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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Party Congress Promotes Officials Linked to Harsh Policies Toward Tibetans
Introduction
The 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which concluded on October 21, 2007, resulted in the promotions of two high-ranking Party officials, Zhou Yongkang and Liu Yandong, whose recent posts associate them with harsh policies that contribute to the repression of human rights such as the freedoms of religion and expression, and that undermine ethnic minority rights guaranteed by China's Constitution and system of regional ethnic autonomy. The Party¡¯s elevation of Zhou and Liu to the highest levels of Party power is likely to signify strong endorsement of their work, and ensure the continuation and perhaps strengthening of the policies associated with them, especially during the period of the Party's 16th Central Committee (2002-2007).
Although Zhou's and Liu's work impacts citizens and groups throughout China, this article will consider their promotions within the context of the human rights and rule of law environment for ethnic Tibetans living in China. Their promotions may presage heightened repression of ethnic minority groups and of cultural, religious, and political rights that the Party suspects could threaten the Party's supremacy or ethnic and national unity. Ethnic and religious issues could be treated as an even higher priority during the period of the 17th Central Committee (2007-2012) than during past five years. The level of Party intolerance toward Tibetan religious activity and expression that it deems threatening may increase, instead of moderating as China becomes a more mature, prosperous, and resilient nation.
Zhou Yongkang is one of the most influential Party figures guiding policy and implementation with respect to public security and the process of investigating, charging, prosecuting, trying, and sentencing cases of alleged criminal activity. Liu Yandong has played a prominent role in ensuring implementation of Party polices toward ethnic minorities and religion. She has played a direct and important role since late 2002 in the on-going dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama's representatives, a process that has resulted in little evidence of progress. Zhou and Liu are both members of the Party's highest ranking group focused on Tibetan issues, giving added weight to their promotions and their views on policy and its implementation.
(See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information on human rights in Tibetan areas of China, and on Chinese government implementation of regional ethnic autonomy.)
Zhou Yongkang Promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo
(People¡¯s Daily bio, 22 October 07)
Swift Rise to Party's Most Powerful Body
Zhou Yongkang has moved up swiftly to join the Party's highest-ranked and most powerful body, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee, and to head one of the Central Committee's most influential supervisory groups, the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (Xinhua, 26 December 07). Advancing within the Central Committee at each of the 14th-17th Party Congresses, he attained the rank of an alternate Central Committee member at the 14th Congress, full Central Committee member at the 15th Congress, member of the Politburo at the 16th Congress, and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 17th Congress. Zhou held the posts of Party Secretary and Minister of the Ministry of Public Security from 2002-2007. As Secretary of the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, Zhou presides over a group whose members include the leadership of the state's security, legal, and judicial establishment (Web site of China's Central Government, State Structure, visited 22 January 08): Xiao Yang (President of the Supreme People's Court), Jia Chunwang (Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate), Wu Aiying (Minister of Justice), Meng Jianzhu (Minister of Public Security), and Geng Huichang (Minister of State Security). Zhou served as the committee's Deputy Secretary from 2002-2007.
Party Secretary in Sichuan Province
Zhou served as the Secretary of the Sichuan Province Communist Party Committee from 1999-2002, a period that included the partial destruction of the Larung Gar and Yachen Gar monastic teaching institutions, located in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and the expulsion of thousands of Tibetan Buddhist nuns and monks from the institutions. (International Campaign for Tibet, 20 June 01 and 9 July 04). During Zhou's tenure as the Sichuan Party Secretary, authorities throughout the Tibetan autonomous areas of China detained or imprisoned 187 Tibetans for peaceful expression or non-violent activity, based on information available in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD). Of those 187 Tibetans, 60, of whom 33 were monks and nuns, were detained or imprisoned in Sichuan. In two of the Sichuan cases, the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced to imprisonment popular Tibetan Buddhist teachers who had traveled to India without official permission and met with the Dalai Lama: Sonam Phuntsog (detained October 2004, sentenced to five years¡¯ imprisonment for "splittism"); and Tenzin Deleg (detained April 2002, sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, later commuted to life imprisonment, for conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism).
While Zhou served as the Sichuan Party secretary, he characterized China's ethnic minority educational system, which provides for teaching of ethnic minority languages as well as for classes to be taught in those languages, as a "heavy burden" on the government, and questioned whether the government should "bother so much" with the program (South China Morning Post, in OSC, 14 March 00). He accused Tibetans of having "blind faith" in the Dalai Lama and of wasting their money by offering donations to Buddhist monasteries, according to the article.
