|
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Introduction
As global economic crisis unfolds around the world, its full impact inside China remains unclear. However, as the articles in this newsletter illustrate, the Chinese government appears to be focusing its attention on perceived sources of "instability" across a diverse cross-section of Chinese society. Leading intellectuals, lawyers, writers, farmers, workers, and others who have signed Charter 08, face harassment, detention and other abuses. So do China¡¯s Tibetan and Uyghur citizens, religious adherents, and others who have engaged in peaceful political dissent.
The Chinese government¡¯s efforts to control information and its instrumental use of law, which this Commission documented in its 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, continues. In January, the Chinese government¡¯s efforts to control information included official censorship of portions of President Obama's inaugural address. As this newsletter also shows, the Chinese government continues to invoke criminal law as a tool for punishing peaceful dissent, for punishing spiritual or religious adherents practicing outside state-sanctioned boundaries, and for bolstering security controls in ethnic minority regions. At the same time, many Chinese citizens nonetheless accept the risks of civic activism--and suffer consequences including harassment and detention. On February 9, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva will review China's human rights record under a new mechanism known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). In the months ahead, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China will continue to monitor and report on the Chinese government¡¯s record with respect to its international commitments to safeguard fundamental rights and to develop the rule of law.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-02-02 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-03 |
 |
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116876 |
Officials To Strengthen Security Before Anniversaries and During Economic Downturns
Chinese officials have warned of increasing "social unrest" in 2009 and have called for strengthening public security in the run-up to several significant anniversaries and amid the country's economic downturn. Security officials reportedly plan to use the "valuable" and "successful" experience of security measures deployed during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games to increase security controls in 2009, according to a January 6 People's Daily article and a January 13 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu called on public security officials to acknowledge the "grave challenge of maintaining national security and social stability" ahead of the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October this year, as reported in the People's Daily article. Chen Jiping, director of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security, was quoted in an interview with the state-run magazine Outlook Weekly as saying that authorities will deploy new measures such as a neighborhood watch program and the creation of special departments modeled on those used during the Olympics that mobilized and used volunteers to help police maintain public order, according to the South China Morning Post report.
In addition to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October, 2009 also marks several sensitive anniversaries, including the 50th anniversary of the March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising, and the 20th anniversary of the June 4, 1989, peaceful democracy protest at the Tianamen Square. A January 6 Associated Press report writes that "opponents of the authoritarian regime could seize on [anniversaries] as symbolically rich opportunities to stage demonstrations or issue calls for political reform." The Chinese government and Communist Party have used campaigns to strengthen security measures and crack down on "social unrest" and dissent in the name of maintaining social stability during other "sensitive" times, including most recently before and during the Beijing Olympics and during the Olympic torch relay. (See the Preface of the CECC 2008 Annual Report and a previous CECC analysis for more information.)
The recent high-level official statements on maintaining "social stability" also come at a time when official statistics paint a grim economic picture and as the media and government officials have warned of potential mass protests resulting from high unemployment rates and increasing social discontent. Reuters reported on December 17, 2008, that up to 1.5 million graduates may face difficulty finding employment in 2009, that at least 4 million unemployed migrant workers have left cities to find jobs in large towns or counties, and that the urban unemployment rate is at 9.4 percent, according to estimates by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The first issue of the Outlook Weekly in 2009 also reported that nearly 10 million migrant workers have lost their jobs, according to an estimate by China's National Bureau of Statistics. The same article said the economic downturn has led to greater social instability, including increasing incidents of unemployment-related labor disputes, land disputes, "highly sensitive" taxi strikes, and financial crimes. The article said experts have called for "proper handling" of mass incidents through prevention and mediation, to "keep conflict resolution at the local level," to "solve problems locally," and to "eliminate hidden danger at the initial stage."
For more discussion on "social instability" and "social unrest," see the Preface and General Overview in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-30 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116313 |
Officials Increase Censorship of Foreign and Domestic Web Sites
Chinese authorities appear to have stepped up censorship of the Internet in recent weeks with increased reports of foreign- and Hong Kong-based Web sites being blocked and the closure of a popular domestic blog hosting site for posting "harmful" political information.
Foreign and Hong Kong Web Sites
In December 2008, foreign and Hong Kong media reported that access from within China to several foreign- and Hong Kong-based news Web sites had been blocked after having been temporarily unblocked last August around the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, according to a mid-December Yazhou Zhoukan (Asiaweek) report (in Chinese), a December 16 BBC report, and a December 17 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). The blocked Web sites include the Chinese-language sites for the BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, YouTube's Hong Kong and Taiwan sites, and the Web sites for the Hong Kong-based news organizations Ming Pao, Asiaweek, and Apple Daily. Access to some of these sites subsequently was restored, according to a December 19 New York Times (NYT) article. Citing reports from users in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the NYT said that access to its own Web site from within China had been blocked for more than three days, noting the absence of technical issues with the site, and no problems with accessibility from Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States, according to the December 19 article and a December 22 article. Amnesty International (Amnesty) reported on January 12, 2009, that authorities had resumed blocking its site in China after allowing access for the Olympics.
Chinese officials are able to block domestic access to foreign Web sites because they control the gateway connection between mainland China and the global Internet. Official involvement in the blocking of any particular site is difficult to confirm because officials provide little information about which sites are blocked and why a specific site has been blocked or unblocked. Sites that are blocked often report accessibility outside of mainland China and no technical issues. In response to questions about blocked Web sites, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Liu Jianchao said at a December 16 press conference (Chinese, English) that he was "not aware of the specifics" but that "it is undeniable that some websites do violate the Chinese law." Liu cited as an example Web sites that "publicly stage 'two Chinas' by putting the mainland China and China's Taiwan Province into two independent categories," in violation of the Anti-Secession Law. On January 13, 2009, MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu denied allegations that Chinese officials were blocking the Amnesty Web site ahead of a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009, according to a January 13 Agence France-Presse article (via France 24). The same article quoted Jiang as saying that Amnesty "has always been biased toward China." Chinese and English transcripts of Jiang's January 13 press conference on the MFA's Web site do not mention the denial, but indicate that Jiang reiterated China's position that it manages the Internet according to Chinese laws and legally-binding regulations, which "prohibit the spreading of illegal information through the Internet, such as advocating cults and separatism."
Mainland Web Sites
Southern Metropolitan Daily, a newspaper based in Guangdong province, reported on January 12 that the Beijing Municipal Government's Information Office had ordered the closure of the blog hosting Web site Bullog (www.bullog.cn) after the site failed to remove large amounts of "harmful information" relating to current events and politics as authorities had requested, according to the Web site's administrator and founder, Luo Yonghao. Luo said that the site's service provider informed him by e-mail on January 9 that the provider received the shutdown order from the Beijing Communications Administration. Attempts by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China to access the Bullog Web site on January 27 were unsuccessful, yielding only browser-generated messages that the address could not be found. According to a January 12 Sydney Morning Herald article, Bullog has become a popular site for Chinese intellectuals and commentators to discuss politics and policy, registering more than one million daily viewers in April 2008. A January 13 Reporters Without Borders report said that at least nine contributors to Bullog had signed Charter 08, an open statement calling for political reform in China that has attracted the attention of authorities. Chinese officials have harassed signatories and censored references to Charter 08 on the Internet.
