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China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update
Harassment of Journalists Sparks Outcry in Chinese Press
November 1, 2010
In the summer of 2010, several high-profile incidents involving the harassment of journalists for reporting on local officials and companies have highlighted both local efforts to prevent unwelcome media coverage and the Chinese media's attempts to push back by calling for greater rights for journalists. At the same time, however, the media have been careful not to challenge the central government directly. The incidents involved journalists whose critical reporting on local companies prompted police action or physical assault by thugs connected to the targeted companies. Incidents also involved local officials barring journalists from covering events, such as a plane crash, that officials regarded as potentially embarrassing. The incidents prompted editorials, op-eds, and news articles in Chinese media, many defending the journalists. It is unclear what long-term impact this recent flurry of media attention will have on press freedom in China. Communist Party control over news content and heavy government regulation illustrate the Chinese government's failure to comply with international human rights standards on free expression.
Incidents in July and August 2010 involving harassment of journalists by local police and by local companies have sparked numerous news articles, editorials, and op-eds in the Chinese media. The case that received perhaps the most media attention, the Qiu Ziming case, is discussed below. Other incidents included journalists detained and barred by local officials from covering a plane crash in Heilongjiang province (see August 29 Caixin report), investigations by local police and propaganda officials in Shandong province of journalists who prepared a story critical of a local biotech company (see August 30 China Youth Daily report, via Xinhua), and violent attacks against journalists who wrote stories critical of companies (see August 8 Financial Times report). The Financial Times article quoted a deputy editor at Caijing, a Chinese newspaper known for its investigative reporting, as saying "[t]he fact that a company can enlist state authorities to fight its private battles highlights the core problem: our police and judiciary are not independent and there is widespread collusion between officials and enterprises."
Qiu Ziming Case
In late July 2010, public security officials in Suichang county, Zhejiang province, sought to arrest Qiu Ziming, a reporter at the Economic Observer (EO). According to a July 30 EO article, Qiu authored a series of reports on the privatization of the parent company of Zhejiang Kan Specialty Material Company (ZKSMC), a company listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange. The reports alleged that certain individuals purchased the parent company at a steep discount and received free land in the transaction. On July 23 Qiu's name appeared on a national online list of "wanted persons," suspected by Suichang police of "damaging the commercial reputation" of ZKSMC (Article 221, Criminal Law). A representative of ZKSMC acknowledged to CCTV, China's national television station, that the company had used its connections with local police to secure Qiu's detention, according to a July 29 New York Times (NYT) article. In a July 28 statement, EO defended Qiu's reports and alleged that the company had offered bribes to "journalists and others" and threatened them during the newspaper's investigation.
Central Government Response
News of the case caused a stir on the Internet, and national-level officials intervened. The General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the national regulator of China's media, ordered provincial and local officials with jurisdiction over Suichang to investigate. Their investigation concluded that the Suichang police's decision to detain Qiu "did not meet legal requirements" because it was based on insufficient evidence, according to a July 30 GAPP article and an August 2 Legal Daily article. Under orders from higher level officials, Suichang police apologized to Qiu and on July 29 revoked the detention decision. A week later, the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) announced a new policy affecting arrests in defamation cases (the Qiu case appeared to involve detention, which precedes arrest under Chinese law). The new policy stipulates that in order to arrest someone accused of defamation, authorities not only will require approval from the procuratorate at the same level (as currently required by law) but also require approval of the procuratorate at the next higher level, according to an August 7 Procuratorial Daily article. The SPP official cited in the article said that police should not treat speech criticizing individual leaders, even if extreme, as criminal defamation. Premier Wen Jiabao also appeared to address the recent cases involving journalists in an August 27 speech before the State Council. Wen said, "in accordance with the law we must protect people's rights to directly supervise the government. We must support the news media's exposure of illegal or inappropriate administrative behavior."
It is unclear what impact the cases of Qiu and others will have on the long-term development of press freedom in China. At least one commentator has said the Qiu case highlighted central-level control over local matters rather than expanding press freedom. "This was a local error corrected by officials in the central party apparatus. The incident shows, in fact, just how nimble the party can be," Russell Leigh Moses, a professor based in Beijing, told the South China Morning Post (SCMP) in an August 1 report (subscription required). Other observers, however, said that the case could embolden China's media. The critic Li Xiang told SCMP that Chinese media could use the case to show that media can "write critical reports about public companies without being harassed by powerful governments" and "if later a more powerful institution is involved in a similar case, journalists can cite this as a precedent to defend themselves."
Chinese Media Commentary on Qiu Case
Chinese news media responded to the Qiu case by publishing editorials, op-eds, and news articles, some raising questions about the abuse of criminal defamation charges to harass journalists and advocating for more space to criticize officials and businesses. For example, Zhan Jiang, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University (Southern Weekend op-ed, July 29) noted that, with the advent of cell phones and the Internet, local officials were increasingly using the crime of defamation to punish citizens who used these technologies to criticize local interests (noting at least 20 cases from 2006 to July 2009), reversing the declining trend of criminal defamation in favor of civil lawsuits. Ge Sunchun (July 29 op-ed reprinted on the popular Web portal Sina) criticized local police in the Qiu case for hastily pursuing a criminal case against Qiu and asked why the company had not filed a civil lawsuit. "If every journalist who writes a [report exercising the media's supervisory role] is prosecuted to the point of having an order for the arrest of a criminal at large...then will journalists dare to accept the responsibility of covering and reporting the news? Of what use is the right to freedom of speech provided in [China's] Constitution?" The Oriental Morning Post ran a story on July 29 (via Sohu) that included comments from a partner at a Shanghai law firm who urged caution in using the crime of defaming commercial reputation, arguing that "so long as there is no malicious intent, even if the reporting is not entirely in line with the true situation, it shouldn't constitute [the crime of commercial defamation]." Similarly Professor Zhan argued that in the absence of malice and gross negligence, criticism of state institutions and officials should not constitute defamation even if it results in some reputational harm. Zhan said "erroneous expression is inevitable" during discussion and to punish such expression would lead to "many people unwilling to take part in debates."
Some media commentary appeared to frame the issue carefully as a problem involving local officials, avoiding direct criticism of central authorities, but also addressing more systemic problems plaguing China. For example, in an op-ed titled "Freedom of Speech Is an Essential Weapon for Curbing Abuse of Public Power" (South Wind Window, August 13) Zhang Qianfan, a Peking University law professor, noted that the Qiu case and others from recent years were all "typical examples of local governments suppressing journalists." Zhang drew a direct comparison to the United States, arguing that "freedom of speech is even more indispensable in China" since China lacks certain checks and balances found in the U.S. system and instead "relies more on top-to-bottom central control" to fight corruption. Zhang aligned the interests of the media with those of central authorities, saying that the media could help alleviate the central government's burden of monitoring local officials and prevent problems, from torture in the criminal justice system to controversial land takings, that have contributed to societal conflict in recent years. "If journalists are persecuted and free speech is stifled anywhere, then the central authorities have lost their most trustworthy 'eyes' and 'ears'...," Zhang wrote. In his Southern Weekend op-ed, Professor Zhan tied the Qiu case to his suggestion that China should follow international practice in determining when freedom of speech may be restricted, noting that China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998.
As the Commission noted in its 2010 Annual Report, Chinese media currently do not enjoy press freedoms in line with international standards due to Communist Party controls and heavy government regulation of the news industry.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-09-07 / English) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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New Information Released on Uyghur Political Prisoners Mehbube Ablesh and Omer Akchi
October 20, 2010
New information is now available on the cases of two Uyghur political prisoners serving prison sentences in the far western region of Xinjiang. According to information from the Dui Hua Foundation, Mehbube Ablesh, a radio station employee detained in 2008 in apparent connection to her criticism of Chinese government policies, is now known to be serving a three-year sentence for "splittism" (separatism). The date she was sentenced is not known. Omer Akchi, a farmer sentenced to 14 years in prison in 1997 for a "counterrevolutionary" crime in connection to an organization he allegedly led, is now known to have had his sentence extended in December 2006 to life in prison for a "splittist" crime. The details of this crime are not known. As of October 2010, he is the only known living prisoner in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database who has had his sentence extended to life imprisonment.
Mehbube Ablesh
According to a report from the Dui Hua Foundation, based on responses to a request for information from Chinese authorities, former Uyghur radio station employee Mehbube Ablesh is serving a three-year prison sentence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) for "splittism" (separatism), a crime under Article 103 of China's Criminal Law, in apparent connection to her criticism of Chinese government policies. (See the Dui Hua Foundation's summer 2010 Dialogue Newsletter and article on Uyghur cases.) Given the length of the sentence and circumstances of the case, Dui Hua conjectures that the full charge could be "inciting splittism."
