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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months' Imprisonment
The Beijing Number 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced activist Hu Jia on April 3 to three and a half years' imprisonment and one year deprivation of political rights for "inciting subversion of state power," according to an April 3 Xinhua article (no longer available via Xinhua, but reprinted via Boxun; shorter English version available via China Daily). Article 105, Paragraph 2 of China's Criminal Law makes inciting others "by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system," a crime punishable by up to five years in prison, or no less than five years for "ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes." The Beijing court found that from August 2006 to October 2007, Hu had "incited subversion" through essays he posted on foreign Web sites and telephone interviews he gave to foreign news agencies, according to the Xinhua article. Li Jinsong, one of Hu's lawyers, said it was unlikely that Hu would appeal the ruling, according to an April 3 Reuters article.
The court said that Hu's essays, including "China's Political and Legal Systems Create a Widespread Atmosphere of Fear Ahead of the 17th CPC National Congress," and "One Country Doesn't Need Two Systems," and his comments to foreign journalists, amounted to "malicious rumors, slander, and incitement, in a vain attempt to achieve the goal of subverting China's state power and socialist system," according to the Xinhua article. (Links provided for the articles are from blogs, one of which appears to be Hu Jia's.) The court also pointed out that numerous foreign Web sites had linked to or reprinted Hu's essays and interviews. The two essays mentioned above are critical of the Chinese government and Communist Party's intensified harassment of rights defenders before the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, and their "one country, two systems" approach to governing Hong Kong and mainland China. Hu writes that the government and Party's approach leaves people in Hong Kong vulnerable to the same deprivation of rights that occurs on the mainland, such as the lack of meaningful freedom of speech and the press.
The Xinhua article made no mention of the specific content of the "rumors, slander, and incitement," the potential threat Hu's essays and interviews posed to China's national security, or whether the court considered Hu's right to free speech, as provided for under Article 35 of China's Constitution. Chinese officials have insisted that cases like Hu's are handled in accordance with Chinese laws, but the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and human rights groups have criticized laws such as Article 105 for failing to protect a citizen's right to free expression.
According to the Xinhua article, the court gave Hu a lighter sentence because he "showed penitence and was willing to be dealt with according to the law" (the English article in the China Daily reported that he confessed to the crime and accepted the punishment). While Chinese media reported that Hu "showed penitence" and may have confessed, Hu plead "not guilty" at his trial on March 18. After the verdict's announcement, Hu's lawyers said that Hu had acknowledged "excesses" and accepted that some of his statements "were contrary to the law as it stands," according to the Reuters article. Li Fangping, Hu's other lawyer, maintained that the sentence was unjust, according to the same article. "The law on inciting subversion of state power doesn't have a clear boundary, but the Constitution guarantees citizens freedom of speech," he said.
The Xinhua article reported that during the trial, the court fully protected Hu Jia's procedural rights. The article said Hu's lawyer was able to present an "ample" defense and that Hu's family and others were allowed to observe the trial and sentencing. Hu's lawyer Li Fangping has said, however, that he did not have enough time to advocate on Hu's behalf. Furthermore, only Hu's mother was allowed to attend the trial, even though it appears that under Chinese law the trial should have been open to the public and other people affiliated with Hu should have been allowed to attend. Instead, some were taken into police custody and beaten. Hu's mother and Hu's wife, Zeng Jinyan, were present when the sentence was announced, according to an April 3 Chinese Human Rights Defenders article.
Hu's case highlights how China has sought to counter a regulation giving foreign journalists greater freedom to report in China by in turn targeting citizens who speak to foreign journalists. Under a regulation China issued in order to comply with a commitment for the Olympics, foreign reporters may, at least on paper, more freely interview Chinese citizens. Foreign media and human rights organizations have reported, however, that authorities have warned citizens not to speak to journalists. Internet essayist Wang Dejia was reportedly released on bail in January only after agreeing not to speak to foreign journalists. Also in January, land rights activist Yu Changwu reportedly was sentenced to two years reeducation through labor in part for speaking to foreign reporters.
For more information see previous CECC analyses on Hu's trial, arrest, and detention, and the records of detention for Hu, Wang, and Yu, searchable through the CECC's Political Prisoner Database.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-04-04 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Land Rights Activist Yang Chunlin Sentenced to Five Years
Yang Chunlin, the land rights activist who organized a petition titled "We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics," was sentenced to five years in prison on March 24 by the Jiamusi City Intermediate People's Court in Heilongjiang province for "inciting subversion of state power," according to March 24 articles by the Associated Press (AP) and Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD). The court also sentenced Yang to two years deprivation of political rights, according to CHRD. Procuratorate officials claimed that the petition received heavy foreign media coverage and hurt China's image abroad, and accused Yang of writing essays critical of the Communist Party and accepting 10,000 yuan (US$1,430) from a "hostile" foreign group, according to a February 19 Reuters article (via the Guardian) and a March 25 Guardian article. The Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch Web site (CRLW), a site that supports rights defenders in China, reported on March 28 that Yang would appeal the ruling.
According to Yang's lawyer, police scuffled with Yang's son after the sentencing and shocked Yang with electric batons, the AP article reported. Yang has alleged that because he refused to confess to a crime, authorities chained his hands and feet together from August 6 to August 14, 2007, and that he was unable to move during this time, according to the CRLW report. Chinese law prohibits and punishes the use of torture to coerce a confession and China has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. A March 31 CHRD article reported the allegation that on March 5 prison cadres beat Yang for pointing out their misconduct. The article also said prison officials have refused to allow Yang any time outdoors. Article 25 of China's Regulations on Detention Centers provides that detainees should be allowed one to two hours of outdoor activity each day.
"We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics" Petition
Yang was first detained on July 6, 2007, after he and land rights activists Yu Changwu and Wang Guilin launched the petition in June, according to a March 24 Human Rights in China statement. The AP article said that Yang had gathered more than 10,000 signatures for the petition, mostly from farmers seeking redress for land that officials allegedly took from them, and that the petition was posted on the Internet. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database, officials formally arrested Yang on August 13 and held his trial on February 19.
The petition is connected to a movement by farmers in Fujin city, Heilongjiang, to reclaim land seized by the government and to challenge China's rural land policy of collective ownership. Yang's February 19 criminal defense pleading, prepared by Yang's lawyers and posted on the CHRD Web site, said the reason behind the petition was the "illegal expropriation of land from 40,000 farmers in Fujin, the failure to set up any social safeguards, and the lack of any resolution despite the farmers representatives' more than 10 years of frequent petitioning." According to a January 14 Washington Post (WP) article, farmers in Fujin have sought to reclaim 250,000 acres of land that local officials took in the 1990s and planned to sell to private agricultural businesses. The article said the farmers have also expanded their claims to include the right to own the collective land they currently lease, and that their efforts sparked similar movements in other parts of China. Both Yu and Wang were recently sentenced to reeducation through labor for two years and one and a half years, respectively, in connection with their advocacy on behalf of the Fujin farmers. (For more information on Yu and Wang, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC Political Prisoner Database).
