"I look forward to when my country is a land with freedom of expression; where every citizen's speech will be treated equally well; where different values, ideas, beliefs, and political views ... can compete with one another and coexist peacefully; ... where all political views will be spread out under the sun for the people to choose from; where every citizen can express political views without fear; and where under no circumstances can one suffer political persecution for expressing different political views."

• Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets International Standards (12/10/10)


• Hearing: Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo and the Future of Political Reform in China (11/9/10)


• Beijing High People's Court Affirms Liu Xiaobo's 11-Year Sentence (2/26/10)


• Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case from Outset (1/21/10)


• Beijing Court Sentences Liu Xiaobo to 11 Years (1/5/10)


• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin on the Trial of Liu Xiaobo (12/23/09)


• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)


• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)


• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)


• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)


• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)


• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)


• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)


• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)


• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)


• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)


• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)






Source: -See Summary (2010-12-10 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=151761

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Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets International Standards

December 9, 2010

Official Chinese media have argued that the 11-year sentence for "inciting subversion," imposed last year on Nobel Peace Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo in connection with his writings, is consistent both with international human rights standards and with the practices of other countries, notably North American and Western European countries. The Chinese central government's news agency, Xinhua, published an article on October 25, 2010, that makes this claim based on the arguments of a noted Chinese legal scholar who specializes in criminal law. The Commission has translated this article into English and provides the full text and translation here. As the Commission noted in its 2010 Annual Report, Chinese officials increasingly have sought to portray their practices as consistent with international human rights standards.

On October 25, 2010, Xinhua News Agency issued a news article (in Chinese) aiming to rebut foreign media criticism of the imprisonment of prominent Chinese intellectual and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo. Liu is a writer and democracy advocate who was sentenced to 11 years in prison in December 2009 for "inciting subversion of state power," a crime under Article 105, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Law. His sentence was based on six essays he wrote and his help drafting Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and human rights, as well as the dissemination of the writings over the Internet. Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (announcement via the Nobel's official Web site) on October 8, 2010. The Xinhua article is based on an interview with Professor Gao Mingxuan, who argues in the article that Chinese courts acted correctly in convicting Liu and that restrictions on free speech are common throughout the world. Gao is a professor at the Renmin University of China Law School whose research interests include Chinese criminal law and international criminal law, according to the school's Web site.

[Note: Quotes below from the Xinhua article are based on the Commission's English translation found here. It is unclear whether some of Gao's remarks in the Xinhua article are direct quotes or are paraphrased. We treat them below as direct quotes unless otherwise specified. On November 5, Xinhua's English Web site posted an English-language article covering Gao's remarks, which was posted on the Web site of the Chinese Embassy in the United States that same day. China Daily, a state-controlled English newspaper, ran an op-ed titled "A Crime In Any Other Country As Well" on November 3 that includes some of the same arguments as the Xinhua article, but is attributed to "Zhang Zhengyi, a commentator in Beijing."]

Gao's Arguments

According to the Xinhua article, Professor Gao argues Chinese courts acted correctly in Liu's case because Liu sought to incite the overthrow of the Chinese regime and posed a serious threat to society. As evidence of Liu's intent to subvert the Chinese regime, Gao points to passages in Liu's writings, including: "the Chinese Communist Party's dictatorship brings calamity to the country and the people," and references to "changing the regime" and "establishing a Chinese federal republic." To support his contention that Liu's actions posed a serious threat, Gao cited Liu's use of the Internet to disseminate and gain support for his views and Liu's prior activism, which officials had also punished. According to Gao, "[fo]reign, anti-China forces used Liu's words and deeds to launch attacks against China, leading in fact to serious harmful effects and consequences." Gao provides no further details regarding such attacks or their effects.

Gao also argued that the Chinese government is not the only government that punishes incitement as a crime or restricts speech. "The laws of nearly every nation in the world and relevant international conventions" have provisions criminalizing some speech, and "'freedom of speech' in any nation has its limits," the article paraphrases Gao as saying. Gao cites laws and cases from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, Singapore, France, Austria, Denmark, and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as provisions from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), American Convention on Human Rights, and Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. At the end of the article Gao argues that under U.S. case law, Liu would also have been found guilty. Citing the 1919 U.S. Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States (via Findlaw), which set forth the "clear and present danger" test, Gao reportedly said "[e]ven if we use the American standard to judge the case of Liu Xiaobo, the decisions of the Beijing courts at the two levels [in the case of Liu] are not in doubt."

International Human Rights Standards and the Liu Case

China has signed and committed to ratify the ICCPR, which specifies the conditions under which states may restrict freedom of expression. Article 19 of the ICCPR provides that such restriction must: (1) be provided for by law, (2) address one of the aims enumerated in paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of Article 19, which include protecting national security, and (3) be necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose. The UN Human Rights Committee, established under the ICCPR, has interpreted Article 19 in specific cases, providing guidance on what states must show in order to prove that a restriction is "necessary." States must specify the nature of the threat posed by the expression with some precision. For example, in the 1998 case of Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea (via UNHCR Web site), the Committee found that the state had failed to specify the precise nature of the threat to national security in a case involving a citizen convicted for "having read out and distributed printed material which were seen as coinciding with the policy statements" of North Korea. The Committee faulted South Korean courts for failing to address questions of the nature and extent of the risk to national security or "whether the contents of the speech or the documents had any additional effect upon the audience or readers such as to threaten public security, the protection of which would justify restriction within the terms of the [ICCPR] as being necessary." The UN Human Rights Council recently cautioned states against imposing restrictions inconsistent with Article 19, including restrictions on "[d]iscussion of government policies and political debate; reporting on human rights, government activities and corruption in government;...peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy; and expression of opinion and dissent...." (see Resolution 12/16, available by clicking on Symbol Number at this link).

In Liu's case, Chinese officials charged him with violating a crime of endangering national security, Article 105, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Law. Neither the lower court nor the appeals court, however, specified how Liu's actions posed a threat to China's national security. (See Human Rights in China's English translations of the lower court's December 25, 2009, judgment, and the appeals court's February 9, 2010, judgment.) Those courts instead rely on general claims that Liu used the Internet's features to "incite others to overthrow our country's state power and the socialist system" and that "his articles were widely linked, reproduced, and viewed, spreading vile influence." The courts do not specify who was incited or the specific nature of the "vile influence," much less the extent of the risk posed to national security. The courts do not cite any language in which Liu advocates violence. As noted above, Gao offers his own explanation of the harm caused to China's national security, namely attacks from "[f]oreign, anti-China forces" but that explanation is also unspecific and in any case was not specifically cited by the courts. Finally, the courts did not indicate what weight, if any, they gave to Liu's constitutional right to free speech.

Furthermore, neither Gao nor the courts acknowledge other language in Charter 08 or the essays for which Liu was convicted that contradict their characterization of Liu's writings as inciting the overthrow of the current regime. The essay from which the phrase "changing the regime" is taken, for example, argues for gradual political change. In that essay, titled "Changing the Regime by Changing Society" (via Observe China, HRIC translation), Liu writes that: "[i]n terms of opposition to the might of the Chinese Communist regime...there is no way to cultivate in a short time a political force adequate to the task of replacing the Communist regime." Instead, Liu advises Chinese citizens to "pursue the free and democratic forces among the people; do not pursue the rebuilding of society through radical regime change, but instead use gradual social change to compel regime change." Moreover, he emphasizes non-violence:
• "The greatness of non-violent resistance is that even as man is faced with forceful tyranny and the resulting suffering, the victim responds to hate with love...and to violence with reason";


• "The non-violent rights defense movement does not aim to seize political power, but is committed to building a humane society..."; and


• "The non-violent rights defense movement need not pursue a grand goal of complete transformation."
In addition, while Charter 08 calls for changes in China's political system it does not specify a process or timetable for achieving this. Instead, it sets forth certain "fundamental principles" and "recommendations": human rights, equality, democracy, constitutional rule, separation of powers, freedom of expression, and an independent judiciary, among others.

China's application of the inciting subversion provision used in Liu's case repeatedly has fallen short of international standards. While Article 105(2) is intended to protect national security, numerous cases in recent years indicate that the law has been used instead to punish peaceful critics of the Chinese government and Communist Party, including Tan Zuoren, an advocate of victims of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Hu Jia, a human rights activist, and Yang Chunlin, a land rights activist. The law is subject to abuse because, as Chinese defense lawyers, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and human rights organizations have found, its wording is vague, Chinese officials have not clearly delineated constitutionally protected speech from subversive speech, and courts make no effort to show the "potential or real subversive effect" of the speech. China lacks an independent judiciary and officials commit frequent abuses in their handling of cases they deem to be politically sensitive, as evidenced by the numerous ways in which officials in the Liu case ignored legal protections for suspects and defendants and made it difficult for Liu to mount a defense.

While equating China's practices with those of other countries and jurisdictions, Gao draws parallels to laws and cases that diverge widely from the facts and setting of the Liu case. For example, Gao cites a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) against George Ruggiu, a Belgian journalist who worked at a radio station in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. According to the ICTR's judgment in the case, the court found that Ruggiu's radio broadcasts had "incited massacres of the Tutsi population" (Paragraph 50). While such case supports the general proposition that international law permits restrictions on expression, it provides no further information regarding whether the restriction as applied in Liu's case comports with international law.

Finally, Gao's contention regarding the hypothetical outcome of Liu's case under U.S. law is without basis. As noted above, the courts in Liu's case did not undertake to determine the nature or extent of the threat to national security posed by Liu's actions or indicate the weight given to Liu's constitutional right to free speech. Furthermore, as noted in the Congressional Research Service's Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, there have been a number of cases since Schenck that have provided additional guidance on the boundaries of free speech in the United States (see pp. 1091-1110). For example, in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969, via Findlaw) the U.S. Supreme Court notes that the advocacy of force or of law violation is permissible "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." It is unclear why Gao cites only to the Schenck case and fails to mention the later precedents.

As noted in the Commission's 2010 Annual Report, Chinese officials "increasingly tend to declare the Chinese government's compliance with international norms, even in the face of documented noncompliance." In June 2010, for example, the State Council Information Office released a white paper discussing the state of the Internet in China, claiming that the government "guarantees citizens' freedom of speech on the Internet" and that its regulation of the Internet is "consistent with international practices." In another example, China's foreign ministry denied the existence of "black jails," or secret detention sites, even though official Chinese media had reported on their existence, as recently noted by George Washington University Law School Professor Donald Clarke. For more information on the compliance of China's restrictions on freedom of expression with international standards, see Section II—Freedom of the Expression, in the 2010 Annual Report.

Additional CECC Resources on Liu Xiaobo:
• Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets International Standards (12/10/10)
  
• Hearing: Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo and the Future of Political Reform in China (11/9/10)
  
• Beijing High People's Court Affirms Liu Xiaobo's 11-Year Sentence (2/26/10)
  
• Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case from Outset (1/21/10)
  
• Beijing Court Sentences Liu Xiaobo to 11 Years (1/5/10)
  
• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin on the Trial of Liu Xiaobo (12/23/09)
  
• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
  
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
  
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
  
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
  
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
  
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
  
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
  
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
  
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
  
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
  
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)




Source: -See Summary (2010-11-22 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-12-17
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=150864

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Mongol Activist, Family Members Harassed and Detained as Release Date of Political Prisoner Hada Nears (Updated)

December 8, 2010

In advance of Mongol activist and political prisoner Hada's anticipated December 10 release from prison, authorities in Inner Mongolia have harassed, placed under house arrest, and detained some of Hada's family members and fellow activists. Public security officers took Hada's wife Xinna into detention on December 4. They also took her son Uiles into custody on December 4 and released him later that day, but placed him in detention on December 5. In mid-November, authorities placed Mongol activist Govruud Huuchinhuu under house arrest, in apparent connection to her plans to greet Hada upon his anticipated release from prison. The legal basis under which she was confined to her home is not clear. Officials reportedly later allowed her to leave her home, but continue to keep her under watch. The recent events underscore the challenges Mongols have faced in upholding their rights and preserving their culture. Authorities in Inner Mongolia have repressed independent expressions of ethnic identity among Mongols, implemented policies that have eroded Mongols' pastoral livelihoods, and placed curbs on Mongolian language Web sites.