Authorities detained Mehbube Ablesh (identified as Mehbube Abrak in information provided to Dui Hua) in August 2008, but at that time, charges against her and subsequent information on the case remained unknown. As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database, Mehbube Ablesh was fired from her job in the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio Station in Urumqi in August 2008 and placed in detention. A co-worker connected the detention to articles she wrote for the Internet. An overseas source said that in her communications with him, she had been critical of political leaders in the XUAR and had criticized Mandarin-focused language policies in the region. (See Radio Free Asia reports from August 8 (1, 2) and August 9, 2008, for initial reports on the case.) She is serving her sentence in the Xinjiang Women's Prison (Xinjiang Number 2 Prison) in Urumqi.
The date of Mehbube Ablesh's sentencing is not known. News of her sentence, however, follows the detention and trials of several other Uyghurs in connection to other articles critical of government policy or in connection to their involvement with Uyghur Web sites. See a related CECC analysis on the cases of Gheyret Niyaz, Dilshat Perhat, Nijaz Azat, and Nureli. The detentions come during a year of tightened controls over the free flow of information in the XUAR following demonstrations and rioting in the region in July 2009.
Omer Akchi
According to Dui Hua information from official Chinese sources, also reported in Dui Hua's summer 2010 Dialogue newsletter, Uyghur farmer Omer (Emer) Akchi's prison sentence was extended in December 2006 from 14 years (a sentence handed down in 1997 for a "counterrevolutionary" crime) to life imprisonment for an alleged "splittist" (separatist) crime. Details of the alleged splittist crime are not available. Dui Hua describes the extension as "presumably for acts committed during his imprisonment." Article 71 of China's Criminal Law provides that if a "criminal again commits a crime" before a punishment is complete, "another judgment shall be rendered for the newly committed crime."
As reported in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, drawing on Dui Hua information based on official Chinese sources, public security officials in Awat county, Aksu district, XUAR, detained nine Uyghur farmers, including Omer Akchi, in or about December 1996. Authorities alleged the men joined the "Islamic Party of Allah" earlier in the year, and that Omer Akchi attended a party meeting in Hotan in November, returning home with drafts of the party's "Basic Program" and constitution. On September 1, 1997, the Aksu Intermediate People's Court sentenced five of the men to prison terms for "organizing and leading a counterrevolutionary group" (a crime since removed from China's Criminal Law), including Omer Akchi, who received the longest sentence, 14 years.
Based on CECC analysis of the 75 cases in its Political Prisoner Database known to involve sentence extensions as of October 2010, Omer Akchi is the only known living political prisoner whose sentence has been extended to life imprisonment. The only other known political prisoner in the Political Prisoner Database to have a sentence extended to life imprisonment, Rigzin Wanggyal, died in 2003. He had been sentenced to 16 years for splittism in late 1995, and his sentence was extended in May 1997 to life imprisonment for "espionage" allegedly committed in prison.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-17 / English) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Government Policy on Tibetan Reincarnation Leads to Expulsions, Detentions, Suicide
October 18, 2010
Summary
A series of events from May to July 2010 at Shag Rongpo, a little-known monastery located in Naqu (Nagchu) county, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), has resulted in the expulsion and apparent house arrest of the 75-year-old abbot, the detention of other monks, the sentencing of one monk to imprisonment, the expulsion and apparent sentencing of 17 monks to "public surveillance," and the suicide of a 70-year-old monk, according to reports from Tibetan organizations based in India. The events began when Chinese officials reportedly accused the abbot, who also served as the monastery's senior Buddhism teacher, of contacting the Dalai Lama about the search for the reincarnation of a Shag Ronpgo trulku！a teacher whom Tibetan Buddhists believe is one of a lineage of reincarnated teachers that can span centuries. After the May detentions, officials and People's Armed Police arrived at the monastery to conduct "patriotic education" and pressure monks to denounce the Dalai Lama and the monastery's senior teacher.
The Chinese government issued the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (MMR, translated by International Campaign for Tibet),effective on September 1, 2007, asserting unprecedented government control over the process of searching for, identifying, seating, and educating all Tibetan Buddhist trulkus in China. This is the first incident since the measures took effect in which the Commission has observed reports of the consequences at a monastery where a senior figure attempted to reach out to a prominent Tibetan Buddhist teacher living in exile！such as the Dalai Lama！on a matter relating to the succession of a trulku. [For more information on the freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists in China, see the Commission's Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009.]
Events at Shag Rongpo Monastery
Based on Phayul (23 July 10, 27 July 10) and Tibetan government-in-exile (TGiE) (27 July 10) reports, the following events took place from May to July.
May 17: Five detentions. Security officials detained Abbot Dawa Khyenrab Wangchug (or Dawa), titled with the honorific "Rinpoche" and apparently regarded as a trulku, Shag Rongpo monks Ngawang Jangchub, Ngawang Thogme, and Dungphug, and layman Tashi Dondrub while the five men were in Lhasa city, the TAR capital. Authorities accused Dawa of attempting to contact the Dalai Lama about the search for a Shag Rongpo reincarnation known as Rongpo Choeje. The reports did not state the purpose of the men's visit to Lhasa or provide information about how the alleged attempted contact with the Dalai Lama took place. Article 2 of the MMR states that Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations "shall not be interfered with" by any "foreign organization or individual." The Chinese government labels the Dalai Lama a "splittist" and seeks to end his influence among Tibetans as a paramount religious leader. [For more information on the anti-Dalai Lama campaign, see the Commission's Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009.] Officials dealt with the five detainees in the following manner.- Abbot Dawa: Apparent house arrest. Stripped of all of his monastic positions, authorities forced Dawa to leave the monastery and reportedly held him "incommunicado" at his residence in an unspecified location in Naqu. Authorities banned Dawa from any contact with Shag Rongpo Monastery, and monks from any contact with Dawa.
- Monk Ngawang Thogme: Two years' imprisonment. The monastic temple-keeper detained with Dawa was reportedly sentenced for keeping photos of the Dalai Lama in his room. The reports did not provide information about the criminal charge against Ngawang Thogme, the court that sentenced him, or his place of imprisonment.
- Two monks and one layman: Released. Police released from detention after an unspecified period of time monks Ngawang Jangchub and Dungphug, and layman Tashi Dondrub.
After Dawa's detention: Intensive "patriotic education." According to the reports, approximately 50 members of "patriotic education" work teams accompanied by approximately 150 People's Armed Police arrived at Shag Rongpo. The work teams pressured monks to sign or fingerprint denunciations of the Dalai Lama and Dawa, and reportedly threatened monks with expulsion or imprisonment if they failed to comply. Phayul reported that one monk suffered a "severe breakdown" and the monastic disciplinarian became so depressed that authorities "forced" the two monks to leave the monastery.
July 17: Monks expelled, ordered to serve "public surveillance." According to the July 23 Phayul and July 27 TGiE reports, a group of 17 monks led by senior monk Ngawang Lobsang had requested "repeatedly" that officials cease the patriotic education sessions, and presented to patriotic education instructors reasons why the monks should not denounce the Dalai Lama and Dawa, and why the monastery should maintain contact with Dawa. Unspecified authorities expelled the 17 monks from the monastery and, according to the TGiE report, ordered them "to report once a week at the local government office and not to leave the place for two years." Ngawang Lobsang, named in the TGiE report, is the only monk identified so far. Based on the description of the punishment, public security officials apparently ordered the monks to serve "public surveillance" (see Criminal Law, Arts. 38-41). The provisions empower police to impose up to two years of public surveillance without judicial process (Art. 38). A person ordered to serve public surveillance must fulfill conditions that include the following requirements (Art. 39).- Obey laws and regulations and submit to "supervision" by government and public security offices;
- Forfeit rights provided under Article 35 of China's Constitution, including the freedoms of speech, press, association, and assembly unless public security officials authorize the exercise of a right;
- Report on one's activities as directed by public security officials;
- Comply with "regulations for receiving visitors" that public security officials stipulate;
- Remain within one's county-level area of residence unless public security officials grant permission to leave it.
July 20: An elderly monk allegedly commits suicide. According to the reports, 70-year-old Ngawang Gyatso committed suicide on July 20 as a result of "depression" linked to religious repression and pressure to denounce the Dalai Lama. Officials allegedly confiscated Ngawang Gyatso's suicide note and ordered Shag Rongpo monks not to discuss his death as a suicide and to support the government description of his death as "natural."
July 21: "Patriotic education" results in another detention. During a "patriotic education" session that included demands to denounce the Dalai Lama, monk Khyenrab Norbu declared that life in the monastery would be "worthless" if officials maintained the ban on contact between the monastery and senior teacher Dawa, according to the TGiE report. He reportedly threw away the keys to the monastery and said that the authorities should keep them instead. Officials detained him after he left the meeting.
The Panchen Lama Precedent: An Abbot Imprisoned For Contacting the Dalai Lama About Reincarnation
The Chinese government's dismissal as "illegal and invalid" the Dalai Lama's May 1995 recognition of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama, and the December 1995 installation of another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, as the Panchen Lama, is an internationally recognized example of government and Communist Party intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist affairs. The government had authorized Chadrel Jampa Trinle, titled Rinpoche and the abbot of Tashi Lhunpo Monastery, the Panchen Lama's seat, to lead the committee searching for the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama. During the search he allegedly sent the Dalai Lama a letter listing the boys identified as possible candidates (Tibet Information Network, reprinted in World Tibet Network, 23 August 01). Chinese authorities detained Chadrel Rinpoche on May 17, 1995, and nearly two years later, in April 1997, sentenced him to six years' imprisonment for counterrevolution and disclosing state secrets to "separatist forces abroad" (Xinhua, reprinted in World Tibet Network, 7 May 97.) Chinese authorities have provided no information about Chadrel Rinpoche's location or well-being following his January 2002 release from prison. The U.S. Department of State's 2009 International Religious Freedom Report noted that he "reportedly remained under house arrest."
