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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Demonstrations Take Place Again in Xinjiang Following Reported Syringe Attacks
Demonstrations--primarily by Han Chinese--took place in Urumqi, capital of the far western region of Xinjiang, in early September. The demonstrations came roughly two months after a demonstration by Uyghurs on July 5 and outbreaks of violence in the city starting that day. In the September demonstrations, participants protested the government response following events on July 5 and following reports that people had randomly attacked Urumqi residents with syringes. Crowds of people reportedly attacked some bystanders or people believed to have committed the syringe attacks, and police reportedly clashed with some protesters. Officials announced that five people died during one day of the demonstrations. Within a short period of time after the September demonstrations, authorities tried and convicted several people charged with syringe attacks.
Demonstrations--primarily by Han Chinese--took place in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in early September, following almost two months after a demonstration by Uyghurs on July 5 and outbreaks of violence in the city starting that day. During the September demonstrations, participants protested the government response following events on July 5 and after reports that primarily Han residents of Urumqi alleged that persons they believed to be Uyghurs had randomly attacked them with syringes. Following gatherings on September 2, according to Xinhua, the demonstrations swelled on September 3, and additional demonstrations and gatherings continued into the following days. (See, e.g., September 3 Agence France-Presse (AFP) (via The Free Library) and Reuters reports, September 4 reports from the Associated Press (AP) (via Toronto Star) and Xinhua (1, 2), a September 5 Xinhua report (via China Daily), and a September 7 Reuters report.) Urumqi deputy mayor Zhang Hong said on September 4 that 5 people died and 14 were injured during demonstrations on the previous day, and 2 of the dead had been "confirmed as innocent civilians," according to the second September 4 Xinhua report. During the demonstrations, protesters reportedly called for the resignation of XUAR Party secretary Wang Lequan, according to the Reuters and AP reports. Authorities have blamed "separatist forces" for the syringe attacks and strife in the region (see below for details), but also removed Urumqi Party secretary Li Zhi and XUAR public security department director Liu Yaohua from their positions on September 5, following the start of the September demonstrations. They have been replaced with other officials from within the XUAR Party apparatus and government. (See a September 5 Xinhua report, via CCTV.)
Authorities Disperse Crowds With Tear Gas, Impose Ban on Demonstration
Authorities used tear gas on crowds and reportedly beat some protesters, while media reported on cases of crowds beating bystanders or people believed to have committed syringe attacks. A journalist from Hong Kong described being among a crowd of people on September 4 whom police tear gassed, detained, and beat. The reporter was released from detention, along with two photographers, that day, according to a September 4 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article (subscription required, searchable through the archive). (In addition, see information on the use of tear gas in the September 5 Xinhua report via China Daily. See a September 7 SCMP article on reporters from Hong Kong detained again in Urumqi as they attempted to carry out interviews of people who had been tear gassed.) The Xinhua report said "victims sought revenge" on two alleged syringe attackers, and that public anger after police isolated the alleged attackers led police to use the tear gas. The AFP and September 7 Reuters reports cited sources who said Uyghurs had been beaten by crowds. A September 4 Xinhua report said crowds had beaten "suspects" who had been "caught...when attacking members of the public." Authorities issued a ban against unlicensed demonstrations on September 4 (see September 4 Xinhua reports in English and translation of the Chinese text from the China News Service in Open Source Center, subscription required), following an earlier ban issued after the July 5 demonstration. According to the Chinese text of the September ban, authorities may use force to disperse crowds.
