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Special Report: Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of Freedom of Religion

December 23, 2011

This CECC Special Report demonstrates an apparent correlation between increasing Chinese Communist Party and government repression of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries, and 12 instances in 2011 of current or former monks and nuns resorting to self-immolation. Reporting from each of the Commission's 10 annual reports (2002-2011) reveals a trend of deterioration in the environment for Tibetan Buddhism, especially in Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions. The trend worsened significantly after mostly peaceful political protests swept across the Tibetan plateau in March and April 2008. The Party and government responded to those protests by intensifying a long-established anti-Dalai Lama campaign; issuing regulatory measures that intrude upon and micromanage Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs; implementing aggressive "legal education" programs that pressure monks and nuns to study and accept expanded government control over their religion, monasteries, and nunneries; and convening a high-level Party forum to formally establish a coordinated policy on Tibetan issues, including religion, across all Tibetan autonomous areas. All of the Tibetan Buddhist self-immolations except the most recent attempt took place in Sichuan province, outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Commission Political Prisoner Database (PPD) information indicates a higher level of Tibetan political detention since March 2008 in Sichuan than in any other provincial-level area, including the TAR.

Tibetan Buddhist Monks and Nuns Resort to "Desperate Acts"

Nine current or former Tibetan Buddhist monks, two nuns, and one former monk who had married and become the father of three children, reportedly committed self-immolation during the period March 16 to December 1, 2011. Five of the current or former monks and both nuns reportedly died; five current or former monks reportedly were hospitalized or were in unknown locations. As the protesters burned, they shouted slogans including calls for Tibetan freedom, the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, and freedom of religion, according to reports. Seven of the self-immolations, including the March 16 occurrence, involved current or former monks affiliated with one religious center！Kirti Monastery, located in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP). (For more information on the crackdown at Kirti from March through June, see an August 17, 2011, Commission report.) One other self-immolation, a nun from Dechen Choekorling Nunnery, took place in Aba county. Three self-immolations took place in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP): a monk from Nyitso Monastery in Daofu (Tawu) county; a nun from Gaden Choeling Nunnery in Daofu; and a monk from Gepheling Monastery (often called Kardze Monastery) in Ganzi county. The most recent attempted self-immolation took place in Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR.

In prepared testimony submitted on November 3, 2011, to the U.S. House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (TLHRC), Kirti Rinpoche, the spiritual head and abbot of Kirti Monastery who fled into exile in 1959, stated that conditions at Kirti had driven the monks "to a state of utter fear and desperation" (testimony available on the TLHRC Web site; bio available on Drepung Loseling Monastery Web site). The Dalai Lama said on November 7 that the self-immolations are "desperate acts by people seeking justice and freedom" (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 7 November 11). Chinese officials have not acknowledged the role of Chinese government policy and regulatory control of religion in the self-immolations, and instead characterize the incidents as "terrorist acts in disguise" that "took place with the Dalai clique's orchestration, instigation and support" (Xinhua, 3 November 11 (translated in OSC, 5 November 11)).

Information available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) suggests that since March 2008 security officials in Sichuan province detained more Tibetans for political reasons than in any other provincial-level administration that includes Tibetan autonomous area. As of December 9, 2011, of 1,152 cases of political detention of Tibetans since March 2008 recorded in the PPD, more than half (656) took place in Sichuan, compared to 265 in the TAR, 114 in Qinghai province, 114 in Gansu province, and 1 in Yunnan province. Such statistics cannot provide an accurate account because the Chinese government withholds information on political detention, but the available data suggests that Party and government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of religion, speech, and association may be greater in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Sichuan than in Tibetan autonomous areas located in other provincial-level administrations. (See the Commission's 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 Annual Reports for more information on Tibetan political imprisonment since March 2008.)

The chronological list below includes a 2009 precedent for the 2011 self-immolations！Tashi (or Tabe, Tapey), a Kirti monk who attempted self-immolation to protest official interference in a monastic festival. The Commission has not observed any reports of Tibetan Buddhist self-immolations during the period from September 1987, when the current period of Tibetan political activism began, to the February 2009 self-immolation.
    2009: One self-immolation; non-fatal.

      February 27. Tashi (or Tabe, Tapey), age 24; Kirti Monastery; Aba county, Aba T&QAP; "detained" in a military hospital in Aba prefecture. See, e.g., Phayul, 17 December 11; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), 27 February 09; Free Tibet (FT), 27 February 09; Xinhua, 5 March 09, reprinted in China Daily.

    2011: Twelve self-immolations; seven reported fatal.


