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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Beijing Court Sentences American Geologist to Eight Years for State Secrets
July 30, 2010
On July 5, 2010, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Dr. Xue Feng, a naturalized American citizen, to eight years in prison for allegedly helping the American company he worked for purchase commercial information on oil wells in China. The court said the information was a state secret and the purchase had endangered China's national security. Officials reportedly did not declare the information a state secret until after the transaction occurred; attempted to coerce Dr. Xue into confessing to the crime by allegedly torturing him; violated China's consular agreement with the United States by delaying notification of Dr. Xue's detention and limiting access by American officials; and violated China's Criminal Procedure Law with respect to the handling of Dr. Xue's case. The case also highlights the risk for foreign companies and their employees competing or doing business with China's state-owned enterprises, which can leverage state secrets laws to protect their commercial interests.
Background
Dr. Xue is a geologist who was born in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, according to a November 19, 2009, Associated Press (AP) article (via Huffington Post). He studied northern China rock formations at the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D., the article said. In 2001, a Colorado-based energy consulting firm, IHS Energy (now IHS Inc.), hired Dr. Xue to be the company's Northeast Asia manager, AP reported. In 2005, Dr. Xue allegedly helped IHS purchase from a third party a commercial database containing information on the locations and reserves of 32,115 oil wells and prospecting sites that were mostly owned by PetroChina Co., according to a July 6, 2010, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article's (registration required) recounting of the court's findings. PetroChina's controlling shareholder is China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the jurisdiction of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), according to PetroChina's Web site. Dr. Xue, a naturalized American citizen, reportedly "disappeared" into official custody in Beijing on November 20, 2007, according to a July 21, 2010, op-ed in the South China Morning Post (via U.S.-Asia Law Institute) by Jerome Cohen, co-director of NYU Law School's U.S.-Asia Law Institute. On July 5, 2010, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Dr. Xue to eight years in prison plus a fine of 200,000 yuan (US$29,850) for purportedly trafficking state secrets, WSJ reported. (See Article 111 of China's Criminal Law.) Dr. Xue has appealed the verdict, a July 16 WSJ article reported.
Procedural Abuses
During the two-and-a-half year period that Dr. Xue was in custody before his sentencing, Chinese officials reportedly committed numerous procedural abuses. - Consular Notification and Access Violations. Under Article 35(2) of the U.S.-PRC Consular Convention of 1980 Chinese officials were supposed to notify U.S. officials "no later than" four days after "any form of detention" of a U.S. national. In Dr. Xue's case, however, Chinese officials waited three weeks before acknowledging to U.S. officials that Dr. Xue was being held by the Ministry of State Security, according to the Cohen op-ed. Furthermore, the op-ed noted that Chinese officials did not allow American officials to visit with Dr. Xue until the 32nd day of his detention. Article 35(4) of the convention states that officials shall be able to meet with their national "at the latest" two days after notification of the detention.
- Torture Allegations. Dr. Xue reportedly showed American consular officials burn marks on his arms made by investigators, according to the AP article. The op-ed said that police coerced Dr. Xue into "signing false documents," and that in May 2008 an officer injured Dr. Xue by throwing a glass ashtray at his head.
- Criminal Procedure Law Violations. The Ministry of State Security transferred Dr. Xue to the Beijing State Security Bureau detention house on February 4, 2008, and he was formally arrested on April 11, according to the op-ed. Assuming February 4 is the date Dr. Xue was formally detained, officials violated Article 69 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) by not formally arresting him within the 37-day limit. Based on the op-ed, another period of more than seven months passed before state security officials forwarded the case to prosecutors sometime around December 2008. Articles 124, 126, and 127 of the CPL appear to place a seven-month limit on this period. Six months passed between December 2008 and Dr. Xue's indictment in May 2009, according to the op-ed. Articles 138 and 140 of the CPL would appear to limit this period to three-and-a-half months.
