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The accusations against him are connected to essays he published on his Web site about the protests in Tibet [in 2008], and related to information he disclosed to the outside world about the suppression of Tibetans during the protests and the detention of monks at monasteries by People's Armed Police, etc. These essays on his site have already been deleted. He is charged with "divulging state secrets."

• In June 2009, the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee reviewed a draft revision of the PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets (State Secrets Law) and the NPC released the draft for public comment, but the proposed changes do not address abuses that occur under the current state secrets legal framework. Currently, the broad and vague definition of ''state secrets'' in Chinese law and regulations gives officials wide latitude to declare almost any information a state secret.
  
  
• [Police] can declare that a case involves state secrets to deny criminal defendants basic procedural rights, including access to counsel and an open trial. Citizens cannot challenge such a determination and officials may declare information a state secret retroactively.

During [2008's] "Tibet incident", [Konchog Tsephel and Kunga Tsayang] themselves witnessed how their fellow countrymen of their hometown determinedly took to the streets and voiced their opposition. The two writers revealed their aspirations and discussed facts on the internet, which then unexpectedly became the reason for them becoming criminals accused of jeopardising "state security" and revealing "state secrets". In other words, one could say that the country's action of using its power to suppress the violent behaviour of the opposing masses belongs to the category of secret which is often practiced but never spoken of.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133098

• "strengthen the building of grassroots democracy, research the adoption of the documentation system and other methods, vigorously develop community-based social organizations, enhance the ability of communities to self-govern" (Item 4 in section of Agreement marked "Content of Agreement").



• "Unless other regulations specify otherwise, explore establishing a system whereby civil society organizations apply and register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The Ministry of Civil Affairs shall regard this as a point for observation, tracking, and research" (Item 11).



• "Ministry of Civil Affairs will consult with relevant departments regarding the transfer of administrative and registration jurisdiction over foreign foundations with representative offices in Shenzhen to the Shenzhen municipal government, authorize the city of Shenzhen to launch a pilot project regarding the registration and management of foundations, chambers of commerce, and trans-provincial trade associations" (Item 12).



• "promote the transfer of government functions for public services that social organizations are capable of undertaking, especially newly increased public services; government procurement services, delegation or contracting of responsibilities, and other methods can be adopted—[in order to] support the provision of public services by social organizations" (Item 14).



• "accelerate the establishment of a legal incorporation management system for charitable organizations, increase the public creditability of charitable organizations, explore the creation of a system that can effectively link, and to a moderate degree separate, the collection, use, and supervision of charitable funds, [and] move forward on constructing the standardization of charitable groups" (Item 27).

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135081

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered—combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web—have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all.

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05		more ...
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• Subsidies for farmers to buy minivans or light goods vehicles (Article 2),


• Subsidies for scrapping old vehicles (Article 3),


• Allocation of 10 billion yuan from the central government for development of technology (Article 9), and


• Subsidies for a national fuel-efficient and new-energy vehicle demonstration project (Article 10).

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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Source: -See Summary (2010-01-15 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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• Liu was denied the right to hire the attorney of his choice. After Liu's arrest, officials barred Mo Shaoping from representing Liu because Mo was a fellow signatory of Charter 08.


• Liu's defense attorneys were denied the right to present their opinions to prosecutors before the indictment was issued, as required by law, and were not given adequate time to prepare for trial.


• Officials barred Liu's wife and foreign diplomats from attending the December 23 trial, according to a December 25 CHRD report.


• Judges reportedly limited Liu's defense lawyers to less than 20 minutes to present their arguments for Liu's innocence, according to the December 25 CHRD report. The report also said that the presiding judge cut Liu off while he was delivering his prepared statement, preventing him from finishing his remarks.


• No witnesses appeared in court, a common occurrence in China. Most criminal cases proceed solely on the basis of written witness statements for the prosecution, leaving the defense with no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and challenge such statements. (See p. 106 of the CECC 2009 Annual Report.) According to the trial court judgment, there were 11 witnesses for the prosecution, including Liu's wife. The other 10 were human rights activists who allegedly participated in Charter 08. At least one witness has denied making the statements that the prosecution had attributed to him. In a December 25 statement published on CHRD's Web site, prominent intellectual Zhang Zuhua said he never told police that Liu had published Charter 08 on overseas Web sites, pointing out that both he and Liu had been apprehended by authorities before the charter was released online. "How could I have said that 'Liu Xiaobo posted Charter 08 on foreign Web sites'? Clearly, this characterization has no basis," Zhang said. Another witness, human rights defender Teng Biao, said in a December 26 essay (via Boxun) that the statements from his police interrogation cited in the court judgment were not relevant since he had never mentioned Liu Xiaobo. Teng noted that in his experience authorities often cited family and friends as witnesses not for evidentiary purposes, but rather to sow discord among them and to raise suspicions about the moral character and integrity of the "witnesses."

• "We Are Willing To Share Responsibility with Liu Xiaobo" (December 10 statement from Chinese citizens who co-drafted or signed Charter 08, via Independent Chinese Pen Center)


• Online Yellow Ribbon Campaign (see December 23 Radio Free Asia article)


• "The Dirtiest of Political Trials" (December 23 statement by Ding Zilin, leader of the Tiananmen Mothers, translated by Human Rights in China)


• U.S. State Department (December 24 Statement by Mark Toner, Acting Spokesman) - "[W]e call on the Government of China to release him immediately and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens to peacefully express their political views."


• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay (December 25 Remarks via UN News Centre) - "The conviction and extremely harsh sentencing of Liu Xiaobo mark a further severe restriction on the scope of freedom of expression in China."


• European Union Presidency (Undated Statement on the Sentencing of Liu Xiaobo) - "The verdict against Mr Liu gives rise to concern with respect to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial in China."


• Former Czech President Vaclev Havel (January 6 Letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao, which Havel attempted to deliver to Chinese Embassy in Prague, as reprinted in the Washington Post) - "There is nothing subversive to state security or damaging to future prosperity when citizens act guided by their own will and according to their best knowledge and conscience, when they associate among themselves to discuss and express peacefully their concerns and visions about the future development of their society."


• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin (December 23)

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-14 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134546

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-11 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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Source: -See Summary (2010-01-07 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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• Envisions the development of automotive technology, both through indigenous innovation and by studying international cutting-edge technology (Articles 7 to 12). The policy refers to support for technology to lower emissions, raise fuel-efficiency, produce hybrid and electric vehicles, use new vehicle materials, and use alternative fuels.


• Lays out a framework for the structural adjustment of the auto sector. This is done through the creation of large auto enterprise groups and alliances, and international cooperation to broaden the scope of operations and cope with globalization (Articles 13 to 16). Provides for "an exit mechanism" for companies that cannot compete (Article 17).


• Lays out detailed investment approval procedures and requirements (Articles 40 to 51). These cover government approval of various categories of auto or auto parts companies, establishment of automotive research and development centers, and foreign shareholding ratio restrictions applicable to foreign investment in the sector.


• Encourages the growth of private automobile consumption, and sets standards (Articles 56 to 69). These standards include a range of regulations to facilitate and encourage auto purchases, such as regulations on types of vehicles, toll road charges, fees, auto finance, the second-hand market, insurance premiums, and construction of parking lots.


• Additional miscellaneous provisions. These include, for example, provisions on technical standards, trademarks and branding, sales and service networks, import restrictions, and support from other industries, such as metallurgy and electronics.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133273

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-28 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-17 / Chinese) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
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• Chinese regulations that expressly prohibit foreign investment in businesses that import reading materials, AVHE products, or sound recordings, as well as regulations that give the Chinese government discretion to determine who may import reading materials, AVHE products, sound recordings, and films into China. For example, Articles X(2) and X(3) of the Catalogue of Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries prohibit foreign investment in the "business of… importing of books, newspaper and periodical" and the "business of… importing of audio and visual products and electronic publications." The Panel found that these provisions violate commitments in the Chinese government's Protocol of Accession to the WTO (Protocol) and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (Working Party Report) that require China to permit all enterprises in China and foreign enterprises and individuals to import and export all goods (with some limited exceptions) to and from China by December 2004. In addition, the Panel found other regulations that violate commitments in the Protocol and the Working Party Report. Examples include Articles 41 and 42 of the Regulation on the Administration of Publishing, which require companies that import publications into China to be Chinese wholly state-owned enterprises, and Article 30 of the Regulations Regarding Management of Films, which gives the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television discretionary authority to decide who can import films.

• Chinese regulations that restrict the ability of wholly foreign-owned enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint ventures to distribute reading materials, AVHE products, and sound recordings within China. For example, the Panel found that Article 8(4) of the Rules for the Management of Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures for the Distribution of Audiovisual Products, which stipulates that the Chinese partner in a Chinese-foreign joint venture distributor of audiovisual products must be the majority shareholder, violates national treatment provisions in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Article XVI:2(f) of the GATS prohibits parties to the GATS from putting ceilings on the percentage or total value of foreign investment. The Panel also cited other regulations expressly prohibiting foreign investors from engaging in the distribution of the products in question, such as Article 4 of the Several Opinions on the Introduction of Foreign Capital Into the Cultural Sector, which prohibits foreign investors from distributing publications or audiovisual products within China.