Public security officers in Saihan district, Hohhot, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), detained Mongol bookstore owner Xinna at her bookstore on December 4, 2010, in connection to the upcoming scheduled release from prison of her husband, Mongol activist Hada, according to December 4 and December 8, 2010, Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC) reports. Authorities confiscated items from the store including books and CDs and also searched a warehouse connected to the bookstore, confiscating Xinna's diary, her son's computer, business records, and other items. Public security officers also took Xinna and Hada's son Uiles into custody on December 4 and released him later that day, while holding Xinna at the Inner Mongolia Public Security Department Detention Center for allegedly "running an illegal business." On December 5, public security officers placed Uiles in detention at the same detention center as his mother, according to the reports. Xinna suffers from a heart condition, according to SMHRIC, and Uiles was not allowed to bring medications to her prior to his own detention. Xinna's current health condition is not known. SMHRIC connected the recent events to official efforts to quell publicity about Hada's upcoming release. Uiles said that authorities took him into custody on December 4 for "spreading the word through the Internet," and in a December 5 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report, SMHRIC's spokesperson noted interviews Xinna and Uiles had given to foreign media outlets and human rights groups. Uiles said that while he was in custody on December 4, he refused to sign a pledge that he would not convey information about his family by phone or Internet, would cut ties with his parents, and would not "carry out any separatist activities." In addition, SMHRIC reported in its December 4 article that in advance of Hada's scheduled release from prison, authorities in the IMAR also have harassed, detained, and put under house arrest other family members and activists. Hada's uncle Haschuluu reported to SMHRIC that public security officers have harassed him since he gave foreign media interviews. In addition, authorities detained activist Arslan and told him not to plan to welcome Hada's release. He is now under house arrest, according to SMHRIC.

In addition, public security officers in Ke'erqin (Horchin) district, Tongliao city, IMAR, placed Govruud Huuchinhuu, a Mongol activist and writer, under house arrest on November 11, 2010, in apparent connection to her plans to welcome Hada upon his anticipated release from prison, according to a November 16, 2010, SMHRIC article and November 18 RFA report. Officers had taken her to the Ke'erqin District Public Security Bureau (PSB) earlier that day, before placing her under house arrest. Based on information in the articles, it appears that Govruud Huuchinhuu's house arrest may have amounted to a form of home confinement that lacks basis in Chinese law, as also may be the case for Arslan. Under Articles 50 and 58 of China's Criminal Procedure Law (English, Chinese), public security officers, prosecutors, and courts can impose "residential surveillance" on criminal suspects for a period of up to six months, but it is unclear if the Ke'erqin PSB officials ordered formal residential surveillance in this case. Govruud Huuchinhuu reported in the RFA article that she received no formal documentation from public security officials on the nature of the actions against her and that no proceedings occurred while she was at the PSB office. Govruud Huuchinhuu told RFA that her house arrest likely was linked to activist Hada's anticipated release. She reported that she had described plans on her blog to greet him upon his release and said that authorities "probably detained me under house arrest ahead of time, for fear that I would spread the news around." In a November 26 Agence France-Presse article (via Yahoo!), before her detention, Hada's wife Xinna was paraphrased as saying that "Huuchinhuu was now being allowed to leave home but is followed by police and faces other restrictions." Xinna also reported that since April, authorities had not permitted her (Xinna) to visit her husband in prison.

According to SMHRIC and RFA, Govruud Huuchinhuu is an activist and writer who has promoted the rights of ethnic Mongols in China and has criticized Chinese government policy in the IMAR. She is a member of an organization banned by Chinese authorities, the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance (SMDA), which Hada led. She also moderated several online discussion fora on Web sites that SMHRIC reports have been closed for "posting separatism contents" and "discussing ethnic problems." (As reported in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010 Annual Report and a previous analysis, authorities have targeted some Mongolian-language Web sites and Mongol discussion sites for scrutiny and closure in recent years.) SMHRIC reported Govruud Huuchinhuu has been detained and harassed on multiple occasions in the past and in 2007 was denied a passport and barred from traveling abroad for a five-year period.

The recent cases of harassment, house arrest, and detention come as Hada faces a scheduled release from prison on December 10, 2010, upon expiration of his 15-year sentence. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, authorities detained Hada on December 11, 1995, after he organized peaceful protests for ethnic rights in the IMAR capital city of Hohhot. The Hohhot Intermediate People's Court sentenced him on December 26, 1996, to the 15-year prison term for "splittism" and "espionage," crimes under Articles 103 and 110 of China's Criminal Law (English, Chinese). (Some sources report a November 11, 1996, sentencing date.) The Inner Mongolia High People’s Court rejected Hada’s appeal in January 1997. Hada is held in the Inner Mongolia No. 4 Prison in Chifeng, IMAR, where he is reportedly in poor health, has been denied proper medical treatment, and has been subject to routine physical abuse.

Hada's case and the recent events surrounding his scheduled release underscore the challenges Mongols have faced in upholding their rights. As reported in the CECC 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports, authorities in the IMAR have repressed independent expressions of Mongol ethnic identity and punished Mongols who have aimed to protect their rights and preserve their culture, language, and pastoral livelihoods. In late 2009 and 2010, authorities detained Batzangaa, who ran a traditional Mongolian medicine school which held activities with Mongols and Tibetans, and Sodmongol, a rights activist whom authorities detained at the Beijing airport as he was en route to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

For more information on conditions in the IMAR, see Section II—Ethnic Minorities in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.

UPDATE, December 10, 2010: Hada's prison sentence expired on December 10, but family members have not received confirmation of his release, according to a December 11, 2010, report from the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center. Hada's uncle Haschuluu said that a state security officer earlier implied that Hada had been moved from his prison in Chifeng to Hohhot, in an apparent effort to prevent people from meeting him upon his release. Xinna's sister reported that she received official detention notices for the detentions of Xinna and Uiles. Authorities detained Xinna for allegedly "running an illegal business," as reported earlier, while authorities have detained Uiles for allegedly "being involved in drug dealing," according to the report.





Source: -See Summary (2010-11-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=150920

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Authorities Deny Human Rights Lawyers Professional License Renewals

December 10, 2010

In 2010, Chinese authorities have continued to pressure human rights lawyers that took on sensitive cases or engaged in sensitive human rights work by denying annual professional license renewals. Chinese lawyers must have their professional licenses renewed annually by passing an assessment review overseen by Communist Party-controlled local lawyers' associations and justice bureaus. In recent years, local lawyers' associations and justice bureaus have adopted increasingly strict measures to tighten control of law firms and lawyers in the review process. The July attempts to control and intimidate human rights lawyers follow various events that highlight the ongoing hardships facing Chinese human rights lawyers.

Authorities Use Annual Inspection To Intimidate Lawyers

Authorities in China continued to pressure human rights lawyers who took on sensitive cases (such as those involving house church activists, Falun Gong practitioners, and victims of illegal property seizures) or engaged in sensitive causes by denying professional license renewals during the "annual inspection and assessment process" (niandu jiancha kaohe), which justice departments throughout the country completed in July of this year. According to a July 16 China Human Rights Lawyer Concern Group (CHRLCG) article and a July 18 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article, Chinese authorities failed to renew the professional licenses of several human rights lawyers during the process, following similar refusals to renew licenses in previous years (for more information, see the Commission's July 10, 2009, "China's Human Rights Lawyers: Current Challenges and Prospects" roundtable transcript here). This year, judicial authorities refused to renew the professional licenses of several prominent human rights lawyers—Jiang Tianyong, Wen Haibo, Zhang Lihui, Tong Chaoping, Yang Huiwen, and Li Jinsong—by the July 15, 2010, deadline (extended from an original deadline of May 2010). According to the July 18 RFA article, some human rights lawyers reportedly only passed the annual "inspection and assessment" after accepting additional terms, such as pledging that they would avoid certain sensitive cases or decline interviews.

Regulations Aimed at Tightening Control on Lawyers and Law Firms

Under the 2008 PRC Lawyer's Law, law firms must submit an annual practice report with assessments of lawyers' practices to relevant judicial administrative departments (see Arts. 23 and 24). State-controlled lawyers' associations, in coordination with local justice bureaus, decide each year which lawyers will be able to practice law based on the assessments. Lawyers who fail to pass the annual review are denied license renewals and can be barred from practicing for a period of time depending on the severity of the case. In the most severe cases, lawyers' licenses may be permanently revoked. In 2010, according to the July 16 CHRLCG article, authorities have attempted to control human rights lawyers by pressuring law firms to refrain from employing certain lawyers. Consequently, some law firms have persuaded human rights lawyers to move to other law firms. In the CECC 2009 Annual Report, the Commission noted that the government had used the annual review process to revoke the licenses of at least 21 rights lawyers. In the CECC 2010 Annual Report, the Commission noted that judicial authorities denied license renewals to at least six lawyers. As in previous years, rights organizations and lawyers have stated that this process has become a political tool to silence human rights lawyers and intimidate other attorneys from joining their ranks.

Although the PRC Lawyer's Law remains the basis for the annual review, the Ministry of Justice has passed, or amended, a series of measures tightening government and Party control over the process in recent years:

• "Measures for Punishing Unlawful Acts by Lawyers and Law Firms" (Ministry of Justice Order No. 122) (2010)

• "Measures on Annual Inspection and Annual Assessment of Law Firms" (Ministry of Justice Order No. 121) (2010)

• "Measures for the Management of the Professional Credentials of Lawyers and Law Firms" (Ministry of Justice Order No. 119) (2009)

• "Measures for Management of the Legal Profession"(Ministry of Justice Order No. 112) (2008)

• "Measures for Managing Law Firms" (Ministry of Justice Order No. 111) (2008)

The various sets of measures institute new stipulations to supervise and control lawyers and law firms. The 2008 Measures for Managing Law Firms, for instance, permits law firms to remove lawyers who fail to pass the annual inspection and specifies circumstances under which lawyers' licenses may be revoked (see Art. 41). The 2009 Measures for the Management of the Professional Credentials of Lawyers and Law Firms contains provisions detailing procedures for carrying out annual inspections and license revocations (see Arts. 12 through 17). According to a April 9, 2010, Legal Daily article (reprinted in Xinhua), the Ministry of Justice issued the Measures on Annual Inspection and Annual Assessment of Law Firms and amended the Measures for Punishing Unlawful Acts by Lawyers and Law Firms in order to "strengthen the supervision of practicing lawyers and law firms' activities" and to "specify lawyers and law firms' penalties for work violations." The 2010 Measures on Annual Inspection and Annual Assessment of Law Firms, according to state-controlled news media, reportedly provides further clarification on annual assessment procedures, evaluation criteria, and other assessment details broadly stipulated in the PRC Lawyer's Law. Domestic Chinese lawyers, however, have criticized the measures. According to a June 22, 2010, Democracy and Rule of Law article, for instance, Beijing lawyers Mu Jiyuan and Li Jinxing sent a letter to the State Council in May 2010, proposing that the Measures on Annual Inspection and Annual Assessment of Law Firms and the amended Measures for Punishing Unlawful Acts by Lawyers and Law Firms be revoked. The lawyers reportedly pointed out that the two measures "not only violated the law, but also included excessively harsh content that would influence normal practices."

For more information on the annual inspection and assessment process and the rights of human rights lawyers, see Section III—Access to Justice in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2010-11-04 / English) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=149916

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Government Issues New Draft Regulations on Demolishing Residential Buildings on State-owned Land

December 8, 2010

On September 19, 2010, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) called a meeting of experts in Beijing to discuss a new draft of the Regulations on Expropriation, Demolition, and Payment of Compensation for Residential Buildings on State-owned Land (New Regulations). The New Regulations would replace the 2001 Regulations on Management of Demolition of Urban Residential Buildings (2001 Regulations). The SCLAO issued a comment draft of the New Regulations in January 2010, with the comment period ending in February. The New Regulations followed the publication of an open letter written by five Peking University law professors in December 2009. The professors claimed that the 2001 Regulations violate the PRC Constitution and Property Law.