The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court held the first hearings in Dr. Xue's trial in July 2009, according to AP, meaning the court had agreed to accept the case before this date. Article 168 of the CPL says a court has up to two-and-a-half months after accepting a case to pronounce a judgment, and Article 166 allows for one-month postponements if prosecutors request supplementary investigations. Cohen said prosecutors had requested two postponements, which would have placed the outer limit between the court's accepting the case and pronouncing the judgment at four-and-a-half months. The judgment was not pronounced until July 2010. As the op-ed noted: "As winter turned to spring, [the court] ran out of legal grounds for further delays and no longer attempted explanation."
- Access to Counsel Violations. According to the op-ed, authorities denied Dr. Xue access to counsel for more than a year.
State Secrets！Impact on Rule of Law and Foreign Companies Doing Business in China
Dr. Xue's case highlights several problems with China's state secrets regime！problems that make it susceptible to abuse if Chinese officials wish to use it to protect commercial interests. - Retroactive Classification. It was only after the transaction took place that officials classified the information as a state secret, according to a July 4 Dui Hua article.
- Commercial Information as State Secret. The line between commercial information and state secrets is blurry under Chinese law. The state secrets law currently in effect provides wide latitude for officials to declare information a state secret, including "secrets in national economic and social development," "secrets concerning science and technology," and "other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department." Cohen said that in Dr. Xue's case "there was no meaningful way to clarify the line between common, commercial information and state secrets." The blurring of commercial information and state secrets is especially problematic when dealing with SOEs. For example, Jiang Jiemin, General Manager of CNPC, the SOE that controls PetroChina, said in June 2010 that oil is an "important strategic asset," and that the company's work to protect its secrets bears on China's national security and social stability, according to the company's Web site. Chinese regulations make explicit that some commercial secrets of SOEs shall be considered state secrets. In March 2010, SASAC issued Interim Provisions on the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central Enterprises, Article 3 of which requires central-level SOEs to protect "the operating information and technical information which belongs within the scope of state secrets." According to SASAC's Web site, CNPC is a central-level SOE and is thus subject to this requirement. In addition, according to an April 30 21st Century Business Herald article, since SOEs, especially central SOEs, have "a certain administrative rank," they may themselves possess the power to declare information a state secret.
Dr. Xue's case follows another case involving the Anglo-Australian mining firm Rio Tinto. In July 2009 four employees of that firm were charged with stealing state secrets shortly after Rio Tinto pulled out of a proposed $19.5 billion deal with a major state-owned firm. The charges were reduced to commercial bribery and commercial secrets infringement the following month.
- Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review. In criminal cases involving state secrets, Chinese courts do not have the power to question an agency's classification of information as a state secret, according to a 2007 Human Rights in China report on China's state secrets system. Furthermore, in cases where endangering national security is alleged, such as cases involving the charge of inciting subversion, courts make little to no assessment of the actual harm to national security. In Dr. Xue's case, the July 6 WSJ article reported that the court provided few details regarding the damage the transaction caused to China's national security.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-15 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Xinjiang Court Imposes Prison Sentences on Uyghur Journalist and Webmasters
August 7, 2010
A court in the far western region of Xinjiang sentenced a journalist and three Web site administrators to prison sentences in July for endangering state security. Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and Web editor, received a 15-year prison sentence. Prosecutors at trial cited essays he wrote addressing economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs; sources also connected the case to interviews he gave to foreign media after demonstrations and rioting in Xinjiang in July 2009. In separate cases, Web site administrators Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli received sentences of 10, 5, and 3 years, respectively, on the same charges, in reported connection to articles posted on their Web sites describing hardships in Xinjiang and announcements on one of the Web sites calling for the demonstration in Urumqi in July 2009. Other Uyghur journalists, writers, and Web site workers from Xinjiang remain in prison or in detention for exercising their right to free expression, including people whose cases also are connected to the July 2009 events.
Urumqi Court Sentences Journalist Gheyret Niyaz
The Urumqi Intermediate People's Court in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) sentenced Uyghur journalist and Web site editor Gheyret Niyaz to 15 years' imprisonment on July 23, 2010, for endangering state security, according to a July 23 Associated Press (AP) article (via Washington Post), July 23 posting on the Web site Uyghur Online, and July 22 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article. China's Criminal Law (Articles 102-113) defines several different crimes of endangering state security (also translated as "endangering national security"), and a July 30 open letter signed by Chinese scholars and writers calling for Gheyret Niyaz's release (via Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Boxun, July 30) reported that the charge was "leaking state secrets," a crime under Article 111 of the Criminal Law.
