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Introduction

One year after a wave of protests began in Lhasa and swept across the Tibetan Plateau, the Chinese government continues to focus its attention on perceived sources of ¡°instability¡± not just in ethnic minority areas, but across a diverse cross-section of Chinese society. As the articles in this newsletter show, official efforts to promote Party policy through the control of information extend beyond media coverage of ethnic affairs. A broad sweep of issues ranging from press coverage of national economic matters to reporting on Beijing building fires has been subject to the close scrutiny of censors. Prompted by anniversaries of events they deem to be ¡°sensitive,¡± authorities have vowed to ¡°strike hard¡± against perceived threats to ¡°social stability.¡± Official announcements indicate that authorities will respond early to ¡°social unrest¡± prompted by rising unemployment or other causes. The case of a Uyghur historian recently released from prison, and the postponement of the trial of rights activist Huang Qi illustrate that China¡¯s criminal law system continues to function as a tool to punish people for exercising the right to free speech. In the months ahead, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China will continue to monitor and report on these and other developments, and on China's record with respect to its international commitments to develop the rule of law and to safeguard human rights.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-27 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118876

Ahead of Sensitive Dates, Lhasa Officials Add "Strike Hard" to Crackdown

Officials in Lhasa city, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), have implemented a "strike hard" anti-crime campaign running from mid-January until late March 2009¡ªa period of time that brackets a series of dates that many Tibetans consider to have a high level of cultural and political sensitivity. The campaign aims to "strike hard according to law against all kinds of illegal criminal activity and to vigorously uphold the city's social order and stability," according to a January 23 report (in Chinese) published in the Communist Party-run Lhasa Evening News (LEN).

The "strike hard" campaign took effect as Lhasa residents entered the 11th month of a well-entrenched security crackdown that People's Armed Police (PAP) and public security officials established following the cascade of Tibetan protests that began in Lhasa on March 10, 2008, and by April had reached across the TAR and Tibetan autonomous areas located in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces. Tibetan protesters resorted to rioting on March 14-15 in Lhasa and other nearby locations. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) reported in its 2008 Annual Report that as a result of the Chinese government crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of Tibetan protests, Chinese government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of speech, religion, and association had increased to what may be the highest level since approximately 1983, when Tibetans were able to set about reviving Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries. (See International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), "Tibet at a Turning Point, 6 August 08, for more information on the crackdown.)

LEN reported that the "strike hard" campaign during its first week deployed a substantial amount of security resources¡ªa force certain to attract residents' notice¡ªbut information in the report shows that "strike hard" personnel detected relatively little alleged criminal activity. More than 600 personnel using more than 160 vehicles were mobilized by January 21, according to the January 23 LEN report. On January 25, LEN reported (in Chinese) that in the first week security officials conducted checks on a total 8,424 persons at 3,813 rented residences, 33 hotels and guest houses, 56 bars and Internet cafes, and 30 residential courtyards. Police detained a total of 51 of the 8,424 persons (0.6 percent) on suspicion of criminal activity, including 30 on suspicion of theft, burglary, and prostitution. Two of the detainees had "reactionary discussion" and "reactionary songs" on their cell phones, the LEN report said.

"Strike hard" officials checked whether or not each of the 8,424 persons they examined had a permit to be in Lhasa¡ªonly 148 persons (1.8 percent) did not. NGOs and media organizations have reported that officials have intensified such checks since the early stages of the crackdown (see, e.g., China Digital Times, 30 April 08; Radio Free Asia (RFA), 5 November 08; and ICT, 13 November 08). Persons visiting Lhasa for as little as four days must register with public security officials, according to a January 23 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report.

The "strike hard" campaign will be in force during a 70-day period that brackets a series of dates that Tibetans regard as sensitive. The campaign will not expire until March 29 if measured from the January 18 launch date announced in the LEN report, or until March 31 if measured from a January 20 "comprehensively launched" date that LEN provided in a second January 23 report (in Chinese). The campaign will be active during the following observances and anniversaries.
  • Tibetan New Year (Losar), February 25, 2009. Some Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas of China intend to express in a passive manner their discontent with developments over the past year, including the death and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters, by foregoing the usual celebration of Losar. Reuters reported from Lhasa on February 12 that "many Tibetans" are boycotting Losar celebrations "in quiet defiance of the crackdown." A February 11 Xinhua report said that Nyima Tsering, Vice Chairman of the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee (TAR PCSC), at a February 10 press conference in Lhasa urged Tibetans to continue with Losar celebrations "in response to an underground campaign by some secessionists to boycott the festival." "Tibetan people are enjoying a good life now," Nyima Tsering said, "there is no reason for them to forgo celebrating their traditional holiday this year." If Chinese government officials choose to characterize Tibetan non-celebration of the New Year as an expression of "splittism," a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal Law, then authorities could pressure Tibetans to choose between celebrating Losar or facing the possibility of punishment that could include criminal prosecution.

