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Special Report: Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of Freedom of Religion

December 23, 2011

This CECC Special Report demonstrates an apparent correlation between increasing Chinese Communist Party and government repression of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries, and 12 instances in 2011 of current or former monks and nuns resorting to self-immolation. Reporting from each of the Commission's 10 annual reports (2002-2011) reveals a trend of deterioration in the environment for Tibetan Buddhism, especially in Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions. The trend worsened significantly after mostly peaceful political protests swept across the Tibetan plateau in March and April 2008. The Party and government responded to those protests by intensifying a long-established anti-Dalai Lama campaign; issuing regulatory measures that intrude upon and micromanage Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs; implementing aggressive "legal education" programs that pressure monks and nuns to study and accept expanded government control over their religion, monasteries, and nunneries; and convening a high-level Party forum to formally establish a coordinated policy on Tibetan issues, including religion, across all Tibetan autonomous areas. All of the Tibetan Buddhist self-immolations except the most recent attempt took place in Sichuan province, outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Commission Political Prisoner Database (PPD) information indicates a higher level of Tibetan political detention since March 2008 in Sichuan than in any other provincial-level area, including the TAR.

Tibetan Buddhist Monks and Nuns Resort to "Desperate Acts"

Nine current or former Tibetan Buddhist monks, two nuns, and one former monk who had married and become the father of three children, reportedly committed self-immolation during the period March 16 to December 1, 2011. Five of the current or former monks and both nuns reportedly died; five current or former monks reportedly were hospitalized or were in unknown locations. As the protesters burned, they shouted slogans including calls for Tibetan freedom, the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, and freedom of religion, according to reports. Seven of the self-immolations, including the March 16 occurrence, involved current or former monks affiliated with one religious center！Kirti Monastery, located in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP). (For more information on the crackdown at Kirti from March through June, see an August 17, 2011, Commission report.) One other self-immolation, a nun from Dechen Choekorling Nunnery, took place in Aba county. Three self-immolations took place in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP): a monk from Nyitso Monastery in Daofu (Tawu) county; a nun from Gaden Choeling Nunnery in Daofu; and a monk from Gepheling Monastery (often called Kardze Monastery) in Ganzi county. The most recent attempted self-immolation took place in Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR.

In prepared testimony submitted on November 3, 2011, to the U.S. House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (TLHRC), Kirti Rinpoche, the spiritual head and abbot of Kirti Monastery who fled into exile in 1959, stated that conditions at Kirti had driven the monks "to a state of utter fear and desperation" (testimony available on the TLHRC Web site; bio available on Drepung Loseling Monastery Web site). The Dalai Lama said on November 7 that the self-immolations are "desperate acts by people seeking justice and freedom" (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 7 November 11). Chinese officials have not acknowledged the role of Chinese government policy and regulatory control of religion in the self-immolations, and instead characterize the incidents as "terrorist acts in disguise" that "took place with the Dalai clique's orchestration, instigation and support" (Xinhua, 3 November 11 (translated in OSC, 5 November 11)).

Information available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) suggests that since March 2008 security officials in Sichuan province detained more Tibetans for political reasons than in any other provincial-level administration that includes Tibetan autonomous area. As of December 9, 2011, of 1,152 cases of political detention of Tibetans since March 2008 recorded in the PPD, more than half (656) took place in Sichuan, compared to 265 in the TAR, 114 in Qinghai province, 114 in Gansu province, and 1 in Yunnan province. Such statistics cannot provide an accurate account because the Chinese government withholds information on political detention, but the available data suggests that Party and government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of religion, speech, and association may be greater in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Sichuan than in Tibetan autonomous areas located in other provincial-level administrations. (See the Commission's 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 Annual Reports for more information on Tibetan political imprisonment since March 2008.)

The chronological list below includes a 2009 precedent for the 2011 self-immolations！Tashi (or Tabe, Tapey), a Kirti monk who attempted self-immolation to protest official interference in a monastic festival. The Commission has not observed any reports of Tibetan Buddhist self-immolations during the period from September 1987, when the current period of Tibetan political activism began, to the February 2009 self-immolation.
    2009: One self-immolation; non-fatal.

      February 27. Tashi (or Tabe, Tapey), age 24; Kirti Monastery; Aba county, Aba T&QAP; "detained" in a military hospital in Aba prefecture. See, e.g., Phayul, 17 December 11; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 27 February 09; Free Tibet (FT), 27 February 09; Xinhua, 5 March 09, reprinted in China Daily.

    2011: Twelve self-immolations; seven reported fatal.


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Government Expands Use of Legal Measures To Repress Tibetan Buddhist Affairs

China's Constitution (Article 36) protects "freedom of religious belief"！not freedom of religion！and provides protection only for "normal religious activities," a category that the Party and government uses policy, educational, and legal measures to define and manage. A series of central- and prefectural-level regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs began taking effect in 2007, were more numerous in 2009 and 2010, and continued into 2011 (see information below). As of December 1, 2011, regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs were effective in 8 of the 10 TAPs; the Commission had not observed information on whether regulations reported for approval in March 2010 had become effective in Yushu (Yushul) TAP, Qinghai province; or whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province was preparing Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations. Provincial-level regulations on religion took effect in Gansu on December 1, 2011 (Gansu Province Religious Affairs Regulations, available in Chinese on the Gansu Daily Web site). Prefectural-level regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs in Gannan could follow the provincial regulations.