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-27 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129022

• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin (12/23/09)
• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-05 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133838

• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133614

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-30 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
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• "The Chinese Communist Party's Dictatorial Patriotism" (October 3, 2005, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu argues that the source of a nation's sovereignty is its people and that the government and ruling party are servants of the nation. Therefore, Liu argues, in order for a government to be truly patriotic, it must respect its people and their right to peacefully criticize and oppose their government. Dictatorships, however, according to Liu, pay lip service to patriotism but do not respect or love the main component of a nation—its people.


• "Can It Be That the Chinese People Are Only Suited To Accepting 'Party-ruled Democracy'?" (January 6, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu critiques the 2005 government white paper Building of Political Democracy in China (via Xinhua) and criticizes its claim that it places authority in the people; instead Liu coins the term "party-ruled democracy" to describe the Chinese Communist Party's dictatorship and approach toward democracy. Liu also discusses recent history including the Chinese government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.


• "Changing State Power Through Changing Society" (February 26, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu discusses how societal changes in the post-Mao era in the relationship between citizens and the state has improved prospects for political reform and urges a gradual, non-violent approach in the pursuit of a liberal democracy.


• "The Multi-faceted Dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party" (March 13, 2006, originally on Observechina.net, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu discusses how the Communist Party has maintained political control, despite the sudden decline in the popularity of the Party's ideology after the events of June 1989, by appealing to the economic self-interests of elites, business people, and officials and entangling them in corruption, bribery, and tax evasion which "autocrats" can use to punish them at any time.


• "The Negative Effects of the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party on Democratization in the World" (May 6, 2006, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu calls the Chinese Communist Party one of the largest obstacles to democratization around the world for, among other things, using the prospect of energy cooperation to build closer relations with Iran and other countries that oppose the United States and the West, using "dollar diplomacy" to extract political concessions from free countries in Europe, and pressuring American companies to restrict freedom of expression to gain access to the Chinese market.


• "Continuing Questions with Regard to the Black Kiln Child Slave Incident" (July 16, 2007, posted on Human Rights in China's Web site) - Liu questions the official handling of a 2007 scandal in which children were sold to work in brick kilns in Shanxi province, calling officials "cold-blooded and brazen."

• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-22 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133497

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-17 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
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• In February 2009, authorities attempted to prevent Dr. Gao Yaojie from meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, according to Dr. Gao's written statement for a December 3 Commission roundtable. Authorities cut her telephone line in May following news that she was to receive a French human rights award for women, according to a November 29 ChinaAid statement. Dr. Gao left China for the United States in August, hoping to find a "peaceful environment" in which to finish her three books and reveal "the truth about the AIDS epidemic in China," according to the statement.


• On August 4, Asia Catalyst reported that Chinese police seized the passport of an unnamed Chinese AIDS advocate and prevented him from leaving the country to attend the International Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, to which he was invited by UNAIDS. According to the report, he was warned that if he spoke to the media and international organizations, he would "face the same fate as Hu Jia."


• HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a three-and-a-half year prison sentence for "inciting subversion of state power." He is expected to be released on December 17, 2011. On November 17, 2009, Hu's wife Zeng Jinyan reported on her blog that she and her daughter were still under "soft detention" in their home, and were being monitored by seven or eight domestic security protection officials sitting outside the building.


• On December 2, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that Beijing authorities detained Henan activist Tian Xi, who reportedly was infected with HIV in 1996 through a hospital blood transfusion, after he unfurled a banner outside of the Ministry of Health on November 19. Officials then forcibly returned him to his home in Gulu township, Xincai county, Henan province, where he remains under 24-hour surveillance, according to the report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133285

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-07 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
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• Article 34 includes language similar to that reported in the June draft, stating that "no organization or individual may lure or force minors to participate in religious activities" and that they "may not use religion to carry out activities to obstruct compulsory education." The regulation lacks criteria for determining what acts constitutes "luring" or "force," leaving latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that conflicts with "the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions," as defined in the ICCPR.
• Article 48 also contains language similar to that in the June draft, stating that where minors are "lured" or "forced" into such activities, they "can ask for protection from schools, neighborhood committees, village committees, offices for the protection of minors, or public security organs," and such "organizations or work units receiving requests for help must take measures in a timely manner and not refuse or shift responsibility."
• Article 53 contains the regulation's final mention of religion. It stipulates that where "any organization or individual lures or forces a minor to participate in religious activities" in violation of Article 34, the controlling agency will give "criticism and education" and "order the situation to be amended." In addition, public security organs will give administrative punishment "in accordance with law" in cases of violations of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which includes the possibility of short-term detention. The 1993 XUAR Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection of Minors did not specify penalties for violations of its religion-related provisions.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-27 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132578

Last year, on the eve of Human Rights Day, which is observed each year on December 10th, 303 Chinese citizens—including scholars, writers, lawyers, and activists—issued on the Internet Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. Liu Xiaobo, a prominent intellectual and dissident who signed Charter 08, was detained the night before the document was released. In June 2009, authorities formally arrested Liu for "inciting subversion." Earlier this month, the police forwarded the case to prosecutors, almost a year after he was taken into custody. Many of the other original signers of Charter 08 (which has since garnered over 10,000 signatures within and outside China) have been subjected to harassment, surveillance, and unlawful house arrest. Chinese authorities have blocked Charter 08, and any reference to it, on the Internet.

Human Rights Day commemorates the anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. China voted to adopt the UDHR in 1948, and the current Chinese government has committed itself to protecting the fundamental human rights that are enshrined in the UDHR through international agreements and its own domestic law. In April 2009, the Chinese government reaffirmed this commitment in its first-ever National Human Rights Action Plan.

As detailed in this Commission's 2009 Annual Report, there were many setbacks for rule of law and human rights in China during this past year. In addition to the crackdown on Charter 08 signers, the persecution of human rights lawyers, including Jiang Tianyong and others, reached an unprecedented level; authorities have revoked or suspended the licenses of numerous human rights lawyers and many face ongoing persecution and harassment. Ten months after his disappearance, lawyer Gao Zhisheng remains missing. Petitioners continue to be detained and abused in illegal "black jails." The trials of people—mostly Uyghurs—charged with crimes committed during unrest in Xinjiang in July have been marked by violations of international standards for due process including judges selected for "political reliability" and curbs on defendants' right to independent counsel. The Chinese government continues to suppress civil society initiatives and freedom of expression. For their efforts to advocate peacefully for parents of schoolchildren killed in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, authorities put Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren on trial for endangering national security; Huang Qi recently was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of three years for "illegal possession of state secrets." The cases of over 1,200 of the many political and religious prisoners who are being held in China's jails and prisons today are documented in the Commission's publicly accessible Political Prisoner Database.

On Human Rights Day 2009, this Commission calls on the Chinese government to cease the harassment, control, and arbitrary detention of Chinese citizens who engage in peaceful advocacy for their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other international human rights instruments, and China's own Constitution and laws.


Human Rights Day 2008

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-10
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Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133112

• Agriculture. China said it would allow imports of U.S. pork and live swine. These had been banned starting in May 2009 because of swine flu. It is not clear how great an impact this commitment will have on U.S. exports to China which, according to industry, as reported in the October 30 Wall Street Journal, had been growing before the ban. Since the ban was imposed the Chinese have ramped up the domestic industry.
• Clean tech. Access to China's market for foreign wind turbines had been largely restricted for foreign manufacturers. China agreed to allow greater access by removing a 2007 local content requirement for wind turbines, according to an October 30 China Daily report. This commitment was somewhat overshadowed by news of a large wind energy project in Texas that, according to a report in the November 1, 2009 New York Times, will use wind turbines manufactured in China, providing roughly 2000 jobs for Chinese workers.
• Government procurement. China made some commitments concerning government procurement, which has been largely closed to foreign companies as well as companies in China that have foreign investors. China agreed to treat products of these foreign-invested companies the same as products of domestically-owned companies. Further, China agreed to submit a revised offer to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) by early in 2010. The 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 JCCTs had also included commitments concerning China's joining the GPA.
• IPR. Every JCCT since 2004 has included commitments by China to improve its IPR protection in light of rampant piracy in China. These commitments have ranged from the general, such as China's commitment at the 2004 JCCT to significantly reduce levels of infringement and make greater use of criminal penalties, to the specific, such as the 2005 commitment to post an IPR ombudsman at the Chinese embassy in Washington DC. This year, according to the USTR fact sheet, the Chinese gave some general assurances concerning Internet piracy and encouraging the protection of certain types of publications at public libraries, and agreed to work with the U.S. to address certain IPR issues.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131919

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-28 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133127

• calling on journalists to follow the "correct" political orientation and to maintain complete consistency with the Party's Central Committee.
• noting that in the past 60 years China's news media has played an important role in supporting the Party as it led China through socialist revolution and socialist modernization.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-24 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132226

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132273

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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• Zhu claimed that the Dalai Lama broke off talks with China twice in November 2008 and demanded an explanation before talks could resume. "If the Dalai Lama side really intends to continue talks, he must first well explain why he cut off the talks twice last year, especially what they did on the second occasion." Zhu's remark about "the second occasion" refers to an unusual meeting of Tibetan political, religious, educational, cultural, and community leaders living outside of China. The meeting was convened in India to "hold an extensive discussion and debate with regard to the Tibetan cause in the light of recent emergency events in Tibet and the international scenario," according to a November 22, 2008, Tibetan government-in-exile (TGiE) report. The meeting participants adopted a set of recommendations urging, among other things, that Tibetans "follow the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama based on the prevailing situation." The recommendation also observed that "views to stop sending envoys and to pursue complete independence or self-determination if no result comes out in the near future were also strongly expressed," the TGiE report said. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari, a meeting participant, referred to the eighth round of dialogue that had concluded on November 5 and said, "As far as our task is concerned, it has certainly come to a crucial stage. We did not even talk about future meetings," according to a November 21 Reuters report. The Commission has not observed any reports of statements by the Dalai Lama or his representatives asserting that they had "cut off the talks." [See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the current status of discussions between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives.]
  