In addition, Chinese authorities imprisoned Jampa Chung, Chadrel Rinpoche's monastic assistant, and detained or imprisoned 34 other Tashi Lhunpo monks linked to protests against Chadrel Rinpoche's detention, based on information available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database. The period of detention or imprisonment for the 35 monks ranged from two months to Jampa Chung's four-year sentence. The Commission has not observed any confirmation of Jampa Chung's release or recent report on his location and status.
See the Commission's 2010 Annual Report, 2009 Annual Report, and Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for more information on the freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists and on the political imprisonment of Tibetans. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more information on cases of political prisoners named in this report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-16 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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SASAC Issues New Commercial Secrets Regulations
October 29, 2010
In March and April 2010, the Chinese government issued two key pieces of legislation on protection of secrets. On March 25, 2010, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) approved the Interim Provisions on the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central Enterprises (Provisions), concerning protection of commercial secrets (also known as "business secrets" or "trade secrets") by central-level state-owned enterprises (zhongyang qiye). The Provisions came into effect on April 26. Three days later, on April 29, the National People's Congress Standing Committee passed the amended Law on the Protection of State Secrets (Amendments), which maintains the vague and broad definition of state secrets written in the law prior to the amendment. The Amendments came into effect in October. The issuance of the Provisions and Amendments drew particular attention of observers, occurring as it did against the backdrop of the arrest and conviction, and later sentencing, of four employees of Anglo-Australian company, Rio Tinto. The four employees were arrested in July 2009 for violating state secrets laws, though the charges subsequently were lowered to infringing commercial secrets and bribery.
On April 26, 2010, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC, a commission under the State Council, which holds, supervises, and manages state-owned assets, including central-level state-owned enterprises) published the Interim Provisions on the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central Enterprises (Provisions). The provisions came into effect on the date of publication. Though the Provisions apply only to central-level state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to a May 5 post on the China Law Blog, "It would also come as no surprise if provincial-level authorities would take SASAC's lead and issue regulations aimed at provincial-level SOEs in the near future."
Scope of the Commercial Secrets Provisions
Article 2 of the Provisions defines commercial secrets as "business or technical information, which is unknown to the public, can bring about economic benefits to a central-level enterprise, is of practical use, and in respect of which the central-level enterprise has adopted measures to maintain confidentiality." This definition closely resembles that stated in Article 219 of the Criminal Law and Article 10 of the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL), both of which define commercial secrets as "technological or business information, which is unknown to the public, can bring about economic benefits to a holder, is of practical use, and for which the holder has adopted measures to maintain their confidentiality." Article 10 of the Provisions further elaborates on the scope of commercial secrets, providing that they may encompass "business information including strategic planning, management methods, business model, restructuring and listing, mergers and reorganizations, property trades, financial information, investment and finance, product procurement strategy, resources reserves, customer information, bidding information, etc.; and technical information including designs, procedures, product formulae, production processes, production methods, technical know-how, etc." A People's Daily article of April 27, 2010, comments that, "The regulation clearly requires central SOEs should expand the scope of protected business secrets."
The Rio Tinto and Xue Feng Cases
The Provisions are dated March 25, four days before the sentencing in the controversial Rio Tinto case. (See March 30 Wall Street Journal article, "Rio Tinto China Employees Get Prison Terms.") The Rio Tinto case, and the state secrets case of Xue Feng, a naturalized American citizen who allegedly helped the American company he worked for purchase commercial information on oil wells in China, highlight the risks for employees of foreign companies operating in China, especially in politically sensitive areas (including primary industries such as steel or oil), and the interrelationships among commercial crimes, state secrets, and the interests of government departments and state-owned enterprises. The Rio Tinto employees were originally arrested on suspicion of stealing state secrets, but the charges were later changed to infringing commercial secrets and bribery, and they were indicted, tried, and convicted of those charges. (For more information on these cases, see CECC analyses on Rio Tinto and Xue Feng.)
Commercial Secrets or State Secrets?
The Rio Tinto and Xue Feng cases underscore the lack of clarity in China as to the distinction between commercial secrets and state secrets. The blurring of the line between the two is especially problematic when dealing with SOEs. Article 11 of the Provisions provides for changing a central-level SOE's commercial secret to a state secret when "there is an adjustment to the scope of state secrets." Such a change can have significant ramifications. Penalties for commercial secrets violations are not as severe as those applicable to state secrets violations. Offenders found guilty of infringing commercial secrets and causing "especially grave consequences" can be sentenced to three to seven years imprisonment and fined under Article 219 of the Criminal Law for illegally obtaining, disclosing, or using commercial secrets, or violating contracts and agreements with the holder of commercial secrets. Article 25 of the AUCL provides for those who commit minor offenses to be ordered to stop the illegal conduct and be fined up to RMB 200,000 as an administrative punishment. However, persons found guilty of stealing, obtaining by spying, buying, or supplying state secrets can be sentenced to five years to life imprisonment and deprived of political rights under Article 111 of the Criminal Law.
For more information on state secrets, and the amendment to the Law on the Protection of State Secrets, see CECC analysis titled National People's Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-13 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Authorities Continue to Restrict Ramadan Observance in Xinjiang
October 20, 2010
Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang exert tight control over religious practice in the region, in a number of cases imposing limits on religious activities that are harsher than restrictions imposed elsewhere in China. Authorities single out Islam in some instances, as illustrated by a series of recent reports illustrating continued controls over Muslims' observance of the holiday of Ramadan. During the month-long period of daily fasting, which ended in mid-September, some local governments described steps to curb observance of the holiday, including barring some people from fasting, ordering restaurants to stay open, and increasing oversight of religious venues.
Local governments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued in 2010 to impose restrictions on Muslims' observance of Ramadan. The curbs in 2010 follow restrictions on the month-long holiday of daily fasting as documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in previous years (1, 2). An official from the XUAR Ethnic Affairs Commission and Religious Affairs Bureau said in an August 12 China Network TV (CNTV) article that Muslims have the "right to choose whether to fast during Ramadan or not," but reports from the past year indicate local officials have interfered with Muslims' right to observe the holiday. Examples include:
- Officials, Students Forbidden From Observing Ramadan. Some local governments have forbidden broad categories of people from observing Ramadan. The head of Ha'erbake township in Luntai (Bugur) county, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, said at a meeting of cadres and religious figures that groups such as Communist Party members, cadres, and students "resolutely must not go in and out of mosques and participate in fasting activities," according to an August 11 report on the Luntai county government Web site. The Artush Agricultural and Machinery Bureau adopted six measures during the holiday for its staff, forbidding people from going to sites of Ramadan-related activities, participating in religious activities, and fasting, or else face being "dealt with severely," according to an August 13 report from the Bureau's Web site. Party members in the Artush City Radio and Television Office, along with their family members, were forbidden from fasting during Ramadan and going to mosques and praying, according to an August 19 Radio Free Asia article.
Ramadan restrictions reported in Shache (Yarkand, Yeken) county, Kashgar district, focused on preventing students from observing the holiday. Education officials in Shache reported taking steps to ensure "stability" and prevent religion from "infiltrating" schools during Ramadan, according to an August 6 report on the Shache government Web site. Measures included visiting students' households to convey Party policy, to grasp students' "ideological posture and acts" and "to conscientiously ensure students don't fast, don't believe in religion, and don't participate in religious activities," according to the report. Schools, teachers, and parents were also to sign a series of "stability responsibility forms" to clarify each party's duties in "ideology work" and ensure "safety and stability" during Ramadan. "Indulging" or "letting students alone" to fast during Ramadan is among 23 acts defined as "illegal religious activities" in the XUAR. (See Item 5 in a copy of the "Autonomous Region Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities" posted February 25, 2008, on the Chinggil (Qinghe) county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, government Web site.)
- Forcing Restaurants To Operate. The CNTV article reported, "At the beginning of Ramadan, some Muslim restaurants and stores are closed during the daytime, as most of their customers are fasting." In practice, however, some local governments in the XUAR have ordered restaurants to stay open during the holiday. Trade and commerce officials met with private business association members in Jeminay county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, in advance of Ramadan to ensure "normal" operations in the restaurant industry during the holiday, according to an August 10 article from Xinjiang News Net. Officials conveyed Communist Party policy on ethnic and religious issues, and businesspeople in attendance "made clear" that they would not suspend their "duty" to engage in business operations during Ramadan, according to the report. The news follows a report of restrictions on the restaurant industry in another part of the XUAR in August 2009. During that time, the Aksu Municipal Construction Bureau issued a notice forbidding Halal restaurants from shutting down during Ramadan on the "pretext" of making repairs or renovations, according to an August 25, 2009, report on the Aksu Municipal Construction Bureau Web site.