The reported shutdown of Bullog comes amidst a government campaign to remove "vulgar content" on the Internet. The campaign began on January 5 and will continue until early February, according to a January 6 People's Daily article (in Chinese). The campaign's primary target appears to be pornography, but employees at Web sites attempting to carry out the government's directive have noted "increased pressure to control political content as much as smut" as well as the vagueness of what the government considers unacceptable content, according to a January 12 Guardian article and a January 6 Straits Times article (via AsiaMedia). "We are just feeling our way in the dark now and going by intuition, deleting whatever we think might not be deemed proper by the government," one senior manager of a Chinese Web site told the Straits Times on the condition of anonymity.
As the CECC noted in its 2008 Annual Report, China's Internet laws and the interpretation and application of such laws by Chinese officials violate international human rights standards because they target content that the Chinese government and Communist Party deem politically sensitive. For more information on Internet censorship in China, see "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-27 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116297 |
Chinese Media Censor Parts of President Obama's Inauguration Speech
An official "full text" Chinese language translation of President Barack Obama's January 20, 2009, inauguration speech that appeared in major state-controlled Chinese news media omitted two paragraphs and the words "and communism," according to a review of the translation as it appeared on the Web sites of those media organizations on January 21. In addition, after President Obama said the word "communism," China's national television station, China Central Television (CCTV), cut away from live coverage of the speech, as shown in a video posted on the CCTV Web site on January 21. (The full text of the speech is available on the Presidential Inaugural Committee Web site; a transcript of the speech as delivered by President Obama is available on the New York Times Web site.)
[UPDATE, January 26, 2009: On January 22, the People's Daily, the Communist Party's flagship newspaper, posted its own "full text" translation of President Obama's speech. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China retrieved that translation from the People's Daily Web site on January 23 and saved a copy here. At the time, the People's Daily translation included the words "and communism" as well as the omitted paragraphs. On January 26, the CECC accessed the same link and found that the words "and communism" had been omitted, even though the original post date of January 22, 2009, 15:48, remained unchanged.]
Omitted Passages; "Silencing of Dissent"
The following two paragraphs, which appear about two-thirds into President Obama's 18-minute speech, were omitted from the "full text" Chinese translation prepared by the official China Daily and reprinted on the Web sites of CCTV (omitted paragraphs should have appeared on page 4), Xinhua, China's central news agency, Sina.com, a popular domestic news and information portal (omitted paragraphs should have appeared on page 2), and People's Daily (omitted paragraphs should have appeared on page 4):To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.
To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it. Sina.com also posted a video with Chinese subtitles of President Obama's entire speech on the Web page where the "full text" Chinese translation begins. As of January 22, the subtitles do not omit the passages above.
"Communism"
About 11 minutes into President Obama's speech, he said: "Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions." The words "and communism" were omitted from the official China Daily translation (omitted words should have appeared on page 3) and its reprint on the Web sites of CCTV (omitted words should have appeared on page 3), Xinhua, Sina.com (omitted words should have appeared on page 2), and People's Daily (omitted words should have appeared on page 3).
As shown in the CCTV video, the station muted audio of the simultaneous interpreter shortly after she translated the word "communism." The screen then cut to the anchor hosting the coverage. It is unclear whether the anchor was caught off guard. (See January 21 BBC report for 30-second clip of this portion of CCTV's live coverage.) The anchor responded by turning to a CCTV reporter in Washington, DC and asking her about the challenges President Obama faces in dealing with the economy. While the station had earlier cut away about five minutes into the speech for three minutes of analysis by the Washington reporter (while the speech ran in the background in English for much of this time), it is unclear whether the later cut away was planned. The latter cut away, which included a background segment on President Obama, lasted for about seven minutes before simultaneous translation resumed with about one minute left in the speech.
Chinese subtitles that appear at the bottom of the video on Sina.com on January 21 also omit the reference to "communism."
English Text Reprinted in Chinese Media
The reference to "communism" and the passages noted above were not removed from the English text of the speech as reprinted on the China Daily Web site (communism, passages) on January 21, as reprinted on CCTV's Web site (communism, passages) on January 21, and as reprinted on Xinhua's Web site on January 21.
Past Censorship of U.S. Officials
Chinese media have censored the remarks of top American officials in the past. According to an April 20, 2004, New York Times (NYT) report, the official "full text" of then Vice President Dick Cheney's 2004 speech in Shanghai that appeared on major Chinese Web sites omitted references to political freedom, Taiwan, North Korea, and other topics that propaganda officials deemed politically sensitive. The NYT report also said that a CCTV broadcast of a 2003 interview with then Secretary of State Colin L. Powell left out references to human rights abuses and other issues despite a diplomatic agreement to broadcast the interview unedited.
For other accounts of the omissions from full text versions of President Obama's speech in Chinese media, see, e.g., a January 21 NYT report and a January 21 Times of London report.
For more information on how the Chinese government and Communist Party's policies toward China's media lead to censorship of information considered politically sensitive, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-27 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116483 |
Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance
Chinese authorities have harassed at least 101 signatories of Charter 08 and placed signer and prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo under residential surveillance at an unknown location in Beijing in apparent violation of Chinese law following his detention on December 8, 2008, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reports on January 2 and January 9. The Central Propaganda Department has warned domestic reporters not to write about or interview any of the charter's signers, while references to the charter appeared to have been removed from the Internet, according to a January 4 Guardian report and a December 15-31 CHRD report. On the eve of December 10, 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more than 300 Chinese citizens signed and posted online Charter 08, which calls for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China and is inspired by a 1970s charter issued in what was then Czechoslovakia. The January 9 CHRD article said that more than 7,200 people have signed the document.
Harassment of Signers
The January 9 CHRD article said that the human rights organization had documented 101 cases in which police sought to question, formally summoned, or otherwise harassed a Charter 08 signer. The article said the cases occurred in 17 provinces and three municipalities and provided a list of people who had been harassed. Those harassed have reported that officials warned them not to give media interviews to promote Charter 08, sought to determine the main authors of the document and how it was disseminated, and demanded public retractions of signatures and support for the document, according to the CHRD article and a January 7 Christian Science Monitor (CSM) article. The prominent intellectual Zhang Zuhua was summoned on December 8 and again on December 26 by the Beijing Public Security Bureau's Domestic Security Protection Unit, the latter occurring shortly after Zhang gave an interview to CSM, according to the December 15-31 CHRD article and the CSM article. In another reported case of harassment, police in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, questioned writer Wen Kejian for several hours on December 25 in connection with his signing of the charter, according to a December 29 CHRD article.
