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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Beijing Public Security Officials Formally Arrest Activist Hu Jia
Beijing public security officials formally arrested activist Hu Jia on charges of "inciting subversion of state power," according to a February 1 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article and a January 31 report in the Dui Hua Foundation's Human Rights Journal. Beijing public security officials detained Hu on December 27, 2007. On January 30, officials served Hu's family with an arrest notice and officials allowed Hu's father to visit him on January 31, according to the Dui Hua report and a February 3 RFA article. The Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau previously denied lawyer Li Jinsong's reconsideration request (posted on Boxun on January 8) to allow Hu to meet with his lawyers, citing the involvement of state secrets in the case, according to a January 25 RFA article. The same article reports that officials also denied Li's application (posted on Boxun on January 15) for Hu to obtain a guarantor pending trial, a process similar to bail, on the grounds that it could "endanger society." Officials have continued to harass individuals connected to Hu and those who attempt to visit the residence of Hu and his wife, Zeng Jinyan, according to the RFA articles dated February 1 and February 3.
For additional information on Hu's detention, see a previous CECC analysis and Hu's record of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-02-04 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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"Green Olympics" Commitments Raise Concerns Over Transparency and Implementation
Beijing's bid in 2000 to host the 2008 Olympics promised a "Green Olympics" and the "greatest Olympic Games environmental legacy ever," yet concerns remain over Beijing's transparency and progress toward fulfilling the specific commitments underlying these promises, especially with regard to air quality. In its bid, Beijing promised to achieve objectives in the city's environmental master plan three years ahead of schedule with the completion of 20 major projects by 2007. The projects include infrastructure improvements addressing air and water quality, waste management, and energy, according to Table 1.1 in the 2007 United Nations Environmental Programme's Environmental Review of the Olympics (UNEP report). Beijing also promised that air quality would meet World Health Organization (WHO) standards and that the city's drinking water, which it said met WHO standards, would continue to be protected. The UNEP report noted that "Beijing has already achieved many of its bid commitments, for example on waste water treatment, water source protection, and waste management, and appears to be well on the way to fulfilling all of them." The UNEP report called the progress "an achievement in itself."
Despite this noteworthy progress, there are concerns over Beijing's promise that air quality "will meet Chinese and WHO standards." The WHO air quality guidelines include guidelines for particulate matter (PM) 2.5 and PM 10, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide. According to an October 5, 2006, WHO press release, revisions made to the guidelines in 2005 significantly reduced the guidelines for PM 10, ozone, and sulfur dioxide. The Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau monitors PM 10, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon, but does not monitor ozone or PM 2.5, according to the UNEP report and an October 16 Washington Post (WP) article. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, exposure to small particulate matter such as PM 2.5 and ground-level ozone, which is at particularly high levels during the summer, have documented adverse health effects. The UNEP report recommended "further investigation" into ozone levels because of the timing of the Olympics in August 2008.
With less than a year to go until the Olympics, air pollutants such as PM 10 and nitrogen dioxide currently exceed WHO guidelines (both before and after the change in 2005) by a significant amount, according to information presented in the UNEP report and the WHO guidelines. There is some ambiguity over whether Beijing is obligated to meet current WHO guidelines or the guidelines in place at the time of Beijing's bid in 2000. The UNEP report uses the current WHO guidelines, but a December 3 Reuters article (reprinted in the Guardian) quotes one of the drafters of the environmental commitments as saying, "We will fulfil our original bid commitment, namely to meet Chinese and pre-2005 World Health Organisation standards on air quality." The Host City Contract, entered into between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the city of Beijing and China's National Olympic Committee, may help to clarify Beijing's contractual obligations in this regard. The contract, however, has not been made publicly available.
The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad pledged in its 2002 Beijing Olympic Action Plan to make preparations for the Olympics transparent, yet there are concerns over the difficulty in accessing information on pollutants and charting Beijing's progress toward achieving its bid commitments. Chinese Communist Party censorship of domestic media reports concerning air quality may lead to less information or misleading information being made available to the public and the scientific community. In addition, Beijing officials refuse to publicly release information on pollutant levels in different areas of the city and during different parts of the day, although there are 27 monitoring stations throughout the city, according to the WP article and a November 29 Associated Press article (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune). In May 2008, the Measures on Open Environmental Information (in Chinese) will go into effect, but it remains to be seen whether these measures will lead to greater transparency regarding Beijing's pollution.
Other areas of concern include what kind of environmental legacy the Olympics will leave behind in Beijing and elsewhere, and if the pursuit of the environmental targets for the Olympics actually signifies greater protection of the environment. For instance, the availability of fuel cell buses highlights Beijing's goals for clean energy and an improved public transportation system, yet an October 23 China Watch article notes that the buses are running far short of their capacity and that usage may be hindered by the lack of signs and schedule information. For more information on environmental protection and access to information in China, see Section II, on "Environment" and "Freedom of Expression," in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, available on the Web site of the Government Printing Office.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Party Congress Promotes Officials Linked to Harsh Policies Toward Tibetans
Introduction
The 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which concluded on October 21, 2007, resulted in the promotions of two high-ranking Party officials, Zhou Yongkang and Liu Yandong, whose recent posts associate them with harsh policies that contribute to the repression of human rights such as the freedoms of religion and expression, and that undermine ethnic minority rights guaranteed by China's Constitution and system of regional ethnic autonomy. The Party¡¯s elevation of Zhou and Liu to the highest levels of Party power is likely to signify strong endorsement of their work, and ensure the continuation and perhaps strengthening of the policies associated with them, especially during the period of the Party's 16th Central Committee (2002-2007).
Although Zhou's and Liu's work impacts citizens and groups throughout China, this article will consider their promotions within the context of the human rights and rule of law environment for ethnic Tibetans living in China. Their promotions may presage heightened repression of ethnic minority groups and of cultural, religious, and political rights that the Party suspects could threaten the Party's supremacy or ethnic and national unity. Ethnic and religious issues could be treated as an even higher priority during the period of the 17th Central Committee (2007-2012) than during past five years. The level of Party intolerance toward Tibetan religious activity and expression that it deems threatening may increase, instead of moderating as China becomes a more mature, prosperous, and resilient nation.
Zhou Yongkang is one of the most influential Party figures guiding policy and implementation with respect to public security and the process of investigating, charging, prosecuting, trying, and sentencing cases of alleged criminal activity. Liu Yandong has played a prominent role in ensuring implementation of Party polices toward ethnic minorities and religion. She has played a direct and important role since late 2002 in the on-going dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama's representatives, a process that has resulted in little evidence of progress. Zhou and Liu are both members of the Party's highest ranking group focused on Tibetan issues, giving added weight to their promotions and their views on policy and its implementation.
(See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information on human rights in Tibetan areas of China, and on Chinese government implementation of regional ethnic autonomy.)
Zhou Yongkang Promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo
(People¡¯s Daily bio, 22 October 07)
Swift Rise to Party's Most Powerful Body
Zhou Yongkang has moved up swiftly to join the Party's highest-ranked and most powerful body, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee, and to head one of the Central Committee's most influential supervisory groups, the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (Xinhua, 26 December 07). Advancing within the Central Committee at each of the 14th-17th Party Congresses, he attained the rank of an alternate Central Committee member at the 14th Congress, full Central Committee member at the 15th Congress, member of the Politburo at the 16th Congress, and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 17th Congress. Zhou held the posts of Party Secretary and Minister of the Ministry of Public Security from 2002-2007. As Secretary of the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, Zhou presides over a group whose members include the leadership of the state's security, legal, and judicial establishment (Web site of China's Central Government, State Structure, visited 22 January 08): Xiao Yang (President of the Supreme People's Court), Jia Chunwang (Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate), Wu Aiying (Minister of Justice), Meng Jianzhu (Minister of Public Security), and Geng Huichang (Minister of State Security). Zhou served as the committee's Deputy Secretary from 2002-2007.