Leadership of Party and Government Agencies Pressuring Tibetan Rights
During the 2002-2007 period when Zhou held the top public security posts in both the Party and government and the position of Deputy Secretary of the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, Chinese security officials, procuratorates, and courts in Tibetan autonomous areas of China pursued a policy of detaining, charging, convicting, and sentencing Tibetans to imprisonment for peaceful expressions and activities that officials characterized as "splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103: "splitting the State or undermining unity of the country"). After Zhou's promotion to the Secretary of the committee, he called on senior officials attending a December 26, 2007, national conference on "politics and law work" to "master the work objectives of improving the national security strategy and system, earnestly safeguard national security, as well as remain highly vigilant and strictly guard against all kinds of splittist, infiltration and subversive activities," (Xinhua, translated in OSC 28 December 07).
Even as Tibetans have become far less confrontational since the early- and mid-1990s, insofar as more recently they rarely resort to open displays of behavior that Chinese officials punish as threats to state security (see below), authorities have not responded to the change by moderating the level of repression of expressions of ethnic and religious identity¡ªespecially in cases where Tibetan devotion to the Dalai Lama is involved. Instead, officials have tightened enforcement of laws and seek to punish activity that is innocuous in comparison with previous years. Tibetans in the early- and mid-1990s faced imprisonment for bold expressions of public dissent, such as staging demonstration marches in busy public locations. In the post-2000 period, however, authorities imprison Tibetans for activities such as possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama and copies of his teachings, writing or possessing "splittist" literature, or for arguing with a patriotic education instructor.
Imprisonment Data: After Public Protests Decline, Inconsequential Actions Punished
Comparing information about Tibetan political imprisonment for the period 2002-2007 with 1992-1997 shows that while Zhou exercised authority over the public security establishment, officials punished Tibetans for inconsequential activity, claiming that the activities endangered state security, even after Tibetans had dramatically moderated the scale and style of expressions of dissent. During the 1992-1997 period there were 1,232 political detentions of Tibetans, according to CECC analysis of PPD information, of which at least 529 (43 percent) resulted from peaceful public demonstrations by Tibetans. An additional 73 (6 percent) of the detentions were the result of protests (including prison protests). Another 259 (21 percent) of the Tibetans put up small posters or distributed leaflets to make political or religious statements. Of the remaining detentions, 95 (8 percent)--a figure certain to be low--are known to have resulted from making statements or possessing materials about the Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama. Of those 95 Tibetans, 32 (33 percent) used posters or leaflets to make their statements.
In comparison, during 2002-2007, none of the protests is known to have been a public demonstration march in a public area. At least 107 (75 percent) of the 142 known political detentions of Tibetans during the period resulted from making statements about the Dalai Lama or possessing materials associated with him, based on PPD information current in January 2008. About 30 (29 percent) of the 107 Tibetans put up small posters or distributed leaflets to make their statements. Of the remaining 35 detentions, only 13 (9 percent) are known to have been the result of protest activity such as shouting slogans.
Deputy Leader of the Party's Tibet Work Coordination Group
Zhou plays a leading role in the Party's top Tibetan policy work group, which seeks to end the Dalai Lama's influence among Tibetans and to prioritize economic development over protecting Tibetan culture. After the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the Central Committee leadership appointed Zhou as one of three deputy leaders of the group, headed by Jia Qinglin, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), according to a July 10, 2006, People's Daily report (translated in OSC, 23 April 07). The other two deputy leaders are Liu Yandong, Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD) and Vice Chairman of the CPPCC, and Hua Jianmin, State Councilor and Secretary General of the State Council. An April 17, 2007, Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 18 April 07) implied that the group's leadership had not previously been made public and stated that the group is formally known as either the "Central Tibet Work Coordination Group" or the "Central Coordination Group on the Struggle Against the Dalai Clique." The group has "overall charge of Tibetan affairs," the Singtao Daily report said.