  
• Zhu asserted that the Dalai Lama should restrain his international travel because "such activities . . . disturbed the central government and were detrimental to friendly relations between China and relevant countries." Zhu's demand that the Dalai Lama curtail international travel is consistent with recent Party and government statements pointing to what Chinese state-run media has described as an emerging "China doctrine" (China Daily, 12 March 09) that would pressure countries "cultivating ties with China" to deny entry to the Dalai Lama. The China Daily article referred to a March 7, 2009, news conference where, according to a China Central Television report the same day (translated in OSC, 10 March 09), Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi said: "In handling their relations with China, no country in the world should allow Dalai to pay visits or use their territory to engage in separatist activities. That should be within the norms of international relations, not a so-called special favor to China." [See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the Chinese government's shift toward a more aggressive international policy on the Tibet issue.]

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-03 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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That I have been arbitrarily prohibited from returning to China and my home after traveling abroad—this is a threat to all Chinese citizens. My misfortune is something that every Chinese person could experience. In the past, others have experienced this misfortune, now it is my turn; if there is someone the leaders are dissatisfied with, then tomorrow that person will meet the same fate. Moreover, based on my experience of having tried seven times to return to China, I've realized this: the Chinese government's unlawful measures in prohibiting its own country's citizens from returning home not only harm Chinese citizens, but in the end, the Chinese government's own dignity and reputation is also harmed.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-02 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
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• In 2005, authorities in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, began requiring Internet chatrooms, bulletin boards, news groups, and instant messaging systems to implement a real name system as part of an Internet "purification and rectification" initiative.


• As noted in the Commission's 2007 Annual Report, the Internet Society of China, a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, attempted to implement a policy that would have required all bloggers to register with their real names. The government backed away from the plan after Internet companies resisted the plan, arguing that the system would be impossible to implement. According to a May 22, 2007, Xinhua article, a Chinese blogger said that the risk of being identified would discourage bloggers from reporting the truth.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-10 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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(1) endanger state security or harm national and social interests; (2) destroy ethnic unity, incite ethnic separatism, or endanger social stability; (3) endanger the safety of the Internet and information systems; (4) violate intellectual property rights, trade secrets, or the lawful rights and interests of individual privacy, citizens, corporations, or other groups; (5) furnish, produce, or disseminate false or harmful information; (6) produce or disseminate information that is obscene, pornographic, violent, terrorist, homicidal, or that instigates crime; and (7) carry out other acts prohibited in laws and regulations.

Source: -See Summary (2009-10-13 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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• Recognizing a "Positive Role" for Religious Communities. The amended Jiangsu RRA states in Article 1 that the regulation was drafted in part to "bring into play the positive role of public figures from religious circles and lay believers in the promotion of social and economic development," apparently the first regulation to include such language since high-level Communist Party officials and statements began to articulate a "positive role" for religious communities. Article 5 of the Hubei regulation also includes similar language. Despite articulating a "positive role" for religious communities, authorities have used the sentiment to bolster support for state goals more so than to accept and protect religious life within Chinese society. See the CECC 2009 Annual Report for more information.
• China's Five Recognized Religions. Article 2 of the Jiangsu RRA, retained under the amendments, defines religion to mean only the five religions recognized by the Chinese government: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The article is similar to provisions in some other provincial-level regulations. Like the national RRA, neither the older 2001 Hubei regulation, the new Hubei RRA, nor the Hainan provisions include specific mention of the five groups, which conceivably could create space for local innovations in accommodating other religions. See CECC analyses on other provincial-level regulations (1, 2) for more information.
• Religious Activities in the Home. Similar to other recent regulations, Article 14 of the Jiangsu RRA states that religious activities are to be held at registered venues, and Article 19 of the Hubei RRA states that "in general" they are to be held in such venues. Article 11 of the Hainan provisions similarly provides that religious citizens can carry out religious activities in registered venues but also stipulates that they can "live a religious life within one's home," language on worship at home similar to a number of other recent regulations on religious affairs. Language on worship at home carries potential significance for groups of people who want to gather in private residences, outside of state-controlled venues, to hold worship services. As discussed in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, the Chinese government states there are no registration requirements for religious gatherings within the home, but continues to target some private religious gatherings for closure. For more information, see CECC analyses of other provincial-level regulations (1, 2).
• Property Protections. Compared to the 2002 version of the regulation, the amended Jiangsu RRA appears to refine and possibly increase property protections for venues for religious activities. Article 32 (revised from Article 30 in the 2002 regulation) lends more specificity to the circumstances in which local governments may demolish religious property and adds more specificity to the process for compensating religious groups. In addition, newly added Article 43 outlines steps including the possibility of criminal liability for people who violate Article 32 and demolish religious property without permission.
• More Specificity, New Deadlines for Official Actions. Some provisions in the new or amended pieces of legislation add specificity to older provisions or clarify them by specifying time limits for officials to make decisions that affect religious communities. See, e.g., Articles 19 and 23 (previously Article 22) of the Jiangsu RRA. Articles 14 and 15 of the Hubei RRA lend more specificity, consistent with the national RRA, to the process of establishing and registering venues for religious activity. For various provisions in the Hainan provisions (some without counterparts in the older regulation) that add time limits for official decisions, see, e.g., Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, and 13.
• Increased Controls. By introducing more clarity, the regulations also articulate more explicit controls in some cases. For example, the older Hubei regulation provided only a limited number of restrictions on the activities of religious personnel (See Article 7). The new regulation, in contrast, contains 6 articles (Articles 30-35) governing a wider scope of their activities. Some articles include new benefits—like the provision of insurance (Article 34)—but taken as a whole, the articles spell out more controls over the activities and qualifications of religious personnel. The Hainan provisions similarly articulate limits on religious personnel's cross-provincial movement (Article 10) missing from the older regulation.
• Penalties Changed. Article 41 (previously Article 38) of the Jiangsu regulation adds to and refines a list of activities that may meet with official sanction, such as religious personnel leading religious activities before their status has been put on file. Whereas under the 2002 regulation such activity could be fined, however, the new revisions only specify that religious affairs bureaus order the activities to stop. (Other articles in the amended Jiangsu RRA continue to specify fines and other penalties.) The 1997 Hainan regulation lacked provisions on liability. In contrast, the new provisions spell out both penalties for officials who abuse their power (Article 21) as well as for citizens or religious organizations that violate the provisions (Articles 22-27).

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-24 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-11-12 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
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Source: -See Summary (2009-09-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-09-02 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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• The court reportedly rejected requests by Tan's lawyers to call three witnesses, including Ai Weiwei, a noted artist and blogger who helped design the Beijing Olympics' Bird's Nest Stadium and was investigating the deaths of students in the quake, according to the China Daily article, a second August 13 CHRD article, and an August 12 Human Rights in China (HRIC) report. Ai told various news agencies that he planned to still watch the trial but that police came to his hotel and prevented him and 10 other volunteers from leaving until after the trial ended (see, e.g., August 12 Reuters article, August 12 Guardian article). Ai also indicated that police had used force in the process, including striking him in the face.
• Tan's lawyers, Pu Zhiqiang and Xia Lin, reported that the judge frequently cut them off during the trial and that their request to show video evidence was not accepted, according to the China Daily and second CHRD articles.
• Parents of earthquake victims attempting to attend the trial were detained, according to an August 13 Global Times article.
• The court did not allow reporters into the court, according to the China Daily article. Police reportedly searched the hotel rooms of two Hong Kong reporters attempting to cover the case, claiming that they were acting on reports that the journalists possessed drugs, and did not free them until seven hours later, according to an August 13 Agence France-Presse article (via The Australian).
• Police barred hundreds of supporters from entering the courtroom saying the supporters needed passes, even though court officials earlier had told them that no passes were necessary, according to an August 12 CHRD report.