Party Secretary in Sichuan Province
Zhou served as the Secretary of the Sichuan Province Communist Party Committee from 1999-2002, a period that included the partial destruction of the Larung Gar and Yachen Gar monastic teaching institutions, located in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and the expulsion of thousands of Tibetan Buddhist nuns and monks from the institutions. (International Campaign for Tibet, 20 June 01 and 9 July 04). During Zhou's tenure as the Sichuan Party Secretary, authorities throughout the Tibetan autonomous areas of China detained or imprisoned 187 Tibetans for peaceful expression or non-violent activity, based on information available in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD). Of those 187 Tibetans, 60, of whom 33 were monks and nuns, were detained or imprisoned in Sichuan. In two of the Sichuan cases, the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced to imprisonment popular Tibetan Buddhist teachers who had traveled to India without official permission and met with the Dalai Lama: Sonam Phuntsog (detained October 2004, sentenced to five years¡¯ imprisonment for "splittism"); and Tenzin Deleg (detained April 2002, sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, later commuted to life imprisonment, for conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism).
While Zhou served as the Sichuan Party secretary, he characterized China's ethnic minority educational system, which provides for teaching of ethnic minority languages as well as for classes to be taught in those languages, as a "heavy burden" on the government, and questioned whether the government should "bother so much" with the program (South China Morning Post, in OSC, 14 March 00). He accused Tibetans of having "blind faith" in the Dalai Lama and of wasting their money by offering donations to Buddhist monasteries, according to the article.
Leadership of Party and Government Agencies Pressuring Tibetan Rights
During the 2002-2007 period when Zhou held the top public security posts in both the Party and government and the position of Deputy Secretary of the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, Chinese security officials, procuratorates, and courts in Tibetan autonomous areas of China pursued a policy of detaining, charging, convicting, and sentencing Tibetans to imprisonment for peaceful expressions and activities that officials characterized as "splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country"). After Zhou's promotion to the Secretary of the committee, he called on senior officials attending a December 26, 2007, national conference on "politics and law work" to "master the work objectives of improving the national security strategy and system, earnestly safeguard national security, as well as remain highly vigilant and strictly guard against all kinds of splittist, infiltration and subversive activities," (Xinhua, translated in OSC 28 December 07).
Even as Tibetans have become far less confrontational since the early- and mid-1990s, insofar as more recently they rarely resort to open displays of behavior that Chinese officials punish as threats to state security (see below), authorities have not responded to the change by moderating the level of repression of expressions of ethnic and religious identity¡ªespecially in cases where Tibetan devotion to the Dalai Lama is involved. Instead, officials have tightened enforcement of laws and seek to punish activity that is innocuous in comparison with previous years. Tibetans in the early- and mid-1990s faced imprisonment for bold expressions of public dissent, such as staging demonstration marches in busy public locations. In the post-2000 period, however, authorities imprison Tibetans for activities such as possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama and copies of his teachings, writing or possessing "splittist" literature, or for arguing with a patriotic education instructor.
Imprisonment Data: After Public Protests Decline, Inconsequential Actions Punished
Comparing information about Tibetan political imprisonment for the period 2002-2007 with 1992-1997 shows that while Zhou exercised authority over the public security establishment, officials punished Tibetans for inconsequential activity, claiming that the activities endangered state security, even after Tibetans had dramatically moderated the scale and style of expressions of dissent. During the 1992-1997 period there were 1,232 political detentions of Tibetans, according to CECC analysis of PPD information, of which at least 529 (43 percent) resulted from peaceful public demonstrations by Tibetans. An additional 73 (6 percent) of the detentions were the result of protests (including prison protests). Another 259 (21 percent) of the Tibetans put up small posters or distributed leaflets to make political or religious statements. Of the remaining detentions, 95 (8 percent)--a figure certain to be low--are known to have resulted from making statements or possessing materials about the Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama. Of those 95 Tibetans, 32 (33 percent) used posters or leaflets to make their statements.
In comparison, during 2002-2007, none of the protests is known to have been a public demonstration march in a public area. At least 107 (75 percent) of the 142 known political detentions of Tibetans during the period resulted from making statements about the Dalai Lama or possessing materials associated with him, based on PPD information current in January 2008. About 30 (29 percent) of the 107 Tibetans put up small posters or distributed leaflets to make their statements. Of the remaining 35 detentions, only 13 (9 percent) are known to have been the result of protest activity such as shouting slogans.
Deputy Leader of the Party's Tibet Work Coordination Group
Zhou plays a leading role in the Party's top Tibetan policy work group, which seeks to end the Dalai Lama's influence among Tibetans and to prioritize economic development over protecting Tibetan culture. After the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the Central Committee leadership appointed Zhou as one of three deputy leaders of the group, headed by Jia Qinglin, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), according to a July 10, 2006, People's Daily report (translated in OSC, 23 April 07). The other two deputy leaders are Liu Yandong, Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD) and Vice Chairman of the CPPCC, and Hua Jianmin, State Councilor and Secretary General of the State Council. An April 17, 2007, Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 18 April 07) implied that the group's leadership had not previously been made public and stated that the group is formally known as either the "Central Tibet Work Coordination Group" or the "Central Coordination Group on the Struggle Against the Dalai Clique." The group has "overall charge of Tibetan affairs," the Singtao Daily report said.
The Tibet work group's "main tasks" are "opposing the Dalai clique and maintaining Tibet's stability," and a principal means of achieving those goals is accelerated economic development, according to the People's Daily report. Completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in July 2006, added "a beautiful chapter to the history of Tibet," and demonstrated the "correct leadership" of central authorities in their work to "consolidate and develop" the TAR and other Tibetan ethnic areas, according to the report. The group held five leadership meetings in the 2003-2006 period, according to People's Daily, as well as three regional level work meetings in the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Liu Yandong Promoted to the Politburo
(People's Daily bio, 22 October 07)
Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD)
Liu Yandong, who served as Head of the UFWD from December 2002 (Xinhua, 5 December 2002) until December 2007 (Xinhua, 2 December 07), has been promoted to the 25-member Politburo of the Central Committee. Liu's attainment of Politburo rank was concurrent with State Council Vice Premier Wu Yi's retirement from the Politburo and Central Committee (Xinhua, 21 October 2007), positioning Liu as China's highest-ranking female Party official. Liu has served since 2003 as a Vice Chairwoman of the CPPCC national committee and a member of its Leading Party Members¡¯ Group. The UFWD oversees the implementation of Party policy toward China's eight "democratic" political parties, ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs, among other functions. In 2005, the UFWD established a new bureau to handle Tibetan affairs, according to a Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 15 September 06). The Seventh Bureau's mission is "to cooperate with relevant parties in struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans."
As noted above, Liu is a Deputy Leader of the Party's Tibet Work Coordination Group tasked with "opposing the Dalai clique" and pursuing a Tibetan solution based on accelerated economic development.
Dialogue with the Dalai Lama's Representatives
Despite the Party's hostility toward the Dalai Lama, the UFWD served as the host organization for the dialogue process between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives, Special Envoy Lodi Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen, during all of their five visits to China. Liu's status as Head of the UFWD during four of the five visits to China by the envoys associates her with the disappointing status of the dialogue. The CECC noted in its 2007 Annual Report:The Commission has observed no evidence of substantive progress in that dialogue toward fair and equitable decisions about policies that could help to protect Tibetans and their religion, language, and culture, even though a session of dialogue took place each year beginning in 2002, and even though a basis for such protections exists under China's Constitution and law. On their first trip, the envoys met with Wang Zhaoguo, then-Head of the UFWD and currently a Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress. Liu served as UFWD Head during the subsequent four visits, and met with the envoys herself on their second and third trips in 2003 and 2004. After meeting with the UFWD's top official during the first three visits, the envoys met UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun on their fourth and fifth visits in 2006 and 2007. In an address to the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. in November 2006, Gyari identified the Chinese government's distrust of the Dalai Lama as "one of the most critical obstacles" facing Tibetans in the dialogue process. In Gyari's statement following the 2007 trip, the briefest and least optimistic issued after any of the rounds of dialogue, he noted that the envoys had conveyed their "serious concerns in the strongest possible manner," and that the dialogue process had reached a "critical stage." (See Special Envoy's statements on visits to China in September 2002, May-June 2003, September 2004, February 2006, and June-July, 2007. In June-July 2005, the envoys met with Zhu Weiqun in Bern, Switzerland. See CECC articles on rounds of dialogue in 2005 and 2006. See CECC Annual Reports 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 for more information on the dialogue.)