Article 105 of the Criminal Law
The language of Article 105, Paragraph 2, the Criminal Law provision on inciting subversion of state power, is vague and overbroad and China's legal institutions have failed to provide clear guidance as to the limits on Chinese citizens' constitutionally protected right to free speech, according to Yang's lawyers. They said that Yang's peaceful expression of a different political viewpoint was protected under Article 35 of China's Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, according to the defense pleading. Article 105, Paragraph 2, restricts that right, they said, but the brevity of the provision made it impossible to determine the boundary between subversion and free speech. Furthermore, neither the Supreme People's Court nor the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress had issued any interpretations of Article 105, Paragraph 2. "So what are the boundaries of 'endangering the state'? We have been unable to find any legal principles that could be referenced in any domestic legal precedent or legal interpretations," they wrote. One of the lawyers, Li Fangping, warned that "[i]f everyone who speaks freely is accused of subverting state power, then it will be very difficult to guarantee free speech because people won't know what they can say and what they can't," according to a March 25 WP article.
In recent months a number of other Chinese citizens have been punished for "inciting subversion of state power," for peaceful expressions of dissent. These include activist Hu Jia, who was sentenced to three and a half years on April 3, freelance writer Lu Gengsong, who was sentenced to four years on February 5, Internet essayist Wang Dejia, who was released on bail on January 12, and Internet essayist Chen Shuqing, whose four-year sentence was affirmed in October 2007. (For more information on these cases, see their records of detention, searchable through the CECC Political Prisoner Database). At a March 18 press conference (posted on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, Chinese, English), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao described as "totally unfounded" the allegation that China is cracking down on dissidents before the Olympics. He said "China is a country under the rule of law" and that cases such as Hu Jia's would be "dealt with in accordance with the law." Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also recently said that it is "impossible" for someone in China to be arrested for saying "human rights are more important than the Olympics."
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) and human rights groups have echoed the concern raised by Yang's lawyers that under Article 105, Chinese officials retain broad discretion to declare peaceful forms of expression "incitement of subversion." In a report on its 2004 mission to China (available on the UNWGAD's Country Visits Web page), the UNWGAD expressed concern that China's Criminal Law had not adopted a definition of the term "endangering national security" (the category of crimes which includes Article 105) and that "no legislative measures have been taken to make a clear-cut exemption from criminal responsibility of those who peacefully exercise their rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." In a January 8, 2008, report titled "Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal Tool for Prosecuting Free Speech in China," CHRD studied 41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which Article 105, Paragraph 2, had been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of expression. The report found that in such cases: "[T]he 'evidence' often consists of no more than the writings of an individual or simply shows that he/she circulated certain articles containing dissenting views, without any effort to show that the expression had any potential or real subversive effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is interpreted as constituting incitement of subversion....[T]he text of the law fails to clearly define the key concepts, 'subversion' and 'state power,' and to precisely specify what constitutes 'subversion' and 'state power.' Thus, anything from calling for an end to one-party rule to criticizing corruption has been construed as 'inciting subversion of state power.'" As noted in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, Yang was reportedly detained in 2006 on four occasions for his work with farmers and for taking part in a hunger strike proposed by Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng and other rights defenders. For more information on freedom of expression in China, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-04-04 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Xinjiang Authorities Pledge Crackdown Against "Three Forces"
Officials in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) renewed a pledge in early March to crack down against the government-designated "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The government has waged a longstanding campaign against the "three forces" and has used its anti-crime campaigns as a pretext for severe rights abuses in the XUAR. The pledges came as the government provided limited details on recent alleged terrorist activities in the region.
Government Pledges Crackdown
On March 7, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri announced that the "three forces" had "recently become more active in planning violent activities," according to a China Daily paraphrasing of his remarks in a March 8 article. "We should stay on high alert all the time to crush any attempt to damage Xinjiang's development and stability," he said. At a March 9 press conference for domestic and foreign reporters, XUAR Communist Party Chair Wang Lequan said that authorities would "destroy" groups plotting to disrupt the Olympics, according to a transcript of the event posted March 10 on Tianshan Net. At the same press conference, Nur Bekri described the government's policy of making preemptive strikes against separatists and maintaining a posture of "striking hard with high pressure."
The March 9 statements from Wang Lequan and Nur Bekri came as the two provided details on two recent criminal incidents, one of which official sources described as terrorist activity aimed at the Olympics and one of which government sources initially said was under investigation but later described as "sabotage" and terrorism. At the press conference, Wang Lequan referred to a January 2008 incident, also reported on by Chinese media in February, which Wang described as a raid on a cell that had manufactured weapons and conspired to attack the Olympics. At the same press conference, Nur Bekri announced that on March 7, a plane en route from the XUAR capital Urumqi to Beijing made an emergency landing after an "attempt to create an air disaster," according to the transcript of the press conference.
Government Links Alleged Terrorist Plot to Olympics
According to the transcript of the March 9 press conference, Wang Lequan made reference to the January raid while answering a question about groups in the XUAR allegedly aiming to disrupt the Olympics. "Just recently, Xinjiang security departments destroyed a gang. They made explosives and grenades in order to cause destruction, and in the process of their preparations, they were discovered by us. When we arrested them, they threw three grenades at our security officers, and seven received minor injuries," he said. In response to another question about the attack, Wang said, "We haven't fully wrapped up the case involving the incident that broke out on January 27. But concerning your questions, I can tell you...their aim was very clear, which was to destroy the carrying out of the Olympics." Official Chinese media writing in English also reported on his remarks. See, e.g., a Xinhua report posted March 9 on the China Daily Web site which quoted Wang as saying "Obviously, the gang had planned an attack targeting the Olympics."