Syringe Attacks Attributed to "Three Forces"
Official media and government portrayals of the July and September demonstrations have pinpointed activities by Uyghurs as the root of conflict and have downplayed Uyghur sources of grievances. In contrast, while authorities clamped down on the September demonstrations by Han Chinese, government authorities and official media appear to have taken a sympathetic stance toward the sentiments stoking those demonstrations. Urumqi deputy mayor Zhang Hong said that Uyghurs had carried out the syringe attacks, according to the September 5 Xinhua report (via China Daily). A September 5 Xinhua report described obtaining drug money as the motivation of one threatened syringe attack and robbery. Authorities more broadly attribute the attacks to "separatists." Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu described the syringe attacks as a continuation of attacks instigated by "ethnic separatist forces" on July 5 (Xinhua, via China Xinjiang Net, September 7), and Zhang Hong attributed the syringe attacks to the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism (Xinhua, September 4). The government similarly attributed events on July 5, a day when Uyghurs demonstrated to protest government handling of a reported attack on Uyghur factory workers and when acts of violence also occurred, to the "three forces" and to U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer in particular. Zhang Hong was paraphrased as attributing the source of the September demonstrations to "panic and resentment from the public" caused by the syringe attacks. (Syringe attacks have been reported in the past in China, and in some cases, the extent of the threat appears to have been magnified by rumors and fear of HIV transmission, amid tight government controls over the flow of information. See a July 31, 2002, Kyodo article (via bnet) and February 20, 2002, Chicago Tribune article (via Aegis).) In Urumqi, as of September 4 "local authorities had confirmed 531 victims of hypodermic syringe stabbings in Urumqi, 171 of whom showed obvious syringe marks," according to a September 13 Xinhua report. Military medical specialists who examined cases of needle attacks found no evidence of viruses or chemicals, according to the report.
Reports Detail Punishment for Syringe Attacks, Launch Ideological Campaigns
In the days following the demonstrations, authorities carried out measures to curb the demonstrations and described steps to punish people for the syringe attacks and directives aimed also at punishing acts such as spreading rumors about the attacks. A September 6 notice (described in Xinhua, via the Hebei News Net) issued jointly by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court, municipal procuratorate, and public security bureau, said needle attacks involving syringes filled with poison or discarded drug needles could result in punishments including death. Attacks involving clean needles or pins also will be subject to criminal punishment, as will intentionally spreading false information about the attacks, according to the notice. A September 7 notice (described in Xinhua, via China News Net) from the XUAR public security department also states that those involved in syringe attacks and intentionally alleging false syringe attacks will face punishment. According to a government spokesperson discussing the notice at a September 8 press conference (via Xinhua Xinjiang, September 9), authorities will punish attacks involving any type of tool, including tacks or pins, because the instances of syringe attacks are "a continuation of our battle with the enemy" after July 5 and are not "ordinary acts of harm, but...criminal acts that seriously harm social order and state security." Xinhua reported on September 9 that authorities had picked up 45 people and held 12 of them in detention. In addition, authorities sent eight people "for forced isolation of drugs," an apparent reference to forced drug detoxification. The public security bureau arrested 4 people on September 7, according to a September 8 Xinhua Xinjiang report. China Daily and Xinhua (via China Daily) reported on September 16 that 75 people to date had been taken into custody. In a rapid progression of the criminal process, three people were sentenced on September 12 to prison terms between 7 and 15 years for crimes related to needle attacks or threatened needle attacks, according to September 13 Xinhua (via China Daily) and September 14 China Daily reports. Four more people received prison sentences between 8 to 15 years on September 17, according to Xinhua reports (English, Chinese) from that day. According to the reports, one of the people sentenced on September 12 and the four sentenced on September 17 had been charged with the crime of "spreading false toxic substances" (Article 291 of the PRC Criminal Law as amended in 2001).
Following the September demonstrations, XUAR Party secretary Wang Lequan also described efforts to dispatch 7,000 officials to "explain policies and solve disputes" in connection to recent strife, according to a September 7 Xinhua report. Wang said the steps will build off of earlier measures after July 5 where officials carried out "a great deal of face-to-face educational work in communities and [maintained] social order." Earlier, Urumqi's mayor reported on August 6 that "stability work teams" dispatched after July 5 had done on-site investigations of 636,000 households and interviewed 1,491,000 people, according to a Xinjiang City News report (via China Xinjiang, August 7).
For more information on events in the XUAR starting July 5, see previous Commission analysis (1, 2, 3, 4). For background information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section VI--Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-09-05 ) |
Posted on: 2009-11-06 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129323 |
Xinjiang Authorities Continue Detentions, Announce Arrests Connected to July 5 Incident
Following the forceful police suppression of a demonstration held by Uyghurs in the far western region of Xinjiang on July 5 and outbreaks of violence starting that day, Xinjiang authorities have reported on continuing detentions and arrests in connection to events on July 5. Some reports from official media on people detained or arrested have been inconsistent, and a number of details remain unknown. The procuratorate initiated prosecution in a first group of cases in September. A court in Urumqi has begun preparing for trials and has selected adjudicators with "high proficiency in policy" to try upcoming cases.