Heading a Tibetan Cultural Preservation Organization
Liu is the head of an organization that describes its purpose as preserving Tibetan culture, and that has registered with the United Nations (UN) as an independent NGO although it is supervised by senior Party and government officials. In her role as Honorary President of the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (CAPDTC), Liu opened the organization's first China Tibetan Culture Forum in Beijing in October 2006, according to an October 10, 2006, report by the China Tibet Information Center (CTIC),a Chinese government-run Web site. Liu retained the position as of December 2007 when CAPDTC held its second forum in Nepal, according to a December 13, 2007, CTIC report.
CAPDTC was founded in 2004 and promotes increased economic development and tourism as measures that can help to ensure the preservation and development of Tibetan culture. UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun is also the Vice President of CAPDTC, and Sithar (Sita), director of the UFWD's Seventh Bureau that handles Tibetan affairs, is the Vice Chairman of CAPDTC. (CAPDTC, 9 October 06; CTIC, 10 October 06; China Daily, 10 October 06; CAPDTC, 10 October 06; CTIC, 9 October 06; CAPDTC, 11 October 06).
For more information, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; and Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-23 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Mixed Progress for Olympic Foreign Reporting Regulations One Year Later
A year after China's Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period went into effect, a Beijing-based association of foreign journalists noted "improved overall reporting conditions for foreign journalists" but also "hot spots where journalists have experienced repeated violations" of the regulations, according to a January 1 Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC) press release. The temporary regulations, effective from January 1, 2007 to October 17, 2008, give foreign journalists greater freedom to report in China, something the International Olympic Committee required China do in order to host the 2008 Olympics. Specifically, foreign journalists no longer need separate government permission to interview individuals and organizations that consent to be interviewed. Furthermore, the regulations apply to a foreign journalist's coverage of all kinds of topics, not just those related to the Olympics.
The FCCC press release notes that while foreign journalists reported "easier travel and better access to officials," they also reported to the FCCC 180 incidents of "reporting interference" in 2007. Of particular concern were reports of: - "Plainclothes thugs" intimidating or physically assaulting foreign journalists. Cited as an example was an incident in September in which more than a dozen "thugs" beat a Reuters reporter trying to investigate allegations that an "illicit detention center" in Beijing was holding petitioners.
- Local authorities following journalists and holding them in custody, including in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and "preventing many Chinese citizens who agree to be interviewed from talking to foreign journalists." One example occurred in August, when a French journalist reported being frequently followed in Kashgar and surrounding counties while investigating allegations that teenage Uighur girls sent to work in factories in eastern China had been abused. The journalist reported that a source and a family he had met were subsequently questioned. In a more recent incident, reported by Reporters Without Borders on January 11, Beijing police prevented foreign journalists from interviewing Zeng Jinyan, a prominent blogger and the wife of detained activist Hu Jia.
- Central government attempts to compel media organizations to drop certain interviews or news stories. The FCCC said that several media outlets had reported being warned to cancel interviews with Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama, or face "the consequences."
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the government agency in charge of foreign journalists in China, has cited the difficulty of implementing a new regulation and argued that it is unrealistic to expect implementation to proceed without any problems. "The regulations' full implementation needs close coordination among different government bodies and it takes time for local governments and organizations to fully understand the terms of the regulations," said Liu Jianchao, Director-General of the Information Department of MOFA in an August 3 China Daily article. Liu noted progress had been made, however, saying that foreign media were now making fewer complaints. He touted the regulations as creating a "better environment for foreign journalists to cover their stories in China in a more comprehensive, objective and balanced way...."
Foreign reporters have reported some progress as a result of the regulations, as noted above, and in separate reports released in August by the FCCC, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), and Human Rights Watch (HRW). For example, the HRW report found that for some reporters the new regulations had "significantly widened access to sources and topics previously taboo, such as access to certain prominent political dissidents and to villages with public health emergencies." The FCCC's January press release said it believed "the new regulations have been a positive step that has brought China closer to meeting international standards."
Anecdotal evidence over the last year, however, suggests several ongoing obstacles to full implementation of the regulations and the spirit behind them. As MOFA has acknowledged, ensuring local officials' compliance with the national regulation has proven difficult. Foreign reporters have encountered local officials who deny knowledge of the regulations or erroneously insist that the regulations apply only to coverage of the Olympics, according to the August FCCC report and HRW report. MOFA has reportedly been helpful in resolving some of these disputes, according to the CPJ report. And while foreign reporters themselves have gained greater freedom to report, authorities have sought to intimidate their Chinese interviewees and co-workers, neither of whom is explicitly protected by the regulations. Authorities have questioned Chinese co-workers, kept them under surveillance, and intimidated members of their family, according to the August FCCC report and HRW report. HRW reported that officials warned a source he would have to "bear the consequences" if he spoke to foreign journalists, and the FCCC reported that interviewees had been chided for "disgracing their own country." In addition, MOFA, which controls a foreign journalist's entry into and ability to remain in China, has called journalists into the foreign ministry to reprimand them for their stories. HRW noted that these reprimands "appear to have become a fallback position for the Chinese government to intimidate foreign correspondents whose coverage displeases them" since the regulations had somewhat weakened "the government's capacity to proactively and overtly prevent such reporting." Finally, Chinese propaganda officials have stepped up censorship of the domestic media's reporting on certain topics out of concern that foreign journalists were picking up story ideas from their domestic counterparts.
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) 2007 Annual Report called on China to live up to its commitment to grant foreign journalists complete freedom to report in China before and during the 2008 Olympics Games, to remove the October 2008 expiration of this commitment, and to grant similar protections to domestic journalists, for which this commitment does not apply. Domestic journalists remain subject to a wide range of government and Party regulations, policies, and pressures that encourage self-censorship and hinder their ability to report freely. For more information on China's restrictions on its own journalists, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-25 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Politburo Study Session Calls for Uniting Religious Communities Around Party
At a Politburo study session held December 18, Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed the Party's policies for controlling religion and called on religious communities to play a "positive role" in promoting state goals and to "closely unite" around the Party. Hu's statements, which outlined direction for carrying forward Party policy on religion, also continued a trend in mentioning a "positive role" for religious communities at high levels of the Communist Party. According to a description of the study session posted December 20 on the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), Hu called for "closely uniting religious personages and the religious masses around the Party and government" and outlined three "requirements" for carrying out the Party's work on religion under what he described as "new historic conditions": - Continuing the Party's Basic Policy on Religion. Hu described this requirement to involve "bringing into play the positive role of religious personages and the religious masses in the promotion of economic and social development." He also called for upholding the state's policies on "freedom of religious belief"; the administration of religious affairs in accordance with law; independence and self-governance; and the guiding of religion's adaptation to socialist society. In addition, he emphasized encouraging religious communities in their cultivation of a "love of country and love of religion," the promotion of unity, and their "fine traditions of serving society," as well as supporting them in making contributions to "ethnic unity, economic development, social harmony, and unification of the motherland."
- Strengthening Work Regarding the "Religious Masses." Hu stressed uniting religious adherents and using their "wisdom and strengths" in building a healthy society and accelerating "socialist modernization." Hu also called for gaining religious communities' consensus on issues including support for Communist Party leadership and the socialist system, an "ardent love of country," defending China's unification, and promoting social harmony. In addition, Hu stressed "sincerely caring" about religious adherents and aiding those living in hardship, to let them experience the "loving care" and "warmth" of the Party and government.
- Strengthening Construction of the Ranks of Religious Personnel. Hu emphasized the importance of building a contingent of religious personnel with political reliability, academic attainments, and appropriate morals. In addition, he called for supporting the role of the state-controlled "patriotic religious associations" in charge of China's registered religious communities and for guiding the associations in their work.
