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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Statement of the Chairman and Cochairman on Political Imprisonment in China Today
August 19, 2010
Recent trials of Webmasters, professors, writers, lawyers, and even a geologist in China who is a U.S. citizen have heightened concern that the Chinese government increasingly is using detention and imprisonment to stifle dissent or to advance government objectives, at the expense of human rights. For example, in July, Dr. Xue Feng, an American geologist, was sentenced to eight years in prison for helping a U.S. company purchase commercial information on oil wells in China. Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and the editor of a popular Web site was sentenced to 15 years in prison for apparently giving an interview to the foreign media after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Xinjiang and for essays critical of some Chinese government policies in Xinjiang. In addition, Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli, have been sentenced to prison in connection to their roles as administrators of three popular Uyghur Web sites.
The threat of political imprisonment affects the work of people and organizations who are engaged in human rights advocacy or who are involved in commercial activity in China, including U.S. citizens. The chilling effects of political imprisonment result in lost opportunities for the Chinese government to make progress on and for Chinese citizens to enjoy the development of human rights and the rule of law.
We note in particular two alarming trends. First, the Internet appears to have spawned a new class of political prisoners in China. Chinese citizens are going to jail for posting essays online critical of the government or for trying to organize political opposition online. Many citizens who criticize the government on blogs and comment boards go unpunished！at most their comment is deleted. But individuals with a track record of human rights advocacy, political activism, grass roots organizing or opposition to the Communist Party are being targeted systematically. The most common charges against these citizens are the crime of subversion, which carries a sentence of up to life imprisonment, and inciting subversion, which carries a sentence of up to 15 years. Individuals are imprisoned on these charges for doing nothing more than criticizing the Communist Party, without any advocacy of violence.
The second trend is the government's harsh crackdown on lawyers and human rights defenders. Over the last two years, several lawyers who represent human rights advocates！including house church members, HIV/AIDS activists, Falun Gong practitioners, and Tibetan and Uyghurs！have been harassed and abused by the government because of their clients and the causes they represent.
Among the most outrageous and cruel examples of abuse by the government is the disappearance of Gao Zhisheng. One of China's greatest human rights lawyers, Mr. Gao endured jail and torture because of his fearless advocacy and commitment to speak the truth as he knew it. Last year, he was then abducted from his home by security agents after his wife and two children left China to seek asylum in the United States.
We now know that for more than a year, security agents moved him from one place to another, and subjected him to psychological and physical abuse. After this Commission and the international community pressed his case, Mr. Gao mysteriously reappeared for two weeks this past Spring. He gave a few interviews, and then security agents abducted him again. His forced "disappearance" by the state reveals a complete disregard for individual rights and the rule of law.
Mr. Gao's photograph and a detailed record of his case can be found in the Commission's newly enhanced political prisoner database. At this time, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database contains about 5,500 records of political prisoners in China. The Commission believes that to promote the rule of law in China, it is vital to publicize and seek the release of these people. It was international pressure that played a critical role in securing the freedom of Nelson Mandela, Lech Walesa, Kim Daejong, and many others who helped lead their countries to greater social justice. Today's imprisoned dissidents are the leading figures of tomorrow's societies built on greater respect for fundamental rights.
China has experienced success on many fronts, including health and education, and the Chinese people justifiably are proud of their successes. But the Chinese government now must lead in protecting the human rights of its people and the integrity of its legal and political institutions with no less skill and commitment than it displayed in opening the doors that allowed the industriousness and entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese people to lift millions out of poverty. Most importantly, it must open the bars of its jail cells and free its political prisoners, among whom are some of the country's most brilliant and socially-committed citizens, including Liu Xiaobo, Hu Jia, Chen Guangcheng, and many others named in this Commission¨s newly-enhanced Political Prisoner Database and in its Annual Reports.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-19 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Beijing Court Sentences American Geologist to Eight Years for State Secrets
July 30, 2010
On July 5, 2010, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Dr. Xue Feng, a naturalized American citizen, to eight years in prison for allegedly helping the American company he worked for purchase commercial information on oil wells in China. The court said the information was a state secret and the purchase had endangered China's national security. Officials reportedly did not declare the information a state secret until after the transaction occurred; attempted to coerce Dr. Xue into confessing to the crime by allegedly torturing him; violated China's consular agreement with the United States by delaying notification of Dr. Xue's detention and limiting access by American officials; and violated China's Criminal Procedure Law with respect to the handling of Dr. Xue's case. The case also highlights the risk for foreign companies and their employees competing or doing business with China's state-owned enterprises, which can leverage state secrets laws to protect their commercial interests.
Background
Dr. Xue is a geologist who was born in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, according to a November 19, 2009, Associated Press (AP) article (via Huffington Post). He studied northern China rock formations at the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D., the article said. In 2001, a Colorado-based energy consulting firm, IHS Energy (now IHS Inc.), hired Dr. Xue to be the company's Northeast Asia manager, AP reported. In 2005, Dr. Xue allegedly helped IHS purchase from a third party a commercial database containing information on the locations and reserves of 32,115 oil wells and prospecting sites that were mostly owned by PetroChina Co., according to a July 6, 2010, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article's (registration required) recounting of the court's findings. PetroChina's controlling shareholder is China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the jurisdiction of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), according to PetroChina's Web site. Dr. Xue, a naturalized American citizen, reportedly "disappeared" into official custody in Beijing on November 20, 2007, according to a July 21, 2010, op-ed in the South China Morning Post (via U.S.-Asia Law Institute) by Jerome Cohen, co-director of NYU Law School's U.S.-Asia Law Institute. On July 5, 2010, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Dr. Xue to eight years in prison plus a fine of 200,000 yuan (US$29,850) for purportedly trafficking state secrets, WSJ reported. (See Article 111 of China's Criminal Law.) Dr. Xue has appealed the verdict, a July 16 WSJ article reported.
Procedural Abuses
During the two-and-a-half year period that Dr. Xue was in custody before his sentencing, Chinese officials reportedly committed numerous procedural abuses. - Consular Notification and Access Violations. Under Article 35(2) of the U.S.-PRC Consular Convention of 1980 Chinese officials were supposed to notify U.S. officials "no later than" four days after "any form of detention" of a U.S. national. In Dr. Xue's case, however, Chinese officials waited three weeks before acknowledging to U.S. officials that Dr. Xue was being held by the Ministry of State Security, according to the Cohen op-ed. Furthermore, the op-ed noted that Chinese officials did not allow American officials to visit with Dr. Xue until the 32nd day of his detention. Article 35(4) of the convention states that officials shall be able to meet with their national "at the latest" two days after notification of the detention.
- Torture Allegations. Dr. Xue reportedly showed American consular officials burn marks on his arms made by investigators, according to the AP article. The op-ed said that police coerced Dr. Xue into "signing false documents," and that in May 2008 an officer injured Dr. Xue by throwing a glass ashtray at his head.
- Criminal Procedure Law Violations. The Ministry of State Security transferred Dr. Xue to the Beijing State Security Bureau detention house on February 4, 2008, and he was formally arrested on April 11, according to the op-ed. Assuming February 4 is the date Dr. Xue was formally detained, officials violated Article 69 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) by not formally arresting him within the 37-day limit. Based on the op-ed, another period of more than seven months passed before state security officials forwarded the case to prosecutors sometime around December 2008. Articles 124, 126, and 127 of the CPL appear to place a seven-month limit on this period. Six months passed between December 2008 and Dr. Xue's indictment in May 2009, according to the op-ed. Articles 138 and 140 of the CPL would appear to limit this period to three-and-a-half months.