Liu Xiaobo
Liu Xiaobo, who was taken into custody on December 8, has been placed under residential surveillance at an undisclosed location in Beijing by the Domestic Security Protection Unit under the Beijing PSB, according to the January 2 CHRD article. The restrictions on Liu's freedom not only appear to violate international human rights standards for free expression and association and China's Constitution, but to also violate China's procedural provisions since officials have placed Liu under residential surveillance at a location outside of his own residence. Article 57(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) provides that a criminal suspect under residential surveillance may not leave his domicile without permission, and contemplates that the suspect may be placed under residential surveillance at a designated location outside his domicile if that person "has no fixed domicile." Article 98 of the Procedural Provisions for Public Security Agencies Handling Criminal Cases (1, 2, 2007 Amendment), issued by the Ministry of Public Security in 1998 to aid implementation of the CPL, defines "fixed domicile" as the "legal residence where the criminal suspect lives within the city or county of the agency handling the case." Since Liu has a home in Beijing and the case is being handled by Beijing officials, the law would appear to require that residential surveillance be carried out at Liu's home and not another location. Furthermore, Article 98 of the Procedural Provisions prohibits public agencies from setting up special places for "residential surveillance" that in effect subject the suspect to detention "in disguised form."
The January 2 CHRD article said that police allowed Liu to meet with his wife on January 1 but have not informed either Liu or his wife of the charges that led to his residential surveillance. According to a source close to the Liu family, the meeting took place at a secret location near Beijing, Times Online reported on January 6. The source said that Liu did not know the location of his residential surveillance. It is unclear what access Liu has to his lawyer, Mo Shaoping, who in recent years has represented a number of journalists, writers, petitioners, and other citizens accused of state security and public disturbance crimes. According to Article 24 of the Provisions Concerning Several Issues in the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law, a person under residential surveillance does not need permission to meet with his lawyer.
It is unclear when Liu's period of residential surveillance began. Article 58 of the CPL allows officials to place someone under residential surveillance for up to six months.
Internet Censorship
As noted in its December 15-31 report, CHRD conducted searches of Baidu, Sina, and Google in late December and found that information about Charter 08 appeared to have been blocked or deleted.
For additional information, including an overview of free expression and free association issues related to Charter 08, and additional background information on the subject, please visit the Commission's Web site. For information on freedom of expression issues in China generally, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-14 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116085 |
Chinese Government Mandates "Ethnic Unity Education" to Promote Party Policy on Ethnic Groups
The Chinese government has directed schools throughout the country to implement "ethnic unity education," in a stated effort to promote Communist Party policy on ethnic minorities. The trial Guiding Program on Ethnic Unity Education in Schools, issued November 26, 2008, by the Ministry of Education and State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) and publicized in December (see a December 15 Xinhua report on the Central People's Government Web site), calls for "ethnic unity education" starting in grade three of elementary school and extending to high school and vocational schools. Describing work to promote ethnic unity as an "inevitable demand" for strengthening "socialist ethnic relations" and safeguarding stability and unification of the country, the program requires schools to guarantee teaching 10-12 hours a year of "ethnic unity education" in elementary and junior high school, 8-10 hours in high school, and 12-14 hours at the vocational school level. The content of the classes, which must use government-approved teaching materials, includes general information on China's ethnic groups and adds a focus on issues including "safeguarding the unification of the motherland" and "opposing separatism" starting in the upper levels of elementary school. Students in high school also study other multiethnic countries and learn the "superiority of the Communist Party's and [Chinese] state's ethnic minority policy." The "ethnic unity education" curriculum also includes topics such as the state's "guarantee of ethnic minorities' freedom of religious belief" and their rights to "preserve and reform" their customs and "use and develop" ethnic minority languages.
The November 2008 program comes after Tibetans and Uyghurs held demonstrations earlier in the year challenging the Chinese government's ethnic minority policies, though the program also builds on earlier efforts to promote ethnic unity education. (For more information, see previous CECC analyses on the Tibetan and Uyghur demonstrations. For information on older central and local government attention to the promotion of "ethnic unity education," see, for example, article 6 of the 1995 Education Law, a 2004 report on the Tonghai county, Yunnan province, government Web site, and a 2005 report (estimated date) from the Henan province Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site.) The Uyghur and Tibetan demonstrators in 2008 had protested issues including government restrictions on religious practice and controls over cultural expression. Following the demonstrations, local governments in Uyghur and Tibetan areas have reported on wide-scale education campaigns in local schools that include focus on "ethnic unity" and anti-separatism. (See a previous CECC analysis for more information on campaigns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. For information on campaigns in Tibetan areas, see, e.g., an April 30, 2008, report on the Tibet Autonomous Region government Web site and a June 27 report on the Lhasa municipal government Web site.)
The program also comes amid central government statements emphasizing the broad promotion of ethnic unity. See, e.g., a November 4 report on the Central People's Government Web site, a December 24 Xinhua report, and a December 31 People's Daily report by the SEAC Leading Party Group (via Xinhua).
For more information on conditions for ethnic minorities in China, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report, as well as the Special Focus on ethnic minorities in the 2005 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2008-12-19 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-02-03 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=115663 |
Lhasa Court Sentences Tibetans for Sharing Information With "The Dalai Clique"
A Communist Party-run newspaper has provided the first detailed information about Tibetans convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for nonviolent activity that authorities link to rioting on March 14, 2008, in and near Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The November 8, 2008, Lhasa Evening News (LEN) report asserted that the defendants had "endangered state security." China's state-run media has previously provided legal process information about the cases of only a few dozen Tibetan "rioters," but almost no information about the large but unknown number of Tibetans believed to have been detained in connection with peaceful protest activity. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information on the 2008 Tibetan protests and their consequences.)
The LEN article (translated in a December 22 International Campaign for Tibet report) described "four 'March 14 incident' cases" involving a total of seven Tibetans who allegedly provided information ("intelligence") to Tibetan organizations based in India that are part of what the Chinese government and Communist Party refer to collectively as "the Dalai Clique." The report did not, however, mention the Dalai Lama himself or provide any information directly linking any of the four cases to the March 14 protests and rioting. The Lhasa Intermediate People's Court sentenced one Tibetan to life imprisonment and six Tibetans to fixed terms of imprisonment ranging from 8 to 15 years on charges of "espionage" (Criminal Law, Article 110) or "illegally sending intelligence abroad" (Article 111).
The court accused six of the defendants of activity "concerning the security and interests of the state" and one defendant of activity "harming the security and interests of the state," according to the LEN report. China's Constitution (Article 54) states that Chinese citizens "must not commit acts detrimental to the security, honor, and interests of the motherland." The Criminal Law chapter on "Crimes of Endangering National Security" (Articles 102-113), however, mentions the ¡°security¡± of the state only once (Article 102) and only with respect to colluding with a "foreign State," a description that is not applicable to "the Dalai Clique." The chapter does not mention the "honor" or "interests" of the state or link them to specific crimes. As a result, law enforcement and judicial officials exercise broad discretion in identifying and punishing behavior that they deem to "concern" or "harm" China's security, honor, and interests. The table below summarizes the information provided in the LEN report.