The study session, which according to a Chinese academic cited in a December 20 South China Morning Post article (subscription required) was the first of its kind as a topic for such a Politburo session, followed an address by Hu on October 15 at the 17th Party Congress, in which he similarly called for promoting religious communities' "positive role" in economic and social development. In that speech, Hu also mentioned the importance of promoting harmony in religious relations and of carrying out the Party's basic policy on religion. At the October Congress, the Communist Party also amended the Communist Party Constitution to include mention of religion for the first time, adding language that calls on the Party to "fully implement" its basic policy toward work on religious affairs and to unite religious adherents "in making contributions to economic and social development." For more information, see the texts of Hu's speech (English, Chinese) and the amended Constitution (English, Chinese) on the China Internet Information Center Web site, as well as an October 21 article from Xinhua. Prior to the October Congress, other high-level officials also had stated that aspects of religion could take on a "positive role" in promoting state goals. For example, in August 2006 SARA director Ye Xiaowen dedicated an article in the official Party journal Seeking Truth (via Open Source Center, subscription required, and the Chinese Communist Party News Web site) to the topic of "bringing into play the positive role of religion in promoting social harmony."
Whether Hu's October and December statements will translate into improvements in religious freedom for Chinese citizens remains unclear. Although the statements articulated a "positive role" for religious communities within China, the December Politburo session reiterated the Party's fundamental positions on religion, including its policy of granting citizens only "freedom of religious belief" rather than "freedom of religion." As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), "freedom of religion" as defined in international human rights standards includes not only the freedom to believe in a religion but also the freedom to manifest that belief. Chinese laws and policies permit only "normal religious activities" and do not define this term in a manner to provide meaningful protection to all aspects of religious practice. In addition, the Chinese government applies its framework for freedom of religious belief only to members of recognized religious communities organized under the patriotic religious associations.
In addition, it is unclear whether statements from the study session that recognize a "positive role" for religious communities reflect a degree of accommodation, an effort to better co-opt religious communities and subject them to tighter state control, or some measure of both. Past statements from state officials have couched measures to control religious groups and their internal religious doctrine in terms of accommodating religious communities. For example, in a July 2006 interview, SARA Director Ye Xiaowen called for helping religious communities integrate into society but stressed achieving this goal by having the state direct religious leaders in their interpretations of religious tenets to "convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers" in line with state goals.
For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-15 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Central Propaganda Department Restricts Reporting on Air Quality, Food Safety
The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) of the Chinese Communist Party recently issued a notice to Chinese news editors restricting domestic coverage of topics relating to China's hosting of the 2008 Olympics, including air quality and food safety, according to a November 13 South China Morning Post (SCMP) report (subscription required). The report said that the CPD, responsible for ensuring that China's media follow the Communist Party's lead, delivered the notice during the week of November 5 and that the notice "ordered journalists to steer clear of Olympics-related story ideas that could show the country in a bad light." A source who read the notice told the SCMP that it identified air quality, food safety, the Olympic torch relay, and the Paralympics as topics that had recently generated "unfavorable publicity" in the foreign media. The source said the notice "requires state media to put a spin on those topics to 'offset the bad publicity' created by those previous reports." The SCMP added that Chinese media regulators were becoming more aware of the influence domestic stories have on foreign media coverage of China, noting that "most foreign media pick up story ideas from the domestic press." CPD directives, which are frequently issued in response to politically sensitive events, may apply to any Chinese journalist.
Such notices violate international standards for freedom of expression. Article 19 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed and has committed to ratify, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), guarantees the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. The ICCPR and UDHR permit states to restrict this freedom under a limited number of circumstances, but furthering a political agenda is not one of the permitted exceptions. In addition to the ICCPR and UDHR protections, Article 35 of China's Constitution provides that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of the press.
The notice follows other instances this year where the CPD and local propaganda officials have exercised their power to restrict or manipulate domestic reporting for political reasons: - In August, the CPD issued an almost complete ban on reporting about a bridge collapse that killed 64 people amid suspicions of corruption and shoddy construction, according to an August 17 Associated Press report (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune).
- In July, local propaganda officials in Beijing ordered a Beijing newspaper to discontinue its political reporting and warned other local papers not to issue "negative" news about food safety, according to a July 31 SCMP report (subscription required). The actions came amid rising international concern over the safety of China's food exports and followed the discovery that a Beijing television reporter had falsified a news report claiming that food vendors were filling steamed buns with pieces of cardboard.
- In January, the CPD ordered media executives not to focus on problems in China's legal system or the excesses of corrupt officials and to emphasize stories "that preserve social stability and avoid triggering social conflict" in the run-up to the annual National People's Congress session held in March and the 17th Party Congress held in October, according to a February 27 Washington Post report.
The notice also calls into question China's commitment, set forth in the Beijing Olympic Action Plan issued by the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games in 2002, to "be open in every aspect to the rest of the country and the whole world" in its preparations for the Olympics. The plan also says that China will bring "into full play the role of public supervision" and that "the preparation for Olympic Games will be transparent." By restricting local media coverage of air quality and food safety, China threatens to hinder public monitoring of the air quality and food safety commitments it made for the Olympics, even as concern about China's ability to fulfill such commitments remains. In its bid, China promised that "air quality during the period of the Games in 2008 will be of a high quality, and meet Chinese and WHO [World Health Organization] standards." A 2007 report by the United Nations Environment Programme noted, however, that levels of small particulate matter "remain well above" current WHO air quality guidelines and that "despite the relatively positive trends of recent years, air quality remains a legitimate concern for Olympic organizers, competitors and observers, as well as for the citizens of Beijing." Controversies this year involving such food products as fish and eggs have called into question China's system for monitoring food production, putting greater spotlight on China's pledge to ensure the safety of food for Olympic participants, as reported in a July 11 Xinhua article (reprinted on the Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympics Games).
The recent restrictions on domestic reporters come in a year when hosting the 2008 Olympics has prompted China to issue regulations that, on paper, relax restrictions on foreign journalists reporting in China. For more information about the CPD and restrictions on the reporting activities of Chinese journalists, see Section II--Freedom of Expression in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Bishop Ordinations in 2007 Return to Holy See Involvement
The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), which oversees China's registered Catholic church, ordained three bishops in late 2007 who had received approval from the Holy See, continuing a trend that was interrupted in 2006 by several bishop ordinations without Holy See approval. Although the CPA appoints and ordains bishops according to its own internal procedures and does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to make such appointments, in recent years it has tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops. After breaking with this practice for some bishop appointments in 2006, the CPA ordained a total of five bishops in 2007 all of whom had Holy See approval. Recent ordinations include:
- L¨¹ Shouwang, ordained as bishop of the Yichang diocese in Hubei province on November 30. For Chinese government reporting on the event, see an article posted December 3 on the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). See a December 3 article from the Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) for overseas reporting on the ordination.
- Gan Junqiu, ordained as bishop of the Guangzhou diocese in Guangdong province on December 4, a year after being elected to the post. According to November 16 and December 3 articles from AsiaNews, internal disputes over which bishops would be involved in the ordination had delayed the date of the ceremony. For Chinese reporting on the event, see a December 7 SARA article.
- Li Jing, ordained as coadjutor bishop of the Ningxia diocese in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on December 21. According to a December 10 article from AsiaNews, the issue of whether bishops with Holy See approval would preside over the ordination may have been a factor in postponing the ceremony from its originally scheduled date of December 8. For additional information, see December 21 articles from AsiaNews and UCAN, as well as a January 7 correction to the UCAN story. See also a December 22 article from the China Daily (via the China Internet Information Center) and a December 24 report from SARA.
In September, the CPA ordained the coadjutor bishop of the Guizhou diocese and the bishop of Beijing. The ordinations followed an open letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Catholic church members in China, written in May and issued the following month, urging reconciliation between registered and unregistered Catholic communities in China and expressing concern about bishop selections by Chinese state authorities. The extent to which the subsequent five bishop ordinations with Holy See approval were a response to the letter, however, remains unclear, given factors including delays in some of the ordinations and in the Chinese government's initial reaction to the letter. Chinese authorities blocked Internet access to the letter, and local officials reportedly detained some Catholic clergy in an effort to assert authority in the aftermath of the letter's publication. For more information, see Section II---Freedom of Religion, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-10 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Religious Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan
Local governments and educational institutions in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued in 2007 to impose religious restrictions on Muslims' observance of the holiday of Ramadan. Local governments and schools called for increased controls over religious activities during Ramadan, banning students from fasting, forbidding teachers and other state employees from engaging in religious activities, and requiring local restaurants to remain open during the holiday.- In the township of Yitimliqum in Qarghiliq county, local Party and government officials convened a meeting to instruct attendees, including local cadres, teachers' representatives, and religious personnel, to intensify inspection and supervision of religious activities during Ramadan, according to a September 13 report on the Qarghiliq county government Web site. Authorities called for strengthening measures by villages and schools to administer and control religious activities; intensifying implementation of the "two systems" of maintaining regular government contact with mosques and religious figures; ensuring religious activities and worship sites remain under the administration of "patriotic religious personages" and preventing unlicensed religious clergy from leading religious activities; and prohibiting party members, state cadres, and minors from observing Ramadan or participating in other religious activities. The report also called for preventing unauthorized religious pilgrimages and eliminating "infiltration and sabotage" activities carried out in the name of religion.