The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court held the first hearings in Dr. Xue's trial in July 2009, according to AP, meaning the court had agreed to accept the case before this date. Article 168 of the CPL says a court has up to two-and-a-half months after accepting a case to pronounce a judgment, and Article 166 allows for one-month postponements if prosecutors request supplementary investigations. Cohen said prosecutors had requested two postponements, which would have placed the outer limit between the court's accepting the case and pronouncing the judgment at four-and-a-half months. The judgment was not pronounced until July 2010. As the op-ed noted: "As winter turned to spring, [the court] ran out of legal grounds for further delays and no longer attempted explanation."
- Access to Counsel Violations. According to the op-ed, authorities denied Dr. Xue access to counsel for more than a year.
State Secrets！Impact on Rule of Law and Foreign Companies Doing Business in China
Dr. Xue's case highlights several problems with China's state secrets regime！problems that make it susceptible to abuse if Chinese officials wish to use it to protect commercial interests. - Retroactive Classification. It was only after the transaction took place that officials classified the information as a state secret, according to a July 4 Dui Hua article.
- Commercial Information as State Secret. The line between commercial information and state secrets is blurry under Chinese law. The state secrets law currently in effect provides wide latitude for officials to declare information a state secret, including "secrets in national economic and social development," "secrets concerning science and technology," and "other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department." Cohen said that in Dr. Xue's case "there was no meaningful way to clarify the line between common, commercial information and state secrets." The blurring of commercial information and state secrets is especially problematic when dealing with SOEs. For example, Jiang Jiemin, General Manager of CNPC, the SOE that controls PetroChina, said in June 2010 that oil is an "important strategic asset," and that the company's work to protect its secrets bears on China's national security and social stability, according to the company's Web site. Chinese regulations make explicit that some commercial secrets of SOEs shall be considered state secrets. In March 2010, SASAC issued Interim Provisions on the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central Enterprises, Article 3 of which requires central-level SOEs to protect "the operating information and technical information which belongs within the scope of state secrets." According to SASAC's Web site, CNPC is a central-level SOE and is thus subject to this requirement. In addition, according to an April 30 21st Century Business Herald article, since SOEs, especially central SOEs, have "a certain administrative rank," they may themselves possess the power to declare information a state secret.
Dr. Xue's case follows another case involving the Anglo-Australian mining firm Rio Tinto. In July 2009 four employees of that firm were charged with stealing state secrets shortly after Rio Tinto pulled out of a proposed $19.5 billion deal with a major state-owned firm. The charges were reduced to commercial bribery and commercial secrets infringement the following month.
- Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review. In criminal cases involving state secrets, Chinese courts do not have the power to question an agency's classification of information as a state secret, according to a 2007 Human Rights in China report on China's state secrets system. Furthermore, in cases where endangering national security is alleged, such as cases involving the charge of inciting subversion, courts make little to no assessment of the actual harm to national security. In Dr. Xue's case, the July 6 WSJ article reported that the court provided few details regarding the damage the transaction caused to China's national security.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-15 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Xinjiang Court Imposes Prison Sentences on Uyghur Journalist and Webmasters
August 7, 2010
A court in the far western region of Xinjiang sentenced a journalist and three Web site administrators to prison sentences in July for endangering state security. Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and Web editor, received a 15-year prison sentence. Prosecutors at trial cited essays he wrote addressing economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs; sources also connected the case to interviews he gave to foreign media after demonstrations and rioting in Xinjiang in July 2009. In separate cases, Web site administrators Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli received sentences of 10, 5, and 3 years, respectively, on the same charges, in reported connection to articles posted on their Web sites describing hardships in Xinjiang and announcements on one of the Web sites calling for the demonstration in Urumqi in July 2009. Other Uyghur journalists, writers, and Web site workers from Xinjiang remain in prison or in detention for exercising their right to free expression, including people whose cases also are connected to the July 2009 events.
Urumqi Court Sentences Journalist Gheyret Niyaz
The Urumqi Intermediate People's Court in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) sentenced Uyghur journalist and Web site editor Gheyret Niyaz to 15 years' imprisonment on July 23, 2010, for endangering state security, according to a July 23 Associated Press (AP) article (via Washington Post), July 23 posting on the Web site Uyghur Online, and July 22 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article. China's Criminal Law (Articles 102-113) defines several different crimes of endangering state security (also translated as "endangering national security"), and a July 30 open letter signed by Chinese scholars and writers calling for Gheyret Niyaz's release (via Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Boxun, July 30) reported that the charge was "leaking state secrets," a crime under Article 111 of the Criminal Law.
As described in the RFA report, sources close to Gheyret Niyaz connected his case to interviews he gave to overseas media following demonstrations and rioting in Urumqi in July 2009. One source reported that police told Gheyret Niyaz that he gave "too many interviews" to foreign media, according to RFA. In court, prosecutors cited essays that Gheyret Niyaz had written and published on the Internet before the July events that addressed economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs, Ilham Tohti, a friend of Gheyret Niyaz's, said in the AP article. Gheyret Niyaz told authorities in court that he authored the essays and accepted interviews from foreign media but argued that these did not violate Chinese law, according to an account of the trial by Gheyret Niyaz's wife as related in the AP article. Article 35 of China's Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of the press. Article 41 guarantees Chinese citizens the right to criticize their government.
Authorities reportedly prevented Gheyret Niyaz from being represented by the lawyer chosen by his family, according to July 23 reports from Amnesty International and the Uyghur American Association. According to July 20 articles (1, 2) from RFA, Ilham Tohti reported that Gheyret Niyaz's wife was told by authorities she could have Ilham Tohti hire a lawyer for the family. After he found a lawyer in Beijing to take the case, however, Gheyret Niyaz's wife said the family could not use a Beijing lawyer, and that they now had a lawyer from the XUAR, whom she did not know, according to the articles.
As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, Gheyret Niyaz was originally taken away from his house on October 1, 2009, and his family was told on October 4 that he was under suspicion for endangering state security. Gheyret Niyaz had worked as an editor and manager for Uyghur Online, which had been accused of contributing to unrest in July 2009. Gheyret Niyaz also had been a journalist for the Xinjiang Economic Daily and Xinjiang Legal Daily. He was last known to be held at the Tianshan district PSB detention center in Urumqi. Gheyret Niyaz's conviction for endangering state security (ESS) comes as ESS trials in the XUAR have spiked in recent years.
Articles apparently connected to Gheyret Niyaz's case include an interview published in the August 2, 2009, edition of the Hong Kong-based Asia Weekly that criticizes some aspects of government policy in the XUAR but also reiterates some Chinese government positions toward the region. In the interview, Gheyret Niyaz said that he notified contacts in the government in advance of the demonstration planned for July 5, 2009, anticipating that unrest would break out and urging authorities to take precautions. He also discussed in the interview two policies in the XUAR that he said prompted dissatisfaction among Uyghurs. He stressed that Mandarin-focused bilingual education policies resulted in widespread lay-offs of teachers and emphasized that programs to transfer Uyghur women to jobs in the interior of China have fueled discontent among Uyghur communities that feared the programs would result in prostitution and intermarriage.