• Protect Huang Qi's and Tan Zuoren's rights to freedom of speech, expression, and association. Based on the published reports about these cases, Huang and Tan engaged in peaceful activities that are guaranteed under China's Constitution and international law. Specifically:
  • China's Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of speech and association (Article 35) and the right to criticize officials (Article 41).
  • The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and expressed an intent to ratify, guarantee all individuals the right to freedom of expression (Article 19) and association (Article 22 for ICCPR, Article 20 for UDHR).

• Allow parents, concerned citizens, and the news media to conduct their own investigations into the role shoddy construction may have played in the school collapses, free from harassment and official interference. China has pledged to protect such activities in its National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), which says "the state will guarantee citizens' rights to criticize, give advice to, complain of, and accuse state organs and civil servants, and give full play to the role of mass organizations, social organizations and the news media in supervising state organs and civil servants." Furthermore, the plan calls for specific measures to guarantee human rights in areas hit by the earthquake, including "respecting earthquake victims" and "registering the names of people who died or disappeared in the earthquake and made [sic] them known to the public."

• Increase transparency regarding the government's own investigations into the school collapses by releasing the details of such investigations and information about victims, including students who died. The Regulations on Open Government Information require government agencies to disclose information that involves the vital interests of citizens (Article 9(1)).

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-14 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-08-12 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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• The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of a total of 237 people in 139 cases, and public security officials also have sought approval to arrest 295 people involved in 175 cases, based on information in a September 11 English-language China Daily report and Chinese-language Xinhua report. The procuratorate has initiated prosecution of 51 people in 14 cases, according to the reports, which appears to clarify information reported the previous week (see below) on cases transferred for review for prosecution. Based on the reports, 956 cases in total have been filed for investigation.
• The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of 196 people in 121 cases related to July 5, and 14 cases involving 51 people have been transferred by public security organs to the procuratorate for review for prosecution, according to the text of a September 4 Chinese-language Xinhua report citing the XUAR government information office. A September 4 English-language Xinhua report (via China.cn) states, in contrast to the Chinese-language report, that authorities have "prosecuted" the cases. (See Articles 136-149 of the Criminal Procedure Law for general information on reviewing cases and initiating prosecution.) Public security officials have sought approval to arrest an additional 239 people involved in 140 cases, and 825 people are being held in criminal detention (xingshi juliu), according to the reports. The numbers represent the second official statement on arrest figures, following information on a first group of arrests reported in August (see below). The September reports do not clarify whether the 196 arrests include the earlier numbers reported in August.
• Authorities have approved arrests (pizhun daibu) of 83 people in connection to crimes on July 5, according to August 4 English-language and Chinese-language reports from Xinhua. The English-language article said the information was the first official announcement on arrests from Urumqi authorities. The article reported that XUAR procurator Otkur Abduraxman "said those arrested will face charges including murder, intentional injury, arson and robbery." According to the Chinese-language report, however, those arrested are also suspected of "destroying vehicles, gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels and making trouble, and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination," in addition to the crimes listed in the English-language report. The Chinese-language report noted those arrested included both Uyghurs and Han. According to a July 18 report from the Legal Daily, citing a XUAR Party official, suspects' alleged crimes fall into five categories, including endangering state security, and include over 20 suspected crimes, including splittism and armed rebellion.
• Following the report of the 83 arrests, an August 23 English-language report from the China Daily (via People's Daily) said over 200 people had been formally arrested and that trials would begin that week, appearing to cite an unnamed Urumqi procuratorate official as the source of the information. The report said charges included splittism and inciting splittism. Hou Hanmin, a spokesperson for the XUAR government called the China Daily report "totally untrue" in an August 25 Global Times report, and another XUAR government official also denied the report, according to an August 25 New York Times report.
• The head of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau reported that 718 suspects had been placed under criminal detention (xingshi juliu) as of August 4, according to a Chinese-language report that day from Xinhua. See also a report of the detentions in an August 4 English-language Xinhua report. A PRC official later reiterated to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that 718 remained in detention and that those who "committed minor offences have been dealt with leniently and released," according to an August 10 Agence France-Presse report (via Yahoo). It is unclear, however, if all other people earlier held in connection to July 5 were outside of some form of custody or oversight as of that date, especially in light of comments from XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri (below) indicating that some peaceful protesters may remain in a form of unofficial custody or under surveillance. According to an August 6 Xinhua report (via China Daily), "Authorities also admitted that some of the detained suspects in connection with the riot have been released as their offences were minor. But they didn't provide the exact number of those who were released."
• According to August 2 English-language and Chinese-language Xinhua reports, public security officers said they had detained (zhuahuo) 319 people in addition to 253 detentions reported earlier. The detentions (zhuahuo) of 253 "prime suspects" were reported in a July 29 Chinese-language Xinhua report, which also noted that a batch of suspects turned themselves in. A July 29 English-language Xinhua report on the detentions said they were "in addition to the more than 1,000 suspects detained by July 6."
  
• Xinhua reported in a July 10 Chinese-language article that authorities detained (zhuahuo) 190 people in a series of four operations on July 9 and July 10, in connection to events on July 5. This news appears to have been unreported in official English-language media.
• Xinhua's English-language service reported on July 7 that authorities had "arrested" 1,434 people--1,379 men and 55 women--in connection to events on July 5. The use of the term "arrests" appears to be an incorrect reference to the initial detention of these individuals. (Formal arrests (daibu) of over 1,400 people two days after alleged criminal activity would be unlikely given the usual progression of the criminal process, including the requirement under the CPL that the procuratorate approve all arrests. This terminology is also inconsistent with Chinese reporting. See, e.g., a July 7 Xinhua article (via Nanfang Daily), noting that police had "caught" (zhuabu) 1,434 people.) Some of the detainees "might be released if no serious criminal records were found," according to a paraphrasing of Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi's remarks in the English-language article.
• XUAR police chief Liu Yaohua initially reported early on July 7 that officials had detained roughly 700 people and continued to pursue "about 90 other key suspects," according to a July 7 English-language Xinhua report.

• 21 Suspects Involved in Urumqi Riot Prosecuted (Xinhua, September 25. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• 108 Stand Accused in Urumqi Riot (China Daily, October 9. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua and Yangzi Evening News, via Sanming Information Net.)
• Six Sentenced to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 12. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• Legal Scholars and Procurator Answer Reporters' Questions about Trial Conditions in Three Major Criminal Cases from "7-5" Incident (People's Daily, October 12, in Chinese. Includes background information, including limited details on legal defense.)
• China Sentences Six to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 15. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• Court Upholds Penalties to Xinjiang Riot Convicts (Xinhua, October 30. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua, via Sina.)

• China Indicts 21 People in July Ethnic Violence (Associated Press, via Seattle Times, September 25.)
• China Court Sentences 6 to Death in Rioting (New York Times, October 12.)
• China Sentences Six More to Death for Xinjiang Unrest (Agence France-Presse, October 15.)
• China Sentences 3 More to Death for Xinjiang Riot (Associated Press, via Yahoo!, October 15.)

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-11 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-07-22 / English) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-04-06 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-10-16 ) | Posted on: 2009-10-19
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• Tibetan New Year (Losar), February 25, 2009. Some Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas of China intend to express in a passive manner their discontent with developments over the past year, including the death and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters, by foregoing the usual celebration of Losar. Reuters reported from Lhasa on February 12 that "many Tibetans" are boycotting Losar celebrations "in quiet defiance of the crackdown." A February 11 Xinhua report said that Nyima Tsering, Vice Chairman of the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee (TAR PCSC), at a February 10 press conference in Lhasa urged Tibetans to continue with Losar celebrations "in response to an underground campaign by some secessionists to boycott the festival." "Tibetan people are enjoying a good life now," Nyima Tsering said, "there is no reason for them to forgo celebrating their traditional holiday this year." If Chinese government officials choose to characterize Tibetan non-celebration of the New Year as an expression of "splittism," a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal Law, then authorities could pressure Tibetans to choose between celebrating Losar or facing the possibility of punishment that could include criminal prosecution.
  
  
• Fiftieth anniversary of March 10, 1959, the date when tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama's Norbulingka residence because they feared a People's Liberation Army plot to harm him. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa a week later and fled into exile. On March 10 of every year since 1960 the Dalai Lama has made a formal statement to the Tibetan people. (See the Web site of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for a chronology, biographical information on the Dalai Lama, and an archive of March 10 statements.)
  
  
• First anniversary of March 10, 2008, the start of the wave of Tibetan protests. The protests resulted in a large number of Tibetan deaths, detentions, and disappearances according to reports by media and NGOs, but Chinese government measures to prevent information from leaving China have prevented a complete and accurate accounting of the consequences. Chinese officials blamed "the Dalai Clique" for "masterminding" the 2008 protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for information on the Tibetan protests and their consequences. See Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 of the 2007 Annual Report, and Section VIII—Tibet of the 2006 Annual Report for additional information on Chinese government and Communist Party policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and legal system.)
  