- Party and government officials in Yopurgha county inspected local restaurants and food service companies during Ramadan to "strengthen work regarding social stability during Ramadan and protect market order," according to a September 18 report on the Kashgar government Web site. Authorities forbade restaurant and food service businesses from closing during the holiday and instructed the food service industry to serve the needs of customers not observing Ramadan. The report said that authorities would "deal sternly" with individuals and businesses that forced restaurants to close during the holiday.
- In a September 15 speech posted on the B¨¹g¨¹r county government Web site, local Party Secretary Zhang Zhengrong stated that Party members, cadres, and students may not profess a religion. Zhang called on schools to strengthen propaganda education during Ramadan and to put a stop to activities including fasting and professing a religion.
- The Kashgar Teachers College implemented a series of measures to prevent students from observing Ramadan, according to a September 25 report from Radio Free Asia. The school imposed communal meals and required students to obtain permission to leave campus. School authorities also made students gather for a school assembly at a time of day coinciding with Friday prayers. The report noted that under direction from the government, other schools in the region appeared to be implementing similar measures in order to prevent students from observing the holiday.
These restrictions over the observance of Ramadan are a continuation of repressive measures implemented by local governments and educational institutions in previous years. According to reports issued in 2006, Qarghiliq county education offices required schools to enforce communal lunches for students and teachers and instructed school officials to take other preventative measures to ensure that students did not fast or participate in other religious activities. Aqsu prefecture education officials forbade teachers from fasting during Ramadan and forcing or leading students to participate in religious activities, among other measures. In the XUAR capital, Urumqi, and within Kashgar prefecture, local governments also enforced measures to prevent students from fasting.Religious repression in the XUAR during Ramadan reflects broader religious controls that local governments and Party leaders impose in the region. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), in recent years the government has limited access to mosques, detained citizens for possession of unauthorized religious texts, imprisoned citizens for religious activities determined to be "extremist," and most recently confiscated Muslims' passports in an effort to strengthen control over Muslim pilgrimages. In addition, the XUAR government maintains the most severe legal restrictions in China on children's right to practice religion. For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on religion in China, see the CECC 2007 Annual Report, Section II--Freedom of Religion, and Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-12 / English) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Tibetans Appeal Splittism, Espionage Sentences for Horse-Racing Festival Incident
Relatives of four Tibetan men -- two nomads, a monk, and a school teacher -- traveled from a Tibetan area of Sichuan province to the provincial capital, Chengdu City, to submit appeals to the Sichuan High People's Court following the men's sentencing on November 20, 2007, on splittism and espionage charges, according to a December 4 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. The Ganzi (Kardze) Intermediate People's Court, located in Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, sentenced the four men to prison terms of up to 10 years on charges of splittism, espionage, or both, for actions linked to an August 1 incident at a horse-racing festival in Litang (Lithang) county in Ganzi TAP, according to a Xinhua report published the same day as the sentencing.
The Ganzi court convicted one of the men, 52 year-old nomad Ronggyal Adrag (or Runggye Adak) on October 29 on the charges of attempting to "subvert state power" and "split the country" by standing before a crowd gathered at the festival and shouting slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and greater Tibetan freedoms, according to an October 30 RFA report. Security officials detained him immediately. (For more information, see International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) reports, 2 August 07, 10 August 07.) If the report of conviction on both charges is accurate, Ronggyal Adrag was the first Tibetan convicted under the 1997 Criminal Law on the charges of "splittism" (Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country") as well as "subversion" (Article 105: "subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system"). The judge presiding over the trial said that Ronggyal Adrag's sentencing would take place within six or seven days (e.g. by November 5), according to the RFA report.
The same court sentenced Ronggyal Adrag to eight years' imprisonment on the charge of splittism on November 20 (about two weeks later than the court predicted), according to another Xinhua report that day. The report did not provide any information showing that Ronggyal Adrag was sentenced on the subversion charge. Articles 103 and 105 each provide sentences ranging from three years up to life imprisonment depending on the court's perception of the seriousness of the alleged activity. In October, the judge presiding over the trial characterized Ronggyal Adrag's crimes as "very severe," according to the October 30 RFA report, leading to initial concerns that he could face a prison sentence of extraordinary length as punishment for an incident of disorderly conduct.
The Ganzi court sentenced the other three Tibetans, monk Adrug Lupoe of Lithang Monastery (detained August 21), middle school teacher Jamyang Kunkhyen (detained August 22), and nomad Jarib Lothog (detained August 19), for alleged activities following Ronggyal Adrag's detention, when Tibetans reportedly protested in and near Litang town, and authorities called in the People's Armed Police (PAP) to enforce a crackdown, according to an August 24 ICT report, an August 28 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report, and a September 4 RFA report. Adrug Lupoe (one of Ronggyal Adrag's nephews) and Jamyang Kunkhyen followed "directions from overseas sources" and "took pictures and made discs and provided them to overseas organizations" with Jarib Lothog's assistance, according to information about the sentence provided in the first Xinhua report cited above. The report did not name the photographer or the overseas recipient of the images. According to the September 4 RFA report, Kunkhyen's detention was "thought to be connected to his possession of a video camera at the time of the protests," and followed a search of his residence by security officials. The August 24 ICT report provided images of security officials and PAP in and near Litang on August 8 to disperse Tibetans gathered to protest Ronggyal Adrag's detention.
The court found the three men guilty of espionage (Criminal Law, Article 110) because some of the images recorded on the discs "concern[ed] national security and interests" and "provid[ed] intelligence to overseas organizations," according Xinhua's account of the verdict. In addition to espionage, the court convicted Adrug Lupoe and Jamyang Kunkhyen of inciting splittism by "writing and posting secessionist flyers," and sentenced them to prison sentences of 10 years and 9 years, respectively. Jarib Lothog was sentenced to three year's imprisonment as an accomplice to espionage.
The men's relatives initially attempted to submit appeals to the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court in Kangding, but "they were not allowed to do so in the same court," according to a Kangding source cited in the December 4 RFA report. The Ganzi court's refusal to accept the appeal is consistent with Article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which provides "the defendant, private prosecutor, or their legal representatives" the right to refuse to accept a judgment and "to appeal in writing or orally to the People's Court at the next higher level." A provincial high court is one level higher than an intermediate court. When the relatives traveled to Chengdu, the Sichuan High People's Court did not at first respond to their requests to submit the appeals, the RFA source said. The provincial court accepted the appeals and provided the relatives with an official receipt only after the relatives produced a "joint appeal" addressed to officials in Beijing and signed by an unspecified number of Tibetan residents of the Litang area.
The CPL imposes strict limits on the period of time during which an appeal may be submitted. Article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law states, "A defendant shall not be deprived on any pretext of his right to appeal," but Article 183 restricts the period of time during which an appeal may be lodged to 10 days after receipt of the written judgment.
Information is not available about whether or not the men have access to legal counsel during their appeals process. A court-appointed lawyer representing Ronggyal Adrag at his trial in Kangding argued that his call for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet was strictly religious in nature, and not aimed at toppling the government, according to a November 20 ICT report.
