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Beijing Cracks Down On Private Security Companies Used To Detain Petitioners

February 2, 2012

According to Global Times, a publication that operates under the official People's Daily, Beijing municipal Public Security Bureaus launched an official six-month "crack down" on illegal detentions of petitioners by private security companies. The crackdown comes after Chinese news media exposed instances of abuse by "stability maintenance organizations" under contract by local governments to prevent petitioners from airing their grievances to the central government. While authorities have cast the "crack down" as a serious attempt to restrict the use of private "stability maintenance organizations," the implications and effectiveness of the crackdown remain unclear.

Background
Petitioning exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for citizens to appeal government decisions and present their grievances. Chinese citizens often use the petitioning system to seek redress for perceived wrongs, especially when dealing with issues in local corruption and land compensation. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2011 Annual Report for additional information on the petitioning system.) When seeking redress at the central government level, petitioners from all regions attempt to travel to Beijing, where the central government is located, and present their grievances to central authorities through attempts to hand over letters, pass out leaflets, set up banners in prominent locations, or otherwise draw attention to one's grievance (See, e.g., hand over letters, pass out leaflets, set up banners).

In October 2010, Southern Metropolitan Daily exposed a private security company, Anyuanding, under contract by local governments to block petitioners from petitioning to central authorities in Beijing. An October 27, 2010 article in Global Times reported that Anyuanding employed a variety of methods to prevent petitioners from making their grievances heard. The methods reportedly included coercion, pressure, abduction, detention in ''black jails'' (extralegal detention facilities) for extended periods of time, and beatings. In 2010, Chinese Human Rights Defenders documented at least 2,600 cases of petitioner detention in the black jails. More recently, in August 2011, Chinese media exposed former employees of a private security company who ran a black jail that held petitioners located on the outskirts of Beijing in an operation revealed to be funded by five local governments.

Current Crackdown Regulations
According to a December 1, 2011 Beijing News article (via Xinhua), the Beijing public security bureau will require all security companies to register by the end of February 2012 and has adopted a zero tolerance policy against those who seek to "block petitioners and act against regulations." Specifically, the main goals of the crackdown target companies that block petitioners from reaching central authorities, operate without a license, and use violence against petitioners. In addition, according to Global Times, authorities will prohibit security companies from using police insignia and start keeping records of security companies' activities.

Results Uncertain
The effectiveness and long-term impact of the crackdown remain unclear. China's Regulations on Public Security Services, which became effective in January 2010, already contain regulations on "stability maintenance," and private security companies. For example, Chapter 2 contains conditions which must be met (Articles 8-12) by security companies before operations can start, including a license application requirement (Article 9). Furthermore, current regulations already prohibit some potential conflict of interest situations by preventing authorities from running and managing private security companies (Article 40).

However, as an April 12, 2011 article from Caijing points out, it has been difficult for local authorities to give up the practice of running private security companies. According to the article, the lack of guidance on how to disentangle security bureaus from operating private security companies, and the desire by public security bureaus to keep collecting financial rewards from the reportedly 40 billion yuan industry have all contributed to lack of reform in spite of having laws on the books.

Many Chinese citizens still view citizen petitioning to central authorities as the ultimate channel for redress against wrongdoing by local officials even though only approximately 0.2 percent of the petitioners resolve their grievances through petitioning, according to Global Times based on 2007 research conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. As a June 6, 2011 Caijing article points out, the central authorities' mandate to preserve stability, especially the practice of tying the lack of petitioning incidents to local officials' career advancement, has contributed to the rise of illegal conduct by private security companies against petitioners.It remains to be seen whether a six-month-long crackdown on these companies will have any fundamental effect on the entrenched system.

For additional information on petitioning, see Section III-Access to Justice in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Sourcing
TEXT:
Petitioning exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for citizens to appeal government decisions and present their grievances. Chinese citizens often use the petitioning system to seek redress for perceived wrongs, especially when dealing with issues in local corruption and land compensation.
SOURCE:
No need to recheck--lifted from 2011 AR.

TEXT:
When seeking redress, petitioners from all regions attempt to travel to Beijing, where the central government is located, and present their grievances to central authorities through handing of letters, chanting slogans, setting up banners in prominent locations, or otherwise drawing attention to one’s grievance.
SOURCE:
Handling of materials, leafleting:
CMS 167297
女访民杨秀荣、徐永峰北京跳楼、撒传单
“在北京京西招待所她们下榻的五楼房间内，从窗口挂出三幅横幅，并抛洒出大量冤情传单，二人数次站在窗台上，非常惊险”
CMS 165882
“经过数年乃至数十年上访不解决问题的李明翠、王群凤等4位访民再次前往中南海西门，希望能将自己的控诉材料递到胡锦涛、温家宝手上，看问题是否有解决的期望。”

Banner:
CMS 167298
中共中央纪律委员会的接待站，今年年初由东城区府学胡同搬到永定门西路的国家信访局为伍,成了不解决问题的“三办”。所以每天都有访民不去“三办”，而到平安大道的中纪委机关上访。只要是工作日几乎或多或少有蓬头垢面的访民在中纪委机关大门喊冤。10月3 日博讯义工途径中纪委机关看见不少于20多名访民在门口喊冤,有穿状衣的，有举横幅的，有喊叫的////路人见怪不怪，说:这场面天天有。
CMS 166941
今天（22日）上海“医患”访民张贵兰、孙军、（今天去卫生部的还有昨天发你的那位女教师姓孙的视频材料）等访民来到卫生部门口，用电喇叭高喊口号，要求陈竺部长下来；上海卫生系统草菅人命、官官相互、、、、并打出横幅。
CMS 150115
“周一再有访民爬上北京一座大烟囱，挂横幅撒标语，下午被特警和消防解救”

Otherwise drawing attention:
CMS 167703 Villager from Hadan Guangping county carries son’s skull to petition in Beijing
邯郸广平县农民提儿人头进京上访

CMS 167302 “十二名维吾尔访民到中央纪委要求见领导，解决有关官员贪污及上访诉求，并在大门外下跪”

CMS 166635 “北京市公安局说，这名男子42岁，来自湖北黄冈，由于不满一项法庭裁决而试图自焚，目前正在康复中

TEXT:
In October 2010, Southern Metropolitan Daily exposed a private security company, Anyuanding, under contract by local governments to ‘retrieve’’ petitioners who attempted to petition in Beijing, where the central government is located.
SOURCE:
Fair summary from a lengthy two-part article on Anyuanding. CMS 148 291 and 157797,
Here some short sentences:
安元鼎用来押送访民的“护送”车。

安元鼎与地方政府的委托书。
但媒体越来越多的调查表明，安元鼎的主业为关押、押送到北京上访的民众。这家时间短却发展迅猛的保安公司据信在北京设立多处“黑监狱”，向地方政府收取佣金，以限制上访者自由并押送返乡，甚至以暴力手段向上访者施暴。

TEXT:
Anyuanding employed a variety of methods to prevent petitioners from making their grievances heard at the central level. The methods reportedly included coaxing, threats, abduction, detention in ‘‘black jails’’ for extended periods of time, and beatings.
SOURCE: CMS 149572
Coaxing, threats:
Zhang Yuliang, said when Xu arrived in Beijing the district government began pressuring the family further and in October 2009 forced her son-in-law to divorce her daughter in order to pressure her to return.

Abduction:
In March this year, Xu was blindfolded by a group of people in uniforms allegedly employed by Anyuanding. Her son told the Global Times that she was driven back to Nantong where he said she was beaten and kicked.

Detention in black jails:
During the "rush time" for petitions, such as the National Day, Party meetings and the Spring Festival, the 37-year-old man said he was arrested on four occasions between March 2008 and October 2009 and detained for a total of 57 days in "black hotels" to prevent him from petitioning until the "sensitive periods" ended.

Beatings:
But her ordeal began a year before that, her son told the Global Times, when 160 thugs allegedly broke into Xu's house, beat up her family and demolished the home. Following that she petitioned all the way from her district government to Beijing.

TEXT:
More recently, in August 2011, Chinese media exposed a black jail holding petitioners located on the outskirts of Beijing, an operation later revealed to be funded by five local governments.
SOURCE: CMS 168522
“今年8月初，部分媒体报道称，位于昌平七里渠有一处“黑监狱”，专门非法关押外地进京上访人员.” “这个“黑监狱”的负责人原是一家保安公司的员工，后来从这家保安公司辞职后，纠集了15名人员，以帮助地方政府维稳为名，与五个省市的政府签订协议”

TEXT:
In 2011, Chinese Human Rights Defenders documented at least 2,600 cases of petitioner detention in the black jails.
SOURCE: 168707
“CHRD documented a total of 3544 incidences of arbitrary detention of individuals for exercising
or defending their own or others’ human rights, as outlined in Table 1.”
Table 1
Cases of arbitrary detention of individuals for exercising or defending their own
or others’ human rights.
Type of detention Incidences of arbitrary detention
Black jails
2621
Soft detention
641
Criminal detention
84
Administrative detention61
75
Imprisonment
46
Enforced travel
36
Re-education through Labor62
34
Psychiatric institutions63
7

TEXT
According to Beijing News, the Beijing public security bureau will require all security companies to register by the end of the February, 2012, and has adopted a zero tolerance policy against those who seek to “block petitioners and act against regulations.”
SOURCE: CMS 168706
“北京市公安部门表示，明年2月底前，保安服务公司及自行招用保安员单位的全部保安员，都将通过保安员资格考试，100%持证上岗。保安服务公司实现零“截访”、零违规 ”

TEXT:
Specifically, the main goals of the crackdown targets companies that block petitioners from reaching central authorities, operate without a license, and use violence against petitioners.
SOURCE: 168706
“未经公安机关许可，擅自设立保安公司，提供保安服务”
“保安公司参与“截访”，非法限制他人人身自由，指使和纵容保安阻碍执法、参与追债、采用暴力或以暴力手段威胁处置纠纷等”

TEXT:
In addition, according to Global Times, authorities will prohibit security companies from bearing police signs and start keeping records of security companies.
SOURCE: 167191
“All security firms have to apply for a business license by the end of January, and all the security guards have to go through a job test by the end of February, the bureau announced.”
“The uniform and services of these companies will be regulated. Their cars will be prohibited from bearing police signs, and the bureau will keep records of their recruitment and operations, it said.”

TEXT:
The effectiveness and long-term impact of the crackdown remain unclear. China’s Regulations on Public Security Services which became effective in January 2010 already contain regulations on “stability maintenance,” or private security companies.
SOURCE: CMS 168523
“第一条　为了规范保安服务活动，加强对从事保安服务的单位和保安员的管理，保护人身安全和财产安全，维护社会治安，制定本条例”
“第五十二条　本条例自2010年1月1日起施行”

TEXT:
For example, chapter 2 contains conditions which must be met (Articles 8-12) by security companies before operations can start....
SOURCE: CMS 168523
第八条　保安服务公司应当具备下列条件：
　　（一）有不低于人民币100万元的注册资本；
　　（二）拟任的保安服务公司法定代表人和主要管理人员应当具备任职所需的专业知识和有关业务工作经验，无被刑事处罚、劳动教养、收容教育、强制隔离戒毒或者被开除公职、开除军籍等不良记录；
　　（三）有与所提供的保安服务相适应的专业技术人员，其中法律、行政法规有资格要求的专业技术人员，应当取得相应的资格；
　　（四）有住所和提供保安服务所需的设施、装备；
　　（五）有健全的组织机构和保安服务管理制度、岗位责任制度、保安员管理制度。
第九条　申请设立保安服务公司，应当向所在地设区的市级人民政府公安机关提交申请书以及能够证明其符合本条例第八条规定条件的材料….
第十条　从事武装守护押运服务的保安服务公司，应当符合国务院公安部门对武装守护押运服务的规划、布局要求，具备本条例第八条规定的条件，并符合下列条件：
　　（一）有不低于人民币1000万元的注册资本；
　　（二）国有独资或者国有资本占注册资本总额的51%以上；
　　（三）有符合《专职守护押运人员枪支使用管理条例》规定条件的守护押运人员；
　　（四）有符合国家标准或者行业标准的专用运输车辆以及通信、报警设备。
第十一条　申请设立从事武装守护押运服务的保安服务公司，应当向所在地设区的市级人民政府公安机关提交申请书以及能够证明其符合本条例第八条、第十条规定条件的材料….
第十二条　取得保安服务许可证的申请人，凭保安服务许可证到工商行政管理机关办理工商登记….
　保安服务公司设立分公司的，应当向分公司所在地设区的市级人民政府公安机关备案….

TEXT:
including a license application requirement (Article 9)
SOURCE: 168523
申请设立保安服务公司，应当向所在地设区的市级人民政府公安机关提交申请书以及能够证明其符合本条例第八条规定条件的材料。

TEXT
Furthermore, current regulations already prohibit some potential conflict of interest situations by preventing authorities from actively running and managing private security companies (Article 41).
SOURCE: CMS 168523
第四十一条　任何组织或者个人未经许可，擅自从事保安服务、保安培训的，依法给予治安管理处罚，并没收违法所得；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

TEXT
However, as the recent article in Caijing points out, it has been difficult for authorities to give up the practice of running private security companies.
SOURCE
Fair summary of CMS 168591, also see the next sentence.

TEXT
According to the article, the lack of guidance on how to disentangle security bureaus from operating private security companies, and the desire by public security bureaus to keep collecting financial rewards from the 40 billion-yuan industry have all contributed to lack of reform in spite of having laws on the books.
SOURCE CMS 168591
“公安机关管办分离不能急；现有公安机关所办国有保安企业的重新登记注册不能急；公安机关对开办保安服务企业的审批不能急；保安协会换届或新成立保安协会不能急。此后，2010年，多个省份举办了《保安服务管理条例》学习座谈会，但会议内容或对改革语焉不详，或是强调稳定为主，未见改革实际行动”
“这背后，是巨大的利益蛋糕。“2006北京国际保安研讨会”披露，中国保安业年产值达400亿元人民币。”

TEXT
Many Chinese citizens view citizen petitioning to central authorities as the ultimate channel for redress against perceived wrongdoing by local authorities even though only approximately two percent of the petitioners resolve their grievances through petitioning.
SOURCE: CMS 149572
According to a 2007 research by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, more than 10,000 petitioners have set up temporary residence in the capital city. They make the rounds of petition offices including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and others.

Only one out of every 500 petitioners, or 0.2 percent, have their problem actually solved, said Yu in his 2004 report The Deficiency of the Petition System and its Political Consequences.

TEXT
A 2010 Caijing article points out, the central authorities’ mandate to preserve stability, especially the practice of tying the lack of petitioning incidents to local officials’ career advancements, has contributed to the rise and illegal conduct by private security companies against petitioners. SOURCE: CMS 160750
SOURCE: CMS 160750
Fair summary of the article, but specifically the following (translation from the Chinese by Duihua):
Central authorities mandate or preserve stability:
Maintaining stability is one of the most important functions of the CPLC. In 1980, when the Central Committee first established the CPLC, Peng Zhen was its first secretary. It was briefly abolished in at the beginning of the 1990s.
Ever since the CPLC announced its “Three Key Tasks” (social conflicts resolution, social management innovation, and clean and fair law enforcement) in 2008, central-level stability preservation work has turned towards the construction of a stability-preservation network and the search for new modes of stability preservation.
Tying petitioning to career:
These rankings are closely connected to assessment of local government performance, but their impact on political evaluations can be taken care of if the right payments are made.
On March 14, 2007, the politico-legal committee secretary of Song County, Henan, said in a work conference on stability-preservation: “From now on, you must pay for any petitioning. Payoffs are only an economic expense, but failing to make payments will damage one’s political future.” Correspondingly, [he continued]: “From January to March of 2007, there were 25 incidents involving 65 petitioners going to Beijing. One of these managed to register [a complaint], placing us ninth in the ranking of all counties and districts in the prefecture. There were 41 incidents involving 55 petitioners going to the provincial capital to petition. Seven of these were registered, placing us third (actually, first) in the ranking. There were also 30 incidents involving 111 petitioners at the prefectural level and 216 incidents involving 1180 petitioners at the county level.”

Rise of private security:
Local governments’ fear of petitioning has led to a huge stability-preservation “market” that includes capital liaison offices, security contracts, and “payoffs” and results in all types of rent-seekers, brokers, and thugs out foraging for themselves. Appetites whetted by the favors that can be had in this rent-seeking arena, the capital liaison offices, security companies, and petitioning officials all [seek ways to] protect and expand the “stability-preservation pie.” As this “market” continues to grow, even things that have nothing to do with “stability preservation” can be categorized as “stability preservation” in order to “collect more rents.”
The abolition of capital liaison offices has obviously made it more expensive for local governments to send personnel to intercept petitioners, leading them to pursue a second method: contracting out petitioner interception to security companies. For example, the Anyuanding Company once had petitioner-interception contracts with the relevant departments of 19 provincial-level governments.

Security companies set out clear and detailed fees for intercepting, detaining, and transporting petitioners on behalf of local governments: 200 to 400 yuan per person for stability control and 200 to 400 yuan per person for restraining measures. Fees for transport vary according to the method of transport, the number of individuals to be transported, and the distance involved.

Source: -See Summary (2012-01-27 ) \| Posted on: 2012-02-02		more ...
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=168817

Status of Uyghur Children in Detention Unknown Following Border Clash

February 1, 2012

Five Uyghur children from a county in Hoten, Xinjiang, are in detention, following a December 2011 clash between a group of Uyghurs and security officials. Local sources say the children were part of a group attempting to leave China due to religious persecution, while official Chinese sources describe the group as terrorists traveling to Pakistan for training. According to multiple accounts, a public security officer was stabbed to death after officials confronted the group, and security forces then opened fire. Official sources report four people in the group were killed and four wounded and taken into detention. Local sources say those in detention are five children, at least four of whom range in age from 7 to 17, and that information on their status and health conditions is not known. Security in the area reportedly remains tight as authorities have attempted to restrict the flow of information about the events and detained family members and others in the aftermath of the clash. The news follows other recent incidents that Chinese authorities have described as terrorist attacks, while other sources have reported facts that differ from the official accounts.

The legal status and health condition of a group of Uyghur children in detention remain unknown, following a reported clash in Pishan (Guma) county, Hoten district, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, at which the children were present, according to a series of reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA) based on interviews with residents and local officials. Sources cited by RFA described the incident as a clash between public security officials and a group of Uyghurs attempting to flee China due to religious repression. Official Chinese media sources reported the incident as police intervention, after members of a terrorist group took two people hostage.

Chinese Media Reports "Terrorist" Group Takes Hostages
According to December 29, 2011, Xinhua reports (English, Chinese) based on XUAR government and Communist Party sources, public security officers intervened after a "violent terrorist" group took two people hostage in Pishan county on the evening of December 28. After the hostage-takers "resisted arrest," officers began to shoot, killing seven members of the group and injuring four others, who were taken into custody. The hostage-takers killed one officer and wounded another, according to the reports. A December 30 article from the Global Times, citing an anonymous local official, reported that the group consisted of 15 people who were en route to Central Asia "to receive jihadist training" and who took two herders hostage to guide them after they became lost. Although the earlier Xinhua report in Chinese said the hostages were rescued, apparently in the course of the shootout (a process described as being "freed" in the English report), the Global Times article reported the same official account of a rescue but also reported a seemingly different account, confirmed by a XUAR government official cited in the article. According to this second account, the herders taken hostage "escaped and contacted local police," apparently before the shootout. The Global Times report does not address the apparent discrepancy.