- Increased Monitoring of People and Religious Venues. In Ta'erlake township, also in Luntai county, a local Party official called for measures including increasing "education and management" of "key persons," strengthening oversight of mosques, having leading cadres "understand and grasp at all times conditions in mosques and among religious personages," and heightening patrols in the township during Ramadan, according to an August 12 report from the Luntai county government Web site. Officials in Keping (Kalpin) county, Aksu district, called for government organizations to raise their sense of "political responsibility and acumen" during Ramadan, to inspect "hot spots" and "troublesome problems" in the area of religion, and increase oversight of religious venues, activities, and religious figures, according to an undated 2010 report on the Aksu Party Committee Organization Department Web site. Education officials in Shache county, cited above, also called for increased monitoring of schools during Ramadan.
For more information on religion in the XUAR, see a related CECC analysis and Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-23 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation Through Labor
October 27, 2010
A house church pastor and church member in Henan province are currently awaiting a court ruling that will determine whether or not they each will be required to serve one year of reeducation through labor (RTL), a form of administrative punishment without trial. The two had appealed a July 2010 Henan court ruling against them in an administrative lawsuit in which they had challenged the legality of the RTL punishments. Local public security officers detained the two men and several other members of the unregistered church in March and accused them of belonging to a "cult" organization, a designation that authorities have used in some cases to interfere with the activities of religious communities that run afoul of government or Party policy. Public security officers reportedly harassed the two men and other members of the Tianmiao Town Church on multiple occasions while they were in detention. In September, authorities harassed and detained seven members of unregistered Protestant churches who attempted to enter the courtroom during the two men's appeal trial, including members of their families.
Henan House Church Members Appeal After Court Refuses To Hear Lawsuit
In late September 2010, Tianmiao Town Church pastor Gao Jianli and church member Liu Yunhua of Yucheng county, Shangqiu city, Henan province appealed a July ruling of the Weidu District People's Court！located in Xuchang city, Henan province！to challenge the legality of reeducation through labor (RTL) punishments that they received in March 2010, according to a September 22 AsiaNews report and a September 25 ChinaAid report. According to reports from ChinaAid (19 May 10, 3 August 10) and Radio Free Asia (3 August 10), Gao filed an administrative lawsuit against the Shangqiu Municipal RTL Committee in May to challenge the legality of the RTL punishments, but the court ruled in favor of the RTL committee in July. Gao and Liu tried to file a second lawsuit with the same court, which refused to hear that lawsuit on August 2. According to the September 22 AsiaNews report and an October 7 ChinaAid report, after the court refused to hear the second lawsuit, Gao and Liu appealed the decision to a higher level court！the Xuchang Intermediate People's Court！which began to hear the case in late September. Gao and Liu are still awaiting a decision from the Xuchang Intermediate People's Court, which effectively will determine whether or not Gao and Liu must begin to serve the RTL punishments.
As the Xuchang Intermediate People's Court heard the case, authorities reportedly harassed and detained several members of unregistered Protestant churches, including members of Gao and Liu's families, who came to attend the trial. Public security officers from Shangqiu city and Xuchang city took into custody seven people: Beijing-based pastor Zhang Mingxuan, his wife Xie Fenglan, and Yucheng house church members Li Yuxia (Gao's wife), Hua Cuiying, Liu Fulan, Ma Ke'ai, and Liu Sen (Liu Yunhua's son). Public security officers from Yucheng county, Shangqiu city！where the Tianmiao Town Church is based！released Zhang, Xie, Ma, and Liu Sen soon thereafter, but ordered Li, Hua, and Liu Fulan each to serve 15 days of administrative detention, beginning on September 20, according to September 20 administrative punishment orders published in a September 26 ChinaAid report. According to the October 7 ChinaAid report, authorities released all three after they served the administrative detentions.
Authorities Use Cult Designation To Interfere with Unregistered House Church
While the most prominent example of a religious or spiritual group officially designated as a "cult" in China is Falun Gong！a spiritual movement based on Chinese meditative exercises called qigong and the teachings of Falun Gong's founder, Li Hongzhi！authorities continue to use the "cult" designation to interfere with the activities of various religious communities that run afoul of government or Party policy, including some Protestant communities.
The Gao and Liu case stems from "cult"-related accusations that public security officers in Yucheng levied against Gao, Liu, and several other members of the Tianmiao Town Church after detaining them in March, according to an April 9 ChinaAid report and a June 29 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). According to an August 3 ChinaAid report, Gao's attorney noted that authorities determined that Gao and Liu belonged to a cult and issued the RTL punishments on the basis of an internal document that has not been made public: The "Public Security Bureau Circular on Several Issues Regarding the Identification and Banning of Cult Organizations" (Circular). On the basis of the Circular, the Shangqiu Municipal RTL Committee (Committee) reportedly determined that the house church organized by Gao and Liu belonged to the "Full-Scope Church" (also translated as the "All-Scope Church"), a Protestant organization that has appeared on lists of officially designated "cult" organizations, such as a list of Chinese government and Party-designated "cults" issued by the Ministry of Public Security (available via the Zhengqi Net Web site, 5 February 07).
Authorities also levied "cult"-related charges against three of the seven unregistered Protestants who attempted to enter the Xuchang Intermediate People's Court as it heard Gao and Liu's case. According to September 20 administrative punishment orders published in the September 26 ChinaAid report, after Yucheng public security officers detained the seven Protestants, the Yucheng PSB determined that Li Yuxia, Hua Cuiying, and Liu Fulan belonged to the Full-Scope Church and carried out activities in connection with the church. Authorities accused them of violating Article 27(1) of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which provides for administrative punishment for various forms of "cult"-related activity.
Authorities also accused additional members of the Tianmiao Town Church of belonging to a cult on the basis of certain religious practices, including teaching religion to children. According to a June 29 ChinaAid report, on June 24, three plainclothes public security officers entered the home of two elderly Tianmiao Town Church members and told them:
Your beliefs are wrong. What you believe in is a cult. You cry when you pray, you let children believe, and you get baptized in ponds when everyone who gets baptized under the Three-Self Patriotic Movement [TSPM] has a pastor dab water on them. You believe in a cult. Don't worship at home. If you want to worship, go to a TSPM church.
According to the Chinese-language August 3 ChinaAid report, the Committee also determined that conducting Sunday school for children "caused social harm." As discussed in the CECC's 2009 Annual Report (p. 112-113), such a restriction on children's freedom of religion lacks a basis in Chinese national law and contravenes protections in international human rights law.
In addition, according to reports from ChinaAid (9 April 10, 29 June 10) and the South China Morning Post (29 June 10, subscription required), public security officials harassed the detainees and other members of the Tianmiao Town Church while they held them in detention. For example, public security officers in Yucheng reportedly demanded money in exchange for granting visitation rights to the families of some of the detainees, and they reportedly threatened some of the detainees with RTL when those detainees refused to renounce their faith.
For more information on conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC's 2010 Annual Report (p. 108-111). For more information on the Chinese government's crackdown on cults, see the CECC's 2010 Annual Report (p. 103-105, 110-111), a CECC analysis, and an October 1999 report on the Web site of the Chinese Embassy to the United States.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-17 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Ministry of Public Security Issues Ban on Public Parades of Suspected Sex Workers
October 27, 2010
In July 2010, the Ministry of Public Security issued a Circular prohibiting police from publicly parading criminal suspects allegedly involved in sex work. The announcement follows extensive media coverage of the public shaming of sex workers in Guangdong and Hubei provinces. The controversial parading of criminal suspects has elicited criticism from the Chinese news media and sympathy from Chinese citizens, particularly Internet users. Chinese officials previously have attempted to prohibit the practice, but in recent years high-profile incidents indicating its continued prevalence have gained widespread media attention.
In late July, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a circular (not publicly released) to local public security departments across China to end the practice of publicly parading suspected sex workers in public, according to a July 26 Dahe Net article. The Dahe Net article reports that the MPS circular calls on all police agencies to "resolutely ban" parading sex workers and other measures that "harm the human dignity of illegal workers." The parades, sometimes referred to as "perp walks," involve "the practice of publicly parading suspects or convicts in order to shame other criminals, drum up witnesses, or stir popular sentiment," according to a July 29 Dui Hua Foundation article. Although the MPS circular appears to apply to all criminal suspects, local law enforcement officials often use the "shame parades" in crackdowns on prostitution, according to a July 27 Reuters article. The new rules come after officials, in late June 2010, launched crackdowns on prostitution, which have led to public concerns and suspicion over public security agencies' methods, according to the Dahe Net article.