Below are brief excerpts from the Commission's annual reports from 2002 to 2011. The Commission's reporting reveals a trend of deterioration in the environment for Tibetan Buddhism, especially in Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions. The sentences are drawn directly from the annual reports but may be reordered for clarity and do not necessarily follow one another directly in the original text. Where relevant below, regulatory measures that took effect during that reporting year are also noted.

    2002 Annual Report, 38-40. Conflict between Tibetan aspirations and Chinese policy is found within cultural, religious, and educational spheres. Despite unrelenting effort by the Chinese government to discourage or prevent expressions of loyalty and devotion to the Dalai Lama, he remains the most respected and influential Tibetan anywhere. Zhu Xiaoming, a senior Party official with oversight on Tibetan policy, told visiting Commission staff, "The Dalai Lama uses religion as a pretext for harming the country. He carries people away [from the Motherland] under the signboard of religion." [Zhu] explained to Commission staff that ["normal religious practice] must be based on seamlessness between religion and patriotism. "Loving the country is identical to loving religion," he said.

    2003 Annual Report, 30-31. Chinese authorities argue that the Dalai Lama is a hostile political figure, not a legitimate religious leader, and that programs counteracting veneration of him do not violate religious freedom. Police confiscate printed, audio, and video material featuring the Dalai Lama's religious teachings and speeches, and those possessing such material sometimes face abusive treatment, including beating and detention. Political education sessions require that monks and nuns denounce the Dalai Lama and Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama in 1995 as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, Tibet's second-ranking spiritual leader.

    2004 Annual Report, 38-39. According to a 2002 propaganda manual for "educating" Tibetan Buddhist monks: "Citizens' freedom of religion [sic] belief should not be described as 'religious freedom' in which unprescribed religious activity is pursued according to individual whims. It would be improper for the practice of freedom of belief to oppose state laws and policies, and religious activity must be pursued within the confines permitted by the national constitution, law, and policy. Monks and nuns learn that their religion "must be relentlessly guided in its accommodation with Socialist society." Reports also assert that monks and nuns face restrictions on religious study and a shortage of qualified teachers.

    2005 Annual Report, 47. China's new [Regulations on Religious Affairs] may lead to more administrative intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist affairs by underscoring the state's right to supervise the effects of religion on society. If the RRA leads to further restrictions on teaching and assembly in Tibetan monasteries, on association between the Tibetan clergy and laity, and on small prayer gatherings of the Tibetan laity, the result will further erode the traditionally close ties between the Tibetan monastic and secular communities. A group of [Democratic Management Committee (DMC)] leaders from [TAR] monasteries completed a training course on the new religious affairs regulations in May 2005. At the closing ceremony, each one pledged individually, "When we go back, we will use the knowledge we have gained in our practical work, further improve the democratic management of our local temples, lead the masses of monks and nuns to love the nation and love the religion, and make more contributions to building a harmonious Tibet."

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 March 05. (Translated from Chinese.)

    2006 Annual Report, 83-84. In May 2006, Zhang Qingli, Secretary of the [TAR] Party Committee, called on senior government and Party officials to widen the patriotic education campaign to include a broader population, and to intensify the "rectification" and restructuring of each monastery and nunnery's [DMC], . . . . Zhang told the officials that the Party is engaged in a "fight to the death struggle" against the Dalai Lama and his supporters, and that the Dalai Lama is "the biggest obstacle hindering Tibetan Buddhism from establishing normal order." Comprehensive implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) will lead to the "normalization of religious order" and the "standardization of religious activity," Zhang said. In December 2005, the government and Party stepped up a campaign to challenge the Dalai Lama's role as the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists by increasing the prominence of Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy the State Council installed in 1995 as the 11th Panchen Lama.

    2007 Annual Report, 29, 183, 193. Tibetan Buddhism in the [TAR] is coming under increased pressure as recent legal measures expand and deepen government control over Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, monks, nuns, and reincarnated lamas. The TAR 2006 Measures state a general formula for the relationship between the state and religion: "All levels of the people's government shall actively guide religious organizations, venues for religious activities, and religious personnel in a love of the country and of religion, in protecting the country and benefiting the people, in uniting and moving forward, and in guiding the mutual adaptation of religion and socialism." The Chinese government issued legal measures that, if fully implemented, will establish government control over the process of identifying and educating reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teachers throughout China.

    • Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government, Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the "Regulations on Religious Affairs" (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi "zongjiao shiwu tiaoli" banfa (shixing)], effective 1 January 07. (Translated from Chinese.)

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei'an banfa], effective 1 March 07. (Available in Chinese on the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.)

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], effective 1 September 07. (Translated from Chinese.)