See Section IV, on "Tibet: Special Focus for 2007," in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, available on the Web site of the Government Printing Office (GPO), for more information. The Tibet section of the 2007 Annual Report is available as a reprint on the GPO Web site.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Guo Feixiong Sentenced to Five Years for Illegal Business Operation
A Guangzhou court sentenced rights defender Yang Maodong (who uses the pen name Guo Feixiong) to five years in prison for "illegal operation of a business," a crime under Article 225 of China's Criminal Law, according to a November 16 Guangzhou Daily article (in Chinese, via the Web site of the Guangzhou Municipal People's Government). A November 14 Human Rights in China (HRIC) press release said that the Tianhe District People's Court, in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, handed down the sentence on November 14 and also fined him 40,000 yuan (US$5,400). The Guangzhou Daily article said that Guo's punishment stemmed from activities he allegedly undertook beginning in 2001. The article said that in July 2001, Guo fabricated the existence of a magazine publisher named "Comprehensive Law" and misappropriated the publication number of the publication "Chemical Reagent." Guo then used the number to print 26,086 copies of a publication named "Comprehensive Law 2001 Special Issue" and distributed them to the cities of Shenyang and Dalian, both in Liaoning province, to be sold. While the Guangzhou Daily described the item being sold as a "publication" and gave no details as to its content, the HRIC press release and a November 15 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article (subscription required) reported that Guo was punished for publishing a book concerning a political scandal in Shenyang. SCMP reported that the book had "angered local officials."
Guo's punishment comes amid a sustained government crackdown against prominent rights defenders such as Guo, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng, and Zheng Enchong. For more information on this crackdown, see "Access to Counsel and Right To Present a Defense" in Section II - Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report. Guo himself was previously detained for more than three months in late 2005, after he advised villagers in Taishi village, Guangdong, on their recall campaign against an allegedly corrupt village committee head. In February 2006, Guo published an online essay identifying government suppression of the recall campaign as the start of the crackdown against rights defenders. Two days after the essay was published, unidentified assailants reportedly beat Guo outside the police station where officials had earlier interrogated him. In early 2006, Guo took part in a hunger strike relay that Gao initiated to protest government abuses. In October 2006, about a month after Guo was detained, Chinese authorities arrested writer Zhang Jianhong and Internet essayist Chen Shuqing, both of whom had expressed support for Gao and are now serving sentences of six years and four years, respectively.
Guo's more recent detention and trial included a number of procedural postponements. According to the HRIC press release: - September 14, 2006 - Guo detained.
- September 30 - Guo formally arrested, after which the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau (PSB) refers his case to the Tianhe District People's Procuratorate.
- January 19, 2007 - procuratorate sends case back to the Guangzhou PSB for supplemental investigation.
- January 20 - case transferred to authorities in Liaoning.
- February 17 - case sent back to the Tianhe District People's Procuratorate.
- March 1 - procuratorate sends case to Guangzhou PSB for supplemental investigation.
- May 15 - Guo formally indicted.
- July 9 - Guo's trial begins at the Tianhe District People's Court.
- July 26 - Guo's wife, Zhang Qing, learns that the procuratorate has requested a supplemental investigation.
- End of August - supplemental investigation completed.
- October 12 - Zhang learns that the court has requested a one-month delay from the Guangdong Provincial High People's Court.
In a June 4, 2007, appeal to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (translated and reprinted by HRIC), Zhang reported that police interrogators in both Guangzhou and Shenyang used coercive methods in an attempt to force a confession from Guo, including tying him to his bed in arm and leg manacles for 40 days and using electric batons and rods to strike his genitals. Article 247 of the Criminal Law and provisions issued by the Supreme People's Procuratorate in 2005 prohibit and punish the use of torture to coerce a confession. The Chinese government is further bound by provisions in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which it ratified in 1988. Wang Zhenchuan, Deputy Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, acknowledged at a November 18, 2006, seminar in Sanya city, Hainan province, that almost all wrongful convictions in China involve police abuse during the investigation stage. Official Chinese statistics show that only about 30 people are wrongfully convicted in China each year due to police abuses, but Wang said that the real number could be higher.
The Chinese government has relied on the crime of "illegal operation of a business" to selectively punish other individuals for publishing political or religious materials. For example, house church pastors Wang Zaiqing and Cai Zhuohua were sentenced to two years and three years, respectively, for printing Bibles and other Christian literature without government permission. China's licensing scheme for publishing prevents citizens from publishing through anyone but a government-licensed publisher. To obtain a license, publishers must have a government sponsor and meet minimum financial requirements. The government limits the number of publications by requiring a publication to have a unique serial number, the allotment of which the government controls. These restrictions force citizens who wish to publish information or opinions that the Chinese government or Communist Party disagrees with to refrain from doing so or to risk punishment by publishing without government permission.
For more information on the Chinese government's policy toward publishing, see "Government Policy Toward Publishing" in Section II - Freedom of Expression of the CECC's 2007 Annual Report. For additional information about Guo, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng, Zhang Jianhong, Chen Shuqing, Wang Zaiqing, and Cai Zhuohua, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Wang Dejia, Shi Weihan Released on Bail
State security officials in China released Internet essayist Wang Dejia (whose pen name is Jing Chu) on bail on January 12, the Chinese rights advocacy Web site Minsheng Guancha reported on the same day. The report said that Wang had been released from the Quanzhou County Detention Center in Guilin city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Wang was originally detained in Quanzhou on December 13, 2007, on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power." Wang has written and posted numerous articles on the Internet criticizing the Chinese government and Communist Party and has also criticized China's hosting of the Olympics, which takes place in August of this year. According to Wang's wife, as reported in a January 17 Agence France-Presse article (via The China Post), authorities released Wang on the condition that he cease posting essays critical of the Chinese government. She said they required Wang to sign a pledge not to write any more and told him not to speak to foreign journalists.
While released on bail, Wang's case could remain open and subject to further investigation and prosecution for up to a year. Under Chinese law, being released on bail is referred to as having "obtained a guarantor pending trial" (qubao houshen). Article 58 of China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) provides that "[t]he period granted by a People's Court, People's Procuratorate, or public security organ to a criminal suspect or defendant for awaiting trial after obtaining a guarantor shall not exceed twelve months..." Article 58 also requires officials to continue "investigation, prosecution and handling" of a case while an individual is released on bail and to terminate such status if officials determine that the individual should not be investigated for criminal responsibility. During the period that Wang is released on bail, he must observe certain restrictions, including obtaining the government's permission before leaving his city or county of residence, according to Article 56 of the CPL.
Also in January, Beijing authorities released bookstore owner Shi Weihan on bail after detaining him for "illegal printing and distribution" of religious literature, according to a January 7 press release (English, Chinese) from the China Aid Association (CAA). According to CAA, authorities decided not to formally arrest Shi because of "insufficient evidence" and released him and two dozen others allegedly involved in the case on bail on January 4. Shi was originally detained on November 28.
For more information on China's imprisonment of online critics and punishment of citizens who publish religious materials without permission, see "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression and "Religious Speech" in Section II - Freedom of Religion, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-18 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Slogans Take on Softer Tone, But Restrictive Population Policies Remain
China's National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) has altered its population planning slogans to reflect a less strident tone, according to an October 11 Xinhua article and a July 19 circular posted on the NPFPC Web site. The NPFPC eliminated older slogans like "Raise fewer babies but more piggies" and "One more baby means one more tomb" that drew controversy and created a "misunderstanding about the [population planning] policy and even tarnish[ed] the image of the government," according to the NPFPC, as cited in the Xinhua article. In their place are slogans including "The mother earth is too tired to sustain more children" and "Having a boy or girl brings much joy, gender imbalances bring much worry." The slogans, organized by theme, include catch phrases directed at migrant populations and slogans to encourage officials to properly implement population planning policies. (See the Xinhua article for translations of some phrases. Click here and scroll to the bottom of the page to open an attachment listing the 190 new slogans in Chinese.) Despite this change in tone, the government's population planning policies remain unchanged, and have been reinforced by two new policy documents issued in recent months.
On May 24, 2007, the National Population and Family Planning Commission issued a plan to "rectify" out-of-plan births in urban parts of China. (English translation available from Open Source Center and quoted here.) The new directive addresses weak compliance with population planning requirements, including by public officials who have more than the permitted number of children. The plan also encourages urban areas to "play a leading and influential role" in population planning work. It sets out four main tasks:- taking "measures against ... social public figures, party members and cadres who run counter to the family planning policy;"
- investigating violations of population planning policies, including births of second children and births to unmarried parents;
- publicizing "unlawful" births; and
- launching a propaganda campaign to "carry forward justice, foster a good atmosphere, and guide the broad masses of the people to consciously carry out the family planning policy."