Background: Previous Measures To Ban Public Parades of Suspects
The ban in the July 2010 MPS circular is not the first time Chinese law enforcement agencies have attempted to prohibit public security officers from publicly parading criminal suspects. According to a July 29 Red Net article, Chinese officials issued circulars in 1984, 1986, and 1988 that prohibited shame parades of criminal suspects. More recently, in 2007 Notice of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice issued the Opinions on Strengthening Handling Cases in Strict Accordance with Law and Guaranteeing the Quality of Handling Death Penalty Cases (in Chinese), which prohibits the parading of convicts in death penalty cases (see Article 48). Although the 1988 rules outlawed the practice, the Red Net article points out that the official standpoint on the public parading of criminal suspects has changed over the last two decades. Twenty years ago, Chinese official rules described the "public parades" as "having an adverse impact [on China] domestically and abroad" or "eliciting external negative impacts." The July 2010 MPS circular, however, reportedly bases the justification on the "protection of human rights."
Public Shaming Incidents Spark Criticism and Concern
International and domestic Chinese news media have widely reported on public shaming incidents targeted at sex workers:
- In October 2009, the Zhengzhou City Public Security Bureau, in Henan province, reportedly carried out a special campaign against gambling and prostitution that resulted in the public release of nude photos of sex workers, according to a July 18 Southern Daily article (via Xinhua).
- In early July 2010, public security officers at the Sanzhong police station in Dongguan city's Qingshi township, Guangdong province, arrested four criminal suspects for their involvement in illegal prostitution. On July 5, local media published the news and photographs showing sex workers handcuffed, barefoot, and roped together while being publicly paraded, according to the July 18 Southern Daily article and a July 27 Guangzhou Daily article.
- In July 2010, in Hongshan district, Wuhan city, Hubei province, public security officials publicly posted information about local sex workers, including their names, ages, and punishments received, according to the July 26 Dahe Net article.
According to a July 26 Global Times article, the incidents of public shaming have "caused heated debate among the general public." A July 28 Xinhua article reported that media exposure of the recent high-profile incident in Dongguan has elicited "severe criticism at all levels of Chinese society." A July 23 opinion-editorial on the People's Daily Web site stated, "It is believed that female sex workers also possess basic human dignity; law enforcement personnel have no authority to humiliate them. [I] think that enforcing the law by breaking the law not only is in serious violation of the modern interpretation of human rights and human dignity, but also 'discredits' the government." A July 28 China Daily editorial criticized the practice of shaming sex workers: "They may be fined or detained for breaking public security rules, or convicted if their charges so warrant. It is unethical, however, to humiliate them in public. Such actions stem from a clear lack of understanding of the law." According to a July 27 New York Times article, some Internet users expressed outrage toward the police policy and urged sympathy of the paraded victims.
Although the recently released circular potentially signals an improvement in the rights of criminal suspects and defendants, it remains unclear whether the new circular will end the practice of publicly parading criminal suspects. In the July 27 New York Times article, one human rights advocate was quoted as saying that ultimately the reforms would require "a great deal of political will to implement these kinds of changes."
For more information on the rights of criminal suspects and defendants in China, see Section II！Criminal Justice in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-27 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Communist Party Seeks To Restrict Already Limited Critical Media Reports
October 18, 2010
The Communist Party reportedly has issued an order that could further diminish Chinese newspapers' already limited space to write stories critical of local-level officials. The order, directed at market-oriented "metropolitan" newspapers, which have developed reputations for more independent reporting, would prevent these newspapers from publishing "negative" stories about other localities, a practice known as yidi jiandu (translated into English as "outside area supervision" or "extra-territorial supervision"). Though officials have sought to curb this practice in recent years, Chinese journalists have engaged in yidi jiandu in part to counter local officials' attempts to bar media within their jurisdiction from reporting "negative" stories about the locality.
The Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department reportedly has sent an order, effective July 1, 2010, to numerous "metropolitan" (dushi) newspapers barring them from publishing "negative" stories about incidents in other geographic areas within China or carrying stories published by newspapers based in other areas, according to a July 15 report in the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao (via Yahoo! Hong Kong). In contrast to traditional media more closely aligned with the Party and government, "metropolitan" newspapers are more commercially oriented and are known for their investigative reports and entertainment stories. (See discussion of "metropolitan" newspapers on the Baidu Web site.) According to Ming Pao, the "metropolitan" newspapers also were ordered to limit domestic and international reports to stories written by the paper's own reporters or written by Xinhua, the central government's news agency. The Ming Pao report said the order is aimed at "news agency alliances" in which newspapers from different areas swap stories in order to get around local controls on reporting. Under this practice, a local newspaper prevented by local officials from reporting a story will pass along that story to a newspaper based outside the geographic area. The outside newspaper, which faces less pressure to refrain from reporting on developments in other areas, may then publish the story. The order effectively prevents both the outside-area newspaper from publishing the story in the first instance and the local newspaper from reprinting the story once it is published. The order also prohibits "negative" reports about public security officials.
The order, if followed and enforced, would enhance both local officials' control over local stories and central authorities' control over international and other domestic coverage. Ming Pao said the order had been confirmed by reporters and editors at newspapers in Hunan province, Guangdong province, and Beijing. Reporters Without Borders, an international organization that advocates for press freedom, also reported the order on July 21.
Both Ming Pao and Reporters Without Borders reported that the order may have been a response to the March 1, 2010, editorial jointly published by 13 metropolitan newspapers calling on delegates to the annual meeting of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference to demand a timetable for reform of China's household registration (hukou) system. The editorial's publication was reportedly followed by censors' removing it from the Internet, the forced resignation of one of its authors, and the Central Propaganda Department's labeling it an inappropriate act. Ming Pao reported that the editorial angered high-level officials who attributed the editorial to the "news agency alliance" among metropolitan newspapers.
Officials in the past have attempted to curb yidi jiandu. In June 2005, the Party Central Committee issued a document requiring a newspaper to obtain the approval of local Party officials in the targeted area before publishing a "critical outside area article." In 2008, authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region suspended publication of a newspaper under its jurisdiction for a critical report the paper had written about a branch of the Agricultural Bank of China located in Hunan province. The newspaper said the punishment was for violating a ban on "outside area" reporting. More recently, Party propaganda officials attempted to bar journalists from outside Qinghai province from covering a large earthquake that struck the region in April 2010.
The Central Propaganda Department order is inconsistent with China's pledge to "give full play to the role of...the news media in supervising state organs and civil servants," which is set forth in the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010). China's Constitution also provides for freedom of the press (Article 35) and the right to criticize officials (Article 41).
For more information on censorship of the news media in China, see Section II！Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-19 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Discriminatory Job Hiring Practices Continue in Xinjiang
October 20, 2010
Job recruitment in the far western region of Xinjiang continues to discriminate against Uyghurs and other groups by reserving positions exclusively for Han Chinese. The job recruitment practices, including in a number of government positions, contravene provisions in Chinese law that forbid discrimination. Examples from recent months include one civil servant recruitment drive that reserved 78 percent of available positions for Han. The remainder of the positions was either reserved for ethnic minorities or available to all candidates. The groups the Chinese government defines as "ethnic minorities" comprise roughly 60 percent of Xinjiang's population.
Hiring practices that discriminate against groups the Chinese government designates as ethnic minorities have continued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the past year. As documented in past Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)analyses (1, 2), job recruitment announcements from the region have reserved positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and state-owned enterprises, as well as in private job announcements posted on both government and non-government Web sites. Such discriminatory practices have continued in the past year, even as at least one announcement reports an increase in positions available to ethnic minorities. The restrictions accompany other discriminatory requirements, also present in some job recruitment programs elsewhere in China, based on factors such as sex and age. (See Section II-Status of Women and Section II-Public Health in the CECC 2009 Annual Report for additional information.)
Job announcements that reserve positions exclusively for Han contravene provisions in China's Constitution and in Chinese laws that forbid discrimination. See, for example, Article 4 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), both of which forbid discrimination based on ethnicity. Article 12 of the Labor Law and Article 3 of the Employment Promotion Law state that job applicants shall not face discrimination in job hiring based on factors including ethnicity, and Article 28 of the Employment Promotion Law states that all ethnicities enjoy equal labor rights. Within this framework of non-discrimination, several provisions in Chinese law permit separate measures to promote the hiring of groups designated as ethnic minorities. Article 14 of the Labor Law allows for separate legal stipulations to govern the hiring of ethnic minorities, and Article 28 of the Employment Promotion Law says that employing units shall give appropriate consideration to ethnic minority workers in job hiring. In addition, Article 22 of the REAL provides that ethnic autonomous government agencies shall give appropriate consideration to ethnic minorities in job hiring. Article 28 of the Implementing Provisions for the REAL also provides that ethnic autonomous areas give appropriate consideration to ethnic minorities in the job hiring process for government positions and includes provisions for their participation in higher levels of government. See a previous CECC analysis for additional detailed information.
The recent job hiring announcements follow an Opinion on employment promotion, implemented by the XUAR government and Party Committee in October 2009, that calls for enterprises registered in the XUAR and other enterprises contracted to work there to recruit no fewer than 50 percent of workers from among the local population (Part 2.2). The opinion also promotes "recruiting more ethnic minorities to the extent possible" (Part 2.2) and providing equal opportunities for employment (Part 3). In addition, employers are instructed to guarantee a fixed proportion of positions for ethnic minorities as part of work to increase recruitment of college graduates and prioritize graduates from the XUAR (Part 1.5). The opinion does not specify whether the guidance applies to civil servant positions.