Local Accounts Conflict with Chinese State Media
Accounts by local public security officers and residents, cited in reports from RFA, differed from official accounts in Xinhua and the Global Times. A public security source cited in a December 29 RFA article said that police stopped a group of Uyghur young people en route to Pakistan and opened fire after one youth stabbed a police officer. The source did not know if hostages had been taken. In an interview cited in a December 30 RFA report, a public security officer reported that the group fleeing consisted of villagers who planned to seek asylum outside China. According to the officer's account, public security officers, acting on a tip about their plans, intercepted the group and tried to persuade them to return home. After an officer caught hold of a woman in the group, a public security officer was stabbed, and other officers "took over and conducted the operation," according to the account. A leader in the village where many in the group were from, cited in the same article, reported the group was leaving due to religious persecution. One person killed in the clash reportedly had been previously detained for three months for participating in an "illegal" religious class. A villager cited in the article also suggested that the group left due to pressure on their religious practices and that the clash ensued after public security officers took hold of one of the women in the group. A January 6 report from RFA (in Uyghur) noted the presence of children in the group (see below for further discussion) but also reported the ages of six of the seven people killed as ranging between 26 and 40 years old. A December 29 RFA article (in Uyghur) raised the question of proportionate use of force against the group, citing a local official who said group members had knives and sticks, but who argued that this appeared as a heavy threat to the police. (For additional information, see UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.)

Official media has not addressed the discrepancy between the initial reporting on the events, based on XUAR government sources, and information provided by local residents, including local officials. Official accounts have differed from those of witnesses and non-official sources in past events, as well. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2011 Annual Report, after the government reported that a premeditated terrorist attack on a police station took place in Hoten district in July 2011, some people in Hoten contradicted the government's account, and some sources reported that the incident involved authorities suppressing a protest that started at another location. A September 28, 2008, New York Times article noted an incident in Kashgar district that authorities described as a terrorist attack against paramilitary officers using a truck and explosives, an account that foreign tourists who witnessed the account disputed.

Status of Detainees Unknown Amid Tight Security Measures
Although official media reports indicated that four people in the group had been detained, RFA articles reported that five children—including those between 7 and 17 years old—were in apparent custody, while a six-year-old child with the group fleeing China had gone missing. (RFA January 8; January 6 in Uyghur; December 30, citing a local source.) A local Communist Party official reportedly said that the six-year-old had taken part in the clash by throwing stones at officers, according to the January 8 report. A public security officer reported in a January 2 RFA article that a minor thought to be 17 years old had been shot and seriously injured, and said all five children were in custody in the county public security bureau.

It is unclear on what legal basis, if any, the children remain in custody and what their current health status is. The whereabouts of the sixth child remains unknown. Although one official reported that the five children were in custody at the county public security bureau, as noted above, it is unclear if family members have been informed. In the case of detention by public security officials, Article 64(2) of China's Criminal Procedure Law mandates that family members receive notification. Article 37(b) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which China is a state party, states that detention "shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time[.]" See also detailed information in United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty.

In addition, security measures in the area reportedly remain tight. A school director cited in the January 2 RFA report said that family members of a nine-year-old boy taken in custody during the clash have been detained, while a World Uyghur Congress (WUC) spokesperson cited in the December 29 RFA article reported additional detentions within the county and orders for hospital personnel at the facility where the injured and dead were taken not to speak about the events. A December 29 WUC press release also cited local residents who said authorities were taking cell phones to stop people from transmitting information about the events.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV-Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2012-01-10 ) \| Posted on: 2012-02-01
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=168528

Gansu and Shandong Provinces Issue New Regulations on Religion

January 18, 2012

Since China's national Regulation on Religious Affairs entered into force in 2005, a number of provincial governments have followed suit with new or amended local regulations on religion. In some respects, new regulations from Shandong and Gansu provide more clarity, legal protections, and consistency than the older regulations they replace, but all within the restrictive framework of China's controls over religious practice. Such framework offers some limited protections but falls far short of international standards for religious freedom. The regulations also codify more extensive controls over religious practice in some regards, and many legal protections are limited to groups and venues registered with the government. The regulations differ from each other in some respects, reflecting a trend in variation among provincial regulations, even as local regulations on religion move toward greater uniformity with the national regulation.

Gansu and Shandong provinces have issued new regulations on religious affairs, following implementation of the national Regulation on Religious Affairs (national RRA) in 2005 and subsequent passage of several other provincial-level regulations on religion. The Gansu provincial People's Congress Standing Committee passed the Gansu Province Regulation on Religious Affairs (Gansu RRA) on September 29, 2011. It entered into force on December 1. The region's earlier legal measures on religion, the 1991 Gansu Province Temporary Provisions on the Management of Religious Affairs, were annulled in 2005. The Shandong provincial People's Congress Standing Committee passed the Shandong Province Regulation on Religious Affairs (Shandong RRA) also on September 29, 2011. The regulation entered into force on January 1, 2012, and replaces the province's 2000 Shandong Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs. Since the national RRA entered into force, the governments of Qinghai, Jilin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hainan, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan, Zhejiang, Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Hunan, Liaoning, Sichuan, Tibet Autonomous Region, Hebei, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi also have reported issuing new or amended regulations on religious affairs.

More Clarity But More Formal Controls
Like other provincial-level regulations, the new Gansu and Shandong regulations provide more clarity, legal protections, and consistency in some respects over the regulations they replace, but all within the restrictive framework of China's controls over religious practice. Such framework offers some limited protections but falls far short of international standards for religious freedom. (See Section II—Freedom of Religious in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2011 Annual Report for additional information on this framework.) The regulations also codify greater formal controls in a number of areas. For example, the Gansu RRA now clarifies that outdoor religious statues may be built outside religious venues (Article 18, compared to no mention in the earlier regulation), but links the process to stipulations in the national RRA requiring several stages of government approval (Article 24). Both the Gansu and national regulations also stipulate that non-religious groups and venues may not build outdoor statues, a prohibition that would appear to apply to religious entities not registered with the government. In addition, the Shandong RRA provides more detailed stipulations on religious publications than the earlier regulation from the province (Article 8 compared to Article 6), clarifying the required process for publishing different types of materials though also reinforcing government control over the process. The Gansu and Shandong regulations also now specify new formal restrictions in areas such as Tibetan Buddhist practices (in the Gansu RRA, per below) and large-scale religious activities (Articles 27 and 29 in each regulation, respectively). In addition, as in the case of constructing outdoor statues, most of the legal safeguards within the regulations apply only to registered religious organizations and venues, thereby excluding religious communities that choose not to submit to state control or that are unable to meet the qualifications to register with the government.

State-Sanctioned Religious Groups
The Shandong RRA specifies Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism as the religions covered by the regulation (Article 48), as did the province's older RRA (Article 37) and Gansu's earlier temporary provisions on religious affairs (Article 3). The national RRA does not specify five state-sanctioned religions, nor does the new Gansu RRA, thus appearing to allow the possibility under law that some other religions could be recognized, though the Chinese government has not done so to date at the national level. Among local-level regulations, a limited number recognize the Orthodox Church.

Worship at Home
The national RRA and the new provincial regulations require that collective religious activities "in general" be held at registered venues (National RRA, Article 12; Gansu RRA, Article 25; Shandong RRA, Article 25). The Shandong RRA also includes a stipulation recognizing that religious believers may carry out some religious activity within one's own home (Article 26). Some other recent provincial-level regulations include similar provisions, though wording on this varies. (See, for example, a previous CECC analysis for a comparison among four provincial regulations.) The Shandong RRA provides that "citizens who believe in a religion and their relatives may, in accordance with religious custom, live a religious life within one's home, but may not influence other people's normal work and lives." (See a similar provision in Article 21 of the older Shandong regulation, minus the qualification on influencing others' work and lives.)

While the new Gansu and national RRAs are silent on home worship, the central government has addressed this issue. The 1997 White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief states, "There is no registration requirement for, to quote from Chinese Christians, 'house services,' which are mainly attended by relatives and friends for religious activities such as praying and Bible reading" (White Paper from the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs and also available in English on the Web site of the China Internet Information Center). The statement does not clarify the permitted scope of such services, however, nor does it address services held outside the home at venues unregistered with the government (also sometimes referred to as house churches). In a November 11 interview with Phoenix TV (via Open Source Center, subscription required, CPP20111116702009), Wang Zuo'an, head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, appeared to dismiss the prevalence of house churches as religious venues independent of state control. He noted in the context of a survey conducted on Chinese Christianity, "I personally do not recognize the notion of this so-called 'house church,' there is no such a problem as with this church...." Against the backdrop of ambiguous policy statements, coupled with lack of clear legal protections in the law, authorities have targeted for closure religious meetings in private homes as well as unregistered venues. (See, e.g., CECC analyses 1, 2, 3.)

Controls over Tibetan Buddhism
The Gansu RRA includes a stipulation (Article 21), absent in the earlier provincial provisional measures, giving the authority to supervise and approve the succession of living Buddhas to the state-controlled Buddhist associations, and mandating that succession procedures follow existing "relevant provisions"—a reference to the 2007 national measures regulating the reincarnation of living Buddhas. The stipulation also forbids individuals and groups from engaging in activities related to this without authorization and forbids "interference or domination from any organization or individual outside the borders." The provisions accord with and reinforce the national measures regulating the reincarnation of living Buddhas (analysis here), amid a trend of tighter formal controls over the fundamental institutions and practices of Tibetan Buddhism.

For more information on regulation of religion in China, see CECC analyses of the Jiangsu, Hubei, and Hainan regulations, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan, and Zhejiang regulations, amendments to the Anhui regulation, amendments to the Beijing regulation, and regulations from Chongqing and Hunan. See also Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2012-01-17 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Authorities Try Human Rights Activist Ni Yulan, Verdict Pending

January 6, 2012

Authorities tried human rights lawyer Ni Yulan and her husband Dong Jiqin on December 29, 2011, on charges of "picking quarrels" and "fraud." The court reportedly is considering the defense's request for access to new evidence. If convicted, Ni could face a lengthy sentence and the possibility of life imprisonment. Since 2002, authorities have repeatedly subjected Ni to intense harassment, including physically crippling her, revoking her license to practice law, and detaining and imprisoning her.

According to the New York Times and Human Rights in China, on December 29, 2011, authorities tried dissident human rights lawyer Ni Yulan and her husband Dong Jiqin on charges of "picking quarrels" and "fraud" under China's Criminal Law. Their lawyer entered a not guilty plea and requested access to new evidence, which the Xicheng District Court reportedly has taken under consideration. According to Ni and Dong's indictment (Chinese), the underlying charges stem from the couple's alleged refusal to pay for their hotel room, arguments with hotel staff, and Ni's alleged misrepresentation of facts surrounding her case and herself as a lawyer for the purpose of defrauding money from others.

According to Human Rights in China, authorities prevented some witnesses for the defense from testifying in court by preventing them from leaving their homes. In addition, authorities also detained Ni and Dong's supporters around Beijing. The couple's daughter was able to testify in court on behalf of the couple for approximately 10 minutes.

If convicted, Ni could face a lengthy sentence. According to China's Criminal Law (Chinese), the crime of "picking quarrels" (Article 293) causing societal discord is punishable by up to 10 years of imprisonment plus fines. The crime of "fraud" (Article 266) is punishable by up to 3 years for "relatively large sums," 3 to 10 years for "large sums or other serious circumstances," and up to life imprisonment for "very large sums or especially serious circumstances." According to the indictment, authorities are seeking to punish Ni as a "recidivist" based on Article 65 of the Criminal Law.

Ni garnered international attention for her advocacy work on behalf of residents adversely affected by the Chinese government's efforts to demolish homes in light of the then upcoming 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Detained while trying to take photographic evidence, authorities eventually sentenced Ni for "obstruction of official business" in 2002 to one year, and for the same crime in 2008 for two years. While in custody, authorities beat Ni, permanently crippling her. Since her release, authorities have continuously harassed Ni and Dong, employing tactics such as detention, cutting off electricity and water, and revoking Ni's license to practice law. For the currently alleged offenses, authorities detained Ni in April 2011 amidst the harsh crackdown against human rights activists and lawyers that began in February 2011.

Source: -See Summary (2012-01-06 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Authorities Sentence Chen Wei to 9 Years for Posting Pro-Democracy Essays

December 23, 2011

The Suining Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Sichuan province sentenced democracy activist Chen Wei on December 23, 2011, to nine years in prison for "inciting subversion of state power," in a case reportedly marred by procedural irregularities. The prosecutor's indictment alleged that four essays Chen authored were intended to incite subversion. The essays had been posted on overseas Web sites and had discussed democratic reform and human rights in China.

The Suining Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Sichuan province sentenced democracy activist Chen Wei on December 23, 2011, to nine years in prison for "inciting subversion of state power" (Associated Press via Washington Post, 23 December 11; New York Times, 23 December 11). Inciting subversion is a crime under Article 105, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Law. Chen's sentencing document asserted 11 essays Chen authored were intended to incite subversion (available via Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), 12 January 12). The court also sentenced Chen to two years' deprivation of political rights upon his release. Human Rights in China (21 December 11) has provided links to four of the essays as they appear on Boxun and Independent Chinese Pen, overseas Chinese Web sites that post literary essays and articles on current events, including politics and human rights. The titles of the essays are: "The Illness of the System and the Antidote of Constitutional Democracy," "The Growth of the Civil Opposition Is the Key to China's Democratization," "The Traps of Harmony and the Absence of Equality," and "Sentiments from a Hunger Striker on International Human Rights Day."

Public security officials in Suining detained Chen on February 21 and formally arrested him on March 28 (sentencing document and CHRD, updated 8 December 11), following protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the appearance in mid-February of online calls for "Jasmine Revolution" protests in China. Procuratorate officials (prosecutors) in Suining transferred Chen's case back to the public security bureau for supplementary investigation on two occasions (China Free Press via Boxun, 3 October 11), possibly indicating insufficient evidence in the case. By late October, Public Security Bureau officials reportedly finished the second supplementary investigation and sent his case back to the procuratorate for the third time (Radio Free Asia, 31 October 11).

Authorities attempted to stop Chen's wife from hiring lawyer Liang Xiaojun, and then allowed Chen to meet with lawyer Zheng Jianwei on only two occasions and Liang on only one occasion, according to the December 21 HRIC article. In addition, authorities allowed Chen's wife to meet with him only once, according to HRIC. Authorities in Chen's case did not respond to a September 9, 2011, request made by his wife for bail pending trial. After she resubmitted her request for bail on September 20, domestic security protection officials reportedly told her that bail was not possible in a case like Chen's, according to China Free Press.

Additional Commission Resources on Chen Wei and the 2011 Crackdown Against Human Rights Lawyers, Activists

2011 Crackdown Update: Ding Mao, Chen Wei, and Ran Yunfei (November 15, 2011)
Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers (May 3, 2011)
Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering "Jasmine Revolution" (March 22, 2011)
Authorities Censor Access to Information on Middle East and Chinese "Jasmine" Protests (March 22, 2011)
Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance, Section II—Criminal Justice, and Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-23 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Special Report: Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of Freedom of Religion

December 23, 2011

This CECC Special Report demonstrates an apparent correlation between increasing Chinese Communist Party and government repression of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries, and 12 instances in 2011 of current or former monks and nuns resorting to self-immolation. Reporting from each of the Commission's 10 annual reports (2002-2011) reveals a trend of deterioration in the environment for Tibetan Buddhism, especially in Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions. The trend worsened significantly after mostly peaceful political protests swept across the Tibetan plateau in March and April 2008. The Party and government responded to those protests by intensifying a long-established anti-Dalai Lama campaign; issuing regulatory measures that intrude upon and micromanage Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs; implementing aggressive "legal education" programs that pressure monks and nuns to study and accept expanded government control over their religion, monasteries, and nunneries; and convening a high-level Party forum to formally establish a coordinated policy on Tibetan issues, including religion, across all Tibetan autonomous areas. All of the Tibetan Buddhist self-immolations except the most recent attempt took place in Sichuan province, outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Commission Political Prisoner Database (PPD) information indicates a higher level of Tibetan political detention since March 2008 in Sichuan than in any other provincial-level area, including the TAR.

Tibetan Buddhist Monks and Nuns Resort to "Desperate Acts"

Nine current or former Tibetan Buddhist monks, two nuns, and one former monk who had married and become the father of three children, reportedly committed self-immolation during the period March 16 to December 1, 2011. Five of the current or former monks and both nuns reportedly died; five current or former monks reportedly were hospitalized or were in unknown locations. As the protesters burned, they shouted slogans including calls for Tibetan freedom, the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, and freedom of religion, according to reports. Seven of the self-immolations, including the March 16 occurrence, involved current or former monks affiliated with one religious center—Kirti Monastery, located in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP). (For more information on the crackdown at Kirti from March through June, see an August 17, 2011, Commission report.) One other self-immolation, a nun from Dechen Choekorling Nunnery, took place in Aba county. Three self-immolations took place in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP): a monk from Nyitso Monastery in Daofu (Tawu) county; a nun from Gaden Choeling Nunnery in Daofu; and a monk from Gepheling Monastery (often called Kardze Monastery) in Ganzi county. The most recent attempted self-immolation took place in Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR.

In prepared testimony submitted on November 3, 2011, to the U.S. House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (TLHRC), Kirti Rinpoche, the spiritual head and abbot of Kirti Monastery who fled into exile in 1959, stated that conditions at Kirti had driven the monks "to a state of utter fear and desperation" (testimony available on the TLHRC Web site; bio available on Drepung Loseling Monastery Web site). The Dalai Lama said on November 7 that the self-immolations are "desperate acts by people seeking justice and freedom" (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 7 November 11). Chinese officials have not acknowledged the role of Chinese government policy and regulatory control of religion in the self-immolations, and instead characterize the incidents as "terrorist acts in disguise" that "took place with the Dalai clique's orchestration, instigation and support" (Xinhua, 3 November 11 (translated in OSC, 5 November 11)).

Information available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) suggests that since March 2008 security officials in Sichuan province detained more Tibetans for political reasons than in any other provincial-level administration that includes Tibetan autonomous area. As of December 9, 2011, of 1,152 cases of political detention of Tibetans since March 2008 recorded in the PPD, more than half (656) took place in Sichuan, compared to 265 in the TAR, 114 in Qinghai province, 114 in Gansu province, and 1 in Yunnan province. Such statistics cannot provide an accurate account because the Chinese government withholds information on political detention, but the available data suggests that Party and government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of religion, speech, and association may be greater in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Sichuan than in Tibetan autonomous areas located in other provincial-level administrations. (See the Commission's 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 Annual Reports for more information on Tibetan political imprisonment since March 2008.)

The chronological list below includes a 2009 precedent for the 2011 self-immolations—Tashi (or Tabe, Tapey), a Kirti monk who attempted self-immolation to protest official interference in a monastic festival. The Commission has not observed any reports of Tibetan Buddhist self-immolations during the period from September 1987, when the current period of Tibetan political activism began, to the February 2009 self-immolation.

2009: One self-immolation; non-fatal.

February 27.

2011: Twelve self-immolations; seven reported fatal.

1. March 16.

2. August 15.

3, 4. September 26.

5. October 3.

6, 7. October 7.

8. October 15.

9. October 17.

10. October 25.

11. November 3.

12. December 1.

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Government Expands Use of Legal Measures To Repress Tibetan Buddhist Affairs

China's Constitution (Article 36) protects "freedom of religious belief"—not freedom of religion—and provides protection only for "normal religious activities," a category that the Party and government uses policy, educational, and legal measures to define and manage. A series of central- and prefectural-level regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs began taking effect in 2007, were more numerous in 2009 and 2010, and continued into 2011 (see information below). As of December 1, 2011, regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs were effective in 8 of the 10 TAPs; the Commission had not observed information on whether regulations reported for approval in March 2010 had become effective in Yushu (Yushul) TAP, Qinghai province; or whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province was preparing Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations. Provincial-level regulations on religion took effect in Gansu on December 1, 2011 (Gansu Province Religious Affairs Regulations, available in Chinese on the Gansu Daily Web site). Prefectural-level regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs in Gannan could follow the provincial regulations.

Below are brief excerpts from the Commission's annual reports from 2002 to 2011. The Commission's reporting reveals a trend of deterioration in the environment for Tibetan Buddhism, especially in Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions. The sentences are drawn directly from the annual reports but may be reordered for clarity and do not necessarily follow one another directly in the original text. Where relevant below, regulatory measures that took effect during that reporting year are also noted.