Mainland Chinese media first reported on the January raid in February, but media reports described Wang Lequan's March remarks as the first time the event had been connected to the Olympics. (See, e.g., a March 9 report from Agence France-Presse (AFP), via Yahoo.) On February 18, the Global Times, a publication connected to the People's Daily newspaper of the Communist Party (CP), reported that on January 27, police broke up a "violent terrorist gang" operating in the Xingfu Gardens area of Urumqi's Tianshan district and discovered firearms, self-manufactured explosives, terrorist training equipment, and materials propagating religious extremism. Police killed 2 and arrested 15, according to the report. (Translation available from Open Source Center (subscription required), February 20.) The article did not explicitly describe the intended targets of the group, but a Chinese terrorism expert quoted in the report said that the "incident reminds us that Olympics security is not only limited to the Beijing area" and that "more attention should be paid to areas that have had terrorist activity break out in the past." A February 19 China Daily article that reported on the information from the Global Times said that "[t]he raid was the latest in a series of efforts by the local government to crack down on violent activities by Uygur [sic] separatists who have carried out several terrorist acts since the 1990s." Elsewhere, Chinese sources have claimed over 260 terrorist attacks have taken place in the region, but they have used shoddy evidence and inconsistent statistics to support their claims.
Outside of mainland Chinese media, information on the January raid appears to have first been reported on February 14 by the Hong Kong-based Sing Tao newspaper (via the Sing Tao Canada Web site and an English translation from the Open Source Center, February 14). It reported then that police had broken up a terrorist ring in Xingfu Gardens, confiscating firearms and explosives and killing "at least 18 terrorists," a death toll similar to that reported for a January 2007 raid. (See below for more details on the 2007 incident.) Sing Tao said the terrorist group was planning activities to commemorate that 11th anniversary of protests in the city of Ghulja, which the government responded to through a violent crackdown. In a February 19 report (via Open Source Center, February 19), AFP noted that "it was impossible to independently verify" the different accounts of the January incident, noting that "[i]ndependent information gathering is difficult in Xinjiang, made particularly hard by China's heavy security presence[.]"
In a March 11 press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Qin Gang said the case was still under investigation and did not mention its reported ties to the Olympics. (See the transcript in Chinese and English on the MFA Web site.)
March Airplane Incident First Said To Be Under Investigation, Later Identified as "Sabotage" and Terrorism
At the March 9 press conference, Nur Bekri provided limited details on an emergency flight landing in response to a reporter who asked if an incident had taken place recently involving four ethnic Uighurs who had brought gasoline aboard a China Southern flight. After presenting his view of the security situation in the XUAR and pledging a crackdown against separatists, Nur Bekri responded that on the afternoon of March 7, a Beijing-bound China Southern flight from Urumqi made an emergency landing in Lanzhou, saying that "from what is understood at present, we can confirm that this was an attempt to create an air disaster." Nur Bekri said that an airline employee detected a problem and prevented an incident from taking place. He said that after the plane had stopped for several hours in Lanzhou, it arrived in Beijing on March 8. He added that suspects were in custody but that their identities and their motives were still under investigation. Nur Bekri did not discuss whether the incident constituted terrorist activity. For reporting in English on Nur Bekri's remarks, see a March 9 Xinhua report.
Government officials openly provided few details on the attack in the days immediately following Nur Bekri's announcement. MFA spokesperson Qin Gang, speaking at the March 11 press conference, said the incident was still under investigation, which he reiterated at a March 13 press conference (on the MFA Web site in English and Chinese). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also provided limited details at a March 12 press conference (via Open Source Center, March 12). On March 11, however, a Chinese-language article from the Global Times (via the China News Net and Open Source Center, March 12), the publication affiliated with the CP-controlled People's Daily, cited an unnamed official source who described the incident as "clearly" a terrorist attack.
Roughly two weeks after the incident, Wang Lequan identified it as an act of sabotage. In a March 19 article based on an interview he gave that day with XUAR media and posted on the Xinjiang Daily Web site, Wang said that "it has now already been ascertained that this was a grave incident of sabotage instigated and implemented by 'East Turkistan' separatists from outside the country." He also described "western hostile forces" as "unceasing" in their efforts to sabotage the region and said they had "penetrated everywhere." He called for various measures, including "striking hard with high pressure" against the "three forces," to ensure stability in the region. For English reporting on his remarks, see a March 20 article from Xinhua.
The following week, on March 27, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a notice stating that police investigation had found the incident was an "organized and premeditated case of terrorism aimed at the aircraft[.]" The MPS notice identified one criminal suspect who had "confessed everything" and said the case was still under investigation. For reporting in English, see a March 27 Xinhua report on the China Daily Web site. In a March 27 press conference (via the MFA Web site in Chinese and English), Qin Gang said he had nothing to add to the MPS report.
Media Rehashes January 2007 Incident
Some reporting on the March and January incidents (see, e.g., the March 9 Xinhua report) also referred to a January 5, 2007, police raid at a location on the Pamirs plateau that Chinese officials described as a terrorist training base. Chinese media reported on the raid shortly after it took place. According to a January 8, 2007, Tianshan Net report on a XUAR Public Security Department press conference held that day, police killed 18 people, captured 17 others, and confiscated 22 homemade grenades and 1,500 partially completed grenades during the raid.
One day after the raid but two days before Chinese media reported on the event, Wang Lequan called on the XUAR government to make stability the "overriding" concern in the region and to "strike hard" against the "three forces," according to remarks at a January 6 conference reported January 7, 2007, in the Xinjiang Daily. While noting that ethnic unity and political stability were strong in the XUAR, Wang said that forces from within China and abroad had carried out infiltration and sabotage activities in the region, the article reported. Wang described the "struggle with separatist forces" as a "long and complicated task," and called for making preemptive attacks against them.
Chinese Reporting Draws Doubts, Concerns From Observers
Official reporting from China on the January and March 2008 events and earlier 2007 raid has drawn doubt from outside observers and concerns that the government is using the incidents to increase repression in the XUAR. In a March 10 AFP article (via Yahoo), scholar James Millward noted that information on the recent events was limited to Chinese press coverage. The Chinese government exerts tight controls over the press and limits the ability of both domestic and foreign reporters to do on-the-ground reporting in the XUAR. (See Section II, Freedom of Expression, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report, via the Government Printing Office Web site, and a CECC analysis on foreign journalists for more information.) Speaking of the January 2007 terrorist raid, scholar Dru Gladney said that the government had not provided clear evidence indicating the existence of a terrorist base, and that the incident could have involved another criminal, but non-terrorist, operation, according to a January 10, 2007, AFP article (via Nexis, subscription required). In a 2004 East-West Center Washington paper titled Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, James Millward similarly noted the Chinese government had not provided enough details about previous alleged terrorist crimes to prove that the acts were separatist or terrorist "as opposed to simply criminal."