Following the forceful police suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs on July 5 in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and outbreaks of violence starting that day, Chinese media continue to carry reports from XUAR officials on detentions and arrests in connection to events on July 5, as well as a first batch of cases to be prosecuted. Official Chinese media's English-language and Chinese-language services have differed in some cases in their coverage of the detentions and arrests, and some details about the detentions and arrests, including the total number of people in custody, remain unclear. Reports have used varying terms to describe the detentions. The formal term for "detention" that appears in the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) (English text, Chinese text) is juliu (also frequently rendered in reports more specifically as "criminal detention" (xingshi juliu), which distinguishes it from other formal types of detention, such as administrative detention). The term in the CPL for "arrest" (which requires procuratorate approval) is daibu. Media reports also have used imprecise and informal terms that do not suggest formal criminal detention for the initial act of taking someone into custody, including phrases like "capturing" (zhuahuo) or "catching" (zhuabu) someone. Such people taken into custody may later be placed under formal criminal detention.
Against the backdrop of a criminal law system in which authorities use criminal charges to cast free expression as a crime, a XUAR official stated authorities had held in custody people who were peaceful protesters, and official media reports suggest that some acts of peaceful protest or expression will be subject to formal criminal charges. (See below for details.) While acts of violence during the week of July 5 were reported to have been committed by both Uyghurs and Han, based on wording in the sources cited within this analysis, Chinese authorities appear to have focused on pursuing prosecution of alleged crimes committed on July 5--the day Uyghurs demonstrated and also when acts of violence were primarily reported to be committed by Uyghurs--without explicitly clarifying whether prosecution efforts will extend to criminal acts committed by Han in the days following July 5. An article from official media indicated that Han are among people reported to be formally arrested, but did not provide additional details. (See information below on the first group of arrests for details.) A court in Urumqi has begun preparing for trials and has selected adjudicators with "high proficiency in policy" to try upcoming cases.
The information on detentions, arrests, and trial preparations comes amid reports of steps taken by authorities in the XUAR and in Beijing to curb independent criminal defense activities. The Xinjiang Justice Department has said it will arrange counsel for the suspects, but has left many details unclear. See a related CECC analysis for more information.
Authorities Report Detentions and Arrests; Some Official Media Accounts Contain Discrepancies
Recent reports of detentions and arrests, as of September 11, and information on a first group of cases to be prosecuted, include:- The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of a total of 237 people in 139 cases, and public security officials also have sought approval to arrest 295 people involved in 175 cases, based on information in a September 11 English-language China Daily report and Chinese-language Xinhua report. The procuratorate has initiated prosecution of 51 people in 14 cases, according to the reports, which appears to clarify information reported the previous week (see below) on cases transferred for review for prosecution. Based on the reports, 956 cases in total have been filed for investigation.
- The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of 196 people in 121 cases related to July 5, and 14 cases involving 51 people have been transferred by public security organs to the procuratorate for review for prosecution, according to the text of a September 4 Chinese-language Xinhua report citing the XUAR government information office. A September 4 English-language Xinhua report (via China.cn) states, in contrast to the Chinese-language report, that authorities have "prosecuted" the cases. (See Articles 136-149 of the Criminal Procedure Law for general information on reviewing cases and initiating prosecution.) Public security officials have sought approval to arrest an additional 239 people involved in 140 cases, and 825 people are being held in criminal detention (xingshi juliu), according to the reports. The numbers represent the second official statement on arrest figures, following information on a first group of arrests reported in August (see below). The September reports do not clarify whether the 196 arrests include the earlier numbers reported in August.