    2008 Annual Report, 182, 185, 189-190. State repression of Tibetan Buddhism has reached its highest level since the Commission began to report on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in 2002. Chinese government and Party policy toward Tibetan Buddhists' practice of their religion played a central role in stoking frustration that resulted in the cascade of Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008. The Party hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama in the wake of the Tibetan protests, increasing attacks on the Dalai Lama's legitimacy as a religious leader, and asserting that he is a criminal bent on splitting China. Armed security forces maintained heightened security at some monasteries and nunneries after the protests as authorities conducted aggressive campaigns of patriotic education ("love the country, love religion"). The government of [Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP)] issued . . . unprecedented measures that seek to punish or eliminate from the prefecture's Tibetan Buddhist institution those monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic officials whom public security officials accuse of involvement in political protests in the prefecture.

    • Ganzi TAP People's Government, Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and Individual Monks and Nuns, issued and effective 28 June 08. (Translated from Tibetan in ICT, 30 July 08.)

    2009 Annual Report, 277-278, 281. Chinese Government and Communist Party interference with the norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unremitting antagonism toward the Dalai Lama, key factors underlying the March 2008 eruption of Tibetan protest, continued to deepen Tibetan resentment and fuel additional Tibetan protests . . . . Seeking to end the Dalai Lama's stature among Tibetans as a paramount religious leader is central to the government campaign to promote what it refers to as "stability" and "harmony" in the Tibetan areas of China. Following the issuance of regulations on Tibetan Buddhism in 2006 and 2007, Party and government officials have increased the emphasis on the use of legal measures and "legal education" to pressure Tibetan Buddhists into compliance with a state-defined "new order" for the religion.

    • Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture People's Government, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09. (Available in Chinese on the Findlaw.cn Web site.)

    • Hainan TAP People's Congress, Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 31 July 09. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Diqing TAP People's Congress, Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 1 September 09. (Available in Chinese on the Findlaw.cn Web site.)

    • Huangnan TAP People's Congress, Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 24 September 09. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    2010 Annual Report, 214, 218. [General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of China] Hu Jintao used the powerful [Fifth Tibet Work Forum] to emphasize the Communist Party's role in controlling Tibetan Buddhism and the important role of law as a tool to enforce what the Party deems to be the "normal order" for the religion. Legal measures requiring a nationwide re-registration of "professional religious personnel," underway in the TAR during 2010, could result in substantial losses to the Tibetan monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding religious views that the government does not deem to be "legal." Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.

    • Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zangchuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], effective 10 January 10. (Available in Chinese on the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.)

    • Yushu TAP People's Congress, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], reported to the Qinghai Province People's Congress for approval as 3 March 10. (Report available in Chinese on Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Haibei TAP People's Congress, Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 22 March 10. (Available in Chinese on the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council Web site.)

    • Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Religious Affairs Regulations [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 May 10. Available in Chinese on the Sichuan Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress, Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 12 August 10. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Guoluo TAP People's Congress, Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 30 September 10.(Available in Chinese on the China Tibet News Web site.)

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], effective 1 November 10. (Available in Chinese on the Central People's Government Web site.)

    2011 Annual Report, 48, 208. In April 2011, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (and principal interlocutor for the Dalai Lama's envoys) summed up Party intentions toward the Tibetan Buddhist religion, monasteries, and nunneries during a working group "investigation" he led in the [TAR]. A Party-run newspaper described [Zhu's remarks as urging the establishment of] "a sound and permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries" [and ensuring that] "all activities of monasteries will have rules to follow." As of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory measures that increase substantially state infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.

    • Ganzi TAP People's Congress, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 December 11. Available in Chinese on the Ganzi Daily Web site.)
For additional information on regulatory measures and Tibetan Buddhist affairs, see Commission reports on 14 November 11, 20 May 11, 10 March 11, 9 March 10, and 22 August 07. See sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007 Annual Reports.


Source: -See Summary (2011-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22 more ...
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=168140
Local Officials in Xinjiang Continue Curbs Over Religious Practice

December 16, 2011

Controls over religion in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang remain among the harshest in China, and local governments have reported continuing steps to tighten curbs over religious practice. In recent months, several local governments have reported carrying out measures to prevent women from veiling or wearing other apparel deemed to carry religious connotations and to prevent men from wearing large beards, practices authorities have associated with "backwardness," "extremism," and "illegal religious activities." Some local governments also reported increasing controls over women religious specialists known as b┨wi. Regionwide, authorities have described continuing steps to target "illegal" religious publications in censorship campaigns.

Several local governments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have reported carrying out steps to tighten controls over religion, singling out aspects of Islam in a number of cases. The recent measures continue similar efforts in recent years, as documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (1, 2, 3, 4). The ongoing campaigns indicate that religious practice remains a main target of government control in the region, at the same time that some local residents continue to find space to practice their religion or express their beliefs apart from state-dictated confines.