In the March 10, 2008, AFP article, Phelim Kine of Human Rights Watch said that the organization was "concerned that the Chinese government may use these alleged terrorist plots as a pretext for a new campaign of repression against the Uighur population in Xinjiang and to stifle any public expressions of dissent[.]" In press releases issued on February 19 and March 11, the Uyghur American Association called for independent investigations into the January and March incidents and expressed concern that the government would use the incidents as cause for continuing repressive policies in the region.
Government Reports on Anti-Separatism Measures
Recent reporting on the XUAR details a range of measures used to address perceived security threats, both prior to and after reports of the January and March 2008 incidents.- A March 14 report from the China News Agency (via the Xinjiang News Net) described recent measures by the Urumqi Public Security Bureau to strengthen security and "strike hard and keep tight lookout against sabotage by the 'three forces'" in the run-up to the Olympics. According to the article, "the city's Olympics security and guard work has already entered into a state of actual combat."
- A report posted March 7 on the Qumul district government Web site described a recent meeting aimed at "ideology reeducation work" for the "battle against separatism and infiltration," designed to heighten awareness of the issue especially among ethnic minority cadres and strengthen supervision and management of the state's work on the issue. The article stressed raising awareness of the "protracted nature, severity, complexity, and arduousness" of the anti-separatism battle.
- A February 28 article posted on the Chinese Ethnicity News Web site detailed a new agreement between ethnic and religious affairs bureaus in Kashgar district and counterpart bureaus in Wuhan city, Hubei province, that includes security measures aimed at Kashgar residents living in Wuhan. "According to the principle that 'safeguarding stability is the number one duty,' Wuhan city will strengthen the intensity of its work to attack the 'three forces,' communicating in a timely manner and sharing information on conditions; Kashgar district will establish a database of information on relevant persons who violate the law and commit crimes, enjoying it with Wuhan and mutually channeling inspection and control categories, attacking in a timely manner those who violate the law and commit crimes, and safeguarding ethnic unity and the unification of the country," the article reported. It also outlined measures to strengthen education in patriotism.
- Former Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang is the new leader of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Group, according to a March 11 report from the Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao (via Open Source Center, March 11). According to a source cited in an April 17, 2007, article from Sing Tao (via Open Source Center, April 18, 2007), personnel appointments for the Xinjiang group and a counterpart group on Tibetan policy have indicated "priority to handling Xinjiang affairs with an iron hand."
Rights Abuses Remain Rampant
As noted in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, the Chinese government has increased repression in the XUAR in recent years and targets the Uighur population in particular with harsh policies to squelch political dissent and control expressions of religious and ethnic identity. The government has used anti-terrorism policies to conflate the peaceful exercise of rights with terrorist or separatist activity. Uighurs remain in prison for activities including conducting historical research on the region and for writing a fictional short story. The government couples "strike hard" anti-crime campaigns with "softer" policies aimed at diluting expressions of Uighur cultural identity.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-03-17 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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New Internet Regulations Tighten State Control Over Audio and Video Content
New regulations, which went into effect January 31, further tighten the state's control over online audio and video content in China. Notably, the Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services (the Provisions) now require state ownership in companies providing these services (hereinafter referred to as A/V companies), although the Chinese government has said it will not impose this requirement on the mostly private companies already in operation. In addition, the Provisions reaffirm the requirement for A/V companies to obtain an "Internet Audio/Visual Program Transmission License" from the government, increase companies' obligation to maintain records of content they host, and extend liability to "major investors and managers." In conjunction with the Provisions, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) said it had recently conducted an inspection of select audio and video Web sites, according to a March 20 announcement on the SARFT Web site. As reported in a March 22 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article (subscription required), the inspection campaign, which lasted from December 20, 2007, to February 20, 2008, resulted in the closure of 25 video Web sites. Another 32 Web sites received warnings about their content. Among the "major problems" cited in the announcement were Web sites posting content containing "obscenity and pornography," "terror and violence," or which "endangered the security and interests of the state," as well as Web sites operating without a license to broadcast video and audio content.
The Provisions, issued jointly by SARFT and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), require Internet companies engaged in "producing, editing, and integrating video and audio programming and offering it to the public over the Internet" or "offering to others the services of uploading and disseminating video and audio programs" over the Internet to be "wholly state-owned" (guoyou duzi) or "state-controlled" (guoyou konggu). On February 3, however, Xinhua reported that during a question and answer session with the state-run news agency, representatives from SARFT and MII said that a company already offering these services could "re-register and continue operating" without meeting the state ownership requirement, as long as "prior to the release of the Provisions [such company] had been established legally and had broken no laws or regulations." Most A/V companies, including the popular video sharing sites Tudou.com and Youku.com, are privately run and financed by domestic and foreign venture capital, according to a January 7 Beijing Business Today article.
The Provisions' New Requirements
A/V companies had already been subject to the 2004 Measures on the Administration of Broadcasting Audio/Visual Programs Over the Internet or Other Information Networks (2004 Measures), which required the companies to obtain an "Internet Audio/Visual Program Transmission License" from SARFT, have as its sponsoring agency a radio/television, news, publishing, cultural, or propaganda unit at the local level or higher, and maintain records of audio and video content. The Provisions, while continuing to require the "Internet Audio/Visual Program Transmission License" and imposing the new state ownership requirement, also introduce a number of other changes that could have the effect of strengthening state control over A/V companies:
The Provisions increase licensed companies' recordkeeping responsibilities. The 2004 Measures required companies to maintain a record of the title of the program, summary of its contents, time and length of broadcast, and source, for at least 30 days. The Provisions now require companies to maintain a complete copy of a program for at least 60 days (Article 16).
The Provisions extend liability to "major investors and managers" of the A/V company, who are now expressly responsible for their Web site's audio and video content (Article 18). Such individuals face a fine of up to 20,000 yuan (US$2,850) for, among other things, failing to report and delete "harmful content" (Article 23); in the case of "major" violations by an A/V company, major investors and managers would be barred from investing in or providing online audio or video services for five years (Article 27).
Like the 2004 Measures, the Provisions prohibit A/V companies from disseminating politically sensitive content, including content the state considers "harmful to the honor or interests of the nation," "endangers the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the nation," or "disturbs social order" (Article 16). Even before the 2004 Measures and the Provisions, A/V companies had been subject to Internet regulations that imposed similar requirements. For example, the Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services, issued in 2000, had already required all Web sites to be licensed or registered, prohibited the dissemination of content falling within a similar enumerated list, and required maintenance of records of customers' online activity for 60 days. Furthermore, as reiterated in Article 9 of the Provisions, A/V companies that engage in "current events-type video and audio news services" must still apply for a separate "Internet News Information Service License" from the government.