As described in the RFA report, sources close to Gheyret Niyaz connected his case to interviews he gave to overseas media following demonstrations and rioting in Urumqi in July 2009. One source reported that police told Gheyret Niyaz that he gave "too many interviews" to foreign media, according to RFA. In court, prosecutors cited essays that Gheyret Niyaz had written and published on the Internet before the July events that addressed economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs, Ilham Tohti, a friend of Gheyret Niyaz's, said in the AP article. Gheyret Niyaz told authorities in court that he authored the essays and accepted interviews from foreign media but argued that these did not violate Chinese law, according to an account of the trial by Gheyret Niyaz's wife as related in the AP article. Article 35 of China's Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of the press. Article 41 guarantees Chinese citizens the right to criticize their government.
Authorities reportedly prevented Gheyret Niyaz from being represented by the lawyer chosen by his family, according to July 23 reports from Amnesty International and the Uyghur American Association. According to July 20 articles (1, 2) from RFA, Ilham Tohti reported that Gheyret Niyaz's wife was told by authorities she could have Ilham Tohti hire a lawyer for the family. After he found a lawyer in Beijing to take the case, however, Gheyret Niyaz's wife said the family could not use a Beijing lawyer, and that they now had a lawyer from the XUAR, whom she did not know, according to the articles.
As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, Gheyret Niyaz was originally taken away from his house on October 1, 2009, and his family was told on October 4 that he was under suspicion for endangering state security. Gheyret Niyaz had worked as an editor and manager for Uyghur Online, which had been accused of contributing to unrest in July 2009. Gheyret Niyaz also had been a journalist for the Xinjiang Economic Daily and Xinjiang Legal Daily. He was last known to be held at the Tianshan district PSB detention center in Urumqi. Gheyret Niyaz's conviction for endangering state security (ESS) comes as ESS trials in the XUAR have spiked in recent years.
Articles apparently connected to Gheyret Niyaz's case include an interview published in the August 2, 2009, edition of the Hong Kong-based Asia Weekly that criticizes some aspects of government policy in the XUAR but also reiterates some Chinese government positions toward the region. In the interview, Gheyret Niyaz said that he notified contacts in the government in advance of the demonstration planned for July 5, 2009, anticipating that unrest would break out and urging authorities to take precautions. He also discussed in the interview two policies in the XUAR that he said prompted dissatisfaction among Uyghurs. He stressed that Mandarin-focused bilingual education policies resulted in widespread lay-offs of teachers and emphasized that programs to transfer Uyghur women to jobs in the interior of China have fueled discontent among Uyghur communities that feared the programs would result in prostitution and intermarriage.
In the interview, Gheyret Niyaz also said that Uyghurs have no historical basis for seeking independence and argued that then-Party Secretary Wang Lequan had placed too much emphasis on the issue of separatism in the region. He blamed events in July 2009 on the international Islamic political movement Hizb ut-Tahrir. Authorities in China have described Hizb ut-Tahrir as a threat to the region and official media specifically blamed another instance of protest in the region on the organization. Authorities have described the July 5 events as violent criminal activity organized by overseas "forces" and also have cast blame specifically on U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress. (For more articles by Gheyret Niyaz, see, e.g., an essay published July 29 in the Singapore United Morning News and a Web site identified as his blog.)
Urumqi Court Sentences Webmasters Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli
Around the same time as Gheyret Niyaz's trial, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court sentenced three Web site administrators to multi-year prison terms also for endangering state security (ESS), according to July 28 reports from RFA (English, Uyghur) and a July 29 press release from the Uyghur American Association (UAA), based on information from a brother of one of the Web administrators. As in the case of Gheyret Niyaz, the specific ESS charges applied to their cases are not known. According to Dilmurat Perhat, cited in the articles, his brother Dilshat Perhat, Web administrator and owner of the Web site Diyarim, received a 5-year sentence, Shabnam Web administrator Nijat Azat received a 10-year sentence, and Salkin Web administrator Nureli received a 3-year sentence. The trials, which were closed to the public, were thought to take place on July 23 or 24, according to the UAA report. Family members received notice of the trials one day in advance, according to the RFA Uyghur article.