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Government Expands Use of Legal Measures To Repress Tibetan Buddhist Affairs

China's Constitution (Article 36) protects "freedom of religious belief"！not freedom of religion！and provides protection only for "normal religious activities," a category that the Party and government uses policy, educational, and legal measures to define and manage. A series of central- and prefectural-level regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs began taking effect in 2007, were more numerous in 2009 and 2010, and continued into 2011 (see information below). As of December 1, 2011, regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs were effective in 8 of the 10 TAPs; the Commission had not observed information on whether regulations reported for approval in March 2010 had become effective in Yushu (Yushul) TAP, Qinghai province; or whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province was preparing Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations. Provincial-level regulations on religion took effect in Gansu on December 1, 2011 (Gansu Province Religious Affairs Regulations, available in Chinese on the Gansu Daily Web site). Prefectural-level regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs in Gannan could follow the provincial regulations.

Below are brief excerpts from the Commission's annual reports from 2002 to 2011. The Commission's reporting reveals a trend of deterioration in the environment for Tibetan Buddhism, especially in Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions. The sentences are drawn directly from the annual reports but may be reordered for clarity and do not necessarily follow one another directly in the original text. Where relevant below, regulatory measures that took effect during that reporting year are also noted.

    2002 Annual Report, 38-40. Conflict between Tibetan aspirations and Chinese policy is found within cultural, religious, and educational spheres. Despite unrelenting effort by the Chinese government to discourage or prevent expressions of loyalty and devotion to the Dalai Lama, he remains the most respected and influential Tibetan anywhere. Zhu Xiaoming, a senior Party official with oversight on Tibetan policy, told visiting Commission staff, "The Dalai Lama uses religion as a pretext for harming the country. He carries people away [from the Motherland] under the signboard of religion." [Zhu] explained to Commission staff that ["normal religious practice] must be based on seamlessness between religion and patriotism. "Loving the country is identical to loving religion," he said.

    2003 Annual Report, 30-31. Chinese authorities argue that the Dalai Lama is a hostile political figure, not a legitimate religious leader, and that programs counteracting veneration of him do not violate religious freedom. Police confiscate printed, audio, and video material featuring the Dalai Lama's religious teachings and speeches, and those possessing such material sometimes face abusive treatment, including beating and detention. Political education sessions require that monks and nuns denounce the Dalai Lama and Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama in 1995 as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, Tibet's second-ranking spiritual leader.

    2004 Annual Report, 38-39. According to a 2002 propaganda manual for "educating" Tibetan Buddhist monks: "Citizens' freedom of religion [sic] belief should not be described as 'religious freedom' in which unprescribed religious activity is pursued according to individual whims. It would be improper for the practice of freedom of belief to oppose state laws and policies, and religious activity must be pursued within the confines permitted by the national constitution, law, and policy. Monks and nuns learn that their religion "must be relentlessly guided in its accommodation with Socialist society." Reports also assert that monks and nuns face restrictions on religious study and a shortage of qualified teachers.

    2005 Annual Report, 47. China's new [Regulations on Religious Affairs] may lead to more administrative intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist affairs by underscoring the state's right to supervise the effects of religion on society. If the RRA leads to further restrictions on teaching and assembly in Tibetan monasteries, on association between the Tibetan clergy and laity, and on small prayer gatherings of the Tibetan laity, the result will further erode the traditionally close ties between the Tibetan monastic and secular communities. A group of [Democratic Management Committee (DMC)] leaders from [TAR] monasteries completed a training course on the new religious affairs regulations in May 2005. At the closing ceremony, each one pledged individually, "When we go back, we will use the knowledge we have gained in our practical work, further improve the democratic management of our local temples, lead the masses of monks and nuns to love the nation and love the religion, and make more contributions to building a harmonious Tibet."

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 March 05. (Translated from Chinese.)

    2006 Annual Report, 83-84. In May 2006, Zhang Qingli, Secretary of the [TAR] Party Committee, called on senior government and Party officials to widen the patriotic education campaign to include a broader population, and to intensify the "rectification" and restructuring of each monastery and nunnery's [DMC], . . . . Zhang told the officials that the Party is engaged in a "fight to the death struggle" against the Dalai Lama and his supporters, and that the Dalai Lama is "the biggest obstacle hindering Tibetan Buddhism from establishing normal order." Comprehensive implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) will lead to the "normalization of religious order" and the "standardization of religious activity," Zhang said. In December 2005, the government and Party stepped up a campaign to challenge the Dalai Lama's role as the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists by increasing the prominence of Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy the State Council installed in 1995 as the 11th Panchen Lama.

    2007 Annual Report, 29, 183, 193. Tibetan Buddhism in the [TAR] is coming under increased pressure as recent legal measures expand and deepen government control over Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, monks, nuns, and reincarnated lamas. The TAR 2006 Measures state a general formula for the relationship between the state and religion: "All levels of the people's government shall actively guide religious organizations, venues for religious activities, and religious personnel in a love of the country and of religion, in protecting the country and benefiting the people, in uniting and moving forward, and in guiding the mutual adaptation of religion and socialism." The Chinese government issued legal measures that, if fully implemented, will establish government control over the process of identifying and educating reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teachers throughout China.

    • Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government, Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the "Regulations on Religious Affairs" (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi "zongjiao shiwu tiaoli" banfa (shixing)], effective 1 January 07. (Translated from Chinese.)