Lhasa Intermediate People's Court: Punishing Tibetans for Sharing Information With "The Dalai Clique"
Pinyin Name
Tibetan Name | Alleged Activity
| Criminal Charge
| Criminal Law
| Sentence Date
| Sentence Length | | Wangdui
Wangdu | Copied "splittist" CD-ROMs and leaflets; sent "intelligence" to "the Dalai Clique"
| "Espionage" | Art. 110 | October 27, 2008 | Life imprisonment | | Mima Dunzhu
Migmar Dondrub | Distributed "splittist" CD-ROMs and leaflets; sent "intelligence" to "the Dalai Clique"
| "Espionage" | Art. 110 | October 27, 2008 | 14 years | | Pingcuo Duojie
Phuntsog Dorje | "Collected intelligence;" "illegally sent intelligence abroad [to "the Dalai Clique"] via Wangdu" | Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China | Art. 111 | October 27, 2008 | 9 years | | Ciwang Duoji
Tsewang Dorje | "Collected intelligence;" "illegally sent intelligence abroad [to "the Dalai Clique"] via Wangdu" | Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China | Art. 111 | October 27, 2008 | 8 years | | Suolang Zhaba
Sonam Dragpa | Joined "the Dalai Clique's 'Tibetan Youth Congress';" collected and sent "intelligence" to the TYC | Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China | Art. 111 | October 27, 2008 | 10 years | | Yixi Quzhen
Yeshe Choedron | Received "financial aid" from "the Dalai Clique's 'Security Department'" for providing "intelligence and information" | "Espionage" | Art. 110 | November 7, 2008 | 15 years | | Suolang Cidian
Sonam Tseten | Collected and provided "intelligence" to "the Dalai Clique's '9, 10, 3' [Gu Chu Sum] splittist organization" | Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China | Art. 111 | November 7, 2008 | 10 years |
The LEN report did not provide any details about the type of information that any of the defendants allegedly provided to entities outside of China. The report did not identify the group or individual deemed to be part of "the Dalai Clique" that allegedly received information from the four defendants accused of acting together: Wangdu, Migmar Dondrub, Phuntsog Dorje, and Tsewang Dorje. One of the other defendants, Sonam Dragpa allegedly provided information to the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), a non-governmental organization (NGO) that seeks Tibetan independence according to the TYC Web site; Yeshe Choedron allegedly provided information to the Tibetan government-in-exile; and Sonam Tseten allegedly provided information to Gu-Chu-Sum, an NGO that Tibetan former political prisoners established to work on behalf of Tibetan political prisoners, according to the group's Web site.
At least two of the Tibetans, Wangdu and Phuntsog Dorje, have served previous sentences as political prisoners. Wangdu was detained on March 8, 1989, the day martial law took effect in Lhasa after three days of protests and rioting. According to the CECC Political Prisoner Database, Wangdu's initial three-year sentence was extended by five years to a total of eight years' imprisonment after he and at least 10 other Tibetan political prisoners signed (in prison) a petition stating that the 1951 17-Point Agreement between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government in Lhasa was forced on an independent Tibet. Wangdu, who had learned English, was a monk and tour guide at Lhasa's Jokhang Temple before the 1989 detention. Prior to detention from his home on March 14, 2008, Wangdu worked in Lhasa for the Australia-based Burnet Institute as a project officer for the institute's HIV Prevention in Lhasa Project, according to information in the ICT report, a December 22 Associated Press report (reprinted in Fox News), and an October 9 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) report. Information about the project is available on the Burnet Institute's Web site.
Phuntsog Dorje, a former employee of the Snowlands Hotel in Lhasa, served a 10-year sentence after detention in 1990, according to the 1994 Human Rights Watch report, "Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious Prisoners." Authorities suspected Phuntsog Dorje of having links to a pro-independence group. In 1993, Phuntsog Dorje was suffering from kidney problems attributed to "extraordinarily heavy labor," the report said, citing an October 19, 1993, Tibet Information Network report (TIN ceased operations in 2005).
The Commission is aware of only one other official Chinese report of detention of Tibetans for peaceful protest activity during the wave of protests that began on March 10, 2008, the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising. The report concerns one of the two protests reported to have occurred in Lhasa on March 10. A March 25 China Tibet News report (translated in OSC, 27 March 08) stated that on March 24 the Lhasa People's Procuratorate authorized public security officials to formally arrest on charges of "illegal assembly" 13 of 15 monks whom police detained on March 10 for "chanting reactionary slogans" and carrying home-made Tibetan flags near the Jokhang Temple. The report did not name any of the monks charged with "illegal assembly," but named another of the monks, Lodroe (Luozhui), as the leader of the protest and the first to display the Tibetan flag. The report did not provide any information about the charges against Lodroe. No information is available about whether or not a court tried and sentenced the monks. All of the monks were temporary students at Sera Monastery in Lhasa but who hailed from other monasteries located in Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces, according to March 10 and March 12 Radio Free Asia (RFA) reports and two March 12 TCHRD reports (1, 2).
Hundreds of Drepung Monastery monks staged the other March 10 peaceful protest in Lhasa by attempting to march from the monastery to the city center, where the Potala Palace and the Jokhang Temple are located, according to the RFA reports and a March 11 TCHRD report. According to information and analysis provided in Section V, Tibet, of the CECC 2008 Annual Report, Tibetan protests spread quickly through more than 50 county-level areas in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. Protesters resorted to rioting in a total of 12 county-level areas, according to official Chinese media reports, but generally peaceful Tibetan protests took place in more than 40 additional county-level areas. China¡¯s leadership blamed the Dalai Lama and "the Dalai Clique" for the Tibetan protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China¡¯s Constitution and legal system. Chinese authorities released by June 2008 more than 3,000 of the more than 4,400 detained Tibetans whom officials characterized as "rioters" and who had surrendered or been detained by April 9, based on CECC analysis of a June 21, 2008, China Daily report and previous Chinese state-run media reports.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-23 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-03 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=115942 |
State Security Cases From Xinjiang Appear to Surge in 2008
Courts in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) completed trials in 2008 for a total of 268 cases involving crimes of endangering state security (ESS), a number that appears to represent a surge over previous years, based on available data. (See analysis below for more details.) The XUAR High People's Court announced the number of cases during a report made at a January 9, 2009, meeting of the XUAR People's Congress, according to a January 10 report on the Xinhua Xinjiang Web site. Crimes of ESS (also translated as "endangering national security") are defined in articles 102-113 of the Chinese Criminal Law to include acts such as separatism, espionage, and armed rebellion. Many of the ESS crimes carry the possibility of life imprisonment and capital punishment. The apparent rise in ESS cases came during a year in which authorities implemented harsh security measures throughout the XUAR amid preparations for the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games and protests in Uyghur and Tibetan areas of China. The figure's release also comes after limited official reports in 2008 of terrorist activity in the region, although the figure may not reflect all cases of alleged terrorism pursued by authorities. In December, a XUAR court found that two men had engaged in terrorist activity earlier in the year and sentenced them to death for "intentional homicide" and "illegally producing guns, ammunition and explosives," crimes outside the ESS category. See December 17 Xinhua reports in English and Chinese (via Xinjiang Peace Net) for more information. In 2008, procuratorate offices in the XUAR capital of Urumqi approved arrests of 133 people in 51 cases involving crimes carried out by the "three forces," including ESS crimes along with other "crimes of serious violence" such as carrying out explosions, murder, plunder, and kidnapping, according to a January 23 report from Urumqi Online. The government uses the term "three forces" to designate what it deems as terrorist, separatist, and "extremist" threats to the region's stability. The Urumqi Online article reported that the number of cases and people involved represented increases of 64.5 percent and 75 percent, respectively.