While some recruitment programs from the past year have not restricted positions by ethnicity and reserved positions for Han (see, e.g., a roster of available positions in Urumqi municipal institutions in an August 8 announcement on Xinjiang Education Net), others continued to do so, including in the following examples:- Discriminatory Bingtuan Hiring Continues. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC or "Bingtuan") announced in May that it would hire 1,131 civil servants, consisting of 53 positions in the XPCC, 497 in several agricultural divisions, 177 public security positions, and 404 positions in the prison system, according to a May 14 announcement on the Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority Web site (also available via Huatu Education Web site). The announcement reported that 472 jobs were designated for Han, 51 for ethnic minorities, and 204 without restrictions, leaving them open to all candidates including Han. The announcement also noted in parentheses that all 404 positions in the prison system were for Han. According to the announcement, members of the Hui and Manchu ethnic groups could apply for jobs designated for Han, but other groups could not. Based on CECC analysis of the roster of open positions, 882 positions total were reserved for Han (78 percent of open positions), 1 for a Uyghur or Kazakh, 45 for Uyghurs (4 percent, including the position also open to a Kazakh), 2 for Kazakhs (0.27 percent, including the position also available to a Uyghur), 1 for an unspecified "ethnic minority" (0.09 percent) and 200 were unrestricted by ethnicity (18 percent), leaving them open to all groups including Han. Adding in positions unrestricted by ethnicity or open to an unspecified "ethnic minority," 96 percent of the positions were available to Han, 22 percent to Uyghurs, and 18 percent to Kazakhs, while 18 percent remained open to other ethnic minorities. (Analysis based on roster of open positions available via Excel sheet download on the Tengxun Education Web site and RAR file from the Qinghe (Chinggil) county government Web site. Numbers rounded to the nearest one except where less than 1 percent.)
The 2010 announcement follows past XPCC recruiting cycles that also reserved the vast majority of positions for Han. (See CECC analyses 1, 2.) In 2009, for example, the XPCC recruited for 894 positions, of which 744 were reserved for Han, 11 for Uyghurs, 2 for Kazakhs, and 137 designated as unrestricted by ethnicity. The 2010 recruitment announcement said that the 2010 quotas would raise the proportion of jobs designated as "unrestricted by ethnicity" or "ethnic minority" up to 22.6 percent of the total jobs offered, compared with 12.4 percent of all jobs in 2009. The figure of 22.6 percent appears to include all positions designated for one or more non-Han groups or unrestricted by ethnicity. Because Han are also eligible for the unrestricted jobs, the proportion of jobs reserved explicitly for members of specified or unspecified minorities would increase from 1.45 percent in 2009 to 4.2 percent in 2010, according to CECC calculations.
- Teacher Recruiting Restricts Jobs. Also in May, the XUAR Education Department announced a recruitment drive for more than 10,000 elementary and secondary school teachers, according to a May 27 Tianshan Net article. Of the 10,643 jobs listed in a roster of available positions, 3,052 (29 percent) were reserved for Han, 5,665 (53 percent) were unrestricted by ethnicity, 1,767 (17 percent) were reserved specifically for Uyghurs, 130 (1.22 percent) for Kazakhs, 18 (0.17 percent) for Kyrgyz, 5 (.05 percent) for Hui, 1 for a Russian (0.01 percent), and 5 (0.05 percent) for Mongols. (Analysis based on roster of positions available as download from the XUAR Human Resources and Social Security Department.) Many of the positions for non-Han groups require knowledge of Mandarin, suggesting that the ethnicity-based requirements were not used as a proxy to signify the language of instruction in a particular teaching position but rather were used as an independent factor in job recruitment.
- Xinjiang Government Reserves Jobs for Han. During May recruiting for a series of civil servant positions in the XUAR, 28 percent of the positions (2,639 of 9,512 jobs) were exclusively reserved for Han, according to CECC analysis. (Analysis based on roster of positions available as a download from a May 26 Tianshan Net article). A May 20 article on China Xinjiang paraphrased the vice director of the XUAR civil service bureau as saying a set number of positions would be guaranteed for ethnic minorities, while the remainder "to the extent possible" would be unrestricted by ethnicity. Based on CECC analysis of the 9,512 available positions, 72 percent of the positions (6,863 jobs) were available to ethnic minorities, including positions open to all non-Han groups as well as those designated for specific communities, meaning not all 72 percent of the positions were available for all non-Han groups. Roughly 38 percent (3,642) of the positions were unrestricted by ethnicity, 17 percent (1,579) designated for unspecified "ethnic minorities," and 17 percent (1,642) for members of specified ethnic minority groups, including 62 positions available to the member of a specified group or a Han. Some categories of jobs reserved a majority of positions for Han, such as 500 of 698 positions in town and township offices in the four southern districts of the XUAR. In other areas, jobs were split among different groups or a majority of positions was unrestricted.
- As Oil Industry Booms, Industry Jobs Favor Han. In an August announcement for jobs with the Xinjiang PetroChina Pipe Engineering Co., a subsidiary of the state-owned enterprise China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), all 50 open positions were reserved for Han. (See the August 11, 2010, job announcement on the Internet Recruiting Association Web site and company introduction on its Web site for more information about the company's relationship with CNPC.) The CNPC also has recruited for jobs in the XUAR in the past that reserved positions for Han. (See an April 7, 2009, announcement on the Xinjiang University Web site.) The August 2010 job recruiting comes as the CNPC has announced plans to increase oil production in the XUAR. Following a series of initiatives announced at the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum to boost economic development in the region, a July 20 People's Daily article reported that the CNPC would "develop Xinjiang as a major oil and gas production and processing base over the next 10 years," in anticipation of the XUAR becoming "the country's most significant base" in oil production and storage, according to a paraphrasing of CNPC's remarks.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-10 / Chinese) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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National Conferences Highlight Restrictions on Buddhist and Taoist Doctrine
October 27, 2010
National conferences of China's state-run Taoist and Buddhist "patriotic religious organizations" from the past eight months have highlighted the restrictions that the Chinese government places on the religious activities of those communities. Few reports regarding the restrictions that the Chinese government places on China's Taoists and non-Tibetan Buddhists reach the international media. However, like members of other officially recognized religious communities in China, Buddhists and Taoists who worship at officially sanctioned temples in China encounter state interference in their religious practice and teaching. Chinese government policy requires that Taoist and Buddhist religious groups affiliate with state-run "patriotic religious organizations" that manage their affairs. Those who practice these faiths at religious sites that the government does not recognize face the possibility that their places of worship will be closed or demolished. China's state-controlled Buddhist and Taoist organizations modify doctrine to eliminate some elements that the Communist Party regards as incompatible with its goals. In addition, authorities designate some religious groups that function independently of state control as "cults," raising the possibility of administrative or criminal punishment for religious leaders and followers.
Buddhist and Taoist National Conferences Infuse Political Themes Into Religious Practice
According to Chinese media sources (see below), the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) and the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA)！both state-controlled "patriotic religious organizations"！held their eighth national conferences in February and June 2010, respectively. In a speech to the eighth national conference of the BAC (via a February 1, 2010, transcript on the Buddhism Online Web site), Wang Zuo'an, director of the government's State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), praised the BAC's adherence to its 2002 seventh national conference agenda, making contributions to the advancement of "economic development, social harmony, ethnic unity, [and] unification of the motherland." He also said that BAC-affiliated communities need to work to improve the "patriotic quality" of religious personnel and believers, that clergy must be "politically reliable," that Buddhist education should lead followers to "uphold the leadership of the Communist Party," and that Buddhists should "follow the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics." Wang also highlighted the "political quality" of official controls over Buddhist doctrine when he praised BAC-affiliated communities for their repudiation of the Tibetan organizations and individuals, and their supporters, whom Chinese officials collectively refer to as the "Dalai clique," as well as the Lhasa protests and rioting of March 2008. According to the transcript of Wang's remarks posted by Buddhism Online, Wang stated:
...our struggle with the Dalai clique is not a question of religious belief, but is rather a major political struggle to oppose separatism and to protect the unity of the motherland and ethnic solidarity. The masses of religious personnel and believers ... must resolutely oppose and consciously resist the Dalai clique's activities that exploit religion to split the motherland, to damage ethnic solidarity, and to disrupt social order´
The June 2010 eighth national conference of the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) reportedly sounded similar themes. According to a June 2010 article from the CTA Web site, the CTA conference focused on encouraging "progress" and "unity," "implementing Party religious policy," and "taking an active role in the development of social harmony and economic development." A June 2010 article from the Eastern Taoism Web site stresses the need to engage in "serious study" of Party policy and the words of high-level Party officials and SARA officials. According to a June 2010 Xinhua report (via the Web site of the Central People's Government), in a visit with representatives of the conference, Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin commended the CTA's commitment to the Chinese Communist Party and stated his appreciation for its "adherence to the socialist road, its work to maintain social stability, and its contributions toward realizing ethnic unity and the unification of the motherland." Jia further stressed the need for the CTA to "encourage patriotism" among its followers.