  • Fiftieth anniversary of March 10, 1959, the date when tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama's Norbulingka residence because they feared a People's Liberation Army plot to harm him. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa a week later and fled into exile. On March 10 of every year since 1960 the Dalai Lama has made a formal statement to the Tibetan people. (See the Web site of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for a chronology, biographical information on the Dalai Lama, and an archive of March 10 statements.)

  • First anniversary of March 10, 2008, the start of the wave of Tibetan protests. The protests resulted in a large number of Tibetan deaths, detentions, and disappearances according to reports by media and NGOs, but Chinese government measures to prevent information from leaving China have prevented a complete and accurate accounting of the consequences. Chinese officials blamed "the Dalai Clique" for "masterminding" the 2008 protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for information on the Tibetan protests and their consequences. See Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 of the 2007 Annual Report, and Section VIII¡ªTibet of the 2006 Annual Report for additional information on Chinese government and Communist Party policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and legal system.)

  • First observance of "Serfs Emancipation Day", March 28, 2009. The TAR People's Congress established the holiday on January 19, 2009, to commemorate the March 28, 1959, Chinese government decree that dissolved the Dalai Lama's Lhasa-based Tibetan government. Legchog (Lieque), the Chairman of the TAR PCSC, said on January 16, 2009, that Serfs Emancipation Day would "strengthen Tibetans' patriotism," according to a January 16 Xinhua report. RFA reported on January 16 that TAR prefectural and county officials had met to "ensure that all people mark the occasion with festivities." Chinese government measures to pressure Tibetans into celebrating the end of the Dalai Lama's government (and, by association, the departure of the Dalai Lama), have already provoked protests. For example, about 300 Tibetans, including monks, protested on January 10 in Jiangda (Jomda) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, in an attempt to dissuade local officials from sending a Tibetan dance troupe to Lhasa to participate in Serfs Emancipation Day celebrations, according to a February 9 Phayul report. Officials forced the dance troupe to depart for Lhasa on January 15 and authorities detained at least seven monks on January 24, the report said.
A Lhasa government official and the Dalai Lama have said in separate statements that current tensions could result in further protests. Lhasa Deputy Mayor Cao Bianjiang referred to the Dalai Lama at a February 10 press conference in Lhasa and said that "some people . . . do not want to see the peaceful development of Lhasa's economy," according to a Reuters report that day. "So it cannot be entirely avoided that some people continue to cause disturbances," Cao said. The Dalai Lama said on February 11 while visiting Germany that there is "too much anger" in Tibet and that "[a]t any moment an outburst could happen," according to Telegraph (U.K.) and Voice of America reports the same day.

According to information accessible by the public in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD) as of February 17, 2009, security officials detained 24 Tibetans during January 2009 for political protest activity¡ªmore than during January in any other year since Tibetans resumed political activism in September 1987. The average number of political detentions of Tibetans during January in the years 1988 through 2008 was 3.7, based on information accessible by the public in the PPD. The increase in 2009 is consistent with statements anticipating a sustained increase in Tibetan protest activity noted above. The January 2009 detentions also are noteworthy for several other reasons.
  • The actual number of detentions during January may continue to increase beyond what has been reported thus far as additional information continues to come to light.

  • The Jiangda county protest was forward-looking, focusing on March 28 "Serfs Emancipation Day" ceremonies, rather than reactive, such as Tibetan protests against anti-Dalai Lama and "patriotic education" campaigns.

  • All 24 of the January 2009 detentions recorded in the PPD took place in Changdu prefecture or Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province. The two prefectures border each other, with the Yangzi River forming a boundary.

  • January has concluded only recently¡ªthe actual number of January protests and detentions may surpass what has been reported so far.
International media organizations have reported that Chinese authorities are closing Tibetan areas to foreign travelers in advance of the sensitive dates. According to a February 18 Telegraph (U.K.) report, officials in the TAR told tourist agencies not to accept tour groups for an unspecified period of time expected to last at least until the end of March. According to a February 12 Associated Press (AP) report (reprinted in Washington Post), several unidentified foreign journalists reported being expelled from unspecified Tibetan-populated areas of China during the week preceding the report. A tourism official in Gannan (Kanlho) TAP said that Gannan would be closed to foreigners until late March, according to the same report. Officials had closed parts of Ganzi TAP that had been open in late January, and only 3 counties (of 18) in the prefecture would remain open, AP said.

