-Profit Civil Society Organizations Accounting System. Under Article 11, one person "must not" take on "concurrent posts" in handling the venues' accounting, cashier work, and financial affairs work. The article also calls for "avoiding" the roles being taken on by people related to each other. Article 21 requires expenditures to receive a "signature of agreement" (qianzi tongyi) by the "responsible person" in the financial affairs group (caiwu xiaozu), with approval from the responsible person in the management committee (guanli zuzhi) of the religious venue. "Large expenditures" require that the management committee of the venue "research" and "agree" to the matter, while opinions must be "heard" and "solicited" from religious believers.
• Filing and Reporting Requirements. Under Article 12, venues are to establish a yearly budget, file it with the agency that oversees their registration, and "share the information with local citizens who are religious believers." Article 32 requires that venues submit a financial report at least once a year to the same government agency.
• Definitions of Finances. Several articles define what qualifies as income and expenditures in venues for religious activities. For example, Article 14 defines venues' income to include domestic and overseas donations, and income from providing religious services, entrance tickets to religious sites, the sale of religious goods, art, and publications, income from social welfare charitable undertakings (shehui gongyi cishanshiye) and other social services, state subsidies, and "other legal income." Article 16 covers the handling of donations and donation boxes. Article 20 defines expenditures. Chapter 6 stipulates provisions for the management of fixed assets.

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-06-04
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Source: -See Summary (2010-03-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-04-22
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Source: -See Summary (2010-04-21 / English) | Posted on: 2010-04-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=139639

Source: -See Summary (2010-04-20 ) | Posted on: 2010-04-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=139617

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-25 ) | Posted on: 2010-04-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136437

* Ethnic group conjectured based on available names provided in media reports.
** The limited number of reports on this trial appear to have been removed from the Internet or are housed on malicious pages. See a cached page from the Xinjiang Daily (via Xinhua) for a copy of the article.

• Media coverage of late December trials differs. While the national state-run media agency Xinhua had provided English-language reports on trials in October and early December, English-language reporting on the late December and January trials appeared absent from Xinhua and other Chinese media agencies.
• Discrepancies in charges involved. In Xinhua reporting on the approval of the arrests (pizhun daibu) of 83 people, an August 4 English-language Xinhua article reported that XUAR procurator Otkur Abduraxman "said those arrested will face charges including murder, intentional injury, arson and robbery." According to Xinhua's Chinese-language report from the same day, however, the group also was suspected of "destroying vehicles, gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels and making trouble, and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination," in addition to the crimes listed in the English-language report. Earlier, a July 18 article from the Legal Daily, citing legal experts from the XUAR, had reported that suspects' alleged crimes related to events in July fell into five categories, including endangering state security (ESS), and included over 20 suspected crimes, including separatism and armed rebellion. Based on information reported by Chinese media, none of the July-related trials that took place in October, December, and January involved ESS crimes.
• Detention numbers vary. Xinhua reported in a July 10 Chinese-language article that authorities detained (zhuahuo) 190 people in a series of four operations on July 9 and July 10, in connection to events on July 5. As noted in an earlier CECC analysis, this news appears to have been unreported in official English-language media.

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-09 ) | Posted on: 2010-04-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=137197

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-10 ) | Posted on: 2010-04-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=137358

Next, we will implement a professional qualification entrance system for news workers. We will use news professional qualification entrance standards to ensure that all comrades who will enter the frontlines of news reporting first study the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and receive training on the Marxist view of news, training in journalist ethics, and training about the Party's news propaganda discipline. Our news workers can never lose this "spirit", which is a news worker's sense of political and historical responsibility...

• The Communist Party, through the CPD and other agencies, frequently issues directives to news media on what they can or cannot report. On March 21, 2010, the New York Times (NYT) released an English translation of a directive issued jointly by the CPD and China's Bureau of Internet Affairs before the March 2010 annual sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Consultative Conference. The directive barred media from reporting on citizens demanding that officials publicize their finances, negative news on front pages or headlines, and features on petitioners, among other stories.


• In the wake of Google’s March 22 announcement that it would redirect users of its mainland Chinese search engine to its uncensored Hong Kong site, Chinese officials reportedly ordered domestic news Web sites not to report information released by Google, to play down Chinese citizens' displays of support for Google, and to publish only stories put out by the central government media, according to a March 25 Washington Post reprint of instructions reportedly issued by propaganda officials that first appeared on China Digital Times.


• During the NPC session, Li Hongzhong, the governor of Hubei province, reportedly berated and seized the audio recorder of a reporter who identified herself as a journalist for the People's Daily, the Party's flagship newspaper, according to another March 21 NYT article. "So you're from a party paper," the article quoted Governor Li as saying. "Is this how a party paper guides public opinion? I'm going to the chief of your paper!"


• In early March the CPD reportedly issued a warning to top editors at the Chinese newspaper, Economic Observer, after it and 12 other newspapers jointly published an editorial calling for reform of China's household registration, or hukou, system, according to a March 10 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report. Zhang Hong, an editor and co-author of the editorial, reportedly was removed from his position. The WSJ report did not indicate who removed Zhang. For more information on the editorial, see a CECC analysis.


• In a February 22, People's Daily interview, an unnamed GAPP official, noting concern about the Internet's role in disseminating news, emphasized legal requirements preventing commercial Web sites and unlicensed "Internet journalists" from independently reporting news on the Internet. The official said that commercial Web sites are not news organizations and thus "are not qualified to legally report or originally issue news." The official said that the only news Web sites that were allowed to originally report news were "traditional media" already licensed by the government and authorized to apply for press cards for their journalists (see Articles 4 and 12 of the Measures for Administration of News Reporter Cards). The official cited as examples the news Web sites of traditional media such as People.com.cn (of the Communist Party's flagship newspaper People's Daily) and Xinhuanet.com (of the central government's news agency). The official said that at most commercial Web sites could obtain government approval only to re-post news (in apparent reference to the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services). The official also took aim at independent online journalists, saying that the "publicly complained about so-called 'Internet journalists'" were illegal and citing what authorities have noticed as some in China setting up "so-called" anti-corruption and other Web sites to pose as licensed journalists and extract bribes.

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-24 ) | Posted on: 2010-04-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=138274

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-23 / English) | Posted on: 2010-04-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136336

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-01 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-26
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136566

• According to a December 24 report from the Guangdong Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (GERAC), a top official for religious affairs in Shaoguan municipality told a local gathering of registered Protestants on December 10 that they must "strengthen theological reconstruction, continuously draw out positive factors from the Protestant canon and doctrines, and push theological reconstruction to new heights."
  
  
• In late November, the TSPM/CCC of Jieyang municipality gathered to discuss proposals to facilitate the development of "harmonious churches." Theological reconstruction figured prominently in the proposals put forward by the TSPM authorities: "we must integrate our efforts to build harmonious churches, insist on the three-self principles, and deepen theological reconstruction; [in order to] resist infiltration and various forms of heresy, and bring about healthier development for the church" (GERAC, December 23).