In the interview, Gheyret Niyaz also said that Uyghurs have no historical basis for seeking independence and argued that then-Party Secretary Wang Lequan had placed too much emphasis on the issue of separatism in the region. He blamed events in July 2009 on the international Islamic political movement Hizb ut-Tahrir. Authorities in China have described Hizb ut-Tahrir as a threat to the region and official media specifically blamed another instance of protest in the region on the organization. Authorities have described the July 5 events as violent criminal activity organized by overseas "forces" and also have cast blame specifically on U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress. (For more articles by Gheyret Niyaz, see, e.g., an essay published July 29 in the Singapore United Morning News and a Web site identified as his blog.)
Urumqi Court Sentences Webmasters Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli
Around the same time as Gheyret Niyaz's trial, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court sentenced three Web site administrators to multi-year prison terms also for endangering state security (ESS), according to July 28 reports from RFA (English, Uyghur) and a July 29 press release from the Uyghur American Association (UAA), based on information from a brother of one of the Web administrators. As in the case of Gheyret Niyaz, the specific ESS charges applied to their cases are not known. According to Dilmurat Perhat, cited in the articles, his brother Dilshat Perhat, Web administrator and owner of the Web site Diyarim, received a 5-year sentence, Shabnam Web administrator Nijat Azat received a 10-year sentence, and Salkin Web administrator Nureli received a 3-year sentence. The trials, which were closed to the public, were thought to take place on July 23 or 24, according to the UAA report. Family members received notice of the trials one day in advance, according to the RFA Uyghur article.
Authorities had blamed some Uyghur Web sites for contributing to unrest in Urumqi on July 5, according to the UAA press release and RFA Uyghur report, and the Web sites affiliated with the cases, now shut down, had contained announcements calling for a peaceful demonstration in Urumqi on July 5, according to the UAA report. In July 2009, XUAR government Chairperson Nur Bekri mentioned Uyghur Online and Diyarim among Web sites he said "stirred up propaganda" and "spread rumors" on July 5. (See, e.g., a July 9 Associated Press article, via the Guardian, and clip of Nur Bekri's speech on YouTube.) A July 30 article from the New York Times reported that relatives and friends close to the cases connected them to the three Web site administrators' "failing to quickly delete content that openly discussed the difficulties of life in Xinjiang and, in one case, for allowing users to post messages announcing the protests last summer that turned violent." Dilmurat Perhat said his brother had erased announcements on his Web site's message board and notified police, according to the UAA press release and NY Times article.
Chinese laws and regulations place a legal burden on Internet companies to monitor content on the Web and censor information deemed unacceptable by the government. The 2000 Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services prohibit providers of Internet information services from disseminating content that falls into any one of a number of vaguely worded categories, including information "harming the honor or the interests of the nation," "spreading rumors," or "disrupting national policies on religion" (Article 15). The Chinese government's regulation of the Internet and other electronic communications violates international standards for free expression. See related CECC analyses (1, 2) for more information.
As reported in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, unidentified men in Urumqi took Dilshat Perhat from his home on August 7, 2009. Authorities had previously interrogated Dilshat Perhat from July 24 until August 2 in connection to the demonstration and violence in Urumqi on July 5. Other people involved with Uyghur Web sites！including Nureli, Selkin administrator Muhemmet, Diyarim worker Obulqasim, and Diyarim contributors Xeyrinisa, Xalnur, and Erkin！also were reportedly detained during the same periods. (Three Diyarim administrators known only by the pen names "Muztagh," "L┨kchek," and "Yanchuqchi" also were taken into detention, according to a December 11, 2009, article from RFA's Uyghur service.)
Other Journalists, Writers, and Online Authors Remain in Detention
Other Uyghur journalists, writers, and online authors from the XUAR remain in detention for exercising their right to freedom of expression, as do fellow journalists and online authors elsewhere in China, including in cases connected to crimes of endangering state security. For information on cases from the XUAR, see, in addition to the cases mentioned above, records on Mehbube Ablesh, Nurmemet Yasin, and Abdulghani Memetemin in the CECC Political Prisoner Database. For cases of journalists and online authors imprisoned elsewhere in China, see, for example, the cases of Liu Xiaobo, Yang Chunlin, Tan Zuoren, and Shi Tao.
The four recent prison sentences come as authorities in the XUAR impose harsh controls over the free flow of information from the region. For more information, see a related CECC analysis and for general information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report. For information on how Chinese officials use endangering state security crimes to punish free expression in violation of international human rights standards, see Subversion and Inciting Subversion in Section II！Freedom of Expression.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-25 / English) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Chinese Government Response to Strikes
August 9, 2010
Since a series of labor strikes in southern Chinese factories in May 2010, recent Chinese media reports have offered clues about the government's reaction. Media coverage of the wage increases that the strikes have spurred has been positive, but the Party appears to remain highly wary of any labor movement not under its direct control. The strikes also have highlighted the shortcomings of "collective consultation" in China, but government leaders remain intent on centralizing power in the state-run All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) rather than devolving autonomy to grassroots labor organizations.
Official Chinese-language media coverage of a series of labor strikes in southern Chinese factories in May has been sparse in part because of tight government restrictions on reporting that authorities imposed on May 28, 2010, according to a June 12 article in the South China Morning Post. The New York Times reported on June 16 that the government is also working to censor Web sites and blog postings about the strikes. A report by the ACFTU on June 21 noted that the new desires of the younger generation of migrant workers had begun to have a "negative influence" on China's political and social stability. An editorial in the June 16 Ming Pao argued that Chinese leaders are worried that the domestic labor movement is vulnerable to manipulation by foreign unions.
Despite the government's uneasiness over the strikes,Xinhua reported on June 8 that "policymakers in Beijing have pinned hope on a steadily increasing pay for tens of thousands of migrant workers to help reorient China's economy from relying on exports towards being propelled by home consumption." Wary of appearing to encourage worker actions as a means to raise wages, the official media have focused on minimum wage increases that boost worker pay, referring to the "wave of rising wages" rather than mentioning any strikes. Examples include: - Xie Zhiqiang, a professor at the Central Party School, wrote in its official Study Times newspaper on June 30 that China's minimum wage system "plays an extremely important role" in ensuring workers earn a liveable wage, and urged governments at all levels to raise and enforce minimum wage standards.
- Xinhua wrote on June 23 that "now in some areas of China a wave of pay raises has appeared. This appeal [for higher wages] is overdue, and it is a reasonable one that should be made in step with economic globalization."
- A spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce said at a press conference on June 12 that recent rises in minimum wages in coastal cities "are in line with the changing trends in the overall national economic and industrial policies," and that more workers should "enjoy the fruits of economic growth."
- Yu Faming, a senior official at the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, said that although pay hikes will bring some challenges in the near term, they will be beneficial for employment in the long term.
Despite workers' success in securing pay raises, the strikes have highlighted problems in China's centralized labor dispute and mediation system. The English-language edition of the Global Times wrote on June 2 that the Honda strikes "[underline] the embarrassing lack of a worker's union that would serve as a collective wage bargaining channel." The Economic Observer reported on June 7 that of the 13 million companies in China, more than 10 million small and medium-sized enterprises have not established a collective wage bargaining system, and that "labor disputes still cannot be resolved smoothly because there is no effective and fair negotiating mechanisms; the ability of labor unions to protect the rights of labor is limited." A June 13 Wall Street Journal article characterized negotiations between workers and management at Honda Lock Manufacturing Co. in Zhongshan as "chaotic," citing interviews with Chinese workers and Japanese managers.