Officials Continue Campaign Against "Unauthorized Religious Sites"
One theme that emerged in both conferences was that Buddhist and Taoist sites of worship must be approved by the government, and that unregistered sites should be closed or demolished. Wang Zuo'an's speech and the CTA article both emphasize the construction of "harmonious" temples, echoing a SARA campaign started in early 2009 and described in a June 2009 article on the Web site of the Zhouzhi County People's Government, Xi'an city, Shaanxi province. According to the article, "harmonious" temples, churches, and mosques must maintain high "patriotic" standards and "safeguard the unification of the motherland, ethnic unity, and social stability." On October 19, 2009, the Wuxi City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Jiangsu province posted a manual on its Web site outlining how to manage unauthorized temples. The manual describes some unauthorized religious sites as centers of "superstition, cults, and illegal criminal activities" and claims that they "distort, mislead, and debase religious belief" and "influence the true implementation of the Party's policies on religious freedoms." The manual offers four methods of dealing with unauthorized temples: "transform," "demolish," "change," or "co-opt"; the manual specifies that the majority of unauthorized temples should be dealt with through "demolition" or "changing." A plan for handling unregistered religious spaces published on the official Web site of the Dingshu town People's Government, Wuxi city, Jiangsu province criticizes "privately erected, indiscriminately constructed" (sida luanjian) temples and indicates that official investigations had uncovered 13 such unregistered religious venues within Dingshu town limits. The plan recommends that these unregistered sites be demolished and that their grounds be reclaimed or be made into green space.
Authorities Continue To Label Unauthorized Groups of Buddhist and Taoist Origin as "Cult Organizations"
As reported in the Commission's 2010 Annual Report (p. 105), the Communist Party's 6-10 Office, an extralegal security apparatus created to enforce a ban against Falun Gong, targets other groups that the government deems "cult organizations," including groups of Buddhist or Taoist origin. Lists of officially designated "cult" organizations, such as a list of Chinese government and Party-designated "cults" issued by the Ministry of Public Security (available via the Zhengqi Net Web site, 5 February 07) include two alleged "cults" primarily of Buddhist progeny: the Quan Yin Method (also known as Guanyin Famen), led by Ching Hai, and the True Buddha School (lingxian zhen fozong), a syncretic sect that combines elements of Tibetan Buddhism and Taoism. While the most prominent example of a religious or spiritual group officially designated as a "cult" in China is Falun Gong！a spiritual movement based on Chinese meditative exercises called qigong and the teachings of Falun Gong's founder, Li Hongzhi！authorities continue to use the "cult" designation to interfere with the activities of various religious communities that run afoul of government or Party policy, including some Buddhist and Taoist-inspired organizations. In some cases, authorities use Article 300 of the Criminal Law as a basis to punish people deemed to "use" cults to undermine state laws or commit other crimes. Authorities placed particular emphasis on anti-cult propaganda and education in the lead-up to and during the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. See, for example, a brief June 2010 introduction to cults published on the Qidong City People's Government Web Site, Jiangsu province and an April 2010 announcement from the Wushan Community Web site, Gulou city, Fujian province, specifically stating that increased supervision of religious organizations is attributable to the Shanghai Expo. A December 2009 Mashang town, Shandong province work summary found on the Zhangdian District Public Information Network particularly emphasizes the need for education campaigns against the Quan Yin Method and Falun Gong. An April 2010 article posted on the Shanghai People's Government Web site also announced the launch of a campaign to "Welcome the World Expo, Speak in a Civilized Way, and Oppose Cults."
For more information about the patriotic religious organizations, China's policies on religion, harmonious temples, and government and Party control of Buddhist and Taoist practice in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC's 2010 Annual Report. For more information on the Chinese government's crackdown on cults, see the CECC's 2010 Annual Report (p. 103-105, 110-111), a CECC analysis, and an October 1999 report on the Web site of the Chinese Embassy to the United States.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-07-30 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Mongol Rights Advocate Sodmongol Remains in Custody Following April Detention at Beijing Airport
October 20, 2010
Sodmongol, a Mongol rights advocate, remains in custody following his detention in April. He was about to depart for New York to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues when authorities at the Beijing Capital International Airport detained him. His case represents the second time in two years that authorities have prevented Mongol rights advocates from participating in UN forums on the protection of indigenous peoples. The Chinese government does not recognize any communities within its borders as "indigenous peoples."
Sodmongol, an ethnic Mongol rights advocate from Chaoyang city, Liaoning province, remains in custody since authorities first detained him at the Beijing Airport in April 2010, according to a July 15 press release from Amnesty International (AI). As reported in an April 23 article from the Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC), officials at the Beijing Capital International Airport detained Sodmongol on April 18 as he was waiting to board a flight to the United States. Sodmongol had planned to attend the Ninth Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York as part of a delegation arranged by the U.S.-based SMHRIC. The following day, authorities in Chaoyang searched Sodmongol's home, confiscated computers and other items, and told Sodmongol's wife of his detention. Sources cited in the AI article conjectured that he is held in detention in Chaoyang and that the Chaoyang procuratorate is investigating the case, but officials have not confirmed his whereabouts, according to the report. His family has been unable to visit him, according to AI.
Sodmongol was the administrator of two Internet forums！now shut down！that had promoted dialogue on Mongols' rights, according to the SMHRIC article. He also organized workshops and other events to promote the protection of Mongols' rights, in one case distributing flyers in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) to promote the protection of Mongolian language rights. Authorities previously questioned him about one of the Web sites in June 2009, asking, among other questions, whether the site posted content relating to "issues of independence of Tibetans, Mongols and Uyghurs," according to a June 22 SMHRIC article. In a December interview (via Police Net, December 4), Zhao Liping, head of the IMAR Public Security Department, said that like in the autonomous Tibetan areas of China and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the IMAR faced the threat of "enemy forces" from Western countries that wanted to "split" the region. He added that public security offices had carried out their duties and prevented the "enemy forces" from succeeding.
Sodmongol's detention comes two years after the detention of another advocate who promoted Mongols' rights as indigenous peoples. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database and a previous analysis, in 2008, authorities in the IMAR placed Mongol rights activist and journalist Naranbilig in confinement in his home for 1 year after detaining him for 20 days in March and April. Naranbilig had planned to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York when authorities intercepted his invitation letter and detained him on March 23. In addition to his planned participation in the Permanent Forum, Naranbilig also was involved in other activities to advocate for Mongols' rights.
The Chinese government voted to adopt the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, but the government does not recognize any populations within its borders as "indigenous peoples" with discrete protections for their rights stemming from this status. (See a September 13, 2007, UN General Assembly press release for the declaration's vote status.) At the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues that Sodmongol had planned to attend, the Chinese government defended its policies toward the groups it defines as "ethnic minorities" and did not directly respond to comments at the session about Sodmongol's detention. See April 27 and 29 press releases from the forum. (For an additional example of Chinese policy toward the recognition of indigenous communities within its borders, see. e.g., a 1997 statement by the Chinese delegation to the 53rd session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, via the Web site of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Switzerland.)
The UN Declaration recognizes "the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples...especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources" (Preamble), and also protects the right of indigenous peoples to "revitalize, use, develop and transmit [their languages] to future generations" (Article 13). Sodmongol had raised concern about Chinese government policies toward grasslands and language use. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report, the IMAR government has continued to implement policies to resettle herders away from grasslands and shift them to new occupations, with the stated aim of improving grasslands conditions. Such "ecological migration" measures in the IMAR, sometimes reported to be compulsory, have eroded Mongols¨ pastoral livelihoods, and scholars have questioned the effectiveness of these government policies in ameliorating environmental degradation. As also described in the 2009 Annual Report, after sustained implementation of policies that decreased the use of the Mongolian language in the IMAR, authorities have taken steps in recent years to spur greater use of the language. At the same time, authorities have targeted some Mongolian-language Web sites and Mongol discussion sites for scrutiny and closure, and a Mongol rights advocate in the IMAR reported curbs over the use of Mongolian on a university campus.
For more information on the rights of Mongols and conditions in the IMAR, see Section II！Ethnic Minorities in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-04-29 / English) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Authorities Prevent Some Human Rights Defenders From Traveling
October 27, 2010
Chinese authorities have appeared increasingly to restrict rights defenders' ability to leave China in recent months. Since April, authorities detained several rights defenders at airports in China, before they could board international flights. Authorities cited China's Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for preventing rights defenders from traveling, or, in some cases, provided no official explanation.
Chinese authorities appear to be applying greater restrictions on rights defenders and advocates' ability to leave China. Authorities appear increasingly to rely on immigration controls to target them at the border.
- On August 3, Beijing Public Security Bureau detained writer Mo Zhixu in Fujian province, as he attempted to board a plane to Japan for vacation, according to reports on August 5 and August 3 from Radio Free Asia. Authorities reportedly cited concerns for state security as the reason for Mo's detention. Mo reportedly speculated that his detention was likely related to his support of Charter 08, a treatise advocating political reform and human rights.