According to an article posted on the Web site of the Ministry of Land and Resources, in September 2010, the PRC State Council Legislative Affairs Office called together a group of experts to discuss draft Regulations for Expropriation, Demolition, and Payment of Compensation for Residential Buildings on State-owned Land (New Regulations); experts who attended the meeting reported that the first draft of the New Regulations has been finalized. The Chinese government had issued a comment draft of the New Regulations on the Web site of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development on January 29, 2010. The September conference and creation of a formal draft follow a period of increasing protests over demolitions and calls for reform. A September 2010 article in Southern Metropolis Daily profiles three competing draft pieces of legislation on expropriation put forth by different Beijing lawyers in hopes of speeding up work on the New Regulations.

Currently, the 2001 Regulations on Government Housing Demolition in Urban Areas (2001 Regulations) govern the demolition of housing on state-owned land in urban areas. There have been reports of abuses in property demolitions, including a February 2010 report by the non-governmental organization, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, which notes, "The current legal framework governing demolition and eviction offers little protection to homeowners." According to a December 2009 Reuters report, five law professors from Peking University had sent an open letter to the National People's Congress calling for repeal or amendment of the 2001 Regulations. The professors said the regulations did not comply with the Constitution and the Property Law, which provide that citizens should receive fair compensation for property which has been taken. Under the 2001 Regulations, there is no requirement that the government show public interest in requisitioning land, as required under Article 42 of the Property Law, or Article 10 of the Constitution.

The January comment draft includes detailed procedures for requisitions and payments of compensation, requires that requisitions be in the public interest in most cases, and provides some clarity concerning the term "public interest." However, Article 40 of the January comment draft still allows requisitions other than in the public interest under certain circumstances. While a full-text version of the first formal draft of the New Regulations (as discussed at the September meeting) has yet to be released, the September 2010 Ministry of Land and Resources article identifies the following key points of the legislation:



• Sufficient compensation must be provided before property demolition in the name of public interest can be carried out.


• The government must clearly show distinction between public and private interests.


• A dispute resolution agency to determine whether a demolition is truly serving the public interest and/or whether the occupant has been adequately compensated must be created.


• The occupant and the party performing the demolition must enter into an agreement detailing the occupant's consent to the demolition and the amount of compensation, before demolition can take place.


• In order to carry out the renovation of old and dangerous buildings, 90 percent of the building occupants must agree to the project.


• Compensation should be equal to the market value of the residential structure as determined by the consideration of the building's location, use, type, age and location.



According to a Voice of America article in May, "The seizure of land is being described by some analysts as perhaps the biggest threat to the Beijing government." An October 22, 2010 article in Xinhua reported that an anonymous blogger in China has created a "Blood Stained Housing Map" of illegal land grabs and demolitions. According to an October 29 Wall Street Journal article, the map had received over 340,000 views in the three weeks since going up on October 8.

For more information on urban land expropriation, see Section III—Commercial Rule of Law in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.









Source: -See Summary (2010-11-16 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
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Chinese Authorities Prevent Protestants From Attending International Evangelization Conference

December 8, 2010

Chinese authorities have harassed, detained, or prevented from leaving the country approximately 200 Protestants in China who received invitations to attend an international conference on evangelization in South Africa. Organizers of the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization, which was held in Cape Town from October 16-25, 2010, reportedly invited members of China's unregistered Protestant church communities to attend as participants and invited members of China's state-controlled Protestant church communities to attend as observers. The state-controlled church did not send any representatives to the Lausanne Congress, and authorities in various locations throughout China reportedly warned members of unregistered church communities not to attend the Lausanne Congress because their attendance would "endanger state security."

Authorities Intimidate Unregistered Protestants Who Seek To Attend Lausanne Congress

As early as March 2010, authorities at the local level in various locations throughout China began to warn some of the approximately 200 members of unregistered Protestant communities who had received invitations to the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization (Lausanne Congress) not to attend, according to reports from ChinaAid (CAA) (1 September 10) and Ming Pao (11 October 10, reprinted in Yahoo! News Hong Kong). By early August, authorities had closed at least three house churches—located in Wuhan city, Hubei province; Sanmenxia city, Henan province; and Changsha city, Hunan province—in reported connection to their members having received invitations to the Lausanne Congress. According to the Ming Pao report and an October 11 ChinaAid report, by October 11, authorities across China had taken measures against all of the invitees to prevent them from attending the Lausanne Congress, including questioning them, threatening them, stopping them at airports, confiscating their passports, detaining them, or threatening their family members.

According to an October 13 CAA report, on October 13, the Chinese government dispatched approximately 1,000 public security officers to watch for Protestants attempting to leave China through the Beijing Capital International Airport to attend the Lausanne Congress. Within two days, public security officers and customs officials had stopped over 100 Protestants from leaving China to attend the conference, according to a September 15 New York Times report. According to reports from CAA (17 October 10, 18 October 10), on October 17, public security officers in Shunyi district, Beijing municipality, raided a hotel gathering of over 30 house church Protestants who had met for a worship service and Bible study session after being refused exit from China to attend the Lausanne Congress. The officers detained house church pastors Jin Tianming of the Shouwang Church, Jin Mingri of the Zion Church, Fang Bing of the BCD Church, and Li Shengfeng of the Urban Revival Church. According to an October 15 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report, legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng said that only three invitees had been able to leave China to attend the Lausanne Congress by that date, although he did not explain how they were able to leave.

Measures To Restrict Freedom of Movement Contravene International Human Rights Standards

While attempting to stop Chinese Protestants from leaving China to attend the Lausanne Conference, public security and customs authorities reportedly offered various explanations that contravene international human rights standards that protect freedom of movement. According to an October 14 National Public Radio (NPR) report, when house church member Liu Guan tried to leave China on October 10, customs officials at the Beijing airport told him that the State Administration for Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security had notified them that Liu's participation in the Lausanne Congress "threatened state security," an explanation apparently drawn from Article 8(5) of China's Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens (Chinese, English). According to legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng—as cited in two RFA reports (3 August 10, 5 August 10)—anecdotal evidence appears to suggest a broader application of the "state security" provision to rights defenders and citizens. The CECC's 2010 Annual Report (p. 126-127) also notes several examples of this phenomenon over the past year. Fan further observed that Article 8(5) deprives citizens of fundamental rights because it does not provide mechanisms for accountability or for Chinese citizens to seek redress. According to the NPR report, in some other cases, officials told invitees that the Lausanne Congress was "anti-China." Such measures restrict Chinese citizens' right to freedom of movement, which is guaranteed under Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Reactions by the Chinese Government to Lausanne Invitations

According to the NPR report and an October 16 AsiaNews report, the organizers of the Lausanne Congress invited members of China's unregistered Protestant communities to attend as participants, while they only invited members of China's state-controlled church communities to attend as observers. According to the official Web site of the Lausanne Movement, one of the criteria for choosing participants in the Lausanne Congress is "affirmation of the Lausanne Covenant" (via the Lausanne Movement Web site), which stipulates that "evangelism and socio-political involvement" are part of the signatories' duty and encourages them to spread Protestant doctrine throughout the world. Undertaking such a commitment, however, could conflict with China's legal framework for the management of religion. For example, Article 12 of China's Regulation on Religious Affairs stipulates that religious activities should take place in state-approved sites of worship, should be organized by state-approved sites of worship or religious organizations, and should be conducted by state-approved religious personnel.

According to the NPR report and an October 14 CAA report, spokesman Ma Zhaoxu of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) provided a statement to NPR that said the Lausanne Congress organizers did not issue an official invitation to China's state-controlled Protestant church—which the statement reportedly referred to as the "lawful representative of Protestants in China"—as well as of having "secret communications" with members of China's unregistered Protestant communities. In the October 14 CAA report, Liu Tongsu, a pastor at an unregistered church, argued that the MFA statement implies that Protestant communities not affiliated with the government are not lawful, which appears to contradict the guarantee of the "freedom of religion" in China's Constitution (Article 36 of China's Constitution states that "[c]itizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief"), an argument reiterated in an October 15 open letter to Chinese authorities (English translation available via CAA, 18 October 10) by Chinese invitees to the Lausanne Congress. Liu also points out that the communication between the Lausanne Congress organizers and unregistered Chinese Protestant communities was completely open, and that the MFA's characterization of that communication as "secret" suggests that the government has the authority to deem "secret" any communication that does not occur within state-controlled parameters.

Public Security Authorities Detain Prominent Christian Rights Advocates

In addition to the pastors detained in Beijing, discussed above, authorities targeted several other prominent members of China's unregistered Protestant communities. For example, according to an October 12 RFA report, on October 12, public security officers from the Shuangyushu police station in Haidian district, Beijing municipality, took into custody legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng, a member of an unregistered Protestant church, after he refused to cancel an interview with Radio Free Asia, injuring Fan's thumb in the process. According to an October 20 RFA report, on October 20, public security officers briefly took Fan from his home again. Fan's wife connected the incident to events surrounding the Lausanne Congress. In another incident, according to an October 15 CAA report and an October 16 Boxun report, on October 15, public security officers took into custody unregistered church pastor Wang Yi at the Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport as he attempted to leave for the Lausanne Congress. The officers reportedly released him that evening but took his passport and reportedly used force in the process of taking him into custody.

For more information about freedom of religion in China and conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (p. 99-100, 108-111). For more information about Chinese citizens who have been barred from leaving China, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement in the 2010 Annual Report (p. 125-127) and a related CECC analysis.



Source: -See Summary (2010-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2011-04-13
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Procuratorate Decides Not to Arrest Author Xie Chaoping in Sanmenxia Dam Relocation Program "Book Case"

December 10, 2010

In Mid-August 2010, public security officials in Shaanxi province detained but did not formally arrest Xie Chaoping, an author and journalist, on suspicion of "illegal business activities." Chinese media articles questioned whether local authorities had detained Xie because he had recently published a book (in the form of a magazine supplement) that documented citizen relocation programs associated with the Sanmenxia Dam. In mid-September, procuratorate officials rejected a request by the local public security bureau (PSB) to arrest Xie on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence in the case. PSB officials released Xie on bail, but are keeping the investigation open. PSB officials also detained and then reportedly released on bail the manager of the print shop where the supplement was printed. Provincial authorities punished the magazine that published the supplement. Xie's case highlights the official abuse of criminal law provisions in cases authorities deem politically sensitive, and the risks authors face when writing about subjects that local government officials believe may be harmful to their reputations.

On August 19, 2010, public security officers from Beijing and Weinan municipality, Shaanxi province, detained Xie Chaoping, an author and journalist with Circumference, a magazine under the Procuratorate Daily according to a September 10 Beijing News article reprinted in Phoenix Net and a September 13 Democracy and Law Times article reprinted in Phoenix Net. Xie's wife said the PSB officials told her they suspected Xie of engaging in "illegal business activities," a crime under Article 225 of China's Criminal Law. Xie's lawyer said authorities likely detained Xie because he published a book, "The Great Relocation (Da Qianzou)," that traces problems related to the Sanmenxia hydroelectric dam relocation programs. The hydroelectric dam was completed by 1960, according to a November 7, 2003 Probe International article. The migrants residing in Weinan are the primary subjects of the book according to the Beijing News Article. In May 2010, Xie published the book as a supplement to Spark (huohua) Magazine (also known as Flash Magazine), through its Beijing office. Linwei District PSB officers travelled to Beijing and detained Xie on August 19, issued a criminal detention notice for Xie on August 20, and requested the procuratorate approve his formal arrest on September 13, according to a September 18 Caijing blog post by Xie's lawyer, Zhou Ze. Zhou's blog entry asserted that Weinan officials set up a "special case group" to handle the case and asked for approval to extend the investigation phase to 30 days, the maximum number of days allowed, according to Article 69 of China's Criminal Procedure Law. Procuratorate officials, however, decided not to formally arrest Xie.

The Linwei District People's Procuratorate rejected the PSB's request to arrest Xie on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence, according to a September 17 Caijing article. The article also quoted a procuratorate official as saying "Xie Chaoping also has a profound recognition of his own illicit behavior and he expressed deep regret." The official did not specify the behavior to which he was referring. According to Zhou's blog, however, Xie has consistently maintained his innocence of any wrongdoing. Linwei public security officials released Xie on bail (qubao houshen); however, they did not withdraw the case and reportedly could continue to investigate. Xie's lawyer reportedly said it is hard to predict what will happen with the case, according to the September 17 Caijing article.

