• Chinese government repression of free religious belief and practice has grown more severe over the past year. The Communist Party intensified its crackdown against unauthorized religious and spiritual groups in 2003 and expanded the campaign during 2004. Hundreds of unregistered religious practitioners, and members of spiritual groups such as Falun Gong, have endured severe government harassment in the past year, with reports of beatings and killings.
• The Party continues its on-going campaign to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes patriotism toward China and repudiates the religion’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. However, the intensity of religious repression against Tibetan Buddhists may vary across regions. Qinghai province, and possibly Gansu, may be relatively less repressive. The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Sichuan province currently implement policy in the most aggressive manner.
• The Chinese government has intensified repression of unregistered Christians. Many unregistered Christian churches have been demolished. Protestant house church congregations have increasingly found themselves the target of severe government harassment, with reports of beatings and killings. Over 25 unregistered Catholic bishops, priests, and seminarians have been arrested, and Chinese officials have intensified harassment of unregistered lay Catholics in some areas, often pressuring them to register with the officially sanctioned Catholic Patriotic Association. The Chinese government took no public steps toward renewing diplomatic relations with the Holy See.
• The Chinese government continues to enforce strict regulations repressing Islamic education and practice, particularly in Xinjiang, where regional policies focus on preventing Uighur Muslim children from developing a strong Islamic identity and punishing adult Muslims engaging in ill-defined ‘‘illegal religious activity.’’ The Chinese government continues to outlaw private madrassas and mosques, impose travel restrictions on imams, restrict haj pilgrimages, and force Muslims to adhere to Party-sanctioned reinterpretations of the Koran and Hadith.

In a pattern broadly comparable to circumstances in other societies where law is deployed to privilege dominant belief systems and marginalize those of the minority, regulation of religion in China is used not only to control religious practices but also to express the boundaries of tolerance and repression so as to isolate resistance and privilege communities loyal to the Party/state. Thus, the government promises tolerance for the compliant and repression for the resistant.²⁹³

Citizens’ freedom of religion [sic] belief should not be described as ‘‘religious freedom’’ in which unprescribed religious activity is pursued according to individual whims. It would be improper for the practice of freedom of belief to oppose state laws and policies, and religious activity must be pursued within the confines permitted by the national constitution, law, and policy.³¹⁵

From the 1980s onward, international anti-China forces led by the U.S. made ‘‘containing China’’ the basis of their policy and, taking the ‘‘Tibet Issue’’ as an important strategic objective, overhauled their deceitful methods. Using the issues of ethnicity, religion, culture, human rights, and the environment, they distorted the actual prevailing situation in Tibet and slandered the policies of our country toward its Tibet region, and stepped up support for the Dalai clique [to] no end, and their ‘‘Independence’’ activity became even stronger, which they took as a starting point for their real aims: to attack China’s stability, contain its economic development, and ultimately destroy it.³²⁰

Commission staff delegations visiting Tibetan areas have seen signs that the intensity of religious repression is not uniform, an impression consistent with privately expressed expert opinions. Conditions in Qinghai province, and possibly in Gansu province as well, may be relatively less repressive, especially where the Gelug sect³²¹ of Tibetan Buddhism is in the minority. The TAR and Sichuan province currently implement policy in the most aggressive manner. Authorities in Sichuan have targeted popular Buddhist teachers for persecution. One, Sonam Phuntsog of Ganzi county, received a five-year sentence after he advised local Tibetans to ‘‘listen whole-heartedly to what the Dalai Lama says.’’ ³²² He is due for release in October 2004. Another, Tenzin Deleg, was sentenced in late 2002 to death with a two-year reprieve on charges of separatism and involvement in causing explosions. Authorities refuse to disclose details about the evidence against him, asserting that it involves state secrets.

State-run political education sessions require that monks and nuns denounce the Dalai Lama’s recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second-ranking spiritual leader. Chinese authorities installed another boy, Gyalsten Norbu, several months later and demanded that the secular and monastic communities accept his legitimacy. Officials promptly took Gedun Choekyi Nyima, then age six, and his parents into custody and have held them incommunicado since that time. The U.S. government has repeatedly urged China to end restrictions on Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his family, and to allow international representatives to visit them. Meanwhile, Gyaltsen Norbu’s appointment continues to stir widespread resentment among Tibetans.

The Party regards Tibetan Buddhism, like all religions, as a burden on society and requires monasteries and nunneries in Tibetan areas to achieve self-reliance.³²³ Charging admission is a common means of generating income for monastic centers in larger towns and cities.³²⁴ The construction of new highways and airports in the vicinity of Tibetan destinations, along with a growing Chinese middle class, has made Han tourism possible on a scale far exceeding that of foreign tourism.³²⁵ Both tourists and tourism disrupt religious activities and create the impression that the government promotes treating Tibetan religious sites as a commodity and cares little about the effect on religion. Credible reports claim that monastic study in some of Tibetan Buddhism’s most respected centers of learning is suffering from an unprecedented onslaught of domestic tourists, many of whom show no awareness that the only purpose of a monastery is to impart a religious education. Reports also assert that monks and nuns face restrictions on religious study and a shortage of qualified teachers. Many risk the perilous trek into exile in order to pursue their studies freely. The Chinese government has demonstrated a commitment to protect religious architecture and art, but it has not demonstrated a similar commitment to respect the sanctity of religious practice.