Freedom of Expression Impact
Chinese and outside observers have indicated that the Provisions could lead to greater censorship of politically sensitive audio and video content. According to a January 4 Southern Metropolitan Daily editorial, the regulations "restrain the civil right of social expression in the era of the Internet." The March 22 WSJ report noted that affected businesses "have been scrambling to prove themselves" following the issuance of the Provisions. "[W]e're always working to upgrade our filtering system, to catch things that need to be caught," said Tudou's vice president of business development after his company received a warning in the recent inspection campaign. Much of the problematic content involves pornography, according to a January 4 WSJ article (subscription required), but the Provisions also require removal of politically sensitive content. Following the recent unrest in Tibetan areas of China, Tudou.com and Youku.com were reportedly devoid of any news footage of the protests, according to a March 18 WSJ article (subscription required). At the same time, China reportedly blocked access to the U.S.-based video sharing Web site YouTube.com after videos of the Tibetan protests showed up on the site, according to a March 17 Associated Press (AP) article (via New York Times). The January 4 WSJ article noted that: "Online-video technology potentially poses a major challenge to the Communist Party's control of information. Content-filtering technologies that can identify politically objectionable text on the Internet can't be used to screen videos effectively."
The Provisions' liability for investors and managers, as well as the risk that currently exempted companies may be subject to the state ownership requirement in the future, provide further incentives for A/V companies to exercise effective self-censorship. Chinese officials also continue to urge Internet companies to sign on to "self-discipline pledges" to improve online censorship. In February, at a meeting attended by representatives from more than 40 A/V companies, government officials presided over the announcement of a self-discipline pledge (via the CCTV Web site) that calls on A/V companies to "meet the standards of socialist morals" and to contribute to a database that would allow companies to share information about content they have deleted from their Web sites, according to a February 23 Xinhua article.
Commercial Rule of Law Impact
The Provisions require A/V companies to "respect copyright laws" and to "adopt copyright protection measures, and protect the lawful rights and interests of copyright holders" (Article 15). Under Article 23 of the Provisions, companies that fail to adopt copyright protection measures face warnings and fines of up to 30,000 yuan ($4,280), while major investors and managers face fines of up to 20,000 yuan (US$2,850). It remains to be seen whether these provisions will lead to better enforcement against pirated online audio and video content.
Some industry participants have praised the regulations for clarifying China's policy toward A/V companies. Tudou's chief executive, Gary Wang, said that three years ago, "we couldn't tell who the governing body was and might be" and "[n]ow this is at least clearly a joint effort," according to the January 4 WSJ article. At the same time, the state ownership requirement led some companies to seek clarification from the government over how the Provisions would be implemented, according to the WSJ article and a January 10 AP article (via Seattle Times). Even though the Provisions provide no express exemption for the state ownership requirement, analysts said that the Chinese government would let private companies sidestep the rule for business reasons, according to the AP report. Chinese officials ultimately announced the exemption, but in the form of a question and answer session with a Xinhua reporter, as opposed to a more formal legally binding document, and three days after the Provisions went into effect.
Finally, the state ownership requirement may act as a further barrier for foreign companies to invest in the industry. The Provisions expressly encourage state-owned strategic investors to invest in the industry (Article 15). Under the 2004 Measures, wholly foreign-owned companies, Chinese-foreign joint ventures, and Chinese-foreign cooperative ventures "could not engage in work to disseminate online audio and video programs," but it is not clear how widely enforced this policy was. The January 10 AP article reported that as of November, Youku.com had raised $40 million from U.S. and Chinese venture capital investors.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-03-31 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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House Church Leader Zhou Heng Released From Detention
According to a February 21 China Aid Association (CAA) article, authorities released house church leader and bookstore manager Zhou Heng from detention on February 19 and dropped the charges against him. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, Zhou was initially detained on August 3, 2007, while picking up a shipment of Bibles reportedly donated by overseas churches for free distribution in China. Authorities formally arrested Zhou on August 31 and accused him of "illegal operation of a business." According to CAA, authorities limited Zhou's meetings with defense counsel, and officials rejected his family's request to post bail. CAA reported that the Shayibake District People's Procuratorate in Urumqi City, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, returned the case to the public security bureau in November due to "insufficient evidence," but that Zhou remained in detention until February 19.
Zhou's release follows bookstore owner Shi Weihan's release from detention on bail on January 4, 2008. Shi was detained for "illegal printing and distribution" of religious literature, but due to "insufficient evidence" was not formally arrested. In contrast to Zhou's case, Shi was released on bail, which means that his case could remain open and subject to further investigation and prosecution for up to a year. While Zhou and Shi were eventually released without facing trial, similar cases in the past have ended in prison sentences. House church leaders Wang Zaiqing and Cai Zhuohua were fined and sentenced to prison in 2006 and 2005, respectively, for "illegal operation of a business" for printing Bibles and other Christian literature without government authorization.
While the recent releases of Zhou and Shi might suggest China's willingness to less aggressively pursue such cases, there is no indication that China is willing to reconsider current regulations that make such activity illegal in the first place and deny its citizens freedom of religion under international human rights standards. Both the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and committed to ratifying, protect the printing and distribution of religious literature as a fundamental human right. But citizens in China may not freely print and distribute religious literature and must instead comply with numerous government restrictions and approvals that in some cases are stricter than those that apply to non-religious publications. For example, the Regulations on the Administration of Printing Enterprises require approval from the provincial-level religious affairs bureau and the press and publication administration to print religious publications, whereas non-religious publications require the approval of only the county level publishing authorities. Chinese authorities are particularly sensitive about the importation of Bibles from overseas. The Provisions Regarding the Administration of Contracts to Print Bible Texts generally prohibit contracting the printing of Chinese language Bible texts from outside China, and limit the printing of domestic bibles to national or provisional level designated book and periodical printing enterprises, or the Nanjing Amity Printing Company, Ltd., which is entrusted to print Chinese-language editions of Bible texts for national religious organizations. As a result, Chinese citizens who wish to freely publish or print religious material without government permission risk violating these regulations and facing criminal punishment for "illegal operation of a business," a crime under Article 225 of the Criminal Law.
For more information on religion in China see the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site), Section II--Religious Freedom.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-03-20 ) |
Posted on: 2008-04-04 |
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Party, Government Launch New Security Program, Patriotic Education, in Tibetan Area
Official Chinese Communist Party and government sources in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, have published unusually detailed accounts of anti-separatism and patriotic education activity in Ganzi county, and of a pilot security initiative underway in selected villages. A January 4, 2008, Ganzi Daily article (translated in OSC, 12 February 2008) noted that the county's remote location and "historical reasons" (a reference to Ganzi's reputation for pro-independence sentiment) had made the work of "maintaining public order and safeguarding stability . . . very arduous." Ganzi, one of 18 counties in the prefecture, has been the site of more known political detentions of Tibetans (55) by Chinese authorities than any other county outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since the current period of Tibetan political activism began in 1987, based on data available in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database (PPD).