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei'an banfa], effective 1 March 07. (Available in Chinese on the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.)

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], effective 1 September 07. (Translated from Chinese.)

    2008 Annual Report, 182, 185, 189-190. State repression of Tibetan Buddhism has reached its highest level since the Commission began to report on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in 2002. Chinese government and Party policy toward Tibetan Buddhists' practice of their religion played a central role in stoking frustration that resulted in the cascade of Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008. The Party hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama in the wake of the Tibetan protests, increasing attacks on the Dalai Lama's legitimacy as a religious leader, and asserting that he is a criminal bent on splitting China. Armed security forces maintained heightened security at some monasteries and nunneries after the protests as authorities conducted aggressive campaigns of patriotic education ("love the country, love religion"). The government of [Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP)] issued . . . unprecedented measures that seek to punish or eliminate from the prefecture's Tibetan Buddhist institution those monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic officials whom public security officials accuse of involvement in political protests in the prefecture.

    • Ganzi TAP People's Government, Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and Individual Monks and Nuns, issued and effective 28 June 08. (Translated from Tibetan in ICT, 30 July 08.)

    2009 Annual Report, 277-278, 281. Chinese Government and Communist Party interference with the norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unremitting antagonism toward the Dalai Lama, key factors underlying the March 2008 eruption of Tibetan protest, continued to deepen Tibetan resentment and fuel additional Tibetan protests . . . . Seeking to end the Dalai Lama's stature among Tibetans as a paramount religious leader is central to the government campaign to promote what it refers to as "stability" and "harmony" in the Tibetan areas of China. Following the issuance of regulations on Tibetan Buddhism in 2006 and 2007, Party and government officials have increased the emphasis on the use of legal measures and "legal education" to pressure Tibetan Buddhists into compliance with a state-defined "new order" for the religion.

    • Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture People's Government, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09. (Available in Chinese on the Findlaw.cn Web site.)

    • Hainan TAP People's Congress, Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 31 July 09. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Diqing TAP People's Congress, Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 1 September 09. (Available in Chinese on the Findlaw.cn Web site.)

    • Huangnan TAP People's Congress, Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 24 September 09. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    2010 Annual Report, 214, 218. [General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of China] Hu Jintao used the powerful [Fifth Tibet Work Forum] to emphasize the Communist Party's role in controlling Tibetan Buddhism and the important role of law as a tool to enforce what the Party deems to be the "normal order" for the religion. Legal measures requiring a nationwide re-registration of "professional religious personnel," underway in the TAR during 2010, could result in substantial losses to the Tibetan monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding religious views that the government does not deem to be "legal." Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.

    • Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zangchuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], effective 10 January 10. (Available in Chinese on the State Administration for Religious Affairs Web site.)

    • Yushu TAP People's Congress, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], reported to the Qinghai Province People's Congress for approval as 3 March 10. (Report available in Chinese on Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Haibei TAP People's Congress, Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 22 March 10. (Available in Chinese on the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council Web site.)

    • Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Religious Affairs Regulations [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 May 10. Available in Chinese on the Sichuan Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress, Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 12 August 10. (Available in Chinese on the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee Web site.)

    • Guoluo TAP People's Congress, Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 30 September 10.(Available in Chinese on the China Tibet News Web site.)

    • State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], effective 1 November 10. (Available in Chinese on the Central People's Government Web site.)

    2011 Annual Report, 48, 208. In April 2011, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United Front Work Department (and principal interlocutor for the Dalai Lama's envoys) summed up Party intentions toward the Tibetan Buddhist religion, monasteries, and nunneries during a working group "investigation" he led in the [TAR]. A Party-run newspaper described [Zhu's remarks as urging the establishment of] "a sound and permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries" [and ensuring that] "all activities of monasteries will have rules to follow." As of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory measures that increase substantially state infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.

    • Ganzi TAP People's Congress, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], effective 1 December 11. Available in Chinese on the Ganzi Daily Web site.)
For additional information on regulatory measures and Tibetan Buddhist affairs, see Commission reports on 14 November 11, 20 May 11, 10 March 11, 9 March 10, and 22 August 07. See sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007 Annual Reports.


Source: -See Summary (2011-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22 more ...
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=168140
Gansu and Shandong Provinces Issue New Regulations on Religion

January 18, 2012

Since China's national Regulation on Religious Affairs entered into force in 2005, a number of provincial governments have followed suit with new or amended local regulations on religion. In some respects, new regulations from Shandong and Gansu provide more clarity, legal protections, and consistency than the older regulations they replace, but all within the restrictive framework of China's controls over religious practice. Such framework offers some limited protections but falls far short of international standards for religious freedom. The regulations also codify more extensive controls over religious practice in some regards, and many legal protections are limited to groups and venues registered with the government. The regulations differ from each other in some respects, reflecting a trend in variation among provincial regulations, even as local regulations on religion move toward greater uniformity with the national regulation.