  
• First observance of "Serfs Emancipation Day", March 28, 2009. The TAR People's Congress established the holiday on January 19, 2009, to commemorate the March 28, 1959, Chinese government decree that dissolved the Dalai Lama's Lhasa-based Tibetan government. Legchog (Lieque), the Chairman of the TAR PCSC, said on January 16, 2009, that Serfs Emancipation Day would "strengthen Tibetans' patriotism," according to a January 16 Xinhua report. RFA reported on January 16 that TAR prefectural and county officials had met to "ensure that all people mark the occasion with festivities." Chinese government measures to pressure Tibetans into celebrating the end of the Dalai Lama's government (and, by association, the departure of the Dalai Lama), have already provoked protests. For example, about 300 Tibetans, including monks, protested on January 10 in Jiangda (Jomda) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, in an attempt to dissuade local officials from sending a Tibetan dance troupe to Lhasa to participate in Serfs Emancipation Day celebrations, according to a February 9 Phayul report. Officials forced the dance troupe to depart for Lhasa on January 15 and authorities detained at least seven monks on January 24, the report said.

• The actual number of detentions during January may continue to increase beyond what has been reported thus far as additional information continues to come to light.
  
  
• The Jiangda county protest was forward-looking, focusing on March 28 "Serfs Emancipation Day" ceremonies, rather than reactive, such as Tibetan protests against anti-Dalai Lama and "patriotic education" campaigns.
  
  
• All 24 of the January 2009 detentions recorded in the PPD took place in Changdu prefecture or Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province. The two prefectures border each other, with the Yangzi River forming a boundary.
  
  
• January has concluded only recently—the actual number of January protests and detentions may surpass what has been reported so far.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-25 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-30
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Source: -See Summary (2009-06-30 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-20
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• Honor the Chinese Constitution's guarantees for the freedoms of speech and association, distinguish between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence, and not treat peaceful protest as a crime.


• Allow international observers and journalists immediate and unfettered access to the Xinjiang.


• Provide details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person's name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned.


• Ensure that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives and work places where detainees are being held.


• Allow access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with protest-related crimes.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-09 / English) | Posted on: 2009-08-19		more ...
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• Joint Press Release on the First Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Washington, DC (7/28/09)
• Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (7/28/09) (Also see pdf of original, signed document)
• Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment (7/28/09)
• U.S. Fact Sheet: First Cabinet-level Meeting of Economic Track of U.S.-China S&ED (7/28/09) (pdf version)
• The First U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Economic Track Joint Fact Sheet (7/28/09)
• Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)


• Closing Remarks for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (7/28/09)
• Joint Press Availability With Treasury Secretary Geithner and Secretary of State Clinton (7/28/09)
• Remarks at Closing Dinner by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State (7/28/09)
• Strategic Track Discussion Session II (7/28/09)
• Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner's Strategic and Economic Dialogue Closing Statement (7/28/09)
• Timothy F. Geithner Economic Track Opening Session Statement (7/28/09)
• Remarks at Plenary Session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State (7/27/09)
• Special Background Briefing on U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Washington, DC (7/27/09)
• Op-Ed by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State and Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury: "A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China;" The Wall Street Journal (7/27/09)
• Secretary Geithner S&ED Opening Ceremony Statement (7/27/09)
• Press Release: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue To Be Held July 27-28, 2009, in Washington, DC (7/13/09)
• Joint Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Geithner and Secretary of State Clinton (6/02/09)
• U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner Names Additions to Economic and Financial Leadership Team for China (6/01/09) (Photo)
• Speech by Secretary Geithner - The United States and China, Cooperating for Recovery and Growth (5/31/09)
• State Department-Treasury Department Joint Statement (4/01/09)
• EcoPartnerships.gov
• S&ED Pictures

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-05 / English) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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• In March, Internet supervision departments issued an internal notice prohibiting Web sites from reporting on or commenting on an environmental impact report relating to the Guangdong Nansha oil refinery and petrochemical project, according to a March 18 China Digital Times report.


• In March, the Central Propaganda Department banned domestic media from republishing or reporting on an article on China's U.S. stock holdings and ordered Web sites to remove the article, according to a March 9 Ming Pao report (via Open Source Center, subscription required). The article was originally published by a Shanghai newspaper and included comments from an academic questioning China's use of foreign exchange reserves to invest in stock. The ban occurred during the annual sessions of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.


• In February, propaganda officials in Beijing ordered Web sites to delete blogs and discussion groups about a fire at a hotel under construction on the grounds of China Central Television's headquarters. The officials also ordered Chinese media not to publish photos, videos, or in-depth reports about the fire, and to run only official stories issued by Xinhua instead of their own reports.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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• Chinese President Hu Jintao and members of the Communist Party Politburo's Standing Committee met on July 8 and issued a statement that the government would "firmly crack down on serious crimes" and target "[i]nstigators, organizers, culprits and violent criminals" involved in the "riot," according to a July 9 Xinhua report. "Cadres and the public in Xinjiang should stick to the principle that stability overrides everything," according to the statement as quoted in the Xinhua article.
• Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang visited the region and called for measures to promote stability and promote Party policy. A July 10 Xinhua report paraphrased Zhou as saying, "All CPC members should fan out to communities and villages in the autonomous region to publicize the Party's policies, in order to ensure the region's social stability," and "Every household and every community in Xinjiang should contribute to the ethnic unity in the region." During his trip, Zhou Yongkang traveled to Kashgar and Hoten districts on July 11 and met with security forces there, according to a report that day from Xinhua. Urumchi Party Secretary Li Zhi had said some of the "criminal elements" involved in "beating, smashing, looting, and burning" came from Kashgar and Hoten districts, and that there was organization and pre-planning involved, according to a July 12 article from CCTV (via People's Daily).

• Abide by the guarantees for freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association contained in the Chinese Constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; distinguish between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence; and not treat peaceful protest as a crime.
• Allow international observers and journalists immediate and unfettered access to the XUAR.
• Provide details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person's name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office ("procuratorate") and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned.
• Ensure that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives and work places where detainees are being held.
• Allow access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with protest-related crimes.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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• Xinjiang Authorities Block, Punish Free Expression
• Xinjiang Authorities Announce Heightened Security Threat, Strengthen Security Capacity, and Continue Propaganda Campaigns
• Xinjiang Authorities Strengthen Controls Over Religion
• Demolition of Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement
• Recruitment for State Jobs in Xinjiang Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities
• Number of Xinjiang Students Receiving Mandarin-Focused "Bilingual" Education Increases
• State Security Cases From Xinjiang Appear to Surge in 2008

• Honor the Chinese Constitution's guarantees for the freedoms of speech and association, distinguish between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence, and not treat peaceful protest as a crime.
• Allow international observers and journalists immediate and unfettered access to the XUAR.
• Provide details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person's name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office ("procuratorate") and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned.
• Ensure that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives and work places where detainees are being held.
• Allow access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with protest-related crimes.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-06 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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The research panel discovered that the 3.14 incident was caused by the confluence of many factors, including psychological loss created by development, discontent among economic classes, the question of migrants, influences from abroad, religious sentiment, and on-scene "mass reactions," which cannot be simply reduced to "splittist violence."

• Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR): Lhasa city, the TAR capital; and Naidong (Nedong) county, the location of Zedang (Tsethang), the capital of Shannan (Lhoka) prefecture;
• Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province: Hezuo (Tsoe) city, the Gannan capital; and Xiahe (Sangchu) county.

• Listen to the views of ordinary Tibetans and adjust policies in Tibetan areas on the basis of respecting and protecting the Tibetan people’s rights and interests.
• Guide economic development so that Tibetans acquire ample benefits, and reduce the discrepancy between urban and rural income.
• Increase central government supervision over local governments in order to reduce local corruption and dereliction of duty, and to speed up the process of democratizing power structures.
• Treat the education of Tibetans as the key to the long-term resolution of "the question of Tibetan areas"; improve educational opportunities available to young Tibetans, especially farmers and herders; develop appropriate content on Tibetan history and culture.
• Respect and protect Tibetan "freedom of religious belief," including recognizing the importance of religion to Tibetans; allow the resumption of "normal religious activities" such as Buddhist teaching, monastic travel to attend Buddhist teaching, and "the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism." (The latter is a reference to the Tibetan Buddhist belief that some Tibetan Buddhist teachers reincarnate, a tradition that the Chinese government seeks to control through regulations issued in 2007.)
• Seek to "reduce inter-ethnic prejudice, ignorance, and injury"; when "sudden incidents" occur, seek the support of "positive forces," such as religious figures, to help resolve them.
• Promote the rule of law in Tibetan areas by encouraging the introduction of "laws and regulations" at the local level; regulate the ownership and exploitation of natural resources; encourage experts to participate in policy discussions.
• Build up ethnic unity by "propagandizing" the success of the reform and opening up policy in Tibetan areas, and avoid depicting the Tibetan past as "serfdom." Along with highlighting the "vitality" of development, admit the "social problems facing Tibet."
• Handle crisis situations by first determining whether a problem is social, economic, or religious, and use different methods for handling each type. The central government should function as an "arbiter" and keep itself distinct from "local officials' inappropriate conduct."