Religious Freedom for China’s Catholics and China-Holy See Relations

The Chinese government has tightened its repression of unregistered Catholic religious practice and believers, intensifying a campaign begun in 2000. In some provinces, government authorities have stepped up efforts to intimidate and harass unregistered Catholics, often pressing them to register with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA).³²⁶ In the most extreme cases, government authorities have destroyed unregistered Catholic church build- ings.³²⁷ Over 40 unregistered Catholic bishops and priests continue to be in prison, in labor camps, under house arrest, or under strict surveillance. In November 2003, a U.S. NGO that monitors religious freedom for Catholics in China reported that unregistered Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin had been seen under guard in a hospital in Baoding, Hebei province. A frequent subject of official U.S. and international inquiry with the Chinese government since his detention in 1997, Bishop Su’s whereabouts and condition are unknown. The same source reports the October 2003 arrest of about a dozen unregistered Catholic priests and seminarians, several 2004 arrests of unregistered Catholic bishops and priests who were soon released, and the arrest of ten unregistered priests and seminarians in August 2004.³²⁸

Chinese religious authorities generally subject registered Catholics to a milder type of control that concentrates on the seminaries, where the government subjects seminarians to interrogation about their religious and political beliefs and requires their attendance at ideological training courses. In early 2003, the officially sanctioned CPA and the CPA-approved bishops issued three documents that strengthened the role of the CPA in matters previously reserved to the clergy.³²⁹ These matters include the selection of bishops, the running of seminaries and convents, and the training of priests and sisters. The initial implementation of these new policies generally has not been vigorous, and has varied from diocese to diocese, in part because CPA supervision is weak or nonexistent in some areas. In parts of China, CPA officials have been accused of embezzling church property, or selling or renting it for personal gain. Registered Catholics have been permitted to continue developing a fledgling network of social organizations including orphanages, nursing homes, clinics, HIV/AIDS treatment centers, and leprosariums, and to engage in disaster relief activities. Government authorities have also permitted registered Catholics to create Internet Web sites and to offer advanced theological training for registered clergy and courses in basic theology for registered laity.

Relations between China and the Holy See seem to have deteriorated over the past year. The Chinese government clashed with the Holy See over China’s attempt to consecrate a large number of official bishops without Holy See approval in January 2000 and responded angrily to the Holy See’s October 2000 canonization of 120 Chinese martyrs. But after failing in 2002 to force its own episcopal candidate on the CPA-registered Catholic diocese of Hengshui, Hebei, the Chinese government permitted the consecration of Feng Xinmao, the appointee approved by the Pope, in January 2004.³³⁰ Although in the past, Chinese government officials and intermediaries representing the Holy See met periodically, such contacts have not occurred since the July 2003 visit to Beijing of a senior U.S. Catholic prelate, who held discussions with state and CPA officials.³³¹ The Chinese government has so far taken no visible steps toward renewing diplomatic relations with the Holy See, which were broken in 1951. The Chinese government remains unwilling to meet the requirements of the Holy See regarding religious freedom for unregistered Catholics, papal selection of bishops, and reduction of the role and authority of the Patriotic Association.

In 2004, the Holy See publicly protested the persecution of Catholic clergy for the first time since the mid-1990s. In March, a spokesman for the Holy See declared that any charges against arrested unregistered Bishop Wei Jingyi ‘‘should be made public, as in any lawful state.’’ In response, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that ‘‘police authorities have not taken any restrictive measures’’ against Wei. SARA claimed that Bishop Wei was stopped for questioning after having traveled abroad with a falsified identity card. In April, the Holy See also declared the arrest of unregistered Bishop Jia Zhiguo ‘‘inadmissible in a state of law that declares that it guarantees ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘respects and safeguards human rights.’ ’’ In both cases the bishops were released.³³² In May, June, and September, Chinese government arrests of additional bishops, priests, and laypeople prompted additional protests from the Holy See.³³³

The situation for China’s Catholics continues to change. The two most important developments are the reconciliation of the official clergy to the Holy See and the growing reconciliation between unregistered and registered Catholics. In 2004, the Vatican announced that 49 of the 79 official bishops have privately established communion with the Holy See.³³⁴ Those who have done so are becoming more forthright. In an interview with a foreign journalist, Li Duan, the CPA-approved Bishop of Xi’an, declared, ‘‘The Pope is the head of the Church . . . The Pope has the right to govern and supervise all the Church’s activities, including the election of bishops. We will never deny that the Pope has the right to do so.’’ ³³⁵ A younger generation of registered Catholic priests frequently has refused to be ordained by bishops not in communion with the Holy See or to attend episcopal consecrations performed by them. Yet a minority of the registered Catholic clergy continues to adhere to the Chinese government’s vision of a national Catholic Church independent of the Holy See. In April 2003, the government rewarded Bishop Fu Tieshan of Beijing for his service to this vision by making him a vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC).³³⁶ Although not discussed openly, the relationship of official bishops to the Holy See framed the discussions at a July 2004 meeting of the National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives. Almost half of the registered bishops refused to attend this joint meeting of the CPA and the registered bishops’ conference. Speaking to the Conference, senior Politburo member Jia Qinglin and Ye Xiaowen, Director of SARA, insisted on the ‘‘autonomy’’ of the Chinese Catholic Church in the matter of episcopal ordination.³³⁷ Ordination of bishops is a question of increasing importance to the Catholic Church in China, as many bishops are elderly. In the registered community, many candidates are reluctant to accept episcopal succession in the current atmosphere; in the unregistered community, candidates who have the proper level of theological education are difficult to find within a given diocese.