2002 Annual Report

2003 Annual Report

2004 Annual Report

2005 Annual Report

State Administration for Religious Affairs, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 March 05. (Translated from Chinese.)

2006 Annual Report

2007 Annual Report

Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government, Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the "Regulations on Religious Affairs" (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi "zongjiao shiwu tiaoli" banfa (shixing)], effective 1 January 07. (Translated from Chinese.)

State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei'an banfa], effective 1 March 07. (Available in Chinese on the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.)

State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], effective 1 September 07. (Translated from Chinese.)

2008 Annual Report

Ganzi TAP People's Government, Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and Individual Monks and Nuns, issued and effective 28 June 08. (Translated from Tibetan in ICT, 30 July 08.)

2009 Annual Report

Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture People's Government, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09. (Available in Chinese on the Findlaw.cn Web site.)

Hainan TAP People's Congress, Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 31 July 09. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

Diqing TAP People's Congress, Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 1 September 09. (Available in Chinese on the Findlaw.cn Web site.)

Huangnan TAP People's Congress, Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 24 September 09. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

2010 Annual Report

Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zangchuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], effective 10 January 10. (Available in Chinese on the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.)

Yushu TAP People's Congress, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], reported to the Qinghai Province People's Congress for approval as 3 March 10. (Report available in Chinese on Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

Haibei TAP People's Congress, Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 22 March 10. (Available in Chinese on the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council Web site.)

Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Religious Affairs Regulations [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 May 10. Available in Chinese on the Sichuan Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress, Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 12 August 10. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

Guoluo TAP People's Congress, Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 30 September 10.(Available in Chinese on the China Tibet News Web site.)

State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], effective 1 November 10. (Available in Chinese on the Central People's Government Web site.)

2011 Annual Report

Ganzi TAP People's Congress, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 December 11. Available in Chinese on the Ganzi Daily Web site.)

For additional information on regulatory measures and Tibetan Buddhist affairs, see Commission reports on 14 November 11, 20 May 11, 10 March 11, 9 March 10, and 22 August 07. See sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007 Annual Reports.

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-23 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24		more ...
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Authorities Loosen Some Restrictions on Chen Guangcheng and Family, Continue To Hold Them Under Tight Control

December 22, 2011

In recent weeks, local authorities in Linyi county, Shandong province, reportedly have loosened some measures used to control rights defender Chen Guangcheng, whom they have held with his wife, daughter, and mother in extralegal detention in their home since September 2010. While in detention, the family has been subjected to beatings, round-the-clock surveillance, and other forms of harassment. Despite reported relaxation of certain controls on Chen and his family, authorities continue to hold them under strict control and continue to block access to individuals who attempt to visit Chen's village.

Reported Changes in Official Restrictions on Chen and Family

Sources close to the family of self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng told Reuters (5 December 11) that Chinese authorities in Linyi county, Shandong province, have loosened some restrictions on Chen and his family. Local authorities reportedly now allow Chen's 77-year-old mother to leave the village for supplies. They also reportedly have permitted Chen to receive medicine for his intestinal illness, and are allowing Chen's six-year-old daughter to attend school, albeit under "constant guard." According to one activist, whom Reuters quoted under the condition of anonymity, "[Chen's] health has improved." However, according to He Peirong, a Nanjing-based rights advocate and friend of Chen's family, "[Authorities] haven't allowed [Chen] to go to the hospital for a full check-up." Chen reportedly remains under strict surveillance and authorities continue to block access to his village, Dongshigu, as evidenced in CNN's video coverage of actor Christian Bale's thwarted attempt to visit Chen on December 16. According to another source close to Chen’s family, cited in the Reuters report, "The government officials said they will keep [Chen] under guard for the rest of his life, until he dies."

Wave of Increased Attention and Advocacy Efforts

In 2011, Chen Guangcheng's case has stirred a wave of human rights advocacy among Chinese citizens, especially Internet users, and attracted international attention to human rights and rule of law developments in China.

Chinese citizen attempts to visit Chen Guangcheng. An increasing number of Chinese citizens have attempted—at times in large groups—to visit Chen's home in 2011 only to encounter beatings and detentions. These include:
- Internet activist He Peirong (see January 12 post on Free Chen Guangcheng blog);
- Journalist and activist Li Jianjun and two other individuals (see October 26 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report);
- Rights advocate Liu Shasha and several companions (see September 19 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report; October 5 RFA report; and October 28 Agence France-Presse report);
- Rights defender Mao Hengfeng and a group of 36 other rights defenders and "netizens" (see October 31 Human Rights in China report); and
- Author Murong Xuecun, newspaper columnist Wang Xiaoshan, digital web director Zhang Enchao, Hu Zhongqiang, and a woman identified as "Nuola" (see Murong Xuecun's account published in the Guardian on November 11).
Foreign journalist attempts to visit Chen Guangcheng. Teams from media outlets including the New York Times, CNN, Le Monde, Radio France Internationale, and Le Nouvel Observateur attempted to visit Chen’s village in early 2011 and were roughed up, threatened with bricks, or had equipment seized or destroyed. (See March 11 CECC Analysis.)

U.S. government efforts to raise Chen’s case. Several U.S. government officials issued statements in late 2011 regarding Chen’s detention, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (November 10, via AFP) and U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke (December 10). (See also a November 6 Global Post report, discussing Gary Locke’s September letter to the Chinese government regarding Chen Guangcheng.) The Congressional-Executive Commission on China held a hearing on November 1 (statement of Representative Chris Smith, Chairman; statement of Representative Tim Walz, Ranking Member), and Chairman Smith and Senator Sherrod Brown, Cochairman, issued a joint statement on November 1.

Protest in Hong Kong. Hong Kong rights advocates protested before the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government on November 11, urging the Chinese government to release Chen ahead of his 40th birthday on November 12. (See November 11 RFA report.)

Ongoing advocacy campaigns. Chinese citizens and civil society organizations as well as international organizations have set up advocacy campaigns on the Internet to raise awareness of and express solidarity for Chen. These campaigns include Dark Glasses: Portrait, Free Chen Guangcheng Civic Action (as discussed in a November 11 CHRD report, pp. 8-10); a “Free Chen” petition organized by Shanghai rights advocate Feng Zhenghu and signed by more than 370 people in Shanghai (see October 20 RFA report); and the Chen Guangcheng Sunglasses Freedom Campaign (see the Women’s Rights Without Frontiers Web site).

Background: Chen Guangcheng

In 1996, Chen Guangcheng began defending the rights of disabled peasants and providing legal advice as a self-trained legal advocate focusing on antidiscrimination. Over the next decade, his legal advocacy was recognized in China and internationally. In 2005, Chen's rights defense work drew international news media attention to population planning abuses in Linyi city, Shandong province. Local authorities placed Chen under house arrest in September 2005 and formally arrested him in June 2006. The Yinan County People's Court first tried and sentenced Chen in August 2006 to four years and three months in prison for "intentional destruction of property" and "organizing a group of people to disturb traffic order." His defense lawyers were taken into custody on the eve of his trial. The Yinan court retried the case in November 2006 and upheld the first judgment. Chen's retrial prompted repeated criticism for its criminal procedure violations. In June 2007, Chen reportedly informed his wife and brother that he had been beaten by fellow inmates, according to a June 21 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report. In August 2007, Yuan Weijing attempted to travel to the Philippines to accept the Ramon Magsaysay award on behalf of Chen, but Chinese authorities intercepted her before leaving the country and forcibly returned her to her village, according to an August 25, 2007, Washington Post report. During the period of Chen's imprisonment, authorities also repeatedly subjected Yuan and their two children to harassment, home confinement, surveillance, and other abuses, according to reports from journalist and blogger Wang Keqin (14 March 09), Amnesty International (20 April 09), and Radio Free Asia (22 April 09), as well as the testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law and Co-Director , US-Asia Law Institute, New York University, at an August 3, 2010, Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing.

The Commission’s most recent analysis on Chen reported on the violent beatings Chen and his wife faced after they recorded and leaked video footage detailing the harsh conditions of their extralegal detention. Previous coverage of Chen Guangcheng's case can be found online via the CECC's Virtual Academy. For additional information on Chen and China's population planning policy, see Section II—Population Planning in the CECC 2011 Annual Report. For more information on Chinese official detention, harassment, and abuse of lawyers, see Section II—Criminal Justice and Section III—Access to Justice in the CECC 2011 Annual Report. For more information on freedom of the press in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-21 / English) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Officials Discourage and Prevent "Independent Candidates" From Getting on Official Ballots in Local People's Congress Elections

December 23, 2011

During the latest round of local people's congress elections taking place in staggered fashion across China from May 2011 to December 2012, central and local officials are discouraging and preventing potential "independent candidates," i.e., candidates nominated by citizens rather than by the Party or by state-affiliated organizations, from getting on official ballots. Citizens are allowed to vote for people's congress delegates only at the lowest levels. Some developments during candidate nomination processes in this latest round do not seem to reflect the spirit of the national election law, highlight contradictions in the national election law, and illustrate continuing challenges to free and fair elections in China. Some local officials reportedly have arrested, detained, and monitored potential "independent candidates," as well as pressured their families, employers, and nominators, and obstructed nomination processes.

Background on Candidate Nomination Processes
The PRC Election Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses (Election Law) provides for direct citizen elections of people's congresses at the lowest levels, such as in urban districts, rural counties, townships, towns, and small cities (that are not further subdivided) (Article 2). The most recent round of these elections began in May 2011 and will end in December 2012 (Radio Free Asia [RFA], 8 November 11). Any citizen over the age of 18, irrespective of ethnicity, gender, occupation, or religious beliefs, in theory may vote or be elected, unless stripped of political rights (Article 3). However, to become a formal candidate, one must be both nominated and appear on a final ballot that has been vetted by the local election committee, which is led by the local people's congress (Articles 8, 10, 29, and 31). A potential candidate may be nominated by either a political party, delegates from the local people's congress, a "people's organization," such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, or by 10 or more ordinary citizens, i.e., "voter nominated" candidates (Article 29). "Voter nominated" candidates are often unofficially referred to as "independent candidates." In some cases, where the number of nominees per open positions exceeds a proscribed ratio, the local election committee should initiate group discussions by "voter groups" and determine the list of candidates based on the majority opinion. If a consensus cannot be reached, the committee will hold a primary election (Article 31).

According to U.S.-based scholar Melanie Manion in her testimony at a May 2009 CECC roundtable on democratic reforms in China, in past election cycles, there were often large numbers of "independent candidates" in the early stages of election activities. By the time election day arrived, however, most such candidates reportedly were winnowed out. There were few "independent candidates" in the most recent round of elections in Beijing, in which 21,760 formal candidates competed to fill 14,290 vacancies, and official figures reportedly indicated only 50-some "independent candidates" among the formal candidates (Mingbao via Sina.com, 9 November 11 and RFA, 8 November 11). An international non-governmental organization tracked 60 "independent candidates" in the Beijing elections but none of these citizens were among the formal candidates (Chinese Human Rights Defenders [CHRD], 6 November 11, via Blogspot).

Central and Local Authorities Discourage or Prevent "Independent Candidates"
Some national-level Communist Party-affiliated newspapers warned of the dangers of including "independent candidates" in elections, including two editorials in the Global Times, after blogger and writer Li Chengping declared his candidacy in May 2011 and gained more than 2.9 million followers on the Internet (Global Times, 30 May 11). The May 30 Chinese and English Global Times editorials noted that "independent candidates" could play a positive role, but also asserted that it was not suitable to allow candidates who held opinions different from those of the "current political system" to run; and that such candidates would bring "even more turbulence, threatening the cohesion of the nation." In this round of elections, local officials have employed various tactics at each stage of the pre-election process to block "independent candidates," as described below.

(1) Arrests, Detentions, and Monitoring of Potential Candidates
Local officials in Henan and Guizhou provinces and Beijing municipality prevented potential "independent candidates" from getting nominated or from assuming office in a variety of ways, including arresting or detaining them or holding them under "soft detention." Below are a few examples of such actions.

Officials in Shangcheng county, Henan province arrested popular farmer leader Hong Maoxuan on August 4, 2011, on the suspicion of "obstructing official business," for an incident that occurred 10 years prior, reportedly to prevent him from running in the local election (CHRD, 6 September 11 and 1 September 11, via Blogspot). In that incident, he and other villagers protested against official corruption. At the time, officials did not detain him.
Authorities in Beijing have taken various potential candidates on "vacation" to tourist resorts outside of the city and prevented some from communicating with others (RFA, 21 October 11). Guizhou officials took similar actions, including detaining Chen Xi from October 19 to October 25, during which time the deadline for accepting candidate nominations passed (CHRD, 9 November 11, 25 October 11, and 6 November 11 via Blogspot, and 2 November 11). Authorities reportedly arrested Chen Xi on November 29, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power." Officials reportedly cited Chen’s writings promoting human rights and democracy as reasons for the charge (CHRD, 21 December 11).

(2) Authorities Discriminate and Manipulate Candidate Lists and Nomination Processes
Authorities in several provinces across China utilized various methods to interfere in or manipulate nomination processes and official candidate lists, including engaging in discriminatory actions, refusing to provide, accept, or validate nomination forms, and requiring nominees to visit election offices in person to make their nomination, as detailed below.

A local election committee in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, disallowed Liang Shuxin, a Party member and Internet forum executive at Tianya, from becoming a candidate because the committee announced they wanted a female worker who was not a Party member as a candidate. The committee later removed the restriction, but Liang Shuxin was not included on the ballot (New York Times, 31 October 11). This example illustrates that language regarding congresses being "broadly representative" in Article 6 of the Election Law may be flexible enough to allow officials to disallow a nomination based on an individual's ethnicity, gender, or occupation. This language seems to contradict language in Article 3 stating anyone with political rights over the age of 18 may run in an election.
In the cases of two Beijing professors, one received thousands of nominations and another received hundreds, but they were unable to become official candidates because their employers either refused to accept their nomination forms or determined their nominators were invalid (CHRD, 31 October 11, via Blogspot).
Officials in Acheng District, Harbin city, Heilongjiang province, told one potential “independent candidate” that no more than 10 nominators must come in person to the election office at a specified time with their household registration, national identity cards, and employer identification cards to make their nominations, according to the October 31 CHRD article.

(3) Authorities Pressure Potential Candidates, Their Families, Employers, and Nominators
Officials in Sichuan province, Shanghai, and Beijing pressured "independent candidates," as well as their families, employers, and nominators to prevent the potential candidate from getting onto the formal ballot.

Officials in Qingyang district, Chengdu city, Sichuan province, threatened and started following the mother of Li Shuangde when he posted an article on the Internet explaining why he wanted to run for the local people's congress (CHRD, 19 November 11, via Blogspot). In addition, the son of Sichuan-based author Li Chengpeng lost a company’s financial support for his tennis playing after Li declared his intent to run in local people's congress elections in Wuhou district, Chengdu, according to the October 31 CHRD article.
After Shanghai writer and business executive Xia Shang declared his candidacy for Shanghai Jing'an District National People's Congress representative, he was not only forced to participate in official "consultations," but his company was ordered to undergo a special inspection. Due to governmental pressure, Xia chose to drop out of the elections, according to the October 31 CHRD article.
In late October 2011, those responsible for elections at the Beijing Foreign Language University obstructed the official nomination of professor Qiao Mu by various means: telling some student nominators to switch their nominations, threatening some students with "thought work" if Qiao received over 10 nominations, and threatening to prevent students from joining the Communist Party if Qiao were to become an official candidate, according to the October 31 CHRD article.

(4) Authorities Censor News of "Independent Candidates" and Interfere in Election Education Activities
Reports indicate that officials censored news of "independent candidates" and interfered with their election education activities.

Beijing officials reportedly gave an order to propaganda authorities on September 26, 2011, to censor news of independent candidates (New York Times, 31 October 11).
Officials reportedly posted election signs and lists of candidates in concealed locations, such as on the back of a boiler or in a backstreet alley. They also reportedly tore down election signs (CHRD, 14 December 11), deleted election-related microblog and other online postings, and suspended some potential candidates' microblog accounts (CHRD, 31 October 11, 5 November 11, via Blogspot; RFA, 7 November 11; and Voice Of America, 8 November 11).
Authorities pressured organizers to cancel election education meetings or have attempted to prevent the public from attending them (CHRD, 2 October 11, via Blogspot).

For more information on local people's congress elections and "independent candidates," see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-12-19 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Local Officials in Xinjiang Continue Curbs Over Religious Practice

December 16, 2011

Controls over religion in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang remain among the harshest in China, and local governments have reported continuing steps to tighten curbs over religious practice. In recent months, several local governments have reported carrying out measures to prevent women from veiling or wearing other apparel deemed to carry religious connotations and to prevent men from wearing large beards, practices authorities have associated with "backwardness," "extremism," and "illegal religious activities." Some local governments also reported increasing controls over women religious specialists known as büwi. Regionwide, authorities have described continuing steps to target "illegal" religious publications in censorship campaigns.

Several local governments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have reported carrying out steps to tighten controls over religion, singling out aspects of Islam in a number of cases. The recent measures continue similar efforts in recent years, as documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (1, 2, 3, 4). The ongoing campaigns indicate that religious practice remains a main target of government control in the region, at the same time that some local residents continue to find space to practice their religion or express their beliefs apart from state-dictated confines.

Continuing bans against veiling and beards. As detailed below, several local governments, as well as the regional state-controlled women's federation, have reported taking steps against religious dress and beards both in campaigns specifically targeting them or as part of broader efforts to curb "illegal religious activities." The recent measures, as well as previous campaigns documented by the Commission (1, 2, 3), often focus on "persuading" or ordering people to stop wearing such apparel or beards. In one past campaign documented by the Commission, however, authorities threatened "severe punishment in accordance with law," and two cases in the CECC's Political Prisoner Database (Nurtay Memet, Ghojaexmet Niyaz) have reported connections to beard-wearing. Based on CECC monitoring of reports on similar campaigns in recent years, the number of recent local efforts appears to represent an increase from earlier in the year. Reports from Fall 2011 include:

Authorities in the town of Tekes, Tekes County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, carried out a 7-day campaign of lectures on "illegal" and permitted religious activities at venues including weddings within the town, according to a September 15 report on the Tekes Party Building Web site. Authorities reported promoting "healthy" religious outlooks and that townspeople responded to the call to curb "underground" scripture study, private religious students, "illegal" religious publications, women veiling their faces, and men wearing "abnormal" large beards.
In Hejing County, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, an official reported at a meeting of 550 households receiving a minimum level of guaranteed social welfare support (dibao jiating) that women wearing veils, young men with large beards, and guardians of minors who illegally enter mosques would not enjoy this social welfare support, according to a September 16 report from the Hejing government Web site. The official added that if such people were found to be receiving benefits, this support would be immediately cut off.
A report from the Ili Prefectural Agricultural Machinery Bureau described outstanding "problems" in a local community and residential district, including people with a "pronounced religious consciousness" and those who have been discovered to wear "Arab dress and adornment," according to a September 24 report from the bureau's Web site. The report called for dealing with such people through door-to-door lectures by cadres, people's police, and work groups on promoting a lifestyle of "positive healthy civilization." The report also called for scoping out beard wearers and people previously punished for participating in illegal religious activities and subjecting them—along with other groups—to "inspection and control." (See a December 15 Reuters report for information on a similar campaign elsewhere in Ili.)
In the town of Xinyuan (Künes) in Xinyuan county, Ili, authorities registered the names of women wearing veils or "abnormal" clothes and men with large beards, as part of campaigns in the town and county against "illegal religious activities," according to an October 20 report on the Xinyuan county government Web site. The report noted the numbers of people who refused to cooperate, as well as those who signed contracts with authorities agreeing to remove veils, shave, or stop wearing "abnormal" clothing.
The weather bureau in Yutian (Keriye) county, Hoten district, reported carrying out a campaign, in accordance with countywide measures to address face veiling, calling on bureau staff and their friends and family not to wear clothing with a "pronounced religious hue" and to "resolutely stop face veiling," according to an October 27 report on the XUAR Weather Bureau Web site.
See also a report from the XUAR Women's Federation (via Kunlun Net, September 3), noting continuing implementation of a regionwide campaign to "Let Beautiful Hair Flutter, Let Beautiful Faces Be Revealed" and a September 23 report on the Shule (Kashgar Yéngisheher) county, Kashgar district, government Web site, on local implementation of this campaign.