Gansu and Shandong provinces have issued new regulations on religious affairs, following implementation of the national Regulation on Religious Affairs (national RRA) in 2005 and subsequent passage of several other provincial-level regulations on religion. The Gansu provincial People's Congress Standing Committee passed the Gansu Province Regulation on Religious Affairs (Gansu RRA) on September 29, 2011. It entered into force on December 1. The region's earlier legal measures on religion, the 1991 Gansu Province Temporary Provisions on the Management of Religious Affairs, were annulled in 2005. The Shandong provincial People's Congress Standing Committee passed the Shandong Province Regulation on Religious Affairs (Shandong RRA) also on September 29, 2011. The regulation entered into force on January 1, 2012, and replaces the province's 2000 Shandong Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs. Since the national RRA entered into force, the governments of Qinghai, Jilin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hainan, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan, Zhejiang, Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Hunan, Liaoning, Sichuan, Tibet Autonomous Region, Hebei, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi also have reported issuing new or amended regulations on religious affairs.

More Clarity But More Formal Controls
Like other provincial-level regulations, the new Gansu and Shandong regulations provide more clarity, legal protections, and consistency in some respects over the regulations they replace, but all within the restrictive framework of China's controls over religious practice. Such framework offers some limited protections but falls far short of international standards for religious freedom. (See Section II—Freedom of Religious in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2011 Annual Report for additional information on this framework.) The regulations also codify greater formal controls in a number of areas. For example, the Gansu RRA now clarifies that outdoor religious statues may be built outside religious venues (Article 18, compared to no mention in the earlier regulation), but links the process to stipulations in the national RRA requiring several stages of government approval (Article 24). Both the Gansu and national regulations also stipulate that non-religious groups and venues may not build outdoor statues, a prohibition that would appear to apply to religious entities not registered with the government. In addition, the Shandong RRA provides more detailed stipulations on religious publications than the earlier regulation from the province (Article 8 compared to Article 6), clarifying the required process for publishing different types of materials though also reinforcing government control over the process. The Gansu and Shandong regulations also now specify new formal restrictions in areas such as Tibetan Buddhist practices (in the Gansu RRA, per below) and large-scale religious activities (Articles 27 and 29 in each regulation, respectively). In addition, as in the case of constructing outdoor statues, most of the legal safeguards within the regulations apply only to registered religious organizations and venues, thereby excluding religious communities that choose not to submit to state control or that are unable to meet the qualifications to register with the government.

State-Sanctioned Religious Groups
The Shandong RRA specifies Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism as the religions covered by the regulation (Article 48), as did the province's older RRA (Article 37) and Gansu's earlier temporary provisions on religious affairs (Article 3). The national RRA does not specify five state-sanctioned religions, nor does the new Gansu RRA, thus appearing to allow the possibility under law that some other religions could be recognized, though the Chinese government has not done so to date at the national level. Among local-level regulations, a limited number recognize the Orthodox Church.

Worship at Home
The national RRA and the new provincial regulations require that collective religious activities "in general" be held at registered venues (National RRA, Article 12; Gansu RRA, Article 25; Shandong RRA, Article 25). The Shandong RRA also includes a stipulation recognizing that religious believers may carry out some religious activity within one's own home (Article 26). Some other recent provincial-level regulations include similar provisions, though wording on this varies. (See, for example, a previous CECC analysis for a comparison among four provincial regulations.) The Shandong RRA provides that "citizens who believe in a religion and their relatives may, in accordance with religious custom, live a religious life within one's home, but may not influence other people's normal work and lives." (See a similar provision in Article 21 of the older Shandong regulation, minus the qualification on influencing others' work and lives.)

While the new Gansu and national RRAs are silent on home worship, the central government has addressed this issue. The 1997 White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief states, "There is no registration requirement for, to quote from Chinese Christians, 'house services,' which are mainly attended by relatives and friends for religious activities such as praying and Bible reading" (White Paper from the Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs and also available in English on the Web site of the China Internet Information Center). The statement does not clarify the permitted scope of such services, however, nor does it address services held outside the home at venues unregistered with the government (also sometimes referred to as house churches). In a November 11 interview with Phoenix TV (via Open Source Center, subscription required, CPP20111116702009), Wang Zuo'an, head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, appeared to dismiss the prevalence of house churches as religious venues independent of state control. He noted in the context of a survey conducted on Chinese Christianity, "I personally do not recognize the notion of this so-called 'house church,' there is no such a problem as with this church...." Against the backdrop of ambiguous policy statements, coupled with lack of clear legal protections in the law, authorities have targeted for closure religious meetings in private homes as well as unregistered venues. (See, e.g., CECC analyses 1, 2, 3.)