According to a report cited in a September 20 Voice of America article, police authorities also questioned workers at the print shop that printed "The Great Relocation." In mid-September, according to the September 17 Caijing article, Linwei branch public security officers detained Zhao Xun, the manager of the print shop. A September 22 Southern Weekend article notes police have apparently released him on bail.

Weinan authorities deemed "The Great Relocation" to be "illegal," a determination that became the basis for their detaining Xie, confiscating copies of the supplement and punishing Spark Magazine. The Weinan Cultural Market Examination Team (Weinanshi Wenhua Shichang Jicha Dadui) reportedly confiscated copies of the supplement on June 27, the morning after their arrival in Weinan, based on, what Xie's lawyer, Zhou Ze, described in his blog as an anonymous "tip about an illegal publicatio." In addition, the local government reportedly sent police, village cadres, and Cultural Examination Team members to the homes of resettled citizens to retrieve copies of the supplement also according to the Beijing News Article and Zhou's blog. Huayang city Bureau of Culture and Sports officials in Huayang city, Shaanxi province confiscated thousands of copies of the supplement from Dong Shengxin, a citizen who had been relocated to make way for the Sanmenxia Dam, according to an August 26 Chinese Human Rights Defenders article reprinted in Boxun that contained a statement by Dong. Dong asserts that the Shanxi Bureau of News and Publications issued a "publication evaluation certification" on June 28 that declared "The Great Relocation" an illegal publication according to Article 30 of the Regulations on the Administration of Publishing (Chuban Guanli Tiaoli) based on the assumption that Spark Magazine had not authorized the supplement. Authorities from the Shanxi Bureau of News and Publications also punished Spark Magazine, according to an account by Wei Pizhi, a former Chief of Spark Magazine Press published in a September 4 article in the China Youth Daily, by issuing a stop publication "warning notice" to the magazine. In addition, the Shaanxi branch of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the "sponsor" organization for the magazine, sent a document cancelling its (business) agreement with the magazine.

Chinese newspapers have covered the case. News stories highlighted the possibility that local officials wanted to squelch reporting about the Sanmenxia dam relocation programs and reported on calls to drop the case (including a 9/3/10 Justice net article; a 9/2/10 Southern Daily article; and a 9/6/10 Caixin article). Other news articles have used the case to highlight new judicial provisions, including the September 17 Caijing article, which referred to relevant articles in the "Provisions Regarding Problems With Supervision of Criminal Case Registration," jointly issued by the Supreme People's Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security. Article 8(1) of the new provisions states: "[If] the People's Procuratorate after investigation of the facts, determines the reasons given by public security organs for not registering a case or for registering a case, are not tenable, through a decision made by the chief procuratorate or the procuratorial committee, it must notify pubic security organs to register or to dismiss the case."

Press law advocates have highlighted the case in advocating for press freedoms. A group of intellectuals used the case to spotlight the need for freedom of the press and a press law in China, according to an October 14 Probe International article. One intellectual promised to donate 1 million yuan to "promote discussion and research on legislation establishing a free press and support for journalists and writers who find themselves on the wrong side of the law."

The crime of "illegally operating a business" (Article 225 of the Criminal Law) has been used by officials in the past to selectively punish those who publish political or religious materials or who otherwise upset officials. The human rights defender Yang Maodong (who uses the pen name Guo Feixiong), for example, had earlier caught the attention of authorities in 2005 for helping villagers in their campaign to recall a corrupt official, and for his support of human rights defenders. In November 2007, a court in Guangdong province sentenced him to five years in prison, alleging that in 2001 he illegally published a book that also reportedly angered local officials, as reported in this CECC analysis. In June 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Shi Weihan, a Protestant house church leader and owner of a Christian bookstore, to three years in prison for operating a business illegally, as decribed in this CECC Political Prisoner Database record. Authorities accused him of illegally printing and distributing Bibles.

For additional information on corruption and rights abuses related to hydroelectric dam relocation projects see this CECC analysis regarding Fu Xiancai and this analysis regarding the Three Gorges Dam Relocation Programs. For more general information on suppression of environmental protection advocates, see Section II-Climate Change and the Environment in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (pp. 156-158). For more information on how the Chinese government uses publishing regulations to restrict free expression, see Section II-Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (pp. 69-70). For more information on the abuse of criminal law provisions in freedom of expression cases, see Section II-Freedom of Expression in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (pp. 58-60).



Source: -See Summary (2010-11-15 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
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Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life

December 10, 2010

Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang have been using a system of "pledges" to regulate behavior in parts of the region's villages. Under the pledge system, which began in Hoten district in 2006 and is now present in a few other Xinjiang localities, village residents and village officials enter into agreements with villagers' committees to abide by local village "codes of conduct," or face fines for non-compliance. The pledge system has no explicit basis in Chinese law, though it builds on legal provisions that allow villages in China to pass village codes of conducts as a form of local regulation. Local officials throughout China have used village codes of conduct to implement population planning requirements, regulate social order, and manage local production, among other tasks. The codes as implemented in some localities throughout China have drawn criticism for exceeding their scope of authority as stipulated under law and for being formulated without villagers' input. In Xinjiang, authorities have used the pledge system to bolster the efficacy of these codes of conduct, placing special emphasis on the pledges and codes of conduct to curb "illegal religious activity." Fines for failing to comply with controls over religion or other provisions in the pledges may exceed a quarter of the yearly per-capita income in some parts of Xinjiang. The pledge system in Xinjiang sheds light on the controversial role of village codes of conduct throughout China, additional mechanisms of control placed over village life in Xinjiang, and the nature of controls over religion in Xinjiang at the grassroots level.

Since 2006, villages in Hoten district, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), have been regulating village behavior through a system of pledges known as zungui shouyue chengnuoshu (literally, "promises to respect the rules and observe customs," also described in a Uyghur-language source, discussed below, as a mes'uliyetname, or accountability certificate). Under the pledge system, village residents and village officials enter into agreements with the local villagers' committee to abide by the village "code of conduct" (cungui minyue) or face fines for non-compliance. The pledge system has no explicit basis in Chinese law, though it builds on legal provisions that allow villages in China to pass village codes of conducts. A Congressional-Executive Commission on China survey of online articles that mention the pledges suggests that this specific type of institutionalized pledge system based on village codes of conduct may be unique to the XUAR, with limited exceptions. The CECC survey, conducted through the Google search engine in September 2010 using the expression zungui shouyue chengnuoshu, resulted in 51 pages after filtering results, with a majority from Hoten district. A limited number of pages were from localities within Fukang municipality in the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture in the XUAR, Jiashi (Peyziwat) county in Kashgar district, localities within Altay district in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, and a government Web site within the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture. (Some results were tables of contents, and in two cases, the location could not be determined.) In addition, the CECC survey found three references from sites outside of the XUAR. Two documents from Gantian township, Yueyang county, Hunan province, called for using village pledges. See a Gantian villagers' committee document dated June 17, 2010, and an April 10, 2010 posting on the Gantian government Web site. The latter includes a sample pledge. Current XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian previously served as Party Secretary of Hunan, and the province is home to the Fengshu Uyghur and Hui Township in Taiyuan county, but the connection, if any, to Gantian township is not clear. A third document, a May 26, 2010, report on the Jiangshan municipality, Zhejiang province, government Web site, describes a township using the pledge as part of work to integrate highway management and traffic safety into village codes of conduct within the township.

A Google search of Web sites using related search terms (such as zunguishouyue chengnuo zhidu alone and chengnuoshu or zungui shouyue where used within the proximity of cungui minyue) found that while use of pledges to regulate officials' conduct or to address specific behaviors, such as drug use, were present elsewhere in China, only an extremely limited number of villages have reported on using pledges to enforce village codes of conduct, similar to the pledge system used in the XUAR, though a Google search alone cannot provide a definitive conclusion in this regard. For limited reports elsewhere, see an April 27, 2009, report about a village in Jiangshan municipality, Zhejiang, on the Dongfang Fazhi Web site, a July 10, 2008, report on the Jiangshan Legal Office Web site (including a copy of a pledge with similar provisions to the pledge in Gantian, discussed above), and an October 22, 2010, report from a village within Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province. Searches of Chinese academic journals on the Eastview database (subscription required) found no articles that reference the pledge system in the XUAR or similar systems elsewhere.

Background: Codes of Conduct in Chinese Villages
Authorities in the XUAR link the pledges to village "codes of conduct" (cungui minyue in Mandarin, also translated into English as "village regulations" or "village rules and customary practices," among other expressions, and kent qa'idisi xelq ehdinamisi in Uyghur), which are stipulated in Article 20 of China's 1998 Organic Law on Villagers' Committees. (See below for detailed reports from XUAR officials discussing the relationship between the pledges and codes of conduct.) According to this article of the Law on Villagers' Committees, villagers' assemblies may establish codes of conducts, as well as village charters and other locally made decisions, but none may conflict with China's constitution, state laws and regulations, or state policies. In addition, such local documents must not infringe on individual, democratic, and property rights.

An interpretation of Article 20, on the National People's Congress Web site, elaborates on village codes of conduct, describing them as behavioral norms (xingwei guifan) that villagers' assemblies deliberate over and formulate in accordance with state laws, regulations, and policies and the actual conditions in villages (part 1). (Villagers' assemblies are comprised of villagers above 18 years old and are convened with a majority of these villagers, or two-thirds of household representatives, in attendance. Villagers' committees, made up of three to seven elected members, are accountable to the villagers' assemblies. See, e.g., Articles 9, 17, and 18 of the 1998 Law on Villagers' Committees.) The interpretation enumerates four categories of issues that may fall under village codes of conduct: safeguarding "order in production" in areas such as water use, forestation, and keeping livestock; safeguarding social order, such as through prohibitions on theft, gambling, and drug use; carrying out legal duties like paying taxes and observing population planning rules; and issues related to the construction of a "spiritual civilization," such as promoting patriotism toward the state and promoting hygiene (part 2(2)). The interpretation does not specifically mention use of the codes of conduct to regulate religious affairs, a focus included in the codes as implemented in the XUAR (see discussion below). The interpretation elaborates on the prohibition against village codes of conduct conflicting with the laws of the state. It notes that the codes must not "be contrary" to the constitution, laws, regulations, and policies of the state; must not violate the "spirit" and "aim" of such documents; must not exceed the scope of their own powers; and must not stipulate "unsuitable measures of punishment" (part 4). It cites as "illegal punishment measures" such things as parading through the street or tearing down the property of someone who violates the code of conduct (part 4). It does not specify, however, what forms of punishment are acceptable and does not address the issue of fines, a controversial aspect of the codes as carried out in practice (see next paragraph). (On October 28, 2010, the National People's Congress Standing Committee adopted an amended version of the Organic Law on Villagers' Committees, effective that day. Article 27 of the revised law also includes a provision allowing villagers' assemblies to pass codes of conduct. A new clause adds that town or township governments are to order the codes and other village documents to be rectified if they violate national laws, regulations, and policies. Because this analysis refers to events prior to the passage of the revision, references to the law and interpretations of it refer to the 1998 version of the Organic Law on Villagers' Committees. The amended version, like the original, makes no references to a pledge system akin to the one in the XUAR.)