Political instructor Chun Mei of the Ganzi County Domestic Security Corps told the Ganzi Daily, "From 1999 to 2006, we solved a total of 44 cases of [ethnic] separatism and apprehended 33 suspects, thus effectively puncturing the arrogance of the national separatists." Chun referred to three separatism cases by date (May 14, 1999; February 27, 2000; May 31, 2006), but he did not name the defendants or link the dates to specific events in the legal process, such as detention, formal arrest, or sentencing. As a result, the CECC cannot match the dates with certainty to any of the PPD's 46 cases of known Tibetan political detention and imprisonment in Ganzi county between 1999 and 2006.
Security officials in Ganzi county are implementing a pilot security program in five villages to recruit rural residents to augment local police work, according to a December 24, 2007, article (in Chinese; CECC translation) posted on the Ganzi Prefecture Development Planning Committee (GDPC) Web site. Testing such a program may signal that the county's security establishment, coupled with programs such as patriotic education, have failed to achieve widespread acceptance by Tibetans of Party policies toward Tibetan culture, religion, and the Dalai Lama. (See the CECC 2007 Annual Report for more information.) After successful completion of the pilot project, officials intend to extend the program throughout the county, according to the GDPC. There are 220 villages in Ganzi county, according to the Ganzi Daily article.
The GDPC article outlined the experimental rural security program's principal features.Officials will "invite" selected villagers to "assume the duties of [a] public security head." Duties include "transmission" (e.g. transmitting information about security policies to villagers), "notification" (e.g. notifying public security officials about security incidents), and "reconciliation" (e.g. seeking to mediate conflicts between villagers). The objective of such duties is to "[safeguard] public order and [promote] harmony and stability."
Public security heads must hold the position of village-level Party secretary, be "politically reliable," and "enjoy prestige among the people." Empowering village Party chiefs to perform defined support services for public security offices would strengthen the Party's capacity to utilize government police powers to promote Party interests.
Party and public security officials will travel to each village to train public security heads. Training topics include legal issues relevant to the duties of village public security heads, as well as the scope of power that they may exercise.
Local public security officials will supervise and evaluate the work of village public security heads. The purpose of oversight and review is to clarify to the public security heads the limits on the scope of their power, urge them to "develop their work according to law and in a standardized way," and address any abuses of power.
The program will offer incentives for village security heads to provide information about village activity to police. If the information helps police prevent or solve an act considered to be a crime, authorities will grant the village security head an award for each such instance. The GDPC article did not disclose details about the type or size of the awards. Incentives could, for example, encourage village security heads to inform police about villagers who possess photographs of the Dalai Lama or copies of his religious teachings, as well as about other cultural and religious matters that Chinese officials deem to endanger state security by "inciting splittism" (Article 103, Criminal Law).Ganzi Daily reported that, along with the increased security measures, a new round of patriotic education is underway in all of Ganzi county's villages, schools, monasteries, and nunneries. Officials have used devices such as "propaganda and cultural service kits" and "mobile propaganda banners" to convey the campaign throughout the county, including to the pastoral areas where Tibetan nomads live. As a result, "100 percent" of the monks and nuns who are officially permitted to reside at the 42 monasteries and nunneries located in the county signed or thumb-printed a pledge to "firmly safeguard nationality solidarity and the unity of the motherland."
In preparation for the recent round of patriotic education, officials sent teams to every monastery and nunnery in Ganzi county to "[get] to know what was on the mind of the numerous monks and nuns," Ganzi Daily reported. Based on their findings, authorities decided to make an example of Dargye (Dajin) Monastery. Ganzi Daily placed Dargye's selection in the context of the county's "complex political background" and its "special political status . . . at the forefront of the combat against separatism and infiltration." In one incident linked to the monastery, hundreds of Tibetans converged at the county police detention center in October 1999 after authorities detained Sonam Phuntsog, a senior teacher at Dargye, according to a July 2004 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) report (p. 77). The Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment for splittism after he urged "crowds of people to believe in the Dalai Lama and recite long life prayers" for him, according to a translation of the official verdict by The Dui Hua Foundation in Selection of Cases from the Criminal Law (Volume 13, August 2003).
For more information, see Section IV, Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, in the CECC 2007 Annual Report; Section V(d), Freedom of Religion, and Section VIII, Tibet, in the CECC 2006 Annual Report; and Section III(d), Freedom of Religion, and Section VI, Tibet, in the CECC 2005 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-03-17 / English / Subscription) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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Foreign Minister "Freedom of Speech" Comments At Odds With Arrests, Detentions
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that it is "impossible" for someone in China to be arrested for saying "human rights are more important than the Olympics," a statement that conflicts with the recent arrest, detention, and questioning of a number of Chinese citizens who have publicly criticized China's human rights record in relation to the Olympics. According to a February 28 Reuters article, Yang told reporters that Chinese citizens enjoy "extensive freedom of speech." His comments followed a meeting that day in Beijing with Britain's foreign minister. "No one will get arrested because he said that human rights are more important than the Olympics. This is impossible. Ask 10 people from the street to face public security officers and ask them to say 'human rights are more important than the Olympics' 10 times or even 100 times, and I will see which security officer would put him in jail," Yang reportedly said.
Yang's statements appear inconsistent with the recent arrests of HIV/AIDS and environmental activist Hu Jia and land rights activist Yang Chunlin (no relation to Yang Jiechi). Officials accused both of "inciting subversion of state power," after each made public statements tying their criticism of China's human rights record to the Olympics. In Hu's case, Beijing public security officials detained him just one month after he criticized China's hosting of the Olympics and its human rights record before a European Parliament Human Rights Subcommittee hearing in November. Hu is set to go on trial on March 18, according to a March 14 Reuters article (via The Guardian). In Yang Chunlin's case, the main piece of evidence against him appears to be a petition he helped organize titled "We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics," which the procuratorate claimed tarnished China's international image, according to Yang's lawyer as reported in a February 19 Reuters article (via The Guardian). Yang was arrested in August 2007. His trial took place on February 19 but the court has not yet issued its verdict.