Ganzi and Gannan TAPs have been especially active protest areas since March 2008, based on information available in the CECC PPD. Ganzi TAP has been the site of more detentions of Tibetan protesters (not rioters) than any other prefectural-level Tibetan area during the period of protest that began on March 10, 2008. None of the 12 county-level areas where China's state-run media reported Tibetan rioting are located in Ganzi TAP (see Section V¡ªTibet, CECC 2008 Annual Report, endnote 6). As of February 23, 2009, the PPD contained information on 528 Tibetan protesters detained on or after March 10, 2008. Security officials detained 213 (40 percent) of the 528 protesters in Ganzi TAP. Authorities detained the next largest number of Tibetan protesters¡ª82 persons¡ªin Gannan TAP. PPD information on the detention of Tibetan protesters since March 10, 2008, is far from complete. Chinese government efforts to prevent information about the detention and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters from leaving China have prevented a complete and accurate accounting of the cases.




Source: -See Summary (2009-02-25 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-30  
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TAR Creates March 28 Holiday To Celebrate 1959 Dissolution of Dalai Lama's Government

Deputies to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) People's Congress voted on January 19, 2009, to establish "Serfs Emancipation Day," a public holiday celebrating the March 28, 1959, Chinese government decree that dissolved the Dalai Lama's Lhasa-based Tibetan government, according to two January 19 Xinhua reports (1, 2 (translated in OSC, 22 January 09). Karma (Gama), Vice Chairman of the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee, explained at a January 19 press conference that Premier Zhou Enlai signed the State Council decree on March 28 "declaring a disbandment" of the Tibetan government after "the reactionary clique at the upper levels of Tibet led by the Dalai launched an all-round armed rebellion on 10 March, 1959, aimed at splitting the motherland." Legchog (Lieque), the Chairman of the Standing Committee, said Serfs Emancipation Day would "strengthen Tibetans' patriotism," according to a January 16 Xinhua report. TAR prefectural and county officials have met to "ensure that all people mark the occasion with festivities," according to a January 16 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report filed three days before the holiday was formally established. The report cited a TAR official who asked not to be identified and acknowledged that Tibetans are unwilling to celebrate the anniversary.

On March 10, 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama¡¯s summer residence (the Norbulingka Palace), where he was residing at the time, because they feared a People's Liberation Army (PLA) plot to harm the Dalai Lama, according to biographical information available on the Web site of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL). Tension increased and on March 15 PLA artillery shells struck outside the Norbulingka, according to a chronology on the OHHDL Web site. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa in disguise and under the cover of darkness on March 17, 1959. Earlier that day, PLA artillery shells exploded outside one of the Norbulingka gates, according to the Dalai Lama's autobiography, Freedom in Exile (p. 149). Speaking from India where he lives in exile, the Dalai Lama has on March 10 of every year since 1960 made a formal statement to the Tibetan people. (The Dalai Lama's 1961-2008 March 10 Statements are available on his official Web site.)

Most Tibetan Buddhists regard the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader despite Party and government campaigns that seek to vilify and discredit him. Tibetan calls for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet were widespread during the 2008 Tibetan protests (see below). The absence of any progress during the seventh and eighth rounds of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue in 2008 has deepened Tibetan frustration with the Chinese government. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2008 Annual Report; Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 of the 2007 Annual Report; and Section VIII¡ªTibet of the 2006 Annual Report for more information on the status of negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives, and the Chinese government and Party's anti-Dalai Lama campaign.).

Establishing "Serfs Emancipation Day" and requiring Tibetans to participate in celebrations of the end of the Dalai Lama's government (and, by association, the departure of the Dalai Lama), is provocative at a time of heightened Tibetan sensitivity, possibly increasing further the risks to what Chinese officials call "social stability." March 10 is also the one-year anniversary of the start in Lhasa in 2008 of a cascade of Tibetan protests that by April 2008 had reached across the TAR and the Tibetan autonomous areas located in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces. The protests resulted in a large number of deaths, detentions, and disappearances according to reports by media and non-government organizations, but Chinese government measures to prevent information from leaving China have obstructed a full or accurate accounting of the consequences. The Lhasa Intermediate People's Court handed down seven sentences in October and November 2008 ranging from eight years in prison to life imprisonment to Tibetans who allegedly provided information about events in Lhasa to Tibetan organizations based in India. Chinese officials blamed "the Dalai Clique" for "masterminding" the 2008 protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information on the Tibetan protests and their consequences.)