Official information on the number of completed ESS trials in the XUAR follows data released in December 2008 showing that, as of November 2008, XUAR procuratorate offices had issued indictments in 204 such cases that year, involving 1,154 people, according to a Procuratorial Daily report posted January 4 on the Xinjiang Peace Net. In total, the procuratorates approved the arrests of 1,295 people suspected of ESS crimes as of November, according to the report. The information on the total number of ESS trials concluded in 2008 did not include the number of people involved.
Number of People Indicted in the XUAR Eclipses Nationwide Totals for Previous Years, Trial Figures Appear to Surge
The XUAR ESS indictment figures for January through November, 2008, are almost as high as nationwide ESS indictment totals in 2007 in terms of number of cases involved and are approximately double in terms of individuals involved. The number of people indicted in the XUAR is also double or more the number of people indicted nationwide in 2006 and 2005. In 2007, procuratorates nationwide issued indictments in 231 cases involving 619 people, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) figures for that year. The previous year, there were indictments nationwide in 258 cases involving 561 people, according to NBS figures for 2006. The figure in 2005 was 185 cases and 349 individuals, according to a compilation of national data on arrests, indictments, and trials in The Dui Hua Foundation's Winter 2009 Dialogue Newsletter. Available data, including a comparison with total numbers of ESS cases tried nationwide in the past five years through 2007 (see The Dui Hua Foundation's compilation of figures) and information from the XUAR on ESS cases accepted by XUAR courts since 2003, also suggests that ESS trial figures in the XUAR in 2008 may have increased significantly from previous years. The head of the XUAR High People's Court reported in 2007 that since 2003, the XUAR court system has accepted an average of roughly 150 ESS cases per year, according to an August 14, 2007, article from the Xinhua Xinjiang Web site.
XUAR Justice System Places Stability "Above All Else"
The apparent surge in ESS cases from the XUAR comes amid information from XUAR procuratorate and court officials emphasizing their offices' roles in upholding stability. The January 4 Procuratorial Daily article reported, "Since 2008, all levels of the XUAR procuratorate have from start to finish taken safeguarding social stability as the utmost political task for strengthening legal supervision." The January 23 Urumqi Online article used similar language to describe procuratorial work in that city. At a meeting on "struggle against separatism" reeducation held by the XUAR procuratorate on December 1, a procuratorial official called on officials to recognize that stability "is above all else," according to a December 3 article from the Xinjiang Legal Daily. In August 2008, the head of the XUAR High People's Court "said [that XUAR courts] at all levels will always maintain high vigilance against ethnic separatism and illegal religious activities to safeguard the motherland's unity and national security and will give top priority to the trial of crimes endangering national security," according to a description of his remarks reported in an August 15, 2008, China News Service article (via Open Source Center, subscription required).
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-15 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-04-16 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116338 |
Xinjiang Authorities Issue Plan Combining Rural Reform With Continued Political Controls
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) issued an opinion in December 2008 to accelerate rural reform and development, combining policies aimed at improving conditions in rural areas with steps to continue tight political controls in the region. The Opinion on Deepening the Promotion of Rural Reform and Development (Opinion), issued by the XUAR Communist Party Committee and XUAR government on December 8, follows national plans issued in 2007 and earlier in 2008 to promote development in ethnic minority regions. The Opinion sets 2020 as a target date for realizing reform goals and describes as one of its basic principles the need to "grasp reform and development in one hand and unity and stability in the other." The plan precedes a work report by XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri, posted January 8, 2009, on the Xinjiang Daily Web site, calling for increased measures to promote stability, while also outlining development objectives for the coming year. (For related information, see also a January 6 article on the Xinjiang Daily Web site providing an analysis and forecast of economic and social conditions in the XUAR.)
The Opinion outlines general measures to promote reform and development in areas such as land contracting, agriculture, finance, employment, the environment, health, and education. Measures include: - Integrating economic and social development between rural and urban areas and implementing preferential development policies in the southern XUAR to close the gap in conditions between southern and northern regions of the XUAR (Point 6). The Opinion's attention to the southern XUAR coincides with news of specific measures to support the region. The central government will subsidize 53.4 billion yuan for a five-year period starting in 2009 to support development in three southern XUAR districts, according to a January 4 report on the Xinjiang Peace Net. The government also has proposed providing free high school education to students in these three districts, in a measure designed both to promote vocational skills and uphold "social security and stability," according to the Communist Party secretary of the XUAR Education Department, as quoted in a January 8 report from the People's Daily.
- Promoting steps to retrain rural residents, shift them to different sectors of employment, and promote programs to export the local labor force (Points 15 and 16). As reported by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in its 2008 Annual Report, the government maintains a labor transfer program that has sent young ethnic minority men and women to jobs in the interior of China. Overseas reports have indicated that local authorities have coerced participation and mistreated workers.
- Developing rural health care, including rural health cooperatives (Point 23). As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, the central government announced plans to increase public spending on healthcare in rural and remote areas, with particular attention to China's western and interior areas. The government announced nationwide plans for healthcare reform in January 2009, according to a January 18 report from Xinhua.
The Opinion also describes steps to promote continued political controls, including:- Strengthening the management of religious affairs, including by strengthening implementation of a two-point system to monitor mosques and religious leaders, by continuing to impose political training on religious personnel, and by forbidding "underground" scripture readings and private pilgrimages (Point 30).
- Point 26 includes a call for developing social welfare undertakings in areas such as helping the poor and disabled, providing disaster relief, and aiding orphans. The CECC 2008 Annual Report reported, however, that elsewhere the XUAR government has taken steps to curb the development of civil society groups, including Islam-focused groups that have aimed to address social problems.
The politicized content of the December Opinion, coupled with the XUAR government's poor track record in promoting equitable development, call into question the Opinion's potential to guide improvements in rural conditions and protect rural residents' rights, including ethnic minority rights. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, although economic reforms and development projects have raised living standards in the region, they have also furthered unequal allocation of resources that favor Han Chinese and have served as a platform for advancing political controls. The government has tied some development projects to the promotion of "social stability" and used development projects to channel migration to the XUAR, resulting in broad demographic and assimilation pressures in the region.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-07 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=115977 |
Two Young Uyghurs Detained for Distributing Leaflets Calling for Student Demonstration
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) capital of Urumqi have detained two young Uyghur men for distributing leaflets on a university campus calling on students to organize a public demonstration. Available information suggests the leaflets may have called on students to protest tobacco and alcohol sales. Two security staff at Xinjiang University (XU) detained 20-year-old Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and 19-year-old Mutellip T¨¦yip on December 20, 2008, after seeing them distribute leaflets within the campus gates, according to a December 25 report of the event on the XU Web site and a Xinhua report posted January 1, 2009, on the Xinhua Bingtuan Web site. Two people outside the campus gates fled the scene as the detention occurred, according to the reports. The Xinhua article reported that the two Uyghur security staff and their ethnic Hui colleague who interrogated the men were initially unable to understand the contents of the Uyghur-language leaflets, but according to the XU report, university authorities later determined the leaflets had "reactionary" and "malicious" content aimed at "inciting students to demonstrate in the streets and create chaos." The XU authorities reported this information to Urumqi public security offices, which took the two young men into detention. Their current whereabouts and further developments in their cases are not known. According to the Xinhua report, Miradil Yasin and Mutellip T¨¦yip identified themselves as XU students, but the XU report did not describe them as students. The Xinhua article reported that based on information provided by XU, public security offices detained on the same day a "criminal gang" made up of more than 20 people. (For additional reporting on the initial detentions on the XU campus, see also a December 26 article from Radio Free Asia's Uyghur service, based in part on interviews with local authorities including XU security staff involved in the case, and a December 30 press release from the Uyghur American Association.)