In resolving the strike at a Honda supplier in the city of Foshan, both sides relied on an ad hoc team of outside advisers rather than an established negotiating mechanism. According to a June 17 Asia Weekly report, mediation by a National People's Congress representative, Zeng Qinghong, was needed to break a deadlock in negotiations, while workers were represented by Renmin University Labor Institute Director Chang Kai rather than the official union. The same report also notes that Zeng is vice chairman of the board of the Guangzhou Automobile Industry Group Co., which has joint ventures with Honda that had been affected by the strike. In a later interview with Caijing magazine, Chang said that the turning point in the negotiations was reached "in large part due to Zeng Qinghong exercising his personal prestige, and not because of any systematic method for managing the dispute."
The New York Times reported on June 10 that workers at the Zhongshan plant were demanding a more autonomous union, but recent comments from official media indicate the government intends to maintain its central position in labor relations. While official media have discussed the need for improvement in China's collective negotiation system [see above], political leaders have stressed that improvements will come by strengthening current government-led policies, rather than reforming them. For example: - A top official at the state-run ACFTU, while not referring directly to the strikes, reasserted the Party-led unions' position as the representative and protector of workers' legal rights, and their role in maintaining social stability.
- The ACFTU also put out an emergency notice on June 4 calling for increased efforts to establish Party-led unions in foreign and privately run enterprises, which employ 70-80 percent of Chinese industry workers according to Tang Jun, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
- Ding Gang, a senior editor at the People's Daily, cited an International Labor Organization study in the Global Times to argue that "a highly centralized wage system is equally helpful in enhancing competitiveness" when compared with a loose wage system.
- On June 11, a Worker's Daily editorial stated that pay raises in Zhejiang, Shanghai, Liaoning, and Jiangsu could all be attributed to the government-organized collective consultation system.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-14 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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New Foreign Exchange Rules May Pose Difficulties for Chinese NGOs
August 10, 2010
New rules issued last year by China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange took effect on March 1, tightening previously-issued rules concerning foreign donations to Chinese organizations. The new rules add procedures and increase the paperwork burden imposed upon Chinese organizations！including non-governmental organizations (NGOs)！wishing to receive financial contributions from overseas organizations. Five months after the rules took effect, some researchers and media reports are beginning to note, with specific examples, authorities' selective enforcement of the rules in a manner that may target groups working on issues the government deems to be "sensitive."
China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued the Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issues Concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions on December 25, 2009, which took effect on March 1, 2010. Despite SAFE's assertion that the new rules are aimed at "facilitating the receipt and payment of donations in foreign exchange," some groups, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), say that the new rules instead have made it nearly impossible to access their funds, placing some of them in difficult financial straits.
The SAFE circular requires all Chinese organizations seeking to receive foreign donations to present the following information: an application stating that the "donation is not against national prohibitive regulation"; a copy of the receiving organization's business license; a notarized donation agreement stating the purpose of the donation; and a certificate of registration of the overseas nonprofit organization (with Chinese translation attached).
In a June 14 Asia Catalyst posting, one expert writes that while the regulations are "not a sweeping shutdown of all NGOs," they have the effect of creating "a chill that shuts some NGOs down, allows others [sic] NGOs to survive but limits the overall growth of the sector." A May 27 Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) article cites the head of a Beijing-based financial management company for NGOs, explaining that the financial problems experienced by some organizations were not primarily a matter of how they actually collect their funding, but rather the authorities' selective enforcement of the rules, depending on what individual groups do.
One particularly problematic element of the new SAFE rules is the requirement that the donation agreement be notarized. "Two months since the regulation came into effect, banks, notary service providers and non-profit outfits are in the dark about how to get a donation agreement 'notarized,'" a May 19 Global Times article reported. Moreover, a May 17 RFA article stated that some notaries reportedly will also require some donors to be present in China for the notarization. In the Asia Catalyst posting, one expert describes the confusion this way: "How many international donors have representatives in China, ready and able to show up at a notarization office at any time? Let alone staff poised to visit multiple notarization offices around the country, in every town where the donor funds local NGOs? Very few." An April 17 report in Deutsche Well (Chinese version) also detailed the difficulties that NGOs are facing as a result of the notarization requirement.
Recent Chinese and international media reports suggest that the Chinese government's selective enforcement of the new SAFE rules has impacted different civil society groups in different ways, and that authorities may be using the rules specifically to target groups handling work and projects that the government deems "sensitive."
- In a May 17 interview with Radio Free Asia, the founder of the Beijing-based public health advocacy group Aizhixing said that his group is on the brink of closure because of the SAFE regulations. Aizhixing was forced to terminate its services in Kunming and to reduce financial support to other groups, but the most difficult challenge remains paying rent and salaries, he said. He also stated in the April 11 issue of Asia Week (Yazhou Zhoukan) that even if all goes smoothly, getting the grant agreement notarized alone can cost several thousand U.S. dollars, and take at least three months.
- The Beijing Yirenping Center, a Beijing-based NGO dedicated to fighting discrimination against people infected with communicable diseases, has also been facing difficulties since the SAFE rules became effective. According to a May 27 Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) article, the group relies on foreign donations for 80 percent of its funding. The center's managing partner said that his organization is on the verge of being "starved" of funds, and that this year it has had to cut back its three planned training sessions to one, and reduce its legal aid work to just providing legal consulting. On May 20, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Center has been unable to get funding from the National Endowment for Democracy between November and May, and has been forced to stay open "by borrowing money from friends on a personal basis." The same article also mentioned that about a dozen NGOs also reported that they were unable to comply with the new requirements set forth in the SAFE rules. The Global Times quoted on May 19 the center's managing partner as saying that "more than 100,000 yuan is locked up in our foreign exchange account, and some cases have been postponed for lack of funds."
For more information on the development of civil society in China, please see Section II！Civil Society in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-19 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Bishop Jia Zhiguo Refuses To Join State-Controlled Church After 15 Months of Detention
August 6, 2010
Authorities in Hebei province recently released unregistered Catholic bishop Jia Zhiguo after detaining him in an unknown location for 15 months. Prior to Jia's latest detention, the Chinese government had harassed and detained him repeatedly since the early 1960s. Chinese policy requires Catholic communities in China to affiliate with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), a state-controlled entity that monitors and controls Catholic doctrine, practices, property, and personnel. The Chinese government continues to deny Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to appoint bishops in China, and the government continues to harass or detain some bishops and priests who defy this policy.
Bishop Jia Released After 15 Months in Detention in Unknown Location
Authorities released 75-year-old unregistered (or "underground") bishop Jia Zhiguo of Zhengding diocese, Hebei province on July 7, 2010, after detaining him in an unknown location for 15 months (Union of Catholic Asian News, 7/08; AsiaNews, 7/08; Radio Free Asia, 7/10). Jia has refused to affiliate with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)！a state-controlled entity that monitors and controls Catholic doctrine, practices, property, and personnel！and the government has harassed and detained him repeatedly over the past five decades for practicing his faith outside the supervision of the state-controlled church. Authorities have imprisoned Jia for at least 15 years and have detained him 13 times since January 2004 (Radio Free Asia, 7/10). For example, authorities detained Jia in August 2007 as he prepared to disseminate and discuss with Chinese Catholics a May 2007 letter (via the Holy See Web site) from Pope Benedict XVI that called for religious freedom for Catholics in China. The AsiaNews article reported that, during his periods of detention, authorities subjected Jia to political indoctrination sessions in order to pressure him to join the state-controlled church, but he announced to members of his congregation after his most recent release that he had not joined (AsiaNews, 7/08). Authorities have also kept Jia under surveillance when not in detention. Public security officers built a small house in front of Jia's cathedral from which to monitor him, according to an August 21, 2008, AsiaNews report.