Some Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas of China intend to express in a passive manner their discontent with developments over the past year, including the death and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters, by foregoing the usual celebration of Losar, the Tibetan lunar New Year (February 25 in 2009), according to the January 16 RFA report, a January 27 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) report, and a January 29 Washington Post (WP) report. A Tibetan source in Aba (Ngaba) county, located in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, told RFA that Tibetans in the county are "observing a year of mourning in memory of those who were killed, tortured, and jailed during the protests in Tibet." The ICT report noted that "many Tibetans posted blogs and comments mostly opposing any celebration" of the New Year. A monk in Qinghai told the WP that instead of celebrating the Tibetan or Chinese New Year, he and other monks would not eat "good food" or set off firecrackers.

Tibetans in Lhasa adopted non-celebration of Losar to express collective dissatisfaction in 1992, the first Tibetan New Year following a 14-month period of martial law imposed on March 8, 1989, after three days of protests and rioting in Lhasa. According to one eyewitness account:
"That year, the first day of the Tibetan New Year, called Losar, fell on March 5, the anniversary of the demonstrations in 1988 and 1989. Many Lhasa residents had decided to acknowledge the coincidence of Tibetan New Year and March 5 not by doing, but by not doing. Contrary to tradition, tattered window-awnings, dirty door-hangings, and faded whitewash remained untouched, greeting the New Year with utter cheerlessness." (Steven Marshall, "Prisons in Tibet," in Elliot Sperling, Steven Marshall, Orville Schell, and Mickey Spiegel, Tibet Since 1950: Silence, Prison, or Exile, Aperture and Human Rights Watch (New York: Aperture, 2000), 144-149.




Source: -See Summary (2009-01-29 ) | Posted on: 2009-05-10  
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Officials' Early Response to Unemployment and "Social Unrest" During Downturn

Since late 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao and other high level officials have made public statements acknowledging rising unemployment in China and the new challenges to "social stability" posed by unemployed migrant workers, according to a January 28 BBC report and a February 2 Financial Times report. (For more discussion of "social stability" and "social unrest," see the Preface and General Overview in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.)

Lower Economic Growth and Higher Unemployment
Chinese officials have stressed that 8 percent is the minimum needed to create enough jobs to avoid unrest, according to a January 29 Economist report. The latest economic figures may add to the leadership's concern. China's gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate slowed to 6.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, marking the lowest growth rate since 2002, according to a January 22 China Daily report citing an official from China's National Bureau of Statistics.

Among the challenges associated with the downturn, two issues related to employment--migrant workers' returning home and employment of college graduates--remain the most worrisome to Chinese leaders despite new measures to sustain economic growth and restrain inflation, as Premier Wen Jiabao has indicated, according to a December 20, 2008, China News report. According to Wen, employment of college graduates is a top priority for the government because 6.5 million college graduates are expected to join the workforce in 2009, and even if China's economy attains the 8 percent target growth rate in 2009, it can provide at most 9 million jobs.

Furthermore, an estimated 20 million migrant workers throughout China either have lost jobs or returned home without employment due to the global financial crisis, according to Chen Xiwen, a rural issues expert who serves as director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Rural Work and deputy director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics, as quoted in a February 2 Caijing report. Chen also stated that unemployment among migrant workers may deteriorate during the first half of 2009 before the financial crisis "hits the bottom."

Concern over "Social Unrest"
In response to rising unemployment among migrant workers and the possibility of "mass incidents" related to social problems exacerbated by the economic downturn, the government has issued new policies, including the State Council Circular Regarding Handling Current Migrant Worker Affairs (State Council Circular) on December 20, 2008, PRC Central People's Government Opinions Regarding Promoting Agricultural Development and Increasing Farmers' Income (Or the so-called "No. 1 Document") on December 31, 2008, and Guiding Opinion Regarding Handling Current Economic Situation and Stabilizing Labor Relations on January 23, 2009. These three documents place emphasis on migrant workers, farmers, and laborers respectively, but they all make reference to "maintaining social harmony and stability" during the financial crisis.

Labor disputes nearly doubled in the first 10 months of 2008 compared to the same period of 2007, according to Wang Shenqjun, president of the Supreme People's Court, as quoted in a December 22, 2008, Radio Free Asia report. The Sunday Times documented numerous protests by farmers, factory workers, and teachers against their employers and government offices in Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu provinces in December 2008 and January 2009, according to its February 1, 2009, report.

