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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Authorities Execute 9 After Trials in Xinjiang Marked by Due Process Violations
November 30, 2009
Authorities have executed nine men, mostly Uyghurs, found guilty by a court in the far-western region of Xinjiang of committing violent crimes during unrest in Xinjiang in July. Amid controls over the free flow of information from Xinjiang, available information indicates the trials were marked by violations of international standards for due process including judges selected for "political reliability" and curbs on defendants' right to independent counsel. Authorities also reported in recent months on steps to detain and initiate prosecution against other people for acts connected to events in July.
Following the forceful police suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs on July 5 and outbreaks of violence starting that day in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), authorities executed nine men in November found guilty of committing crimes in July, according to a November 10 China Daily report and November 10 Xinhua report (via 163.com). The men executed, apparently 8 Uyghurs and 1 Han, were among 21 people sentenced on October 12 and October 15 for crimes including intentional homicide, arson, robbery, and property damage. Authorities sentenced 12 of the 21 men to death, but gave a two-year reprieve to 3 of them. The XUAR High People's Court reviewed all the verdicts, 15 of which had been appealed, and upheld the original judgments on October 30. (See a previous CECC analysis, with updated information at the end of the analysis, for information on the October trials and appeal.) The executions followed a mandatory review of the death sentences by the Supreme People's Court (SPC) of China, according to the reports, a practice which the SPC resumed in January 2007 and that is stipulated under Article 199 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. (See Section II！Criminal Justice in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report for more information on death penalty review.) Amid continued controls over the flow of information from the XUAR, available information indicates trials were marked by violations of international standards for due process including judges selected for "political reliability" and restrictions on defendants' right to have independent legal defense during the trials. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and pledged to ratify, provide for fair trials including through an "independent and impartial tribunal." Article 14 of the ICCPR also provides for the right to legal assistance of one's choice. General Comment Number 13 to this article provides, "Lawyers should be able to counsel and to represent their clients in accordance with their established professional standards and judgement without any restrictions, influences, pressures or undue interference from any quarter."
Politicized Courts
Official reports from state media indicate political considerations guided the trials, undermining the possibility that defendants had fair trials based on international standards for due process. Initial reports from official media stressed that XUAR authorities had selected judges for the trials who had "political reliability" and "high proficiency in policy." (See, e.g., an article from the Legal Daily (via Gansu Daily, July 16), and a July 28 Xinhua Xinjiang report.) The judges participated in training on issues including the "relevant national and XUAR policies and laws concerning the 7-5 [July 5] incident," according to the Xinhua report. In addition, personnel throughout the XUAR court system received training on state policy toward events on July 5. The Party Committee of the XUAR High People's Court distributed a "Propaganda Education Manual on the Truth about the Urumqi '7-5' Incident" and "guided and educated" personnel to "strengthen their political awareness and ability to discern political matters," according to an August 3 report from Xinjiang News Net. A Xinjiang Daily report (via Xinjiang News Net, October 14) about a meeting of XUAR officials and legal scholars said the participants described the October 12 trial as the "outcome of proper leadership by the Communist Party, State Council, and XUAR Party Committee and government," also calling into question the likelihood of fair trials free from political influence.
State Places Curbs on Independent Legal Defense
Authorities have provided limited information on legal defense. Official media quoted authorities who stated all defendants tried in October had lawyers, but earlier reports indicated lawyers faced barriers to representing clients free from state interference. Of the 21 people announced on September 25 to go to trial, 4 had retained their own lawyers, and 17 had lawyers appointed by the court, according to a procuratorate official cited in an October 12 People's Daily article. The 7 people tried on October 12 were all represented by lawyers at trial, who were the same ethnicity as the defendants they represented, according to a XUAR Party school professor and Xinjiang Lawyers Association official quoted in the same article. Lawyers for the defendants also presented defense arguments (bianhu yijian) during the court hearing on October 14, according to an October 15 Xinhua article, and during the court hearing for the XUAR High People's Court's review of the cases, according to a Xinhua report (via Sina, October 30).
The statements follow information that authorities in the XUAR and elsewhere had restricted lawyers' defense activities and clients' right to have independent counsel, calling into question the nature of the legal defense during the October trials. In July, Beijing authorities issued orders dictating the terms upon which lawyers could be involved in cases related to events on July 5, and Beijing authorities are reported to have separately warned human rights lawyers against taking the cases. Li Fangping, a human rights lawyer in Beijing, said he was not aware of any Beijing lawyers who were representing defendants in the Xinjiang trials, according to an Agence France-Presse article (via Bangkok Post, October 17). In July, authorities in the XUAR also reportedly ordered lawyers not to take cases on their own initiative and instead let authorities "arrange" all defense efforts. The same month, the Xinjiang Lawyers Association reported that the XUAR Justice Department would arrange criminal defense for suspects who go to trial, selecting Uyghur lawyers and giving them training in criminal law, raising questions about the lawyers' background in criminal law and whether the training would be used to enforce political agendas. See a previous CECC analysis for additional information.