• On February 9, the Zhejiang Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee reported that the TSPM/CCC held a symposium on theological reconstruction with 151 registered church leaders from across the province. Deng Fucun, the Zhejiang TSPM chairman, told participants how theological reconstruction was necessary to make Christianity sufficiently "Chinese" and to maintain independence from foreign Protestants. Deng described the "spiritual essence" of the TSPM as "insisting on the principle of independence and free initiative without wavering; creating, with single-hearted devotion, a church that belongs to the Chinese people…exerting ourselves to further the construction of a harmonious society…"



• A January 22 report from the Hangzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau (via the Hangzhou Office of Performance Assessment's official Web site) reveals the imperative to modify Protestant doctrine and teachings that lie behind theological reconstruction. Under the heading of "Primary Tasks to Do," the Bureau writes: "we must encourage and support religious circles to interpret doctrines and church rules in ways that conform to the times and accord with the demands of social progress, they must go a step further in deepening Protestant theological reconstruction, push forward with theological reconstruction until its positive results capture pulpits at the basic level."

• On February 2, the Jiangsu Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission reported on a meeting held earlier the same day by the TSPM/CCC of Huai'an municipality to assess their work from 2009. Authorities congratulated TSPM/CCC clergy for their success at "energetically launching theological reconstruction, strengthening personnel training, and coming together to launch 'blessing the motherland' patriotic propaganda activities that celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the New China…" Among its list of priorities for 2010, the Huai'an TSPM/CCC vowed to "safeguard against cults and resist external [forces] that use religion to infiltrate." Registered churches were also urged to "conduct a careful investigation into and promptly dispose of all existing unsafe and unstable factors in various locations."



• On January 25, the TSPM/CCC in Suzhou convened a meeting to review their 2009 activities and to make plans for 2010, according to an official report from the Suzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau. Although the TSPM/CCC leadership found that official churches had "obtained a certain degree of success in launching patriotic education campaigns…promoting theological reconstruction… and attracting and fostering personnel," Suzhou religious affairs officials continued to emphasize Party-dictated political "study" for pastors in their 2010 agenda for Protestants: "all pastoral personnel shall attach great importance to study, take study as a responsibility, treat the study system as a type of hard restraint, and earnestly master [their] studies."



• The TSPM in Sihong county ordained 95 deacons on December 15, after determining that they were "politically reliable" and that they "insisted on the three-self patriotic principles, understood policies and regulations, understood church management, and were capable of correctly interpreting doctrines and church rules," according to a December 29 report from the Suqian Municipal Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs.



• A December 3 report from the same source provided details of officially sponsored "preaching competitions" held in Sihong county in spring 2009 for the purpose of "guiding the masses of believers to the correct understanding of the Bible's basic teachings, purifying Protestants' faith, enhancing the adaptation of Protestant faith to socialism, raising their consciousness to resist cult infiltration and to oppose separatism, and promoting social harmony and stability."

• According to a January 27 report from the Jilin Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (via Buddhism Online), SARA approved a request to establish a new TSPM/CCC-controlled Bible school with the "primary task of educating and fostering Jilin province's full-time theology students and training existing pastoral personnel within the province who serve as the backbones of local churches." Jilin authorities stressed the need for TSPM/CCC leaders to strengthen "political and ideological education at the school," and "in a planned way, foster religious personnel who are patriotic, which will have decisive impact on the future face of Protestantism in Jilin."

• UFWD and SARA officials in Yiliang county launched a campaign in January to promote the incorporation of Party Chairman Hu Jintao's "scientific development concept" into the teachings of the state-sanctioned church, according to a January 25 report from the official Web site of the Yiliang county government and Party committee. Yang Chaoping, the vice
  director of the county UFWD, told local church leaders: "religion must adapt to socialist society; make great efforts to serve the construction of a harmonious society; insist on the three-self principles without wavering; resist, in practical ways, infiltration by external hostile forces; resolutely push forward with theological reconstruction; and accelerate the scientific development of the Protestant church." The vice head of Kuixiang township, Niu Changxiang, urged TSPM/CCC leaders to ensure that "the religious masses strictly abide by national laws and regulations, and endorse and support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party…"

• In late November, the TSPM/CCC in Huangshi municipality held its third symposium on theological reconstruction, according to a December 1 report from the Hubei Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission. Deng Hanguang, the Commission's Vice Director, attended the symposium and "affirmed" the efforts of the TSPM/CCC to reshape Protestant theology. Deng also "raised a clear demand" for how Protestants should explore ways to "deepen the study of the spirit of the leaders' remarks to the plenary session of the 17th Party Congress."

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-03 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136778

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-03 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
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Source: -See Summary (2010-02-25 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136443

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
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Source: -See Summary (2010-02-18 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
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• Aim of the Regulation. Stating that "ethnic separatism" is the main danger to stability in the XUAR, the regulation describes strengthening ethnic unity as citizens' "sacred duty" and "glorious obligation" (Article 5). It also notes that citizens have a "right" and "responsibility" to receive ethnic unity education (Article 6).
• Scope of implementation. The regulation spells out the responsibilities of various government offices, Party organizations, and other institutions in incorporating ethnic unity education into their work and describes intended recipients of such education (see generally Section 2 of the regulation). The regulation charges educational institutions (Article 12), the judiciary (Article 15), human resources offices (Article 16), religious affairs bureaus (Article 17), commercial and industrial agencies (Article 18), and social organizations like trade unions and women's federations (Article 19), among other groups, with including unity education in their work and spreading ethnic unity education to various segments of the population. Educational institutions' tasks include promoting unity education at the kindergarten level, which is lower than the grade level mandated in the national circular on unity education in schools.
• Controls Over Free Speech. Provisions in the regulation call for supervision of artistic and cultural venues (Article 13) and oversight of the publishing market (Article 14); forbid "contents and acts not beneficial to ethnic unity" in commercial activities (Article 18); and call on academic research institutions in philosophy and the social sciences to research "ethnic unity theory and major achievements in practice" and provide "scientific theory guidance and support" for ethnic unity education (Article 22). Other articles also carry implications for academic freedom. Article 12 forbids anyone from using forums or platforms at educational institutions to disseminate speech "not beneficial" to the "unity of the motherland, ethnic unity, and social stability." Article 23 lists a range of subjects as components of unity education, including the history of Xinjiang and "history of ethnic minority development," against a track record of politicizing academic analyses of the region and censoring historical analyses that deviate from state-sanctioned positions. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report, page 147 and accompanying footnotes, for more information.)
• Punishments. The regulation details repercussions and penalties for "words and acts" (Article 36) and for disseminating speech (Article 37) "not beneficial" to ethnic unity. Under Article 37, spreading such speech can carry the possibility of administrative punishment or, where the violation constitutes a crime in the PRC Criminal Law, the possibility of criminal penalties.

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-04 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135732

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-01 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135611

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-26 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135388

• "Insist on adherence to the [CCP’s] leadership";
  
• "Insist on adherence to the socialist system";
  
• "Insist on adherence to the system of regional autonomy for minority nationalities"; and
  
• "Insist on adherence to a development path with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan traits."

• "Improvement in the people's livelihood";
• "Development of social undertakings";
• "Protection for the ecological environment"; and
• "Construction of the infrastructure."

• Great Western Development (GWD, Xibu da kaifa). In 1999, Jiang Zemin announced GWD, a program to accelerate economic development in an area made up of 12 provincial-level administrative areas, including all five of China's ethnic autonomous regions, and designated as "western China" for the purpose of the program. The Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission described GWD in June 2000 as "the necessary choice for solving China's nationality problems." The Party circulated GWD policy guidelines in 2000 and GWD entered into effect on January 1, 2001. (See, Circular of the State Council on Policies and Measures Pertaining to the Development of the Western Region, 26 October 00, reprinted on the Meishan Municipality (Sichuan province) People's Government Web site (scroll down for English).) On June 29, 2001, two days after the Fourth Forum concluded, construction began on the Qinghai-Tibet railway, officially designated as a key GWD project.
  
• Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) amendment. On February 28, 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress amended China's principal law governing the rights of ethnic minorities and the function of local governments of ethnic autonomous areas. (See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for maps and information on Tibetan autonomous areas in China; see Section II—Human Rights—Ethnic Minority Rights in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report for recent information on ethnic minority issues.) The amended REAL "stipulates that . . . the state shall prioritize rational resource exploitation projects and infrastructural projects in localities under ethnic autonomy in accordance with unified plans and market demand," Xinhua reported on the date of amendment (translated in OSC, 28 February 01). According to a March 2001 TIN report (reprinted in WTN, 14 March 01), the amendments "bring [the REAL] into line with new policies to accelerate economic development in the western regions of China," and "focus on the development of autonomous regions according to the Party's political and economic priorities and the further integration of these areas into the rest of China."

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-22 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-16
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135152

• The figure 5.95 million contradicts the December 2007 Xinhua report on passenger traffic during the same 18-month period, surpassing that report by approximately one-quarter.
  
  
  • An average of approximately 10,870 passengers would have to commence travel each day for 18 months to reach a total of 5.95 million. If equal proportions of passengers traveled to and from the TAR -- a premise that ignores the likelihood that somewhat more than one-half of the passengers travel inbound and that some passengers remain for a time to work, trade, or engage in business -- the average daily passenger total in each direction would be approximately 5,435.
    
    
  • The figure 5,435, however, surpasses by about 1,000 persons the average daily total of approximately 4,400 Lhasa-bound passengers during the same 18-month period reported by the December 2007 Xinhua article. (See additional statistical information below.) The February 2008 report does not refer to any of the data provided by the December 2007 report, nor does it provide any new information that could account for the large increase in the reported number of passengers for the same period.
    
    
• The assertion that 5.95 million passengers traveled on the railway in an 18-month period exceeds the railway's stated capacity, as reported in official Chinese media.
  
  
  • In May 2006, a TAR official stated that the railway would transport 4,000 tourists per day into the TAR when it commenced service on July 1. A June 28, 2006, China Tibet Information Center (CTIC) report published shortly before the railway began operation discussed the number and composition of Qinghai-Tibet railway trains. A total of four trains would arrive in Lhasa each day and the capacity of each train would be 936 persons, based on the number and capacity of each type of car the trains reportedly would include. Car capacities range from 32 to 98 passengers depending on the standard of accommodation. Based on the CTIC information, the capacity of four trains would be 3,744 passengers.
    
    
  • CTIC's preliminary schedule information appears to remain generally consistent with timetables available on the Travel China Guide Web site on February 25, 2008. Although passenger services for Lhasa depart from seven Chinese cities, only four trains arrive in Lhasa each day: service from Beijing runs daily; the services departing from Chengdu city and Chongqing city merge into a single train in Baoji city; the service departing from Lanzhou city merges in Xining with the Xining city service; and, according to CTIC, the services departing from Shanghai city and Guangzhou city depart on alternate days. The timetable for Naqu (Nagchu), the capital of Naqu prefecture in the TAR, illustrates how services with different points of origin retain their original service numbers after they merge to form a single train.
    
    
  • The December 2007 report does not provide any information that explains how the railway accommodates the average daily number of TAR-bound passengers claimed by the article (approximately 4,400), which exceeds by approximately 650 passengers per day the 3,744 passenger per day capacity of the four arriving trains based on the CTIC information. The excess number of passengers could be accommodated by adding one or two cars to some of the services.
    
    
  • If the February 2008 report of 5.95 million passengers arriving in and departing from the TAR each day during the first 18 months of operation (10,870 passengers per day) is accurate, then it would surpass by nearly 3,400 passengers per day the railway's daily bidirectional capacity of 7,488 passengers based on the CTIC information. The CECC has not seen any public reports by Chinese news media announcing large increases of service on the Qinghai-Tibet railway.
    
    
  • Even if Chinese authorities had announced a significant expansion of Qinghai-Tibet railway service, such an announcement would not resolve the contradiction between the passenger statistics provided by the December 2007 and February 2008 Xinhua reports.
    
    
• The February 2008 report characterizes all of the Qinghai-Tibet railway's 5.95 million passengers as "tourists," contradicting the December 2007 report's acknowledgement that nearly one-half of the passengers during a 12-month period were not tourists.
  
  
  • The December 2007 report stated that "more than a half" of Qinghai-Tibet railway passengers from July 2006 to June 2007 were tourists, implying that somewhat less than half of the passengers during that period were not tourists.
    
    
  • A September 14, 2006, Xinhua report on the railway's initial period of operation revealed that less than half of the Lhasa-bound passengers were tourists. Midway into September 2006, after two and one-half months' of railway operation, Jin Shixun, the Director of the TAR Committee of Development and Reform, said that 40 percent of the passengers were tourists and that the rest were business persons, students, transient workers, traders, and individuals visiting relatives. (See additional details below.)

• Approximately 2.35 million passengers arrived in Lhasa during the 18-month period from July 2006 to December 2007, based on the December 2007 report.
  
  
  • Referring to the period January-December 2007, the last 12 months of the 18-month period, the December 2007 report stated, "About 1.6 million passengers are forecast to travel on the Qinghai-Tibet railway this year." The article reported that during the first 12 months of operation, July 2006 through June 2007, "[A] total of 1.5 million people had come to [the TAR] by train."
    
    
  • Based on the average monthly passenger traffic provided by these statistics, an average of approximately 125,000 passengers per month (4,170 per day) arrived in the TAR in July to December 2006, and an average of approximately 133,300 passengers per month (4,440 per day) did so in January to December 2007. Based on those figures, the 18-month total of passenger arrivals in the TAR would have been approximately 2.35 million. The December 2007 report did not provide any information about the number of passengers departing from the TAR.
    
    
• Among the approximately 2.35 million persons arriving in Lhasa from July 2006 to December 2007, more than a half million may have been non-Tibetan, mostly ethnic Han, workers, traders, and business persons who intended to remain for a period in the TAR to work, engage in business, or seek other economic opportunity, based on information provided in the September 2006 and December 2007 Xinhua reports.
  
  
  • If information provided in the September 2006 report about the different purposes of passengers for traveling to the TAR remained representative throughout the 18-month period of July 2006 to December 2007, then as many as 1.41 million of the 2.35 million arriving passengers may have been non-tourists, and over half of the 1.41 million non-tourists may have been mainly Han who intended to remain for a period in the TAR for economic reasons. The remaining 940,000 passengers (40 percent of 2.35 million), would have been tourists.
    
    
    • According to the September 14, 2006, Xinhua report, the railway carried 272,700 passengers in the period from July 1, 2006, until Xinhua published the report (76 days). The figure suggests an average of approximately 3,590 arrivals per day in the TAR, a plausible figure because the Shanghai and Guangzhou services did not start operation until October 1 and 2, respectively, according to Xinhua reports on the same dates. According to the September 2006 report, of the 60 percent of the passengers who were not tourists, 30 percent were businesspersons, and the remaining 30 percent were "students, transient workers, traders, and people visiting relatives in Tibet."
      