Continuing bans against veiling and beards. As detailed below, several local governments, as well as the regional state-controlled women's federation, have reported taking steps against religious dress and beards both in campaigns specifically targeting them or as part of broader efforts to curb "illegal religious activities." The recent measures, as well as previous campaigns documented by the Commission (1, 2, 3), often focus on "persuading" or ordering people to stop wearing such apparel or beards. In one past campaign documented by the Commission, however, authorities threatened "severe punishment in accordance with law," and two cases in the CECC's Political Prisoner Database (Nurtay Memet, Ghojaexmet Niyaz) have reported connections to beard-wearing. Based on CECC monitoring of reports on similar campaigns in recent years, the number of recent local efforts appears to represent an increase from earlier in the year. Reports from Fall 2011 include:
  • Authorities in the town of Tekes, Tekes County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, carried out a 7-day campaign of lectures on "illegal" and permitted religious activities at venues including weddings within the town, according to a September 15 report on the Tekes Party Building Web site. Authorities reported promoting "healthy" religious outlooks and that townspeople responded to the call to curb "underground" scripture study, private religious students, "illegal" religious publications, women veiling their faces, and men wearing "abnormal" large beards.
  • In Hejing County, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, an official reported at a meeting of 550 households receiving a minimum level of guaranteed social welfare support (dibao jiating) that women wearing veils, young men with large beards, and guardians of minors who illegally enter mosques would not enjoy this social welfare support, according to a September 16 report from the Hejing government Web site. The official added that if such people were found to be receiving benefits, this support would be immediately cut off.
  • A report from the Ili Prefectural Agricultural Machinery Bureau described outstanding "problems" in a local community and residential district, including people with a "pronounced religious consciousness" and those who have been discovered to wear "Arab dress and adornment," according to a September 24 report from the bureau's Web site. The report called for dealing with such people through door-to-door lectures by cadres, people's police, and work groups on promoting a lifestyle of "positive healthy civilization." The report also called for scoping out beard wearers and people previously punished for participating in illegal religious activities and subjecting them！along with other groups！to "inspection and control." (See a December 15 Reuters report for information on a similar campaign elsewhere in Ili.)
  • In the town of Xinyuan (K┨nes) in Xinyuan county, Ili, authorities registered the names of women wearing veils or "abnormal" clothes and men with large beards, as part of campaigns in the town and county against "illegal religious activities," according to an October 20 report on the Xinyuan county government Web site. The report noted the numbers of people who refused to cooperate, as well as those who signed contracts with authorities agreeing to remove veils, shave, or stop wearing "abnormal" clothing.
  • The weather bureau in Yutian (Keriye) county, Hoten district, reported carrying out a campaign, in accordance with countywide measures to address face veiling, calling on bureau staff and their friends and family not to wear clothing with a "pronounced religious hue" and to "resolutely stop face veiling," according to an October 27 report on the XUAR Weather Bureau Web site.
  • See also a report from the XUAR Women's Federation (via Kunlun Net, September 3), noting continuing implementation of a regionwide campaign to "Let Beautiful Hair Flutter, Let Beautiful Faces Be Revealed" and a September 23 report on the Shule (Kashgar Y└ngisheher) county, Kashgar district, government Web site, on local implementation of this campaign.
Continuing Controls Over Women Religious Specialists. Local governments also continued steps to bring women religious specialists known as b┨wi (Mandarin: buwei) under tighter government regulation, following an official proposal in 2008 to place these religious figures！who perform certain religious rites and provide religious instruction！under stricter state control.
  • In October, authorities in Kashgar municipality held a training class for b┨wi within one township, calling on them to contribute to state-led campaigns and political goals, and reported "going a step further in strengthening management" of the women, according to an October 24 report on the Kashgar Municipal Government Web site.
  • A September 8 report from the Yengisar County Government Web site, in Kashgar district, described strengthening "management" (guanli) of b┨wi, holding regular interviews with them, and increasing communication among measures to "bring into play" the role of b┨wi and prevent women from participating in "illegal religious activities."
Religious Publications Targeted
  • The XUAR Transportation Department reported in a November 14 posting on its Web site that at the end of October, transportation officials throughout the region had investigated and prosecuted 20 cases of "illegal publications," including cases involving 4,386 copies of "illegal religious publications." According to the report, transportation authorities in the region will increase their oversight of the transport of publications as part of the region's work to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications."
  • The Organization Department of the Urumqi Municipal Party Committee described one Urumqi neighborhood's work to "capture the ideological and moral battlefield" of minors in the community by continuing to ban "illegal religious activities" and by investigating and stopping the spread of publications that propagate such activities, along with ethnic separatism and other topics deemed forbidden, according to a November 7 report from the Committee, via Kunlun Net.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR and regulation of religion in the region, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.