News that followed this plan echoed similar concerns about officials' failure to comply with population planning policies by having more children than permitted. As discussed in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), official Chinese media reported in July 2007 that Hunan population planning authorities found that from 2000 to 2005, nearly 2,000 officials in the province had violated the national Population and Family Planning Law. In September 2007, the central government and Communist Party announced new measures to monitor public officials' adherence to population planning requirements and deny promotions to officials who had more than the permitted number of children.
The second document, an opinion issued by the General Office of the State Council on May 31, 2007, focuses on strengthening officials' administration of population planning requirements. The document, issued on the heels of a series of protests in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR) over the enforcement of population planning policies, cited concerns about "mass incidents" and threats to "social stability" stemming from local officials' abuses in implementing the policies. (See Section II, Population Planning, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information on the events in the GZAR.) The opinion calls for:- "unwavering" support for population planning policies;
- strengthening officials' implementation of relevant laws and directives, and safeguarding citizens' "lawful rights and interests;"
- continuing policies to spread propaganda and education, promote contraception, and ensure consistency in population planning work;
- maintaining a system to inspect the enforcement of population planning policies;
- strengthening early warning and response mechanisms to handle urgent situations related to population planning; and
- strengthening legal education for public officials.
Although the opinion articulates a limited number of steps to address abuses in the enforcement of population planning requirements, both the opinion and the earlier plan reinforce basic population planning policies that violate international human rights standards. For more information, see Section II, Population Planning, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-14 / English) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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SEPA Issues Measures on Open Environmental Information
The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) issued measures that standardize the disclosure of environmental information by government agencies and enterprises, and provide the public with the right to request government environmental information, according to an April 25, 2007, SEPA press release. SEPA issued the Measures on Open Environmental Information (the Measures) on April 11, and was the first government agency to release its own implementing measures after the State Council issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information on April 5. Both come into effect on May 1, 2008. The Measures highlight the central government and Communist Party leadership's increased attention to environmental issues in recent years. In 2002, former President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin's report at the Party's 16th National Congress used the words "environment" or "environmental" in reference to environmental issues eight times. Five years later, those words appeared in Hu Jintao's report at the 17th National Congress on 19 occasions. Hu's report also mentioned the requirement to "promote a conservation culture" for the first time, according to a January 11, 2008, China Environment News article.
The Measures could increase the amount of information available on environmental conditions before and during the Beijing 2008 Olympics in August, enabling the public to better assess China's progress toward fulfilling its environmental commitments for the event. The Measures require environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) to disclose information on "environmental quality conditions" and to take no longer than 30 business days to reply to requests for information. EPBs must also disclose environmental statistics, information on sudden environmental incidents, and the outcomes of petition letters and complaints, among other items. Some areas have already formulated documents to implement the Measures. The Chongqing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, for example, has posted its information guide and catalogue (in Microsoft Word format) on its open government information page. For an overview of the Measures, click on "more" below.
A senior Chinese environmental official has noted the importance of information disclosure in efforts to protect the environment. Pan Yue, SEPA's Vice Minister, said in a May 22, 2007, Central People's Government Web site interview (reprinted in Xinhua) that "environmental information disclosure is a prerequisite and the foundation for the public to effectively participate in environmental protection." Pan added that heavily polluting enterprises currently often refuse to provide emissions information to the public on the grounds that such information is a "trade secret." "Disclosing these enterprises' environmental information leverages the weight of public opinion to standardize enterprises' environmental conduct and strengthen the public's societal supervision of enterprises," Pan said. According to a September 2002 World Bank (WB) report, pilot projects in China that involve the public disclosure of enterprise pollution information have significantly reduced pollution, even in locations where environmental groups are not very active.
While the Measures may increase disclosure, their effectiveness in protecting the environment also depends on the extent that they encourage public participation and overcome resistance from local interests. Current measures to encourage participation in environmental issues have fallen short, according to Ma Jun, Director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs. "Looking at the implementation of the Provisional Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment, the public's level of interest has been wholly inadequate," said Ma, according to an April 29, 2007, Xinhua article. Article 8 requires EPBs to ensure the funding and personnel for disclosure work. Disincentives to protect the environment at the local level, however, could hinder EPBs from receiving the funding they need to adequately implement the Measures. The WB report suggests that the costs of disclosing environmental information about enterprises may be low since EPBs already collect much of this information. Yet the report also notes that such programs have "substantial start-up costs." As the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) noted in its 2006 Annual Report and 2007 Annual Report (page 135), EPBs depend on local governments for funding, but local governments derive income from polluting enterprises and evaluations of officials are largely based on local economic performance, leading some officials to underfund and pressure EPBs to overlook polluters. It is not clear whether the Measures will be able to overcome such systemic barriers.
The Measures may still give local officials too much discretion to limit disclosure of government environmental information, which Article 2 defines as "information created or obtained in a definite form by environmental protection departments in the course of carrying out their environmental protection responsibilities and recorded and stored in a definite form." Article 17 provides for an EPB to reject a request if the information "does not fall within the scope of disclosure," "the law provides that disclosure is not within a department's responsibility," the information "does not exist," or "the content for which the application is being made is unclear." The Measures also prohibit EPBs from disclosing environmental information that involves state secrets. According to a Human Rights in China 2007 report, China's laws and regulations define state secrets to encompass essentially all matters of public concern, giving officials broad latitude to withhold information.
Two environmental activists, Wu Lihong and Tan Kai, have been tried and sentenced, in part for their efforts to provide environment-related information to higher levels of government or the public. Tan was released in April 2007 after serving an 18-month sentence on the charge of "illegally obtaining state secrets." Wu is currently serving a three-year sentence on the charge of "extortion." For more information, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database, and the section on the Environment, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.
Overview of the Measures on Open Environmental Information
Supervision Structure:
SEPA's General Office is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of government environmental information disclosure work, with each office within SEPA performing disclosure work in their area of responsibility. Environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) at the county level and above are responsible for disclosure work in their administrative regions, with each EPB designating an office for organizing that bureau's disclosure work. Higher-level EPBs can order lower-level EPBs to make corrections if they violate provisions in the Measures. If circumstances are serious and fall into six categories, managers or other personnel with direct responsibility may be subject to administrative punishment. (Articles 3, 6, 26, and 27)
The Role of Environmental Protection Bureaus:
The Measures require EPBs to disclose information falling into any one of 17 categories within 20 business days from the date "such information arose or was modified." EPBs must publish disclosure guides, catalogues, and an annual report on their disclosure work. EPBs must not endanger social stability or state, public, or economic security in disclosing information, and should establish a disclosure system, which includes a system for safeguarding against disclosing state secrets. EPBs must guarantee the personnel and funding for that bureau's disclosure work. They are authorized to audit environmental information released by an enterprise, award law-abiding enterprises that voluntarily disclose information, and fine enterprises a maximum of 100,000 yuan (US$13,826) for failure to abide by the Measures. When citizens or others request information, EPBs have 15 business days to reply. If they are unable to meet this timeline, the deadline may be extended up to 15 business days. (Articles 2-4, 6, 8-15, 17-18, 23-25, and 27-28)
The Role of Enterprises:
The Measures encourage enterprises to voluntarily disclose information that falls into nine categories. The Measures further require EPBs to compile lists of enterprises whose pollution discharge exceeds standards. Such enterprises must disclose information regarding their major pollutants, environmental protection facilities, and environmental emergency plans, within 30 days of appearing on the list. These enterprises may not use the protection of trade secrets as a reason to refuse the disclosure of information. (Articles 19-23)
The Role of Citizens:
Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations can apply to EPBs to request government environmental information. The Measures require EPBs to maintain disclosure guides explaining what information is available and how to request information. Requests should include the requestor's name and contact, a detailed description of the requested information, and the format of disclosure. Citizens and others shall not harm national interest, public interest, or the interest of other people when using the disclosed information. If they believe a bureau has not fulfilled its obligation to disclose information in accordance with law, they may report their concerns to a higher-level EPB. They may also apply for administrative reconsideration or file an administrative lawsuit if they believe that the specific acts of an EPB in carrying out disclosure work violated their lawful rights and interests. (Articles 5, 7, 16, and 26)
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-31 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Tibetan Nomad Calling for Dalai Lama's Return Convicted of Subversion and Splittism
A court in Sichuan province convicted Tibetan nomad Ronggyal Adrag on October 29, 2007, on charges of attempting to "subvert state power" and "split the country" by standing before a crowd gathered at a horse-racing festival and yelling slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and greater Tibetan freedoms, according to an October 30 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report. The judge presiding over the Ganzi (Kardze) Intermediate People's Court, located in Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, said that sentencing would take place within six or seven days.