Officials have identified sensitive issues such as confiscation of rural land, environmental pollution, citizen relocation and resettlement, and handling of collective properties that may trigger "mass incidents," according to a February 2, 2009, Xinhua report. In response to a question regarding how local governments should handle protests, Chen Xiwen explained:
"If 'mass incidents' happen, leaders at all levels must be at the front line to explain to the people and persuade them face-to-face. Leaders cannot hide behind public security or the police, thus causing conflicts. Except for those unfortunate situations where there is beating, attacking, robbing, or burning, in principle, no police should be deployed. Leaders at all levels should go to the front line to solve problems."
Chen also cited 'mass incidents' in Guizhou and Yunnan provinces in 2008 as examples of local authorities' "poor handling" of protests and harming the people's interests as a result.

Migrant Workers and Hukou
The economic downturn, the concern over unemployed migrant workers, and official unease about "social unrest" also have rekindled discussion of how to implement long-term protections for migrant workers effectively, and of the possible abolition of the household registration (hukou) system. (For a discussion of China's household registration system, see section II--Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, including the Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms (pp. 105-112); for a broader retrospective, see also the CECC October 2005 CECC topic paper on China's household registration system, and a chart on Chinese Hukou reforms as of 2004.)

China has 950 million citizens who hold rural hukou, including 130 million migrant workers who have rural hukou but work and live in urban areas, according to a January 19, 2009, Caijing report. Migrant workers without urban hukou are more vulnerable to exploitation. The economic downturn risks "amplifying rights violations" linked to China's discriminatory hukou system, which denies migrant workers the social welfare benefits available to those who hold urban hukou, according to a Human Rights Watch statement on January 23. Many unemployed migrant workers without urban hukou choose to return home after losing jobs. However, disputes occur when migrant workers return home to find that their land has been either "collectively contracted" without their consent by local officials for other commercial purposes or contracted to other farmers, according to the January 19 Caijing report. For the longer-term protection of migrant workers and to prevent "social instability," experts have called for accelerating hukou reforms that would allow migrant workers to integrate fully into the urban system, according to a January 25, 2009, Xinhua report, and Caijing reports on December 18 and 23, 2008.

For more information on the economic downturn and "social instability," see a previous CECC analysis: Officials To Strengthen Security Before Anniversaries and During Economic Downturns.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-03-12  
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Top Officials Say Propaganda in 2009 To Focus on Economy and Stability

In early January 2009, top Chinese Communist Party officials outlined a propaganda agenda for the year that focuses on safeguarding economic development and social stability. Li Changchun, a member of the Party's Politburo Standing Committee, and Liu Yunshan, Director of the Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD), a department responsible for censorship of China's media, outlined the agenda during the National Propaganda Directors' meeting in Beijing on January 4-5, according to a January 5 Xinhua article.
  • Saying there had been "new, complex changes in the domestic and international situation," Li named safeguarding "economic development" and "social stability" as two of the four most important tasks for the year. Li told officials to improve their guidance of public opinion. They should provide "a favorable public opinion environment for maintaining the calm, steady, and relatively fast development of the economy and society," "vigorously promote social stability," and "maintain the favorable situation of unity, harmony, and stability," Li said. He also said that officials should "vigorously highlight that the Communist Party is good, socialism is good" and promote the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

  • Liu announced a "concrete agenda for propaganda, ideological, and cultural work in 2009" that included "integrating a heightened sense of crisis with shoring up confidence" and "integrating insistence on positive propaganda with defusing public emotion." He also said that officials should "seize the critical links" to promote propaganda overseas and through the press, and literature and art publications.
Li and Liu's statements regarding the direction of the Party's propaganda agenda are in line with concerns expressed recently by other Chinese officials over increasing "social unrest" in 2009, amid the country's economic downturn and the run-up to several significant anniversaries. Propaganda officials had already received instructions to put a positive spin on China's economy. In November 2008, Liu Yunshan called on them to prioritize "economic propaganda work," with "positive propaganda" as their guiding principle.

Propaganda officials, led by the CPD, monitor and censor domestic news to ensure consistency with the Party's political agenda. Li and Liu's statements may indicate the targets for censorship this year. Over the last several months, officials have targeted a number of news organizations for economic reports perceived to be "negative."
  • The Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that authorities in Shanxi province suspended two journalists and two editors for producing a television episode on the potential bankruptcy of a Linfen textile mill and the uncertain future of the mill's 6,300 workers, according to a January 6 Associated Press/Kyodo article (via Breitbart.com) and a January 6 Radio Free Asia article. The episode, which was to air on the program "Concern" [Guanzhu] in December 2008, was never broadcast after Linfen officials reviewing the episode canceled the program for "serious political error." The clips reportedly showed workers protesting at the Linfen government building.