Continuing Controls Over Women Religious Specialists. Local governments also continued steps to bring women religious specialists known as büwi (Mandarin: buwei) under tighter government regulation, following an official proposal in 2008 to place these religious figures—who perform certain religious rites and provide religious instruction—under stricter state control.

In October, authorities in Kashgar municipality held a training class for büwi within one township, calling on them to contribute to state-led campaigns and political goals, and reported "going a step further in strengthening management" of the women, according to an October 24 report on the Kashgar Municipal Government Web site.
A September 8 report from the Yengisar County Government Web site, in Kashgar district, described strengthening "management" (guanli) of büwi, holding regular interviews with them, and increasing communication among measures to "bring into play" the role of büwi and prevent women from participating in "illegal religious activities."

Religious Publications Targeted

The XUAR Transportation Department reported in a November 14 posting on its Web site that at the end of October, transportation officials throughout the region had investigated and prosecuted 20 cases of "illegal publications," including cases involving 4,386 copies of "illegal religious publications." According to the report, transportation authorities in the region will increase their oversight of the transport of publications as part of the region's work to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications."
The Organization Department of the Urumqi Municipal Party Committee described one Urumqi neighborhood's work to "capture the ideological and moral battlefield" of minors in the community by continuing to ban "illegal religious activities" and by investigating and stopping the spread of publications that propagate such activities, along with ethnic separatism and other topics deemed forbidden, according to a November 7 report from the Committee, via Kunlun Net.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR and regulation of religion in the region, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-11-17 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Jiangsu Authorities Order Unregistered Pastor To Serve Two Years of Reeducation Through Labor

November 21, 2011

In late July 2011, authorities in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, ordered pastor Shi Enhao to serve two years in reeducation through labor (RTL) in connection to his activities as an unregistered pastor, including setting up churches and holding gatherings that authorities deemed illegal. Public security authorities in Jiangsu have harassed or detained Shi several times since March 2011. Shi is a leader in a network of unregistered Protestant congregations whose members associate across multiple provinces, and the RTL order came during a time when official sensitivities were heightened toward members of unregistered Protestant congregations.

In late July 2011, authorities in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, ordered unregistered pastor Shi Enhao to serve two years of reeducation through labor (RTL), a form of administrative punishment without trial, according to international media reports dated July 25, 2011, (ChinaAid Association (CAA)) and July 26, 2011, (Associated Press (AP), via Yahoo!; AsiaNews; Radio Free Asia (RFA)). Fellow unregistered pastor Zhang Mingxuan reportedly told RFA that the charges against Shi included "[holding] illegal gatherings" and "[setting up] illegal churches." Such charges appear to violate Articles 18 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 18 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provide for freedom of religion, the freedom to manifest one's belief through, among other things, practice and worship, and freedom of peaceful association. China has signed the ICCPR and has stated that it is preparing to ratify it (National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), sec. V(1), via Xinhua). According to the RFA article, Shi's lawyer Zhang Kai said that Suqian public security officials refused to let Zhang visit Shi in custody because the case involved "secrets." Under China's legal framework for state secrets, officials have wide latitude to declare almost any matter of public concern a state secret. Zhang reportedly also said that authorities seized approximately 100,000 yuan (US$15,500) from Shi's church.

Suqian Officials Harass Shi Enhao Several Times Since March

Public security officials in Jiangsu have harassed and detained Shi several times since March 2011 in apparent connection to his activities as an unregistered pastor. According to CAA (7 March 11) and RFA (10 March 11), on March 4, 2011, officials from Suqian disrupted a house church meeting in Nanyang city, Henan province, and detained Shi, who had been preaching at the gathering. Officials held Shi in a hotel and then returned him to his home in Suqian on March 6. According to RFA (6 March 11), however, authorities reportedly instructed him not to travel anywhere during the meetings of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, held later that month. Shi reportedly told RFA that officials hired several unidentified people to prevent him from leaving his home, and some of those people beat him and took money and personal items from him. Sources do not indicate when officials released Shi from home confinement, but according to CAA (15 June 11, 15 June 11), beginning on May 31, 2011, public security officials in Suqian held him in administrative detention for 12 days. Public security officials released him on June 12 but took him into custody again the same day, eventually issuing a criminal detention notice dated June 21. The detention notice, issued by the Sucheng District Public Security Bureau, Suqian (via a July 5, 2011, CAA article), stated that officials suspected Shi of "using superstition to undermine the implementation of the law," which appears to be a reference to Article 300 of China's Criminal Law. In some cases, authorities have detained other unregistered Protestants on suspicion of "cult"-related activity—language that also can be found in Article 300—and authorities often use "cult"-related charges to detain or sentence Falun Gong practitioners (for more information on these issues and related cases, see this October 27, 2010, CECC analysis).

Harassment and Detention Occurs During Time of Sensitivity to Unregistered Protestants

Shi's harassment, detentions, and RTL punishment appear to have occurred during a period of heightened official sensitivity toward unregistered Protestant communities in various locations throughout China (for more information on government actions against these communities, see this July 1, 2011, CECC analysis). Official reports from Suqian indicate that Suqian authorities had begun targeting unregistered Protestant communities several months before Shi's March detention. A December 18, 2010, report from the Suqian Municipal People's Government describes efforts by authorities in Suqian to "focus on improving effective control of 'house church' activities, as well as vigorously reducing the space and frequency of their activities." Another December 18, 2010, report from the Suqian Municipal People's Government describes efforts to work with the 6-10 Office—an extralegal Party organization that implements the ban on Falun Gong and in some cases targets other unregistered religious communities—and the domestic security protection unit of the public security bureau to ban worship gathering sites established outside of government oversight.

Shi reportedly is a vice president of the Chinese House Church Alliance (CHCA), which the Ministry of Civil Affairs banned on November 28, 2008, for "engaging in activities as a social organization on its own initiative, without registering" (see a notice on the China Social Organizations Web site, a Web site owned and operated by the State Administration for the Management of Social Organizations). Authorities appear to have targeted other individuals who had contact with the CHCA in the past year. For example, according to CAA (17 April 11), in April 2011, public security officials in Zaozhuang city, Shandong province, took into custody seven members of a house church, including several leaders, who had had contact with Shi Enhao and Zhang Mingxuan, vice president and president of the CHCA. According to the same report, authorities in Linyi city, Shandong, also reportedly detained two unregistered Protestants who had hosted Zhang Mingxuan during a visit.

For more information about conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-25 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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2011 Crackdown Update: Ding Mao, Chen Wei, and Ran Yunfei

November 15, 2011

Prosecutors twice transferred the cases of democracy advocates Ding Mao and Chen Wei back to public security officials for supplementary investigation, both first detained in the widespread February 2011 crackdown in China and formally arrested shortly thereafter. In both cases, PSB officials have completed their supplementary investigations and requested indictments from prosecutors for the third and final time. Authorities have not responded to or have not granted family requests to release Ding and Chen on bail. Authorities also denied Ding and Chen access to their lawyers, in Ding's case for the first six months of his detention, and in Chen's case for nearly seven months. In another case involving a citizen detained in the crackdown, Chengdu authorities have released Ran Yunfei on bail pending trial and placed him under "residential surveillance."

Ding Mao and Chen Wei Cases Twice Transferred to Public Security Officials for Supplementary Investigation
Beginning in February 2011, Chinese officials initiated a widespread crackdown on rights defenders, lawyers, democracy activists, artists, and bloggers after protests in the Middle East and North Africa and amid online calls for "Jasmine" protest rallies in China. (For more information on censorship of events related to the "Arab Spring" and the crackdown in China, see CECC analyses from 3 May 11 and 22 March 11.) Citizens detained in February included the democracy advocate Ding Mao. Public security bureau (PSB) officials in Mianyang city, Sichuan Province, originally detained Ding on February 19 on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power," and formally arrested him on March 28 for the same charge (ChinaAid Association (CAA), 17 October 11). While news stories have not explicitly noted the reasons given by authorities for the charge, Ding reportedly forwarded, via microblog, messages related to "Jasmine" protest rallies in China, according to the October 17 CAA press release. Ding reportedly pointed out that he did not author information related to the rallies, merely that he forwarded other people's postings (Radio Free Asia (RFA), 6 September 11). Authorities are reportedly holding Ding in the Mianyang Municipal Detention Center, according to the same article.

The procuratorate in Mianyang reportedly twice transferred Ding's case back to the PSB for supplementary investigation, citing a lack of evidence to prosecute on the charge of "inciting subversion of state power," once in May 2011 and again in September (CAA, 17 October 11 and Amnesty International, 9 September 11). After PSB officials completed their second supplementary investigation, authorities notified Ding's wife on October 24 that they had submitted the case to the procuratorate for the third and final time (CAA, 8 November 11). (For more information on relevant pre-trial procedures, see the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, Articles 66-70.)

In September, procuratorate officials in Suining municipality, Sichuan province, transferred the case of another democracy advocate detained in February, Chen Wei, back to the public security bureau for supplementary investigation for the second time (China Free Press, via Boxun 3 October 11). By late October, PSB officials reportedly finished this second supplementary investigation and sent his case back to the procuratorate for the third time (RFA, 31 October 11). In Chen's case, public security officials in Suining detained him on February 20 and formally arrested him on March 28; Suining PSB officers noted four essays on democracy and human rights authored by Chen and posted overseas in an opinion recommending prosecution (Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), 28 October 11 and RFA, 8 September 11). Authorities are reportedly holding Chen in the Suining Municipal Detention Center, according to the CHRD article.

Authorities Deny Access to Counsel for Months
Mianyang officials have not yet permitted Ding's wife to visit him in detention and did not allow Ding's lawyer to see him for nearly six months after his initial detention, despite several attempts (CHRD, reprinted in Blogspot, 14 July 11). Ding finally met with his lawyer for the first time on August 11, 2011, according to the October 17 CAA article. Article 33 of the PRC Lawyers Law (Chinese) (English) states that a lawyer entrusted to a case has a right to meet with a criminal suspect as of the first police interrogation or from the day when "compulsory measures" are first taken (such as a summons or detention). Article 96 of the Criminal Procedure Law also stipulates that lawyers may meet with suspects, though advance approval is necessary for cases involving state secrets. It is unclear if officials have classified the case as a state secret and news articles have not indicated that Ding's case otherwise involves state secrets. Authorities also prohibited Chen Wei's lawyer from visiting him until September 8, 2011 (CHRD, 12 September 11 and RFA, 8 September 11). News articles have not indicated that Chen's case involves state secrets.

Officials Unresponsive to Family Requests for "Bail Pending Trial"
In addition, Mianyang authorities have not responded to Ding's wife's request to modify the "compulsory measures" in his case which might, for example, lead to his release on bail pending trial or allow him to be placed under residential surveillance (CAA, 17 October 11 and RFA, 6 September 11). (For more information on such arrangements, see Chapter VI of the Criminal Procedure Law.) Authorities in Chen Wei's case did not respond to a September 9 request made by his wife for bail pending trial. After she resubmitted her request for bail on September 20, domestic security protection officials reportedly told her that people in political cases like Chen's are unable to obtain bail (China Free Press, via Boxun, 3 October 11).

Ran Yunfei Released on Bail Pending Trial, Under "Residential Surveillance"
On August 9, officials in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, released on bail intellectual and writer Ran Yunfei and placed him under "residential surveillance" to be in effect for six months. It is possible the procuratorate did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute Ran's case. Ran reportedly posted microblog entries regarding the so-called "Arab Spring" protests in the Middle East (New York Times, 10 August 11, and Associated Press via the Guardian, 10 August 11).

For more information on the crackdown in China beginning in February 2011 and related cases, see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance, Section II—Criminal Justice, and Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-25 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Xinjiang Draft Legal Measures Promote Hiring Ethnic Minorities, Against Track Record of Employment Discrimination

November 18, 2011

New draft measures on employment promotion, under consideration in Xinjiang, stipulate measures to prevent discrimination and promote the hiring of non-Han ("ethnic minority") groups in the region. The measures track China's national employment promotion law, but also stipulate subsidies for hiring ethnic minorities. Such subsidies are absent in the national law and employment promotion regulations in other provincial-level areas. If passed, the impact of the draft measures remains unclear, however, as previous laws and regulations already bar discrimination and have failed to prevent hiring practices in Xinjiang that discriminate against job candidates based on factors including ethnicity and sex.

The Standing Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People's Congress recently completed a first stage of deliberations over draft implementation measures for China's Employment Promotion Law, according to October 9 and October 13, 2011, reports from Legal Daily. The reports highlight the draft's attention to employment discrimination and equal employment, noting stipulations that workers "enjoy the right to equal employment," that hiring units must provide "equal and fair employment opportunities," and that they "must not stipulate discriminatory employment conditions." In addition, the draft stipulates that ethnic minority candidates testing for jobs with the government and state-run institutions receive "appropriate consideration" (shidang zhaogu) and that enterprises that recruit and hire ethnic minority candidates enjoy social insurance subsidies (shehui baoxian butie).

Based on the descriptions of the draft implementing measures in the Legal Daily articles (the full text of the draft measures appears unavailable), the Xinjiang measures mirror many of the provisions in China's national law on employment promotion. Article 3 of the national law states that workers have the right to equal employment and that they are not to be discriminated against based on differences such as ethnicity, race, sex, and religious belief. Article 26 states specifically that employing units and employment intermediaries are to provide equal employment opportunities and not practice employment discrimination. Other articles that address discrimination include Article 25 (stipulating that governments create an environment for equal employment and eliminate discrimination) and Articles 29 and 31 (stipulating that disabled workers and rural workers, respectively, not be discriminated against in hiring). Under Article 62, workers may bring a suit in court in cases of discrimination. It is unclear if the XUAR draft includes similar language on lawsuits. The national law also includes language stating that hiring units shall give "appropriate consideration" to ethnic minorities (Article 28), but it does not include provisions on insurance subsidies.

To date, 19 other provincial-level areas in China appear to have issued implementing measures, regulations, or amended regulations on employment promotion, following passage of the national law. The draft Xinjiang measures appear to be the only one that includes subsidies for employers that hire ethnic minorities, though some other regulations contain multiple provisions addressing discrimination or promoting the employment of ethnic minorities. See, for example, implementing measures from Hunan and Hainan provinces. For comparison with provisions from another autonomous region, see implementing measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region.

It is unclear what impact the XUAR measures, if passed as drafted, would have on curbing discriminatory hiring practices. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2011 Annual Report, despite already existing prohibitions against employment discrimination in Chinese law, some government and private employers in the XUAR have continued to discriminate against categories of job candidates including ethnic minorities and women. The XUAR draft's provision on insurance subsidies may provide a new incentive for eliminating some discriminatory practices and promoting the hiring of ethnic minority candidates, but it is unclear if subsidies to date have been effective in promoting similar employment policies in the region. A XUAR government and Party committee opinion on employment promotion issued in October 2009 included provisions on equal employment opportunities (Item 3) and called for "recruiting more ethnic minority workers to the extent possible"—including an unspecified "fixed proportion" of positions for ethnic minority college graduates (Item 2.2)—but follow-up reporting on the opinion and information on its impact was limited. The opinion also stipulated that the government would subsidize old-age pension insurance for enterprises hiring workers from Xinjiang (Item 2.2), but did not stipulate subsidies specifically for ethnic minority workers from the region.

Moreover, as noted in the CECC 2011 Annual Report, some job recruitment announcements from the XUAR continued to reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs. A job announcement for a hospital in Urumqi city, for example, advertised in late 2010 for 28 positions, all of which were reserved for Han. Civil servant recruitment in fall 2010 for county-level discipline inspection and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open positions for Han, leaving 93 of the remaining positions unrestricted by ethnicity and reserving 38 for members of non-Han groups. In an apparent shift from previous years, however, 2011 annual recruiting for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) left almost all positions unreserved by ethnicity—marking a change from past practice of formally reserving a majority of positions for Han—but the XPCC continued restrictions based on sex.

See Section II7mdash;Labor and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report for additional information. See also CECC analyses (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) for more information on job recruiting practices in the XUAR in 2011 and in previous years.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-19 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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China's White Paper on Corruption and Official Anti-Corruption Efforts

December 14, 2011

The State Council of China issued China's first white paper on corruption titled "China's Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government" in late December 2010, amid an official "anti-corruption storm," high-profile arrests of corruption suspects, and ongoing announcements of new anti-corruption measures. While the white paper did not outline new policy directions, it gave unusual attention to citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts. Over the last few months, central authorities also promoted in the media official channels for citizens to report possible instances of corruption and outlined protections for whistleblowers in government circulars. Whistleblower protections, however, remain inadequate in practice and some non-governmental Web sites that posted reports on alleged corruption have faced cyber attacks and authorities have threatened to close Web sites or warned some webmasters to shut down their sites.

The Information Office of the State Council issued China's first white paper on corruption titled "China's Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government" (English) (Chinese) on December 29, 2010, which acknowledges that corruption in China remains a problem and attributes its persistence to changes in China's economic and social systems as well as "incomplete anti-corruption mechanisms." The white paper followed reported statements by Premier Wen Jiabao saying that the root of corruption lies with the failure to restrict and supervise authority and that corruption is the largest threat to Communist Party rule and government legitimacy (China Review, 27 August 10). The white paper (Section IV) asserts that transparency of government operations is the "best supervision of power" and that China values supervision by the general public and by "public opinion" (i.e., the media) in combating corruption and building a clean government. It explains that citizens participate in "supervision" by filing complaints and making suggestions through institutionalized channels, and it outlines regulatory protections for corruption case informants. News reports, however, continue to detail cases of retribution against whistleblowers (see details below), and authorities reportedly also have censored several non-governmental "confess a bribe" and other independent corruption monitoring Web sites. The white paper came amid the release of several new or revised central-level anti-corruption measures (People's Daily, index, accessed 7 August 11), and a wide-scale anti-corruption campaign (People's Daily, 20 December 10).

Regulatory Protections for Whistleblowers
The white paper states that authorities "attach great importance to protecting the legitimate rights and interests" of informants (Chapter Four) and notes that authorities included stipulations protecting the confidentiality of informants in China's Criminal Law (Article 254), Criminal Procedure Law (Articles 84-85), and internal regulations of the Communist Party. The white paper also notes China signed the United Nation's 2003 Convention Against Corruption. As a signatory, China agreed to Convention Articles that call on State Parties to incorporate into their domestic legal systems measures to protect citizens who report on offences related to corruption (Article 33). The white paper also pointed out that Chinese authorities also enshrined protection for informants in additional laws and regulations:

China's Constitution in principle gives citizens the right to "criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary…" and "[n]o one may suppress such complaints, charges and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens making them" (Article 41).
The State Council's 2005 Regulations on Letters and Visits (Xinfang Tiaoli) (English) (Chinese), also stipulate that citizens have the right to make reports or complaints without retribution (Articles 1-3).
On June 25, 2010, Chinese officials issued a revision to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision that stipulates personal information about whistleblowers should be kept confidential and their rights protected in accordance with measures established by the State Council (Article 6). Further, it stipulates that it is a crime to release information about an informant or the circumstances of an informant's report, subject to punishment and criminal liability will be pursued (Article 46).

Protections for Whistleblowers Remain Insufficient in Practice
In practice, however, protections for whistleblowers at this time remain insufficiently developed. More than 70 percent of the cases of government work-related corruption offenses filed with procuratorate offices in the past few years initially involved a tip from an informant (Legal Daily, 21 June 10), but 70 percent of those informants reportedly faced some form of retribution (Legal Daily, 17 June 2010). Over the last year, Chinese and international media have highlighted several instances of retribution against whistleblowers (China Media Project, 19 April 11; China Daily, 3 December 10; and South China Morning Post [SCMP], 3 December 10—subscription required).