Convicting Ronggyal Adrag on the dual charges of "splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country") and "subversion" (Article 105: "subverting the State power or overthrowing the socialist system") could result in an unusually long sentence that authorities may intend to serve as a warning to Tibetans that they must adhere to Communist Party policies on ethnic and religious issues. (See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information about Party policy and government implementation.) If Tibetans view his punishment as provocative, it may further increase regional tension. Ronggyal Adrag addressed the court, according to the RFA report, and explained the actions that led to his conviction:The main reason was that there is nobody in Tibet who does not have faith in, loyalty to, and the desire to see the Dalai Lama. On the contrary, the Chinese government sends out propaganda saying that the Tibetans inside Tibet have no desire to meet him and have lost faith in him. Ronggyal Adrag (or Runggye Adak) is the only ethnic Tibetan known to have been convicted on the charge of "subversion" since the Criminal Law was amended in 1997 to replace the crime of "counterrevolution" with "endangering state security," based on information in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD). He is the first Tibetan convicted under the 1997 Criminal Law on charges of "subversion" as well as "splittism." If the court sentences Ronggyal Adrag under the "incitement" provisions for each charge, each charge can carry a sentence of not more than five years. But if the court sentences him for "organizing" or "plotting" a "major crime" under either charge, he could face a minimum sentence of 10 years or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for that charge. Both articles provide for sentences of not less than 3 years and not more than 10 years for persons who "take an active part" in splittist or subversive activity. Web site operator Huang Qi, a resident of Sichuan's capital, Chengdu city, is the only other Chinese citizen known to have been convicted of both charges, according to the PPD. Huang served a five-year sentence and was released in 2005.
Procuratorates and courts nearly always apply the charge of splittism to ethnic Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols, whom officials suspect of seeking to break up China through non-violent action. Courts have convicted 131 Chinese citizens of splittism under the 1997 Criminal Law, based on information about official charges in the PPD as of October 31, 2007. Huang Qi is the only known person convicted of splittism or undermining national unity who is not a Tibetan, Uighur, or Mongol. At the same time, courts rarely convict persons of such ethnic groups on the charge of subversion. Of 93 convictions on subversion charges, 1 was of a Tibetan (Ronggyal Adrag) and 2 were of Mongols (Badun and Xu Jian, both now released), based on PPD data for cases with adequate information. The total number of cases of imprisonment resulting from charges of splittism or subversion is higher, but information about official charges is not available for every case.
Ronggyal Adrag climbed onto the stage where officials attending the August 1 horse-races in Litang (Lithang) county were scheduled to speak and, according to an August 2 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) report, shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, the release of Gedun Choekyi Nyima (the Panchen Lama identified by the Dalai Lama), and Tibetan independence. According to other reports (International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 2 August 07; RFA, 2 August 07), he called for the Dalai Lama's return, freedom of religion, and the releases of the Panchen Lama and Tenzin Deleg. Ronggyal Adrag's statements may have been provoked by a petition drive conducted by Chinese officials who visited local monasteries in the weeks before the festival and told monks to sign a petition stating that they do not want the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, according to ICT reports on August 10 and October 8.
In an unusually swift and public response, a Xinhua report (reprinted in China Daily, 3 August 07) acknowledged that officials detained Ronggyal Adrag for "inciting separation of the nationalities," and that more than 200 Tibetans had gathered outside the detention center to call for his release. According to an August 24 ICT report, People's Armed Police (PAP) used tear gas and stun grenades on August 8 to disperse Tibetans who gathered peacefully near the horse-racing grounds to call for Ronggyal Adrag's release.
Information about 10 Tibetans detained in Lithang county during the period from mid-July through mid-October, based on RFA, ICT, and TCHRD reports, is available in the PPD. In addition to Ronggyal Adrag, at least five of the Tibetans are believed to remain detained: Adrug Lupoe, a Lithang Monastery monk and nephew of Ronggyal Adrag; Kunkhyen, a middle school teacher who may have had a video camera at the horse-racing festival; Adrug Kalgyam, a nomad who spoke out at a village patriotic education session, saying that Tibetans are not happy under Communist Party control; Lobsang Phuntsog, a Lithang Monastery monk who allegedly had photographs of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in his room and who was associated with Kunkhyen; and Jamyang Tenzin, a monk of Yuru Monastery who argued with patriotic education instructors, saying that Tibetans do not have religious freedom or they would be able to display images of the Dalai Lama in their homes and monasteries. Other detentions have been reported but details about them remain incomplete.
In the weeks following Ronggyal Adrag's protest, officials moved "thousands" of PAP into Lithang county to reinforce security, according to a September 4 RFA report, and replaced Tibetan officials deemed to be insufficiently loyal with officials presumed to be Han Chinese, including the county Party secretary and the heads of the county government and public security bureau. According to an October 8 ICT report, Chinese Party officials presided over patriotic education sessions conducted in local government offices, with leaders of extended nomad families (clans), and at monasteries and schools. A Tibetan source told ICT, "The main points of the meetings are always the same: denounce His Holiness the Dalai Lama, oppose the 'separatist clique,' of which [Ronggyal Adrag] is said to be a part, and finally, to be grateful to the Communist government." PAP were frequently present at such meetings, adding to the level of intimidation, according to the ICT source. Patriotic education instructors required schoolchildren to write essays denouncing the Dalai Lama and his supporters, according to the same report.
See Section IV, on "Tibet: Special Focus for 2007," in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, available on the Web site of the Government Printing Office (GPO), for more information. The Tibet section of the 2007 Annual Report is available as a reprint on the GPO Web site.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-11-01 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Official Defends Response to Forced Labor Scandal
Yu Youjun, the former provincial governor of Shanxi province, described as "unparalleled" the punishment of 95 local Communist Party officials for their role in a scandal involving the enslavement of more than 1,300 people, including kidnapped children and mentally challenged adults, discovered working in Shanxi brick kilns in May and June 2007. According to an October 22, 2007, China Daily article, "About 8 of the 95 officials were expelled from the Party and lost their jobs, 30 were dismissed from their posts and more than 20 officials were demoted." The head of the provincial department of labor and social security and the mayors of Linfen and Yuncheng cities were "required to make a self-criticism at an official conference."
According to the China Daily, Yu said that the harshness of the punishments was unprecedented in Shanxi's history. "Officials at county and township levels are mainly responsible for the management of brick kilns and small mines, therefore we focused on them," Yu was quoted as saying. Authorities initially announced the punishments of the 95 officials in July 2007, according to a July 16 China Daily article. In July, a death sentence, life imprisonment, and other prison sentences were given to owners, managers, and employees at the kilns, according to a July 17 China Daily article. The October report noted that "life and even death sentences were given to five kiln owners, managers and guards."
In June, Yu apologized for the forced labor scandal and said he would take responsibility for it, according to a June 23 New York Times report. In September, the State Council appointed Yu as a vice-minister in the national Ministry of Culture, as well as Party chief within the Ministry, according to a September 7, 2007, Xinhua article. Yu was also named a Central Committee member at the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress held in October, as noted on the People's Daily Web site (undated).
As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), in May and June 2007, Chinese media and Internet activists uncovered a massive network of forced labor in brick kilns in Shanxi and Henan provinces. Reports indicated that people forced to work in the kilns included children and mentally challenged adults kidnapped by human traffickers and sold to the kilns, where they were beaten, denied food, and forced to work up to 20 hours per day.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-02-04 / English) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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