- Authorities have approved arrests (pizhun daibu) of 83 people in connection to crimes on July 5, according to August 4 English-language and Chinese-language reports from Xinhua. The English-language article said the information was the first official announcement on arrests from Urumqi authorities. The article reported that XUAR procurator Otkur Abduraxman "said those arrested will face charges including murder, intentional injury, arson and robbery." According to the Chinese-language report, however, those arrested are also suspected of "destroying vehicles, gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels and making trouble, and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination," in addition to the crimes listed in the English-language report. The Chinese-language report noted those arrested included both Uyghurs and Han. According to a July 18 report from the Legal Daily, citing a XUAR Party official, suspects' alleged crimes fall into five categories, including endangering state security, and include over 20 suspected crimes, including splittism and armed rebellion.
- Following the report of the 83 arrests, an August 23 English-language report from the China Daily (via People's Daily) said over 200 people had been formally arrested and that trials would begin that week, appearing to cite an unnamed Urumqi procuratorate official as the source of the information. The report said charges included splittism and inciting splittism. Hou Hanmin, a spokesperson for the XUAR government called the China Daily report "totally untrue" in an August 25 Global Times report, and another XUAR government official also denied the report, according to an August 25 New York Times report.
- The head of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau reported that 718 suspects had been placed under criminal detention (xingshi juliu) as of August 4, according to a Chinese-language report that day from Xinhua. See also a report of the detentions in an August 4 English-language Xinhua report. A PRC official later reiterated to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that 718 remained in detention and that those who "committed minor offences have been dealt with leniently and released," according to an August 10 Agence France-Presse report (via Yahoo). It is unclear, however, if all other people earlier held in connection to July 5 were outside of some form of custody or oversight as of that date, especially in light of comments from XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri (below) indicating that some peaceful protesters may remain in a form of unofficial custody or under surveillance. According to an August 6 Xinhua report (via China Daily), "Authorities also admitted that some of the detained suspects in connection with the riot have been released as their offences were minor. But they didn't provide the exact number of those who were released."
- According to August 2 English-language and Chinese-language Xinhua reports, public security officers said they had detained (zhuahuo) 319 people in addition to 253 detentions reported earlier. The detentions (zhuahuo) of 253 "prime suspects" were reported in a July 29 Chinese-language Xinhua report, which also noted that a batch of suspects turned themselves in. A July 29 English-language Xinhua report on the detentions said they were "in addition to the more than 1,000 suspects detained by July 6."
- Xinhua reported in a July 10 Chinese-language article that authorities detained (zhuahuo) 190 people in a series of four operations on July 9 and July 10, in connection to events on July 5. This news appears to have been unreported in official English-language media.
- Xinhua's English-language service reported on July 7 that authorities had "arrested" 1,434 people--1,379 men and 55 women--in connection to events on July 5. The use of the term "arrests" appears to be an incorrect reference to the initial detention of these individuals. (Formal arrests (daibu) of over 1,400 people two days after alleged criminal activity would be unlikely given the usual progression of the criminal process, including the requirement under the CPL that the procuratorate approve all arrests. This terminology is also inconsistent with Chinese reporting. See, e.g., a July 7 Xinhua article (via Nanfang Daily), noting that police had "caught" (zhuabu) 1,434 people.) Some of the detainees "might be released if no serious criminal records were found," according to a paraphrasing of Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi's remarks in the English-language article.
- XUAR police chief Liu Yaohua initially reported early on July 7 that officials had detained roughly 700 people and continued to pursue "about 90 other key suspects," according to a July 7 English-language Xinhua report.
Overseas media have cited sources reporting on widespread security sweeps and mass detentions, including reported mass round-ups of Uyghur men, and some reports indicate detention numbers that would exceed those reported by the Chinese government and Chinese media. Some of the people reported to have been detained appear to have no involvement to either acts of protest or violent activity on July 5. (For more information, see, e.g., a July 6 Radio Free Asia article, a July 11 Telegraph article, July 19 New York Times article, and July 19 Financial Times article.)