The Tibet work group's "main tasks" are "opposing the Dalai clique and maintaining Tibet's stability," and a principal means of achieving those goals is accelerated economic development, according to the People's Daily report. Completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in July 2006, added "a beautiful chapter to the history of Tibet," and demonstrated the "correct leadership" of central authorities in their work to "consolidate and develop" the TAR and other Tibetan ethnic areas, according to the report. The group held five leadership meetings in the 2003-2006 period, according to People's Daily, as well as three regional level work meetings in the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Liu Yandong Promoted to the Politburo
(People's Daily bio, 22 October 07)
Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD)
Liu Yandong, who served as Head of the UFWD from December 2002 (Xinhua, 5 December 2002) until December 2007 (Xinhua, 2 December 07), has been promoted to the 25-member Politburo of the Central Committee. Liu's attainment of Politburo rank was concurrent with State Council Vice Premier Wu Yi's retirement from the Politburo and Central Committee (Xinhua, 21 October 2007), positioning Liu as China's highest-ranking female Party official. Liu has served since 2003 as a Vice Chairwoman of the CPPCC national committee and a member of its Leading Party Members¡¯ Group. The UFWD oversees the implementation of Party policy toward China's eight "democratic" political parties, ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs, among other functions. In 2005, the UFWD established a new bureau to handle Tibetan affairs, according to a Singtao Daily report (translated in OSC, 15 September 06). The Seventh Bureau's mission is "to cooperate with relevant parties in struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans."
As noted above, Liu is a Deputy Leader of the Party's Tibet Work Coordination Group tasked with "opposing the Dalai clique" and pursuing a Tibetan solution based on accelerated economic development.
Dialogue with the Dalai Lama's Representatives
Despite the Party's hostility toward the Dalai Lama, the UFWD served as the host organization for the dialogue process between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives, Special Envoy Lodi Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen, during all of their five visits to China. Liu's status as Head of the UFWD during four of the five visits to China by the envoys associates her with the disappointing status of the dialogue. The CECC noted in its 2007 Annual Report:The Commission has observed no evidence of substantive progress in that dialogue toward fair and equitable decisions about policies that could help to protect Tibetans and their religion, language, and culture, even though a session of dialogue took place each year beginning in 2002, and even though a basis for such protections exists under China's Constitution and law. On their first trip, the envoys met with Wang Zhaoguo, then-Head of the UFWD and currently a Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress. Liu served as UFWD Head during the subsequent four visits, and met with the envoys herself on their second and third trips in 2003 and 2004. After meeting with the UFWD's top official during the first three visits, the envoys met UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun on their fourth and fifth visits in 2006 and 2007. In an address to the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. in November 2006, Gyari identified the Chinese government's distrust of the Dalai Lama as "one of the most critical obstacles" facing Tibetans in the dialogue process. In Gyari's statement following the 2007 trip, the briefest and least optimistic issued after any of the rounds of dialogue, he noted that the envoys had conveyed their "serious concerns in the strongest possible manner," and that the dialogue process had reached a "critical stage." (See Special Envoy's statements on visits to China in September 2002, May-June 2003, September 2004, February 2006, and June-July, 2007. In June-July 2005, the envoys met with Zhu Weiqun in Bern, Switzerland. See CECC articles on rounds of dialogue in 2005 and 2006. See CECC Annual Reports 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 for more information on the dialogue.)
Heading a Tibetan Cultural Preservation Organization
Liu is the head of an organization that describes its purpose as preserving Tibetan culture, and that has registered with the United Nations (UN) as an independent NGO although it is supervised by senior Party and government officials. In her role as Honorary President of the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (CAPDTC), Liu opened the organization's first China Tibetan Culture Forum in Beijing in October 2006, according to an October 10, 2006, report by the China Tibet Information Center (CTIC),a Chinese government-run Web site. Liu retained the position as of December 2007 when CAPDTC held its second forum in Nepal, according to a December 13, 2007, CTIC report.
CAPDTC was founded in 2004 and promotes increased economic development and tourism as measures that can help to ensure the preservation and development of Tibetan culture. UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun is also the Vice President of CAPDTC, and Sithar (Sita), director of the UFWD's Seventh Bureau that handles Tibetan affairs, is the Vice Chairman of CAPDTC. (CAPDTC, 9 October 06; CTIC, 10 October 06; China Daily, 10 October 06; CAPDTC, 10 October 06; CTIC, 9 October 06; CAPDTC, 11 October 06).
For more information, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; and Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-23 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Politburo Study Session Calls for Uniting Religious Communities Around Party
At a Politburo study session held December 18, Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed the Party's policies for controlling religion and called on religious communities to play a "positive role" in promoting state goals and to "closely unite" around the Party. Hu's statements, which outlined direction for carrying forward Party policy on religion, also continued a trend in mentioning a "positive role" for religious communities at high levels of the Communist Party. According to a description of the study session posted December 20 on the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), Hu called for "closely uniting religious personages and the religious masses around the Party and government" and outlined three "requirements" for carrying out the Party's work on religion under what he described as "new historic conditions": - Continuing the Party's Basic Policy on Religion. Hu described this requirement to involve "bringing into play the positive role of religious personages and the religious masses in the promotion of economic and social development." He also called for upholding the state's policies on "freedom of religious belief"; the administration of religious affairs in accordance with law; independence and self-governance; and the guiding of religion's adaptation to socialist society. In addition, he emphasized encouraging religious communities in their cultivation of a "love of country and love of religion," the promotion of unity, and their "fine traditions of serving society," as well as supporting them in making contributions to "ethnic unity, economic development, social harmony, and unification of the motherland."