While authorities state they encourage public supervision and have established official tip sites, officials have reportedly blocked non-governmental whistleblower Web sites and suppressed some independent monitoring activities. The founder of the whistleblower Web site "China Justice and Anti-Corruption Net" reported that his site was filtered by China's top search engine, Baidu, and that officials from press and government agencies pressured him to remove a post about alleged forced evictions (Radio Free Asia, 11 January 11). In early June, new sites based on "confess-a-bribe" Web sites in India began to appear in China (Reuters, 13 June 11), but by mid-June, authorities began blocking access to the sites and warning webmasters to close the sites (Associated Press via Center for Intl. Media Assistance, 22 June 11). The sites, some receiving tens to hundreds of thousands of hits, are likely considered illegal because they are unregistered, and at least two have been targets of cyber attacks (China Times News Group, 18 June 11). Other cases where officials displayed intolerance for independent corruption monitoring and reporting include:

In July 2011, court officials in Tengzhou city, Shandong province rejected an appeal by journalist Qi Chonghuai, known for his official corruption exposés and who had already completed four years in prison on charges of extortion and blackmail following posting stories online about the alleged corrupt practices of municipal government officials (Human Rights in China, 28 July 11). The Tengzhou city Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to eight additional years on the charge of embezzlement, according to the July 28 HRIC press release.
Authorities in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province continue to harass anti-corruption advocate Guo Yongfeng, who officials released from a reeducation through labor facility in August 2011, after he had served 1 year and 9 months. Officials sentenced Guo with "obstructing public affairs," likely in relation to Guo’s alleged involvement in organizing petitions calling for an end to corruption and his role in establishing an unregistered citizens’ group called Citizens' Association for Government Oversight, which sought to monitor alleged official corruption. (Deutsche Welle, 5 September 11 and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 29 January 09, via Boxun).

Recent Anti-Corruption Efforts and Growing Official Corruption Levels
In the effort to address corruption, Wen Jiabao outlined specific anti-corruption priorities for 2011 in his speech at a "clean government work" conference in March 2011 (Xinhua, 5 April 11). In addition, central officials issued numerous provisions, regulations, and guidelines during 2010 and 2011 (People's Daily, index, accessed 7 August 11). Select anti-corruption measures are listed below:

Provision Regarding Implementation of the Responsibility System for Construction of an Honest Party and a Clean Government (2010) (Chinese Text), which is a general provision to promote official accountability.
The Supreme People's Court reportedly issued three new regulations to address corruption in the judicial system (China Daily, 9 February 11).
"Three Public Expenses" policy, which requires government departments to make public their expenditures on overseas trips, public relations activities, and vehicles (Xinhua, 7 April 11 and People's Daily Foreign Edition, via Legal Daily, 7 April 11).
Regulation on Economic Responsibility Audits for Chief Leading Cadres of the Party and the Government and Executives of State-Owned Enterprises, which seeks to reduce corruption by improving the management and supervision of Party, government, and state-owned enterprises' finances and investments. (Xinhua, 8 December 10). Authorities will reportedly use the results of audits in decisions about official appointments and removals (People's Daily, 9 December 10).

Despite new regulatory efforts, corruption in China appears to be rising. In 2010, state corruption investigations of individual government officials rose by 6.1 percent to 44,085 cases from the previous year. (People's Daily, 20 March 11). In 2011, the media highlighted a number of high-profile cases of corruption and graft, including Xu Zongheng, the former mayor of Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, who between 2001 and 2009 reportedly took 33.18 million yuan (US$5.19 million) in bribes, and former vice-mayor of Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, Xu Maiyong, who was accused of accepting a total of 160 million yuan (US$25.03 million) in bribes between 1995 and 2009 (Caixin, 10 May 11 and SCMP, 2 May 11—“Just the Tip of an Iceberg for Official Graft”—and 28 March 11—“The Worst System Corrupts its Best Officials”— subscription required). In its 2010 Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International gave China a score of 3.5 down from a score of 3.6 in 2009 (on a scale for which 10 signifies "highly clean"). The index reflects the results of the organization’s complex measurement of the perceived levels of corruption in the public sector (Transparency International, 2010 and 2009).

For additional analysis of anti-corruption measures last year and in previous years, see previous CECC analyses (5 November 10 and 4 January 07). For more information on issues of corruption and Party and government transparency see the CECC 2011 Annual Report (pp. 166-167), the 2010 Annual Report (pp. 171-176), and the 2009 Annual Report (pp. 212-214).

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-19 / English) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=165443

Xinjiang Students Continue to Harvest Cotton, Directive Allows Child Labor

November 14, 2011

Education authorities in Xinjiang have continued to require students to pick cotton during the fall harvest, in some cases violating permitted parameters for "work-study" programs as stipulated in local directives, as well as contravening domestic and international standards regulating students' work activities and prohibiting child labor. Xinjiang authorities announced in 2008 that students in junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cotton in work-study programs, but issued a directive in 2009 that appears to affirm that younger students may continue to engage in cotton harvesting and other labor as part of work to "help with agriculture," despite the prohibitions against child labor in Chinese law. Reports from the past year indicate that some localities used these younger students to harvest cotton. Xinjiang high schools and colleges continued to make older students pick cotton in work-study programs, in some reported cases exceeding the permitted time period for work-study under local directives and in one reported case levying fines on students who didn't meet quotas. Work-study programs and cotton-picking activities have drawn complaints from students and parents due to the hazards of the work and effect on children's education. The use of student labor this year comes as the region reported difficulties in recruiting regular agricultural workers to pick cotton.

Xinjiang Directives Permit Cotton Harvesting
Education authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have continued to require students to pick cotton during the fall harvest. In some cases, students have been required to pick cotton as part of formal "work-study" programs that integrate the labor into the school curriculum. A circular issued by the Xinjiang Education Department in 2008 ended the practice of having students enrolled in the state's compulsory nine years of elementary and junior high school education pick cotton in work-study programs. (Analysis here. Full text of circular apparently unavailable.) The circular appeared to leave some other forms of work-study in place for these students, while continuing to permit the use of older students to harvest cotton in work-study programs. A 2006 opinion defined the overall scope of work-study, limiting it to children in the third grade of elementary school and higher, as well as limiting work-study to 7 days for elementary school students and 14 days for students in higher grades. The XUAR government reportedly discontinued cotton-picking work-study activities for younger students because central government funding for rural compulsory education now met XUAR schools' funding needs. Despite the prohibition, some schools continued to require younger students to harvest cotton in work-study programs. (See analyses 1, 2 from 2008 and 2010.)

A 2009 circular recently found by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China builds on the 2008 directive and appears to explicitly permit labor by younger students outside the context of work-study, as well as to continue to permit certain forms of labor within the work-study context. (See the only apparent full text copy of the circular on the Internet as posted on August 20, 2009, on the Kuitun Education Bureau Web site.) The circular affirms the 2008 prohibition on elementary and junior high school students picking cotton (Item 1). It notes that with funding advances for compulsory education, schools will no longer organize work-study with the goal of making a profit, but specifies that schools may organize certain types of work-study and other "social practice" activities in order to generate income to be used to support the daily needs and studies (shenghuo he xuexi) of poor students (Item 2). The circular also notes that any crop picking or harvesting activities organized by local governments are not to be considered as "work-study" activities (Item 3)—an apparent allowance for continued crop harvesting by young students, though removing it as a formal part of the school curriculum and basis for grading students. Formal work-study programs had provoked criticism in the past in part because students' performance in the activities affected their academic record, though parents and students also objected to the arduousness of the labor and exposure to danger. A government response to an inquiry on work-study by junior high students, posted September 7, 2011, on a message board on the Xinjiang Education Department Web site, affirms that the 2008 and 2009 government circulars continue to guide policy in the region.

The practical distinction between younger students' cotton harvesting in work-study programs (still practiced in some localities in recent years despite the 2008 prohibition) and cotton harvesting to "help with agriculture" appears minimal. Students and parents continue to object to both forms of labor and at least one locality appears to have prohibited the use of child cotton harvesters in any context. (See discussion below.) The use of younger students to harvest cotton violates domestic and international protections against child labor. The work-study programs for older students as implemented in parts of the XUAR violate permitted parameters for work-study as stipulated in local directives and contravenes domestic and international standards regulating students' work activities. See a previous CECC analysis for more information.

Students Continue to Pick Cotton in the XUAR in 2011
Although it is unclear the full extent to which younger students were involved in cotton harvesting this year—either under the guise of permitted activities to "help with agriculture" or in work-study programs, despite the 2008 prohibitions—some media reports and blog postings indicate that the use of child labor to harvest cotton continued. In one case, a report described this as work to "help with agriculture," and in other cases, the framework for organizing the labor was unclear. According to a September 24, 2011, Bingtuan News Net article profiling cotton harvesters, the 44th Regiment (3rd Agricultural Division, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) Number 1 Middle and Elementary School in Kashgar district organized students to "help with agriculture" by picking cotton. The Bingtuan News Net article profiled a student in the sixth grade at the school. Though the identities of the authors cannot be verified, blog and Internet postings from junior high school students also suggest that younger students continue to pick cotton. A blogger describing himself as a first-year junior high student (7th-grade student) at the same Kashgar school reported that his school had arranged for students to pick cotton, with daily quotas of 25 kilograms [4 kilograms above the quota for his classmate in the grade below him, discussed above], according to a September 24 posting (cached) on a blog hosted at 30edu.com. The author of a September 22 posting on the variety site Maopu said that students enrolled in nine years of compulsory education were made to pick cotton. The author noted that students in the third grade and above—a possible reference to elementary school students, based on the context—had been required to pick cotton for 15 days. A report from a township in Keping (Kelpin) county, Aksu district, called for the township to end the practice of using students in compulsory education to pick cotton, according to a September 7 report on Kunlun Net.

Older students also picked cotton this year, in some reported cases exceeding the permitted 14-day time period for work-study as stipulated under local directives and in one reported case levying fines on students who didn't meet quotas. A vice principal at one senior high school in Huocheng (Korgas) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, reported students would perform 20 days of work-study activities to pick cotton, training them to "endure hardships" and learn teamwork, according to a September 24 report on Ili Net. (See an undated posting on Zhongguo Gaoxiao Portal for more information about the school.) Students will live on the premises while picking cotton, according to the report. In Wusu (Shixo) city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, Ili—where a parent complained in 2008 that junior high school students were made to pick cotton and where students in 2008 and 2010 reportedly did this work beyond the permitted time period of 14 days—students at one senior high school were reported to pick cotton again for 15 days this year as part of "social practice labor" allowing them to "experience the hardships and happiness of labor," according to a September 27 report on the Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal Web site. (See an undated posting on the Wusu Municipal Education Bureau Web site for information noting that the school is a senior high school.) A September 20 Fujian Online report about a technical college in the XUAR reported that the school required all second-year students to pick cotton for two weeks and face fines if they didn't meet quotas, with all profits going to the college president.

The use of student labor comes amid reports of a shortage of cotton pickers that exceeds shortages in previous years, according to recent media reports. A September 8, 2011, Xinhua report noted high expenses for harvesting cotton this year and problems in attracting workers to the XUAR to pick cotton. A labor recruiter interviewed in the story attributed the labor recruitment difficulties to workers' raised wage expectations amid a rise in commodity prices, comparable wages in jobs such as the urban construction industry, and resistance to wage deductions given to middlemen who recruit cotton pickers. A cotton farmer cited in a September 20 Tianshan Net article attributed the worker shortage to a rise in workers' wages in other areas, thereby reducing the number of people who carry out temporary labor to pick cotton, along with insufficient support from local governments in organizing labor exports and fluctuating wages for cotton pickers. A labor recruiter cited in an October 11 China Daily article noted workers were hard to recruit because "[s]ome have concerns and even misunderstandings about the long journey, intensive labor and personal security, which makes them unwilling to come." The previous year, one official cited the Urumqi "July 5 Incident" (demonstrations and riots that took place in July 2009), as a cause of the region's labor shortage in 2010. The XUAR plans to recruit a total of 400,000 workers in 2011 from areas in China outside the XUAR, according to a Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps regiment leader cited in a September 19 Tianshan Net report. Xinjiang residents from "all areas and ethnicities" also have joined the ranks of the cotton pickers, according to the report.

For additional information on conditions in the XUAR and on child labor, see Section II—Worker Rights and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-13 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=165145

Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party "Brazen Meddling" in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation

November 14, 2011

In a September 24, 2011, signed statement, the Dalai Lama rejected Communist Party attempts to use historical misrepresentation and government regulation to impose unprecedented control over one of Tibetan Buddhism's most important features—lineages of teachers (trulkus), whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations, that can span centuries. The Dalai Lama addressed issues pertaining to reincarnation generally and to his potential reincarnation specifically, likely rendering the statement of exceptional significance to Tibetan Buddhists. He denounced the Chinese government's "Order No. 5," a reference to the PRC Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, as "outrageous and disgraceful," and provided a historical basis for rejecting government and Party claims that Tibetan Buddhists selected the 9th through 14th (current) Dalai Lamas in compliance with instructions in a Qing imperial edict. The Dalai Lama's statement explained briefly the Tibetan Buddhist concepts of reincarnation and "emanation"—the latter suggests that the Dalai Lama could establish a successor while he is still living. He concluded by declaring that when he is about 90 years old—he is 76 now—he will take measures to resolve whether or not there will be a 15th Dalai Lama; by condemning Party interference in Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation; and by stating that in the future it will be "impossible" for Tibetan Buddhists to "acknowledge or accept" such "brazen meddling."

Tibetan Buddhists who live in the Tibetan areas of China—where officials characterize the Dalai Lama as a "splittist"—likely will regard the Dalai Lama's September 24 statement (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), 24 September 11), as of heightened importance due to the statement's formality and public release, the significance of the issues to the future of Tibetan Buddhism, and the strong wording of his remarks. The statement followed March 10 and March 14, 2011, addresses (OHHDL, 10 March 11; OHHDL, 14 March 11) in which he explained his decision to take steps to end the historical role of Dalai Lamas in Tibetan governance—a change that he said on March 19 "could allow him to concentrate more effectively on [a] spiritual role" (Phayul, 19 March 11).

The statement. The Dalai Lama published the formal statement, written in the first-person and signed, on the OHHDL Tibetan-language Web site. Translations of the statement into English and Chinese are available on the respective OHHDL Web sites. Tibetans in China could circulate the document widely, but with risk. Since Chinese officials characterize the Dalai Lama as a "splittist" (see, e.g., CECC 2011 Annual Report, 208), authorities sometimes detain or imprison Tibetans on charges of "inciting splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103(2)) for creating, possessing, or sharing print, audio, or video material pertaining to the Dalai Lama. The Commission's Political Prisoner Database documents such cases. (In the Dalai Lama's March 10, 2011, address, he reiterated that he is not seeking Tibetan independence, but "genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the PRC," and expressed disappointment in the "lack of any positive response to our reasonable proposals.")

Reincarnation and emanation. The Dalai Lama provided an overview of the complex Tibetan Buddhist concepts of "reincarnation" and "emanation." In the case of reincarnation, he said, "superior Bodhisattvas" (beings possessed of the highest level of Buddhist understanding and compassionate motivation) "are able to choose their place and time of birth as well as their future parents." Tibetan Buddhists regard the Dalai Lama as a reincarnation of Avalokitesvara, the Bodhisattva of compassion (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography"). As such, Tibetan Buddhists believe that upon the current Dalai Lama's death, Avalokitesvara could reincarnate as a 15th Dalai Lama, and that such a reincarnation would not require the oversight or approval of the Chinese government—the interference that the Dalai Lama referred to in his statement as "Order No. 5" (i.e., Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism). In the case of "emanation," according to the Dalai Lama's remarks, "superior Bodhisattvas," can manifest themselves in one or more other "bodies" (e.g., persons) simultaneously while they are still alive. Based on the explanation, the Dalai Lama could manifest one or more emanations prior to his death, and reincarnation could follow his death. He quoted a 19th century Tibetan Buddhist master to underscore the point:

Reincarnation is what happens when someone takes rebirth after the predecessor's passing away; emanation is when manifestations take place without the source's passing away.The golden urn. The Dalai Lama explained his rejection of Chinese government and Party assertions that a legitimate historical basis exists for selecting Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations by drawing a lot from a golden urn. According to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a 1792 Qing "Imperial Ordinance" set out "explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas in Tibet" (MFA, 15 November 00 (1)), including that Tibetans must use "a golden urn and ivory slips" provided by the Qing emperor for the prescribed ritual (MFA, 15 November 00 (2)). The Dalai Lama acknowledged that after the Tibetan government requested Manchu (Qing) military support in a conflict with Gurkhas, "Manchu officials made a 29-point proposal on the pretext of making the Tibetan Government's administration more efficient," including recognizing high-ranking reincarnations by "picking lots from a Golden Urn." According to the Dalai Lama's summary, only the 11th Dalai Lama and the 8th and 9th Panchen Lamas were selected solely by using the golden urn. Tibetan Buddhists reject using the urn, the Dalai Lama said, because "[t]his system was imposed by the Manchus" and because "Tibetans had no faith in it because it lacked any spiritual quality." An October 31, 2011, People's Daily editorial (in Chinese on People's Daily; translated in OSC, 9 November 11) dismissed the Dalai Lama's statement and claimed that China's "central government" had approved lot-drawing selections of the 10th through 12th Dalai Lamas and officially exempted the selections of the 9th, 13th, and 14th Dalai Lamas by using the golden urn.

The 11th Panchen Lama. Chinese authorities declared the Dalai Lama's May 14, 1995, recognition of six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama to be "illegal and invalid" and have held him and his parents incommunicado in one or more unknown locations since May 17, 1995. On November 29, 1995, Luo Gan, State Councilor and Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee's Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Xinhua, 15 November 02), was the most senior government and Party official presiding over a ceremony that selected another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, by using the Qing golden urn (Xinhua, 29 November 95 (translated in OSC)). In April 1997, a Chinese court imprisoned Chadrel Jampa Trinle, a Rinpoche and trulku who led the search for the reincarnation, to six years' imprisonment on charges of "plotting to split the country" and "leaking state secrets" (the names of boys under consideration) to "separatist forces abroad" (the Dalai Lama) (Xinhua, 7 May 97, reprinted in World Tibet Network; Tibet Radio, 4 November 95 (translated in OSC)). No details on Chadrel Rinpoche's location or well-being have been available since his reported release in early 2002 (New York Times, 21 February 02). (See CECC 2008 Annual Report, 189.)

The Declaration. The Dalai Lama described the final portion of his statement as a "declaration." He summed up his basis for rejecting Party interference in identifying trulkus and outlined measures he intends to take to protect the legitimacy of a possible 15th Dalai Lama. Excerpts from the declaration follow.

Trulkus guide their own reincarnations. "[The] person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth . . . . It is particularly inappropriate for Chinese communists, who explicitly reject even the idea of past and future lives, . . ., to meddle in the system of reincarnation . . . ."
Tibetan Buddhists will not accept continued Party interference. "Such brazen meddling contradicts [Communist] political ideology and reveals their double standards. Should this situation continue in the future, it will be impossible for Tibetans and those who follow the Tibetan Buddhist tradition to acknowledge or accept it."
Around 2025, time to decide the future of Dalai Lamas. "When I am about ninety I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other [Tibetan Buddhists], and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not." (The Dalai Lama was born in 1935 (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography")).
Organization named to lead the search. "If it is decided that . . . there is a need for the Fifteenth Dalai Lama to be recognized, responsibility . . . will primarily rest on . . . the Dalai Lama’s Gaden Phodrang Trust." (The Commission has not observed information about the Trust or references to it that predate the statement.)
Written instructions will guide the search. "[Officers of the Trust] should seek advice and direction from [certain Tibetan Buddhist leaders and other entities] and carry out the procedures of search and recognition in accordance with past tradition. I shall leave clear written instructions about this."