The village codes of conduct, as implemented in practice, have drawn criticism for exceeding their stipulated scope of authority. Various articles in academic, Party, and government-affiliated journals have criticized villages, for example, for implementing codes of conduct without the required input from villagers; for including provisions that contravene national laws and regulations; for failing to publicize the codes; and for including excessive punishments, such as confiscation of property, illegal detention, and killing livestock that trespass on others' property. (See, for example, the following articles, available through the Eastview database: Jiang Yanjun, "Thoughts on Ensuring the Legality of 'Codes of Conduct'" [Guanyu baozhang "cungui minyue" hefaxing de sisuo], Research on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Issue 5, 2003; Wei Caiyun and Wei Min, "Village Codes of Conduct Should Not Violate the Law" [Cungui minyue bie weifa], Party Building, Issue 8, 2007; Yu Dashui, "Research on Village Codes of Conduct" [Cungui minyue zhi yanjiu], Research on Socialism, Issue 2, 2001; Lai Hankou, "Village Codes of Conduct Must Not Conflict with The Constitution and Laws" [Cungui minyue bude yu xianfa he falu xiangdichu], Village and Town Forum, Issue 10, 1999; Zi Zheng, "Village Codes of Conduct Are Not Equal to Law" [Cungui minyue budengyu falu], Southern Agricultural Machinery, Issue 1 , 2000; Zhu Juanchao, "Village Codes of Conduct Must Not Violate the Law" [Cungui minyue bude weibei falu], Chinese Civil Administration, Issue 8, 1998.) One article stressed specifically that there was no legal basis for allowing villagers' committees and codes of conduct to be used to impose administrative punishments, and another article cited a case where a court invalidated the fine a village cadre imposed under a village code of conduct. (See the articles by Zi and Zhu).

Under China's Administrative Punishment Law, which includes fines as a form of administrative penalty (Article 8), administrative punishments are to be based on laws, regulations, or "rules and stipulations" (guizhang guiding), and carried out by administrative organs (Article 3). Such a reference to "rules and stipulations" does not appear to include the village codes of conduct. According to the interpretation of the codes of conduct, cited above, the codes are based in Article 24 of China's Constitution, which allows simply for various "rules of conduct and common pledges" (shouze gongyue), a category not addressed in China's Legislation Law. Under Article 17 of the Administrative Punishment Law, only entities authorized by law may impose administrative penalties. Articles 18 and 19 allow administrative organs to entrust other agencies with imposing penalties under select circumstances. (The penalty of detention, if imposed by codes of conduct, is illegal because under Article 8(5) of the Legislation Law, punishments that involve deprivation of personal freedoms must be established by national law, not lower levels of legislation.) The interpretation of the codes of conduct does not clarify in what capacity, if any, village organizations could be authorized to impose administrative penalties, as opposed to other forms of penalties such as "education," and the interpretation does not explain how, if at all, violations of codes of conduct could be the basis for fines. Interpretations of other articles of the Law on Villagers' Committees stress the role of township and town governments in carrying out administrative functions and note that village self-management does not amount to administrative management. (See interpretations, via the NPC Web site, of Articles 2 and 4.)

The XUAR system, whereby villagers and officials agree to be fined if they violate the pledges based on codes of conduct, could be cast as avoiding the question of villages' fining authority by making the pledge system voluntary. At the same time, however, the authority of villages to set such a "voluntary" fining structure in place remains in question and appears in practice to introduce the same problems as seen in the fining systems in village codes of conduct elsewhere in China. (Reports from the XUAR do not address what types of people have not signed the pledges and how their violations of village codes of conduct are dealt with.) In addition, while some critics of code of conducts elsewhere in China attribute fines and other abuses to a lack of higher level oversight (see journal articles above), the XUAR pledges were set in motion by prefectural-level authorities in Hoten district and reported on by a XUAR regional government official (discussed below), indicating high-level awareness and approval for a system which may circumvent administrative penalty requirements for fining village residents. (In an unrelated case that brings in additional political considerations but may be partially illustrative of the problematic status of "voluntary" fining mechanisms, authorities in Shiqu (Sershul) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, ordered a Tibetan monastery to stop a fining system described by the monastery as a voluntary agreement with local residents to a pay a penalty for speaking a mix of Tibetan and Mandarin. See a November 9, 2010, Voice of America article and November 9 Phayul article.)

Pledge System in Xinjiang
From Codes of Conduct to Pledges, with Focus on "Illegal Religious Activities" and Separatism
Several documents from Hoten district, where the village pledges appear to have originated, detail the parameters of the pledge system. An August 25, 2010, article on the XUAR Rule of Law Leading Group Office Web site (hereafter "Fazhi Xinjiang") reported that the Hoten government first instituted the pledges in 2006, to address a lack of "measures of restraint" for people who refused to abide by village codes of conduct. A March 15, 2008, speech from a XUAR Rule of Law Leading Group Office member and Judicial Department Party committee secretary specifically described the pledges as a way of adding greater force to the village codes of conduct, according to a copy of the speech posted April 6, 2008, on the Fazhi Xinjiang Web site. The village codes of conduct, in turn, were first instituted by the Hoten Judicial Bureau in 2000, in response to various "problems" in the district, including "religious problems" and "infiltration" by the "three evil forces" (terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism), according to the August 25, 2010, Fazhi Xinjiang report. These village codes of conduct focused on areas including social order, religious belief, education, and population planning, among other issues. In 2006, authorities first issued a sample pledge, for which villagers' committees led villagers in adapting the pledges to local conditions, according to the article. The pledges "took the form of agreed-upon contracts and mutual agreements that clarified village cadres' and villagers' duties and responsibilities in the management of difficult points within the village," according to the article. According to a January 22, 2007, opinion from three Hoten district government and Party offices (via the Hoten district government Web site), which calls for "perfecting" the pledge system, neighborhood committees also are to implement the pledge system on a trial basis, in accordance with "residents' codes of conduct" (jumin gongyue).

The August 25, 2010, Fazhi Xinjiang article described the pledges as particularly effective in dealing with cases of people suspected of "illegal religious activities," noting the pledges both played a role in filling in gaps that laws and administrative punishments could not address and acted as a "front-line" defense in the "battle against separatism." A report from the Hoten District Politics and Law Commission, posted March 12, 2009, on Xinjiang Peace Net, added that "from start to finish, separatist groups and illegal religious activities" have been the administrative focus of the pledges. The Xinjiang Peace Net article also reported that the "problem" of women evading birth control inspections had been resolved and said the pledges had raised the number of people who attend village meetings and the number of students who attend school. It added that the pledges also eased problems connected to "collecting fees" and problems connected to people going out to work (chugongnan de wenti). A Hoten official cited in an investigative report on the village pledges in Hoten (from Legal Daily via the Europe-China Strategic Cooperation and Development Forum Web site, April 8, 2008) similarly noted the effectiveness of the pledge system to address "difficult problems" involving such issues as population planning policies, school attendance, and "organizing farmers to participate in labor for the collective welfare." (Uyghurs inside the XUAR have reported that authorities continue to enforce hashar, or forced group labor for public works projects. See Section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information.)

A number of sources (see, e.g., the August 25, 2010, Fazhi Xinjiang article above and source cited below) connected the pledges to a campaign in the region to have "rule of law enter the countryside" (fazhi jin xiangcun) The campaign is present in an apparently limited extent in some other parts of western China, as seen in an August 19, 2010, report from the Shaanxi Province Law and Politics Office and September 29, 2010 report from the Gansu Daily. An exam sheet for evaluating leading cadres from an area in the XUAR outside Hoten described three focal points of work to have "rule of law enter the countryside": compiling and printing village codes of conduct, using the pledges as a basis for implementing the village codes of conduct, and progressively promoting the village codes of conduct, according to Item 88 of the answer sheet, posted May 30, 2010, on the Ruoqiang (Qarqiliq) county, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR government Web site.

Legal Basis for the Pledges
A Hoten official cited in the April 8, 2008, investigative report on village pledges described the legal basis for the pledges simply as "villagers' autonomy plus contractual agreement." The official likened villagers' committees' promotion of the pledges to other types of autonomous acts such as democratic elections, policies, management, and supervision. The official added that if disputes arise over violations of the contracts, those involved can bring a suit in court based on contract litigation, but because villagers themselves agree to undertake the pledges, they have honored the requirement to pay fines and no one has brought a lawsuit against a villagers' committee.

Fines for Noncompliance
The pledges detail a system of fines for non-compliance, in line with concerns (cited above in the August 25, 2010 article) about a lack of adequate "measures of restraint" in the codes of conduct. The March 12, 2009, article from the Hoten District Politics and Law Commission said that the fines "respect the wishes of the people," are "fair, reasonable, legal, and useful" and not only "constrain" people's behavior but protect their interests. In practice, however, fines have run higher than a fourth of a locality's per-capita income for rural residents. According to the January 22, 2007, opinion from three Hoten district government and Party offices, single fines for violations of the pledge can run as high as 500 yuan (US$75), though should not exceed this amount. In 2007, per-capita net income for farmers and herders in Hoten was 1,818 yuan (US$274), according to a communique posted November 5, 2008, on the Hoten district government Web site. The 2007 opinion from three government and Party offices added that villagers' committees are the primary bodies that deal with punishments for violations of the pledges, except in the cases where cadres, rather than residents, violate the provisions. In dealing with violators who participated in "gangs" (an apparent reference to separatist organizations, based on the context) or "illegal religious activities," authorities also are to convene a mass meeting to "help and educate" (bangjiao) offenders, in accordance with village codes of conduct, according to the opinion.

The April 8, 2008, investigative report (cited above) includes partial wording from a pledge in force in a village within Hoten municipality, with details on the system of fines in force. Under the pledge, villagers' committee leaders face 100-yuan (US$15) fines for failing to mediate disputes promptly and letting them escalate. Failing to "promptly report villagers' opinions of all kinds and letting villagers sustain economic losses" carries a 200-yuan (US$30) fine. Villagers who "organize underground sites for teaching scripture or provide a location for illegal religious activities" face a fine of 500 yuan (US$75). Failing to implement requirements for nine years of compulsory education and letting children skip school incurs a fine of 20 yuan (US$3) for each day missed. Violations of the pledges also may result in canceling subsidies for categories of people including religious personnel and may result in carrying out mass meetings to provide "help and education." An April 7, 2008 report on Xinjiang Peace Net provided a specific example of a Party branch secretary fined for violating the pledge after he took sick leave without going through the proper channels and thus failed to arrive at a village mosque in a timely manner to "understand the conditions" there. The article did not specify the amount of the fine. (See a CECC analysis on controls over religion in the XUAR for more discussion of official oversight of mosques in the region.)

Some articles have noted the number of people fined or amount of revenue brought in by the fines. According to an official cited in the April 8, 2008, investigative report, among 111 villages inside Hoten municipality that signed pledges in 2007, there were 3,096 cases of violations bringing in more than 84,900 yuan (US$12,774) in cash. The official said a supervisory group elected by villagers' representatives oversaw the villagers' committee's collection of fines and that the committee put it to the villages' use, primarily for rewarding the comprehensive administration of promoting the pledge and expenses for upholding stability. According to the report, fines were levied on 36,823 people across Hoten district in the past two years. (The statistics are the same as those cited in the August 25, 2010, Faxhi Xinjiang article discussed above, suggesting the 2010 article may be republished from an earlier article or is relying on older statistics.) A March 2, 2009, Uyghur-language report from Xinjiang People's Radio, via the Kunlun government Web site, described fining 887 people in Pishan (Guma) county, Hoten, for violations, yielding 98,205 (US$14,775) yuan.

Scope of the Pledges and Signing Rates
Although authorities stress the role of the pledges as voluntary agreements, the 2007 opinion from three Hoten district government and Party offices called for achieving a signing rate of over 98% within each village. A March 19, 2010, article on Fazhi Xinjiang reported that as of the latter half of February, 371,204 households in rural areas within Hoten district had signed pledges, achieving a signing rate of 98.4%. Within Hoten district, Pishan county described achieving a 99% signing rate, according to the March 2, 2009, report from Xinjiang People's Radio. In Shuimogou township, Fukang city, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, one of the areas in the XUAR other than Hoten that has implemented the pledge system, the justice office called for achieving a signing rate that exceeds 95%, according to an April 28, 2009, report on the Fukang government Web site. According to an official cited in the April 8, 2008, investigative report, the pledges signed by all 111 villages inside Hoten municipality in 2007 amounted to a signing rate of 96.9% or over 31,600 households. In 2010, residential district and community committees in Hoten municipality had signed pledges with 19,103 residents, achieving a signing rate of 92.1%, according to a March 24, 2010, report on the Hoten municipal government Web site. The reports do not specify the status of people who do not sign the pledges and what consequences they face for violating a village code of conduct.