- Strengthening Work Regarding the "Religious Masses." Hu stressed uniting religious adherents and using their "wisdom and strengths" in building a healthy society and accelerating "socialist modernization." Hu also called for gaining religious communities' consensus on issues including support for Communist Party leadership and the socialist system, an "ardent love of country," defending China's unification, and promoting social harmony. In addition, Hu stressed "sincerely caring" about religious adherents and aiding those living in hardship, to let them experience the "loving care" and "warmth" of the Party and government.
- Strengthening Construction of the Ranks of Religious Personnel. Hu emphasized the importance of building a contingent of religious personnel with political reliability, academic attainments, and appropriate morals. In addition, he called for supporting the role of the state-controlled "patriotic religious associations" in charge of China's registered religious communities and for guiding the associations in their work.
The study session, which according to a Chinese academic cited in a December 20 South China Morning Post article (subscription required) was the first of its kind as a topic for such a Politburo session, followed an address by Hu on October 15 at the 17th Party Congress, in which he similarly called for promoting religious communities' "positive role" in economic and social development. In that speech, Hu also mentioned the importance of promoting harmony in religious relations and of carrying out the Party's basic policy on religion. At the October Congress, the Communist Party also amended the Communist Party Constitution to include mention of religion for the first time, adding language that calls on the Party to "fully implement" its basic policy toward work on religious affairs and to unite religious adherents "in making contributions to economic and social development." For more information, see the texts of Hu's speech (English, Chinese) and the amended Constitution (English, Chinese) on the China Internet Information Center Web site, as well as an October 21 article from Xinhua. Prior to the October Congress, other high-level officials also had stated that aspects of religion could take on a "positive role" in promoting state goals. For example, in August 2006 SARA director Ye Xiaowen dedicated an article in the official Party journal Seeking Truth (via Open Source Center, subscription required, and the Chinese Communist Party News Web site) to the topic of "bringing into play the positive role of religion in promoting social harmony."
Whether Hu's October and December statements will translate into improvements in religious freedom for Chinese citizens remains unclear. Although the statements articulated a "positive role" for religious communities within China, the December Politburo session reiterated the Party's fundamental positions on religion, including its policy of granting citizens only "freedom of religious belief" rather than "freedom of religion." As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), "freedom of religion" as defined in international human rights standards includes not only the freedom to believe in a religion but also the freedom to manifest that belief. Chinese laws and policies permit only "normal religious activities" and do not define this term in a manner to provide meaningful protection to all aspects of religious practice. In addition, the Chinese government applies its framework for freedom of religious belief only to members of recognized religious communities organized under the patriotic religious associations.
In addition, it is unclear whether statements from the study session that recognize a "positive role" for religious communities reflect a degree of accommodation, an effort to better co-opt religious communities and subject them to tighter state control, or some measure of both. Past statements from state officials have couched measures to control religious groups and their internal religious doctrine in terms of accommodating religious communities. For example, in a July 2006 interview, SARA Director Ye Xiaowen called for helping religious communities integrate into society but stressed achieving this goal by having the state direct religious leaders in their interpretations of religious tenets to "convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers" in line with state goals.
For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-15 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Bishop Ordinations in 2007 Return to Holy See Involvement
The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), which oversees China's registered Catholic church, ordained three bishops in late 2007 who had received approval from the Holy See, continuing a trend that was interrupted in 2006 by several bishop ordinations without Holy See approval. Although the CPA appoints and ordains bishops according to its own internal procedures and does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to make such appointments, in recent years it has tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops. After breaking with this practice for some bishop appointments in 2006, the CPA ordained a total of five bishops in 2007 all of whom had Holy See approval. Recent ordinations include:
- L¨¹ Shouwang, ordained as bishop of the Yichang diocese in Hubei province on November 30. For Chinese government reporting on the event, see an article posted December 3 on the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). See a December 3 article from the Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) for overseas reporting on the ordination.
- Gan Junqiu, ordained as bishop of the Guangzhou diocese in Guangdong province on December 4, a year after being elected to the post. According to November 16 and December 3 articles from AsiaNews, internal disputes over which bishops would be involved in the ordination had delayed the date of the ceremony. For Chinese reporting on the event, see a December 7 SARA article.