Authorities have provided limited information on a small number of detainees or suspects (see, e.g., articles cited above and a list of suspects published in a July 30 Chinese-language Xinhua report), but detailed information about most of the people officially said to remain in detention, including the specific grounds for their detentions, appears to remain unreported. In addition, Chinese media have reported information on the arrest of one man "who allegedly spread rumors used to trigger the Urumqi riots on July 5." According to a July 6 Xinhua report (via China Daily), Kurban Khayum "was arrested for exaggerating the death toll of a factory unrest involving Uygurs in Shaoguan, Guangdong province in June." The article reports that Kurban Khayum was a member of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC)--an organization headed by U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer and blamed by Chinese authorities for events on July 5--and that after the WUC told him to "gather intelligence on separatist activities in China by Uygurs and people of other ethnic groups ... in order to carry out activities to split China," he fabricated a report on the number of people killed in Shaoguan. Kurban Khayum wrote to the WUC that "a massive protest should be staged to let the world know about this bloody incident," according to the article. See also an August 6 report from the Beijing Times (via People's Daily). For additional information which challenges the facts of the case as reported by Chinese media, see an August 20 report from the East Turkistan Information Center.
Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi said at a press conference on July 8 that authorities would use the death penalty for crimes connected to events on July 5. The Supreme People's Court said in late July that the government and court will take steps to reduce the amount of death sentences in China, according to a July 29 Xinhua report.
For additional information, see a July 13 XUAR Public Security Bureau notice (via Xinhua Xinjiang) on "reporting and exposing criminals" connected to events on July 5.
Official Describes Taking Measures Toward Peaceful Protesters
Although authorities and official media largely refer to all events on July 5 as a "riot" or "violent criminal incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning," a limited number of sources have reported that a demonstration took place, and a XUAR official appeared to acknowledge that some participants had protested peacefully. (See source cited below. See also a July 19 English-language Xinhua report, via China Daily, citing XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri referring to a "student demonstration" on July 5.) Some participants may have been detained and subjected to surveillance or possibly arbitrary detention after being released from formal police custody. Nur Bekri said on July 24 that people "unaware of the truth" who "took part in the demonstrations but did not join in the beating, smashing, looting, and burning," along with those "not deeply involved," had been returned to their "work unit," "community," or "permanent place of residence" for "further assistance and education," following "education" while in detention and after they "pledged to repent," according to a July 24 Xinhua report via Ta Kung Pao (cached page) and translation of the Xinhua report via Open Source Center (subscription required). The reference to returning people to work units or communities and subjecting them to "assistance and education" suggests such people may remain under surveillance or supervision, or possibly a form of arbitrary detention. Other protesters, including organizers of the demonstration, may remain subject to criminal punishment. Chinese President Hu Jintao and members of the Communist Party Politburo's Standing Committee met on July 8 and issued a statement on July 9 that the government would "firmly crack down on serious crimes" and target "[i]nstigators, organizers, culprits and violent criminals" involved in the "riot," according to a July 9 Xinhua report, while "[t]hose taking part in the riot due to provocation and deceit by separatists, should be given education." During an August 4 visit to the Urumqi procuratorate, Zhu Hailun, standing committee member and secretary of the politics and law commission in the XUAR Party committee, called for "digging deeply to ferret out the organizers, masterminds, conductors, and core members in these cases," according to an August 12 Xinjiang Daily report (via PDF of hardcopy and translation in Open Source Center, subscription required).
Trials Initially Reported to Begin Mid-August, Adjudicators with "High Proficiency in Policy" Chosen
Although later reports indicated that no trial date had been set as of late August, a July 31 China Daily report paraphrased a source as saying trials would start in mid-August, and that the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court "has been preparing for the hearings." See also a Chinese-language July 28 Xinhua Xinjiang report. Under Article 20 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, intermediate people's courts have jurisdiction as the court of first instance over counterrevolutionary cases, cases of endangering state security, "ordinary criminal cases punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty," and cases involving non-PRC citizens. According to the Xinhua report, the XUAR High People's Court has already selected from courts within the XUAR adjudicators who have "a high proficiency in policy" and "professional spirit." The adjudicators are currently undergoing training on state and XUAR policies and regulations toward events on July 5, as well as on the PRC Constitution, Criminal Law, and other relevant laws, according to the report.
Following the July 5 demonstration in Urumqi, the Party leading group in the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court launched anti-separatism education in the court, as well as in eight district courts in the municipality. The Party leading group called for cadres and police in the courts to carry out the policy deployments of the Party central committee and XUAR government, according to a July 25 People's Court Daily article (via Xinhua Xinjiang).