Xinjiang Pledges Curb Religious Activity
As Hoten authorities instituted the pledges in part to address "illegal religious activities," a number of reports on the pledges stress their role in curbing religion. One report describes conditions for religion in Hoten and the scope of "illegal" activities. The report from the Hoten District Politics and Law Commission, posted March 12, 2009, on Xinjiang Peace Net, described Hoten as a "backward" area in terms of economic and social development, with a "pronounced religious atmosphere, low cultural level among the rural population, and [where] consciousness of democratic legal institutions is correspondingly weak." It also described the district as a key target for "infiltration" and "destruction" by "western enemy forces" and the "three forces" (terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism) inside and outside the country. It noted later in the report that "illegal religious activities" have persisted despite repeated bans. In the speech posted April 6, 2008, on Fazhi Xinjiang, the XUAR Rule of Law Leading Group Office member and Judicial Department Party committee secretary said that "in accordance with Hoten district's ethnic and religious characteristics," the pledges made "restricting illegal religious activities" their focus, "filling in blank spots not yet touched upon in legal and administrative punishments." The speech cited Hoten's pledge system for playing an "outstanding" role in work to curb "illegal religious activities" and uphold rural stability. An August 27, 2010, report on the Fazhi Xinjiang Web site, about conditions in Jiashi (Peyziwat) county, Kashgar district, said the pledge system was useful in stemming suspected Hizb-ut-Tahrir membership in several villages.

In addition, at a January 16, 2009, district-wide meeting in Hoten, authorities called for strengthening the handling of people involved in "illegal religious activities," in accordance with rural localities' use of the pledge system, according to a January 20, 2009, report on the Hoten district government Web site. The article called for raising fines against key people involved in cases of "illegal religious activities," while using "criticism and education" against those "unaware of the truth" involved in such activities who show an attitude of "repentance and reform." In January 2009 in Moyo (Qaraqash) county, Hoten district, authorities launched a three-month "rectification" campaign to curb "illegal religious activities," according to a January 9, 2009, Xinhua report. Authorities called for promoting signing of the village pledges to address "illegal religious activities." In one village in Chira county, Hoten, no cases of "illegal religious activity" occurred for a one-year period, after authorities implemented the pledge system, according to a March 18, 2008, report on Fazhi Xinjiang.

Some reports indicate the use of pledges to institute prohibitions and penalties beyond what are stipulated in XUAR and national regulations on religion. In Shuimogou township, Fukang municipality, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, the local pledge included fines between 100 and 500 yuan for engaging in a range of activities, including activities beyond prohibited conduct in the national Regulation on Religious Affairs and both the 1994 XUAR Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs and the 2001 amendments in force in the region (unpublished but documented by Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China in the report Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang). It also includes conduct not specified in a region-wide directive of unknown legal status, also apparently in force in the XUAR, known as the "Autonomous Region Definitions of 23 Types of Illegal Religious Activities." (Estimated date of issue is 2008. See a copy posted February 25, 2008, on the Chinggil (Qinghe) county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, government Web site.) In the Shuimogou township pledge, prohibited activities include organizing "underground" scripture study sites (prohibited in Article 11 of the 2001 amendments to the XUAR regulation), as well as participating in underground scripture study classes, furnishing sites for "illegal" religious activities, participating in "all types" of "illegal religious activities," forcing children, family and friends, and neighbors to study scripture, or knowing but not reporting that others conducted or participated in "illegal religious activities" (activities not specifically prohibited in higher level regulations or directives, though broad restrictions on children's religious activities remain in force in the region). See the October 16, 2009, report on the Fukang government Web site.

Villagers in Hoten Detained, Fined, for Violating Pledge
In 2009, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on a group of Uyghurs in Hoten fined in connection to violating their villages' pledges, after the group visited a shrine outside their villages to conduct prayers. A village official cited in the April 2, 2009, RFA report said Hoten district Party authorities had forbidden "cross village worshiping" and that "an agreement between villagers and the government required [the village official] to impose the fine." (Article 16 of the 2001 amendments to the XUAR"s 1994 regulation on religious affairs also prohibits "mass religious activity which spans different localities," but the amended regulation does not specifically stipulate fines for violation of the regulation, while the penalty of detention is outside the formal scope of the regulation.) A man who was among those detained said that authorities ordered them to pay the 500-yuan fine or face continued detention. Following their release, authorities in one village held a village-wide meeting to publicly criticize their actions, he said in the article.

For more information about conditions in the XUAR and controls over religion in the region, See Section II-Religion and Section IV-Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.




Source: -See Summary (2010-10-14 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-17
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=148787

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Supreme People's Court Approves Fan Qihang Execution Despite Allegations of Torture

December 10, 2010

In late September 2010, Chinese authorities executed alleged Chongqing criminal syndicate boss Fan Qihang, despite publicly released videos reportedly supporting Fan's claims that he had suffered torture for more than six months. In late July, Zhu Mingyong, Fan's criminal defense lawyer, released the secret video recordings of his client, in which Fan recounts the numerous forms of torture he claimed to have suffered while in police detention and shows related wounds. The high-profile execution comes only months after six Chinese agencies issued regulations to make confessions obtained through torture inadmissible in court. In addition, in August 2010, a group of Chinese lawyers and activists released open letters calling on the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court (SPC) to investigate the case and the "common phenomenon" of torture in Chongqing municipality's high-profile anti-crime campaign. The SPC's decision to execute Fan—despite the evidence and advocacy—raises continued doubts over the court's willingness to investigate allegations of torture fully and to implement the new guidelines that aimed to prohibit evidence obtained through torture.

Chongqing Executes Alleged Criminal Syndicate Boss Fan Qihang

According to media reports, on September 26, 2010, Chongqing authorities executed alleged criminal syndicate boss Fan Qihang, after the Supreme People's Court (SPC) approved Fan's death penalty sentence as part of the SPC verification and approval process mandated under Article 48 of the Criminal Law (Chongqing Daily News Group, reprinted via Xinhua, 26 September 10; Xinhua, 26 September 10). In February 2010, Chongqing authorities sentenced Fan to death for "organizing, leading and participating in triads," murder, and other charges (Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 3 August 10; Xinhua, 10 February 10). In August 2010, however, Fan's criminal defense attorney Zhu Mingyong publicly released a video detailing how authorities "subjected [Fan] to many forms of torture on [an] almost daily basis for six months," according to a July 30 South China Morning Post article (subscription required). The SPC review did not acknowledge the torture claims, and failed to uphold legal provisions in the new evidence regulations that would have allowed Zhu to attend the review (see Art. 38 of the "Rules Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases"). According to a September 26 Zhengyi Net article, the SPC reportedly approved the death penalty, claiming "the facts were clear, the evidence reliable and adequate, the conviction accurate, the sentence appropriate, and the proceedings legal." The SPC review approved the capital sentence, despite new procedural guidelines issued by China's top judicial and law enforcement bodies in June 2010. The guidelines purportedly intended to exclude confessions obtained through torture from trial and grant special scrutiny for the review of evidence in death penalty cases. (For more information on the guidelines, see the "Rules Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases" and the "Rules Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases.")

Case Background: Alleged Criminal Syndicate Boss Fan Qihang

Over the course of the year, the case against Fan Qihang has emerged as one of the highest profile cases in Chongqing municipality's ongoing "anti-crime" campaign, which has reportedly led to more than 3,100 arrests as of late September 2010 (Chongqing Daily, 22 September 10). On June 26, 2009, public security officers with the Jiangbei branch of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau detained Fan in the large-scale crackdown, according to an August 3, 2010, CHRD statement and a December 25, 2009, Sanlian Lifeweek Magazine article (reprinted in the New People's Network Web Site). Although Fan's family retained Zhu to represent Fan, authorities did not permit the criminal defense lawyer to meet with Fan until November 2009, according to an August 6, 2010, Amnesty International article and the December 25, 2009, Sanlian Lifeweek Magazine article. Between November 24, 2009, and December 2, 2009, Sanlian Lifeweek Magazine reports that Zhu met with Fan on five occasions, all of which occurred with a police presence. Fan allegedly confessed to the murder and other crimes while in detention, but later denied any involvement. On January 6, 2010, Fan retracted his earlier confession stating that he did not learn of the murder until after his arrest, according to a January 6 China Youth Daily article. On February 10, 2010, the Chongqing Municipal No. 1 People's Court sentenced Fan Qihang to death for "running a gang, murder, illegal dealing in and transportation of guns and ammunition, drug trafficking, operation of illegal businesses, bribery, operation of a casino, and tolerating others' drug taking," according to a September 26 Xinhua article. On May 31, 2010, the Chongqing Municipal Higher People’s Court upheld Fan's sentence, according to a May 31 Zhengyi Net article (in Chinese).

Fan Qihang Case Leads to Criticism of Chongqing Crackdown

On July 27, criminal defense lawyer Zhu Mingyong, Fan's defense counsel, publicly released secret recordings showing Fan discussing torture he endured for up to six months, according to a July 30, 2010, South China Morning Post article (subscription required). (Fan Qihang's video testimony is available online here.) On August 23, 2010, a group of Chinese lawyers and activists released open letters calling on the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate to investigate the use of torture and other illicit methods in the sweeping crackdown on organized crime in Chongqing, according to an August 22, 2010, Agence France-Presse article and August 23, 2010, Chinese Human Rights Defenders translations of the letters. In the letter the Supreme People's Court (available in English on the Chinese Human Rights Defenders Web site here; in Chinese on the Web site of Teng Biao here) the lawyers share their concerns over alleged procedural abuses and torture accusations: "[A]vailable evidence makes one come to the conclusion that the legal and political authorities of Chongqing are producing a large quantity of wrongful convictions in the name of 'striking hard against organized crime,' and are suspected of using torture indiscriminately, harming innocent persons, and trampling on the rules of procedure." The letter specifically points out Fan Qihang's firsthand accounts found in the publicly released materials by Fan's criminal defense lawyer Zhu.



• "For instance they shackled my hands behind my back and hung me by my wrists from an iron window grille, so that my toes just barely touched the ground, and they never took me off. The longest they did that was for five [consecutive] days before they took me off."


• "Then they kept me standing for a week; the longest period, I remember, was for over 10 days. For over 10 days I was not able to sleep for one minute, not even one second. During that time I fainted and fell unconscious several times, when they saw me fainted, they splashed me with cold water to bring me back to my senses."


• "Whenever I collapsed, they pulled me up again, made me stand again, and beat and kicked me….Living was worse than dying; and I actually tried to commit suicide because I could no longer endure this torment. Twice I bashed my head against the wall, leaving two big scars on my head. While I was hung up and they wouldn’t take me off, but instead splashed me with cold water to wake me up, I bit through the tip of my tongue. After that, it took two days before they took me to a clinic to treat the wound."

In addition to these specific accounts, the letter also raises the issue of police threats to bury other Chongqing defendants alive if they did not confess to roles in the organized crime crackdown, as well as other alleged abuses committed by authorities. In the letter's conclusion, the lawyers and activists call on the Supreme People's Court to protect against torture, which "violates the dignity of [China's] laws," and to hold those found responsible for torture, if any, legally accountable.

Prospects for the New Guidelines on Excluding Evidence Obtained Through Torture

The SPC's decision to execute Fan—despite lawyers' advocacy and the video—raises doubts over the court's willingness to investigate allegations of torture fully and to implement the June guidelines that aimed to prohibit evidence obtained through torture. In a September 2, 2010, South China Morning Post article (subscription required; reprinted on the US-Asia Law Institute Web site here),Professor Jerome Cohen and Professor Eva Pils discuss the hopes of Chinese lawyers and reformers who seek greater consistency between Chinese laws and implementation. Cohen and Pils write, "If the SPC should reverse Fan’s conviction for murder and other offenses on the ground that it was based on evidence obtained through torture and send the case back for a fairer trial, this would be landmark progress in the administration of justice in China. If, on the other hand, it dispatches Fan to his death by allowing the conviction to stand, this will signal the continuation of business as usual." In its September 8, 2010, report to the Committee Against Torture (CAT), CHRD raises specific concerns over the new regulations. The report, for example, points out that Article 6 of the "Rules Concerning Questions About the Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases" places an undue burden of proof on torture victims to produce evidence that "may be difficult or impossible for a torture victim to ascertain or understand at the time they were tortured or afterwards."