Controls over Tibetan Buddhism
The Gansu RRA includes a stipulation (Article 21), absent in the earlier provincial provisional measures, giving the authority to supervise and approve the succession of living Buddhas to the state-controlled Buddhist associations, and mandating that succession procedures follow existing "relevant provisions"—a reference to the 2007 national measures regulating the reincarnation of living Buddhas. The stipulation also forbids individuals and groups from engaging in activities related to this without authorization and forbids "interference or domination from any organization or individual outside the borders." The provisions accord with and reinforce the national measures regulating the reincarnation of living Buddhas (analysis here), amid a trend of tighter formal controls over the fundamental institutions and practices of Tibetan Buddhism.

For more information on regulation of religion in China, see CECC analyses of the Jiangsu, Hubei, and Hainan regulations, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan, and Zhejiang regulations, amendments to the Anhui regulation, amendments to the Beijing regulation, and regulations from Chongqing and Hunan. See also Section II—Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.



Source: -See Summary (2012-01-17 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=168717
Local Officials in Xinjiang Continue Curbs Over Religious Practice

December 16, 2011

Controls over religion in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang remain among the harshest in China, and local governments have reported continuing steps to tighten curbs over religious practice. In recent months, several local governments have reported carrying out measures to prevent women from veiling or wearing other apparel deemed to carry religious connotations and to prevent men from wearing large beards, practices authorities have associated with "backwardness," "extremism," and "illegal religious activities." Some local governments also reported increasing controls over women religious specialists known as b┨wi. Regionwide, authorities have described continuing steps to target "illegal" religious publications in censorship campaigns.

Several local governments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have reported carrying out steps to tighten controls over religion, singling out aspects of Islam in a number of cases. The recent measures continue similar efforts in recent years, as documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (1, 2, 3, 4). The ongoing campaigns indicate that religious practice remains a main target of government control in the region, at the same time that some local residents continue to find space to practice their religion or express their beliefs apart from state-dictated confines.

Continuing bans against veiling and beards. As detailed below, several local governments, as well as the regional state-controlled women's federation, have reported taking steps against religious dress and beards both in campaigns specifically targeting them or as part of broader efforts to curb "illegal religious activities." The recent measures, as well as previous campaigns documented by the Commission (1, 2, 3), often focus on "persuading" or ordering people to stop wearing such apparel or beards. In one past campaign documented by the Commission, however, authorities threatened "severe punishment in accordance with law," and two cases in the CECC's Political Prisoner Database (Nurtay Memet, Ghojaexmet Niyaz) have reported connections to beard-wearing. Based on CECC monitoring of reports on similar campaigns in recent years, the number of recent local efforts appears to represent an increase from earlier in the year. Reports from Fall 2011 include:
  • Authorities in the town of Tekes, Tekes County, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, carried out a 7-day campaign of lectures on "illegal" and permitted religious activities at venues including weddings within the town, according to a September 15 report on the Tekes Party Building Web site. Authorities reported promoting "healthy" religious outlooks and that townspeople responded to the call to curb "underground" scripture study, private religious students, "illegal" religious publications, women veiling their faces, and men wearing "abnormal" large beards.
  • In Hejing County, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, an official reported at a meeting of 550 households receiving a minimum level of guaranteed social welfare support (dibao jiating) that women wearing veils, young men with large beards, and guardians of minors who illegally enter mosques would not enjoy this social welfare support, according to a September 16 report from the Hejing government Web site. The official added that if such people were found to be receiving benefits, this support would be immediately cut off.
  • A report from the Ili Prefectural Agricultural Machinery Bureau described outstanding "problems" in a local community and residential district, including people with a "pronounced religious consciousness" and those who have been discovered to wear "Arab dress and adornment," according to a September 24 report from the bureau's Web site. The report called for dealing with such people through door-to-door lectures by cadres, people's police, and work groups on promoting a lifestyle of "positive healthy civilization." The report also called for scoping out beard wearers and people previously punished for participating in illegal religious activities and subjecting them！along with other groups！to "inspection and control." (See a December 15 Reuters report for information on a similar campaign elsewhere in Ili.)
  • In the town of Xinyuan (K┨nes) in Xinyuan county, Ili, authorities registered the names of women wearing veils or "abnormal" clothes and men with large beards, as part of campaigns in the town and county against "illegal religious activities," according to an October 20 report on the Xinyuan county government Web site. The report noted the numbers of people who refused to cooperate, as well as those who signed contracts with authorities agreeing to remove veils, shave, or stop wearing "abnormal" clothing.
  • The weather bureau in Yutian (Keriye) county, Hoten district, reported carrying out a campaign, in accordance with countywide measures to address face veiling, calling on bureau staff and their friends and family not to wear clothing with a "pronounced religious hue" and to "resolutely stop face veiling," according to an October 27 report on the XUAR Weather Bureau Web site.
  • See also a report from the XUAR Women's Federation (via Kunlun Net, September 3), noting continuing implementation of a regionwide campaign to "Let Beautiful Hair Flutter, Let Beautiful Faces Be Revealed" and a September 23 report on the Shule (Kashgar Y└ngisheher) county, Kashgar district, government Web site, on local implementation of this campaign.
Continuing Controls Over Women Religious Specialists. Local governments also continued steps to bring women religious specialists known as b┨wi (Mandarin: buwei) under tighter government regulation, following an official proposal in 2008 to place these religious figures！who perform certain religious rites and provide religious instruction！under stricter state control.
  • In October, authorities in Kashgar municipality held a training class for b┨wi within one township, calling on them to contribute to state-led campaigns and political goals, and reported "going a step further in strengthening management" of the women, according to an October 24 report on the Kashgar Municipal Government Web site.
  • A September 8 report from the Yengisar County Government Web site, in Kashgar district, described strengthening "management" (guanli) of b┨wi, holding regular interviews with them, and increasing communication among measures to "bring into play" the role of b┨wi and prevent women from participating in "illegal religious activities."
Religious Publications Targeted
  • The XUAR Transportation Department reported in a November 14 posting on its Web site that at the end of October, transportation officials throughout the region had investigated and prosecuted 20 cases of "illegal publications," including cases involving 4,386 copies of "illegal religious publications." According to the report, transportation authorities in the region will increase their oversight of the transport of publications as part of the region's work to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications."
  • The Organization Department of the Urumqi Municipal Party Committee described one Urumqi neighborhood's work to "capture the ideological and moral battlefield" of minors in the community by continuing to ban "illegal religious activities" and by investigating and stopping the spread of publications that propagate such activities, along with ethnic separatism and other topics deemed forbidden, according to a November 7 report from the Committee, via Kunlun Net.
For more information on conditions in the XUAR and regulation of religion in the region, see Section IV—Xinjiang in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.


