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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Beijing Court Sentences Liu Xiaobo to 11 Years
January 5, 2010
The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo on December 25, 2009, to 11 years in prison for "inciting subversion of state power," a crime under Article 105, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Law. The court also sentenced Liu to two years' deprivation of political rights upon his release. Human Rights in China released an English translation of the court's verdict on December 30, 2009. The court cited essays Liu had written critical of the Communist Party and China's political system and his participation in Charter 08. The court highlighted Liu's use of the Internet, including his posting of essays online and his e-mailing of the charter and its signatures to overseas Web sites. Liu submitted his appeal of the decision to the Beijing High People's Court on December 29, according to a January 4, 2010, New York Times article.
Additional Commission Resources on Liu Xiaobo:
| Source: -See Summary (2010-01-05 ) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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The Trial of Liu Xiaobo - Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin
December 23, 2009
Following the trial of Mr. Liu Xiaobo in Beijing on the morning of December 23, China once again is at an important crossroads, and seems to be turning in the wrong direction. We call on the Chinese government to release Mr. Liu, and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens to peacefully express their political views and desires for universally-recognized fundamental freedoms.
Mr. Liu has been detained and tried for exercising internationally-recognized rights to free expression and association; his case should be dismissed, and he should be released. The trial of Mr. Liu demonstrates again the Chinese government¡¯s failure to uphold its international human rights obligations and also its failure to abide by procedural norms and safeguards that meet international standards. The apparent violations of Chinese legal protections for criminal defendants that have marred Mr. Liu¡¯s case from the outset are numerous and well-documented. Serious concerns have been raised over matters such as the failure of Chinese prosecutors to consult defense lawyers and the speed with which they acted in indicting Mr. Liu and bringing him to trial, effectively denying his lawyers sufficient time to review the state¡¯s evidence and to prepare for his defense. Mr. Liu¡¯s wife, Liu Xia, has been harassed relentlessly and prevented by officials from attending the trial, in which she reportedly had hoped to testify on behalf of her husband. Mr. Liu's lawyers reportedly have been ordered by state judicial authorities not to grant interviews.
All nations have the responsibility to ensure fairness and transparency in judicial proceedings. The effective implementation of basic human rights and the ability of all people in China to live under the rule of law depend on careful attention to, and transparent compliance with, procedural norms and safeguards that meet international standards. Instead of signaling its intent to uphold international standards, the Chinese government thus far in its treatment of Liu Xiaobo has demonstrated callous disregard for those standards.
All Chinese citizens deserve unconditional protection of their internationally-recognized rights to free expression and free association. Those in China, like Mr. Liu, who have penned thoughtful essays or signed Charter 08 seek to advance debate on ¡°national governance, citizens¡¯ rights, and social development¡± consistent with their ¡°duty as responsible and constructive citizens.¡± Their rights must be protected. As stated in this Commission¡¯s recently-released 2009 Annual Report, the development of a stable China firmly committed to the rule of law and citizens¡¯ fundamental rights is in the national interest of the United States. Those rights include the freedoms of speech, assembly, association and other rights protected under China¡¯s Constitution and laws or under China¡¯s international human rights obligations.
The verdict in Mr. Liu¡¯s case reportedly may be announced on December 25. We call on China¡¯s judiciary to signal genuine commitment to the rule of law and fundamental rights by dismissing the case against Liu Xiaobo, and in so doing to recognize the serious procedural flaws and substantive violations of his rights that have taken place. We call on Chinese officials to release Mr. Liu, and in so doing to demonstrate through action the Chinese government¡¯s commitment to developing the rule of law and to upholding international human rights standards.
Additional Commission Resources on Liu Xiaobo:
Contact for CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan: Charlotte Oldham-Moore 202-226-3798
Contact for CECC Cochairman Sander Levin: Doug Grob 202-226-3777
| Source: -See Summary (2009-12-23 ) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23
December 22, 2009
Prosecutors indicted prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo on December 10, 2009, and a Beijing court will hold his trial on December 23. Charged with the crime of "inciting subversion," Liu faces up to 15 years in prison for essays he wrote critical of the Chinese government and political system and for participating in Charter 08. Liu's case has been marred from the beginning by apparent violations of Chinese legal protections for criminal suspects. Both the United States and European Union recently called for Liu's release.
The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court will conduct the trial of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo on December 23, 2009, according to a December 21 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) article. Prosecutors indicted Liu on December 10, according to a December 11 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article. Mo Shaoping, a defense lawyer whose law firm is handling Liu's case, told RFA that the prosecution's indictment alleges that Liu drafted and organized Charter 08, a document originally signed by more than 300 Chinese citizens and which calls for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. Liu was taken into custody on December 8, 2008, a day before the charter was released. The charter was posted on the Internet and additional persons have signed the document via e-mail. CHRD reported on December 10 that about 80 percent of the charter's more than 10,000 signers live in mainland China. Authorities have harassed signatories and censored the charter from the Internet. Mo said that the indictment also cites six essays written by Liu from 2005 onward that were posted on overseas Web sites including "Guancha" (Observerchina.net) and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Based on the titles of the essays as reported by RFA, Commission staff located copies of the essays on the Internet: - "The Chinese Communist Party's Dictatorial Patriotism" (October 3, 2005, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu argues that the source of a nation's sovereignty is its people and that the government and ruling party are servants of the nation. Therefore, Liu argues, in order for a government to be truly patriotic, it must respect its people and their right to peacefully criticize and oppose their government. Dictatorships, however, according to Liu, pay lip service to patriotism but do not respect or love the main component of a nation—its people.