For more information on the rights of criminal suspects and the issue of torture, see Section II—Criminal Justice in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2010-08-17 / English) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=146224

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Henan Authorities Order One-Year Reeducation Through Labor Sentence for Activist's Satirical Tweet

December 10, 2010

Authorities in Henan province have ordered rights defender Cheng Jianping to serve one year of reeducation through labor for a reportedly satirical online post mocking anti-Japanese protests related to an incident at sea in disputed territory between China and Japan. Cheng has a record of activism and online commentary.

The Xinxiang City Reeducation Through Labor Committee in Henan province on November 15, 2010, ordered rights defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pen name Wang Yi) to serve one year of reeducation through labor, according to a November 15 Chinese Human Rights Defenders article (in Chinese, via Boxun). Authorities alleged that Cheng "disturbed social order" when on October 17 she re-posted or re-tweeted a Twitter (microblog) message from her fiancé. The message concerned anti-Japanese protests following a fishing incident between China and Japan related to an island territorial dispute. According to a November 17 Amnesty International report, the original tweet said "Anti-Japanese demonstrations, smashing Japanese products, that was all done years ago by Guo Quan [an activist and expert on the Nanjing Massacre]. It’s no new trick. If you really wanted to kick it up a notch, you’d immediately fly to Shanghai to smash the Japanese Expo pavilion." The pavilion refers to the Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. Amnesty said Cheng re-tweeted the comment, adding the words "Angry youth, charge!" Amnesty, Agence France-Presse (November 19, via Google News), and the New York Times (November 18) described the tweet as being "satirical" or "mocking" in tone. Amnesty said, "Cheng may be the first Chinese citizen to become a prisoner of conscience on the basis of a single tweet." The tweet is available (in Chinese) on Twitter here.

Cheng reportedly has a record of activism and online commentary. A representative of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) told the New York Times (NYT) that Cheng was part of a group that advocated on behalf of dissidents by traveling to their trials and posting information online about officials involved in their detention, according to the November 18 article. NYT reported that Cheng also sent a Twitter message in support of awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese writer and democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo. Authorities detained her for a short period in August after she expressed support for Liu Xianbin, another detained democracy advocate, according to NYT. Amnesty reported that Cheng also had been involved in fundraising for activists.

Cheng is serving her reeducation through labor sentence at the Shibali River Women's Reeducation Through Labor Center in Zhengzhou city, Henan, according to a November 17 CHRD report (in Chinese, via Boxun). The November 15 CHRD article says that Cheng's sentence is set to end on November 9, 2011. Agence France-Presse reported that Cheng had begun a two-day hunger strike after the conviction. The status of that strike is not known.

The CECC previously reported on an apparent government crackdown on microblogs and blogs in China in the summer of 2010, involving service disruptions at major microblogging sites, removal of the blogs of well-known activists and lawyers, and increased monitoring of journalists' blogs.

For more information on freedom of expression issues in China, see the CECC 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2010-11-24 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-02-10
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Proposal To Experiment With Collective Wage Consultations in Guangdong Province Delayed

December 8, 2010

Recent strikes in the spring and summer of 2010 highlighted the need for more genuine representation for Chinese workers. Partly in response to the strikes, in late August, the government of Guangdong province in southern China released for public comment a third draft of the Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises (draft Regulaton). As proposed, the draft Regulations would extend workers the right to ask for collective wage consultations--a power currently given only to the state-run unions. In September 2010, under heavy lobbying by members of the Hong Kong industrial community, many of whom operate factories in southern China and are concerned with rising production costs, the Standing Committee decided to suspend further deliberation of the draft Regulation.

According to media reports, in late September 2010, the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee decided to suspend further deliberation of the draft Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises, which was originally scheduled to be discussed at the 21st Standing Committee meeting from September 27 to 29 (Wen Wei Po, September 18; VOA, September 22). With a stated aim to "advance the enterprises' lawful implementation of democratic management" and to "safeguard the legal rights of workers and enterprises," the draft Regulation stipulates that workers have the right to ask for collective wage consultations, delineates the responsibilities of enterprises and workers when disputes arise, and sets forth a representative framework within which consultations between workers and enterprises may take place.

Heavy lobbying by some members of the Hong Kong industrial community, many of whom operate factories in southern China, reportedly played a role in the Standing Committee's decision. An organization that represents many members of that community, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI), stated in a September 14 press release that market principles should determine wage raises, and that many small and medium enterprises may not be able to catch up with such a drastic change in policy, especially in the midst of an economic recovery.

In particular, opponents appeared to have raised concerns regarding two aspects of the draft Regulation (the draft's latest version, published on August 23, is available on the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee's Web site):
1. Article 32 provides that worker members sitting on the enterprise's board of directors and board of supervisors will represent worker interests in the boards' meetings; moreover, they will take part in the enterprise's decisionmaking processes. Article 34 further clarifies that the worker members of the respective boards will enjoy equal rights and will carry out the same responsibilities as other members.


2. According to Article 38, if less than one-third of workers request wage consultations with management, they must notify the enterprise union, and the union may consult with management on the workers' behalf, and report the results to workers. Furthermore, if one-third or more of workers demand collective consultations, the union must demand collective consultations with the enterprise's management.
In a September 14 Power Point interpretation of the draft Regulation posted on the FHKI's Web site, an attorney noted several aspects of the draft Regulation that may not be beneficial to enterprises, including the concern that the draft Regulation grants "too much power to worker representatives"; that allowing workers to become members of the board of directors could compromise commercial secrets, especially given the high turnover of workers and the lack of clarity in establishing what constitutes commercial secrets.

Furthermore, many in the Hong Kong industrial community have stated their concern that operating costs will increase should the draft Regulation go into effect. In a July 2010 FHKI survey, the organization indicated that "most manufactures will try to reduce manpower in order to cope with rising production costs," and that "two thirds of the respondents would introduce automation in production gradually while almost half of the respondents would outsource their manufacturing process in the coming year." Some economists, however, have challenged this argument, saying that wages have been frozen during the global financial crisis and thus there is room for adjustment, and that "improved productivity can pay for more than half of these wage increases, while the other half can be passed in the form of higher customer prices" (Bloomberg, June 10; Caixin, June 28). A FHKI vice chair said in the September 18 edition of Wen Wei Po that, in liew of the draft Regulation, he preferred to link wage increases to the annual inflation rate, plus two percent, in order to ensure that pay levels remain above inflation.

Notwithstanding the industrial community's reservations, the draft Regulation did contain provisions that specifically describe a consultation process and the environment within which it is to take place. For example:
• During consultation periods, enterprises may not threaten workers or prevent workers from working (Article 47); at the same time, before making their demands to initiate collective consultations or during the collective consultations, workers may not take part in work stoppages, strikes, or other "behaviors that could intensify contradictions" (Article 48).
The draft Regulation was reportedly an attempt to defuse potential collective labor disputes by preemptively bringing workers into formal legal and regulatory channels. Prior to the Standing Committee's decision to delay further action in September, the draft Regulation generated much attention in the domestic press, and a July 22 Xinhua article even identified the draft Regulation's potential to "turn 'lose-lose' labor disputes into 'win-win' negotiations" (see, also, Southern Daily, August 5; YCWB, August 5; China Court, August 16). In late summer 2010, after the occurrence of the recent worker strikes, the Guangdong government actually demanded faster action on the draft (China Labour Bulletin, August 10); officials recognized that the "changes in labor supply and demand" have enabled workers to gradually gain more leverage in their relations with management, and as a result the absence of genuine and effective representation can easily turn common labor strife into a "hard landing" with "intensified contradictions" (Sannong Express, July 26).

Despite the Standing Committee's decision, labor advocates continued to maintain the draft Regulation's potential to enhance worker rights. The China Labour Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based labor advocacy organization, has argued that the draft Regulations … "could, if implemented, finally open the door to genuine worker participation in collective bargaining in China." CLB also took out a half-page advertisement in the September 22 edition of the Hong Kong Economic Journal, reiterating that "a legally binding system of collective negotiation in enterprises will allow workers to make wage demands according to set procedures, and thereby help reduce the incidences of strikes." The CLB advertisement continued:

We cannot accept that just when the country has decided to acknowledge, and is about to pass legislation to guarantee, international labour standards that should have been applied a long time ago, namely the right to collective negotiation, some Hong Kong businesses, who have benefited enormously from the oppression of workers over the last 30 years, are now howling in protest!

According to a September 24 South China Morning Post article (subscription required), the CLB had made appeals to the Hong Kong industrial community to debate the merits of the draft Regulation. But the FHKI and the Hong Kong Young Industrialists Council (HKYIC) declined the debate invitation, noting that, "as employers, we look at the long-term interests and investment desires of Hong Kong investors across the border whereas the [CLB] looks from the workers' perspective and fights for the bargaining power of migrant workers." The HKYIC President added, "We are speaking two different languages and unlikely to reach any consensus."

For more information on the draft Regulation in Guangdong province, collective bargaining, and other topics relating to labor relations in China, please see previous CECC analysis and the CECC 2010 Annual Report.




Source: -See Summary (2010-09-07 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=147340

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Legal Scholar and Religious Freedom Advocate Fan Yafeng Harassed, Kept Under Surveillance

December 9, 2010

Since early October 2010, authorities in Beijing have increased pressure on legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng—who is a signatory of Charter 08—in apparent connection to the heightened monitoring of unregistered Protestant communities surrounding the October 2010 Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization. Public security officers in Beijing have taken Fan into custody for questioning six times since October 12, in at least some of those instances citing "making noise" as the reason. Authorities have reportedly taken measures against Fan that target more than just "noise," however. For example, most recently, they have accused him of "engaging in activities in the name of a social organization," and previously have confiscated copies of a magazine published by a non-governmental organization of which Fan is the director. Public security officers continue to monitor Fan's actions around the clock from outside his home.

On November 24, 2010, public security officers in Beijing took legal scholar and religious freedom advocate Fan Yafeng, along with his wife and three-year-old son, into custody from his home for questioning for approximately four-and-a-half hours, according to a November 26 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). A document from the Haidian District Public Security Bureau, Beijing municipality (reprinted in a November 24 ChinaAid (CAA) report) states that authorities took Fan into custody for "engaging in activities in the name of a social organization." Fan is the leader of a house church, and according to reports from ChinaAid (2 November 10, 8 November 10), this incident was the sixth time that public security authorities had him in custody since early October, in some cases interrupting house church gatherings led by Fan in his home. In at least some of these instances, public security officers cited "making noise" as the reason for interrupting the gatherings, according to reports from Radio Free Asia (31 October 10, 18 November 10) and the November 2 CAA report. However, despite citing "noise" disturbances, authorities took other measures that targeted more than just "noise." According to the November 2 CAA report, they confiscated copies of a magazine published by the Holy Mountain Institute, a non-governmental organization of which Fan is the director.

A November 10 South China Morning Post (SCMP) report (subscription required) notes that pressure on Fan—who is a signatory of Charter 08—may have increased as a result of a broader crackdown on supporters of Liu Xiaobo after he was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. In addition, an October 20 RFA report quotes Fan's wife as saying that the recent harassment of Fan may be linked to the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization (Lausanne Congress), an international conference on Protestant evangelization held in Cape Town, South Africa from October 16-25, 2010. The recent harassment of Fan began on October 12—four days after the Nobel Peace Prize announcement and four days before the start of the Lausanne Congress—when a public security officer from the Shuangyushu police station, Haidian district, Beijing municipality and a member of that station's Communist Party political committee visited Fan at his home, according to an October 12 RFA report. They pressured Fan to cancel an interview that he had scheduled with National Public Radio, but he refused. Later that day, a public security officer used force to take Fan into custody. Public security officers now stand continuous watch outside of Fan's home, according to the SCMP report.


For more information about freedom of religion in China and conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2010 Annual Report (p. 99-100, 108-111). For more information about the Chinese government's recent efforts to prevent members of unregistered Protestant communities from attending the Lausanne Congress, see a related CECC analysis.