Source: -See Summary (2011-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=166663
Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party "Brazen Meddling" in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation

November 14, 2011


In a September 24, 2011, signed statement, the Dalai Lama rejected Communist Party attempts to use historical misrepresentation and government regulation to impose unprecedented control over one of Tibetan Buddhism's most important features！lineages of teachers (trulkus), whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations, that can span centuries. The Dalai Lama addressed issues pertaining to reincarnation generally and to his potential reincarnation specifically, likely rendering the statement of exceptional significance to Tibetan Buddhists. He denounced the Chinese government's "Order No. 5," a reference to the PRC Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, as "outrageous and disgraceful," and provided a historical basis for rejecting government and Party claims that Tibetan Buddhists selected the 9th through 14th (current) Dalai Lamas in compliance with instructions in a Qing imperial edict. The Dalai Lama's statement explained briefly the Tibetan Buddhist concepts of reincarnation and "emanation"！the latter suggests that the Dalai Lama could establish a successor while he is still living. He concluded by declaring that when he is about 90 years old！he is 76 now！he will take measures to resolve whether or not there will be a 15th Dalai Lama; by condemning Party interference in Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation; and by stating that in the future it will be "impossible" for Tibetan Buddhists to "acknowledge or accept" such "brazen meddling."

Tibetan Buddhists who live in the Tibetan areas of China！where officials characterize the Dalai Lama as a "splittist"！likely will regard the Dalai Lama's September 24 statement (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), 24 September 11), as of heightened importance due to the statement's formality and public release, the significance of the issues to the future of Tibetan Buddhism, and the strong wording of his remarks. The statement followed March 10 and March 14, 2011, addresses (OHHDL, 10 March 11; OHHDL, 14 March 11) in which he explained his decision to take steps to end the historical role of Dalai Lamas in Tibetan governance！a change that he said on March 19 "could allow him to concentrate more effectively on [a] spiritual role" (Phayul, 19 March 11).

The statement. The Dalai Lama published the formal statement, written in the first-person and signed, on the OHHDL Tibetan-language Web site. Translations of the statement into English and Chinese are available on the respective OHHDL Web sites. Tibetans in China could circulate the document widely, but with risk. Since Chinese officials characterize the Dalai Lama as a "splittist" (see, e.g., CECC 2011 Annual Report, 208), authorities sometimes detain or imprison Tibetans on charges of "inciting splittism" (Criminal Law, Article 103(2)) for creating, possessing, or sharing print, audio, or video material pertaining to the Dalai Lama. The Commission's Political Prisoner Database documents such cases. (In the Dalai Lama's March 10, 2011, address, he reiterated that he is not seeking Tibetan independence, but "genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the PRC," and expressed disappointment in the "lack of any positive response to our reasonable proposals.")