- "Can It Be That the Chinese People Are Only Suited To Accepting 'Party-ruled Democracy'?" (January 6, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu critiques the 2005 government white paper Building of Political Democracy in China (via Xinhua) and criticizes its claim that it places authority in the people; instead Liu coins the term "party-ruled democracy" to describe the Chinese Communist Party's dictatorship and approach toward democracy. Liu also discusses recent history including the Chinese government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
- "Changing State Power Through Changing Society" (February 26, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu discusses how societal changes in the post-Mao era in the relationship between citizens and the state has improved prospects for political reform and urges a gradual, non-violent approach in the pursuit of a liberal democracy.
- "The Multi-faceted Dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party" (March 13, 2006, originally on Observechina.net, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu discusses how the Communist Party has maintained political control, despite the sudden decline in the popularity of the Party's ideology after the events of June 1989, by appealing to the economic self-interests of elites, business people, and officials and entangling them in corruption, bribery, and tax evasion which "autocrats" can use to punish them at any time.
- "The Negative Effects of the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party on Democratization in the World" (May 6, 2006, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu calls the Chinese Communist Party one of the largest obstacles to democratization around the world for, among other things, using the prospect of energy cooperation to build closer relations with Iran and other countries that oppose the United States and the West, using "dollar diplomacy" to extract political concessions from free countries in Europe, and pressuring American companies to restrict freedom of expression to gain access to the Chinese market.
- "Continuing Questions with Regard to the Black Kiln Child Slave Incident" (July 16, 2007, posted on Human Rights in China's Web site) - Liu questions the official handling of a 2007 scandal in which children were sold to work in brick kilns in Shanxi province, calling officials "cold-blooded and brazen."
None of the language in the essays advocates violence and, as indicated above, one essay specifically calls for non-violence. In China, citizens who peacefully criticize the Chinese government and political system and disseminate such views over the Internet can face imprisonment for inciting subversion, a crime under Article 105, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Law. Courts typically acknowledge, but give little or no protection to, the right to freedom of speech found in Article 35 of China's Constitution. Such government restriction on freedom of expression violates international human rights standards. (See Section II—Freedom of Expression (p. 46–47) in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.)
One of Liu's defense lawyers said that prosecutors acted unusually fast in indicting Liu, and Mo Shaoping said prosecutors violated Chinese law by not seeking the opinion of defense lawyers before indicting. Shang Baojun told RFA that prosecutors indicted Liu on December 10, only two days after informing the defense that they had begun reviewing the case for prosecution. Mo told RFA that, under Chinese law, in order to ensure that defense lawyers carry out their legal professional duties during the criminal process, the prosecution must solicit the opinion of defense lawyers during their review to decide whether to indict. Article 139 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that "[w]hen examining a case, the People's Procuratorate shall interrogate the criminal suspect and heed the opinions of the victim and of the persons entrusted by the criminal suspect and the victim." The failure of the prosecutors to consult defense lawyers is the latest in a string of violations of legal protections for criminal suspects that have marred Liu's case from the beginning. Liu was taken into custody on December 8, 2008, and placed under residential surveillance. But instead of confining Liu to his home in Beijing, as required by Chinese law, officials kept Liu at an undisclosed location in Beijing. Officials also limited Liu's access to his lawyer, despite provisions under Chinese law that give a person under residential surveillance the right to meet with his lawyer without permission. Officials kept Liu under residential surveillance beyond the six-month legal limit and did not formally arrest him until June 23, 2009.
Liu's defense lawyers also requested postponement of the trial, concerned that there was too little time to review the voluminous case file and prepare their defense, according to the December 21 CHRD report. The court rejected this request. CHRD also reported that officials denied Liu's wife a permit to attend the trial because she was listed as a prosecution "witness." CHRD said that officials had warned numerous Chinese activists and supporters of Liu not to express support for Liu on the Internet or attempt to attend the trial.
Following news of Liu's indictment, both the United States and European Union called for Liu's release, a move China rejected. On December 14, U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly urged the Chinese government to "release Liu Xiaobo immediately and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens who peacefully express their desire for internationally recognized freedoms, including the right to petition one¡¯s government," according to the State Department's Web site. In a December 14 declaration, the European Union called on the Chinese government "to unconditionally release Mr. Liu Xiaobo and to end the harassment and detention of other signatories of Charter 08." On December 15, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Jiang Yu said "these accusations are unacceptable. China is a country of rule of law. The fundamental rights of Chinese citizens are guaranteed by the law," according to a December 15 Reuters article.