Detentions Continue, "Strike-Hard" Campaign Launched
The October trials came amid news of ongoing steps to detain and initiate prosecution against other people in connection to events in July. Authorities launched a 100-day campaign in September to "capture suspects" in relation to the July events, and as of mid-October, more than 200 people had been detained, according to Chen Qibiao, a legal scholar and director of the legal division of the XUAR Party School, as cited in a Xinjiang Daily report (via Xinhua, October 16). Authorities also launched a "strike hard" campaign in the region starting in November, which will be used in part to continue detaining people in connection to events in July, according to November 2 Xinhua reports (English, Chinese via Sohu). As noted by the CECC in a previous analysis, official Chinese reports on detention numbers connected to events in July have been inconsistent in some cases, and some overseas media reports have suggested that the number of people held in some form of custody exceed detention numbers reported at different times by official Chinese sources. In an October report, Human Rights Watch documented 43 cases of forced disappearance outside the formal protections of Chinese criminal law. Among people officially reported to be detained, Xinhua reported that the Urumqi procuratorate initiated prosecution on November 9 against 20 additional people in 10 cases. (See the Chinese-language report via Net Ease, October 10, and the October 9 English-language report).
UPDATE, December 4, 2009:
In verdicts announced on December 3 and December 4, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court found 20 more people guilty of crimes committed in early July, including intentional homicide, arson, robbery, carrying out explosions, and intentional injury, according to Xinhua reports from December 3 (English, Chinese) and December 4 (English, Chinese). On December 3, the court sentenced five people to death, two people to life imprisonment, and six to prison terms between 10 and 20 years, all for crimes committed on July 5. All of the people sentenced who were identified in the December 3 Chinese-language report appeared to have Uyghur names. The following day, the court sentenced three people to death, one to life imprisonment, and three to prison terms between 10 and 18 years for crimes committed on July 5, 6, and 7. Based on the names provided in the December 4 Chinese-language Xinhua report, two of the defendants, including one sentenced to death, appeared to be Han and the remainder Uyghur. According to the articles, the trials took place in the languages of the defendants and included interpretation. Lawyers retained by the defendants and court-appointed lawyers presented their legal defense during both trials, which were attended by "hundreds of people," according to the reports, including regional and municipal people's congress representatives, reporters, and family members of defendants and victims at the December 4 trial, according to the December 4 Chinese-language report.
For additional information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-11-12 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-12-08 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131859 |
Xinjiang Government Issues Internet Regulation, Keeps Strict Controls on Information
Authorities in the far-western region of Xinjiang have passed a new regulation on "informatization" promotion that includes provisions against using the Internet to incite ethnic separatism, threaten state security, or spread false information. While the ban is similar in some respects to prohibitions found elsewhere in China, Xinjiang authorities also have stressed the importance of the regulation in upholding stability following demonstrations and outbreaks of violence in the region in July and September. The regulation follows earlier efforts in Xinjiang to limit and punish people for online activity.
Internet Regulation Targets Online Separatism
On December 1, a new regulation will go into effect in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) that includes provisions that prohibit the use of the Internet to incite ethnic separatism, threaten state security, or spread false information, among other acts. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion Regulation, adopted on September 25, also contains general provisions to promote and regulate Internet technology, similar to regulations elsewhere in China, some of which also prohibit certain online activity. The XUAR regulation comes as authorities have stated concern about the role of the Internet in events on July 5, when Uyghurs organized a demonstration in Urumqi and outbreaks of violence also occurred. A member of the XUAR People's Congress Legal Committee described the new measures as partly a response to the Internet having been used to "spread rumors, incite ethnic separatism, and provoke disturbance" in the lead-up to events on July 5, and to spread "false reports and information to confuse public opinion" after July 5, according to a paraphrasing of his remarks in a September 23 Xinjiang Dushibao article. The regulation also comes after authorities issued a notice that called for punishing the intentional spread of false information following reports of syringe attacks in September. This recent focus on regulating Internet use in the XUAR follows the shutdown of Internet access in the region soon after July 5. Internet access in the region reportedly remains limited. (See, eg., an October 29 Reporters Without Borders report, an October 29 Radio Free Asia report, an October 23 Agence France-Presse report (via Google), an October 23 IDG News Service report (via PC World), and a September 28 China Daily report.)