Reincarnation and emanation. The Dalai Lama provided an overview of the complex Tibetan Buddhist concepts of "reincarnation" and "emanation." In the case of reincarnation, he said, "superior Bodhisattvas" (beings possessed of the highest level of Buddhist understanding and compassionate motivation) "are able to choose their place and time of birth as well as their future parents." Tibetan Buddhists regard the Dalai Lama as a reincarnation of Avalokitesvara, the Bodhisattva of compassion (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography"). As such, Tibetan Buddhists believe that upon the current Dalai Lama's death, Avalokitesvara could reincarnate as a 15th Dalai Lama, and that such a reincarnation would not require the oversight or approval of the Chinese government！the interference that the Dalai Lama referred to in his statement as "Order No. 5" (i.e., Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism). In the case of "emanation," according to the Dalai Lama's remarks, "superior Bodhisattvas," can manifest themselves in one or more other "bodies" (e.g., persons) simultaneously while they are still alive. Based on the explanation, the Dalai Lama could manifest one or more emanations prior to his death, and reincarnation could follow his death. He quoted a 19th century Tibetan Buddhist master to underscore the point:
    Reincarnation is what happens when someone takes rebirth after the predecessor's passing away; emanation is when manifestations take place without the source's passing away.
The golden urn. The Dalai Lama explained his rejection of Chinese government and Party assertions that a legitimate historical basis exists for selecting Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations by drawing a lot from a golden urn. According to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a 1792 Qing "Imperial Ordinance" set out "explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas in Tibet" (MFA, 15 November 00 (1)), including that Tibetans must use "a golden urn and ivory slips" provided by the Qing emperor for the prescribed ritual (MFA, 15 November 00 (2)). The Dalai Lama acknowledged that after the Tibetan government requested Manchu (Qing) military support in a conflict with Gurkhas, "Manchu officials made a 29-point proposal on the pretext of making the Tibetan Government's administration more efficient," including recognizing high-ranking reincarnations by "picking lots from a Golden Urn." According to the Dalai Lama's summary, only the 11th Dalai Lama and the 8th and 9th Panchen Lamas were selected solely by using the golden urn. Tibetan Buddhists reject using the urn, the Dalai Lama said, because "[t]his system was imposed by the Manchus" and because "Tibetans had no faith in it because it lacked any spiritual quality." An October 31, 2011, People's Daily editorial (in Chinese on People's Daily; translated in OSC, 9 November 11) dismissed the Dalai Lama's statement and claimed that China's "central government" had approved lot-drawing selections of the 10th through 12th Dalai Lamas and officially exempted the selections of the 9th, 13th, and 14th Dalai Lamas by using the golden urn.
  • The 11th Panchen Lama. Chinese authorities declared the Dalai Lama's May 14, 1995, recognition of six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama to be "illegal and invalid" and have held him and his parents incommunicado in one or more unknown locations since May 17, 1995. On November 29, 1995, Luo Gan, State Councilor and Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee's Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Xinhua, 15 November 02), was the most senior government and Party official presiding over a ceremony that selected another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, by using the Qing golden urn (Xinhua, 29 November 95 (translated in OSC)). In April 1997, a Chinese court imprisoned Chadrel Jampa Trinle, a Rinpoche and trulku who led the search for the reincarnation, to six years' imprisonment on charges of "plotting to split the country" and "leaking state secrets" (the names of boys under consideration) to "separatist forces abroad" (the Dalai Lama) (Xinhua, 7 May 97, reprinted in World Tibet Network; Tibet Radio, 4 November 95 (translated in OSC)). No details on Chadrel Rinpoche's location or well-being have been available since his reported release in early 2002 (New York Times, 21 February 02). (See CECC 2008 Annual Report, 189.)
The Declaration. The Dalai Lama described the final portion of his statement as a "declaration." He summed up his basis for rejecting Party interference in identifying trulkus and outlined measures he intends to take to protect the legitimacy of a possible 15th Dalai Lama. Excerpts from the declaration follow.
  • Trulkus guide their own reincarnations. "[The] person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth . . . . It is particularly inappropriate for Chinese communists, who explicitly reject even the idea of past and future lives, . . ., to meddle in the system of reincarnation . . . ."
  • Tibetan Buddhists will not accept continued Party interference. "Such brazen meddling contradicts [Communist] political ideology and reveals their double standards. Should this situation continue in the future, it will be impossible for Tibetans and those who follow the Tibetan Buddhist tradition to acknowledge or accept it."
  • Around 2025, time to decide the future of Dalai Lamas. "When I am about ninety I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other [Tibetan Buddhists], and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not." (The Dalai Lama was born in 1935 (OHHDL, "A Brief Biography")).
  • Organization named to lead the search. "If it is decided that . . . there is a need for the Fifteenth Dalai Lama to be recognized, responsibility . . . will primarily rest on . . . the Dalai Lama¨s Gaden Phodrang Trust." (The Commission has not observed information about the Trust or references to it that predate the statement.)
  • Written instructions will guide the search. "[Officers of the Trust] should seek advice and direction from [certain Tibetan Buddhist leaders and other entities] and carry out the procedures of search and recognition in accordance with past tradition. I shall leave clear written instructions about this."
For additional information, see Commission analysis of the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, and of prefectural-level regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs. See also sections on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the Commission's 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005 Annual Reports, and in Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009.