In the past 20 years in China, the people who manage Tibet . . . have really gained power. Their economic interests and everything else are built on this power. They blame everything that goes wrong in Tibet . . . on the Dalai Lama, or on Tibetans in exile. . . . Sometimes it looks as though we are seeing only the truly top-level of China’s state leadership, and we assume such high-ranking views are the only reason for what is happening. [If] you look at the details, there's a messy political process going on. In that process, there are people who have political and economic self-interests playing a role in this particular policy.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-04 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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• Commission Analysis: Chinese Government Requires Censorship Software To Accompany Computers Sold After July 1 (discusses the impact on freedom of expression, the public's response in China, confusion over the pre-installation requirement, and questions about transparency, short preparation time, government procurement, and intellectual property rights);
• Commission Translation: Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers (English translation of official circular setting forth pre-installation requirement);
• Section II-Freedom of Expression in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-30 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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Not only does it block access to a wide range of Web sites based on keywords and image processing, including porn, gaming, gay content, religious sites, and political themes, it actively monitors individual computer behavior, such that a wide range of programs including word processing and email can be suddenly terminated if content algorithm detects inappropriate speech.

• Wei Yongzheng, a professor at Hong Kong Shue Yan University, and Zhou Ze, an associate professor at China Youth University for Political Sciences, said in a letter to the State Council that although the MIIT's stated purpose is to protect youth, in practice the requirement could restrict Internet users from accessing other information, in violation of freedom of expression provisions in the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to a June 11 Caijing article (in Chinese). The two scholars noted that Chinese laws do not clearly delineate what constitutes "harmful information" to be censored on the Internet. "The filtering system only needs to be installed in computers that youth may use, and their guardians can take responsibility," they said.


• A June 9 Caijing editorial (in Chinese) also raised questions about what constitutes "harmful information." "Is there a transparency mechanism for the determination of the 'blacklist' and a free-flowing channel for corrections and remedies? How do they make sure this does not become a 'back door' for abuse of authority?" the editorial said.


• In a June 11 editorial titled, "Questionable Move," the state-run English-language China Daily questioned why the government was requiring every computer to install the software when taxpayers' money could have been used to sponsor a Web site offering the software on a voluntary basis. The editorial also raised concerns about who would decide what content to block and the criteria for blocking. "Are software developers qualified to do that? How is citizens' freedom of expression or right to know to be balanced against the need to filter 'unhealthy' content?" read the editorial.


• Online surveys conducted by four popular Chinese Web portals showed that more than four in five respondents indicated they will not use the software or will uninstall it, according to a June 15 China Daily article.


• On June 22, Reuters reported that Internet users in China were calling for a boycott of the Internet on July 1 to protest the government policy.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-22 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
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Source: -See Summary (2009-06-24 ) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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1. Computers manufactured and sold domestically should have the newest version of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed when leaving the factory. Imported computers should have the newest version of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed before being sold domestically.


2. The "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software should be pre-installed on the computer's hard drive or on a CD that accompanies the computer. It also should be included in the recovery partition and on the system restore CD as a backup file.


3. Suppliers of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software should take steps proactively to support the computer manufacturing industry in launching the pre-installation.


4. The computer manufacturing and sales industries should complete pre-installation tests of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software and other related work by the end of June 2009. Computers leaving the factory and sold after July 1, 2009, should have the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed.


5. In 2009, computer manufacturers and suppliers of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software every month should file a report with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's Software Service Industry Department showing the numbers of computers sold and filtering software pre-installed in the previous month, along with any suggestions. Beginning in 2010, the previous year's numbers should be reported before the end of February each year.

Source: Ministry of Information Industry (2009-05-19 / Chinese / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02		more ...
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Source: -See Summary (2009-02-25 ) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Source: -See Summary (2009-03-13 / English) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Source: -See Summary (2009-05-26 / English) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Though more attention has been paid in recent years to abiding by certain provisions of the CPL, Chinese law-enforcement authorities have in the past frequently ignored legally established rights and time limits, especially in cases like this one that appear to be of a political nature.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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• A district in Qaramay municipality reported in late November 2008 that the municipal government had issued a "notice on confiscating Muslim books such as 'The Truth About the Holy Teachings' and 'The Call to Orthodoxy,'" according to a November 29 report on the Jerenbulaq district (Baijiantan), Qaramay municipal government Web site. Authorities investigated local book and music sellers in accordance with the notice, the article reported.
• In an inspection of the cultural market in the XUAR capital of Urumqi, authorities reported confiscating 175 copies of "illegal religious pictures," according to a February 10 report from the Urumqi municipal government Web site.
• XUAR authorities will coordinate with propaganda departments from provinces including Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to establish a cross-provincial mechanism to stop the printing and sales of "illegal" religious materials, according to a March 2 Xinjiang Daily report about a meeting to enlarge the law enforcement teams that monitor cultural markets in the XUAR. The article also reported that in 2009, XUAR authorities established a fund to reward efforts to "purify" the cultural market, with focus on "illegal" religious and political publications.
• As part of a campaign to curb "illegal religious activity" in Hoten district, authorities reported finding large amounts of "illegal propaganda materials such as books, handwritten texts, CDs, and tapes," according to a March 4 article on the Xinjiang Peace Net. See a related Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis for more information about the steps to fight "illegal religious activity" in Hoten.
• Authorities in the XUAR will implement a special system of oversight for bookstores, newspaper stands, audio and video suppliers, and similar vendors that are located within 500 meters of schools, according to a March 18 report from Tianshan Net. The report also provided statistics on the number of books confiscated in 2008. Of a total of 877,193 copies of items confiscated in 2008, 29,905 were "illegal" political materials. The article did not report the number of "illegal" religious items confiscated.

• According to April reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), authorities in Turpan municipality detained Ekberjan Jamal, a young Uyghur man, on December 25, 2007, after he had used his cell phone to make audio recordings of November 2007 shopkeepers' demonstrations in Turpan and sent the recordings to friends overseas. (See an April 15 English-language report and April 13 and 14 Uyghur-language reports.) His friends gave the recordings to Hong Kong-based Phoenix News and to RFA. (See 2007 RFA articles about the demonstrations dated November 1, 2, and 26.) Ekberjan Jamal later posted on his own Web site the news based on his audio recordings. The Turpan Intermediate People's Court sentenced Ekberjan Jamal to 10 years in prison on February 28, 2008, for splittism and revealing state secrets, crimes under articles 103 and 111 of the Criminal Law. He is being held in the Xinjiang Number 4 prison in Urumqi, according to the RFA reports.
• Chinese state-run media reported in March that procuratorate officials approved the arrest of and initiated prosecution against a young man, identified only as "Ya," after he allegedly "spread rumors" on the Internet about a clash that broke out in January at an Internet Café in Shayar county, Aqsu district. (See a March 16 report from Tianshan Net and a March 17 report from Xinhua, via China Daily.) The reports said that "Ya" fabricated the nature of the clash, reporting that Han Chinese had beaten and killed a Uyghur youth, describing police indifference to the matter, and reporting that over 500 Uyghurs took to the streets to demonstrate. The Tianshan Net report said that "Ya's" article was then used by "separatist" Web sites overseas that aimed to "disrupt ethnic unity" and "influence social stability." (For reports on the incident by RFA after the clash broke out in late January, see a February 6 article as well as RFA Uyghur-language articles from January 30, February 3, and February 4. See also a January 31 report from the East Turkistan Information Center.)
• Also in March, official media reported that in June 2008, authorities from Hoten district intercepted and arrested people described as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir who planned to "sabotage" the Olympic torch relay. A report posted March 3 on the Hoten Peace Net (from the Hoten Frontier Defense Detachment) said that authorities found the group traveling in a vehicle carrying a computer, printer, and "reactionary" leaflets. The report did not provide additional details about the case.
• The Uyghur American Association reported in a March 16 press release that a court in Hoten municipality, Hoten district, sentenced Abdukadir Mahsum on February 26 to 15 years in prison for his activities organizing peaceful demonstrations in Hoten in March 2008 to protest government human rights abuses. The news follows other steps in the XUAR to punish people who plan or participate in demonstrations. In December 2008 public security offices took two young men into detention after they tried to organize a demonstration on the campus of Xinjiang University.

• Uyghur Historian Released From Prison
• Two Young Uyghurs Detained for Distributing Leaflets Calling for Student Demonstration
• Authorities Block Uyghur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters
• Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political and Religious Publications
• Uyghur Editor Korash Huseyin's Prison Sentence Expires
• Xinjiang Cracks Down on "Illegal" Religious Publications
• Xinjiang Government Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-30 ) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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• Creation of a black list. Journalists who "violate laws and regulations" will have their press cards revoked and names placed on a black list of journalists with "bad records."
• Amendment of the Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards to "strengthen the regulatory system relating to applying for, examining and verifying, and granting press cards."
• New measures to strengthen oversight over reporting and editing activities to "regulate order in news reporting and curb fake reports."