The new XUAR regulation aims to promote information technology and infrastructure in the region, but also strengthens oversight of "information security," including by prohibiting several categories of Internet conduct. Article 40 of the regulation prohibits using the Internet to: (1) endanger state security or harm national and social interests; (2) destroy ethnic unity, incite ethnic separatism, or endanger social stability; (3) endanger the safety of the Internet and information systems; (4) violate intellectual property rights, trade secrets, or the lawful rights and interests of individual privacy, citizens, corporations, or other groups; (5) furnish, produce, or disseminate false or harmful information; (6) produce or disseminate information that is obscene, pornographic, violent, terrorist, homicidal, or that instigates crime; and (7) carry out other acts prohibited in laws and regulations. Article 41 of the regulation specifies penalties for violating the prohibitions. (Article 8(4) of the PRC Legislation Law states that only national laws (falu) may be enacted relating to crimes and criminal sanctions. As a regulation (tiaoli), the XUAR legislation does not directly criminalize online activity. It stipulates that authorities are to pursue criminal responsibility for certain violations of the regulation.) Article 41 of the XUAR regulation specifies that for violations involving the first two types of prohibited conduct, which include using the Internet to endanger state security, destroy ethnic unity, or incite ethnic separatism, public security organs will "strike hard" against the activity, and judicial organs will "thoroughly and swiftly investigate criminal responsibility." Individuals and work units that engage in any of (3) through (6) above, including using the Internet to spread false information, will be subject to fines. In addition, Article 34 of the regulation requires Internet service providers and related administrators to "establish and perfect" an "inspection and control" system for Internet security, and Article 43 specifies fines and the possibility of criminal responsibility for violations of Article 34.
National Measures, Provincial Regulations Contain Some Similarities to Xinjiang Regulation
Previous national measures on Internet use and those from other localities in China also have addressed state security, separatism, ethnic unity, and the spread of rumors. Articles 4 and 5 of the Measures for the Administration of Security Protection of Computer Information Networks With International Connections, issued in 1997 by the Ministry of Public Security, prohibit use of the Internet that "endangers state security" and specify that work units and individuals must not use the Internet to "produce, duplicate, look for, or disseminate" information that "incites separatism" or "ethnic hatred," "destroys the unity of the nation" or "ethnic unity," or "spreads false information," among other acts. Articles 20 and 22 of these national measures also specify fines for violations and stipulates that criminal responsibility will be pursued for serious violations. See related provisions directed at Internet news and information services work units in Article 15 of the Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services and Article 19 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services. At least two local regulations, the Hangzhou Municipality Computer Information Internet Safety and Protection Management Regulation (Article 23), and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Regulation on Computer Information Systems Security Protection (Article 17), both issued this year, contain detailed lists of prohibited acts similar to the above national measures and to the relevant articles of the XUAR regulation, as well as stipulations on pursuing criminal responsibility for some violations (Articles 42 and 33, respectively). In the past two years, other areas of the country have issued informatization promotion regulations, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, and Yunnan, which are similar to the new XUAR regulation in their general aims of information promotion. They do not contain the same detailed list of prohibited Internet activity, but some of the regulations contain prohibitions on endangering state security or other acts and penalize violations. (See Articles 36 and 47 in the Beijing regulation and Article 38 of the Shandong regulation.)
International human rights standards permit restrictions on free expression in order to protect public interests such as state security, but Chinese officials exceed such allowances by using regulations such as the one recently passed in the XUAR to target expression that the Communist Party deems to be a threat to its own, as opposed to the public's, interests. For more information, see Section II！Freedom of Expression！Censorship of the Internet and Cell Phones in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
Xinjiang and Beijing Authorities Detain Internet Posters, Bloggers
The XUAR regulation indicates the government has placed a renewed emphasis on regulating and punishing certain types of Internet activity following events in July, but XUAR authorities have punished people for similar activity in the past. In March 2009, Chinese state media reported that authorities initiated prosecution against a man identified only as "Ya" after he allegedly "spread rumors" and fabricated information on the Internet about a clash in Shayar County, Aqsu district, between Uyghurs and Han. A XUAR media report said that Ya's articles were used by foreign Web sites that aimed to "disrupt ethnic unity" and "influence social stability." In a case involving both sharing information overseas and posting it on the Internet in China, in December 2007, authorities in Turpan detained Ekberjan Jamal after he took audio footage of shopkeepers' demonstrations, sent it to foreign media outlets, and published the media outlets' news on his own Web site. The Turpan Intermediate People's Court sentenced him in February 2008 to 10 years in prison for splittism and revealing state secrets. (See previous CECC analysis for more information on the cases of "Ya" and Ekberjan Jamal.)
In a case outside of the XUAR but connected to events in Urumqi on July 5, Beijing authorities detained Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti around July 8 after an official within the XUAR alleged Ilham Tohti's blog contributed to incitement of rioting on July 5. After holding Ilham Tohti in a hotel and within his home, authorities released him without charges on August 22, according to an August 24 Radio Free Asia report. Earlier in the year, Ilham Tohti had said that he had been repeatedly interrogated by police and informally accused of separatism. In a more recent case with an apparent connection to Internet use and events in July, XUAR authorities detained Dilshat Perhat (Dilixiati Paerhati), editor of the Web site diyarim.com, on August 7, according to an October 22 Amnesty International press release. Specific details about his current detention are not available, but authorities had earlier questioned him about events in Urumqi in July, the press release reported.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report. For more information about Internet censorship generally in China, see Section II！Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-10-13 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-12-08 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=130352 |
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