Additional Commission Resources on Liu Xiaobo:
| Source: -See Summary (2009-12-22 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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Authorities Sentence Rights Activist Huang Qi to Three Years in Prison
December 18, 2009
In late November 2009, a court in Chengdu city, Sichuan province, sentenced rights activist Huang Qi to three years in prison for illegal possession of state secrets. Huang had used his Web site to advocate on behalf of parents who lost children in school collapses during the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.
The Wuhou District People's Court in Chengdu city, Sichuan province, sentenced rights activist Huang Qi on November 23, 2009, to three years in prison for illegal possession of state secrets, according to a New York Times (NYT) article of the same date. Authorities detained Huang in June 2008 after he used his human rights Web site to advocate for parents who lost children in school collapses during the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Boxun, a U.S.-based Chinese news Web site, posted a copy of the court's judgment on December 1. The court gave Huang the maximum sentence for violating Article 182, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Law. The judgment said the "confidential" documents Huang was found to have possessed were two city-level documents and a document from the Central Political-Legal Committee of the Communist Party. One of Huang's lawyers said the documents were publicly available and that the charges were fabricated.
Background
Huang's detention in June 2008 came as Huang was using his Web site, Tianwang Human Rights Center (64Tianwang), to raise awareness about parent demands following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. According to NYT, Huang had posted an article about five grieving parents who were seeking compensation for their children's deaths in the collapse of a middle school in Hanwang township, Sichuan province. The article also noted that the parents wanted officials to investigate the school's construction. A July 21, 2008, Reporters Without Borders article said that Huang posted articles on his site "criticising the way the relief was being organized." Following the earthquake, which officially left 68,712 dead, including 5,335 schoolchildren, and 17,921 missing, parents of the children grew frustrated with officials' unwillingness to investigate fully the role that shoddy construction and corruption may have played in the school collapses, many of which occurred while other nearby buildings remained standing. Officials responded by forcefully breaking up protests, offering parents money in exchange for silence, ordering some parents to serve reeducation through labor, refusing to hear lawsuits filed by parents, and preventing parents from traveling to Beijing to petition the central government (see previous CECC analysis). In a November 23, 2009, report, the human rights organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders said it believed that Huang's imprisonment also was related to interviews he gave to foreign reporters about protests by the parents.
"State Secrets" in Question
The court's judgment said police discovered in September 2007 that two "confidential documents" ("jimi wenjian") from a city in Jiangsu province had been posted on Huang's Web site. Police later searched Huang's home and found a portable hard drive that contained both of the city documents as well as a document marked "confidential" ("jimi") from the Central Political-Legal Committee of the Communist Party. The Washington Post reported on November 23 that both Huang's wife and one of his lawyers called the charges a fabrication. The lawyer, well-known defense attorney Mo Shaoping, described the documents as rules for government agencies on dealing with citizen petitions and said they were available to the public because newspapers had published them and they were easily accessible on the Internet. The Chinese government has considerable discretion to declare almost any matter of public concern a "state secret." In recent months the government has considered revising the State Secrets Law and Chinese media have urged the government to narrow the scope of its power in this area. A June 23, 2009, China Daily editorial said "[t]he 1989 State Secrets Law is obsolete and deserves to be transformed. It is a one-sided legislation under which citizens have only obligations. In theory, government institutions, should they choose to do so, have the authority to label everything as State secrets. And, citizens, once prosecuted on the ground of violating State secrets, can expect no legal relief."
Court Refuses To Provide Copy of Judgment to Huang's Family; Obstructs Appeal
Human Rights in China (HRIC) reported that court officials made it difficult for Huang's family and lawyers to obtain a copy of the court's judgment and for Huang to file his appeal. HRIC reported on November 25 that Huang's lawyers sent a letter to the court requesting that the court mail them a copy of the judgment. The court had refused to do so and told the lawyers they had to pick up a copy in person, which would require the lawyers to travel from Beijing at great expense. HRIC reported on December 1, that the presiding judge "berated" Huang's mother and refused to give her and Huang's wife, Zeng Li, a copy of the verdict on November 23. On December 1, one of Huang's lawyers was able to obtain a copy of the verdict in person from the court, but family members were still refused a copy. As noted in a letter from Huang's lawyers to the court (posted by HRIC), Article 182 of the Supreme People's Court Interpretation of Questions Regarding Implementation of China's Criminal Procedure Law requires that once a judgment has been announced, a copy shall be immediately delivered to the defendant's lawyers and family, among other parties. HRIC also reported on December 1 that authorities were obstructing Huang's attempts to file an appeal. The report, citing Zeng Li, said officials were refusing to allow Huang to mail out his appeal or to allow one of Huang's lawyers to carry the appeal out of the Chengdu Detention Center during a visit with Huang. One of Huang's lawyers, Ding Xikui, reportedly relayed these difficulties to the court, noting that the 10-day period to file an appeal was about to expire in two days. Article 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that a "defendent shall not be deprived on any pretext of his right to appeal." Radio Free Asia reported on December 4, that Huang's appeal apparently had been delivered to the court, but that Zeng Li had not received any confirmation from the court. The report said Zeng and Ding Xikui were having difficulty making phone contact with anyone at the court. Ming Pao reported on December 2 (via Sina.com.hk) that Zeng also had requested that authorities release Huang on bail for medical treatment. Huang reportedly suffers from two tumors in his abdomen, hepatitis B, an irregular heartbeat, and two lumps in his left breast.