Relations With the Holy See
The Chinese government insists on the independence of the state-controlled church, and it denies Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of overseas organizations, such as the Holy See; recent statements and reports from government and Party sources indicate that authorities continue to order monitoring of contact between Catholics in China and overseas organizations. For instance,various documents from local governments throughout China since late 2009 instruct local officials to monitor contact between unregistered Catholics and foreign organizations. Examples include a September 15, 2009, circular from the Communist Party Committee of Zetan township, Ruijin city, Jiangxi province (posted on the official Web site of the Ruijin city People's Government); and a January 8, 2010, circular from the Qujiang town People's Government, Fengcheng city, Jiangsu province (posted on the official Web site of the Fengcheng city People's Government.) These documents mirror recent statements from high-level officials, as well. For example, in an article from the Study Times (reprinted on January 15, 2010, on China Religion), Wang Zuo'an, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), said that "by launching the anti-imperialist, patriotic movement, Catholics ... have gone down the path of independence, autonomy, and self-management, casting off control and utilization by imperialist and foreign forces."
As part of its policy of maintaining an independent Catholic church, the government does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to select bishops in China, as noted in the CECC's 2009 Annual Report (p. 116, 119-120). In some cases, however, the CPA has appointed bishops who also have approval from the Holy See. Since April 2010, the CPA has appointed seven bishops who have also received approval from the Holy See, according to a July 22, 2010, Asia News report:
- Bishop Du Jiang of Bameng diocese, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) (AsiaNews, 4/08). Despite appointing Du, authorities placed him under home surveillance soon thereafter. See below for details.
- Bishop Meng Qinglu of Hohhot diocese, IMAR (Union of Catholic Asian News, 4/19)
- Bishop Shen Bin of Haimen diocese, Jiangsu province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 4/21)
- Bishop Cai Bingrui of Xiamen diocese, Fujian province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 5/10)
- Bishop Han Yingjin of Sanyuan diocese, Shaanxi province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 6/24)
- Bishop Xu Jiwei of Taizhou diocese, Zhejiang province (Washington Post, 7/14)
- Bishop Yang Xiaoting of Yan'an diocese, Shaanxi province (Union of Catholic Asian News, 7/15)
For two years prior to this series of appointments, the CPA had not ordained any bishops in China, leaving approximately 40 dioceses of the state-controlled church with octogenarian pastors or vacant seats (AsiaNews, 7/22).
Harassment and Detention of Bishops and Priests in China
While the government has tolerated the involvement of the Holy See in such cases, however, authorities continue to arbitrarily harass, detain, or otherwise interfere in the religious practices of bishops who have challenged the full authority of the state-controlled church. For example, Jia Zhiguo's most recent detention was linked to the involvement of the Holy See, according to a March 31, 2009, AsiaNews report. At the request of the Holy See, officially recognized bishop Jiang Taoran agreed to become Jia's auxiliary bishop, while Jia would become the ordinary bishop of the diocese without affiliating with the CPA. According to AsiaNews, local authorities told Jia that the "unity" between Jia and Jiang "is bad because it is desired by a foreign power like the Vatican. If there must be unity, it must come through the government and the [CPA]." Other recent examples of the government's continued interference include the following:
- Public security officials are believed to continue holding unregistered bishops Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang in custody in unknown locations. The two bishops have been missing since 1996 and 2001, respectively.
- Authorities have kept Bishop An Shuxin of Baoding diocese, Hebei province under surveillance even after he agreed to join the CPA, according to an October 29, 2009, AsiaNews report. Authorities detained An in an unknown location from 1996 to 2006 and have kept him under surveillance since his release in 2006.
- At the October 10, 2009, funeral of Bishop Lin Xili, unregistered bishop of Wenzhou diocese, Zhejiang province, authorities forbid displays that would portray Lin as a recognized bishop. According to an October 15, 2009, AsiaNews report, authorities prohibited those in attendance from displaying a picture of Lin with a mitre and pectoral cross, clothing his body in bishop's robes, and referring to Lin as a "bishop."
- According to a January 4, 2010, AsiaNews report, authorities prevented displays of official bishop's insignia during the January 2010 funeral of unregistered bishop Yao Liang, prohibited the publication of obituaries, and only allowed three priests to attend. Yao was an octogenarian released from detention less than a year before his death, according to a January 5, 2010, New York Times report.
- In March 2010, authorities in the Mindong diocese of Fujian province detained unregistered priests Luo Wen and Liu Maochun for organizing religious camps for Catholic university students, according to reports from the Union of Catholic Asian News (3/11, 3/23). Authorities released Luo on March 18, 2010; the Commission has observed no reports that Liu has been released.
- According to an April 8, 2010, AsiaNews report, authorities placed Bishop Du Jiang of Bameng diocese in the IMAR under home confinement on the same day that the state-controlled church installed him in his office. The CPA insisted that he attend his official installation ceremony together with Ma Yinglin, an officially recognized bishop whom the government installed in 2006 without approval from the Holy See. Du stated publicly that he was forced to attend the ceremony with Ma, and authorities subsequently placed Du under home confinement.
- Public security officers in Tangshan city, Hebei province detained unregistered priest Wang Zhong on July 24, 2010, as Wang was leaving Jidong Prison after completing a three-year sentence, according to a July 28, 2010, CathNews China report. Members of Wang's family and congregation who were awaiting his release witnessed the officers put Wang into a police car as he attempted to walk out of the prison gates. In July 2007, Wang had organized a ceremony to consecrate a new church registered with the government in Hebei, according to a November 22, 2007, AsiaNews report. In November 2007, a court in Hebei sentenced him to three years in prison for organizing an illegal meeting and using an official parish seal without permission from the authorities. According to Wang's defense attorney, cited in the AsiaNews report, authorities had approved the consecration ceremony. The attorney described the seal as internal church property.
For more information on Jia Zhiguo and conditions for Catholics in China, see the CECC's Political Prisoner Database and Section II！Freedom of Religion in the CECC's 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-19 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Ministry of Public Security Launches Seven-Month Nationwide "Strike Hard" Campaign
August 11, 2010
In June 2010, the Ministry of Public Affairs launched a seven-month "strike hard" campaign aimed at quelling "crimes of extreme violence." The official campaign report specifically calls on public security officers to "strengthen strike hard measures" and to "increase efforts to resolve social conflicts." Chinese and international media outlets have noted that the campaign announcement follows highly publicized incidents, including a series of school attacks. Critics of the "strike hard" campaigns claim that the nationwide campaigns signal a step back for human rights protections in China. Some Chinese scholars and lawyers have expressed concerns that efforts to meet law enforcement targets under "strike hard" campaigns lead to wrongful convictions and abuses of criminal procedure.