      
  • The December 2007 Xinhua information reports a lower proportion of non-tourist arrivals than the September 2006 report, but even the more recent information supports the observation that the railway passengers may have included more than a half million mostly Han workers, traders, and businesspersons.
    
    
    • The December 2007 Xinhua report stated that "more than a half" of the 1.5 million passengers arriving in the TAR between July 2006 and June 2007 were tourists -- a greater proportion of tourist arrivals than the 40 percent Xinhua reported in September 2006. It is unlikely, however, that the proportion of tourists surpassed one-half by a substantial amount. If, for example, the proportion of tourists had reached 60 percent, or even more, officials and news reports would have been likely to call attention to the figure and identify it.
      
      
    • If, for the purpose of illustration, the tourists who made up "more than a half" of the 1.5 million arriving passengers reached 55 percent of the total, then the 45 percent of arriving passengers who were not tourists during the 12-month period would have been numbered approximately 675,000 (about 56,250 per month). If that rate of arrivals for non-tourists represented an average for the entire 18-month period, then approximately 1 million non-tourists would have arrived in the TAR. If the proportions of purposes for non-tourist travel that the September 2006 report described continued to be indicative for the 18-month period, then over half of the 1 million non-tourists arriving in the TAR may have been principally Han persons seeking work and business opportunity.
      

• National census and yearbook data on the same period conflict because each collects data differently. The census methodology is designed to include temporary residents, recent arrivals, and persons without a household registration. But because census day in 2000 was November 1, a substantial number of Han who work or trade in the TAR had departed by census day to spend the winter elsewhere in China. Provincial annual statistical yearbooks rely on data compiled by the Public Security Bureau (PSB).
  

• A TAR government official explained to a CECC staff delegation visiting Lhasa in 2003, before the Qinghai-Tibet railway was completed, why the Han population appeared to be larger than official statistics indicate. He said that "every day" there is a mobile Han population numbering more than 200,000 in the TAR, and that it peaks from June through October. (CECC 2004 Annual Report.) A Tibetan academic in Lhasa told a CECC staff delegation in 2002 that the temporary population of Han workers and traders in Lhasa's urban district alone reaches approximately 100,000 during summer and declines to about 10,000 in winter.
  
  
• A Chinese academic study of the migrant worker population in Lhasa in 2005, before the railway was completed, concluded that the actual number of temporary migrants is much larger than official records reveal. Studying the migrant workers in the TAR is difficult, the paper observed, because the workers move seasonally and generally try to avoid registering with local authorities in order to escape payment of fees and charges. The paper noted that the Great Western Development program promotes the flow of "a large number of temporary migrants" into the TAR, and leads to increased competition between a "low quality" local Tibetan workforce and incoming (mostly Han) migrant workers.
  

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-04 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-03-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=102411

Source: -See Summary (2009-09-02 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129250

The accusations against him are connected to essays he published on his Web site about the protests in Tibet [in 2008], and related to information he disclosed to the outside world about the suppression of Tibetans during the protests and the detention of monks at monasteries by People's Armed Police, etc. These essays on his site have already been deleted. He is charged with "divulging state secrets."

• In June 2009, the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee reviewed a draft revision of the PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets (State Secrets Law) and the NPC released the draft for public comment, but the proposed changes do not address abuses that occur under the current state secrets legal framework. Currently, the broad and vague definition of ''state secrets'' in Chinese law and regulations gives officials wide latitude to declare almost any information a state secret.
  
  
• [Police] can declare that a case involves state secrets to deny criminal defendants basic procedural rights, including access to counsel and an open trial. Citizens cannot challenge such a determination and officials may declare information a state secret retroactively.

During [2008's] "Tibet incident", [Konchog Tsephel and Kunga Tsayang] themselves witnessed how their fellow countrymen of their hometown determinedly took to the streets and voiced their opposition. The two writers revealed their aspirations and discussed facts on the internet, which then unexpectedly became the reason for them becoming criminals accused of jeopardising "state security" and revealing "state secrets". In other words, one could say that the country's action of using its power to suppress the violent behaviour of the opposing masses belongs to the category of secret which is often practiced but never spoken of.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133098

• "strengthen the building of grassroots democracy, research the adoption of the documentation system and other methods, vigorously develop community-based social organizations, enhance the ability of communities to self-govern" (Item 4 in section of Agreement marked "Content of Agreement").



• "Unless other regulations specify otherwise, explore establishing a system whereby civil society organizations apply and register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The Ministry of Civil Affairs shall regard this as a point for observation, tracking, and research" (Item 11).



• "Ministry of Civil Affairs will consult with relevant departments regarding the transfer of administrative and registration jurisdiction over foreign foundations with representative offices in Shenzhen to the Shenzhen municipal government, authorize the city of Shenzhen to launch a pilot project regarding the registration and management of foundations, chambers of commerce, and trans-provincial trade associations" (Item 12).



• "promote the transfer of government functions for public services that social organizations are capable of undertaking, especially newly increased public services; government procurement services, delegation or contracting of responsibilities, and other methods can be adopted—[in order to] support the provision of public services by social organizations" (Item 14).



• "accelerate the establishment of a legal incorporation management system for charitable organizations, increase the public creditability of charitable organizations, explore the creation of a system that can effectively link, and to a moderate degree separate, the collection, use, and supervision of charitable funds, [and] move forward on constructing the standardization of charitable groups" (Item 27).

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135081

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134999

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered—combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web—have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all.

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05		more ...
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• Subsidies for farmers to buy minivans or light goods vehicles (Article 2),


• Subsidies for scrapping old vehicles (Article 3),


• Allocation of 10 billion yuan from the central government for development of technology (Article 9), and


• Subsidies for a national fuel-efficient and new-energy vehicle demonstration project (Article 10).

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135079

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-15 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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• Liu was denied the right to hire the attorney of his choice. After Liu's arrest, officials barred Mo Shaoping from representing Liu because Mo was a fellow signatory of Charter 08.


• Liu's defense attorneys were denied the right to present their opinions to prosecutors before the indictment was issued, as required by law, and were not given adequate time to prepare for trial.


• Officials barred Liu's wife and foreign diplomats from attending the December 23 trial, according to a December 25 CHRD report.


• Judges reportedly limited Liu's defense lawyers to less than 20 minutes to present their arguments for Liu's innocence, according to the December 25 CHRD report. The report also said that the presiding judge cut Liu off while he was delivering his prepared statement, preventing him from finishing his remarks.


• No witnesses appeared in court, a common occurrence in China. Most criminal cases proceed solely on the basis of written witness statements for the prosecution, leaving the defense with no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and challenge such statements. (See p. 106 of the CECC 2009 Annual Report.) According to the trial court judgment, there were 11 witnesses for the prosecution, including Liu's wife. The other 10 were human rights activists who allegedly participated in Charter 08. At least one witness has denied making the statements that the prosecution had attributed to him. In a December 25 statement published on CHRD's Web site, prominent intellectual Zhang Zuhua said he never told police that Liu had published Charter 08 on overseas Web sites, pointing out that both he and Liu had been apprehended by authorities before the charter was released online. "How could I have said that 'Liu Xiaobo posted Charter 08 on foreign Web sites'? Clearly, this characterization has no basis," Zhang said. Another witness, human rights defender Teng Biao, said in a December 26 essay (via Boxun) that the statements from his police interrogation cited in the court judgment were not relevant since he had never mentioned Liu Xiaobo. Teng noted that in his experience authorities often cited family and friends as witnesses not for evidentiary purposes, but rather to sow discord among them and to raise suspicions about the moral character and integrity of the "witnesses."