UPDATE (2009-10-30): Chinese media reported in late September and mid-October on prosecutions and trials related to events in July. For more information, see the following articles:- 21 Suspects Involved in Urumqi Riot Prosecuted (Xinhua, September 25. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
- 108 Stand Accused in Urumqi Riot (China Daily, October 9. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua and Yangzi Evening News, via Sanming Information Net.)
- Six Sentenced to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 12. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
- Legal Scholars and Procurator Answer Reporters' Questions about Trial Conditions in Three Major Criminal Cases from "7-5" Incident (People's Daily, October 12, in Chinese. Includes background information, including limited details on legal defense.)
- China Sentences Six to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 15. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
- Court Upholds Penalties to Xinjiang Riot Convicts (Xinhua, October 30. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua, via Sina.)
For other news reports, see, e.g.:For more information on events in the XUAR starting July 5, see previous Commission analysis (1, 2). For background information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section VI--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-08-11 ) |
Posted on: 2009-11-06 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128326 |
Authorities Impose Restrictions on Lawyers Defending Xinjiang Suspects Amid Official Announcements on Arranging Legal Defense
In the aftermath of the forceful police suppression of a demonstration held by Uyghurs in the far western region of Xinjiang on July 5 and outbreaks of violence starting that day, authorities in Xinjiang and Beijing have taken steps to restrict lawyers' activities defending people accused of committing crimes on July 5. The steps come as authorities continue to detain and formally arrest suspects in connection to events on July 5 and prepare for trials. The Xinjiang Justice Department has said it will arrange lawyers for the suspects, but has left many details unclear. Against a backdrop of systemic barriers to adequate legal defense in China, the developments raise questions about the likelihood suspects will receive fair trials. The developments also raise questions about the effectiveness of the recently revised Lawyers Law.
Following the forceful police suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs on July 5 and outbreaks of violence starting that day in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) capital of Urumqi, authorities in Xinjiang and Beijing have taken steps to restrict lawyers' activities defending people accused of committing crimes on July 5. The steps precede an announcement in late July that the XUAR Justice Department will select and train lawyers to provide criminal defense to suspects alleged to have links to crimes committed on July 5 when they go to trial. Chinese media reports on the nature of the legal defense are inconsistent, however, and a number of details remain unknown. The announcement comes as authorities continue to report on detentions, arrests, and preparations for trials in connection to events on July 5. For more information on the detentions and arrests, see a related CECC analysis. For more information on the curbs imposed on lawyers and the link between the restrictions and recent amendments to the PRC Lawyers Law, see below.
Xinjiang and Beijing Authorities Impose Curbs on Lawyers; Xinjiang Authorities Announce Plans To Organize Legal Defense
Authorities in at least two localities, Xinjiang and Beijing, have taken steps to prevent lawyers from independently accepting legal defense cases connected to alleged crimes committed on July 5. As also discussed in a previous Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis, on July 8, the Beijing Municipal Judicial Bureau issued a notice on its Web site (copy available on the Chinese Human Rights Defenders Web site) calling on justice bureaus, the Beijing Municipal Lawyers Association, and law firms in Beijing to "exercise caution" in representing cases related to events in the XUAR. Characterizing events on July 5 as a "typical, premeditated, organized beating, smashing, looting, and burning incident organized overseas and executed at home," the notice calls on lawyers to stand on the side of protecting "national integrity and ethnic unity" and stresses as motivation for the notice factors including "establishing a good image for Beijing lawyers." The notice specifies that before accepting cases, partners in law offices should look into the issue, "report the matter," and "take initiative to accept supervision and direction from judicial organs and the lawyers association." While the language in the notice does not explicitly bar lawyers from accepting cases related to July 5, according to sources cited in a July 10 Amnesty International press release, authorities warned some law firms employing human rights lawyers that those lawyers were not to work on cases related to events in the XUAR.