Authorities had blamed some Uyghur Web sites for contributing to unrest in Urumqi on July 5, according to the UAA press release and RFA Uyghur report, and the Web sites affiliated with the cases, now shut down, had contained announcements calling for a peaceful demonstration in Urumqi on July 5, according to the UAA report. In July 2009, XUAR government Chairperson Nur Bekri mentioned Uyghur Online and Diyarim among Web sites he said "stirred up propaganda" and "spread rumors" on July 5. (See, e.g., a July 9 Associated Press article, via the Guardian, and clip of Nur Bekri's speech on YouTube.) A July 30 article from the New York Times reported that relatives and friends close to the cases connected them to the three Web site administrators' "failing to quickly delete content that openly discussed the difficulties of life in Xinjiang and, in one case, for allowing users to post messages announcing the protests last summer that turned violent." Dilmurat Perhat said his brother had erased announcements on his Web site's message board and notified police, according to the UAA press release and NY Times article.
Chinese laws and regulations place a legal burden on Internet companies to monitor content on the Web and censor information deemed unacceptable by the government. The 2000 Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services prohibit providers of Internet information services from disseminating content that falls into any one of a number of vaguely worded categories, including information "harming the honor or the interests of the nation," "spreading rumors," or "disrupting national policies on religion" (Article 15). The Chinese government's regulation of the Internet and other electronic communications violates international standards for free expression. See related CECC analyses (1, 2) for more information.
As reported in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, unidentified men in Urumqi took Dilshat Perhat from his home on August 7, 2009. Authorities had previously interrogated Dilshat Perhat from July 24 until August 2 in connection to the demonstration and violence in Urumqi on July 5. Other people involved with Uyghur Web sites！including Nureli, Selkin administrator Muhemmet, Diyarim worker Obulqasim, and Diyarim contributors Xeyrinisa, Xalnur, and Erkin！also were reportedly detained during the same periods. (Three Diyarim administrators known only by the pen names "Muztagh," "L┨kchek," and "Yanchuqchi" also were taken into detention, according to a December 11, 2009, article from RFA's Uyghur service.)
Other Journalists, Writers, and Online Authors Remain in Detention
Other Uyghur journalists, writers, and online authors from the XUAR remain in detention for exercising their right to freedom of expression, as do fellow journalists and online authors elsewhere in China, including in cases connected to crimes of endangering state security. For information on cases from the XUAR, see, in addition to the cases mentioned above, records on Mehbube Ablesh, Nurmemet Yasin, and Abdulghani Memetemin in the CECC Political Prisoner Database. For cases of journalists and online authors imprisoned elsewhere in China, see, for example, the cases of Liu Xiaobo, Yang Chunlin, Tan Zuoren, and Shi Tao.
The four recent prison sentences come as authorities in the XUAR impose harsh controls over the free flow of information from the region. For more information, see a related CECC analysis and for general information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report. For information on how Chinese officials use endangering state security crimes to punish free expression in violation of international human rights standards, see Subversion and Inciting Subversion in Section II！Freedom of Expression.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-25 / English) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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New Foreign Exchange Rules May Pose Difficulties for Chinese NGOs
August 10, 2010
New rules issued last year by China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange took effect on March 1, tightening previously-issued rules concerning foreign donations to Chinese organizations. The new rules add procedures and increase the paperwork burden imposed upon Chinese organizations！including non-governmental organizations (NGOs)！wishing to receive financial contributions from overseas organizations. Five months after the rules took effect, some researchers and media reports are beginning to note, with specific examples, authorities' selective enforcement of the rules in a manner that may target groups working on issues the government deems to be "sensitive."