The maximum sentence for violating Article 282, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Law for "illegally possessing" state secrets is three years. In handing down the maximum sentence in Huang's case, the court cited the legal provision providing for a heavier sentence in cases where the person has committed a crime punishable by fixed-term imprisonment within five years of completing his sentence for another crime punishable by fixed-term imprisonment (as provided for in Article 65 of the Criminal Law, one of the provisions governing "recidivists"). Huang previously served a five-year sentence from 2000 to 2005 for "inciting subversion of state power." The court in that case cited articles Huang posted on his Web site, Tianwang Human Rights Center, dealing with topics such as "democracy," "June 4," and "Falun Gong."
For more information about official efforts to suppress public criticism of the collapse of schools and schoolchildren deaths following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, see p. 47 in Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2009 Annual Report, as well as a previous analysis on Huang's August 5 trial and the trial of another earthquake activist, Tan Zuoren, who called for an independent investigation into the school collapses and was charged with inciting subversion.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-12-17 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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Authorities Begin New Incentive Initiative To Continue Population Control in Xinjiang
December 11, 2009
The central government has launched a series of initiatives in the far-western region of Xinjiang to strengthen the region's population control work, including through monetary rewards to residents in designated areas who have fewer births than allowed under the region's population planning requirements. The reward program, started in fall 2009 and mainly directed at ethnic minorities, is part of broader efforts throughout China to control population growth using both punitive measures and incentives to promote compliance. Citizens who expose abuses in official implementation of population planning policies have faced repercussions including harassment and detention, as a recent case from Xinjiang illustrates.
New Initiative in Xinjiang Rewards Fewer Births, Focuses on Ethnic Minorities
The central government has launched a series of initiatives in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to strengthen the region's population control work, including through monetary incentives for families who have fewer children than allowed under the region's population planning requirements, according to Chinese government and media reports. On October 31, the National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) signed an agreement with the XUAR government to launch the initiatives, including "special rewards" (teshu jiangli) for families in 26 poor and border counties who have fewer children, according to a November 6 report from the NPFPC (via the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site). According to a November 2 Xinhua article, the new reward policy mainly targets rural ethnic minority households who already have two children and have "been certified" (lingzheng) as voluntarily forgoing a third birth [shengyu liang tai hou zhudong fanqi di san tai]. Under Article 15 of the XUAR's Regulation on Population and Family Planning, rural ethnic minority families are permitted to have a maximum of three children. The Xinhua report does not indicate how households prove that they will not have a third child. Some local governments elsewhere in China have launched incentive programs that reward couples who voluntarily undergo sterilization or abortion procedures, and policies launched in previous years also have rewarded certain couples beyond childbearing age (see below). The families in the XUAR who forgo a third birth will receive 3,000 yuan (US$439) as a one-time payment, and each member of the couple will receive an annual payment of 720 yuan (US$105) starting the following year. Under the latest initiatives, authorities also will continue a reward policy already in place in three southern XUAR districts (see a February 3 Xinhua report for more details), provide services including free prenatal health screenings for "better births" in the southern XUAR, and arrange yearly technology training and training for grassroots cadres, according to the NPFPC article. Authorities also will continue "preferential policies" in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC or bingtuan), an apparent reference to policies there that also reward fewer births. (See, e.g., a May 4 Bingtuan News Net article describing a preferential policy to reward households with one child.)
The recent initiatives build on previous efforts in the XUAR to control population growth by targeting communities designated as ethnic minorities and by focusing on programs that reward fewer births. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report, earlier in 2009, authorities stressed strengthening population planning in southern XUAR, which is a predominantly non-Han area, and central and XUAR authorities pledged to increase investment in 2009 to meet the population control targets mandated by the central government. In 2008, the government reported that the XUAR had achieved 65,000 fewer births in 2007 under policies of providing rewards to families who had fewer children than legally permitted, as reported in the CECC 2008 Annual Report. A 2006 Xinhua article reported that the XUAR's population planning policy had taken the "first steps" in moving from "emphasis on punishing multiple births" to "emphasis on encouraging and rewarding fewer births." Since first beginning reward policies in the XUAR in 2006, the number of "certified families" who have given birth to fewer children has increased, according to the November 2 Xinhua report, including 109,000 households in the first nine months of 2009. In the XUAR and throughout China, however, authorities continue to enforce regulations that punish non-compliance with population planning requirements at the same they implement systems to reward fewer births. See below and see Section II—Population Planning in the CECC 2009 Annual Report for additional information.