In addition, the Xinjiang Lawyers Association reportedly ordered lawyers not to take cases on their own initiative and instead let authorities "arrange" all defense efforts, according to a July 14 Radio Free Asia report and July 15 report from the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group. The news precedes an announcement, reported in a July 24 English-language report from the Global Times, that the XUAR Justice Department will arrange criminal defense efforts for suspects who go to trial in connection to events on July 5. The report quotes Mao Li, general secretary of the Xinjiang Lawyers Association, as saying that "[t]he Department of Justice in Xinjiang will choose dozens of Uygur lawyers from local law offices to act as free criminal-defense attorneys." The lawyers chosen will receive three to five days of training in criminal law, according to Mao, suggesting the XUAR Justice Department may be including lawyers without extensive experience in criminal defense and it is unclear whether authorities are using the opportunity to appoint and train lawyers to enforce political agendas during the criminal process.
It is not clear whether authorities have informed suspects of the stated availability of defense counsel, especially in light of Chinese-language reports that differ from the Global Times account of the defense efforts. According to August 5 CCTV and Xinhua reports, XUAR Government Information Office spokesperson Hou Hanmin said that criminal suspects and defendants "can receive legal assistance and defense in accordance with the law," but that to date, no criminal suspects or defendants or their families had made any requests for legal assistance or defense. In addition, it is unclear how far in advance of the trial the state-appointed lawyers will be made available to meet with suspects and whether suspects could retain their own lawyer or other legal defender if state-appointed lawyers are not provided until the trial stage. The Global Times article paraphrased authorities as saying that the legal defense "will be given to all those suspected of participating in the Xinjiang riots when they face trial" (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the article, Mao is paraphrased as noting that formal arrests will begin soon and that "judicial departments promised to ensure that each suspect is represented by a lawyer," which may indicate representation earlier in the process. In response to questions including whether suspects could hire lawyers on their own, Hou said in the CCTV article that "China's judicial organs will, in strict accordance with laws and regulations, fully ensure [criminal suspects and defendants'] various procedural rights," according to the CCTV report.
Under Article 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) (English text, Chinese text), suspects may hire a lawyer after their first police interrogation or from the day when compulsory measures [such as a summons or detention] are first taken against them. Suspects must receive approval to appoint a lawyer where cases involve state secrets. Lawyers may meet with suspects, though advance approval is necessary for cases involving state secrets, and all meetings may be monitored by investigating organs. According to Article 33, criminal suspects have the right to entrust a defender (youquan weituo bianhuren) from the day a case is transferred to the procuratorate for review for prosecution, and the procuratorate must notify them of this right within three days from receiving the case record for examination. In addition, under Article 33 of the recently revised PRC Lawyers Law (see discussion below on the relationship between the CPL and Lawyers Law), a lawyer entrusted to a case, based on her or his lawyer's practice certificate, law office certificate, and power of attorney or official legal aid letter, has a right (youquan) to meet with a criminal suspect as of the first police interrogation or from the day when compulsory measures are first taken. Under this article, the lawyer meeting with a suspect is not to be monitored (bubei jianting). Chinese law also guarantees pro bono legal defense, but only if the defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is blind, deaf, or mute. In other cases in which defendants cannot afford legal representation, courts may appoint defense counsel or the defendant may apply for legal aid. (See Articles 33-34 of the CPL and Articles 11-12 of the Regulations on Legal Aid.)
Amid conflicting reports from Chinese media, questions also remain about the languages to be used in trial and the availability of qualified lawyers and personnel who could speak or interpret into the languages of the defendant. (Han Chinese are among those formally arrested, according to an August 4 Xinhua report, but the Global Times report cited above suggests most suspects are Uyghur.) Under Chinese law, citizens are guaranteed the right to use their own language in court proceedings. (See, e.g., Article 9 of the CPL and Article 47 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.) According to a February 7, 2006, report from Tianshan Net, however, personnel shortcomings in XUAR courts have meant that "there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority languages to carry out litigation." (See also a November 22, 2007, report from Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua Xinjiang.) According to August 14 and October 18, 2007, reports from Xinhua, out of 4,552 judges in the XUAR--where non-Han ethnic groups comprise approximately 60 percent of the total general population according to official Chinese statistics--1,948 (43 percent) of judges were ethnic minorities, and as of September of that year, 380 lawyers, or 17 percent of the total number in the region were ethnic minorities. The reports did not identify the lawyers' language capabilities. An August 23 report from China Daily (via People's Daily) said, "More than 170 Uygur and 20 Han lawyers have been assigned to the suspects; the trials will be carried out in their native languages," but XUAR government authorities later refuted the report, which also said trials would begin that week and listed the number arrested as higher than previously reported. See August 25 reports from the Global Times and New York Times.