Short of formally arresting citizens, Chinese officials have also detained citizens or held them for questioning in an apparent effort to prevent them from publicly criticizing the Chinese government and the Olympics. Earlier this month, law professor Teng Biao went missing for two days after plainclothes police officers seized Teng outside his home in Beijing, placed a sack over his head, and drove him away to be questioned, according to a March 14 Wall Street Journal article. Authorities warned him to stop writing articles criticizing China's human rights record and the Olympics or risk losing his university post and going to jail. In September, Teng and Hu co-wrote a letter titled "The Real China Before the Olympics" (Chinese, English), which criticized Beijing for failing to live up to its promise to improve human rights for the Olympics. Internet essayist Wang Dejia was recently detained after he used the Internet to air his criticisms of the government and gave an interview to a foreign newspaper in which he said China was focusing too much on hosting the Olympics and not enough on caring for its own citizens. Before releasing him on bail on January 12, officials reportedly required Wang to agree to stop posting online essays critical of the government and told him not to speak to foreign journalists.
For more information on freedom of expression in China, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-03-17 ) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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"Bilingual" Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools
A new program in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) strengthens government measures to promote Mandarin Chinese at the preschool level via educational instruction that the government describes as "bilingual" but that places primacy on Mandarin at the expense of ethnic minority languages. According to a February 28 article from the Urumqi Evening News (via Tianshan Net), authorities in the XUAR implemented a program in February to send student-teachers from the Xinjiang Preschool Teacher's College to preschools in Kashgar prefecture to supplement the area's shortage of bilingual teaching staff. Students who volunteer for the one-semester program receive various benefits, including a monthly subsidy for living expenses and preferential treatment once they enter the job market. Based on the results from this group of student-teachers, authorities will expand the scope of the program, the article reported.
The program follows earlier news on enlarging the scope of bilingual preschool education. In late 2005, the XUAR government stressed the importance of strengthening bilingual preschool education and announced plans to comprehensively implement bilingual education at the preschool level the following year. In 2006, it announced it would allocate 430 million yuan (US$59.76 million) over five years to support bilingual preschool programs in seven prefectures, to reach a target rate of 85 percent of rural ethnic minority children enrolled in two years of bilingual preschool education by 2010, according to an October 2006 article from the Xinjiang Economic News (via Tianshan Net). The following year, the XUAR Department of Finance allotted 70.39 million yuan (US$9.78 million) to cover subsidies for both students and teachers in bilingual preschool programs, according to a November 2007 report from Xinjiang Daily. According to the Urumqi Evening News article, as of 2007, the XUAR had 2,982 bilingual preschool classes encompassing around 93,000 children and 1,835 staff members. The previous year, the Xinjiang Economic News article reported that the XUAR would support over 1,300 bilingual preschool classes involving 51,900 students and 1,296 teachers for that academic year.
Available information on the bilingual programs in XUAR schools indicates that many programs deemed "bilingual" have focused on instruction primarily in Mandarin Chinese, in some cases relegating instruction in ethnic minority languages solely to language arts classes. In addition, at least one predominantly ethnic minority city has cast its language policy as instruction exclusively in Mandarin Chinese, rather than use the "bilingual" label. The education for students enrolled at the Xinjiang Preschool Teacher's College, the XUAR's training base for bilingual preschool certification and source of student-teachers for the February program, also indicates the shift to Mandarin at higher levels of education. Although one description of the college, available on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site (undated), describes the institution as a combined ethnic minority-Han school that teaches in Mandarin, Uighur, and Kazakh, 2007 recruitment materials for the school, posted on the Xinjiang Education Department Web site (undated), stated that the language of instruction for all subject areas, including bilingual education classes, would be in Mandarin Chinese.
Despite evidence of this focus on Mandarin in XUAR schools, as reported in sources including a 2006 Xinjiang Daily article (via Tianshan Net), XUAR Chair Nur Bekri stated in a March 5, 2008, Xinjiang Metropolitan News article (via Xinhua) that bilingual education in the region equally values ethnic minority languages and Mandarin. Nur Bekri described criticisms of bilingual education as an attack from the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism operating outside China.
XUAR language policies violate Chinese laws that protect and promote the use of ethnic minority languages, which form part of broader legal guarantees to protect ethnic minority rights and allow autonomy in ethnic minority regions. For example, Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) guarantee that ethnic minorities have the freedom to use and develop their own languages. Article 121 of the Constitution and Article 21 of the REAL state that government agencies in ethnic autonomous regions adopt the languages in common use in the region. The REAL adds that "where several commonly used languages are used for the performance of such functions, the language of the nationality exercising regional autonomy may be used as the main language." In the specific area of education, Article 37 of the REAL stipulates that "[s]chools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction." Despite these various legal provisions to protect ethnic minority languages and promote their use as lingua franca of the region, authorities have developed a linguistic environment in the XUAR that privileges Mandarin and makes knowledge of it a functional requisite in various public spheres, including but not limited to the XUAR education system. As a result of current policy, opportunities for educational, professional, and economic advancement in the XUAR increasingly have become contingent on knowledge of Mandarin. While bilingual education programs that diminish the use of ethnic minority languages respond to this need for Mandarin skills, XUAR officials do not acknowledge that the need stems from official failures to protect ethnic minority rights and implement autonomy in ethnic minority regions as provided for in Chinese law.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).
| Source: -See Summary (2008-03-13 / English) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To Provide "Sustainable" Solutions
China's first national plan to combat trafficking of women and children formalizes cooperation among agencies and establishes a national information and reporting system. The State Council's General Office issued China's National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) on December 13, 2007. The long-awaited plan, which was submitted for approval in July 2006, went into effect on January 1, 2008, and will be implemented over the next five years. Its overall goal is to "prevent and severely crack down" on crimes of trafficking, and provide care for trafficking victims. (An English translation of the plan is available from Open Source Center (registration required), and quotes from that translation are used here.) The plan sets specific targets, and outlines measures for the prevention of trafficking, prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and strengthening of international cooperation. The plan designates the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) as the lead agency in implementing the plan, and calls for coordination among 28 agencies, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the All-China Women's Federation. According to Du Hangwei, Director of the MPS' Criminal Investigation Bureau, the plan seeks to provide "sustainable and long-term solutions to human trafficking," as reported in a December 13 China Daily article. For an overview of the plan, click on "more" below.