Source: -See Summary (2010-11-19 ) | Posted on: 2011-05-11
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Underage Students Continue To Pick Cotton in Xinjiang Work-Study Program

December 8, 2010

Authorities in the far western region of Xinjiang have continued to enforce "work-study" programs that require students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor. The programs allow schools to take students out of class for periods of one to two weeks a year to engage in fulltime labor, though in some reported cases, students have worked for longer periods. While authorities portray the work-study programs as a means of instilling a work ethic in students, they also have described the programs as a way to meet harvesting quotas and raise revenue for schools. In fall 2009 and 2010, officials stressed the importance of using students to meet labor shortages in the cotton industry, following demonstrations and rioting in the region in July 2009. Although Xinjiang authorities announced in 2008 that students in junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cotton in the work-study programs, reports from 2009 and 2010 indicate that some localities continued to use these younger students to meet the shortage of cottonpickers. Both the work to pick cotton and other forms of work-study exceed permissible boundaries for vocational education and work-study programs as defined in both Chinese and international law.

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued to implement work-study programs in 2009 and 2010 that require students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor, according to various media and government reports from the region. (Internet access in the region was blocked in late 2009, and during that time, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China did not find any articles about work-study programs in the region that year.) As noted in past CECC analyses (1, 2, 3), the work-study programs have been used since the mid-1990s as a stated means of generating income for local schools and meeting local harvesting quotas. The work-study programs, and work involving cottonpicking in particular, have drawn complaints from students and parents over the workload and health and safety risks. In 2006, XUAR authorities implemented an opinion limiting work-study to children in the third grade of elementary school and higher, as well as limiting work-study to 7 days for elementary school students and 14 days for students in higher grades. In 2008, the XUAR Department of Education issued a circular stating that students enrolled in the state's compulsory nine years of elementary and junior high school would no longer take part in work-study activities to pick cotton. In 2009 and 2010, however, some localities reported that they continued to use elementary and junior high school students to pick cotton. Localities also continued to use high school students, stressing the importance of the student labor in fulfilling a shortage of workers in the cotton industry.

Authorities Disregard Circular, Younger Children Pick Cotton
At least two localities in 2009 and 2010 reported using underage students to pick cotton, though details of the reports suggest that the actual scope of student labor may have been wider. A message submitted to the Xinhe (Toqsu) county government, Aqsu district, Web site on September 18, 2010, reported that at a Xinhe education bureau meeting for elementary and secondary school principals in September 2010, authorities made plans for students to take part in 14 days of work-study to pick cotton in 2010, despite the 2008 circular ending the use of younger students in cottonpicking work-study activities. The message's author complained about the workload and health risks and asked the Xinhe government to pay heed to the issue. In response, the government reported that it stopped having students pick cotton in work-study programs following issue of the 2008 circular. Due to the influence of the Urumqi "July 5 Incident" (demonstrations and riots that took place in July 2009), however, the region faced a shortage of cotton workers during harvest season in 2009, and in accordance with instructions from then-XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan, the county arranged for elementary and secondary school students to pick cotton, according to the response. The government response also stated that the Xinhe education bureau asked the Xinhe government in 2010 to arrange for students to pick cotton, due to high cotton yields and the school system's debts related to implementing compulsory education. At the present time, however, the education bureau had not yet implemented work-study activities, according to the response.

In addition, the Party committee of a division regiment of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) brought in fifth- through eighth-grade students from one secondary school to pick cotton in 2010, according to an October 4, 2010, report from the Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal (XAIP) Web site. The grade range appears to include students in nine years of compulsory education who would be excluded from cottonpicking activities under the XUAR's 2008 circular. The article did not describe the students' labor specifically as "work-study" and focused primarily on safety "education" and precautions taken to avoid accidents, suggesting official recognition, as in the past, that the work exposes students to risk of injury.

Students Fulfill Labor Shortages, High School Students Continue To Pick Cotton
Some articles from the past year cited the need for student workers because of a shortage of labor in the region. See, for example, a September 28, 2010, article on the XPCC 5th Division Web site, an October 2 XAIP article, and the October 4 XAIP article cited above. (For related articles on this year's cotton yield in the XUAR and its role in easing rising cotton demand in China, see, e.g., a November 6, 2010, Xinjiang Daily article and November 10, 2010, China Daily article.) Some localities reported on meeting the shortage of laborers with high school students, whose participation in cottonpicking work-study activities was left intact under the 2008 circular. In Wusu (Shixo) city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district—where a parent complained in 2008 that junior high school students were made to pick cotton and that students worked beyond the permitted time period of 14 days—a total of 4,888 students in the area took part in 15 days of work to pick cotton in 2010, according to the October 2 XAIP article. 488 of these students were identified as third-year senior high school students. The article does not specify the grade levels of the remaining students. A person leading the group of 488 senior high school students noted they had extensive experience in picking cotton and many could likely pick an average of 60 kilograms of cotton a day, according to the report. The story did not specifically describe the students' labor as "work-study." The dates of the work indicate it took place during the school semester.

The attention to using work-study programs to generate income for schools—as noted in the Xinhe government's reply discussed above—suggests that students are not always compensated for their labor. As reported in a previous CECC analysis, in 2006, students in one locality reportedly only could receive a personal income from their labor if they exceeded the quota assigned to them, and students had to pay a fine if they were under quota. A September 25, 2010, Tianshan Net article reported that a school in Xinyuan (Kunes) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, failed to return to high school students the income that they earned during work-study activities in 2009.

Xinjiang Programs Exceed Permitted Parameters for Work-Study
The continued use of younger children in work-study programs, including cottonpicking activities, as well as the focus on older students' participation in the activities in order to meet labor shortages, underscores how the programs exceed permitted parameters for "work-study" programs under both Chinese and international law. The International Labor Organization's Convention 138, which China has ratified, sets the minimum age for child labor at 15, with limited exceptions. Although the Convention excludes work done as part of general, vocational, or technical education, such work must be an "integral part" of a course of study or training course. Article 15 of China's Labor Law forbids the employment of minors under 16. Within this legal framework prohibiting child labor, Article 13 of the Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor and Article 58 of the Education Law allow for "education practice labor" and work-study programs for children under the age of 16, but such programs must not harm children's health or safety or adversely affect their normal studies. See previous CECC analyses (1, 2) for additional information.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2010 Annual Report.




Source: -See Summary (2010-10-27 ) | Posted on: 2010-12-13
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Premier Wen Jiabao Calls Freedom of Speech "Indispensable," Comments Reportedly Censored

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao answered questions on the topics of freedom of expression and political reform during an interview with the U.S.-based international cable network CNN that aired in early October 2010. In his interview, Wen said that freedom of speech was "indispensable" for both developing and developed countries and that the Chinese people's wishes for democracy and freedom were "irresistible." Chinese officials reportedly censored the interview within China.

Premier Wen Jiabao appeared in a CNN interview with journalist Fareed Zakaria that aired on October 3, 2010, according to an English transcript provided by CNN. In response to Zakaria's question about whether China could be "as strong and creative a nation with so many restrictions on freedom of expression, with the Internet being censored?" Wen said through a translator:

I believe freedom of speech is indispensable, for any country, a country in the course of development and a country that has become strong. Freedom of speech has been incorporated into the Chinese constitution.

Wen also said "I don't think you know all about China on this point," and then cited figures regarding China's Internet to support his contention that there is freedom of speech in China. He said there are 400 million Internet users and 800 million cell phone subscribers in China who are able to express their views, some critical, on the Internet. He added:

I often say that we should not only let people have the freedom of speech, we more importantly must create conditions to let them criticize the work of the government. It is only when there is the supervision and critical oversight from the people that the government will be in a position to do an even better job, and employees of government departments will be the true public servants of the people.

In response to Zakaria's observation that opinions challenging the "political primacy" of the Communist Party are blocked on the Internet and that Internet restrictions could impede people's creativity, Wen said:

I believe I and all the Chinese people have such a conviction that China will make continuous progress, and the people's wishes for and needs for democracy and freedom are irresistible. I hope that you will be able to gradually see the continuous progress of China.

In response to a question about Wen's commitment to political reform, Wen said:

In spite of the various discussions and views in society, and in spite of some resistance, I will act in accordance with these ideals unswervingly, and advance within the realm of my capabilities political restructuring... . I will not fall in spite of the strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not yield until the last day of my life.

According to Zakaria, the interview was Wen's first with a Western journalist since Zakaria last interviewed Wen in 2008 (CNN English transcript). During the 2008 interview, Wen spoke on such topics as Internet freedom and political reform, and said the "government should be subject to oversight by the people." In his 2008 interview, as in his 2010 discussion with Zakaria, Wen highlighted the number of Internet users in China (then over 200 million) and Internet comments critical of the government as evidence of China's Internet freedom. In both interviews Wen also mentioned the need for government limits on speech. In 2010, Wen said speech activities needed to be "conducted within the range allowed by" China's constitution and laws. Wen said controls were necessary because of China's large population and the need to maintain "normal order." In 2008, Wen said that China's "impos[ing] some proper restrictions" to uphold state security was important for "the overall safety of the country and for the freedom of the majority of the people."

Wen's CNN interview was preceded by other public appearances at which Wen discussed political reform. In August 2010, Wen gave a speech in the coastal city of Shenzhen, at which he said "[i]f there is no guarantee of reform of the political system, then results obtained from the reform of the economic system may be lost, and the goal of modernization cannot be achieved," according to an August 23 People's Daily article. The next month, during a talk with overseas Chinese media while in New York for the UN General Assembly, Wen reportedly responded to a question by saying, "I've previously said economic reform without the protection of political reform will not achieve complete success, and might even lose what's been gained," according to a September 27 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article ("Wen Returns to Hot Topic of Political Reform" - subscription required).

News media based in the United States and Hong Kong reported that Wen's political reform comments in his speech and interviews received little coverage in China, raising questions about restrictions on the free flow of information inside the country and the political sensitivity of Wen's remarks. An October 13 Washington Post (WP) article said the portions of Wen's Shenzhen speech referring to political reform were "never reported in most of the strictly controlled mainland press." SCMP reported that Wen's New York comments "only received sketchy reports at home." The New York Times (October 27) and the China Digital Times (October 20) reported that Chinese officials issued an October 19 directive ordering Web sites and news organizations to remove all content relating to Wen's CNN interview. The WP noted that a Xinhua article on the CNN interview had "omitted the remarks about democracy and political reform." On October 12 the Beijing News included an article (in Chinese) on Wen's CNN interview, noting that Zakaria had referenced Wen's Shenzhen remarks and that Wen had responded by summing up his political ideals in four main points: "to let every Chinese citizen live happily and with dignity, to let everyone feel safe and secure, to let society achieve fairness and justice, and to let everyone face the future with confidence." The article made no mention of Wen's comments about freedom of speech, democracy, and political reform. Official Chinese media similarly refrained from reporting Wen's comments about political reform during his 2008 CNN interview, according to an October 5, 2008, Radio Free Asia article (in Chinese).

Some Chinese citizens have referenced Wen's statements in their calls for greater freedom of speech. In early October, for example, 23 former top Communist Party officials, including Mao Zedong's former secretary, issued an open letter calling for an end to censorship of the press and the creation of a press law to protect freedom of speech and the press, citing Wen's "freedom of speech is indispensable" comment.

Wen's characterization of the current state of freedom of expression in China, including his citation of the number of Internet users in China and the presence of language critical of the government on the Internet, echo the government's statements that this is proof that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of speech. In June 2010, for example, China's State Council Information Office released a White Paper on the State of the Internet (Chinese, English via China Daily), which notes that lively exchanges occur on China's Internet and that China has a "huge quantity of BBS posts and blog articles" that would be "hard to imagine in any other country." (For more information on the White Paper, see this related CECC analysis.) Under international human rights standards, however, the existence of a large number of Internet users in China and some discussion that the government characterizes as "critical" or "vigorous" are insufficient evidence that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of speech. Rather, under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and expressed an intent to ratify, the test is whether government restrictions on speech are "provided by law" and "necessary" to protect one of the purposes provided in Article 19, which are limited to purposes such as protecting national security and public morals and do not include purposes such as censoring and punishing criticism of the government. Chinese officials, however, continue to use restrictions on speech to censor and punish criticism of the Chinese government and Communist Party. For more information, see Section II—Freedom of Expression in the CECC's 2010 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2010-11-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2011-01-10
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