Source: -See Summary (2011-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
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Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party "Brazen Meddling" in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation

November 14, 2011


In a September 24, 2011, signed statement, the Dalai Lama rejected Communist Party attempts to use historical misrepresentation and government regulation to impose unprecedented control over one of Tibetan Buddhism's most important features！lineages of teachers (trulkus), whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations, that can span centuries. The Dalai Lama addressed issues pertaining to reincarnation generally and to his potential reincarnation specifically, likely rendering the statement of exceptional significance to Tibetan Buddhists. He denounced the Chinese government's "Order No. 5," a reference to the PRC Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, as "outrageous and disgraceful," and provided a historical basis for rejecting government and Party claims that Tibetan Buddhists selected the 9th through 14th (current) Dalai Lamas in compliance with instructions in a Qing imperial edict. The Dalai Lama's statement explained briefly the Tibetan Buddhist concepts of reincarnation and "emanation"！the latter suggests that the Dalai Lama could establish a successor while he is still living. He concluded by declaring that when he is about 90 years old！he is 76 now！he will take measures to resolve whether or not there will be a 15th Dalai Lama; by condemning Party interference in Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation; and by stating that in the future it will be "impossible" for Tibetan Buddhists to "acknowledge or accept" such "brazen meddling."

Tibetan Buddhists who live in the Tibetan areas of China！where officials characterize the Dalai Lama as a "splittist"！likely will regard the Dalai Lama's September 24 statement (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), 24 September 11), as of heightened importance due to the statement's formality and public release, the significance of the issues to the future of Tibetan Buddhism, and the strong wording of his remarks. The statement followed March 10 and March 14, 2011, addresses (OHHDL, 10 March 11; OHHDL, 14 March 11) in which he explained his decision to take steps to end the historical role of Dalai Lamas in Tibetan governance！a change that he said on March 19 "could allow him to concentrate more effectively on [a] spiritual role" (Phayul, 19 March 11).

The statement. The Dalai Lama published the formal statement, written in the first-person and signed, on the OHHDL Tibetan-language Web site. Translations of the statement into English and Chinese are available on the respective OHHDL Web sites. Tibetans in China could circulate the document widely, but with risk. Since Chinese officials characterize the Dalai Lama as a "splittist" (see, e.g., CECC 2011 Annual Report, 208), authorities sometimes detain or imprison Tibetans on charges of "inciting splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103(2)) for creating, possessing, or sharing print, audio, or video material pertaining to the Dalai Lama. The Commission's Political Prisoner Database documents such cases. (In the Dalai Lama's March 10, 2011, address, he reiterated that he is not seeking Tibetan independence, but "genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the PRC," and expressed disappointment in the "lack of any positive response to our reasonable proposals.")

Reincarnation and emanation. The Dalai Lama provided an overview of the complex Tibetan Buddhist concepts of "reincarnation" and "emanation." In the case of reincarnation, he said, "superior Bodhisattvas" (beings possessed of the highest level of Buddhist understanding and compassionate motivation) "are able to choose their place and time of birth as well as their future parents." Tibetan Buddhists regard the Dalai Lama as a reincarnation of Avalokitesvara, the Bodhisattva of compassion (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography"). As such, Tibetan Buddhists believe that upon the current Dalai Lama's death, Avalokitesvara could reincarnate as a 15th Dalai Lama, and that such a reincarnation would not require the oversight or approval of the Chinese government！the interference that the Dalai Lama referred to in his statement as "Order No. 5" (i.e., Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism). In the case of "emanation," according to the Dalai Lama's remarks, "superior Bodhisattvas," can manifest themselves in one or more other "bodies" (e.g., persons) simultaneously while they are still alive. Based on the explanation, the Dalai Lama could manifest one or more emanations prior to his death, and reincarnation could follow his death. He quoted a 19th century Tibetan Buddhist master to underscore the point:
    Reincarnation is what happens when someone takes rebirth after the predecessor's passing away; emanation is when manifestations take place without the source's passing away.
The golden urn. The Dalai Lama explained his rejection of Chinese government and Party assertions that a legitimate historical basis exists for selecting Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations by drawing a lot from a golden urn. According to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a 1792 Qing "Imperial Ordinance" set out "explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas in Tibet" (MFA, 15 November 00 (1)), including that Tibetans must use "a golden urn and ivory slips" provided by the Qing emperor for the prescribed ritual (MFA, 15 November 00 (2)). The Dalai Lama acknowledged that after the Tibetan government requested Manchu (Qing) military support in a conflict with Gurkhas, "Manchu officials made a 29-point proposal on the pretext of making the Tibetan Government's administration more efficient," including recognizing high-ranking reincarnations by "picking lots from a Golden Urn." According to the Dalai Lama's summary, only the 11th Dalai Lama and the 8th and 9th Panchen Lamas were selected solely by using the golden urn. Tibetan Buddhists reject using the urn, the Dalai Lama said, because "[t]his system was imposed by the Manchus" and because "Tibetans had no faith in it because it lacked any spiritual quality." An October 31, 2011, People's Daily editorial (in Chinese on People's Daily; translated in OSC, 9 November 11) dismissed the Dalai Lama's statement and claimed that China's "central government" had approved lot-drawing selections of the 10th through 12th Dalai Lamas and officially exempted the selections of the 9th, 13th, and 14th Dalai Lamas by using the golden urn.
  • The 11th Panchen Lama. Chinese authorities declared the Dalai Lama's May 14, 1995, recognition of six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama to be "illegal and invalid" and have held him and his parents incommunicado in one or more unknown locations since May 17, 1995. On November 29, 1995, Luo Gan, State Councilor and Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee's Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Xinhua, 15 November 02), was the most senior government and Party official presiding over a ceremony that selected another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, by using the Qing golden urn (Xinhua, 29 November 95 (translated in OSC)). In April 1997, a Chinese court imprisoned Chadrel Jampa Trinle, a Rinpoche and trulku who led the search for the reincarnation, to six years' imprisonment on charges of "plotting to split the country" and "leaking state secrets" (the names of boys under consideration) to "separatist forces abroad" (the Dalai Lama) (Xinhua, 7 May 97, reprinted in World Tibet Network; Tibet Radio, 4 November 95 (translated in OSC)). No details on Chadrel Rinpoche's location or well-being have been available since his reported release in early 2002 (New York Times, 21 February 02). (See CECC 2008 Annual Report, 189.)
The Declaration. The Dalai Lama described the final portion of his statement as a "declaration." He summed up his basis for rejecting Party interference in identifying trulkus and outlined measures he intends to take to protect the legitimacy of a possible 15th Dalai Lama. Excerpts from the declaration follow.
  • Trulkus guide their own reincarnations. "[The] person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth . . . . It is particularly inappropriate for Chinese communists, who explicitly reject even the idea of past and future lives, . . ., to meddle in the system of reincarnation . . . ."
  • Tibetan Buddhists will not accept continued Party interference. "Such brazen meddling contradicts [Communist] political ideology and reveals their double standards. Should this situation continue in the future, it will be impossible for Tibetans and those who follow the Tibetan Buddhist tradition to acknowledge or accept it."
  • Around 2025, time to decide the future of Dalai Lamas. "When I am about ninety I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other [Tibetan Buddhists], and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not." (The Dalai Lama was born in 1935 (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography")).
  • Organization named to lead the search. "If it is decided that . . . there is a need for the Fifteenth Dalai Lama to be recognized, responsibility . . . will primarily rest on . . . the Dalai Lama¨s Gaden Phodrang Trust." (The Commission has not observed information about the Trust or references to it that predate the statement.)
  • Written instructions will guide the search. "[Officers of the Trust] should seek advice and direction from [certain Tibetan Buddhist leaders and other entities] and carry out the procedures of search and recognition in accordance with past tradition. I shall leave clear written instructions about this."
For additional information, see Commission analysis of the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, and of prefectural-level regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs. See also sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005 Annual Reports, and in Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009.