Citizens Who Expose Abuses Face Repercussions, Uyghur Man Detained
Citizens who expose abuses in official implementation of population planning policies have faced repercussions including harassment and detention, as a recent case from the XUAR illustrates. On July 2, authorities in Yining (Ghulja), Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, within the XUAR, detained Tursunjan Hesen, a 67-year-old Uyghur man, for reportedly revealing state secrets and endangering state security, according to a village head and neighbor cited in an October 30 Radio Free Asia article. Tursunjan Hesen had given interviews to overseas media about a case involving his daughter, Arzigul Tursun, according to the article. In 2008, authorities had planned to subject her to a forced abortion while she was six months pregnant with her third child, but canceled the plans following international advocacy on her behalf. An official had said Arzigul Tursun "should undergo an abortion" because she violated population planning requirements by becoming pregnant with a third child. As noted, rural ethnic minority couples may give birth to three children, but under the XUAR Regulation on Population and Family Planning, urban ethnic minority couples are permitted to give birth to two children, and where one member of the couple is an urban resident—as was the case in Arzigul Tursun's marriage—urban birth limits apply. The official's statement calling for an abortion, however, has no basis under XUAR population planning regulations. Although those in violation of the policy are required to pay "social compensation fees," there is no stipulation that pregnancies must be terminated if the fee cannot be paid. Both national law and XUAR legal regulations provide sanctions for government officials who infringe on citizens' rights or abuse their power in carrying out population planning requirements, but it is unclear if local authorities faced penalties for their plans to subject Arzigul Tursun to a forced abortion.
Xinjiang Initiative Part of Population Planning Controls Throughout China
Central and local authorities throughout China continue to strictly control the reproductive lives of women in China through an all-encompassing system of family planning regulations in which the state is directly involved in the reproductive decisions of its citizens. As noted in Section II—Population Planning in the CECC 2009 and 2008 Annual Reports, violators of population planning policy are routinely punished with fines, and in some cases, subject to forced sterilization, forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and torture. In addition to punishing non-compliance with population planning requirements, some local governments offer monetary incentives and other benefits to couples who voluntarily undergo sterilization or abortion procedures. Authorities also have provided financial rewards under other circumstances (see, e.g., the CECC 2005 Annual Report and a previous CECC analysis). The utilization of financial incentives reflects an emerging national pattern, but thus far incentives for compliance have only been implemented in addition to, rather than in place of, longstanding coercive measures. Additionally, many provinces connect job promotion with an official's ability to meet or exceed population planning targets, thus providing a powerful incentive for officials to use coercive measures in order to meet population goals.
Population Planning Policy Violates International Standards
China¡¯s population planning policies in both their nature and implementation violate international human rights standards, as described in the 2009 Annual Report. Although implementation tends to vary across localities, the government¡¯s population planning law and regulations contravene international human rights standards by limiting the number of children that women may bear and by coercing compliance with population targets through heavy fines. For example, the PRC Population and Family Planning Law is not consistent with the standards set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families and additional abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against "out-of-plan" children whose births were not authorized, also violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, all of which the Chinese government has ratified.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR and on population planning policy, see Section II—Population Planning and Section IV—Xinjiang, in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-12-07 ) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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Ministry of Health Ranks HIV/AIDS Deadliest Infectious Disease in China, Government Harassment of Advocates Continues
December 18, 2009
December 1, 2009, marked the 22nd annual World AIDS Day. HIV/AIDS was first officially reported in China in 1985, but reached epidemic proportions in rural areas in the early to mid-1990s due in part to tainted blood transfusions conducted at makeshift blood and plasma donation stations set up by enterprising businessmen and government officials. Medical procedures in these facilities reportedly were deficient: needles and tubes reportedly were reused, blood from multiple donors was mixed, and once plasma had been removed, re-injected into donors of the same blood type. Such practices reportedly resulted in the spread of blood-borne diseases including HIV. HIV/AIDS continues to spread throughout China today through a variety of channels. Many who provide assistance to or who advocate on behalf of people living with HIV/AIDS in China face government pressure, including harassment and other forms of abuse, as detailed below.
Current statistics
In February 2009, the Ministry of Health (MOH) announced that HIV/AIDS had become the deadliest infectious disease in China. The MOH and UNAIDS estimate the number of people living with HIV in China to be between 560,000 and 920,000, and the number of people living with AIDS to be between 97,000 and 112,000, according to a November 24 MOH report. These estimates far exceed actual statistics cited in the same report. UNAIDS reported in November that "it is estimated that fewer than one in three people living with HIV in China have been diagnosed." While problems surrounding diagnosis¡ªincluding general social stigma, fear, and discrimination¡ªdiscourage individuals from getting tested (see UNAIDS China Stigma Index) and may obstruct statistical accuracy, "under-reporting" of cases in China also is a major problem, according to a February 28 article in the international medical journal, The Lancet.