- Li Jing, ordained as coadjutor bishop of the Ningxia diocese in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on December 21. According to a December 10 article from AsiaNews, the issue of whether bishops with Holy See approval would preside over the ordination may have been a factor in postponing the ceremony from its originally scheduled date of December 8. For additional information, see December 21 articles from AsiaNews and UCAN, as well as a January 7 correction to the UCAN story. See also a December 22 article from the China Daily (via the China Internet Information Center) and a December 24 report from SARA.
In September, the CPA ordained the coadjutor bishop of the Guizhou diocese and the bishop of Beijing. The ordinations followed an open letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Catholic church members in China, written in May and issued the following month, urging reconciliation between registered and unregistered Catholic communities in China and expressing concern about bishop selections by Chinese state authorities. The extent to which the subsequent five bishop ordinations with Holy See approval were a response to the letter, however, remains unclear, given factors including delays in some of the ordinations and in the Chinese government's initial reaction to the letter. Chinese authorities blocked Internet access to the letter, and local officials reportedly detained some Catholic clergy in an effort to assert authority in the aftermath of the letter's publication. For more information, see Section II---Freedom of Religion, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).
| Source: -See Summary (2008-01-10 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Religious Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan
Local governments and educational institutions in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued in 2007 to impose religious restrictions on Muslims' observance of the holiday of Ramadan. Local governments and schools called for increased controls over religious activities during Ramadan, banning students from fasting, forbidding teachers and other state employees from engaging in religious activities, and requiring local restaurants to remain open during the holiday.- In the township of Yitimliqum in Qarghiliq county, local Party and government officials convened a meeting to instruct attendees, including local cadres, teachers' representatives, and religious personnel, to intensify inspection and supervision of religious activities during Ramadan, according to a September 13 report on the Qarghiliq county government Web site. Authorities called for strengthening measures by villages and schools to administer and control religious activities; intensifying implementation of the "two systems" of maintaining regular government contact with mosques and religious figures; ensuring religious activities and worship sites remain under the administration of "patriotic religious personages" and preventing unlicensed religious clergy from leading religious activities; and prohibiting party members, state cadres, and minors from observing Ramadan or participating in other religious activities. The report also called for preventing unauthorized religious pilgrimages and eliminating "infiltration and sabotage" activities carried out in the name of religion.
- Party and government officials in Yopurgha county inspected local restaurants and food service companies during Ramadan to "strengthen work regarding social stability during Ramadan and protect market order," according to a September 18 report on the Kashgar government Web site. Authorities forbade restaurant and food service businesses from closing during the holiday and instructed the food service industry to serve the needs of customers not observing Ramadan. The report said that authorities would "deal sternly" with individuals and businesses that forced restaurants to close during the holiday.
- In a September 15 speech posted on the B¨¹g¨¹r county government Web site, local Party Secretary Zhang Zhengrong stated that Party members, cadres, and students may not profess a religion. Zhang called on schools to strengthen propaganda education during Ramadan and to put a stop to activities including fasting and professing a religion.
- The Kashgar Teachers College implemented a series of measures to prevent students from observing Ramadan, according to a September 25 report from Radio Free Asia. The school imposed communal meals and required students to obtain permission to leave campus. School authorities also made students gather for a school assembly at a time of day coinciding with Friday prayers. The report noted that under direction from the government, other schools in the region appeared to be implementing similar measures in order to prevent students from observing the holiday.
These restrictions over the observance of Ramadan are a continuation of repressive measures implemented by local governments and educational institutions in previous years. According to reports issued in 2006, Qarghiliq county education offices required schools to enforce communal lunches for students and teachers and instructed school officials to take other preventative measures to ensure that students did not fast or participate in other religious activities. Aqsu prefecture education officials forbade teachers from fasting during Ramadan and forcing or leading students to participate in religious activities, among other measures. In the XUAR capital, Urumqi, and within Kashgar prefecture, local governments also enforced measures to prevent students from fasting.Religious repression in the XUAR during Ramadan reflects broader religious controls that local governments and Party leaders impose in the region. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), in recent years the government has limited access to mosques, detained citizens for possession of unauthorized religious texts, imprisoned citizens for religious activities determined to be "extremist," and most recently confiscated Muslims' passports in an effort to strengthen control over Muslim pilgrimages. In addition, the XUAR government maintains the most severe legal restrictions in China on children's right to practice religion. For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on religion in China, see the CECC 2007 Annual Report, Section II--Freedom of Religion, and Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
| Source: -See Summary (2007-12-12 / English) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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