The MPS estimates that 10,000 women and children are kidnapped and sold each year, while the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that up to 20,000 people are trafficked annually in China, according to the China Daily article and the U.S. State Department's 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Of these, public security officials have registered a decreasing number of cases in recent years, prompting the MPS to state that trafficking-related crimes in parts of China have been effectively contained, according to a December 12 MPS article. The MPS reported 23,163 cases in 2000, 7,008 in 2001, 5,684 in 2002, 3,721 in 2003, 3,343 in 2004, 2,884 in 2005, 2,569 in 2006, and 2,375 in 2007, according to a March 10 Washington Post article and the 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 China Statistical Yearbook. In recent years, the MPS has handled an increasing number of cases involving forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation, and gang-related and cross-border components, and a decrease in the number of cases involving the trafficking of women and children for marriage and adoption, according to the plan and a July 27 China Daily article. At a press conference on December 14, MPS Vice Minister Zhang Xinfeng noted that the plan underscores China's efforts to move from "combating trafficking" to "anti-trafficking." Such a shift aims to broaden the focus from prosecution and rescue to also include prevention, protection of victims, and supporting victims' reintegration into society, as reported in a December 15 Beijing Youth Daily article.
The release of the plan fulfills an obligation made by the Chinese government to the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking (COMMIT), according to the State Department's Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment that was released on January 19, 2007, and a July 13 China Daily article. COMMIT is a government-led initiative, supported by the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), to foster cross-border cooperation between countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion, including China, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma, according to information posted on the UNIAP Web site. The plan, released on December 13, coincided with China's hosting of the COMMIT Second Inter-Ministerial Meeting in Beijing on December 12-14, 2007, according to a UNIAP article posted on January 7. The joint declaration signed at the meeting reaffirmed cooperation between the six countries and pledged for the first time to include "civil society groups" in future antitrafficking efforts.
At a recent MPS forum, public security officials identified existing challenges in combating trafficking and the next steps for implementing the plan. Individuals from local public security bureaus discussed difficulties in their everyday work, including the lack of an office and personnel that focuses full-time on combating trafficking, financial restraints, and difficulties in discovering cases, and rescuing and repatriating victims, according to the January 24 MPS article. The plan outlined challenges including the need to enhance laws and regulations, define the functions of government agencies, strengthen interagency cooperation, and improve access to funding. According to a January 30 MPS article, Zhang Xinfeng convened a meeting with representatives from the Ministry's Criminal Investigation Bureau and the Combating Trafficking Office to discuss next steps for implementing the plan, which include:
- Holding a joint meeting of the 28 government agencies, confirming its members, and raising awareness of the plan;
- Working with the Ministry of Finance to resolve finances associated with anticrime campaigns to combat trafficking;
- Researching and investigating the current number of trafficking crimes in women and children, standardizing the way criminal case reports are received and guidelines for docketing a case, and setting up an antitrafficking hotline;
- Enlarging crackdowns and strengthening punishment for traffickers;
- Having each local criminal investigation unit strive to establish a special office to combat trafficking, and providing financial assistance and a subsidy to handle cases that involve gang-related crimes and major cases of trafficking in women and children.
It remains to be seen to what extent the plan will strengthen antitrafficking efforts. Implementing measures currently being formulated and cooperation on items such as funding will play a significant role in the successful implementation of the plan. The plan, with a focus on women and children, neglects male adults, who are often targeted for forced labor. The February 28 Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment stated that China's government made "modest efforts" to combat trafficking in the latter half of 2007, although it still does not provide adequate care for victims. For more information, see the section on Human Trafficking, in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report.
Overview of China's National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children
The Plan mandates:
- Establishment of a ministerial-level joint meeting headed by the Ministry of Public Security and comprising of 28 agencies. Local regions should establish offices to combat trafficking, especially in areas that have a high number of trafficking cases.
- Establishment of national information and reporting systems to "improve the mechanism for information collection and exchange on combating crime," and encourage the public to report trafficking-related criminal activities. A December 15 Beijing Youth Daily article notes that China will establish a database that contains DNA information of women and children who have been trafficked and a database of criminal suspects involved in the crime of trafficking women and children. This may help the Chinese government identify trafficking victims among those arrested for prostitution.
- Funding for the implementation of the Plan is to be derived from national and local government sources, as well as solicited from social groups, public organizations, enterprises, institutions, individuals, and international sources.
The Plan's Main Areas of Focus Includes:
- Building education and awareness among the public and law enforcement personnel, especially in key areas and with at-risk populations, in order to exchange information, learn best practices, and improve existing legislation and the current system.
- Preventing trafficking-related crimes through poverty alleviation, education, and vocational training programs tailored to at-risk populations, encouraging women to participate in the community, increasing public awareness of laws and regulations related to trafficking, especially in areas such as railway and bus stations, and strengthening assistance to at-risk groups. Strengthen regulation of activities related to recruitment, professional intermediaries, and the registration system of labor contracts, and help with the successful reintegration of criminals into society. Provincial governments in key areas will sign "cooperation letters of intent" by the end of 2008, and aim to control trafficking by the end of 2012.
- Combating crime and rescuing trafficked women and children, with the goal that the "ratio of cracked cases to reported cases should witness an obvious increase" by the end of 2012. Public security agencies in key areas should strengthen efforts to combat trafficking, and launch anti-crime campaigns. Agencies should "investigate and punish units illegally using child labor, and ban illegal Internet intermediaries like employment and marriage arrangement Web sites. Units or individuals who buy or introduce abducted and trafficked women and children or force them to engage in sexual acts or other forms of forced labor will be prosecuted for their administrative, civil and criminal liabilities."
- Strengthening relief and rehabilitation of rescued women and children by increasing the number of women and children who receive training, aid, and medical treatment, such as by adding "institutions for relief service, transfer, and rehabilitation as well as training" to agencies and training personnel at these institutions, encouraging companies, groups, and individuals to provide financial and technical support and services, and providing legal aid and legal awareness training to rescued women and children. Rescued children of school age should return to school, while women and minors over 16 who cannot or are not willing to return to their original residences should receive vocational training and help with finding a job. Rescued women and children should be successfully reintegrated into society and agencies should "strengthen registration, management, and protection" by establishing "specialized archives," and "track the living conditions of rescued women and children." Agencies should "strengthen research on physical and mental health" of trafficked women and children, and strengthen cooperation between "different regions, departments, and institutions."
- Strengthening international cooperation among police, United Nations agencies, and other international entities, strengthening border control, entry-exit certificate inspection, and "cracking down on illegal activities that involve crossing national borders." In border areas, build awareness of laws, prevention measures, and crime identification among the public and law enforcement personnel. In addition, strengthen supervision of the labor market, and "regulate the operation of overseas employment intermediaries."
While many of the initiatives are not new, the plan mandates the implementation of these initiatives nationwide or on a larger scale in key areas that have an especially high rate of trafficking, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Henan, Sichuan, and Anhui provinces. Other initiatives, such as establishing national information and reporting systems, represent government efforts to improve data collection and the standardization of policies related to trafficking.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-04-04 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2008-05-05 |
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