The reports provided no additional information on the specific contents of the leaflets, but information from two other Urumqi universities where leaflets were found on the same day suggests that leaflets at all three campuses may have similarly called on students to peacefully demonstrate against tobacco and alcohol sellers. The Xinjiang Agricultural University said in a December 30 report that the leaflets found on that campus urged ethnic minority students to gather at the campus gymnasium on December 21 and demonstrate in support of removing tobacco and alcohol from supermarkets, stores, and banquet halls. A December 26 report from Xinjiang Medical University, where officials held a meeting to address the discovery of leaflets there, described the contents of the leaflets as aiming "in name to improve the lifestyle habits of ethnic minority students," but claimed that in fact the contents amounted to "reactionary speech" that aimed to spur students into an "illegal assembly" that would disrupt "stability and unity." The report said that through the meeting, students were able to recognize that "to advocate lashing out at tobacco and alcohol businesses in fact [amounts to] an act of beating, smashing and looting, and this is forbidden by our country's laws."
In the aftermath of discovering the leaflets, the three universities reported taking measures to strengthen propaganda campaigns and oversight of students. The XU article noted that the school is in the process of carrying out anti-separatism education activities, and reported that the school's Communist Party committee called on staff to improve their sense of responsibility and urgency in their work to fight separatism and "infiltration." According to a second December 25 report from XU, the XU Communist Party secretary called on the university to strengthen "management" of places including dorms, cafeterias, and shower halls, and intensify "supervision and control" of technologies including Internet and cell phone messaging. A department at the Xinjiang Medical University convened a meeting on December 22 to address the leaflets, noting that the distribution of the leaflets indicated that the "fight against separatism" remained "complex and severe," and calling for an "unceasing strengthening of students' political immunity" against perceived threats to stability, according to another December 26 report from that university. The article also said that the meeting demonstrated that students would not be "hoodwinked" by the "pretense" of "illegal religion." The article reiterated XUAR government calls to emphasize the concept of "stability above all else." Xinjiang Agricultural University described taking measures on December 20 and 21 for "prevention and control" within the school and called on school departments to attach high importance to anti-separatism and anti-infiltration education, according to the report from that school. The Xinjiang Agricultural University also described plans to reward the student who informed officials of finding the leaflets. XU authorities gave monetary rewards to the security staff involved in stopping distribution of the leaflets on that campus and held a meeting to honor them, according to the two XU reports.
The confiscation of leaflets and detentions of Miradil Yasin, Mutellip T¨¦yip, and others occurred within a heightened security climate in place in the XUAR in the past year since preparations for the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games, limited Chinese government reports of terrorist activity, and protests among Uyghurs and Tibetans in early 2008. The universities' characterization of the planned anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol demonstrations as illegal gatherings associated with separatism may have reflected a response both to the possibility of large-scale assembly as well as to religious expressions deemed by authorities to be "extremist." Separatism, terrorism, and "extremism" form the "three forces" designated by the government as threatening the region's security. The government's "strike hard" campaigns against the "three forces" have spurred tight controls over religious practice in the region and caused other rights abuses. Disrupting the planned demonstration also continues a trend in restricting grassroots religion-based efforts to address social issues such as substance abuse.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-12 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116179 |
State-Controlled Catholic Church Celebrates Independence from "Foreign Interference"
China's state-controlled Catholic church held a meeting in December to celebrate the Chinese church's policy of appointing bishops independently of Holy See practices for designating the religious leaders. The Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the Chinese Catholic Bishops Conference, the two Communist Party-controlled organizations that lead China's state-sanctioned Catholic church, convened the meeting on December 19 in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the church's policy of "self-selecting" and "self-ordaining" bishops, according to a December 19 Xinhua report. (For overseas reporting on the meeting, see a December 19 Union of Catholic Asian News report and December 20 Asia News report.) Du Qinglin, head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department and vice-chair of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said at the meeting that the church began "self-selection" in 1958 to address bishop shortages, "eliminate foreign interference in internal affairs," and "withstand the threat of 'ruthless punishment' from foreign forces." Du called on Catholics to "unflinchingly" continue the church's policy of independence and said that as one of the pre-conditions for improving Sino-Vatican relations, the Vatican must not interfere in China's internal affairs, including by "using religion to interfere." As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report, the two countries do not maintain diplomatic relations.
As reported in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, although CPA policy requires that the registered church depart from the practice of recognizing Holy See authority to select bishops and instead make bishop selections based on its own internal procedures, in recent years the CPA has tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops. The church ordained a total of five bishops in 2007 all of whom had Holy See approval, after breaking with the practice of ordaining Holy See-approved bishops for some appointments in 2006.
The Holy See-selected bishops who serve China's unregistered Catholic church community continue to remain vulnerable to government abuse, the CECC reported in its 2008 Annual Report. The approximately 40 bishops who serve the unregistered church are reported to remain in detention, confinement in their homes, in hiding, or under strict surveillance by the government. In the past year, authorities continued their pattern of detention and harassment of Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered bishop of Zhengding diocese in Hebei province. Authorities also have harassed registered bishops, in some cases coercing them to officiate consecrations for the registered church.
For more information, see section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-09 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116044 |
Authorities Target Protestant House Churches for Harassment, Detentions in December
Authorities disrupted several Protestant house church gatherings in December 2008, in some cases detaining church leaders, according to reports from the China Aid Association (CAA), an organization that monitors conditions for religious freedom in China. The reports come amid calls from local governments in late 2008 to stem Protestant house church gatherings and meetings of other unregistered religious groups. The CAA also issued a report in December on the demolition of a registered church and provided information on new developments in ongoing cases.