• "We Are Willing To Share Responsibility with Liu Xiaobo" (December 10 statement from Chinese citizens who co-drafted or signed Charter 08, via Independent Chinese Pen Center)


• Online Yellow Ribbon Campaign (see December 23 Radio Free Asia article)


• "The Dirtiest of Political Trials" (December 23 statement by Ding Zilin, leader of the Tiananmen Mothers, translated by Human Rights in China)


• U.S. State Department (December 24 Statement by Mark Toner, Acting Spokesman) - "[W]e call on the Government of China to release him immediately and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens to peacefully express their political views."


• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay (December 25 Remarks via UN News Centre) - "The conviction and extremely harsh sentencing of Liu Xiaobo mark a further severe restriction on the scope of freedom of expression in China."


• European Union Presidency (Undated Statement on the Sentencing of Liu Xiaobo) - "The verdict against Mr Liu gives rise to concern with respect to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial in China."


• Former Czech President Vaclev Havel (January 6 Letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao, which Havel attempted to deliver to Chinese Embassy in Prague, as reprinted in the Washington Post) - "There is nothing subversive to state security or damaging to future prosperity when citizens act guided by their own will and according to their best knowledge and conscience, when they associate among themselves to discuss and express peacefully their concerns and visions about the future development of their society."


• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin (December 23)

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-14 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134546

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-11 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134265

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-07 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134110

• Envisions the development of automotive technology, both through indigenous innovation and by studying international cutting-edge technology (Articles 7 to 12). The policy refers to support for technology to lower emissions, raise fuel-efficiency, produce hybrid and electric vehicles, use new vehicle materials, and use alternative fuels.


• Lays out a framework for the structural adjustment of the auto sector. This is done through the creation of large auto enterprise groups and alliances, and international cooperation to broaden the scope of operations and cope with globalization (Articles 13 to 16). Provides for "an exit mechanism" for companies that cannot compete (Article 17).


• Lays out detailed investment approval procedures and requirements (Articles 40 to 51). These cover government approval of various categories of auto or auto parts companies, establishment of automotive research and development centers, and foreign shareholding ratio restrictions applicable to foreign investment in the sector.


• Encourages the growth of private automobile consumption, and sets standards (Articles 56 to 69). These standards include a range of regulations to facilitate and encourage auto purchases, such as regulations on types of vehicles, toll road charges, fees, auto finance, the second-hand market, insurance premiums, and construction of parking lots.


• Additional miscellaneous provisions. These include, for example, provisions on technical standards, trademarks and branding, sales and service networks, import restrictions, and support from other industries, such as metallurgy and electronics.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133273

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-28 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132585

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-17 / Chinese) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132161

• Chinese regulations that expressly prohibit foreign investment in businesses that import reading materials, AVHE products, or sound recordings, as well as regulations that give the Chinese government discretion to determine who may import reading materials, AVHE products, sound recordings, and films into China. For example, Articles X(2) and X(3) of the Catalogue of Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries prohibit foreign investment in the "business of… importing of books, newspaper and periodical" and the "business of… importing of audio and visual products and electronic publications." The Panel found that these provisions violate commitments in the Chinese government's Protocol of Accession to the WTO (Protocol) and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (Working Party Report) that require China to permit all enterprises in China and foreign enterprises and individuals to import and export all goods (with some limited exceptions) to and from China by December 2004. In addition, the Panel found other regulations that violate commitments in the Protocol and the Working Party Report. Examples include Articles 41 and 42 of the Regulation on the Administration of Publishing, which require companies that import publications into China to be Chinese wholly state-owned enterprises, and Article 30 of the Regulations Regarding Management of Films, which gives the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television discretionary authority to decide who can import films.

• Chinese regulations that restrict the ability of wholly foreign-owned enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint ventures to distribute reading materials, AVHE products, and sound recordings within China. For example, the Panel found that Article 8(4) of the Rules for the Management of Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures for the Distribution of Audiovisual Products, which stipulates that the Chinese partner in a Chinese-foreign joint venture distributor of audiovisual products must be the majority shareholder, violates national treatment provisions in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Article XVI:2(f) of the GATS prohibits parties to the GATS from putting ceilings on the percentage or total value of foreign investment. The Panel also cited other regulations expressly prohibiting foreign investors from engaging in the distribution of the products in question, such as Article 4 of the Several Opinions on the Introduction of Foreign Capital Into the Cultural Sector, which prohibits foreign investors from distributing publications or audiovisual products within China.

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-27 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129022

• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin (12/23/09)
• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-05 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133838

• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133614

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-30 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133403

• "The Chinese Communist Party's Dictatorial Patriotism" (October 3, 2005, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu argues that the source of a nation's sovereignty is its people and that the government and ruling party are servants of the nation. Therefore, Liu argues, in order for a government to be truly patriotic, it must respect its people and their right to peacefully criticize and oppose their government. Dictatorships, however, according to Liu, pay lip service to patriotism but do not respect or love the main component of a nation—its people.


• "Can It Be That the Chinese People Are Only Suited To Accepting 'Party-ruled Democracy'?" (January 6, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu critiques the 2005 government white paper Building of Political Democracy in China (via Xinhua) and criticizes its claim that it places authority in the people; instead Liu coins the term "party-ruled democracy" to describe the Chinese Communist Party's dictatorship and approach toward democracy. Liu also discusses recent history including the Chinese government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.


• "Changing State Power Through Changing Society" (February 26, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu discusses how societal changes in the post-Mao era in the relationship between citizens and the state has improved prospects for political reform and urges a gradual, non-violent approach in the pursuit of a liberal democracy.


• "The Multi-faceted Dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party" (March 13, 2006, originally on Observechina.net, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu discusses how the Communist Party has maintained political control, despite the sudden decline in the popularity of the Party's ideology after the events of June 1989, by appealing to the economic self-interests of elites, business people, and officials and entangling them in corruption, bribery, and tax evasion which "autocrats" can use to punish them at any time.


• "The Negative Effects of the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party on Democratization in the World" (May 6, 2006, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu calls the Chinese Communist Party one of the largest obstacles to democratization around the world for, among other things, using the prospect of energy cooperation to build closer relations with Iran and other countries that oppose the United States and the West, using "dollar diplomacy" to extract political concessions from free countries in Europe, and pressuring American companies to restrict freedom of expression to gain access to the Chinese market.


• "Continuing Questions with Regard to the Black Kiln Child Slave Incident" (July 16, 2007, posted on Human Rights in China's Web site) - Liu questions the official handling of a 2007 scandal in which children were sold to work in brick kilns in Shanxi province, calling officials "cold-blooded and brazen."

• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-22 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133497

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-17 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133274

• In February 2009, authorities attempted to prevent Dr. Gao Yaojie from meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, according to Dr. Gao's written statement for a December 3 Commission roundtable. Authorities cut her telephone line in May following news that she was to receive a French human rights award for women, according to a November 29 ChinaAid statement. Dr. Gao left China for the United States in August, hoping to find a "peaceful environment" in which to finish her three books and reveal "the truth about the AIDS epidemic in China," according to the statement.