MPS Launches "2010 Strike Hard" Anticrime Campaign
On June 13, 2010, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) announced that public security agencies across the country have launched a seven-month "strike hard" campaign (known in Chinese as yanda) to "severely crack down on every type of serious violent crime." According to a June 15, 2010, China Daily article, the campaign focuses on "extreme violent crime, gun and gang crime, telecom fraud, human trafficking, robbery, prostitution, gambling and drugs." Amidst reports of rising crime and high-profile cases of public violence, the MPS announcement states that public security officers must "pinpoint the source, underlying and basic problems that influence local public security." According to the China Daily article, Vice Minister of Public Security Zhang Xinfeng told a national meeting that the campaign aims to target destabilizing developments within China: "China, during a process of social and economic transformation, is facing emerging social conflicts and new problems in social security." The MPS announcement also calls on public security officers to "strive to bring about a favorable public order environment for the successful hosting of the Shanghai World Expo and the Guangzhou Asian Games."
Striking Hard Against Rising Crime and Emerging Social Conflicts
The 2010 "strike hard" campaign comes as China's violent crime reportedly rose in 2009, according to statistics from the 2010 Rule of Law Blue Book (published by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)), which were reprinted in a March 1 People's Daily article. The article reported that "violent crimes such as homicide, rape, and robbery saw sizable growth in 2009, the first increase of such cases since 2001." According to a July 1 Oriental Outlook article, the CASS 2010 Rule of Law Blue Book showed that "criminal cases" [xingshi anjian] increased by more than 10 percent between January and October 2009, while "public security cases" [zhi'an anjian] increased by about 20 percent in the same period. Chinese and international media outlets have also connected the "strike hard" campaign announcement to publicity surrounding other social tensions and conflicts in China. A June 14 Radio Free Asia article, for instance, reported that unspecified "media" outlets have noted that the strike hard campaign！the "longest in China in recent years"！follows recent high-profile school attacks and a series of violent incidents involving law enforcement officials. According to a June 15 Associated Press article (via the Boston Globe), the crackdown appears to be a response to unspecified "experts" who say the crimes appear to be more the result of "simmering and widespread frustration over the growing wealth gap, corruption and too few legal channels for people who have grievances.￣
Background: China's "Strike Hard" Campaigns
In response to an increase in crime and corruption over the past 30 years, the Chinese government has periodically instituted national crackdowns against crime！referred to as "strike hard" anticrime campaigns. (Chinese governments at the provincial-level and below often hold similar "strike hard" campaigns.) The "2010 strike hard campaign" is the fourth round of nationwide "strike hard" campaigns since 1983, according to the June 15 China Daily article. China previously conducted similar national anticrime campaigns in 1983, 1996, and 2001. The China Daily article notes that "[d]uring the campaign, police usually take tough measures against crimes and judicial authorities hand down swifter and harsher penalties." As a result, some Chinese scholars and lawyers have expressed concerns that efforts to meet law enforcement targets under the campaigns have led to wrongful convictions and abuses of criminal procedure. In a July 3 Radio Free Asia interview, Heilongjiang-based lawyer Wei Liangyue described the shortcomings of the "strike hard" policies:
[It] should be said that the most fundamental law of our country is the Constitution; the Constitution also clearly stipulates that the People's Republic of China implements the rule of law and establishes a socialist country ruled by law. However, this type of "strike hard" [campaign] often occurs outside of rule of law and legal provisions！and may even breach the boundaries of the law to carry out a crackdown on crime.
According to the July 1 Oriental Outlook article, some Chinese legal scholars have criticized previous "strike hard" campaigns, whose "severity and speed" have led to criminal procedure violations. The Oriental Outlook article states "the procedural rights of criminal suspects and defendants to a certain extent are deprived！which is not consistent with the spirit of the rule of law."
The "2010 strike hard campaign" signals that the leadership may be backtracking on recent policy changes affecting criminal justice policy and human rights protections. On March 13, 2007, a People's Daily article reported that China's leadership had adopted the criminal justice policy of "balancing severe punishment with leniency" (known in Chinese as kuanyan xiangji) in what appeared to be "a deliberate move away from the 'strike hard' anti-crime policy that has been in place in China for more than two decades." In the 2007 article, Professor Liu Hainian of CASS stated, "Handling all criminal offenses under the sole approach of 'strike hard' is not in the spirit of building a harmonious society, which is based on equity and justice." According to the July 1, 2010, Oriental Outlook article, a number of legal scholars interviewed expressed "great surprise" to see "strike hard" in the news again, since they believed "the term "strike hard" had already faded out of Chinese criminal justice history."
For general information on the national "strike hard" campaign in 2001, see p. 30 of the CECC 2002 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-08 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Government Appears To Crack Down on Microblogs and Blogs
August 6, 2010
An apparent government crackdown on microblogs and blogs in China reportedly began in mid-July 2010, involving service disruptions at major microblogging sites, removal of the blogs of well-known activists and lawyers, and increased monitoring of journalists' blogs. Blogs and microblogs have become increasingly popular in China, with hundreds of millions of users.
In mid-July 2010, a government-linked crackdown on the use of microblogs and blogs on the Internet in China reportedly began. Blogs are personalized Web pages on which users provide running commentary on all kinds of topics. Microblogs (weibo) allow users to post messages containing up to about 140 characters at a time and to follow the postings of other users (see the Chinese search engine Baidu's definition here), much like Twitter elsewhere. (Twitter is blocked in China, although some citizens obtain access through circumvention tools.) According to mainland Chinese, Hong Kong, and foreign media, recent actions taken against microblogs and blogs in China include: - Disruptions in the microblogging services of at least four major Chinese Web portals - Sina, Sohu, NetEase, and Tencent. Microblogging services at these sites were reportedly suspended for maintenance, or switched to testing (or beta) mode, according to a July 16 New York Times (NYT)article. A July 15 South China Morning Post article (subscription required) said that "beta version generally means that the system is still unstable and might need maintenance for some time." Microbloggers at Sina, which reportedly has 20 million users, discovered that links to foreign-based Web sites would not work, the NYT article said. Sohu's microblogging site went offline for maintenance from July 9-12, and users were unable to conduct searches or link to sites other than Sohu, NYT reported.
According to the NYT article, employees at two of the Web portals said "the latest tweaking was in response to direct pressure from Chinese Internet authorities to bolster their systems for monitoring content." A July 15 report in Shanghai's Oriental Morning Post cited unnamed industry insiders as saying the latest measures were the result of pressure from regulators. According to a July 14 Reuters article, company sources told the news agency that tightening government restrictions were the cause.
NYT reported that other employees at the companies denied any tightening of control by saying that the services had continuously undergone testing from their inception, although the NYT article said "they had no clear explanation for why they had not noted so previously." A source at Sina who refused to be named told Global Times that the reversion to testing mode had nothing to do with government pressure, according to a July 15 article.
A survey of reports on the issue found that virtually all sources refused to be named (or were not named) and that government officials could not be reached for comment, reflecting the opaque environment in which Chinese officials regulate and censor the Internet. (See also July 15 articles in Associated Press (via Washington Post) and South China Morning Post (SCMP, subscription required).)
- Requirement that the microblogging services delete posts and user accounts that touch upon sensitive political issues or pornography. The July 15 SCMP article reported on the deletion demands, quoting one insider as saying, "We believe this round of control is just a warning [to all portals]." Another SCMP article on July 17 reported that mainland microblogging sites also were asked recently to impose greater self-discipline, and that microblog searches now displayed fewer results and, in the case of sensitive topics, sometimes no results. The July 15 Associated Press article reported that dozens of blogs for prominent rights advocates and bloggers were suddenly shut down, including those of rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and legal expert Xu Zhiyong. The July 16 NYT article said that the rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan had one of his blog posts removed within five minutes.