For additional information, see Commission analysis of the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, and of prefectural-level regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs. See also sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005 Annual Reports, and in Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-04 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=164940

Uyghur Political Prisoners Mehbube Ablesh's and Abdulghani Memetemin's Prison Sentences Expire

October 18, 2011

The prison sentences of two Uyghur political prisoners in Xinjiang have expired, and both are presumed to have since been released. Mehbube Ablesh completed a three-year prison sentence for "splittism" around August 2011. Authorities handed down the prison sentence in apparent connection to her criticism of Chinese government policies, including Mandarin-focused "bilingual" education. Abdulghani Memetemin completed a nine-year prison sentence in late July for "supplying state secrets" to an overseas group. He had sent information on human rights abuses and translations of Chinese government speeches to an organization in Germany that monitors rights violations against Uyghurs. Other Uyghurs in Xinjiang continue to serve prison sentences for exercising their right to free expression.

Mehbube Ablesh
Uyghur radio station employee Mehbube Ablesh completed a three-year prison sentence for "splittism" around August and is presumed to have since been released, according to information in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. As reported in the Political Prisoner Database, Mehbube Ablesh, a Uyghur woman from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), was detained around August 2008 in apparent connection to her criticism of Chinese government policies. The detention came after she was fired from her job in the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio Station. A co-worker connected the detention to articles she wrote for the Internet. An overseas source said that in Mehbube Ablesh's communications with him, she had been critical of political leaders in the XUAR and had criticized Mandarin-focused "bilingual" education in the region. A source also noted she had posted articles on the Internet that criticized government security measures for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games and government handling of collecting donations from Uyghurs following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. She served her sentence at the Xinjiang Number 2 Prison. For additional information, see Radio Free Asia reports from September 8, 2008, (English, Uyghur) and September 9, 2008 (Mandarin).

Following the detention, charges against Mehbube Ablesh and subsequent information on the case appeared unknown until summer 2010, when the Dui Hua Foundation reported newly obtained information on her case. Based on responses to a request for information from Chinese authorities, the Dui Hua Foundation reported that Mehbube Ablesh (identified as Mehbube Abrak in the report) was serving a three-year prison sentence for "splittism" (separatism), a crime under Article 103 of China's Criminal Law (English, Chinese). Given the length of the sentence and circumstances of the case, the Dui Hua Foundation conjectured that the full charge could be "inciting splittism." For additional information, see the Dui Hua Foundation's summer 2010 Dialogue Newsletter and article on Uyghur cases.

Under Article 47 of China's Criminal Law, each day in custody counts as one day served of a prison sentence. Although the precise date of Mehbube Ablesh's detention is not known, if authorities followed the law in calculating her sentence from the day around August 2008 when she appears to have been detained, her sentence would have expired on the same date in 2011.

Abdulghani Memetemin
Uyghur teacher and journalist Abdulghani Memetemin completed his nine-year sentence for "supplying state secrets to an organization outside the country" on July 25 and is presumed to have since been released from prison, according to information in the CECC Political Prisoner Database. As reported in the Political Prisoner Database, authorities in Kashgar district, XUAR, detained Abdulghani Memetemin on July 26, 2002, in connection to his reporting on human rights abuses to an overseas group. He was charged with "threatening the integrity of the state by separatist means, violating state secrets and sending them outside the country." The Kashgar Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment on June 24, 2003, on the charge of "supplying state secrets for an organization outside the country," a crime under Article 111 of China's Criminal Law.

The verdict cited information on human rights abuses and translations of Chinese government speeches and news that Abdulghani Memetemin provided to the East Turkistan Information Center, a Munich-based organization that reports on human rights violations against Uyghurs. Abdulghani Memetemin reportedly represented himself at trial and did not have access to a lawyer before trial. He reportedly was tortured while in custody. He served his sentence at the Xinjiang Number 4 Prison. See a December 6, 2004, report from Amnesty International and July 30, 2004, report from Radio Free Asia for additional information.

Uyghurs Imprisoned for Exercising Right to Free Expression
Authorities in the XUAR continue to hold other Uyghurs in detention for exercising their right to free expression. Cases include:

Gheyret Niyaz, a journalist and Web editor in Urumqi, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court on July 23, 2010, to 15 years' imprisonment for "leaking state secrets." Prosecutors in court cited essays by Gheyret Niyaz addressing economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs. Sources also connected the prison sentence to interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to foreign media after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that were critical of aspects of government policy in the XUAR.
Gulmira (Gulmire) Imin, a Uyghur Web site administrator and government employee, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court on April 1, 2010, to life in prison for "splittism, leaking state secrets, and organizing an illegal demonstration." Authorities alleged she was involved in organizing demonstrations that took place in the XUAR on July 5, 2009.
Memetjan Abdulla, a Uyghur journalist and Web site administrator, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court to life in prison on April 1, 2010. The sentence is in apparent connection to an announcement he translated that called on Uyghurs to hold demonstrations in July 2009 and in connection to interviews he gave to foreign journalists.
Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli, Web site administrators, received prison sentences of 10, 5, and 3 years, respectively, in July 2010 for "endangering state security." Sources connected the cases to their Web sites not deleting postings about hardships in the XUAR and, in one instance, permitting the posting of announcements for the July 2009 demonstration.
Nurmemet Yasin, a Uyghur writer, was sentenced by the Bachu (Maralbeshi) County People's Court in Kashgar district to 10 years in prison on February 2, 2005, for "inciting racial hatred or discrimination." (Some sources have reported that the sentence was for "inciting splittism.") He was sentenced after writing a story about a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom.
Tursunjan Hezim, a Uyghur Web site administrator, was sentenced by the Aksu Intermediate People's Court in July 2010 to seven years' imprisonment. Precise charges are not known, but the sentence is in apparent connection to Tursunjan Hezim's Web site on Uyghur history and culture and came during a period in which authorities cast blame on Uyghur Web sites for allegedly contributing to unrest during demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-09-06 ) \| Posted on: 2012-01-24
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Chen Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse

March 11, 2011

Authorities reportedly beat rights defender Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing in their home on February 8 and February 18, 2011. The beatings are believed to be in connection to the couple's recording of video footage in which they spoke of official abuse and restrictive control over the family's home and daily life following Chen's release from prison on September 9, 2010. Officials reportedly have not permitted Chen and Yuan to seek medical care for their injuries. Foreign journalists and a "netizen" who attempted to visit Chen's village in recent weeks reported encountering "groups of violent, plainclothes thugs." Police also reportedly detained several lawyers and rights defenders in Beijing after they met to discuss Chen's case.

Officials Beat Chen Guangcheng and Yuan Weijing

On the evening of February 8, 2011, security officials from Linyi city, Shandong province, and Shuanghou township, Yinan county, Shandong province, reportedly beat self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing, according to a February 10 China Aid Association (CAA) report. The report cited an unnamed source and indicated that the exact time of the beatings was still being confirmed. According to the report, officials may have denied Chen and Yuan access to medical care following the February 8 beatings. On February 18, officials reportedly broke into the family's home and for the second time beat Chen Guangcheng and Yuan Weijing and searched through their belongings, according to a February 21 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group report. Officials reportedly beat Yuan about the face and head. The two reported beatings followed the couple's covert recording of video footage in which they described the official surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and abuse their family has endured since Chen's release from prison after serving his full sentence on September 9, 2010. (CAA released part 1 of the video on its Web site on February 9, and parts 2, 3, 4, and 5 via Youtube.)

Smuggled Video Depicts Harsh Official Treatment

The hour-long video, recorded in secret and smuggled out of the family's home, contains footage of Chen Guangcheng and Yuan Weijing describing the restrictive conditions the family endures under "soft detention" (ruanjin). According to Chen and Yuan, authorities have employed the following measures to exert control over the family:

Tightened surveillance. Authorities reportedly assigned three teams of 22 security personnel to keep watch over the family home. Officials also reportedly installed additional surveillance devices, including floodlights around the family's home that are removed from sight during the daytime, and surveillance cameras trained on their home and nearby street intersections.

Restricted access to communication channels. Authorities reportedly cut off Internet and telephone access in the home and installed equipment in neighboring homes to block the family's cell phone signal.

Restricted movement and access to basic supplies. Officials reportedly place a lock on the family's door at night to prevent them from escaping while those charged with guarding them sleep on the front stoop. Chen said officials have not permitted anyone to enter or leave the home, except for his 76-year-old mother, whom Yuan describes as in poor health. The family, therefore, has limited ability to purchase food and supplies and relies on home-grown produce.

Restrictions involving the couple's children. When Chen and Yuan's young son, Chen Kerui, accidentally injured himself with a kitchen knife while staying at Yuan's parents' home, officials did not permit the couple to visit him in the hospital. In addition, their young daughter, Chen Kesi, reportedly has encountered difficulty attending school.

Prohibited access to medical care. Officials reportedly have prevented Chen Guangcheng from seeking medical care for recurring diarrhea. According to a Chinese Human Rights Defenders report (January 14, 2009) quoting Yuan, Chen developed the ailment while in prison in July 2008 and has since become emaciated and frail.

Restricted privacy. Officials illegally enter the home at will, without notice. Yuan described one instance in which security personnel even followed family members into the restroom.

The couple expressed concern in the video for the treatment they would face in the future. Chen said that, following the video's release, he is prepared for the possibility of officials treating him as they have treated human rights attorney Gao Zhisheng, whose whereabouts remain unknown after his second disappearance in April 2010. Yuan Weijing referred to officials' claims that if the couple remained incompliant, they would treat them "more brutally than in 2005 and 2006." In the video footage, Yuan asked friends to look after their children should something befall the couple.

Foreign Journalists and Supporters of Chen Encounter Police Abuse

Foreign journalists attempting to access Chen "encountered groups of violent, plainclothes thugs" in the dozens who blocked all entrances to the village, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC) said in a February 17 warning on reporting Chen's case. The FCCC said journalists from the New York Times, CNN, Le Monde, Radio France Internationale, and Le Nouvel Observateur were roughed up, threatened with bricks, or had equipment seized or destroyed. CNN released a video on February 16 showing the men pushing one reporter and throwing rocks at the CNN team and their vehicle as they fled the scene. In a February 19 report, the New York Times said that one of the men responded to a question about the legal authority of their actions by saying, "This has nothing to do with law." The FCCC said that journalists notified local police about the situation but received no assistance. Security officials also beat "netizen" Gao Xingbo after he entered Chen's village, according to a February 15 CAA report. Human Rights in China (HRIC) reported on February 16 that police beat and detained Beijing-based lawyer Jiang Tianyong after he met with a group of lawyers, news reporters, and rights defenders to discuss possibilities for assisting Chen Guangcheng. According to HRIC, police also detained lawyer Tang Jitian at his home after attending the meeting and confiscated recorded video of the meeting from the home of another attendee. Police reportedly barred several other lawyers and rights advocates, including Xu Zhiyong, Li Xiongbing, Li Heping, Wang Lihong, Mo Zhixu, Chen Tianshi, and Liu Di from attending the meeting. According to a February 21 Huffington Post report, Tang Jitian's whereabouts remain unknown.

Background on Chen Guangcheng

In 1996, Chen Guangcheng began defending the rights of disabled peasants and providing legal advice as a self-trained legal advocate focusing on antidiscrimination. Over the next decade, his legal advocacy was recognized in China and internationally. In 2005, Chen's rights defense work drew international news media attention to population planning abuses in Linyi city, Shandong province. Local authorities placed Chen under house arrest in September 2005 and formally arrested him in June 2006. The Yinan County People's Court first tried and sentenced Chen in August 2006 to four years and three months in prison for "intentional destruction of property" and "organizing a group of people to disturb traffic order." His defense lawyers were taken into custody on the eve of his trial. The Yinan court retried the case in November 2006 and upheld the first judgment. Chen's retrial prompted repeated criticism for its criminal procedure violations. In June 2007, Chen reportedly informed his wife and brother that he had been beaten by fellow inmates, according to a June 21 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report. In August 2007, Yuan Weijing attempted to travel to the Philippines to accept the Ramon Magsaysay award on behalf of Chen, but Chinese authorities intercepted her before leaving the country and forcibly returned her to her village, according to an August 25, 2007, Washington Post report. During the period of Chen's imprisonment, authorities also repeatedly subjected Yuan and their two children to harassment, home confinement, surveillance, and other abuses, according to reports from journalist and blogger Wang Keqin (March 14, 2009), Amnesty International (April 20, 2009), and Radio Free Asia (April 22, 2009), as well as the testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law and Co-Director , US-Asia Law Institute, New York University, at an August 3, 2010, Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing.

Previous coverage of Chen Guangcheng's case can be found online via the CECC's Virtual Academy. For additional information on Chen and China's population planning policy, see Section II—Population Planning in the CECC 2010 Annual Report. For more information on Chinese official detention, harassment, and abuse of lawyers, see Section II—Criminal Justice and Section III—Access to Justice in the CECC 2010 Annual Report. For more information on freedom of the press in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-02-22 / English) \| Posted on: 2011-12-21
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Leaders of Bipartisan Commission Call on China To Release Human Rights Lawyer, Chen Guangcheng

November 1, 2011

The Chairman and Cochairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China today issued the following joint statement calling for updated information on prominent human rights defender Chen Guangcheng’s condition and calling for Chen’s long overdue release. “It is very troubling to know that for six years, Chen Guangcheng has repeatedly encountered abuse and surveillance from Chinese officials. Recent reports in international media have shown that those who have attempted to visit him have been met with physical attacks and harassment. This and the government’s attempts to deter people from voicing their support for him online are deplorable," said New Jersey Congressman Chris Smith who chairs the Commission.

“The increasing inability to obtain any verified information about Chen’s status has led many to believe that the conditions and treatment for Chen and his wife, Yuan Weijing, who have already endured inexplicably harsh conditions, may actually have gotten worse—if that is possible. The Chinese authorities have gone into overdrive using every restrictive control in their attempt to silence Chen and Yuan. We are gravely concerned about Chen’s status and urge Chinese officials to not only provide the proof that neither he nor his family have been harmed but also set them free. The continued lack of information about their well-being must end,” Smith said.

“We are extremely concerned about the conditions under which Chen Guangcheng and his family are being held by the government. We are also aware of reports indicating that government officials are building a separate facility outside the family’s home, and that they plan to move Chen and his wife into this facility soon for enhanced security. We are especially concerned about the effect this control is having on the entire family, including Chen and Yuan’s young daughter. We join Chinese citizens in demanding immediate transparency and explanation from the Chinese government regarding his case,” said Senator Sherrod Brown, the Cochairman of the Commission.

“In light of the stonewalling on information about Chen and Yuan, as well as the mistreatment they have already suffered, we urge the Chinese government to release Chen Guangcheng and his family from extralegal detention in their home and allow journalists and others to visit them freely,” the U.S. lawmakers said.

In 2005, legal advocate Chen Guangcheng drew international news media attention to population planning abuses in Linyi city, Shandong province. He has also advocated on behalf of farmers, the disabled, and other groups. Local authorities placed Chen under “house arrest” in September 2005 and formally arrested him in June 2006. Following a trial and retrial which prompted repeated criticism for procedural violations, Chen served four years and three months in prison on charges of “intentional destruction of property” and “organizing a group of people to disturb traffic order.”

Authorities released Chen on September 9, 2010, after he completed his sentence, but have continued to extralegally confine him in his home in Dongshigu village outside of Linyi. Since February 2011, reports have emerged indicating that Chen and his wife, Yuan Weijing, have been beaten, locked inside their home, and subjected to round-the-clock surveillance by local public security personnel. Authorities reportedly had also prevented their young daughter from attending primary school until recently. Chen reportedly continues to suffer from an intestinal illness that he contracted while in prison, but has not been permitted to seek medical treatment for it.

Source: -See Summary (2011-11-01 ) \| Posted on: 2011-11-01		more ...
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County Court Convicts Monks of Intentional Homicide for Sheltering Self-Immolation Monk

October 18, 2011

On August 29 and 30, 2011, a county-level court in a Tibetan autonomous area of Sichuan province sentenced three monks to prison terms of 10, 11, and 13 years on charges of "intentional homicide" (PRC Criminal Law, Article 232) in connection with the March 16, 2011, self-immolation of a Kirti Monastery monk, China's state-run media reported. International media and advocacy group reports described the sentenced monks' intentions toward the severely burned monk in terms of rescue, protection, and shelter. If official reports are accurate in that the Ma'erkang County People's Court sentenced the monks, then it appears to be a violation of Article 20 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which requires intermediate level courts to hear trials on criminal charges punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty—a category that includes "intentional homicide." A fourth monk faced charges linked to the incident but had not been sentenced as of October 18, 2011. For more information on the aftermath of the self-immolation at Kirti Monastery, located in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP), see an August 17 CECC analysis.

According to an official media report (Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China Daily), on August 29 the Ma'erkang (Barkham) County People's Court, located in the capital of Aba prefecture, sentenced a Kirti monk named "Drongdru" to 11 years' imprisonment for "intentional homicide" because he allegedly "hid the injured monk and prevented emergency treatment." The verdict, according to the report, asserted that an 11-hour delay in providing emergency medical treatment caused the death of Rigzin Phuntsog (or Phuntsog, according to international media and advocacy group reports). None of the official reports observed by the Commission provided information about evidence proving that Drongdru intended to murder Phuntsog. International media and advocacy groups citing local sources reported in March that when security officials arrived and extinguished the flames burning Phuntsog, they kicked, beat, and threw objects at him (Phayul, 16 March 11; Radio Free Asia (RFA), 17 March 11; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 17 March 11). Reports described the intent of Kirti monks and other Tibetans who took the severely injured monk back to the monastery in terms of rescue (RFA, 16 March 11), protection (Phayul, 16 March 11), and shelter (ICT, 11 April 11). The August 29 Xinhua report did not provide information about the legal proceedings against Drongdru or his access to legal counsel, but asserted that he pleaded guilty and would not appeal the verdict.

On August 30, the same county-level court sentenced monks referred to as "Tsering Tenzin" and "Tenchum" to 13 years and 10 years in prison respectively for the "intentional homicide" of Phuntsog (Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily). According to the report, the court found that the two monks "plotted, instigated and assisted in the self-immolation" of Phuntsog. The same article noted that a fourth monk, "Dorje," would also face criminal prosecution linked to Phuntsog's death. The report provided no information on the evidence against Tsering Tenzin and Tenchum, the legal proceedings against them, or their access to legal counsel, but alleged that both monks had "confessed their guilt." According to an advocacy group report (ICT, 31 August 11), after security officials detained the two monks in March, authorities did not inform their families of their whereabouts or the legal proceedings against them until August 28—two days prior to sentencing. The ICT report did not use the names "Tsering Tenzin" or "Tenchum" and stated that both monks have the same name: "Losang Tenzin" (or Lobsang Tenzin). The families "were given no opportunity" to retain a defense lawyer, the report said, but it is not clear what, if anything, a newly retained lawyer could have accomplished two days prior to sentencing. RFA (30 August 11) referred to the monk sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment as "Tenzin Gyamo-Kha" (instead of Tsering Tenzin) and reported that he "rejected the charges."

According to PRC law, the trials of the monks on charges of "intentional homicide" should not have been heard before a county-level court—instead, the trial should have been heard before the Aba T&QAP Intermediate People's Court. Article 20(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law states, "The Intermediate People's Courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over . . . ordinary criminal cases punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty." Article 232 of the Criminal Law states, "Whoever intentionally commits homicide shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; if the circumstances are relatively minor, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 10 years." Official media reports have provided no information on why trials on charges punishable by the death penalty or life imprisonment were heard before a county-level court. An additional unusual aspect of the trials is that the county court that reportedly tried the cases was not the county court with jurisdiction over the site where the alleged crimes were committed: Kirti Monastery is in Aba, not Ma'erkang, county. The Ma'erkang County People's Court is located in the prefectural capital, along with the Aba T&QAP Intermediate People's Court.