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-18 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Source: -See Summary (2009-03-18 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Source: -See Summary (2009-05-15 ) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
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Source: -See Summary (2009-03-17 / English) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
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Source: -See Summary (2009-03-17 / English) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
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• Strengthening leadership and deployment of work on religion, including through the establishment of leading groups on "illegal religious activity," the use of accountability systems among officials, and through strengthened supervision over government work in this area.
• Increasing warnings against "illegal religious activity" and increasing propaganda on issues such as Communist Party policy toward religion and the nature of the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; using media like art and broadcast communications to spread propaganda and using artistic performances and recreational activities to weaken religious atmospheres; and carrying out activities such as events for people to sign their names to show resistance to "illegal religious activities."
• Deepening capacity to investigate and detect "illegal religious activity," including by mobilizing the support of local organizations and schools.
• "Strengthening management and purifying the environment" through five steps: strengthening management of religious activities; strengthening oversight of students during vacation periods through a system of both fixed and unscheduled contact with students; strengthening the management of the "cultural market," an activity that has been tied to censorship campaigns in the region; strengthening "inspection and control" over floating populations; and strengthening capacity for management.
• Stopping violations of the law and attacking crimes through measures including: carrying out public education and punishment of participants in "illegal religious activities"; penalizing and holding accountable heads of households, religious leaders, and other responsible people for the acts of students in "illegal" scripture classes; and holding open arrests and trials at the sites of illegal activity to send a message to the public about the consequences of such activity.

• The discovery of scripture instruction sites at mosques within the scope of a few religious leaders' jurisdiction.
• "Illegal religious activity" extending across multiple localities.
• The discovery of "illegal tabligh activities" and people suspected of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir.
• Failure to curb or report the presence of illegal propaganda.
• Inadequate enthusiasm among some religious figures toward contributing to the development of the rural economy.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-12 ) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
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• Four schools recruiting teachers within the Shihezi municipal education system have reserved all open positions exclusively for Han Chinese, and one school has reserved three of four open positions exclusively for Han Chinese, according to a job announcement issued January 24, 2009, by the Shihezi 8th Division Personnel Bureau, available as a download from the Shihezi Education Net and online from a page posted January 28 by the Shihezi Number 10 Middle School. In total, the positions form 17 of 69 open positions available in schools within the Shihezi education system. The remaining 52 slots are specified as unrestricted by ethnicity and thus are open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han. On February 6, the Shihezi Personnel Bureau amended the announcement to remove two other hiring restrictions in the job recruitment, according to a February 10 Xinjiang Daily report, but left the restrictions on ethnicity in place.
• Jing (Jinghe) township, in Jing (Jinghe) county, Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture (XUAR), has advertised 11 open community public welfare positions, 6 of which are reserved for Han Chinese, 1 for an ethnic Uyghur, 2 for ethnic Kazakhs, and 2 for ethnic Mongols, according to a January 16 announcement posted January 21 on the Jing county government Web site. The announcement specifies that ethnic groups including Hui, Manchu, Xibo, and Zhuang may apply for the positions open to Han Chinese.
• The Turpan District Tobacco Monopoly Branch Office is recruiting for two positions, both reserved for Han Chinese, according to an announcement posted January 14 on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site.
• A mining company advertised only for Han Chinese to fill 18 open positions, according to a September 16, 2008, job announcement posted the following day on the Koktoqay (Fuyun) county government, Altay district, Web site.
• A new store advertised for 30 employees, specifying that 20 positions were for Han Chinese and 10 for ethnic minorities, according to a September 4 announcement posted on the Jing county government Web site.
• Job openings publicized as part of government-organized job recruiting activities in Jing county included 17 positions explicitly reserved for Han Chinese, according to a May 16 announcement on the Jing county government Web site. (See also a May 12 description of the job recruiting activities posted May 15 on the same Web site.) Descriptions of the remaining 100-plus positions either did not mention ethnicity or specified that there were no restrictions based on ethnicity. Employers listed appeared to include private employers alongside state-owned enterprises.
• The Aqsu District (XUAR) Human Resources Department visited the Xi'an Jiaotong University in Shaanxi province to recruit personnel for jobs in Aqsu hospitals and an agricultural technology center, reserving 18 of 43 positions for Han Chinese, according to an April 16 posting on the Xi'an Jiaotong University Web site. The Aqsu District Human Resources Department job announcement specified the remaining slots as unrestricted by ethnicity, thereby leaving them open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-06-10
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"That year, the first day of the Tibetan New Year, called Losar, fell on March 5, the anniversary of the demonstrations in 1988 and 1989. Many Lhasa residents had decided to acknowledge the coincidence of Tibetan New Year and March 5 not by doing, but by not doing. Contrary to tradition, tattered window-awnings, dirty door-hangings, and faded whitewash remained untouched, greeting the New Year with utter cheerlessness." (Steven Marshall, "Prisons in Tibet," in Elliot Sperling, Steven Marshall, Orville Schell, and Mickey Spiegel, Tibet Since 1950: Silence, Prison, or Exile, Aperture and Human Rights Watch (New York: Aperture, 2000), 144-149.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-29 ) | Posted on: 2009-05-10
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Source: -See Summary (2009-01-15 / English) | Posted on: 2009-04-16
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Source: -See Summary (2009-02-17 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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"If 'mass incidents' happen, leaders at all levels must be at the front line to explain to the people and persuade them face-to-face. Leaders cannot hide behind public security or the police, thus causing conflicts. Except for those unfortunate situations where there is beating, attacking, robbing, or burning, in principle, no police should be deployed. Leaders at all levels should go to the front line to solve problems."

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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• According to the Outline, China's multiethnic status "has been the determinant that strengthening ethnic unity, in the final analysis, is a major task affecting the unification of the motherland, territorial integrity, and consolidating frontier defense." (Point 1)
• While affirming that all ethnic groups are equal and are "masters of their own affairs" within the socialist system, the Outline also notes outstanding problems remain as a result of factors such as inadequate mutual understanding among ethnic groups, discrepancies in economic and cultural development, a historical legacy of ethnic bias and estrangement among ethnic groups, and poor understanding of the legal structure affecting ethnic groups. (Point 3)
• The Outline also notes that "international hostile forces" continue to carry out the "political schemes" of "westernization" and "separatism." According to the Outline, these "hostile forces" coordinate with "domestic ethnic separatist forces" to use "so-called ethnic, religious, and human rights issues" to carry out activities such as "infiltration" and "subversion." The Outline describes March 2008 protests in Tibetan areas as an "alarm bell" in this respect. (Point 3)

• The Outline affirms the state's existing model for dealing with ethnic issues, noting that Party policy "has concentrated the wisdom and painstaking effort of several generations of Party figures in their dealing with ethnic issues, and it is an important component of the Party's basic theories, basic vocabulary, basic programs, and basic experiences[.]" (Point 5)
• It also highlights the importance of strengthening ethnic relations and ethnic unity in order to realize full implementation of Party policy, while also noting that improving ethnic relations and unity can only be truly achieved under Party policy. (Point 6)

• The Outline describes equality among ethnic groups as a cornerstone of Party policy and describes legal protections for ethnic minorities within the PRC Constitution and laws. It adds that the state guarantees equal rights in areas including employment and that each ethnic group has the right to use and develop its own language. (Point 8) (The Congressional-Executive Commission on China has observed job hiring practices in both government and private sectors that discriminate against ethnic minorities. See analyses from 2005, 2006, and 2009. It has also tracked policies that undercut protections for ethnic minority languages stipulated in Chinese law.)
• While acknowledging that problems remain in ethnic relations and ethnic unity, the Outline attributes them to "contradictions among the people" and calls for promoting "principles, legal institutions, policies, and strategies" to remedy this. It also calls for resisting "international hostile forces raising the banner of such things as 'ethnicity,' 'religion,' and 'human rights' to carry out westernization and separatist activities toward our country." In addition, it calls for striking against the "infiltration and sabotage" of "ethnic separatist forces, religious extremist forces, and violent terrorist forces." (Point 9)
• The Outline describes its system of self-government in designated ethnic minority areas as a basic policy that promotes ethnic minorities' right to autonomy. At the same time, the Outline stresses the role of autonomous governments in guaranteeing the fundamental policies of the Party and central government. (Point 10)

• The Outline concludes with a call for propaganda education on the state's policy on ethnic issues, calling for education among both ethnic minorities and "especially" among Han Chinese, and education of both the public and "especially" of cadres. (Point 13)
• The Outline also calls on service providers, employers, and other groups to observe legal provisions that protect equality among ethnic groups. In addition, it calls for preventing situations that "hurt the feelings of ethnic groups and injure ethnic unity" (Point 14), sentiments that have been used in the past to promote publishing restrictions.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-17 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Source: -See Summary (2009-02-06 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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• Saying there had been "new, complex changes in the domestic and international situation," Li named safeguarding "economic development" and "social stability" as two of the four most important tasks for the year. Li told officials to improve their guidance of public opinion. They should provide "a favorable public opinion environment for maintaining the calm, steady, and relatively fast development of the economy and society," "vigorously promote social stability," and "maintain the favorable situation of unity, harmony, and stability," Li said. He also said that officials should "vigorously highlight that the Communist Party is good, socialism is good" and promote the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.