- Targeting of journalists' microblogs. The July 17 SCMP article reported that Sina's microblog service had been ordered to verify the accounts of journalists at traditional media outlets. Verifying which accounts belong to journalists will make such microblogs easier to monitor, according to a media analyst cited in the article.
The media reports offered possible reasons for the crackdown, including increased concern over loss of control over these types of online social networking tools, possible plans by officials to subject these sites to greater regulation, and journalists' use of these tools to post information not allowed to be published in their newspapers. The reported crackdown also came shortly after the July 7 release of a report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on new media that alleges that social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook may be used for subversive purposes and exploited by Western intelligence services, according to a July 9 Global Times article and the July 17 SCMP article.
Social networking media such as blogs and microblogs have become popular in China in recent years. According to the official China Internet Network Information Center's latest report on Internet use in China, there were 231 million bloggers in China as of June 2010. According to iResearch statistics cited in the July 17 SCMP article, almost 81 million Internet users in China used microblogging services in May, an increase of almost 50 percent over March. According to the July 15 Global Times article, major domestic portals such as Sina recently launched microblogging services to fill the void left after Chinese officials blocked Twitter and Fanfou following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Fanfou was a Chinese service similar to Twitter. While Chinese officials tout the prevalence of blogs as evidence that Chinese enjoy freedom of expression (see the Chinese government's June 2010 Internet white paper (Chinese, English) and accompanying CECC analysis), the extent to which the Chinese government censors online content continues to violate international human rights standards. In China, censorship of the Internet and cell phones is not limited to the removal of content such as pornography, spam, or content deemed to violate intellectual property rights, but also political and religious content the government and Communist Party deem to be politically sensitive.
For more information on Chinese government regulation of the Internet, see pp. 58-64 of the Commission's 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-20 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Authorities Bolster Ethnic Unity Campaigns, Promote Spreading Party Policy During Ethnic Minority Holidays
August 9, 2010
In recent years, the Chinese government and Communist Party have strengthened "ethnic unity" campaigns as a vehicle for promulgating Party policy on ethnic issues and for imposing state-defined interpretations of the history, relations, and current conditions of ethnic groups in China. Campaigns and official documents promoting "ethnic unity" have imposed far-reaching controls on freedom of expression in China. After central government and Party authorities issued guidance on ethnic unity in 2008 and 2009, authorities publicized a new document this July to further strengthen ethnic unity. The new document appears to intensify past measures by calling on authorities to use the "traditional holidays" of ethnic minorities to promote state ethnic unity campaigns. The recent guidance follows a major speech by President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao in September 2009 on "promoting ethnic unity" and "realizing common progress," which he delivered in the wake of protests and riots in Tibetan areas in March 2008 and in the far western region of Xinjiang in July 2009.
One government commission and two Party offices jointly have issued a new document to further strengthen "ethnic unity" in China. The Central Propaganda Bureau, United Front Work Department, and State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) adopted the Opinion on Further Launching Activities To Establish Ethnic Unity and Progress (Opinion) on February 1, 2010, but did not appear to release the full text of the document until July 2010. (For an earlier news report about the document, without the full text, see a March 4 article on the SEAC Web site.) The document follows the release of national guidance in late 2008 and 2009 on promoting propaganda and education on ethnic policies and on ethnic unity education in schools. The Opinion also comes after a September 29, 2009, speech by President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao that stresses "promoting ethnic unity" and "realizing common progress" among ethnic groups in China by accelerating development among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas. (Xinhua, via PRC Government Web site and translation via Open Source Center, subscription only, CPP20090929119001.) The new Opinion cites the importance of implementing the spirit of Hu's speech in its preface.
The Opinion continues in the tradition of other recent guidance by connecting ethnic unity to other state aims of "upholding stability" and the "unification of the country." Following the 2008 opinion on promoting propaganda and education on ethnic policies and 2009 trial program on ethnic unity education in schools, the new Opinion also calls for strengthening "propaganda and education" on ethnic unity and integrating unity education into school curricula (Point 3(3) of the Opinion). In addition, the Opinion calls for using ethnic minorities' "traditional holidays" to promote activities to promote ethnic unity, a focus not seen in the two other recent documents and in Hu Jintao's September speech. Point 3(5) of the Opinion calls for "fully using ethnic minorities' traditional holidays and adopting many types of effective forms to launch activities on the establishment of ethnic unity and progress and to promote exchange, understanding, and unity among all ethnicities." It also calls for "enhancing the excellent traditional cultures of each ethnic group" while "strengthening the vitality and creative power of Chinese culture" [zhonghua wenhua]. Echoing a similar sentiment in Hu Jintao's September speech, Point 3(5) concludes with a call to raise a sense of cultural identification with the Chinese nation [zhonghua minzu]. In another difference from the earlier documents, the new Opinion also calls for including the establishment of activities promoting ethnic unity and progress as a major part of assessments of leading cadres' work (Point 4.1).
The Opinion also calls for "firmly handling in accordance with law" all criminal cases, regardless of the ethnic groups involved (Point 1(2)), a provision consistent with provisions in China's Constitution (Articles 4, 33) and Criminal Law (Article 4) establishing equality before the law. A July 11 article in the Hong Kong-based, PRC-owned newspaper Ta Kung Pao reports, however, that the Opinion establishes a shift from Communist Party Central Committee document Number 5, issued in 1984, that promotes "fewer arrests and death sentences" and "more leniency" in cases involving ethnic minorities. It is unclear, however, to what extent authorities have followed the document (which does not appear to be publicly available) since its reported issue in 1984. Trends in anti-crime campaigns and detentions among Uyghurs and Tibetans suggest that the document's call for "fewer arrests and death sentences" and "more leniency" in cases involving ethnic minorities has not been followed as guiding policy as applied to these groups in recent decades. (See the sections on Xinjiang and Tibet in past CECC Annual Reports for more information, as well as an analysis on endangering state security cases in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.)
Other goals of the Opinion include promoting economic and social development among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas (Point 1(2)). The stated focus comes during the 10th anniversary year of the Great Western Development project, a development initiative directed at a number of areas in China that include large non-Han populations. Authorities have announced new plans for continuing the program in the coming decade. (See, e.g., a July 7 China Daily report.) Central government and Party authorities also convened major meetings on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas of China to discuss initiatives there to promote development and "stability." The new Opinion also calls for establishing and commending "model" localities, organizations, and people who contribute to "undertakings on ethnic unity and progress" (Points 3(1), 3(2)). Hu Jintao gave his September speech at a meeting to commend "model" collectives and individuals for their contributions to undertakings to promote ethnic unity and progress, and localities and offices throughout China have reported on similar ceremonies during the year. (See, e.g., a November 18 article from the Henan News, via the Henan government Web site, a November 19, 2009, article from the Dalian News, and June 11, 2010, article from China Police Net.)
For more information on conditions for the 55 groups the Chinese government designates as "ethnic minorities" or "minority nationalities" [shaoshu minzu] and for more information on ethnic unity campaigns, see Section II-Ethnic Minorities in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-14 / English) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Internet Available in Xinjiang, But Controls Over Information Remain
August 7, 2010
Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang continue to exert tight control over freedom of expression, imposing limits on expression in a number of cases that are harsher than restrictions imposed elsewhere in China. Following demonstrations and rioting in Xinjiang in July 2009, authorities restricted access to the Internet, text messaging, and international telephone calls, claiming that they played a key role in inciting unrest. While authorities largely restored access to the technologies by May 2010, harsh restrictions on expression remain in place: popular Uyghur Web sites remain inaccessible and staff of some Uyghur Web sites remain in detention or in prison, Xinjiang residents report prohibitions against discussing the July 2009 events online, legal regulations imposing tight controls over free expression remain in force, and the Xinjiang government continues to carry out wide-scale censorship campaigns.