  • In September 2008, the Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau ordered the three-month suspension of the China Business Post after it published a report in July critical of the Agricultural Bank of China, which at the time was preparing for a stock offering.

  • In September 2008, propaganda officials ordered major financial Web sites to remove "negative" reports regarding China's stock markets, according to a September 10 South China Morning Post article (subscription required).
The Party's propaganda agenda does not mean that China's state-controlled media will entirely avoid stories relating to the economic downturn. China's media, for example, have reported on the government's acknowledgement of rising unemployment and slowing economic growth (see, e.g., a February 2, 2009, Caijing article, on a government official's estimates that 20 million migrant workers are unemployed, and a January 22, 2009, China Daily article, on the decrease in GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008). Such stories are not necessarily inconsistent with the Party's agenda. Commentators have noted that the Internet has forced government officials to respond more quickly and openly to news developments in order to maintain control of the agenda, according to a November 18, 2008, Bloomberg report (reprinted in International Herald Tribune).

For more information on how the Chinese government and Party censor China's media, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12  
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Chengdu Court Postpones Trial of Activist Huang Qi

The Wuhou District People's Court in Chengdu, Sichuan province, postponed the trial of rights activist Huang Qi after initially notifying Huang's wife and his lawyer on February 2, 2009, that the trial would be held the next day, according to February 2 articles in the Washington Post (WP) and Associated Press (AP, via WTOP.com). Huang's wife, Zeng Li, said the court called her twice on February 2, first informing her of the trial date on the next day, and later telling her the date had been postponed and that she would receive three days' notice before the trial. No new date has been announced. Huang, founder of the rights advocacy Web site, 64tianwang.com, has been detained since June 2008 on charges of illegally possessing state secrets. Prior to his detention, Huang had traveled to areas affected by the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and posted articles on his Web site about demands by parents for compensation and an investigation into school collapses that killed thousands of children.

The court's original one-day notice would have violated Chinese law had it been carried out. Article 151(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) requires the court to notify the defendant's counsel and representatives no later than three days before the opening of the court session. Furthermore, Article 151(2) requires the court to deliver the indictment to the defendant no later than 10 days before the opening of a court session. One of Huang's lawyers, Mo Shaoping, called the one-day notice "a totally illegal process," according to the AP article. According to Mo, the judge blamed the short notice on difficulties reaching Huang's lawyer and family. Mo and Zeng told AP that their addresses and phone numbers were contained in court documents. Moreover, Zeng said she had been trying to reach the court for weeks to no avail. Prosecutors and court officials told WP they were not permitted to speak to foreign media, and the AP's calls to the court on February 2 went unanswered.

The underlying activity giving rise to the state secrets charge is unclear. Mo told Agence France-Presse (AFP) last September that authorities had questioned Huang about interviews he conducted while visiting areas affected by the Sichuan earthquake, according to a September 24 AFP article. "They also asked him about issues regarding his charge of illegally possessing state secrets," Mo told AFP. Mo was not able to disclose further information about the state secret Huang is alleged to have possessed. The Chinese government takes a broad interpretation of what constitutes a state secret that potentially includes essentially any matter of public concern. "There's an expansive definition of state secrets, and the problem is it cannot be challenged, and very often the courts don't see the documents that are allegedly state secrets," Nicholas Bequelin, a China researcher for Human Rights Watch, told the New York Times in a February 2 article about Huang's case. "There's no mechanism under Chinese law to challenge something that the prosecution says is a state secret. So basically, if you're charged with state secrets, it's unlikely you can shake the charges," Bequelin said. Furthermore, by alleging that a defendant's case involves state secrets, authorities may deny the defendant access to a lawyer. In a March 10, 2006, report (searchable by date on the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Web site) based on visits to China, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment noted that China's vaguely defined crimes of endangering state security, splittism, subverting state power, and supplying state secrets left "their application open to abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly," and recommended the abolition of such "political crimes."