Transmission of HIV/AIDS in China
HIV/AIDS is spreading today in all of China's 31 provincial-level jurisdictions through a variety of channels, according to international AIDS charity AVERT's Web site. Dr. Gao Yaojie, Chinese gynecologist and whistleblower of the 1990s HIV/AIDS epidemic in rural China, suggested in her written statement for a December 3, 2009, Commission roundtable that "rampant" underground "blood trading" may be the main avenue of HIV/AIDS transmission in China. This mode of transmission, however, is not mentioned in the UNAIDS November AIDS Epidemic Update. The report instead charges that "heterosexual transmission has become the predominant mode of HIV transmission," and that a low rate of condom usage in the sex industry plays a key role in HIV/AIDS transmission in the region. According to the report, "In China, 60% of female sex workers do not consistently use condoms with their clients." Other key modes of transmission mentioned in the report include needle-sharing among intravenous drug users, unprotected sex between men who have sex with men (MSM), unsafe practices in the migrant worker population, and mother-to-child transmission. According to a May 1 address by Joanne Csete, Director of the HIV/AIDS and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch, government harassment of potential HIV/AIDS advocates makes it difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the epidemic in China. Csete remarked that "the government consistently has sought to suppress the history of massive HIV infection through state-run blood plasma collections, of which we are likely never to know the true scale and the true cost in lives. This history has made HIV even more taboo in public discourse, as though sex and drugs didn't make it taboo enough."
Government Response to Civil Society Action
While non-governmental organizations and individual activists play an important role in HIV/AIDS education, prevention, and treatment in China, official treatment of them often is harsh and repressive. According to the Commission's 2009 Annual Report (p.203), the Chinese government continues to exert control over advocates' right to associate with strict requirements that limit organizations' ability to legally function independently from the government. Individual HIV/AIDS activists also continue to face serious obstacles in their work, including arbitrary detention, harassment, surveillance, intimidation, restrictions on travel, and other violations of their fundamental human rights. Examples of HIV/AIDS activists who have been subjected to such government pressure in the past year include:
- In February 2009, authorities attempted to prevent Dr. Gao Yaojie from meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, according to Dr. Gao's written statement for a December 3 Commission roundtable. Authorities cut her telephone line in May following news that she was to receive a French human rights award for women, according to a November 29 ChinaAid statement. Dr. Gao left China for the United States in August, hoping to find a "peaceful environment" in which to finish her three books and reveal "the truth about the AIDS epidemic in China," according to the statement.
- On August 4, Asia Catalyst reported that Chinese police seized the passport of an unnamed Chinese AIDS advocate and prevented him from leaving the country to attend the International Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, to which he was invited by UNAIDS. According to the report, he was warned that if he spoke to the media and international organizations, he would "face the same fate as Hu Jia."
- HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a three-and-a-half year prison sentence for "inciting subversion of state power." He is expected to be released on June 26 or June 27, 2011. On November 17, 2009, Hu's wife Zeng Jinyan reported on her blog that she and her daughter were still under "soft detention" in their home, and were being monitored by seven or eight domestic security protection officials sitting outside the building.
- On December 2, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that Beijing authorities detained Henan activist Tian Xi, who reportedly was infected with HIV in 1996 through a hospital blood transfusion, after he unfurled a banner outside of the Ministry of Health on November 19. Officials then forcibly returned him to his home in Gulu township, Xincai county, Henan province, where he remains under 24-hour surveillance, according to the report.
For additional information on the spread of HIV/AIDS in China and government pressure on advocates, see Section II¡ªPublic Health in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) |
Posted on: 2009-12-22 |
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New Regulation in Xinjiang Appears To Expand Controls Over Children's Religious Freedom (Includes Update)
December 11, 2009
A new regulation on the protection of minors, adopted by the Xinjiang government and effective December 1, 2009, appears to expand formal legal controls over children's freedom of religion and parents' right to impart religious teachings. The regulation reportedly addresses the "negative impact" various religious activities have on minors. While the full text of the regulation is unavailable, an earlier draft version of the regulation expanded upon restrictions in force in Xinjiang that already prohibited parents or guardians from letting children engage in religious activities, adding more specificity to earlier restrictions and stipulating obligations for government offices and other entities to intervene in certain cases. The prohibition, unseen elsewhere in China, appears to have no basis in Chinese law and also contravenes international protections for freedom of religion. [See the end of this analysis for an update based on a copy of the regulation made available on December 25.]