Source: -See Summary (2011-10-04 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=164940
Jiangsu Authorities Order Unregistered Pastor To Serve Two Years of Reeducation Through Labor

November 21, 2011

In late July 2011, authorities in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, ordered pastor Shi Enhao to serve two years in reeducation through labor (RTL) in connection to his activities as an unregistered pastor, including setting up churches and holding gatherings that authorities deemed illegal. Public security authorities in Jiangsu have harassed or detained Shi several times since March 2011. Shi is a leader in a network of unregistered Protestant congregations whose members associate across multiple provinces, and the RTL order came during a time when official sensitivities were heightened toward members of unregistered Protestant congregations.

In late July 2011, authorities in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, ordered unregistered pastor Shi Enhao to serve two years of reeducation through labor (RTL), a form of administrative punishment without trial, according to international media reports dated July 25, 2011, (ChinaAid Association (CAA)) and July 26, 2011, (Associated Press (AP), via Yahoo!; AsiaNews; Radio Free Asia (RFA)). Fellow unregistered pastor Zhang Mingxuan reportedly told RFA that the charges against Shi included "[holding] illegal gatherings" and "[setting up] illegal churches." Such charges appear to violate Articles 18 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 18 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provide for freedom of religion, the freedom to manifest one's belief through, among other things, practice and worship, and freedom of peaceful association. China has signed the ICCPR and has stated that it is preparing to ratify it (National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), sec. V(1), via Xinhua). According to the RFA article, Shi's lawyer Zhang Kai said that Suqian public security officials refused to let Zhang visit Shi in custody because the case involved "secrets." Under China's legal framework for state secrets, officials have wide latitude to declare almost any matter of public concern a state secret. Zhang reportedly also said that authorities seized approximately 100,000 yuan (US$15,500) from Shi's church.

Suqian Officials Harass Shi Enhao Several Times Since March

Public security officials in Jiangsu have harassed and detained Shi several times since March 2011 in apparent connection to his activities as an unregistered pastor. According to CAA (7 March 11) and RFA (10 March 11), on March 4, 2011, officials from Suqian disrupted a house church meeting in Nanyang city, Henan province, and detained Shi, who had been preaching at the gathering. Officials held Shi in a hotel and then returned him to his home in Suqian on March 6. According to RFA (6 March 11), however, authorities reportedly instructed him not to travel anywhere during the meetings of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, held later that month. Shi reportedly told RFA that officials hired several unidentified people to prevent him from leaving his home, and some of those people beat him and took money and personal items from him. Sources do not indicate when officials released Shi from home confinement, but according to CAA (15 June 11, 15 June 11), beginning on May 31, 2011, public security officials in Suqian held him in administrative detention for 12 days. Public security officials released him on June 12 but took him into custody again the same day, eventually issuing a criminal detention notice dated June 21. The detention notice, issued by the Sucheng District Public Security Bureau, Suqian (via a July 5, 2011, CAA article), stated that officials suspected Shi of "using superstition to undermine the implementation of the law," which appears to be a reference to Article 300 of China's Criminal Law. In some cases, authorities have detained other unregistered Protestants on suspicion of "cult"-related activity！language that also can be found in Article 300！and authorities often use "cult"-related charges to detain or sentence Falun Gong practitioners (for more information on these issues and related cases, see this October 27, 2010, CECC analysis).

Harassment and Detention Occurs During Time of Sensitivity to Unregistered Protestants

Shi's harassment, detentions, and RTL punishment appear to have occurred during a period of heightened official sensitivity toward unregistered Protestant communities in various locations throughout China (for more information on government actions against these communities, see this July 1, 2011, CECC analysis). Official reports from Suqian indicate that Suqian authorities had begun targeting unregistered Protestant communities several months before Shi's March detention. A December 18, 2010, report from the Suqian Municipal People's Government describes efforts by authorities in Suqian to "focus on improving effective control of 'house church' activities, as well as vigorously reducing the space and frequency of their activities." Another December 18, 2010, report from the Suqian Municipal People's Government describes efforts to work with the 6-10 Office！an extralegal Party organization that implements the ban on Falun Gong and in some cases targets other unregistered religious communities！and the domestic security protection unit of the public security bureau to ban worship gathering sites established outside of government oversight.

Shi reportedly is a vice president of the Chinese House Church Alliance (CHCA), which the Ministry of Civil Affairs banned on November 28, 2008, for "engaging in activities as a social organization on its own initiative, without registering" (see a notice on the China Social Organizations Web site, a Web site owned and operated by the State Administration for the Management of Social Organizations). Authorities appear to have targeted other individuals who had contact with the CHCA in the past year. For example, according to CAA (17 April 11), in April 2011, public security officials in Zaozhuang city, Shandong province, took into custody seven members of a house church, including several leaders, who had had contact with Shi Enhao and Zhang Mingxuan, vice president and president of the CHCA. According to the same report, authorities in Linyi city, Shandong, also reportedly detained two unregistered Protestants who had hosted Zhang Mingxuan during a visit.

For more information about conditions for Protestants in China, see Section II！Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2011 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2011-10-25 ) | Posted on: 2012-05-22  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=165664


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