Plainclothes police took Huang into custody on June 10, 2008. Chengdu public security officials formally arrested him on July 18 on the state secrets charge. Under Article 96 of the CPL, lawyers in state secrets cases must obtain the approval of investigating authorities before meeting with a client. Mo was not able to meet with Huang until September 23, according to the September 24 AFP article. Huang's lawyers have criticized their lack of access to the police's evidence and case files, according to the AFP article and a November 12 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article (in Chinese). According to the RFA article and a November 14 Voice of America (VOA) article (in Chinese), prosecutors have returned the case to police for supplementary investigation on two occasions, the second occurring in November. VOA quoted one of Huang's lawyers as saying the supplementary investigations indicated that the state's evidence was insufficient.

Huang previously served a five-year sentence from 2000 to 2005 for "inciting subversion of state power." The court in that case cited articles Huang posted on his Web site dealing with topics such as "democracy," "June 4," and "Falun Gong."

For more information on Huang's case, please see his record of detention, searchable through the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-06 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12  
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Uyghur Historian Released From Prison

Uyghur historian Tohti Tunyaz completed his 11-year sentence for "inciting splittism" and "unlawfully obtaining state secrets" on February 10, 2009, according to information accessible to the public in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database, and he has since been released from prison, according to February 10 reports from the Sankei and Mainichi (via Yahoo) newspapers, based on information from sources close to the case. According to the reports, after being met by his sister at the prison in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Tohti Tunyaz traveled to a relative's home. The Sankei report said it is unclear whether Tohti Tunyaz will be allowed to return to Japan, where he had previously lived. According to the Mainichi report, his wife and two children reside in Japan.

As noted in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, on February 11, 1998, Chinese authorities detained Tohti Tunyaz, an ethnic Uyghur citizen of China based at Tokyo University in Japan, while he was visiting the XUAR to conduct research on Uyghur history. On March 10, 1999, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to 11 years¡¯ imprisonment for "inciting splittism" and "unlawfully supplying state secrets to entities outside China," crimes under Articles 103 and 111 of the Criminal Law. On February 15, 2000, the Xinjiang High People's Court rejected his appeal, but it changed the charge of "unlawfully supplying state secrets" to foreign entities to the charge of "unlawfully obtaining state secrets," a crime under Article 282 of the Criminal Law. Sources close to the case said the alleged "state secrets" were a list of documents from an official librarian and sources said that Tohti Tunyaz had not published a separatist book, though the trial court alleged he had. On May 17, 2001, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his imprisonment to be arbitrary and in violation of his right to freedom of thought, expression, and opinion (decision via University of Minnesota Human Rights Library). Tohti Tunyaz served his sentence in the Xinjiang Number 3 Prison in Urumqi.

Authorities in the XUAR continue to hold other Uyghurs in detention for exercising their right to free expression, based on information accessible to the public in the CECC Political Prisoner Database. Cases include:
  • Miradil Yasin and Mutellip T¨¦yip. Xinjiang University (XU) security staff detained Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and Mutellip T¨¦yip on December 20, 2008, for distributing leaflets on campus calling on students to hold a demonstration. XU staff notified public security offices, which took the two young men into detention.
  • Mehbube Ablesh. An employee in the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio Station, Mehbube Ablesh was fired from her job in August 2008 and detained in apparent connection to her writings for the Internet that were critical of government policies, including "bilingual" education.
  • Nurmemet Yasin. A XUAR court sentenced writer Nurmemet (Nurmuhemmet) Yasin to 10 years in prison in 2005 for "inciting splittism'' after he wrote a story about a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom. Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the journal that published Nurmemet Yasin's story, received a three-year sentence in 2005 for "dereliction of duty." Korash Huseyin completed his sentence in February 2008 and is presumed to have been released from prison.
  • Abdulla Jamal. Authorities arrested teacher Abdulla Jamal in April 2005, after he submitted for publication a manuscript that authorities claimed incited separatism. The arrest followed his detention a month earlier, along with the detention of 3 other teachers and 17 or 18 students, ostensibly for involvement in a fight between ethnic Uyghur and Han Chinese students.
  • Abdulghani Memetemin. A XUAR court sentenced journalist Abdulghani Memetemin to nine years' imprisonment in 2003 for providing information on government repression against Uyghurs to an overseas organization that reports on human rights abuses in the XUAR. Authorities characterized this act as "supplying state secrets to an organization outside the country."
The CECC reported in its 2008 Annual Report that repression in the XUAR increased in 2008 amid preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, limited official reports of terrorist activity, and protests among Uyghurs and Tibetans in China. Authorities implemented harsh security measures, especially among the ethnic Uyghur population, including wide-scale detentions, inspections of households, restrictions on Uyghurs' domestic and international travel, restrictions on peaceful protest, and increased controls over religious activity and religious practitioners. The government also continued to strengthen policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and promoting assimilation. Since publishing its 2008 Annual Report, the CECC has observed a continuation of harsh security measures and policies that place assimilation pressures on ethnic minorities.