China's state-run media and international media and advocacy groups have provided varying names for the three monks, including those listed below.

Drongdru, sentenced on August 29 to 11 years' imprisonment (Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China Daily): possibly Zhongzhou (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11); Lobsang Tsondru (RFA, 29 August 11); Tsundue (Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), 29 August 11).
Tsering Tenzin, sentenced on August 30 to 13 years' imprisonment (Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily): possibly Zerang Zhade (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11); Lobsang Tenzin and Tsering Gyamo-kha (RFA, 30 August 11); Tsering Tamding (TCHRD, 30 August 11).
Tenchum, sentenced on August 30 to 10 years' imprisonment (Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily): possibly Ladan (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11); Lobsang Tenzin and Nagten (RFA, 30 August 11); Tenzin (TCHRD, 30 August 11). RFA, like ICT (31 August 11), reported that both monks sentenced on August 30 are named Lobsang Tenzin. A conflated form of Lobsang Tenzin can be "Loten," similar to "Ladan."

For more information on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in China, see a previous CECC analysis titled "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures." See sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006 Annual Reports.

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-27 ) \| Posted on: 2011-10-18
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State Council Opinion Bolsters Grazing Ban, Herder Resettlement

October 18, 2011

A new government opinion bolsters longstanding grazing bans on China's grasslands, with a stated goal of improving the environment, and promotes the continued resettlement of herders. The opinion applies to grasslands areas and herding communities throughout China, including several ethnic minority groups such as Mongols, Tibetans, and Kazakhs. Observers have questioned the effectiveness of government grasslands policies in ameliorating environmental degradation and have raised concern about their impact on the rights of herders. The new opinion outlines target dates for meeting environmental and resettlement goals. It follows implementation earlier in the year of a government program to provide subsidies for herders who abide by grazing bans. The opinion also comes after demonstrations in Inner Mongolia in May by Mongols protesting government policies toward grasslands. The opinion calls for promoting the "ethnic culture" of herders, but the impact of this measure remains unclear amid the opinion's broader policy aims.

The State Council has issued an opinion on the development of pastoral areas that bolsters longstanding grazing bans and the resettlement of herders, policies that have drawn concern over the efficacy of their stated environmental aims and for their impact on herding communities, including several ethnic minority groups. The State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas (Opinion), issued in June 2011 but apparently only made public in early August, stresses the importance of the grasslands-related measures for purposes including environmental protection and ecological security; changing modes of animal husbandry on grasslands and increasing herders' incomes; closing gaps in development among regions in China and meeting the goals of realizing a "well-off society" (xiaokang shehui); and "promoting ethnic unity and border stability" (Item 1). The June Opinion follows implementation of a new system in 2011 to bolster grazing bans and provide new subsidies and awards to herders who abide by government directives on grasslands use.

The June Opinion emphasizes the urgency of environmental protection measures. According to the Opinion, the environmental state of grasslands—which comprise over 40 percent of China's territory—remains severe, with "a trend of overall worsening grasslands ecology yet to be fundamentally curbed" (Items 1, 2). The Opinion sets 2015 as a target for curbing a worsening ecosystem and 2020 as the target for achieving a healthy state of the environment and a balance between grasslands and livestock (Item 6). It promotes grazing bans (e.g., Items 7, 11), calls for "gradually promoting" a three-way system of grazing bans, laying fields fallow, and rotating fields, and promotes measures such as decreasing the amount of livestock and erecting fences (Item 11) as means for meeting these goals. It promotes subsidies and awards for herders who abide by directives on grasslands use (Item 9) and calls for "promptly redressing" violations of grazing bans (Item 10).

The Opinion continues longstanding policies (see analysis) to address grasslands degradation through grazing bans and other measures. As noted in the analysis, outside observers and some domestic scholars have questioned the effectiveness of these government policies in ameliorating environmental degradation. At a 2005 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable titled China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does it Protect Minority Rights?, scholar Christopher Atwood stated in his written testimony, "What is beyond doubt is that the almost twenty years of state-directed and scientifically managed programs to alleviate grasslands degradation have not worked and indeed may well have accelerated desertification."

The June Opinion also stresses economic goals, raising questions about the extent to which economic aims may trump long-term environmental protection. Item 17 of the Opinion promotes industry investment and using mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to promote economic cooperation with neighboring countries. A recently reported grazing ban from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region underscores some of the potential economic motives in grazing bans. A recent report from Xinhua (via Sohu, August 2) described the problem of tourists confronting animal feces as one impetus for a grazing ban at a tourist site containing grasslands.

The Opinion continues to promote the resettlement of herders, a policy that has drawn criticism for its impact on the rights of herding communities, including ethnic minority nomadic pastoralists with cultural ties to grasslands. The Opinion calls for "hastening implementation" of resettlement projects for nomadic herders, "basically completing" responsibilities in this area by 2015 (Items 6, 21). It also promotes herders' change in modes of production and change of occupation, along with an "orderly, organized labor export of herders" (Item 19). In addition, the Opinion calls for poverty alleviation and infrastructure improvement for herding communities and steps to promote herders' "material and cultural standard of living," along with "ethnic culture" and "grasslands culture." (Items 5, 16, 23). Authorities describe the promotion of ethnic culture as part of steps to promote the "superior industries" of grasslands areas, however, and it is unclear to what extent authorities can protect herding communities' rights, including the right to culture, while enforcing resettlement and other policy aims. An earlier statement by an official in Xilingol League, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, appeared to acknowledge the threat that resettlement presents to cultural preservation, at the same time as detailing resettlement measures that appear unlikely to promote broad cultural preservation. While describing plans to resettle at least 100,000 herders away from grasslands, the official noted, "A lot of people worry that, if the herder population is moved out, will the culture of pastoral areas be retained? This is still a necessary concern. In the future, Xilingol League's pastoral areas will retain 50,000 herders, and these herders will retain the traditional characteristics of the grassland culture...." See a November 6, 2010, Xinhua report.

As noted in the earlier CECC analysis, human rights organizations have expressed concern about the impact of grasslands policies on the protection of herders' rights and have described cases of forced resettlement, inadequate compensation, minimal recourse for grievances, and poor living conditions for affected communities. Some herders have mounted protests against grasslands policies. In May, Mongols in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region protested government policy toward grasslands use and broader curbs on Mongol culture, following two reported confrontations between grasslands residents and mining operations that resulted in the murders of the grasslands residents. Authorities and official media acknowledged some of the protesters' concerns but did not address broader grievances over official curbs on Mongol culture. The June Opinion calls for prosecuting "misuse" and "destruction" of grasslands as part of measures to increase grasslands "management and supervision," but does not define these acts (Item 10). It also promotes continued resource extraction on grasslands (Item 16).

For more information on conditions for herding communities in China, see Section II—Ethnic Minorities, Section II—The Environment, Section IV—Xinjiang, and Section V—Tibet in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-25 ) \| Posted on: 2011-10-18
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Statement of CECC Chairman Christopher Smith and Cochairman Sherrod Brown on the Release of the 2011 Annual Report

October 13, 2011

The bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China released its 2011 Annual Report on human rights and rule of law developments in China this week.

"In the areas of human rights and rule of law this year, China's leaders have grown more aggressive in their violation of rights, disregarding the very laws and international standards that they claim to uphold," said Congressman Chris Smith (NJ–04), Chairman of the Commission, and Senator Sherrod Brown (OH), Cochairman of the Commission.

The report found that Chinese officials ignored the law or used the law as a tool to repress human rights, stifle dissent, and unfairly subsidize Chinese industry.

"This year saw one of the harshest crackdowns on dissidents in recent memory. Chinese officials simply ignored their own laws and international standards to round up, disappear, and detain numerous human rights activists, artists, and lawyers," said Smith. "Chinese officials also continued to implement its reprehensible population control policy through the use of violence, forced abortion, and sterilization in flagrant disregard for human rights and the rule of law. China's implementation of their one-child-per-couple policy remains one of the most brutal and barbaric attacks against women and children—ever," Smith added.

"As this report shows, China continued to engage in egregious trading practices that place our workers at an unfair disadvantage and which violate China's commitments to the World Trade Organization," Brown said. "These practices include industrial policies and subsidies to protect Chinese companies and exports. We must demand a level playing field where China abides by the rule of law and its international commitments."

The report notes that the Chinese government continued to deny Chinese citizens basic freedoms guaranteed under both Chinese law and international human rights standards, including freedom of expression. The report cited the jailing of Chinese citizens who criticized the government and heavy censorship of the Internet and press.

"It is fitting that this report comes out on the one year anniversary of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Liu is languishing in a jail in China, serving an 11-year sentence for peacefully exercising his right to free expression by writing about and advocating for democratic reforms," Brown said.

"Liu’s case, and the cases of numerous other political prisoners cited in the report, including missing activist Gao Zhisheng, illustrate in stark terms what happens to Chinese citizens who dare to speak out against injustice and corruption," Smith added.

The report found that Chinese officials also continued to deny citizens the freedoms of religion and association.

"Chinese authorities continue to persecute religious people who practiced their faith outside of state control, including Protestant house church members, underground Catholics, and Falun Gong members," Smith said.

"The Chinese government continues to deny workers their right to organize independent unions and to demand a fair wage and better working conditions," Brown said.

The report notes that China's ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans, remain under threat as Chinese authorities imposed harsh curbs on their cultures, languages, and religions.

The CECC's 2011 Annual Report is the Commission's 10th annual report since it was created by Congress in 2000 as part of the debate over granting China permanent, normal trade relations.

The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President. In addition to its annual reports, the Commission maintains an extensive database of political prisoners in China, many of whom are cited in its reports. Political prisoners cited in the 2011 report include Catholic bishop Su Zhimin, labor activist Zhao Dongmin, democracy activist Liu Xianbin, Uyghur journalist Memetjan Abdulla, former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso, and Mongol activist Hada.

All of the Commission's reporting and its Political Prisoner Database are available to the public online via the Commission's Web site, www.cecc.gov

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-13 ) \| Posted on: 2011-10-13
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Xinjiang Authorities Implement Ramadan Curbs Amid Renewed Pledges for Tight Controls Over Religion

October 11, 2011

Authorities in Xinjiang have continued to exert tight controls over the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, which occurred this year in August. During the month-long period of daily fasting, local government authorities prohibited students, teachers, and government workers from observing the fast, ordered restaurants to stay open, and increased oversight of mosques and religious personnel. Xinjiang officials have enforced similar restrictions in previous years. The curbs in 2011 also came amid a renewed pledge by Xinjiang authorities to crack down on "illegal religious activities."

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have continued to exert tight controls over the Muslim holiday of Ramadan. Directives from local governments throughout the region indicate that during the month-long period of daily fasting, authorities prohibited students, teachers, and government workers from observing the fast, ordered restaurants to stay open, and increased oversight of mosques and religious personnel. The Ramadan curbs follow similar controls in place in previous years, as documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) (1, 2, 3).

The curbs also came amid a renewed pledge by XUAR authorities to "strike hard" against "illegal religious activities." At an August 5 meeting, XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian called for "resolutely curbing illegal religious activities," as well as attacking "using religion to instigate and implement violent terrorist activities." See an August 7 Tianshan Net report and Xinhua report, via People's Daily, August 9. The XUAR Public Security Department launched a two-month "strike hard" anti-terrorism campaign later in the month that includes "illegal religious activities" and "religious extremism" as targets. See, e.g., a Xinjiang Legal Daily report, via Xinjiang Peace Net, August 15. The heightened controls follow incidents in Kashgar and Hoten municipalities in July that authorities and official media described as terrorist attacks. See official reporting of the incidents from the Kashgar Municipal People's Government, August 1, and China News Service, July 20, via Open Source Center, CPP20110720075001. For overseas reports, including reported information from witnesses and local sources that contradicts official Chinese reporting of events in Hoten, see, e.g., Radio Free Asia, July 18 and July 19; World Uyghur Congress, July 19; Associated Press, via Times of India, July 20; and Washington Post, August 1. See a previous CECC analysis for background on Chinese government reporting on terrorist activity and see Section II—Freedom of Expression and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report for information on curbs on free press that have hindered efforts to gather information on reported terrorist attacks in the XUAR.

As noted in the CECC 2010 Annual Report, Chinese authorities have long claimed "religious extremism" and "illegal religious activities" as threats to security in the XUAR. They define such terms to encompass religious practices, group affiliations, and viewpoints protected under international human rights guarantees for freedom of religion. Authorities have labeled religious education for children and private religious classes outside of government control as "illegal" activities, for example, and have carried out campaigns against clothing and attire, such as veils, deemed to reflect "extreme" forms of religion. (See, e.g., previous CECC analyses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.) As authorities continue to target "illegal religious activities" and "extremism," recent curbs instituted during Ramadan include:

Students, Teachers Forbidden from Fasting. As XUAR authorities continue to enforce harsh controls over children's freedom of religion, including curbs unseen elsewhere in China, local authorities have described a range of steps to prevent children from observing Ramadan and from participating in other religious activities. "Indulging" or "letting students alone" to fast during Ramadan is among 23 acts defined as "illegal religious activities" in the XUAR. (See Item 5 in a copy of the "Autonomous Region Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities," via the Chinggil (Qinghe) county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, government Web site, posted February 25, 2008.) Authorities also have applied curbs to teachers.

Authorities in Toghraqliq township, Qiemo (Cherchen) county, Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, convened an "ideological education meeting" for students and teachers ahead of Ramadan and called on teachers to regularly visit students' homes and understand their "ideological state," to ensure no students under 18 enter mosques, and to strictly prohibit fasting, according to an August 4 report on the Qiemo County Government Web site (cached). Authorities also called on students to take part in a campaign called "little hands guiding big hands," whereby students convey Party policy to their parents and "contribute their strength" to the township's "social and political stability." Authorities in Mandanbulaq township, Jinghe (Jing) county, Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, visited local elementary schools in advance of the holiday and called for "leading" students not to "participate in religious activities, such as Ramadan and religious services," according to a June 30 report on the Bortala Government Web site. In Bole (Bortala) municipality, Bortala, authorities called for carrying out "propaganda and education" toward Muslim students and for "resolutely stopping" the phenomenon of minor-age Muslim students entering mosques, according to a July 20 report on the Bortala Government Web site. An elementary school in Mekit county, Kashgar district, described plans for holding a meeting to "mobilize" teachers, staff, and students not to fast, according to an August 5 report on the Mekit County Government Web site. (Original link redirects to incorrect site. See a reprint via Uyghur Online.) Authorities also noted plans to carry out education in atheism, according to the report. Authorities in Yengiyer township, Yengisar county, Kashgar district, called for teachers to visit students' homes during Ramadan to convey state policy and provide information on the "harms" of fasting, according to an August 4 report on the Yengisar County Government Web site. They also called for "resolutely examining and putting a stop to" students and teachers participating in "unlawful activities" such as fasting, entering religious venues, and participating in "underground scripture study sites."

Government Workers Barred From Observing Holiday. Authorities have continued to forbid government employees from observing Ramadan, in some cases also imposing curbs on their family members. Authorities at the Yutian (Keriye) County Agricultural Bureau, Hoten district, called for each work unit to strengthen "management" of bureau staff and retired workers and to guarantee they "don't believe in religion, attend religious activities, or fast," according to an August 3 report on the Agricultural Bureau's Web site. They also called for ensuring family members do not "engage in, join, or participate" in "illegal religious activities," participate in "underground scripture study sites," or fast during Ramadan. Authorities also called for work units to send cadres to mosques every day during Ramadan to inspect certain prayer times. At a meeting on upholding stability and safety, the Kashgar District Meteorology Bureau called on all Bureau cadres and staff, "especially Party member cadres," to stress "science" and "civilization," and not join in religious activities like Ramadan, according to an August 4 report on the XUAR Meteorology Bureau Web site. The Kashgar District Agricultural Bureau called for holding "education in atheism" during Ramadan for cadres in the district's bureaus, according to an August 3 report on the Xinjiang Agricultural Department Web site. Authorities in Urumqi reportedly told officials there not to observe the fast in order to preserve their health for work needs, according to a July 28 Radio Free Asia article. The article also reported orders barring Party members and their families from observing Ramadan or going to mosques.

Orders for Restaurants To Stay Open. Some local governments have ordered or pressured restaurants to continue operations during Ramadan, a period when some eating establishments traditionally close during the day. In Jiashi (Peyziwat) county, Kashgar, authorities reported they would inspect restaurants to ensure the "political stability of the county" during Ramadan and not permit "any restaurant to stop operations for any reason," according to a July 28 report on the Jiashi County Government Web site. In Oyyaylaq township, Qiemo, Bayingol, officials reported they would send inspection teams to restaurants and "deal in accordance with regulations" with any eating establishment that closed "without cause," while "severely dealing with" anyone who "forced" others to close, according to an August 5 report on the Qiemo County Government Web site (cached, apparently updated August 10). Authorities in Zepu (Poskam) county, Kashgar, convened a "mobilization meeting" on the "normal operations" for the restaurant industry during Ramadan, according to a July 28 article (cached) on the Zepu County Government Web site. The county head "encouraged" (guli) ethnic minority-run restaurants to continue "normal operations" during Ramadan, pledged tax breaks for restaurants that stayed open, and said authorities would shut down restaurants that "operated irregularly without cause" during Ramadan and revoke their licenses for one year. A September 11 Los Angeles Times report from Kashgar said that local directives led restaurants to make "token gestures" to stay open.

Increased Controls Over Mosques and Religious Personnel. Local authorities have described taking a range of measures to increase supervision of mosques and religious personnel during Ramadan. In Wassheri township, Ruoqiang (Chaqiliq) county, Bayingol, township authorities held a meeting for religious personnel in advance of Ramadan and called on them to convey "propaganda and education" to religious believers, told them to help the Party and government convey the "real truth" and "essence" of the reported attack in Hoten in July, and called on them to maintain vigilance over their own conduct and over religious venues, according to a July 29 report on the Ruoqiang County Government Web site. Authorities also told religious personnel they were responsible for "dissuading" (quanzu) any students, teachers, or Party members found to be fasting and told religious leaders they would be "severely dealt with" if found "inciting" a student to fast. Authorities in Tatirang township, Qiemo, described promoting a range of measures to strengthen control over religious personnel and venues, according to an August 5 report on the Qiemo County Government Web site (cached). Measures included "seriously implementing" a system of fixed contact with religious venues and a system of "chatting and making friends" with religious personnel; strengthening a system of legal responsibility for religious venues; enhancing training of religious personnel; and taking "effective measures" to stop "illegal activities" such as "underground scripture studies," taking on private religious students, and organizing religious activities that go beyond the locality.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR and controls over religion, see Section II—Freedom of Religion and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-08 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2011-10-11
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=163260

Statement of CECC Chairman Christopher Smith and Cochairman Sherrod Brown on Uyghurs Forcibly Returned to China

August 31, 2011

The chairman and cochairman of a US bipartisan, bicameral commission charged with monitoring human rights in China today called on Chinese authorities to reveal the whereabouts and status of 11 Uyghur men who were forcibly deported from Malaysia to the People's Republic of China on August 18, in violation of international law.

The American lawmakers also strongly urged Malaysian authorities not to deport the five Uyghur asylum seekers who were arrested and remain in Malaysian custody.

"Forced returns of Uyghurs to China reflect a blatant disregard for international law, not only by the countries deporting Uyghurs, but by the Chinese government, which is complicit in their return and responsible for egregious rights abuses within its borders," said Congressman Chris Smith (NJ-04), the chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC).

"This most recent incident follows other cases in the past year of Uyghurs returned to China under the sway of Chinese influence in nearby countries. They come as China has increased its economic and political reach throughout Asia, concluding large trade deals or aid packages with countries that have deported Uyghur refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants," said Senator Sherrod Brown (OH) cochair of the commission.