Recent reports include:- The Zhoukou municipality Reeducation Through Labor Committee (RTL) in Henan province issued a decision on December 16, 2008, sentencing three church leaders to one year of RTL for their involvement in "illegal proselytizing" and an "illegal gathering," according to a January 6 CAA report and a copy of the RTL decision posted January 6 on the CAA Web site. Authorities initially detained the three church leaders, Tang Houyong, Shu Wenxiang, and Xie Zhenqi, on December 3 at a house church gathering. CAA reported that authorities detained other attendees and sentenced 20 of them to 15 days of administrative detention. According to CAA, authorities alleged the church members belonged to the "Shouters," a group deemed a cult by authorities, but CAA said the church members were not associated with the group. The wife of one of the men sentenced to RTL has since pursued legal action in the case, including filing an administrative lawsuit and a motion to dismiss a judge involved, according to a January 26 CAA press release and copy of a court filing posted the same day on the CAA Web site.
- On January 2, public security officers in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), disrupted a house church meeting and detained 51 attendees. Authorities held 3 of the 51 in public security bureau custody, one of whom was sentenced to 10 days of administrative detention, according to a January 5 report from CAA.
- On December 17, police officers in Yancheng, Jiangsu province, demolished a registered church, according to a December 22 report from CAA. The CAA said sources described the demolition of the Chengnan Christian Church as the result of collusion between the Yancheng government and real estate developers. The demolition came despite a December 16 court ruling in favor of the church, CAA reported.
Among reports from CAA are also several incidents which took place during the Christmas season, a period also targeted in past years.- Authorities disrupted Christmas eve and Christmas day gatherings in Bozhou, Anhui and Yucheng county, Shangqiu, Henan provinces and Qitai county, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, in the XUAR, according to CAA reports from December 26 and December 30. Officials took into detention two church leaders from the Anhui gathering, seven church leaders from the XUAR, and nine people from Henan. Authorities later released five of the nine detained in Henan and sentenced the remaining four to 15 days of administrative detention, according to a December 27 report from Monitor China, a Web site affiliated with the CAA.
- Earlier in the week, authorities targeted other house church Christmas celebrations in Anhui and in the XUAR, according to a December 25 CAA report via the Christian News Wire. Authorities disrupted a Bible training class in Dongzhi county, Chizhou, Anhui province, on December 22, interrogated the 19 students and 2 church leaders in the class, and sealed off the building where the classes were held. On December 22, authorities warned a house church leader in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, to stop holding services.
- On December 24, police disrupted a group of people, including Protestant volunteers, who had gathered to rebuild housing for victims of the May 12, 2008, earthquake in Sichuan province, according to a December 27 CAA report. Authorities confiscated the group's property and took some of the group members into detention. CAA reported that authorities had targeted the group because of the presence of the Protestant volunteers.
Also in December, the CAA reported on developments in ongoing cases. - On December 15, a court in Qorghas (Huocheng), XUAR, tried the case of church leader Lou Yuanqi, detained since May 17, 2008, for ¡°inciting separatism,¡± in connection to interviews he gave about his prior detentions for leading house church services. Authorities formally arrested him on June 20, on charges of using superstition to undermine implementation of state law, a crime under Article 300 of the Criminal Law, stemming from his church activities and from reporting abuses to overseas groups. See a CAA December 15 report and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information.
- On December 21, 2008, public security officers detained Beijing-based house church leader Zhang Mingxuan in Ulanhot, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, while he was there to preach, according to a December 22 CAA report. He was sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention for "operating an illegal organization for religious activities." International pressure prompted his early release on December 22, CAA reported. Authorities harassed Zhang on multiple other occasions in 2008, as noted in previous CECC analyses (1, 2) and the CECC Political Prisoner Database.
For more information, see section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-26 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116591 |
Manipulation of the Criminal Law to Penalize "Cults" Continues in Case of Painter and Popular Musician
Continuing a trend in which the PRC Criminal Law is used to persecute Falun Gong practitioners, a Beijing court sentenced a 40-year-old award-winning artist to three years in prison late last year on account of her association with the banned spiritual movement. On November 25, 2008, the Beijing Chongwen District People's Court sentenced Xu Na to three years in prison for "using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law," according to Xu's attorney as reported by the Associated Press (AP) (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune), Agence France-Presse (AFP) (reprinted in Yahoo! News), and Radio Free Asia (RFA) on November 25. The AP reporter spoke with a clerk at the Chongwen court who confirmed that a verdict against Xu was issued, but refused to disclose the details of her sentence.
In an interview with AFP, Xu's attorney indicated that she was convicted on the basis of "possessing and intending to distribute" 53 documents and 8 computer disks containing information about Falun Gong. Xu pleaded not guilty to the charges against her, and in her defense, appealed to Article 36 of the PRC Constitution, which provides for citizens' freedom of religious belief. The verdict was handed down after a 15-minute hearing, which for reasons that are unclear, was closed to some who sought to observe the proceedings, according to a November 26 report by the Falun Dafa Information Center (FDIC). Xu's lawyer told the AFP that she intends to appeal her sentence.
10-Month Pre-Trial Detention
Xu had been detained by police for 10 months in the lead-up to her recent sentencing. Authorities initially took Xu and her husband, folk musician Yu Zhou, into custody at a police checkpoint while they were driving to their Beijing home after a concert on the night of January 26, 2008. The couple's detention coincided with a pre-Olympics crackdown that resulted in the detention of more than 8,000 Falun Gong practitioners, according to a July 7 FDIC report.
The verdict handed down on November 25 marks the second time in eight years that Xu Na has been sent to prison for her association with Falun Gong. In 2001, Xu was given a five-year sentence for renting a room to Falun Gong practitioners who came to Beijing from other provinces, according to the RFA report. While serving her first sentence, Xu was reportedly beaten, deprived of sleep, force-fed, and tied down in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time, according to the November 26 FDIC report. Falun Gong has been outlawed in China since the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a decision in July 1999 calling it an "illegal organization" that "harms society."
Manipulation of the Criminal Law
Xu's sentence reflects a broader trend in using the Criminal Law to penalize Falun Gong practitioners. The ill-defined charge of "using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law" is drawn from Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law and is commonly used to sentence Falun Gong practitioners (for example, see page 96 of the CECC 2006 Annual Report). First inserted into the Criminal Law in March 1997, Article 300 was adopted to provide a legal basis for the government's "anti-superstition" campaign, which had targeted since the early-1990s various religious and spiritual groups deemed "heretical" or "superstitious." Following the commencement of the government's crackdown on Falun Gong in the summer of 1999, this campaign has gradually expanded into a highly-organized, nationwide "anti-cult" operation with a dedicated security force called the 6-10 Office (for more information, see pages 88-91 of the CECC 2008 Annual Report).
The Criminal Law does not precisely define what constitutes a "cult organization" (xiejiao zuzhi). In practice, Chinese authorities have applied the cult designation arbitrarily against religious groups perceived as potential political threats, including Christian and Muslim groups. On October 30, authorities in Neixiang county in Henan province sentenced house church pastor Zhu Baoguo to one year of reeducation through labor for leading an "evil cult," according to a November 18 China Aid Association report. In 2007, an official report published on the Web site of the Jinghe County Political-Legal Committee in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region called for "severe strikes" against "cults" such as Falun Gong and a Muslim group called the "Islam Liberation Party" (for more information, see previous CECC analysis).