China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued the Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issues Concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions on December 25, 2009, which took effect on March 1, 2010. Despite SAFE's assertion that the new rules are aimed at "facilitating the receipt and payment of donations in foreign exchange," some groups, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), say that the new rules instead have made it nearly impossible to access their funds, placing some of them in difficult financial straits.
The SAFE circular requires all Chinese organizations seeking to receive foreign donations to present the following information: an application stating that the "donation is not against national prohibitive regulation"; a copy of the receiving organization's business license; a notarized donation agreement stating the purpose of the donation; and a certificate of registration of the overseas nonprofit organization (with Chinese translation attached).
In a June 14 Asia Catalyst posting, one expert writes that while the regulations are "not a sweeping shutdown of all NGOs," they have the effect of creating "a chill that shuts some NGOs down, allows others [sic] NGOs to survive but limits the overall growth of the sector." A May 27 Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) article cites the head of a Beijing-based financial management company for NGOs, explaining that the financial problems experienced by some organizations were not primarily a matter of how they actually collect their funding, but rather the authorities' selective enforcement of the rules, depending on what individual groups do.
One particularly problematic element of the new SAFE rules is the requirement that the donation agreement be notarized. "Two months since the regulation came into effect, banks, notary service providers and non-profit outfits are in the dark about how to get a donation agreement 'notarized,'" a May 19 Global Times article reported. Moreover, a May 17 RFA article stated that some notaries reportedly will also require some donors to be present in China for the notarization. In the Asia Catalyst posting, one expert describes the confusion this way: "How many international donors have representatives in China, ready and able to show up at a notarization office at any time? Let alone staff poised to visit multiple notarization offices around the country, in every town where the donor funds local NGOs? Very few." An April 17 report in Deutsche Well (Chinese version) also detailed the difficulties that NGOs are facing as a result of the notarization requirement.
Recent Chinese and international media reports suggest that the Chinese government's selective enforcement of the new SAFE rules has impacted different civil society groups in different ways, and that authorities may be using the rules specifically to target groups handling work and projects that the government deems "sensitive."
- In a May 17 interview with Radio Free Asia, the founder of the Beijing-based public health advocacy group Aizhixing said that his group is on the brink of closure because of the SAFE regulations. Aizhixing was forced to terminate its services in Kunming and to reduce financial support to other groups, but the most difficult challenge remains paying rent and salaries, he said. He also stated in the April 11 issue of Asia Week (Yazhou Zhoukan) that even if all goes smoothly, getting the grant agreement notarized alone can cost several thousand U.S. dollars, and take at least three months.
- The Beijing Yirenping Center, a Beijing-based NGO dedicated to fighting discrimination against people infected with communicable diseases, has also been facing difficulties since the SAFE rules became effective. According to a May 27 Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) article, the group relies on foreign donations for 80 percent of its funding. The center's managing partner said that his organization is on the verge of being "starved" of funds, and that this year it has had to cut back its three planned training sessions to one, and reduce its legal aid work to just providing legal consulting. On May 20, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Center has been unable to get funding from the National Endowment for Democracy between November and May, and has been forced to stay open "by borrowing money from friends on a personal basis." The same article also mentioned that about a dozen NGOs also reported that they were unable to comply with the new requirements set forth in the SAFE rules. The Global Times quoted on May 19 the center's managing partner as saying that "more than 100,000 yuan is locked up in our foreign exchange account, and some cases have been postponed for lack of funds."
For more information on the development of civil society in China, please see Section II！Civil Society in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-19 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Government Appears To Crack Down on Microblogs and Blogs
August 6, 2010
An apparent government crackdown on microblogs and blogs in China reportedly began in mid-July 2010, involving service disruptions at major microblogging sites, removal of the blogs of well-known activists and lawyers, and increased monitoring of journalists' blogs. Blogs and microblogs have become increasingly popular in China, with hundreds of millions of users.