"Tragically, the deported Uyghur men face the real threat of torture, arbitrary detention, and abuse back in China," Brown said. "The Chinese government has long waged a harsh campaign of suppression in Xinjiang that violates international law and it appears to have conscripted its neighbors to help carry out its oppressive policies. These are deliberate, intentional acts and part of a broader set of policies that threaten the Uyghur culture, religion, and language."

"The Chinese government claims compliance with international law, but its actions speak louder than its words. The Chinese government must end its oppressive policies toward the Uyghurs, stop enlisting its neighbors in its campaigns of suppression, respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of the UNHCR, and ensure the fundamental rights and freedoms of all its citizens," Smith said.

Malaysian authorities arrested the group of 16 Uyghurs on August 6. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Kuala Lumpur said that Malaysian authorities did not allow the UNHCR access to any members of the group. The five who remain in Malaysian custody have formally sought asylum with the UNHCR. Information on asylum claims by other members of the group remains unclear. Malaysian authorities allege that all members of the group were involved in a human trafficking ring, charges that do not preclude access to UNHCR procedures or permit deportation to China.

International law mandates that asylum seekers receive a determination of their refugee status and forbids returning any person to a country where she or he faces risk of torture. As documented by the CECC in its Annual Reports, torture and abuse by law enforcement officers remain widespread in China.

The two US lawmakers noted that on August 8, authorities in Pakistan forcibly returned five Uyghurs, including two children, to China. On August 6, authorities in Thailand detained a Uyghur man, Nur Muhammed, and turned him over to Chinese authorities in Bangkok.

CECC Annual Reports have noted worsening human rights conditions in Xinjiang in recent years, as authorities have increased oppressive security campaigns and cracked down on peaceful dissent and independent expressions of Uyghur cultural and religious identity.

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-31 ) \| Posted on: 2011-08-31
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Statement of CECC Chairman Christopher Smith and Cochairman Sherrod Brown on Human Rights Lawyer Gao Zhisheng

August 22, 2011

CECC Chairman Christopher Smith and Cochairman Sherrod Brown call on Chinese authorities to immediately account for and free China's most famous human rights lawyer, Gao Zhisheng.

"China's shocking treatment of Mr. Gao is unconscionable and cannot be reconciled with China's desire for international respect and recognition," said Commission Chairman Representative Chris Smith. "It has now been five years since authorities abducted Mr. Gao on August 15, 2006, escalating their brutal repression of Gao and his family. Since then Mr. Gao has been tortured, threatened with death, sentenced to prison, and forcibly 'disappeared,'" Smith said.

"Mr. Gao has been missing in China since April 2010, with no word as to his health or whereabouts. His wife and two children have fled to the United States. Mr. Gao's life is clearly in danger, and the conspicuous silence only raises more questions about his fate," said Commission Cochairman Senator Sherrod Brown. "These are not the acts of a country based on the rule of law. The Chinese government wants a seat at the table of world powers, but its repression of human rights cannot be tolerated. We cannot turn a blind eye to its brutal repression of those who seek universal rights of freedom and justice."

Under both Chinese and international law, China is obligated to assure Mr. Gao's safety, free him immediately, and let him resume his important work of defending the rights of his fellow citizens.

The Chinese government initially praised the self-trained Gao as one of the country's top lawyers. But he angered authorities when he used the law to defend China's oppressed. A Christian house church member, Mr. Gao represented fellow Christians accused of "illegally" distributing Bibles and reported on government raids of house churches. In a high-profile labor case, Mr. Gao bravely defended workers detained for protesting low wages and poor working conditions. He also documented the torture and abuse of Falun Gong practitioners. In addition, Mr. Gao has advocated on behalf of victims of land expropriation and those harmed by China's population planning policy.

In response, authorities revoked Mr. Gao's law license in 2005. In 2006, they sentenced Mr. Gao to three years in prison on trumped-up "inciting subversion" charges. Authorities suspended the sentence for five years, but their harassment and abuse only worsened.

After Mr. Gao wrote an open letter to the U.S. Congress in 2007 criticizing China's human rights record and hosting of the Olympics, authorities abducted and brutally tortured him for 50 days. Officials reportedly beat him with electric prods, abused him with toothpicks and threatened to kill him if he told anyone of his treatment. Mr. Gao later "disappeared" into official custody, resurfaced briefly in early 2010, and has been missing since April 2010.

"Mr. Gao's plight reflects the dire state of human rights lawyers and activists in China today," said Chairman Smith. "Since the beginning of this year, Chinese officials have launched a major assault on the country's vocal community of rights defenders and activists."

Cochairman Brown added, "The more recent crackdown has defied Chinese and international law. Numerous citizens have been detained, forcibly disappeared, and subjected to every form of abuse and harassment."

Smith and Brown noted that the victims include prominent artist Ai Weiwei, writer and activist Ran Yunfei, democracy activist Zhu Yufu, and rights defense lawyer Ni Yulan. They pointed out that the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances has spoken out against China's abuses as violating international law. Recently, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has declared Gao's detention to be arbitrary and has demanded his release. They also declared that the imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and house arrest of his wife Liu Xia violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In addition to urging for Gao's immediate release, Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown reiterated their call on the Chinese government to "immediately cease its crackdown on rights activists and religious people, to free all political prisoners, and to protect Chinese citizens' fundamental rights to freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, and right to be free from arbitrary detention."

Representative Christopher Smith was recently appointed as Chairman of the CECC and Senator Sherrod Brown was appointed as Cochairman in May.

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-22 ) \| Posted on: 2011-08-22
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=163601

After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and "Education" for Monks; Possible Murder Charges

August 17, 2011

Tibetan Buddhist monks at Kirti Monastery whom officials suspect of assisting or sheltering a monk who committed self-immolation on March 16, 2011, could face criminal charges, possibly for "premeditated murder." China's state-run media characterized the suicide as a "plot" to "incite other monks to create disturbances," but did not acknowledge monastic resentment against increasing government and Party control over Tibetan Buddhist affairs. On April 21, security officials allegedly beat to death two elderly Tibetans and injured others who tried and failed to block People's Armed Police from removing at least 300 Kirti monks from the monastery. Official media reported the next day that the local government would begin immediately "mass legal education" of Kirti monks to maintain what officials described as "normal religious order." The use of enforced confinement (de facto detention) and coerced participation in a program under the pretext of "education" appears to disregard Article 37 of China's Constitution which prohibits "[u]nlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens' freedom of the person by detention or other means." On June 9, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson dismissed a United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances request for information on the monks and asserted that "there was no question of forced disappearances." Kirti Monastery is located near the seat of Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

Chronological Summary of Principal Developments

March 16: Self-immolation. Monk Phuntsog of Kirti Monastery, age 20 or 21 according to international media and advocacy group reports, reportedly set himself on fire at about 4 p.m. on March 16, 2011, near an Aba market area to protest the fatal shooting on the same date in 2008 of at least 10 Tibetans during a protest [and some rioting], according to same-day reports by Radio Free Asia (RFA, 16 March 11), International Campaign for Tibet (ICT, 16 March 11), and Phayul (16 March 11). China's official media cited an Aba county government spokesman who provided the monk's name as Rigzin Phuntsog, his age as 16, and noted that he had "a history of epilepsy" and had become a Kirti monk in 2005 (Xinhua, 17 March 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center). Xinhua did not explain whether officials deemed the alleged "history of epilepsy" to be relevant to the self-immolation. Phuntsog reportedly shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's long life as he burned, and security officials allegedly kicked and beat him as they extinguished the flames (ICT, 17 March 11; RFA 16 March 11, Phayul 16 March 11). Tibetans "intervened and managed to take Phuntsog away from the police" and returned him to the monastery (ICT, 17 March 11). Later that night, monks took Phuntsog to the county hospital after the government gave them "permission" to do so, according to an RFA source (RFA, 17 March 11). China's official media acknowledged "hours of negotiation," but asserted that the government waited for permission from the monks to move Phuntsog (Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). He died at about 3 a.m. on Thursday, March 17, according to media and advocacy group reports (RFA, 17 March 11; ICT, 17 March 11), or "early Thursday morning," according to official media (Xinhua, 17 March 11, reprinted in China Daily). Chinese media cited a hospital official who stated that a post-mortem examination of Phuntsog turned up no evidence of wounds consistent with a police attack on him (Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). After seeking and receiving official permission, on March 18 Kirti management conducted a funeral service and cremation for Phuntsog (ICT, 18 March 11).

March 19-21: More PAP arrive; education on "patriotic religion" starts. On March 19, the day after Phuntsog's cremation, People's Armed Police (PAP) and public security officials began to converge on Kirti in substantial numbers, halted normal monastic activity, and placed the monastery under tight security (RFA, 22 March 11; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), 11 April 11). Security personnel reportedly did not permit monks to leave the monastery’s premises without written permission from monastic and government officials, or to move about the monastery, and allegedly beat monks who did not remain in their rooms. On March 21, provincial-, prefectural-, and county-level Party and government officials launched a political education program in Kirti called "patriotic religion" (RFA 22 March 11).

April 9: Hundreds more PAP; work starts on barbed wire, walls, to seal off monastery. On April 9, approximately 800 additional PAP arrived at Kirti and tightened security further, sealing off traffic access to the monastery and prohibiting most pedestrian entry and exit (RFA, 12 April 11; TCHRD, 11 April 11). PAP manning monastery entrances refused to allow Tibetans to bring in food for the monks (a Buddhist custom toward monks and nuns), reportedly resulting in a food shortage. Authorities directed the installation of barbed wire to seal off portions of the monastery's perimeter that were not already closed, then workers completed construction of a concrete "boundary wall" to prevent entry or exit except at three gates manned by security officials and PAP (Phayul, 19 April 11; ICT, 11 April 11, updated 12 April 11; TCHRD, 11 April 11).

April 12: Decision to send monks aged 18-40 away for "education." On April 12, authorities reportedly announced that monks between the ages of 18 and 40 would be taken from the monastery to other locations to undergo "patriotic education" (ICT, 11 April 11, updated 12 April 11; ICT, 13 April 11; RFA, 14 April 11). Local Tibetans who were aware of the government's intentions rushed to block access to the monastery by "around 40" buses carrying PAP (RFA, 14 April 11; TCHRD, 13 April 11; ICT, 9 May 11). PAP allegedly beat some of the Tibetans and allowed police dogs to attack them, resulting in injuries, but the Tibetans maintained their position and the confrontation ended a few hours later without the PAP buses entering the monastery (RFA, 14 April 11; ICT, 13 April 11; ICT, 11 April 11).

April 21-22: PAP remove 300 monks for "mass legal education." Around 9 p.m. on April 21, PAP and public security officials went from room to room at Kirti and forced at least 300 monks onto buses or trucks that took them to locations that may have been in Wenchuan (Lunggu), Mao (Maowun), and Li (Tashiling) counties in Aba prefecture, and Dujiangyan city in Chengdu municipality (RFA, 22 April 11; ICT, 22 April 11; Phayul, 22 April 11). PAP and police allegedly beat some Tibetans in a group of about 200 who attempted to block removal of the monks from the monastery, resulting in the deaths of 2 elderly Tibetans, serious injuries to some, and brief detention of most of the others. The Aba county police chief later claimed there had been no clash, no injuries, and no deaths (Xinhua, 30 April 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center). On April 22, the Aba County People's Government issued a notice stating that "mass legal education" of Kirti monks would begin immediately in order to maintain "normal religious order" (Xinhua, 22 April 11, 10:04 GMT, translated in OSC; Xinhua, 22 April 11, 13:39 GMT, translated in OSC). The notice included the allegation that some of the Kirti monks "for a long time" had "disturbed the social order," "[damaged] the normal religious order," and "[tarnished] the image of Tibetan Buddhism" by fighting, gambling, drinking, circulating pornography, and using prostitutes (Xinhua, 22 April 11, 10:04 GMT; Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). "Legal education" would compel monks to "study the country's laws and regulations as well as religious disciplines and [precepts]" (Xinhua, 23 April 11). The use of enforced confinement (de facto detention) and coerced participation in a program under the pretext of "education" appear to disregard Article 37 of China's Constitution, which prohibits "[u]nlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens' freedom of the person by detention or other means."

April 22: "Legal experts" say monks linked to self-immolation suspected of "intentional homicide." Concurrent with the start of "legal education," China's state-run media reported that "local legal experts" described two Kirti monks, referred to in Chinese as Zhongzhou and Da'erji and who allegedly delayed Phuntsog's handover to the hospital, as suspects in a case of "intentional homicide" (guyi sharen) (Xinhua, 22 April 11, translated in OSC, 24 April 11), or "premeditated murder" (Xinhua, 23 April 11, reprinted in China Daily). The April 22 Xinhua report linked two additional monks, referred to as Ladan and Zerang Zhade, to the self-immolation. The April 23 Xinhua report described security officials' assessment of the self immolation as "a carefully planned and implemented criminal case, which aimed at triggering disturbances." China's Criminal Law, Article 232, provides a minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment and a maximum punishment of execution for "intentional homicide," and a sentence of 3 to 10 years "if circumstances are relatively minor." Article 233 provides three to seven years in prison for "negligently causing death," but not more than three years "if the circumstances are relatively minor."

June 8-9: MFA dismisses UN concerns over 300 monks’ "disappearance." The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) issued a press release (8 June 11, available on the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Web site) expressing "serious concern" about all persons subjected to enforced disappearance in China, including the 300 monks security personnel allegedly removed from Kirti on April 21. The press release urged the Chinese government to provide information about their "fate and whereabouts" and called on China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. On June 9, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson responding at a scheduled news conference to a question about the Working Group press release asserted that no "forced disappearances" took place at Kirti," according to a BBC report (BBC, 9 June 11). "The relevant local authorities are conducting legal education for the Kirti monastery monks in order to maintain religious order there," the MFA spokesperson said. Based on the BBC report, the spokesperson apparently did not provide any information on the location of the monks, the duration of the "legal education" program, or whether officials kept the monks confined to the program site. The transcript of the press conference (available in Chinese and English on the MFA Web site) did not contain the question about the Kirti monks or the spokesperson's response.

May-June: Some "disappeared" monks from Qinghai sent home. An unknown but substantial number of monks hailing from Qinghai province who were among the 300 monks removed from Kirti and subjected to "legal education" have been returned to their family homes in Qinghai, according to international media and advocacy group reports issued in late May (ICT, 26 May 11) and June (RFA, 16 June 11). Authorities prohibited monks from Yushu (Yulshul) and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in Qinghai from returning to Kirti, took them back to their Qinghai homes, and released them, according to sources cited in the RFA report. Information on their post-release status and activity is not available. A spreadsheet linked to a TCHRD report (10 June 11) listing 161 of the monks reportedly among those forcibly removed from Kirti contains a total of 139 entries of monks with residences in Yushu or Guoluo TAPs. Only 4 of the 161 entries record a residence in Sichuan province. Commission analysis has not confirmed whether or not every entry on the list represents a unique case.

Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures

Source: -See Summary (2011-06-15 ) \| Posted on: 2011-08-17
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=159229

UN Group Calls for Immediate Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia

In May 2011, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued two opinions declaring that the Chinese government's imprisonment of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo and house arrest of his wife Liu Xia contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The opinions call on Chinese officials to immediately release Liu Xiaobo, immediately end Liu Xia's house arrest, and provide reparations to both persons. Freedom Now, a US-based non-profit organization that filed a petition for the opinions with the Working Group, released the opinions to the public in August 2011.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

press release

Liu Xiaobo

2010 Nobel Peace Prize

Liu Xia

filed a petition

Chinese officials contravened Liu Xiaobo's Article 19 right to political free speech.

Chinese officials contravened Liu Xiaobo's Article 10 right to a fair trial and Article 9 right to be free from arbitrary detention.

initially kept Liu under "residential surveillance" in conditions that violated Chinese law

failed to count that period as time served for purposes of his sentence expiration date

generally obstructed Liu's defense

Chinese officials' restrictions on Liu Xia amount to detention and violate Articles 9, 10 and 19.

2010 CECC Annual Report

Source: -See Summary (2011-08-11 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2011-08-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=163369

Official Repression of Religion Continues in Xinjiang

Official repression of religion in Xinjiang remains severe. Authorities continue to claim that "illegal religious activities" and "religious extremism" constitute threats to the region's security. Officials have singled out Islamic practices in a number of cases and have maintained a range of curbs over Muslims' religious activities. Recent reports describe continuing campaigns against head scarves, measures to monitor Friday sermons at mosques, and reported imprisonment of a religious leader who refused to abide by government demands regarding a local mosque.

Xinhua

report

Campaign Against "Illegal Religious Activities" in Aksu Township

report

codes of conduct

Campaigns Against Veiling and Beards

yifa yancheng

Monitoring Sermons

report

monitoring mosques and sermons

Continued Oversight of Women Religious Specialists

büwi

March 15

March 30

büwi

Prison Sentences and Detentions in Shihezi

Source: -See Summary (2011-05-18 ) \| Posted on: 2011-07-12
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Authorities Release Prominent Rights Advocate Hu Jia Upon Completion of His Sentence

On June 26, 2011, authorities released Hu Jia from prison upon completion of his three-and-a-half year sentence. Hu has been an active advocate on issues including environmental protection, HIV/AIDS, and freedom of expression and movement. He has also expressed public support for rights defenders, including Chen Guangcheng and Guo Feixiong. He was sentenced in 2008 for "inciting subversion of state power." During his time in prison, authorities refused multiple requests for his medical parole. Hu is now home with his wife, Zeng Jinyan, in Beijing and reportedly remains under tight official surveillance.

Hu Jia's Release

Hu Jia

26 June 11

Twitter

Prior Advocacy Efforts and Official Harassment

Guo Feixiong

Chen Guangcheng

Sakaharov Prize

In August 2005, Hu reported that authorities beat him and placed him under house arrest during visits by top United Nations and European Union officials.

In November 2005, authorities reportedly detained Hu when he attempted to deliver a petition to Vice Premier Wu Yi at an AIDS conference in Henan province.

In January 2006, authorities placed Hu under surveillance and house arrest and then "disappeared" him until March 28.

Starting in July 2006, authorities held Hu and Zeng Jinyan under house arrest for at least six months. The couple documented the tight surveillance measures in a home video distributed widely on the Internet.

In May 2007, authorities again placed Hu and Zeng under house arrest following their attempt to leave the country, as documented in a May 21, 2007, Human Rights Watch report.

While Hu remained in official custody, authorities continued to subject Zeng and their young daughter to ongoing surveillance and periodic home confinement, in addition to physically harassing and "disappearing" Zeng while Hu remained in official custody, according to Zeng's blog, in addition to reports from Global Voices Advocacy (1 June 08), Chinese Human Rights Defenders (9 August 08), Telegraph (21 February 09), and Agence France-Presse (via Google, 19 November 09, 9 December 10).

Hu Jia's Imprisonment

Political Prisoner Database

Source: -See Summary (2011-06-30 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2011-07-01
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=161667

Beijing Authorities Harass and Detain Shouwang Church Members

Beginning on April 9, 2011, public security officials in Beijing frequently harassed, detained, and restricted the freedom of movement of some members and leaders of the unregistered Beijing Shouwang Church in response to the church's efforts to organize outdoor services every Sunday in Beijing's Haidian district. Shouwang began organizing the services after authorities reportedly pressured its landlords to deny the church access to indoor sites of worship where it had previously met or planned to meet. In one instance, according to overseas reports, uniformed and plainclothes police took into custody over 160 Shouwang members, including clergy. Between April 10 and May 15, authorities reportedly placed a total of approximately 500 members and church leaders under "soft detention" (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home confinement. As of June 5, authorities had taken Shouwang members into custody in connection with nine outdoor services. The incidents of harassment and detention occurred during a time when authorities' sensitivities to members of unregistered Protestant congregations who assemble into large groups or across congregations appeared to have increased, as well as during a broader crackdown against rights defenders, petitioners, artists, Internet bloggers, and others that began in mid-February 2011.

Beijing Authorities Take Into Custody, Confine to Their Homes Congregants and Church Leaders