Source: -See Summary (2011-10-04 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=164940
Xinjiang Draft Legal Measures Promote Hiring Ethnic Minorities, Against Track Record of Employment Discrimination

November 18, 2011

New draft measures on employment promotion, under consideration in Xinjiang, stipulate measures to prevent discrimination and promote the hiring of non-Han ("ethnic minority") groups in the region. The measures track China's national employment promotion law, but also stipulate subsidies for hiring ethnic minorities. Such subsidies are absent in the national law and employment promotion regulations in other provincial-level areas. If passed, the impact of the draft measures remains unclear, however, as previous laws and regulations already bar discrimination and have failed to prevent hiring practices in Xinjiang that discriminate against job candidates based on factors including ethnicity and sex.

The Standing Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People's Congress recently completed a first stage of deliberations over draft implementation measures for China's Employment Promotion Law, according to October 9 and October 13, 2011, reports from Legal Daily. The reports highlight the draft's attention to employment discrimination and equal employment, noting stipulations that workers "enjoy the right to equal employment," that hiring units must provide "equal and fair employment opportunities," and that they "must not stipulate discriminatory employment conditions." In addition, the draft stipulates that ethnic minority candidates testing for jobs with the government and state-run institutions receive "appropriate consideration" (shidang zhaogu) and that enterprises that recruit and hire ethnic minority candidates enjoy social insurance subsidies (shehui baoxian butie).

Based on the descriptions of the draft implementing measures in the Legal Daily articles (the full text of the draft measures appears unavailable), the Xinjiang measures mirror many of the provisions in China's national law on employment promotion. Article 3 of the national law states that workers have the right to equal employment and that they are not to be discriminated against based on differences such as ethnicity, race, sex, and religious belief. Article 26 states specifically that employing units and employment intermediaries are to provide equal employment opportunities and not practice employment discrimination. Other articles that address discrimination include Article 25 (stipulating that governments create an environment for equal employment and eliminate discrimination) and Articles 29 and 31 (stipulating that disabled workers and rural workers, respectively, not be discriminated against in hiring). Under Article 62, workers may bring a suit in court in cases of discrimination. It is unclear if the XUAR draft includes similar language on lawsuits. The national law also includes language stating that hiring units shall give "appropriate consideration" to ethnic minorities (Article 28), but it does not include provisions on insurance subsidies.

To date, 19 other provincial-level areas in China appear to have issued implementing measures, regulations, or amended regulations on employment promotion, following passage of the national law. The draft Xinjiang measures appear to be the only one that includes subsidies for employers that hire ethnic minorities, though some other regulations contain multiple provisions addressing discrimination or promoting the employment of ethnic minorities. See, for example, implementing measures from Hunan and Hainan provinces. For comparison with provisions from another autonomous region, see implementing measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region.