A new regulation that took effect in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on December 1, 2009, includes provisions addressing the "negative impact" various religious activities have on minors, according to a November 19 Xinhua report. Although the full text of the XUAR Regulation on the Protection of Minors appears to be unavailable on the Internet and in legal databases, if the final version retains provisions included in the draft regulation considered for deliberation in June, it will expand existing legal controls over children's right to freedom of religion in the XUAR and parents' right to impart religious teachings. The June draft reportedly retains an earlier restriction in force in the XUAR (see below for discussion) stating that parents or guardians "may not permit minors to be engaged in religious activities." The draft also states that "no organization or individual may lure or force minors to participate in religious activities or use religion to obstruct minors' compulsory education," adding "lure" to a similar provision already in force. In addition, the draft states that where minors are "lured" or "forced" into such activities, they "can ask for protection from schools, neighborhood committees, village committees, offices for the protection of minors, or public security organs," and such "organizations or work units receiving requests for help must take measures in a timely manner and not refuse or shift responsibility." According to a June 8 report from Legal Daily (via the Ministry of Commerce's China Market Order Net) on the June draft, the provisions "are directed at the phenomenon in some places in Xinjiang of parents or other guardians forcing minors to believe in a religion or participate in religious activities." The Xinhua article reported that the legislative process included 10 drafts of the regulation but did not specify if any revisions were made to the version considered in June. Recent work on the regulation dates to early 2008, and the drafting process included three study trips inside and outside the XUAR, four sessions to solicit input from each district and municipality, two scholarly forums, and survey work, according to the article.
The new stipulations would add to a restriction previously in force in Article 14 of the XUAR's 1993 Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection of Minors that prohibited parents or guardians from "permitting minors to be engaged in religious activities," which alone appeared to amount to a total ban on children's religious activities. Article 30 also stated that "no organization or individual may force minors to participate in religious activities" or "use religion to obstruct minors' compulsory education." As noted in an earlier CECC analysis, the earlier prohibition in Article 14 barring parents from permitting children to engage in religious activities was unseen among other regulations in China and appeared to have no basis in national Chinese law. The PRC Law on the Protection of Minors is silent on the matter of religion, and the national Regulation on Religious Affairs is silent on the issue of children's freedom of religion and parents' right to impart religious teachings to their children.
The legal restrictions in the XUAR also contravene international human rights protections for freedom of religion. Article 18 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and pledged to ratify, provide that everyone has the right to freedom of religion. The ICCPR also stipulates "the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions." Under the ICCPR, freedom of religion "may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others," and General Comment Number 22(8) to this article of the ICCPR notes that "the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted." Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which China has ratified, specifies that "States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." In addition, "States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child."
The formal legal restrictions, combined with policy directives and the individual interpretations of implementing officials, have translated into harsh controls in practice over children's freedom of religion. See previous Commission analyses (1, 2) for additional information. Authorities identify "illegal religious activities" and "religious extremism" as threats to the region's security and target religion in broader security measures and anti-separatism campaigns. In past years, XUAR media and local government Web sites provided detailed information on implementation of legal measures and policies on religion, including measures affecting children. Such information has been limited this year as Web sites from the XUAR have remained inaccessible to users outside the region since July. For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II¡ªFreedom of Religion¡ªIslam and Section IV¡ªXinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
UPDATE, January 7, 2010:
On December 25, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council posted the full text of the XUAR Regulation on the Protection of Minors on its Web site (available via the CECC). The text differs from the reported version of the June draft in that it excludes the previous provision stating that parents or guardians "may not permit minors to be engaged in religious activities." The regulation retains, however, other language from the earlier draft that leaves wide latitude in restricting children's religious activities. It also includes obligations for government offices and other entities to intervene in certain cases.- Article 34 includes language similar to that reported in the June draft, stating that "no organization or individual may lure or force minors to participate in religious activities" and that they "may not use religion to carry out activities to obstruct compulsory education." The regulation lacks criteria for determining what acts constitutes "luring" or "force," leaving latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that conflicts with "the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions," as defined in the ICCPR.
- Article 48 also contains language similar to that in the June draft, stating that where minors are "lured" or "forced" into such activities, they "can ask for protection from schools, neighborhood committees, village committees, offices for the protection of minors, or public security organs," and such "organizations or work units receiving requests for help must take measures in a timely manner and not refuse or shift responsibility."
- Article 53 contains the regulation's final mention of religion. It stipulates that where "any organization or individual lures or forces a minor to participate in religious activities" in violation of Article 34, the controlling agency will give "criticism and education" and "order the situation to be amended." In addition, public security organs will give administrative punishment "in accordance with law" in cases of violations of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which includes the possibility of short-term detention. The 1993 XUAR Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection of Minors did not specify penalties for violations of its religion-related provisions.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-11-27 ) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132578 |
Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises Questions About Governmental Accountability
January 6, 2010
The suspicion of lead poisoning in hundreds of children caused by industrial pollution prompted protests by parents in Hunan province in August 2009. The heavy metal pollution case raises questions about governmental accountability; the plant linked to the lead pollution did not have approval to operate from local environmental authorities. In addition, parents of ill children expressed reservations about the results of lead poisoning tests conducted locally, and also reported that some hospitals would not conduct the tests. The case also raises questions about freedom of expression; local officials reportedly intimidated and warned parents not to talk to the media.