• On August 4, Asia Catalyst reported that Chinese police seized the passport of an unnamed Chinese AIDS advocate and prevented him from leaving the country to attend the International Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, to which he was invited by UNAIDS. According to the report, he was warned that if he spoke to the media and international organizations, he would "face the same fate as Hu Jia."


• HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a three-and-a-half year prison sentence for "inciting subversion of state power." He is expected to be released on December 17, 2011. On November 17, 2009, Hu's wife Zeng Jinyan reported on her blog that she and her daughter were still under "soft detention" in their home, and were being monitored by seven or eight domestic security protection officials sitting outside the building.


• On December 2, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that Beijing authorities detained Henan activist Tian Xi, who reportedly was infected with HIV in 1996 through a hospital blood transfusion, after he unfurled a banner outside of the Ministry of Health on November 19. Officials then forcibly returned him to his home in Gulu township, Xincai county, Henan province, where he remains under 24-hour surveillance, according to the report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133285

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-07 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132951

• Article 34 includes language similar to that reported in the June draft, stating that "no organization or individual may lure or force minors to participate in religious activities" and that they "may not use religion to carry out activities to obstruct compulsory education." The regulation lacks criteria for determining what acts constitutes "luring" or "force," leaving latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that conflicts with "the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions," as defined in the ICCPR.
• Article 48 also contains language similar to that in the June draft, stating that where minors are "lured" or "forced" into such activities, they "can ask for protection from schools, neighborhood committees, village committees, offices for the protection of minors, or public security organs," and such "organizations or work units receiving requests for help must take measures in a timely manner and not refuse or shift responsibility."
• Article 53 contains the regulation's final mention of religion. It stipulates that where "any organization or individual lures or forces a minor to participate in religious activities" in violation of Article 34, the controlling agency will give "criticism and education" and "order the situation to be amended." In addition, public security organs will give administrative punishment "in accordance with law" in cases of violations of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which includes the possibility of short-term detention. The 1993 XUAR Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection of Minors did not specify penalties for violations of its religion-related provisions.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-27 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132578

Last year, on the eve of Human Rights Day, which is observed each year on December 10th, 303 Chinese citizens—including scholars, writers, lawyers, and activists—issued on the Internet Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. Liu Xiaobo, a prominent intellectual and dissident who signed Charter 08, was detained the night before the document was released. In June 2009, authorities formally arrested Liu for "inciting subversion." Earlier this month, the police forwarded the case to prosecutors, almost a year after he was taken into custody. Many of the other original signers of Charter 08 (which has since garnered over 10,000 signatures within and outside China) have been subjected to harassment, surveillance, and unlawful house arrest. Chinese authorities have blocked Charter 08, and any reference to it, on the Internet.

Human Rights Day commemorates the anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. China voted to adopt the UDHR in 1948, and the current Chinese government has committed itself to protecting the fundamental human rights that are enshrined in the UDHR through international agreements and its own domestic law. In April 2009, the Chinese government reaffirmed this commitment in its first-ever National Human Rights Action Plan.

As detailed in this Commission's 2009 Annual Report, there were many setbacks for rule of law and human rights in China during this past year. In addition to the crackdown on Charter 08 signers, the persecution of human rights lawyers, including Jiang Tianyong and others, reached an unprecedented level; authorities have revoked or suspended the licenses of numerous human rights lawyers and many face ongoing persecution and harassment. Ten months after his disappearance, lawyer Gao Zhisheng remains missing. Petitioners continue to be detained and abused in illegal "black jails." The trials of people—mostly Uyghurs—charged with crimes committed during unrest in Xinjiang in July have been marked by violations of international standards for due process including judges selected for "political reliability" and curbs on defendants' right to independent counsel. The Chinese government continues to suppress civil society initiatives and freedom of expression. For their efforts to advocate peacefully for parents of schoolchildren killed in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, authorities put Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren on trial for endangering national security; Huang Qi recently was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of three years for "illegal possession of state secrets." The cases of over 1,200 of the many political and religious prisoners who are being held in China's jails and prisons today are documented in the Commission's publicly accessible Political Prisoner Database.

On Human Rights Day 2009, this Commission calls on the Chinese government to cease the harassment, control, and arbitrary detention of Chinese citizens who engage in peaceful advocacy for their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other international human rights instruments, and China's own Constitution and laws.


Human Rights Day 2008

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-10
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Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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• Agriculture. China said it would allow imports of U.S. pork and live swine. These had been banned starting in May 2009 because of swine flu. It is not clear how great an impact this commitment will have on U.S. exports to China which, according to industry, as reported in the October 30 Wall Street Journal, had been growing before the ban. Since the ban was imposed the Chinese have ramped up the domestic industry.
• Clean tech. Access to China's market for foreign wind turbines had been largely restricted for foreign manufacturers. China agreed to allow greater access by removing a 2007 local content requirement for wind turbines, according to an October 30 China Daily report. This commitment was somewhat overshadowed by news of a large wind energy project in Texas that, according to a report in the November 1, 2009 New York Times, will use wind turbines manufactured in China, providing roughly 2000 jobs for Chinese workers.
• Government procurement. China made some commitments concerning government procurement, which has been largely closed to foreign companies as well as companies in China that have foreign investors. China agreed to treat products of these foreign-invested companies the same as products of domestically-owned companies. Further, China agreed to submit a revised offer to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) by early in 2010. The 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 JCCTs had also included commitments concerning China's joining the GPA.
• IPR. Every JCCT since 2004 has included commitments by China to improve its IPR protection in light of rampant piracy in China. These commitments have ranged from the general, such as China's commitment at the 2004 JCCT to significantly reduce levels of infringement and make greater use of criminal penalties, to the specific, such as the 2005 commitment to post an IPR ombudsman at the Chinese embassy in Washington DC. This year, according to the USTR fact sheet, the Chinese gave some general assurances concerning Internet piracy and encouraging the protection of certain types of publications at public libraries, and agreed to work with the U.S. to address certain IPR issues.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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Source: -See Summary (2009-07-28 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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• calling on journalists to follow the "correct" political orientation and to maintain complete consistency with the Party's Central Committee.
• noting that in the past 60 years China's news media has played an important role in supporting the Party as it led China through socialist revolution and socialist modernization.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-24 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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• Zhu claimed that the Dalai Lama broke off talks with China twice in November 2008 and demanded an explanation before talks could resume. "If the Dalai Lama side really intends to continue talks, he must first well explain why he cut off the talks twice last year, especially what they did on the second occasion." Zhu's remark about "the second occasion" refers to an unusual meeting of Tibetan political, religious, educational, cultural, and community leaders living outside of China. The meeting was convened in India to "hold an extensive discussion and debate with regard to the Tibetan cause in the light of recent emergency events in Tibet and the international scenario," according to a November 22, 2008, Tibetan government-in-exile (TGiE) report. The meeting participants adopted a set of recommendations urging, among other things, that Tibetans "follow the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama based on the prevailing situation." The recommendation also observed that "views to stop sending envoys and to pursue complete independence or self-determination if no result comes out in the near future were also strongly expressed," the TGiE report said. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari, a meeting participant, referred to the eighth round of dialogue that had concluded on November 5 and said, "As far as our task is concerned, it has certainly come to a crucial stage. We did not even talk about future meetings," according to a November 21 Reuters report. The Commission has not observed any reports of statements by the Dalai Lama or his representatives asserting that they had "cut off the talks." [See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the current status of discussions between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives.]
  