It is unclear what impact the XUAR measures, if passed as drafted, would have on curbing discriminatory hiring practices. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2011 Annual Report, despite already existing prohibitions against employment discrimination in Chinese law, some government and private employers in the XUAR have continued to discriminate against categories of job candidates including ethnic minorities and women. The XUAR draft's provision on insurance subsidies may provide a new incentive for eliminating some discriminatory practices and promoting the hiring of ethnic minority candidates, but it is unclear if subsidies to date have been effective in promoting similar employment policies in the region. A XUAR government and Party committee opinion on employment promotion issued in October 2009 included provisions on equal employment opportunities (Item 3) and called for "recruiting more ethnic minority workers to the extent possible"！including an unspecified "fixed proportion" of positions for ethnic minority college graduates (Item 2.2)！but follow-up reporting on the opinion and information on its impact was limited. The opinion also stipulated that the government would subsidize old-age pension insurance for enterprises hiring workers from Xinjiang (Item 2.2), but did not stipulate subsidies specifically for ethnic minority workers from the region.

Moreover, as noted in the CECC 2011 Annual Report, some job recruitment announcements from the XUAR continued to reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs. A job announcement for a hospital in Urumqi city, for example, advertised in late 2010 for 28 positions, all of which were reserved for Han. Civil servant recruitment in fall 2010 for county-level discipline inspection and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open positions for Han, leaving 93 of the remaining positions unrestricted by ethnicity and reserving 38 for members of non-Han groups. In an apparent shift from previous years, however, 2011 annual recruiting for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) left almost all positions unreserved by ethnicity！marking a change from past practice of formally reserving a majority of positions for Han！but the XPCC continued restrictions based on sex.

See Section II7mdash;Labor and Section IV！Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report for additional information. See also CECC analyses (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) for more information on job recruiting practices in the XUAR in 2011 and in previous years.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-19 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=165390
Xinjiang Students Continue to Harvest Cotton, Directive Allows Child Labor

November 14, 2011

Education authorities in Xinjiang have continued to require students to pick cotton during the fall harvest, in some cases violating permitted parameters for "work-study" programs as stipulated in local directives, as well as contravening domestic and international standards regulating students' work activities and prohibiting child labor. Xinjiang authorities announced in 2008 that students in junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cotton in work-study programs, but issued a directive in 2009 that appears to affirm that younger students may continue to engage in cotton harvesting and other labor as part of work to "help with agriculture," despite the prohibitions against child labor in Chinese law. Reports from the past year indicate that some localities used these younger students to harvest cotton. Xinjiang high schools and colleges continued to make older students pick cotton in work-study programs, in some reported cases exceeding the permitted time period for work-study under local directives and in one reported case levying fines on students who didn't meet quotas. Work-study programs and cotton-picking activities have drawn complaints from students and parents due to the hazards of the work and effect on children's education. The use of student labor this year comes as the region reported difficulties in recruiting regular agricultural workers to pick cotton.

Xinjiang Directives Permit Cotton Harvesting
Education authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have continued to require students to pick cotton during the fall harvest. In some cases, students have been required to pick cotton as part of formal "work-study" programs that integrate the labor into the school curriculum. A circular issued by the Xinjiang Education Department in 2008 ended the practice of having students enrolled in the state's compulsory nine years of elementary and junior high school education pick cotton in work-study programs. (Analysis here. Full text of circular apparently unavailable.) The circular appeared to leave some other forms of work-study in place for these students, while continuing to permit the use of older students to harvest cotton in work-study programs. A 2006 opinion defined the overall scope of work-study, limiting it to children in the third grade of elementary school and higher, as well as limiting work-study to 7 days for elementary school students and 14 days for students in higher grades. The XUAR government reportedly discontinued cotton-picking work-study activities for younger students because central government funding for rural compulsory education now met XUAR schools' funding needs. Despite the prohibition, some schools continued to require younger students to harvest cotton in work-study programs. (See analyses 1, 2 from 2008 and 2010.)

A 2009 circular recently found by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China builds on the 2008 directive and appears to explicitly permit labor by younger students outside the context of work-study, as well as to continue to permit certain forms of labor within the work-study context. (See the only apparent full text copy of the circular on the Internet as posted on August 20, 2009, on the Kuitun Education Bureau Web site.) The circular affirms the 2008 prohibition on elementary and junior high school students picking cotton (Item 1). It notes that with funding advances for compulsory education, schools will no longer organize work-study with the goal of making a profit, but specifies that schools may organize certain types of work-study and other "social practice" activities in order to generate income to be used to support the daily needs and studies (shenghuo he xuexi) of poor students (Item 2). The circular also notes that any crop picking or harvesting activities organized by local governments are not to be considered as "work-study" activities (Item 3)—an apparent allowance for continued crop harvesting by young students, though removing it as a formal part of the school curriculum and basis for grading students. Formal work-study programs had provoked criticism in the past in part because students' performance in the activities affected their academic record, though parents and students also objected to the arduousness of the labor and exposure to danger. A government response to an inquiry on work-study by junior high students, posted September 7, 2011, on a message board on the Xinjiang Education Department Web site, affirms that the 2008 and 2009 government circulars continue to guide policy in the region.