Lead Poisoning in Children Triggers Protests by Parents
On August 8, 2009, approximately 1,000 residents in Wugang city, Hunan province blocked a street, overturned a car, and clashed with 200 officials and police officers during a protest against the Wugang Fine-Processed Manganese Smelting Plant, according to an August 20 New York Times article. The residents reportedly alleged the plant's pollution was linked to lead poisoning in as many as 1,354 children. As reported in an August 20 Xinhua article, when children became sick in July, parents suspected the pollution from the smelter. The plant reportedly had opened in May 2008 without the approval of environmental protection authorities and at least one resident reported smoke and dust pollution whenever the plant was in operation, according to Xinhua. The Hunan case follows another instance of lead poisoning in children in Shaanxi province, which involved hundreds of children. (See previous CECC analysis for more information on the Fengxiang county, Shaanxi province lead poisoning case). The Hunan, Shaanxi and other recently discovered cases of lead poisoning in children are part of a more widespread lead poisoning problem in China. For example, according to a September 4 Wall Street Journal article, the director of Yunnan province's lead prevention office for children, Liu Dakun, said that in Yunnan's mining areas, 50 to 60 percent of children under 14 years old are victims of lead poisoning.
Local Officials Investigate Protesters Alleged Links to Falun Gong
Officials reportedly detained 15 parents who participated in the August 8 protests in Wugang, Hunan province, according to a September 3 Guardian report citing an Associated Press story. Authorities reportedly "accused" the parents of being Falun Gong practitioners or being "influenced" by Falun Gong, a spiritual movement, banned by the Chinese government as being a "cult organization." A September 4 Global Times article reported that the chief of the Wugang Public Security Bureau (PSB) denied detaining parents, saying that "No parents were detained. There were indeed 15 people who participated in the protest and gave themselves up to the police after the protest. ...We just asked them to explain what happened that day and set them free." The same article noted that the chief of the PSB also stated that police were investigating the involvement of Falun Gong adherents in the August 8 protest.
Officials Response to Protests, Intimidate Citizens, and Restrict Free Expression; Some Hospitals Reportedly Refuse to Provide Tests
City officials allegedly suspended operations of the smelter on July 31 according to the August 20 Xinhua article. Residents reportedly protested three times before the local government issued the order to close down the smelter, according to a September 26 Financial Times article (registration required). The August 20 Xinhua article noted that local city officials ordered the immediate closure of the plant on August 13, after the large-scale protests of August 8 had taken place. According to an August 28 Xinhua article (via NetEase), the Hunan and Shaoyang city environmental protection bureaus determined that the manganese smelter was linked to the pollution causing the lead poisoning on August 11. According to the same article, officials detained two of the smelter's executives, and the plant's legal representative, who had fled, turned himself in on August 27.
Wugang officials stated they would provide testing for children affected by the heavy metal pollution, according to an August 18 Southern Metropolis Daily article. Nevertheless, one resident reported that there appeared to be a limited number of "permission slips" available that could be presented for free individual tests, according to an August 26 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article. In addition, residents apparently suspecting government influence over local hospitals, doubted the objectivity of tests conducted locally. Some reportedly took their children instead to a county in Guangxi province for testing, according to the Southern Metropolis Daily article. One resident reported that "...hospitals have been bribed by someone, so the parents never see the correct results," according to the RFA article. The RFA article noted that some residents reported hospitals would not test their children for elevated blood lead levels. One resident who traveled to southern Guangxi province to obtain a test for her two-year-old reported being turned away after revealing she was from Wugang, according to the RFA article. "They knew about the lead poisoning cases in Wugang and they asked if I was from there," RFA reported her as saying.
In late September, officials reportedly said that the soil and water were safe and "declared the problem solved," according to the Financial Times article. The same article reported that hospitals treated 17 children and then released them. Despite the August 11 finding by the Hunan and Shaoyang city environmental protection officials that the manganese smelter was linked to the pollution causing the lead poisoning, Wugang officials reportedly told the Financial Times that children were not showing symptoms of serious industrial lead poisoning. Officials instead assigned blame for the children's high blood lead levels on gasoline residue or pencil lead. One official said that the fevers experienced by children who were treated at a hospital in Changsha were not related to lead; "[m]aybe it's H1N1 [swine flu] from England."
Furthermore, some villagers recounted official intimidation to keep silent about the lead poisoning, according to a September 2 CNN article. A government notice explaining a compensation scheme reportedly cautioned villagers not to "spread rumors" or cause trouble. Parents said hospital officials requested they sign forms agreeing not to discuss the blood poisoning incident with reporters. In addition, a CNN journalist reported being followed while investigating the story.
For more information on government accountability and environmental protection, see Section II¡ªClimate Change and Environment (p. 190) of the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2009-12-30 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-01-08 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133403 |
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