In mid-July 2010, a government-linked crackdown on the use of microblogs and blogs on the Internet in China reportedly began. Blogs are personalized Web pages on which users provide running commentary on all kinds of topics. Microblogs (weibo) allow users to post messages containing up to about 140 characters at a time and to follow the postings of other users (see the Chinese search engine Baidu's definition here), much like Twitter elsewhere. (Twitter is blocked in China, although some citizens obtain access through circumvention tools.) According to mainland Chinese, Hong Kong, and foreign media, recent actions taken against microblogs and blogs in China include: - Disruptions in the microblogging services of at least four major Chinese Web portals - Sina, Sohu, NetEase, and Tencent. Microblogging services at these sites were reportedly suspended for maintenance, or switched to testing (or beta) mode, according to a July 16 New York Times (NYT)article. A July 15 South China Morning Post article (subscription required) said that "beta version generally means that the system is still unstable and might need maintenance for some time." Microbloggers at Sina, which reportedly has 20 million users, discovered that links to foreign-based Web sites would not work, the NYT article said. Sohu's microblogging site went offline for maintenance from July 9-12, and users were unable to conduct searches or link to sites other than Sohu, NYT reported.
According to the NYT article, employees at two of the Web portals said "the latest tweaking was in response to direct pressure from Chinese Internet authorities to bolster their systems for monitoring content." A July 15 report in Shanghai's Oriental Morning Post cited unnamed industry insiders as saying the latest measures were the result of pressure from regulators. According to a July 14 Reuters article, company sources told the news agency that tightening government restrictions were the cause.
NYT reported that other employees at the companies denied any tightening of control by saying that the services had continuously undergone testing from their inception, although the NYT article said "they had no clear explanation for why they had not noted so previously." A source at Sina who refused to be named told Global Times that the reversion to testing mode had nothing to do with government pressure, according to a July 15 article.
A survey of reports on the issue found that virtually all sources refused to be named (or were not named) and that government officials could not be reached for comment, reflecting the opaque environment in which Chinese officials regulate and censor the Internet. (See also July 15 articles in Associated Press (via Washington Post) and South China Morning Post (SCMP, subscription required).)
- Requirement that the microblogging services delete posts and user accounts that touch upon sensitive political issues or pornography. The July 15 SCMP article reported on the deletion demands, quoting one insider as saying, "We believe this round of control is just a warning [to all portals]." Another SCMP article on July 17 reported that mainland microblogging sites also were asked recently to impose greater self-discipline, and that microblog searches now displayed fewer results and, in the case of sensitive topics, sometimes no results. The July 15 Associated Press article reported that dozens of blogs for prominent rights advocates and bloggers were suddenly shut down, including those of rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and legal expert Xu Zhiyong. The July 16 NYT article said that the rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan had one of his blog posts removed within five minutes.
- Targeting of journalists' microblogs. The July 17 SCMP article reported that Sina's microblog service had been ordered to verify the accounts of journalists at traditional media outlets. Verifying which accounts belong to journalists will make such microblogs easier to monitor, according to a media analyst cited in the article.
The media reports offered possible reasons for the crackdown, including increased concern over loss of control over these types of online social networking tools, possible plans by officials to subject these sites to greater regulation, and journalists' use of these tools to post information not allowed to be published in their newspapers. The reported crackdown also came shortly after the July 7 release of a report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on new media that alleges that social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook may be used for subversive purposes and exploited by Western intelligence services, according to a July 9 Global Times article and the July 17 SCMP article.
Social networking media such as blogs and microblogs have become popular in China in recent years. According to the official China Internet Network Information Center's latest report on Internet use in China, there were 231 million bloggers in China as of June 2010. According to iResearch statistics cited in the July 17 SCMP article, almost 81 million Internet users in China used microblogging services in May, an increase of almost 50 percent over March. According to the July 15 Global Times article, major domestic portals such as Sina recently launched microblogging services to fill the void left after Chinese officials blocked Twitter and Fanfou following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Fanfou was a Chinese service similar to Twitter. While Chinese officials tout the prevalence of blogs as evidence that Chinese enjoy freedom of expression (see the Chinese government's June 2010 Internet white paper (Chinese, English) and accompanying CECC analysis), the extent to which the Chinese government censors online content continues to violate international human rights standards. In China, censorship of the Internet and cell phones is not limited to the removal of content such as pornography, spam, or content deemed to violate intellectual property rights, but also political and religious content the government and Communist Party deem to be politically sensitive.