- Several other human rights defenders were prevented from leaving China in recent months. In May, authorities detained rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong at the Beijing Capital International Airport while he attempted to board a flight to the United States, according to the August 5 report by Radio Free Asia. Customs officials reportedly invoked state security as grounds for preventing Jiang from traveling abroad.
- In July, authorities prevented Guo Yushan, director of the non-government Transition Institute, from attending a conference organized by the European Union in Poland, and a second, unrelated conference in Brussels, according to the August 5 report by Radio Free Asia. Authorities reportedly did not provide any explanation for preventing Guo's travel.
- On July 4, authorities in Beijing prevented human rights lawyer Zhang Kai from attending a church-organized training conference in the United States, according to China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group and ChinaAid. Zhang's colleagues were allowed to leave. During the past year, Zhang Kai has defended members of house churches in several cases that authorities have regarded as politically sensitive. Authorities at the Beijing International Airport reportedly cited state security, and orders from a higher government entity as reasons Zhang was not allowed to travel.
- On April 18, authorities at the Beijing Capital International Airport reportedly prevented Sodmongol, a Mongol rights advocate, from attending the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York City, according to an April 23 article from the Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center. Authorities apparently did not provide an explanation for Sodmongol's arrest. As of July 15, Sodmongol had been held in detention in Chaoyang city, Liaoning province according to an Amnesty International press release. For more information on Sodmongol, see CECC analysis, Mongol Activist Remains in Custody Following April Detention at Airport.
In instances where explanations were given (Mo, Jiang, and Zhang), authorities most frequently cited Article 8 (5) of China's Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens (Chinese, English) as justification for preventing rights defenders from traveling. The section prohibits the departure from China of "... persons whose exit from the country ... in the opinion of the competent department of the State Council, [would] be harmful to state security or cause a major loss to national interests." According to the August 3 and 5 reports from Radio Free Asia, human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong expressed concern about the apparent trend of preventing Chinese citizens who are "active in the public domain" from traveling abroad in recently months. According to one Chinese scholar, anecdotal evidence appears to suggest a broader application of the "state security" provision to rights defenders and citizens. He further observed that Article 8 (5) deprives citizens of fundamental rights due to its lack of accountability and remedial provisions.
These recent developments suggest that Chinese authorities are placing significant burdens on freedom of movement, which is a human right guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For more information on restrictions on freedom of movement, see Section II！Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-08-23 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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Xinjiang Authorities Target Beards, Veils in Campaigns To Tighten Control Over Religion
October 18, 2010
Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang have carried out campaigns in 2010 and previous years targeting Muslim men who wear large beards and women who wear veils (singling out face veiling in a number of cases), tying the practices in the Muslim-majority region to "religious extremism" and "backwardness." The campaigns against beards and veils come as Xinjiang authorities continue to tighten controls over religion in the region. Amid these campaigns, newly available information indicates that authorities imposed prison sentences on two men in 2007 and 2008 in cases that reportedly have connections to the men wearing beards.
Authorities in the XUAR have carried out campaigns in 2010 and previous years to restrict wearing beards, veils, and clothing perceived to carry religious connotations, associating the practices with "religious extremism" and "backwardness." In some cases, authorities have focused their efforts on younger people, in an apparent effort to stem perceived "religious extremism" among segments of the population deemed more likely to challenge official authority. In at least one reported campaign, authorities described using legal punishments to address wearing beards and veils. As part of the work to implement Communist Party directives in Aksu district in 2009, local officials were instructed to discern the thinking, motives, and behavior of people with beards, veils, or "bizarre" clothes and then to deal with them according to these "different situations," through measures including "punishing severely in accordance with law" (yifa yancheng), "handling [matters] through coercion" (qiangzhi chuli), and "helping" to "liberate" (bangzhu jietuo). See a report posted December 11, 2009, on the Shayar county, Aksu, government Web site. In addition, authorities in Shayar county went to people's homes to carry out "face-to-face propaganda and education" and to have them sign pledges that they would no longer wear "bizarre" clothes or beards, according to the report. In Wensu (Onsu) county, Aksu, the propaganda bureau engaged in "propaganda and education activities" resulting in 569 women "voluntarily" removing face coverings, 606 women no longer wearing "bizarre" clothes, and 295 young men shaving their beards, according to the report.
The previous year, officials from the religious affairs bureau in Awat county, Aksu, noted in a summary of accomplishments from 2008 that it carried out work aimed at "big beards" worn by young men and face veiling by women, according to a November 11, 2008, report from the Awat county government Web site. (The document has been removed from the Awat county Web site. A partial excerpt is available from Fast Document Net.) Authorities provided "study and education" to young men with big beards and women with veiled faces, and "in accordance with the principle of channeling responsibility to the proper authorities, each relevant department carried out beard-shaving and unveilings directed at young men with big beards and young women covering their faces." Also in 2008, government and Communist Party officials in the town of Yengi Mehelle, Shayar county, Aksu, called for taking various "effective measures" during the month of Ramadan to have men with big beards shave them off and have women remove face veils, according to an August 28, 2008, report on the Shayar county government Web site (available via Open Source Center, subscription required, CPP20080905072001).
In Chabucha'er (Chapchal) Xibe Autonomous County in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, "abnormal" big beards, veiling one's face, and other forms of expression with a "religious hue" were among 16 situations to be "reported on" and "dealt with," according to the answer sheet for a knowledge contest on "promoting ethnic unity, opposing separatism, and upholding stability" (Item 64) posted August 31, 2009, on the Chapchal Xibe Autonomous County, Ili, government Web site. The answer sheet also connected wearing big beards to a religious organization--called the "faithfulness" organization, or zhongcheng zuzhi in Mandarin, based on the original Uyghur name, ita'et or "obedience"！described as having members with a "Wahhabi" outlook who disregard the laws of the state, refuse to pay taxes, advocate jihad, and prohibit eating food that has "MSG, butter, and seasonings made in factories in [China's] interior" (Item 161).
Authorities have continued campaigns targeting beards and veils in 2010. The XUAR Women's Federation carried out campaigns in the past year to persuade women to stop wearing veils, describing one pilot project as successful in making women "realize that wearing a veil is not a form of expression of ethnic dress but rather of extreme religion, an expression of a type of ignorant and backward way of thinking, and an expression not suited for the developments of the times." See a related CECC analysis for detailed information. In May 2010, authorities in Hanikatamu (Xaniqatam, Xaniqa atam, Hankhatam) township in Kucha, Aksu, assessed a campaign connected to "illegal religious activities" as an effective step in attacking "religious fanaticism" and changing "outmoded thinking" regarding "bizarre" apparel worn by some women in Hanikatamu and "big beards" worn by some young men. See a related CECC analysis for detailed information. A person from the township reported to Radio Free Asia in September that authorities strengthened controls over face coverings, beards, and "religious" clothing during Ramadan, according to September 21 and September 24, 2010, articles from Radio Free Asia. Sources cited in the articles also reported fines for people who didn't remove face veils or beards, as well as restrictions on beards and religious apparel in force elsewhere in the XUAR.
As authorities have politicized beard wearing, newly available information indicates that authorities levied prison sentences on two men in 2007 and 2008 in cases that have reported connections to the men wearing beards. Public security officers in Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili, detained a Uyghur laborer, Nurtay Memet, in 2007 on grounds related to "superstition" and to violating the region's social order regulation, according to an August 20, 2010, report from Radio Free Asia's Uyghur service. Nurtay Memet's wife connected the detention to her husband wearing a beard. The Yining (Ghulja) Municipal People's Court tried and sentenced Nurtay Memet in 2007 to five years' imprisonment on the "superstition"-related charge. Under Article 300 of China's Criminal Law (English, Chinese), "using superstition to undermine the implementation of the laws and administrative rules and regulations of the State" is punishable by prison sentences between three and seven years or sentences of no less than seven years in serious cases. Nurtay Memet is reportedly held in a prison in Wusu (Shixo) city in Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district in Ili. His wife said that her husband, now 52 years old, is in poor health. She also reported that authorities forced her to stop covering her face.
In a separate case, the same court sentenced Uyghur trader Ghojaexmet Niyaz to six years in prison in 2008, which a source familiar with the case connected in part to Ghojaexmet Niyaz's refusal to shave his beard, according to a September 13, 2010, report from Radio Free Asia's Uyghur service. Public security officers in Weihai city, Shandong province, initially detained Ghojaexmet Niyaz in May 2008 during a security sweep in advance of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, on the grounds that he did not have an identification card, according to the report. Ghojaexmet Niyaz had just come to the city with his family for work, and authorities returned him to his home in the XUAR. The specific charges against him at trial are not known, but the source familiar with the case said he had committed no other misdeed than not having identification and connected the sentence to Ghojaexmet Niyaz's refusal in court to shave his beard and show remorse. Ghojaexmet Niyaz is currently held at a prison in the Yanqi Hui Autonomous County in the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture within the XUAR, according to the report.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.
| Source: -See Summary (2010-09-17 ) |
Posted on: 2010-11-09 |
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