  
• Zhu asserted that the Dalai Lama should restrain his international travel because "such activities . . . disturbed the central government and were detrimental to friendly relations between China and relevant countries." Zhu's demand that the Dalai Lama curtail international travel is consistent with recent Party and government statements pointing to what Chinese state-run media has described as an emerging "China doctrine" (China Daily, 12 March 09) that would pressure countries "cultivating ties with China" to deny entry to the Dalai Lama. The China Daily article referred to a March 7, 2009, news conference where, according to a China Central Television report the same day (translated in OSC, 10 March 09), Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi said: "In handling their relations with China, no country in the world should allow Dalai to pay visits or use their territory to engage in separatist activities. That should be within the norms of international relations, not a so-called special favor to China." [See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the Chinese government's shift toward a more aggressive international policy on the Tibet issue.]

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-03 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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That I have been arbitrarily prohibited from returning to China and my home after traveling abroad—this is a threat to all Chinese citizens. My misfortune is something that every Chinese person could experience. In the past, others have experienced this misfortune, now it is my turn; if there is someone the leaders are dissatisfied with, then tomorrow that person will meet the same fate. Moreover, based on my experience of having tried seven times to return to China, I've realized this: the Chinese government's unlawful measures in prohibiting its own country's citizens from returning home not only harm Chinese citizens, but in the end, the Chinese government's own dignity and reputation is also harmed.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-02 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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• In 2005, authorities in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, began requiring Internet chatrooms, bulletin boards, news groups, and instant messaging systems to implement a real name system as part of an Internet "purification and rectification" initiative.


• As noted in the Commission's 2007 Annual Report, the Internet Society of China, a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, attempted to implement a policy that would have required all bloggers to register with their real names. The government backed away from the plan after Internet companies resisted the plan, arguing that the system would be impossible to implement. According to a May 22, 2007, Xinhua article, a Chinese blogger said that the risk of being identified would discourage bloggers from reporting the truth.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-10 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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(1) endanger state security or harm national and social interests; (2) destroy ethnic unity, incite ethnic separatism, or endanger social stability; (3) endanger the safety of the Internet and information systems; (4) violate intellectual property rights, trade secrets, or the lawful rights and interests of individual privacy, citizens, corporations, or other groups; (5) furnish, produce, or disseminate false or harmful information; (6) produce or disseminate information that is obscene, pornographic, violent, terrorist, homicidal, or that instigates crime; and (7) carry out other acts prohibited in laws and regulations.

Source: -See Summary (2009-10-13 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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• Recognizing a "Positive Role" for Religious Communities. The amended Jiangsu RRA states in Article 1 that the regulation was drafted in part to "bring into play the positive role of public figures from religious circles and lay believers in the promotion of social and economic development," apparently the first regulation to include such language since high-level Communist Party officials and statements began to articulate a "positive role" for religious communities. Article 5 of the Hubei regulation also includes similar language. Despite articulating a "positive role" for religious communities, authorities have used the sentiment to bolster support for state goals more so than to accept and protect religious life within Chinese society. See the CECC 2009 Annual Report for more information.
• China's Five Recognized Religions. Article 2 of the Jiangsu RRA, retained under the amendments, defines religion to mean only the five religions recognized by the Chinese government: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The article is similar to provisions in some other provincial-level regulations. Like the national RRA, neither the older 2001 Hubei regulation, the new Hubei RRA, nor the Hainan provisions include specific mention of the five groups, which conceivably could create space for local innovations in accommodating other religions. See CECC analyses on other provincial-level regulations (1, 2) for more information.
• Religious Activities in the Home. Similar to other recent regulations, Article 14 of the Jiangsu RRA states that religious activities are to be held at registered venues, and Article 19 of the Hubei RRA states that "in general" they are to be held in such venues. Article 11 of the Hainan provisions similarly provides that religious citizens can carry out religious activities in registered venues but also stipulates that they can "live a religious life within one's home," language on worship at home similar to a number of other recent regulations on religious affairs. Language on worship at home carries potential significance for groups of people who want to gather in private residences, outside of state-controlled venues, to hold worship services. As discussed in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, the Chinese government states there are no registration requirements for religious gatherings within the home, but continues to target some private religious gatherings for closure. For more information, see CECC analyses of other provincial-level regulations (1, 2).
• Property Protections. Compared to the 2002 version of the regulation, the amended Jiangsu RRA appears to refine and possibly increase property protections for venues for religious activities. Article 32 (revised from Article 30 in the 2002 regulation) lends more specificity to the circumstances in which local governments may demolish religious property and adds more specificity to the process for compensating religious groups. In addition, newly added Article 43 outlines steps including the possibility of criminal liability for people who violate Article 32 and demolish religious property without permission.
• More Specificity, New Deadlines for Official Actions. Some provisions in the new or amended pieces of legislation add specificity to older provisions or clarify them by specifying time limits for officials to make decisions that affect religious communities. See, e.g., Articles 19 and 23 (previously Article 22) of the Jiangsu RRA. Articles 14 and 15 of the Hubei RRA lend more specificity, consistent with the national RRA, to the process of establishing and registering venues for religious activity. For various provisions in the Hainan provisions (some without counterparts in the older regulation) that add time limits for official decisions, see, e.g., Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, and 13.
• Increased Controls. By introducing more clarity, the regulations also articulate more explicit controls in some cases. For example, the older Hubei regulation provided only a limited number of restrictions on the activities of religious personnel (See Article 7). The new regulation, in contrast, contains 6 articles (Articles 30-35) governing a wider scope of their activities. Some articles include new benefits—like the provision of insurance (Article 34)—but taken as a whole, the articles spell out more controls over the activities and qualifications of religious personnel. The Hainan provisions similarly articulate limits on religious personnel's cross-provincial movement (Article 10) missing from the older regulation.
• Penalties Changed. Article 41 (previously Article 38) of the Jiangsu regulation adds to and refines a list of activities that may meet with official sanction, such as religious personnel leading religious activities before their status has been put on file. Whereas under the 2002 regulation such activity could be fined, however, the new revisions only specify that religious affairs bureaus order the activities to stop. (Other articles in the amended Jiangsu RRA continue to specify fines and other penalties.) The 1997 Hainan regulation lacked provisions on liability. In contrast, the new provisions spell out both penalties for officials who abuse their power (Article 21) as well as for citizens or religious organizations that violate the provisions (Articles 22-27).

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-24 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-12 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-09-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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• The court reportedly rejected requests by Tan's lawyers to call three witnesses, including Ai Weiwei, a noted artist and blogger who helped design the Beijing Olympics' Bird's Nest Stadium and was investigating the deaths of students in the quake, according to the China Daily article, a second August 13 CHRD article, and an August 12 Human Rights in China (HRIC) report. Ai told various news agencies that he planned to still watch the trial but that police came to his hotel and prevented him and 10 other volunteers from leaving until after the trial ended (see, e.g., August 12 Reuters article, August 12 Guardian article). Ai also indicated that police had used force in the process, including striking him in the face.
• Tan's lawyers, Pu Zhiqiang and Xia Lin, reported that the judge frequently cut them off during the trial and that their request to show video evidence was not accepted, according to the China Daily and second CHRD articles.
• Parents of earthquake victims attempting to attend the trial were detained, according to an August 13 Global Times article.
• The court did not allow reporters into the court, according to the China Daily article. Police reportedly searched the hotel rooms of two Hong Kong reporters attempting to cover the case, claiming that they were acting on reports that the journalists possessed drugs, and did not free them until seven hours later, according to an August 13 Agence France-Presse article (via The Australian).
• Police barred hundreds of supporters from entering the courtroom saying the supporters needed passes, even though court officials earlier had told them that no passes were necessary, according to an August 12 CHRD report.