The practical distinction between younger students' cotton harvesting in work-study programs (still practiced in some localities in recent years despite the 2008 prohibition) and cotton harvesting to "help with agriculture" appears minimal. Students and parents continue to object to both forms of labor and at least one locality appears to have prohibited the use of child cotton harvesters in any context. (See discussion below.) The use of younger students to harvest cotton violates domestic and international protections against child labor. The work-study programs for older students as implemented in parts of the XUAR violate permitted parameters for work-study as stipulated in local directives and contravenes domestic and international standards regulating students' work activities. See a previous CECC analysis for more information.

Students Continue to Pick Cotton in the XUAR in 2011
Although it is unclear the full extent to which younger students were involved in cotton harvesting this year—either under the guise of permitted activities to "help with agriculture" or in work-study programs, despite the 2008 prohibitions—some media reports and blog postings indicate that the use of child labor to harvest cotton continued. In one case, a report described this as work to "help with agriculture," and in other cases, the framework for organizing the labor was unclear. According to a September 24, 2011, Bingtuan News Net article profiling cotton harvesters, the 44th Regiment (3rd Agricultural Division, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) Number 1 Middle and Elementary School in Kashgar district organized students to "help with agriculture" by picking cotton. The Bingtuan News Net article profiled a student in the sixth grade at the school. Though the identities of the authors cannot be verified, blog and Internet postings from junior high school students also suggest that younger students continue to pick cotton. A blogger describing himself as a first-year junior high student (7th-grade student) at the same Kashgar school reported that his school had arranged for students to pick cotton, with daily quotas of 25 kilograms [4 kilograms above the quota for his classmate in the grade below him, discussed above], according to a September 24 posting (cached) on a blog hosted at 30edu.com. The author of a September 22 posting on the variety site Maopu said that students enrolled in nine years of compulsory education were made to pick cotton. The author noted that students in the third grade and above—a possible reference to elementary school students, based on the context—had been required to pick cotton for 15 days. A report from a township in Keping (Kelpin) county, Aksu district, called for the township to end the practice of using students in compulsory education to pick cotton, according to a September 7 report on Kunlun Net.

Older students also picked cotton this year, in some reported cases exceeding the permitted 14-day time period for work-study as stipulated under local directives and in one reported case levying fines on students who didn't meet quotas. A vice principal at one senior high school in Huocheng (Korgas) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, reported students would perform 20 days of work-study activities to pick cotton, training them to "endure hardships" and learn teamwork, according to a September 24 report on Ili Net. (See an undated posting on Zhongguo Gaoxiao Portal for more information about the school.) Students will live on the premises while picking cotton, according to the report. In Wusu (Shixo) city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, Ili！where a parent complained in 2008 that junior high school students were made to pick cotton and where students in 2008 and 2010 reportedly did this work beyond the permitted time period of 14 days！students at one senior high school were reported to pick cotton again for 15 days this year as part of "social practice labor" allowing them to "experience the hardships and happiness of labor," according to a September 27 report on the Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal Web site. (See an undated posting on the Wusu Municipal Education Bureau Web site for information noting that the school is a senior high school.) A September 20 Fujian Online report about a technical college in the XUAR reported that the school required all second-year students to pick cotton for two weeks and face fines if they didn't meet quotas, with all profits going to the college president.

The use of student labor comes amid reports of a shortage of cotton pickers that exceeds shortages in previous years, according to recent media reports. A September 8, 2011, Xinhua report noted high expenses for harvesting cotton this year and problems in attracting workers to the XUAR to pick cotton. A labor recruiter interviewed in the story attributed the labor recruitment difficulties to workers' raised wage expectations amid a rise in commodity prices, comparable wages in jobs such as the urban construction industry, and resistance to wage deductions given to middlemen who recruit cotton pickers. A cotton farmer cited in a September 20 Tianshan Net article attributed the worker shortage to a rise in workers' wages in other areas, thereby reducing the number of people who carry out temporary labor to pick cotton, along with insufficient support from local governments in organizing labor exports and fluctuating wages for cotton pickers. A labor recruiter cited in an October 11 China Daily article noted workers were hard to recruit because "[s]ome have concerns and even misunderstandings about the long journey, intensive labor and personal security, which makes them unwilling to come." The previous year, one official cited the Urumqi "July 5 Incident" (demonstrations and riots that took place in July 2009), as a cause of the region's labor shortage in 2010. The XUAR plans to recruit a total of 400,000 workers in 2011 from areas in China outside the XUAR, according to a Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps regiment leader cited in a September 19 Tianshan Net report. Xinjiang residents from "all areas and ethnicities" also have joined the ranks of the cotton pickers, according to the report.

For additional information on conditions in the XUAR and on child labor, see Section II—Worker Rights and Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.


Source: -See Summary (2011-10-13 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=165145


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