Restrictions Contravene Domestic and International Protections for Lawyers and Criminal Suspects
The orders issued by the Beijing Municipal Judicial Bureau and the Xinjiang Lawyers Association, whether explicit or indirect, contravene both domestic law and international protections for lawyers and criminal suspects. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and pledged to ratify, provides for fair trials including through legal assistance of one's choice. General Comment Number 13 to this article provides, "Lawyers should be able to counsel and to represent their clients in accordance with their established professional standards and judgement without any restrictions, influences, pressures or undue interference from any quarter." The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers promotes "effective access to legal services provided by an independent legal profession." (See also Articles 1 and 16.) Article 28(3) of the PRC Lawyers Law specifies that lawyers may represent suspects in criminal cases, and Article 33, as discussed above, gives lawyers entrusted to the case the right to meet with suspects and defendants as of the first instance of interrogation or from the day compulsory measures are taken. (In addition, see above for discussion of other legal provisions on hiring lawyers and retaining legal defense.)
Revised PRC Lawyers Law Continues To Face Barriers to Effective Implementation
The July 5 demonstration and subsequent outbreaks of violence in Urumqi came approximately one year after the Chinese government undertook legal reforms designed to reduce barriers to the work of defense attorneys. In June 2008, revisions to the Lawyers Law took effect, and in August 2008, the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress Standing Committee said that where provisions of the Lawyers Law differ from ("alter," xiugai) CPL provisions, the provisions in the Lawyers Law are to be followed. (See a copy of the Legislative Affairs Commission statement on the All China Lawyers Association Web site.) As discussed in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, the Lawyers Law was revised largely to address the "three difficulties" (san nan) faced by defense attorneys: gaining access to detained clients, reviewing the prosecution's case files, and collecting evidence. An April 2008 Human Rights Watch report, also citing broader problems in China's legal system, including a lack of judicial independence, noted that courts and police often created obstacles to defense attorneys by claiming that a particular case was "exceptional" or "especially complicated." In addition, the report also found, "Only a fraction of criminal suspects are able to meet their counsel before they are charged. In some cases, lawyers have been entirely unable to secure even a single meeting before the trial takes place." Despite the reforms formally implemented in the past year, the effectiveness of enforcement remains unclear, as does the impact of the NPC Standing Committee statement on conflicts between laws. In addition, many criminal suspects continue to lack defense attorneys, and attorneys working on sensitive issues in particular continue to face harassment. (For more information, see, e.g., a June 18 report from China Youth Daily and July 17 New York Times report.) The continuing problems suggest that in addition to shortcomings criminal suspects in the XUAR may face through government-organized legal defense, broader systemic problems within China's legal system also hinder the likelihood of a fair criminal trial.
Restrictions in Xinjiang Follow Efforts To Block Legal Defense in Tibetan Trials
The actions taken by XUAR and Beijing authorities continue a wider trend in hindering criminal defense efforts especially in cases deemed to involve sensitive issues in ethnic minority areas. After the March 2008 Tibetan protests and riots, the government denied criminal suspects the right to independent counsel, as discussed in the CECC 2008 Annual Report and a March 9, 2009, Human Rights Watch report. A July 20, 2009, Radio Free Asia article quotes defense attorney Li Fangping, who traveled to Gansu province after being hired by the families of two Tibetan monks to represent them in a criminal case, as saying, "The authorities not only refused my request to meet those two men, they also refused my involvement in the case by saying they already had lawyers. They effectively denied the families' rights to independently hire attorneys." The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which examined the Chinese government's compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in August 2009, "[noted] with concern reports on the harassment of defense lawyers taking up cases of human rights violations, especially those introduced by members of ethnic minorities." (August 28 concluding observations available via download from Web site of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.)
For more information on events in the XUAR starting July 5, see previous Commission analysis (1, 2). For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report. For more information on lawyers in China, see Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, as well as Section III--Access to Justice in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-08-12 ) |
Posted on: 2009-11-06 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128444 |
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