For more information on Chinese government regulation of the Internet, see pp. 58-64 of the Commission's 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-20 / English / Free) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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Internet Available in Xinjiang, But Controls Over Information Remain
August 7, 2010
Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang continue to exert tight control over freedom of expression, imposing limits on expression in a number of cases that are harsher than restrictions imposed elsewhere in China. Following demonstrations and rioting in Xinjiang in July 2009, authorities restricted access to the Internet, text messaging, and international telephone calls, claiming that they played a key role in inciting unrest. While authorities largely restored access to the technologies by May 2010, harsh restrictions on expression remain in place: popular Uyghur Web sites remain inaccessible and staff of some Uyghur Web sites remain in detention or in prison, Xinjiang residents report prohibitions against discussing the July 2009 events online, legal regulations imposing tight controls over free expression remain in force, and the Xinjiang government continues to carry out wide-scale censorship campaigns.
Following 10 months of restricted Internet access in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) after demonstrations and rioting in the region in July 2009, authorities announced in May that they had fully restored Internet access in the region. (See a May 14 announcement on the restoration of Internet service via Tianshan Net.) As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report, the Communist Party Secretary of Urumqi, where the demonstrations and rioting occurred, had announced on July 7, 2009, that authorities cut Internet access in the city to "quench the riot quickly and prevent violence from spreading to other places." Authorities also instituted Internet restrictions across the region and imposed curbs on text messaging and international phone calls. The actual role the communication devices played in violent rioting (as opposed to demonstrations) was unclear, however, and the wide-reaching restrictions！affecting all Internet, SMS, and international phone content and lasting for months after the July 2009 events！exceeded permissible boundaries for limiting the right to free expression as defined in international human rights standards.
Authorities announced the incremental reopening of communications services starting in December and provided more access to text messaging and international phone calls starting in January. (See, e.g., a December 29 Xinhua article, January 18, 2010, China Daily article, and January 20 Agence France-Presse article via Channel News Asia.) Despite what authorities termed the "full restoration" of Internet access in May, a year after the July 2009 events authorities continue to impose curbs over Internet access along with broader controls over the free flow of information.
Uyghur Websites Still Closed Down, Uyghur Webmasters Detained. After initial reports that the Internet had been fully restored in the XUAR, Urumqi residents reported in a May 19 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article that Uyghur Web sites such as Diyarim, Shabnam, Salkin, and Orkhun were still shut down. CECC monitoring of the Web sites in July from Washington, DC, found the Web sites inaccessible. (Orkhun's home page is available, but the site's content is restricted.) In addition to the curbs over Uyghur Web sites, China's broader system of blocking online content deemed to be sensitive ("China's Great Firewall" or the "Great Electronic Wall of China") remains in place, as noted in a May 19, 2010, open letter to XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian from Reporters without Borders.
Authorities have detained Webmasters and staff involved in some of the shuttered Uyghur Web sites and have since sentenced some to prison terms. Authorities detained Diyarim editor Dilshat Perhat from July 24 to August 2, 2009, and unidentified men took him from his home on August 7. Other people involved with Uyghur Web sites！Selkin Web site administrator Nureli, Selkin administrator Muhemmet, Diyarim worker Obulqasim, and Diyarim contributors Xeyrinisa, Xalnur, and Erkin！also were reportedly detained during the same periods. (Three Diyarim administrators known only by the pen names "Muztagh," "L┨kchek," and "Yanchuqchi" also were taken into detention, according to a December 11, 2009, article from RFA's Uyghur service.)
In July 2010, a court in the XUAR sentenced Dilshat Perhat, Nureli, and Shabnam administrator Nijat Azat to prison terms of 5, 3, and 10 years, respectively. Some Uyghur Web sites contained postings calling people to demonstrate in Urumqi on July 5, and authorities had blamed the Web sites for contributing to unrest. The cases of the three Web administrators also are reportedly connected to other content posted on their Web sites that described hardships in the XUAR. See a related CECC analysis for more information on these cases, as well as the case of Uyghur journalist and Web editor Gheyret Niyaz, sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on July 23, 2010, in connection to essays and interviews he gave to foreign media.