• Protect Huang Qi's and Tan Zuoren's rights to freedom of speech, expression, and association. Based on the published reports about these cases, Huang and Tan engaged in peaceful activities that are guaranteed under China's Constitution and international law. Specifically:
  • China's Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of speech and association (Article 35) and the right to criticize officials (Article 41).
  • The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and expressed an intent to ratify, guarantee all individuals the right to freedom of expression (Article 19) and association (Article 22 for ICCPR, Article 20 for UDHR).

• Allow parents, concerned citizens, and the news media to conduct their own investigations into the role shoddy construction may have played in the school collapses, free from harassment and official interference. China has pledged to protect such activities in its National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), which says "the state will guarantee citizens' rights to criticize, give advice to, complain of, and accuse state organs and civil servants, and give full play to the role of mass organizations, social organizations and the news media in supervising state organs and civil servants." Furthermore, the plan calls for specific measures to guarantee human rights in areas hit by the earthquake, including "respecting earthquake victims" and "registering the names of people who died or disappeared in the earthquake and made [sic] them known to the public."

• Increase transparency regarding the government's own investigations into the school collapses by releasing the details of such investigations and information about victims, including students who died. The Regulations on Open Government Information require government agencies to disclose information that involves the vital interests of citizens (Article 9(1)).

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-14 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-08-12 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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• The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of a total of 237 people in 139 cases, and public security officials also have sought approval to arrest 295 people involved in 175 cases, based on information in a September 11 English-language China Daily report and Chinese-language Xinhua report. The procuratorate has initiated prosecution of 51 people in 14 cases, according to the reports, which appears to clarify information reported the previous week (see below) on cases transferred for review for prosecution. Based on the reports, 956 cases in total have been filed for investigation.
• The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of 196 people in 121 cases related to July 5, and 14 cases involving 51 people have been transferred by public security organs to the procuratorate for review for prosecution, according to the text of a September 4 Chinese-language Xinhua report citing the XUAR government information office. A September 4 English-language Xinhua report (via China.cn) states, in contrast to the Chinese-language report, that authorities have "prosecuted" the cases. (See Articles 136-149 of the Criminal Procedure Law for general information on reviewing cases and initiating prosecution.) Public security officials have sought approval to arrest an additional 239 people involved in 140 cases, and 825 people are being held in criminal detention (xingshi juliu), according to the reports. The numbers represent the second official statement on arrest figures, following information on a first group of arrests reported in August (see below). The September reports do not clarify whether the 196 arrests include the earlier numbers reported in August.
• Authorities have approved arrests (pizhun daibu) of 83 people in connection to crimes on July 5, according to August 4 English-language and Chinese-language reports from Xinhua. The English-language article said the information was the first official announcement on arrests from Urumqi authorities. The article reported that XUAR procurator Otkur Abduraxman "said those arrested will face charges including murder, intentional injury, arson and robbery." According to the Chinese-language report, however, those arrested are also suspected of "destroying vehicles, gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels and making trouble, and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination," in addition to the crimes listed in the English-language report. The Chinese-language report noted those arrested included both Uyghurs and Han. According to a July 18 report from the Legal Daily, citing a XUAR Party official, suspects' alleged crimes fall into five categories, including endangering state security, and include over 20 suspected crimes, including splittism and armed rebellion.
• Following the report of the 83 arrests, an August 23 English-language report from the China Daily (via People's Daily) said over 200 people had been formally arrested and that trials would begin that week, appearing to cite an unnamed Urumqi procuratorate official as the source of the information. The report said charges included splittism and inciting splittism. Hou Hanmin, a spokesperson for the XUAR government called the China Daily report "totally untrue" in an August 25 Global Times report, and another XUAR government official also denied the report, according to an August 25 New York Times report.
• The head of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau reported that 718 suspects had been placed under criminal detention (xingshi juliu) as of August 4, according to a Chinese-language report that day from Xinhua. See also a report of the detentions in an August 4 English-language Xinhua report. A PRC official later reiterated to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that 718 remained in detention and that those who "committed minor offences have been dealt with leniently and released," according to an August 10 Agence France-Presse report (via Yahoo). It is unclear, however, if all other people earlier held in connection to July 5 were outside of some form of custody or oversight as of that date, especially in light of comments from XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri (below) indicating that some peaceful protesters may remain in a form of unofficial custody or under surveillance. According to an August 6 Xinhua report (via China Daily), "Authorities also admitted that some of the detained suspects in connection with the riot have been released as their offences were minor. But they didn't provide the exact number of those who were released."
• According to August 2 English-language and Chinese-language Xinhua reports, public security officers said they had detained (zhuahuo) 319 people in addition to 253 detentions reported earlier. The detentions (zhuahuo) of 253 "prime suspects" were reported in a July 29 Chinese-language Xinhua report, which also noted that a batch of suspects turned themselves in. A July 29 English-language Xinhua report on the detentions said they were "in addition to the more than 1,000 suspects detained by July 6."
  
• Xinhua reported in a July 10 Chinese-language article that authorities detained (zhuahuo) 190 people in a series of four operations on July 9 and July 10, in connection to events on July 5. This news appears to have been unreported in official English-language media.
• Xinhua's English-language service reported on July 7 that authorities had "arrested" 1,434 people--1,379 men and 55 women--in connection to events on July 5. The use of the term "arrests" appears to be an incorrect reference to the initial detention of these individuals. (Formal arrests (daibu) of over 1,400 people two days after alleged criminal activity would be unlikely given the usual progression of the criminal process, including the requirement under the CPL that the procuratorate approve all arrests. This terminology is also inconsistent with Chinese reporting. See, e.g., a July 7 Xinhua article (via Nanfang Daily), noting that police had "caught" (zhuabu) 1,434 people.) Some of the detainees "might be released if no serious criminal records were found," according to a paraphrasing of Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi's remarks in the English-language article.
• XUAR police chief Liu Yaohua initially reported early on July 7 that officials had detained roughly 700 people and continued to pursue "about 90 other key suspects," according to a July 7 English-language Xinhua report.

• 21 Suspects Involved in Urumqi Riot Prosecuted (Xinhua, September 25. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• 108 Stand Accused in Urumqi Riot (China Daily, October 9. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua and Yangzi Evening News, via Sanming Information Net.)
• Six Sentenced to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 12. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• Legal Scholars and Procurator Answer Reporters' Questions about Trial Conditions in Three Major Criminal Cases from "7-5" Incident (People's Daily, October 12, in Chinese. Includes background information, including limited details on legal defense.)
• China Sentences Six to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 15. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• Court Upholds Penalties to Xinjiang Riot Convicts (Xinhua, October 30. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua, via Sina.)