For additional information about conditions in the XUAR, see the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-03 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12  
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Propaganda Officials Censor Coverage of Beijing Fire

Propaganda officials in Beijing ordered Chinese Web sites to delete blogs and discussion groups about a fire at a hotel under construction on the grounds of China Central Television's (CCTV) headquarters that began on the evening of February 9, 2009, according to a February 11 Los Angeles (LA) Times article. The officials also ordered Chinese media not to publish photos, videos, or in-depth reports about the fire, which took place in Beijing, and to run only official stories issued by the Xinhua News Agency instead of their own reports, the article said. Other foreign and Hong Kong media reported the existence of a propaganda order whose description closely matches the description in the LA Times article, including a February 11 Agence France-Presse (AFP) report (via Straits Times), a February 11 Times of London report, a February 10 New York Times (NYT) report, and a February 10 Apple Daily (Hong Kong) report (subscription required).

The fire, which reportedly began at 8:27 pm, quickly engulfed the 30-story hotel, and was allegedly caused by an illegal fireworks show arranged by CCTV employees for the last day of China's Lunar New Year holiday, according to a February 11 Xinhua article. The timing of the propaganda order is unclear. Apple Daily, citing the Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, reported that at 11:15 pm on the night of the fire, the Network News Management Department of the Beijing Municipal Internet Propaganda Management Office under the Beijing Municipal Government issued the propaganda order. LA Times reported that by the next morning the "Beijing propaganda ministry" issued the order.

The impetus behind the order is also unclear, although a flood of comments on the Internet after the fire reflected public anger toward CCTV and may have prompted the order, according to AFP and LA Times. LA Times reported that the fire "laid bare simmering anger and resentment toward the network both for spending public money on grand construction projects and for continuing to broadcast government propaganda." The state-run CCTV is China's sole national television network and reaches more than a billion viewers, according to an August 21, 2008, NYT article. According to the network's Web site, CCTV serves as "an important mouthpiece for the Communist Party, government, and people."

Propaganda officials, led by the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD), frequently issue orders to Chinese media intending to ensure that news coverage is consistent with the Party's political agenda. Prior to last year's Beijing Olympics, propaganda officials issued a number of orders to journalists, banning coverage of politically sensitive topics such as food safety issues and directing them on how to cover controversies arising before and during the Olympics. In December 2008, the CPD reportedly issued two orders instructing domestic news organizations to stop reporting on a CCTV reporter who had been arrested at her home in Beijing by officials from Shanxi province and to run only Xinhua versions of the story, according to a December 12 South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) article (subscription required). Propaganda officials often direct media to run only Xinhua stories following events deemed politically sensitive. Xinhua is an institution directly under the control of the State Council, China's central government, according to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China's Web site. In January 2009, top Party officials said the propaganda agenda for 2009 would focus on safeguarding economic development and social stability.

Reporting by Xinhua and other official outlets appeared to dominate initial coverage of the fire although news outlets were observed later to publish their own photos and stories. State media did not report the fire until 10 pm, with Xinhua leading the way with just a one-sentence brief, according to a February 12 South China Morning Post article (subscription required). (According to Xinhua's Web site, at 10:07 pm the news agency issued a one-sentence story and at 10:14 pm published several photos.) According to the Beijing Youth Daily's Web site, the paper posted pictures and a brief story from the official Chinanews.com on February 9. Early on February 10, the paper published its own story that reported similar content as Xinhua reports printed elsewhere (see, e.g., February 10 Beijing Daily article), including the report that top Chinese officials, among them CPD Director Liu Yunshan, had rushed to the scene. On February 11, the paper issued a lengthier report including its own photos. The extent to which such reporting was consistent with the propaganda order reported here or other orders not known to the public is unclear. A previous Congressional Executive Commission on China analysis reported that in May 2008 many Chinese journalists ignored an order prohibiting them from traveling to Sichuan province to cover an earthquake.

The geographic scope of the order is also unclear. In Beijing, residents had difficulty finding images of the fire in the city's newspapers, on the Internet, or on television, according to the February 10 NYT article. Outside of Beijing, however, "photos and giant headlines about the fire were splashed across the front pages of newspapers throughout the country," according to a February 10 report on the Danwei Web site, which issues commentary on media, advertising, and urban life in China.

For more information on the Chinese government and Party's censorship of Chinese media, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-17 ) | Posted on: 2009-03-12  
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