Online Discussion of July 2009 Events Reportedly Prohibited, Media Reporting Curbed. Authorities have blocked online discussion of events in July 2009, according to a June 22 RFA report. An employee from the public information and Internet supervision office of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau told RFA in an interview that online discussions of the "July 5 incident," including discussion of articles about the event published in the news, are not allowed. Another government employee cited in the article also described keyword filtering of content related to events in July 2009. In addition, the Hong Kong-based Mingpao newspaper reported on June 19 (via Yahoo) that XUAR media received a directive that month prohibiting reports connected to the July 2009 anniversary or other sensitive events such as protests in Kyrgyzstan, other than those prepared by the central government's news agency Xinhua. During the one-year anniversary, national media with government or Party affiliation, particularly those directed toward international audiences, issued reports on events in July 2009. (See, e.g., a July 4 Xinhua article in Chinese and July 5 articles from China News Service (in Chinese), Global Times, and China Daily.)
Restrictions on local media have been accompanied by reported curbs on XUAR residents' freedom to interact with foreign journalists. Authorities issued an internal circular prohibiting unauthorized interviews with foreign media during "sensitive days," according to a World Uyghur Congress spokesperson cited in a June 15 RFA article. In her written testimony for the July 19, 2010, CECC roundtable "China's Far West: Conditions in Xinjiang One Year After Demonstrations and Riots," journalist Kathleen E. McLaughlin reported being told of similar restrictions in Kashgar during the past year, where
reporting was extremely difficult because locals did not want to be interviewed. I was told there were clear directives that residents should not be speaking with foreign journalists and that all local tour guides had been issued guidelines to report journalists to the local police. This has been borne out by the experience of other journalists who have tried to work in Kashgar over the past year. It's a marked turnabout from conditions before the riots, when Kashgar was relatively open to reporters and locals [talked] with journalists without extreme fear of reprisals. That's no longer the case.
Regulations, Directive Penalize Free Speech. Regulations issued in the past year and currently in force maintain tight curbs over freedom of expression. Legislation in force throughout the XUAR and examined by the CECC in past analyses include regulations on informatization promotion, social order, and ethnic unity. In addition, the Kashgar District Public Security Bureau, Kashgar District Procuratorate, and Kashgar District Intermediate Court issued an announcement (via Kashgar district government Web site) in March for that locality that specifies penalties under China's Criminal Law for using technology such as Internet and cell phones to "incite splittism" (separatism), a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal Law. The directive defines the crime to include using technology to carry out, with the aim of splitting the country, acts including: spreading "materials, open discussion, content, and advocacy on separatism"; "inciting participation in rallies, marches, demonstrations, or the criminal activity of beating, smashing, looting, and burning'; disseminating literary works with separatist content; and "slandering and assaulting the Party and government." The announcement also describes penalties under the Criminal Law for "illegal sermonizing" and "tabligh activities" deemed to incite "ethnic hatred and bias" and for "cult"-related activities, along with using information technology to propagate terrorism.
Censorship Campaigns Continue. The XUAR government and Party also continue to enforce wide-scale censorship campaigns. Zhou Huilin, an official involved with the nationwide campaign to "sweep away pornography and strike down illegal publications" explained in December 2009 that within the XUAR, the censorship campaign's focus on "illegal publications" includes an additional component targeting materials from the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, according to a December 16 Tianshan Net report. The XUAR government and Party have made "striking hard" against "reactionary" materials and other "illegal" political and religious publications from the "three forces" as the focus of the region's censorship campaign since 2009, according to a January 19, 2010, Tianshan Net report. The article also described strengthening controls over "illegal" materials especially after events in July 2009. A work summary published on July 5, 2010, on the Web site of the XUAR Press and Publications Bureau said that the bureau would deepen its implementation of the censorship work during the last half of the year and would focus on "striking hard" against "reactionary propaganda materials" and "illegal" political and religious publications publicized and disseminated by the "three forces."
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2009 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-09 ) |
Posted on: 2010-08-19 |
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| Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=143705 |
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