Following 10 months of restricted Internet access in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) after demonstrations and rioting in the region in July 2009, authorities announced in May that they had fully restored Internet access in the region. (See a May 14 announcement on the restoration of Internet service via Tianshan Net.) As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report, the Communist Party Secretary of Urumqi, where the demonstrations and rioting occurred, had announced on July 7, 2009, that authorities cut Internet access in the city to "quench the riot quickly and prevent violence from spreading to other places." Authorities also instituted Internet restrictions across the region and imposed curbs on text messaging and international phone calls. The actual role the communication devices played in violent rioting (as opposed to demonstrations) was unclear, however, and the wide-reaching restrictions！affecting all Internet, SMS, and international phone content and lasting for months after the July 2009 events！exceeded permissible boundaries for limiting the right to free expression as defined in international human rights standards.
Authorities announced the incremental reopening of communications services starting in December and provided more access to text messaging and international phone calls starting in January. (See, e.g., a December 29 Xinhua article, January 18, 2010, China Daily article, and January 20 Agence France-Presse article via Channel News Asia.) Despite what authorities termed the "full restoration" of Internet access in May, a year after the July 2009 events authorities continue to impose curbs over Internet access along with broader controls over the free flow of information.
Uyghur Websites Still Closed Down, Uyghur Webmasters Detained. After initial reports that the Internet had been fully restored in the XUAR, Urumqi residents reported in a May 19 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article that Uyghur Web sites such as Diyarim, Shabnam, Salkin, and Orkhun were still shut down. CECC monitoring of the Web sites in July from Washington, DC, found the Web sites inaccessible. (Orkhun's home page is available, but the site's content is restricted.) In addition to the curbs over Uyghur Web sites, China's broader system of blocking online content deemed to be sensitive ("China's Great Firewall" or the "Great Electronic Wall of China") remains in place, as noted in a May 19, 2010, open letter to XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian from Reporters without Borders.
Authorities have detained Webmasters and staff involved in some of the shuttered Uyghur Web sites and have since sentenced some to prison terms. Authorities detained Diyarim editor Dilshat Perhat from July 24 to August 2, 2009, and unidentified men took him from his home on August 7. Other people involved with Uyghur Web sites！Selkin Web site administrator Nureli, Selkin administrator Muhemmet, Diyarim worker Obulqasim, and Diyarim contributors Xeyrinisa, Xalnur, and Erkin！also were reportedly detained during the same periods. (Three Diyarim administrators known only by the pen names "Muztagh," "L┨kchek," and "Yanchuqchi" also were taken into detention, according to a December 11, 2009, article from RFA's Uyghur service.)
In July 2010, a court in the XUAR sentenced Dilshat Perhat, Nureli, and Shabnam administrator Nijat Azat to prison terms of 5, 3, and 10 years, respectively. Some Uyghur Web sites contained postings calling people to demonstrate in Urumqi on July 5, and authorities had blamed the Web sites for contributing to unrest. The cases of the three Web administrators also are reportedly connected to other content posted on their Web sites that described hardships in the XUAR. See a related CECC analysis for more information on these cases, as well as the case of Uyghur journalist and Web editor Gheyret Niyaz, sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on July 23, 2010, in connection to essays and interviews he gave to foreign media.
Online Discussion of July 2009 Events Reportedly Prohibited, Media Reporting Curbed. Authorities have blocked online discussion of events in July 2009, according to a June 22 RFA report. An employee from the public information and Internet supervision office of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau told RFA in an interview that online discussions of the "July 5 incident," including discussion of articles about the event published in the news, are not allowed. Another government employee cited in the article also described keyword filtering of content related to events in July 2009. In addition, the Hong Kong-based Mingpao newspaper reported on June 19 (via Yahoo) that XUAR media received a directive that month prohibiting reports connected to the July 2009 anniversary or other sensitive events such as protests in Kyrgyzstan, other than those prepared by the central government's news agency Xinhua. During the one-year anniversary, national media with government or Party affiliation, particularly those directed toward international audiences, issued reports on events in July 2009. (See, e.g., a July 4 Xinhua article in Chinese and July 5 articles from China News Service (in Chinese), Global Times, and China Daily.)
Restrictions on local media have been accompanied by reported curbs on XUAR residents' freedom to interact with foreign journalists. Authorities issued an internal circular prohibiting unauthorized interviews with foreign media during "sensitive days," according to a World Uyghur Congress spokesperson cited in a June 15 RFA article. In her written testimony for the July 19, 2010, CECC roundtable "China's Far West: Conditions in Xinjiang One Year After Demonstrations and Riots," journalist Kathleen E. McLaughlin reported being told of similar restrictions in Kashgar during the past year, where
reporting was extremely difficult because locals did not want to be interviewed. I was told there were clear directives that residents should not be speaking with foreign journalists and that all local tour guides had been issued guidelines to report journalists to the local police. This has been borne out by the experience of other journalists who have tried to work in Kashgar over the past year. It's a marked turnabout from conditions before the riots, when Kashgar was relatively open to reporters and locals [talked] with journalists without extreme fear of reprisals. That's no longer the case.
Regulations, Directive Penalize Free Speech. Regulations issued in the past year and currently in force maintain tight curbs over freedom of expression. Legislation in force throughout the XUAR and examined by the CECC in past analyses include regulations on informatization promotion, social order, and ethnic unity. In addition, the Kashgar District Public Security Bureau, Kashgar District Procuratorate, and Kashgar District Intermediate Court issued an announcement (via Kashgar district government Web site) in March for that locality that specifies penalties under China's Criminal Law for using technology such as Internet and cell phones to "incite splittism" (separatism), a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal Law. The directive defines the crime to include using technology to carry out, with the aim of splitting the country, acts including: spreading "materials, open discussion, content, and advocacy on separatism"; "inciting participation in rallies, marches, demonstrations, or the criminal activity of beating, smashing, looting, and burning'; disseminating literary works with separatist content; and "slandering and assaulting the Party and government." The announcement also describes penalties under the Criminal Law for "illegal sermonizing" and "tabligh activities" deemed to incite "ethnic hatred and bias" and for "cult"-related activities, along with using information technology to propagate terrorism.
Censorship Campaigns Continue. The XUAR government and Party also continue to enforce wide-scale censorship campaigns. Zhou Huilin, an official involved with the nationwide campaign to "sweep away pornography and strike down illegal publications" explained in December 2009 that within the XUAR, the censorship campaign's focus on "illegal publications" includes an additional component targeting materials from the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, according to a December 16 Tianshan Net report. The XUAR government and Party have made "striking hard" against "reactionary" materials and other "illegal" political and religious publications from the "three forces" as the focus of the region's censorship campaign since 2009, according to a January 19, 2010, Tianshan Net report. The article also described strengthening controls over "illegal" materials especially after events in July 2009. A work summary published on July 5, 2010, on the Web site of the XUAR Press and Publications Bureau said that the bureau would deepen its implementation of the censorship work during the last half of the year and would focus on "striking hard" against "reactionary propaganda materials" and "illegal" political and religious publications publicized and disseminated by the "three forces."
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-09 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=143705 |
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