• Liu announced a "concrete agenda for propaganda, ideological, and cultural work in 2009" that included "integrating a heightened sense of crisis with shoring up confidence" and "integrating insistence on positive propaganda with defusing public emotion." He also said that officials should "seize the critical links" to promote propaganda overseas and through the press, and literature and art publications.

• The Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that authorities in Shanxi province suspended two journalists and two editors for producing a television episode on the potential bankruptcy of a Linfen textile mill and the uncertain future of the mill's 6,300 workers, according to a January 6 Associated Press/Kyodo article (via Breitbart.com) and a January 6 Radio Free Asia article. The episode, which was to air on the program "Concern" [Guanzhu] in December 2008, was never broadcast after Linfen officials reviewing the episode canceled the program for "serious political error." The clips reportedly showed workers protesting at the Linfen government building.


• In September 2008, the Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau ordered the three-month suspension of the China Business Post after it published a report in July critical of the Agricultural Bank of China, which at the time was preparing for a stock offering.


• In September 2008, propaganda officials ordered major financial Web sites to remove "negative" reports regarding China's stock markets, according to a September 10 South China Morning Post article (subscription required).

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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• Miradil Yasin and Mutellip Téyip. Xinjiang University (XU) security staff detained Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and Mutellip Téyip on December 20, 2008, for distributing leaflets on campus calling on students to hold a demonstration. XU staff notified public security offices, which took the two young men into detention.

• Mehbube Ablesh. An employee in the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio Station, Mehbube Ablesh was fired from her job in August 2008 and detained in apparent connection to her writings for the Internet that were critical of government policies, including "bilingual" education.

• Nurmemet Yasin. A XUAR court sentenced writer Nurmemet (Nurmuhemmet) Yasin to 10 years in prison in 2005 for "inciting splittism'' after he wrote a story about a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom. Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the journal that published Nurmemet Yasin's story, received a three-year sentence in 2005 for "dereliction of duty." Korash Huseyin completed his sentence in February 2008 and is presumed to have been released from prison.

• Abdulla Jamal. Authorities arrested teacher Abdulla Jamal in April 2005, after he submitted for publication a manuscript that authorities claimed incited separatism. The arrest followed his detention a month earlier, along with the detention of 3 other teachers and 17 or 18 students, ostensibly for involvement in a fight between ethnic Uyghur and Han Chinese students.

• Abdulghani Memetemin. A XUAR court sentenced journalist Abdulghani Memetemin to nine years' imprisonment in 2003 for providing information on government repression against Uyghurs to an overseas organization that reports on human rights abuses in the XUAR. Authorities characterized this act as "supplying state secrets to an organization outside the country."

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-03 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Source: -See Summary (2009-03-11 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Source: -See Summary (2008-12-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-02-03
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Source: -See Summary (2009-01-23 ) | Posted on: 2009-02-03
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• "The Charter of the United Nations
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
• Human rights instruments (covenants, conventions and other treaties) to which [China] is a party
• Voluntary pledges and commitments made by [China]
• Applicable international humanitarian law" (OHCHR, Fact Sheet)

• China's National Report;
• A compilation of information contained in human rights-related UN reports, prepared by OHCHR;
• A summary of information provided by other relevant stakeholders, prepared by OHCHR (primarily non-governmental organizations (NGOs)).

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2009-02-02
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Source: -See Summary (2009-01-30 / English) | Posted on: 2009-02-01
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• Establish an anti-trafficking "leadership committee" with an office located within the provincial public security department. The "leadership committee" will implement, organize, and coordinate cross-regional, inter-governmental, inter-agency, and cross-provincial (district and city) anti-trafficking efforts.


• Include funds in the annual budget required by each locality and department to ensure the development and implementation of anti-trafficking work.


• Investigate and punish, according to law, illegal employers and employment of child labor, and ban illegal employment or marriage brokerage agencies or their Internet sites.


• Strengthen the provision of social welfare and assist with victim reintegration for rescued women and children, including appropriate arrangement for children without guardians, school enrollment for children who have reached appropriate age, as well as occupational training and employment assistance.


• Create special files for rescued women and children to track their living conditions and to coordinate relevant departments and organizations' efforts to resolve problems faced by those who have been rescued.


• Enhance international and cross-provincial cooperation.

1. Trafficked Chinese women without a local hukou may avoid involuntary repatriation, thus minimizing the risks of facing danger, such as threats from their traffickers, or re-trafficked once returned home.


2. For non-Chinese women trafficked into Yunnan, neither the National Action Plan nor the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion distinguishes between foreign and Chinese victims, and the measures do not specify that this new policy is applicable only to Chinese citizens. If interpreted in this way, the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion's policy of allowing non-Chinese women to remain in Yunnan would comply with the international standard set forth in Article 7 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children. This Protocol states that "each State Party shall consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases." However, it remains to be seen how the new policy will be implemented in practice.

• The measures do not include language about men identified as trafficking victims.


• Authority coordinating the inter-agency anti-trafficking effort is assigned to the provincial public security department. Generally speaking, public security departments may favor a "law and order" approach to anti-trafficking, rather than a human rights approach that favors prevention and addresses the root causes of human trafficking.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-29 / English) | Posted on: 2009-02-01
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To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-27 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Source: -See Summary (2009-01-27 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-02-01
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• The Zhoukou municipality Reeducation Through Labor Committee (RTL) in Henan province issued a decision on December 16, 2008, sentencing three church leaders to one year of RTL for their involvement in "illegal proselytizing" and an "illegal gathering," according to a January 6 CAA report and a copy of the RTL decision posted January 6 on the CAA Web site. Authorities initially detained the three church leaders, Tang Houyong, Shu Wenxiang, and Xie Zhenqi, on December 3 at a house church gathering. CAA reported that authorities detained other attendees and sentenced 20 of them to 15 days of administrative detention. According to CAA, authorities alleged the church members belonged to the "Shouters," a group deemed a cult by authorities, but CAA said the church members were not associated with the group. The wife of one of the men sentenced to RTL has since pursued legal action in the case, including filing an administrative lawsuit and a motion to dismiss a judge involved, according to a January 26 CAA press release and copy of a court filing posted the same day on the CAA Web site.

• On January 2, public security officers in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), disrupted a house church meeting and detained 51 attendees. Authorities held 3 of the 51 in public security bureau custody, one of whom was sentenced to 10 days of administrative detention, according to a January 5 report from CAA.

• On December 17, police officers in Yancheng, Jiangsu province, demolished a registered church, according to a December 22 report from CAA. The CAA said sources described the demolition of the Chengnan Christian Church as the result of collusion between the Yancheng government and real estate developers. The demolition came despite a December 16 court ruling in favor of the church, CAA reported.

• Authorities disrupted Christmas eve and Christmas day gatherings in Bozhou, Anhui and Yucheng county, Shangqiu, Henan provinces and Qitai county, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, in the XUAR, according to CAA reports from December 26 and December 30. Officials took into detention two church leaders from the Anhui gathering, seven church leaders from the XUAR, and nine people from Henan. Authorities later released five of the nine detained in Henan and sentenced the remaining four to 15 days of administrative detention, according to a December 27 report from Monitor China, a Web site affiliated with the CAA.

• Earlier in the week, authorities targeted other house church Christmas celebrations in Anhui and in the XUAR, according to a December 25 CAA report via the Christian News Wire. Authorities disrupted a Bible training class in Dongzhi county, Chizhou, Anhui province, on December 22, interrogated the 19 students and 2 church leaders in the class, and sealed off the building where the classes were held. On December 22, authorities warned a house church leader in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, to stop holding services.

• On December 24, police disrupted a group of people, including Protestant volunteers, who had gathered to rebuild housing for victims of the May 12, 2008, earthquake in Sichuan province, according to a December 27 CAA report. Authorities confiscated the group's property and took some of the group members into detention. CAA reported that authorities had targeted the group because of the presence of the Protestant volunteers.

• On December 15, a court in Qorghas (Huocheng), XUAR, tried the case of church leader Lou Yuanqi, detained since May 17, 2008, for “inciting separatism,” in connection to interviews he gave about his prior detentions for leading house church services. Authorities formally arrested him on June 20, on charges of using superstition to undermine implementation of state law, a crime under Article 300 of the Criminal Law, stemming from his church activities and from reporting abuses to overseas groups. See a CAA December 15 report and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information.

• On December 21, 2008, public security officers detained Beijing-based house church leader Zhang Mingxuan in Ulanhot, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, while he was there to preach, according to a December 22 CAA report. He was sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention for "operating an illegal organization for religious activities." International pressure prompted his early release on December 22, CAA reported. Authorities harassed Zhang on multiple other occasions in 2008, as noted in previous CECC analyses (1, 2) and the CECC Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-26 ) | Posted on: 2009-02-01
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