The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a joint interpretation on "criminal cases involving cult organizations" in October 1999 that outlined vague criteria for designating a "cult organization." Such criteria include "harming society," "deifying" its leadership, "seducing and deceiving" others through "superstitions and heresies," and "controlling" the group's membership. No further details were given to clarify key terms such as "deify" or "control." According to this joint interpretation, activities prohibited by Article 300 of the Criminal Law include, among many other things, the publishing, printing, duplicating, or distributing of publications with "cult"-related content or symbols of "cult organizations."
Xu's Husband Dies in Custody
Yu Zhou died in police custody 11 days after he and his wife were detained, as reported by the Times of London on April 20. In an interview with AFP, Xu's lawyer confirmed that Yu died in police custody. Fans of Yu's band -- Xiaojuan and the Co-Residents of the Valley -- also wrote of Yu's death on Chinese language blogs. Authorities offered conflicting accounts of the cause of Yu's death, initially telling his family that he died of diabetes, and later attributing his death to a hunger strike. His relatives, however, indicated that Yu had no history of diabetes and that results from an autopsy the family demanded were withheld from them, according to a June 11 report from Clearwisdom.net. Xu's lawyer told AFP that "there are suspicions that he was beaten to death while in prison, but so far we have been unable to collect any evidence." Security officials prevented Xu from attending her husband's funeral.
For more information on Yu Zhou and Xu Na, please see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. For more information on the government's persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, please see Section II -- Freedom of Religion -- Falun Gong in the CECC's 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-14 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=115536 |
Yunnan To Establish Anti-Trafficking Office To Focus on Women and Children
The Yunnan provincial government issued the Yunnan Province Implementing Opinion on the National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) (Yunnan provincial implementing opinion) for the National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) (National Action Plan) on November 21, 2008, calling for the establishment of an anti-trafficking office to coordinate the province's anti-trafficking efforts. The implementing opinion, like the National Action Plan, focuses on women and children. Yunnan is the fourth province to issue an implementation plan after the State Council issued the National Action Plan in December 2007. Guizhou province issued an implementing opinion in May 2008, followed by Hainan and Fujian provinces in June 2008.
Similar to Guizhou, Hainan, and Fujian's implementing plans, Yunnan province will:- Establish an anti-trafficking "leadership committee" with an office located within the provincial public security department. The "leadership committee" will implement, organize, and coordinate cross-regional, inter-governmental, inter-agency, and cross-provincial (district and city) anti-trafficking efforts.
- Include funds in the annual budget required by each locality and department to ensure the development and implementation of anti-trafficking work.
- Investigate and punish, according to law, illegal employers and employment of child labor, and ban illegal employment or marriage brokerage agencies or their Internet sites.
- Strengthen the provision of social welfare and assist with victim reintegration for rescued women and children, including appropriate arrangement for children without guardians, school enrollment for children who have reached appropriate age, as well as occupational training and employment assistance.
- Create special files for rescued women and children to track their living conditions and to coordinate relevant departments and organizations' efforts to resolve problems faced by those who have been rescued.
- Enhance international and cross-provincial cooperation.
The Yunnan provincial implementing opinion also includes a new measure allowing rescued women who cannot or are unwilling to return home to remain in Yunnan, subject to the approval of the relevant department(s). For those rescued women who are allowed to stay in Yunnan, the Yunnan Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission will regard them as "permanent residents" (changzhu renkou), instead of as migrants or members of the so-called "floating population" who do not have a local household registration (hukou). (For a discussion of China's household registration system, see section II--Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, including the Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms (pp. 105-112); for a broader retrospective, see also an October 2005 CECC topic paper on China's household registration system, and a chart on Chinese Hukou reforms as of 2004.) The significance of the new policy is twofold: - Trafficked Chinese women without a local hukou may avoid involuntary repatriation, thus minimizing the risks of facing danger, such as threats from their traffickers, or re-trafficked once returned home.
- For non-Chinese women trafficked into Yunnan, neither the National Action Plan nor the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion distinguishes between foreign and Chinese victims, and the measures do not specify that this new policy is applicable only to Chinese citizens. If interpreted in this way, the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion's policy of allowing non-Chinese women to remain in Yunnan would comply with the international standard set forth in Article 7 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children. This Protocol states that "each State Party shall consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases." However, it remains to be seen how the new policy will be implemented in practice.
Even though the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion appears to provide better protection and prevention measures to trafficked women and children, there remain several weaknesses:- The measures do not include language about men identified as trafficking victims.
- Authority coordinating the inter-agency anti-trafficking effort is assigned to the provincial public security department. Generally speaking, public security departments may favor a "law and order" approach to anti-trafficking, rather than a human rights approach that favors prevention and addresses the root causes of human trafficking.
See the following Commission analyses for a discussion of China's anti-trafficking efforts: China's Anti-Trafficking Efforts Remain Inadequate One Year After Government's Release of National Action Plan, Infant Trafficking From the Earthquake Zone and Other Cases Reflect Anti-Trafficking Challenges, China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To Provide "Sustainable Solutions". See also Section II-Human Trafficking in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-29 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-02-01 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116491 |
UN Human Rights Council To Review China's Human Rights Record
On February 9, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva will review China's human rights record under a new mechanism known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The UPR was created on March 15, 2006 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/251 (A/Res/60/251), which established the 47-member Human Rights Council (Council), replacing the Commission on Human Rights. The UPR mechanism "involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years." (UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), Basic Facts About The UPR). OHCHR describes the UPR as "one of the key elements of the new Council which reminds States of their responsibility to fully respect and implement all human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ultimate aim of this new mechanism is to improve the human rights situation in all countries and address human rights violations wherever they occur." (OHCHR, Fact Sheet: Human Rights Council-Universal Periodic Review).
The Working Group on the UPR will meet in a three-hour session on February 9 to review China's human rights record. Each review is facilitated by a group of three rapporteurs (referred to as "troikas"), who are drawn by lot from Council members and from different Regional Groups. Canada, India, and Nigeria will serve as the troika for China's review. They will facilitate the "interactive dialogue" portion of the Working Group session and will prepare the report of the Working Group. (Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, "Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council," sections D.2.18(d), and 21 (18 June 2007).) Participation in the review is not limited to Members of the Council; any Member State may be involved, including in the interactive dialogue, during which they may ask questions, make comments and/or offer recommendations. (Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, sec. D.2.18 (b); OHCHR, Basic Facts About The UPR). Representatives of NGOs may also attend the review. (HRC Resolution 5/1.)
The review will be based on:
The documents that will be considered for the review are:
For more information on China's compliance with its international human rights obligations and commitments, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report. For more information on the UPR review process, see China's National Report (in Chinese only), the "compilation of UN information" and the "summary of stakeholders' information" prepared by the OHCHR (in English), and the original submissions of 46 stakeholders . The final report (referred to as "outcome") of China's review, once released, will be available here. Click here for a list of representative cases to use as a resource for formulating questions, comments, and/or recommendations pertaining to the release of citizens detained or imprisoned for advocating greater human rights guarantees in China, including citizens who engage with the international community to address human rights abuses.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-01-21 ) |
Posted on: 2009-02-02 |
|
|
| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116477 |
|
Back To Top
Previous Page