Despite the difficult issues facing China’s Catholics, the registered and unregistered communities keep moving closer together. The increasingly open loyalty of the registered clergy to the Holy See has earned them growing acceptance from underground Catholics. Some unregistered clergy have urged their members to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the registered Church, and many have done so. Most unregistered Catholics, however, continue to refuse to worship with the CPA-approved Catholic community.³³⁸

Religious Freedom for China’s Muslims

The Chinese government continues to strictly regulate Islamic education and practice, particularly in Xinjiang, where regional policies on religion are designed in part to ensure that Uighur Muslim children do not develop a strong Islamic identity.³³⁹ Private madrassas and mosques are prohibited in Xinjiang,³⁴⁰ and children under 18 years of age cannot receive religious instruction, including private Koranic study at home.³⁴¹ Chinese authorities impose harsh travel restrictions on imams in Xinjiang,³⁴² and they must demonstrate ‘‘good political quality’’ ³⁴³ before they can participate in the state-run propaganda classes that are mandatory for preaching or leading prayer.³⁴⁴ The state-authorized China Islamic Association has begun implementing a policy that directs Muslims to interpretations of the Koran and Hadith that conform to Party guidelines.³⁴⁵

Following a gradual increase in Party tolerance of religion beginning in 1978, Islamic education and practice surged in Xinjiang. By the late 1980s, regional authorities became concerned that Islam was weakening the Party’s influence.³⁴⁶ In response, the Xinjiang government issued a series of laws and regulations to ‘‘control’’ Islam.³⁴⁷ These laws and regulations, and their successors, continue to govern Islamic education and practice today. They prohibit Muslims from unauthorized organizing,³⁴⁸ accepting foreign contributions, ³⁴⁹ or printing or distributing religious materials without explicit permission from authorities.³⁵⁰ Authorities in Xinjiang have also cracked down on the construction of mosques. Chinese government rhetoric attempts to cast suspicion on Muslims in Xinjiang. For example, according to one official in Urumqi, before 1999 the number of mosques in Xinjiang far exceeded the ‘‘the needs of normal religious activity,’’ ³⁵¹ and ‘‘nearly all the illegal activities or disturbances in Xinjiang are connected to religion.’’ ³⁵² According to a member of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, the most prevalent ‘‘illegal religious activities’’ in the region include private underground Koranic study, trans-regional missionary work, and Talib (student) activities.³⁵³

Chinese authorities seem to be implementing policies likely to generate further Uighur alienation and resentment rather than national unity. A recent Party Central Committee document noted that the major dangers to maintaining stability in Xinjiang are ethnic separatism and illegal religious activity.³⁵⁴ Chinese authorities accuse ‘‘ethnic separatists’’ of trying to ‘‘politicize the problem of religion,’’ and emphasize the importance of drawing a clear distinction between these two ‘‘dangers.’’ ³⁵⁵ However, strict and often insensitive Chinese policies toward Uighurs and government efforts to categorize long-held Uighur aspirations for increased autonomy as ‘‘splittism’’ or ‘‘terrorism,’’ may be just as responsible for linking the two issues. According to one U.S. scholar, Islamic piety or practice cannot be understood in isolation from politics, but it should also not be simply reduced to politics.³⁵⁶ ‘‘Uighur religiosity has political content, but state interventions have, indeed, politicized it further.’’ ³⁵⁷ Public security officers reportedly arrested a young Muslim poet in January 2003 for chanting a verse in public. ‘‘Security officials told foreign journalists . . . (that) . . . the young man was guilty of ‘spiritual terrorism.’ Officials said the poem ‘attacked our government policy’ regarding ethnic minorities.’’ ³⁵⁸

Chinese authorities may have overreached in the continuing crackdown on Uighur ‘‘separatism.’’ According to a recent study by a U.S.-based human rights NGO, ‘‘the Chinese authorities are sowing the seeds of an ethnic resentment so profound as to jeopardize the very stability they claim to defend.’’ ³⁵⁹ Rather than focusing attention on ‘‘the extremely small number of ethnic separatists . . . (engaged) in violent terrorist activities,’’ ³⁶⁰ Chinese authorities have instituted harsh religious policies that discriminate against all Uighurs, based on the false premise that most Uighurs support radical and violent Islamist separatism and terrorism. In fact, Uighurs are ‘‘divided from within by religious conflicts, in this case competing Sufi and non-Sufi factions, territorial conflicts, linguistic discrepancies, common-elite alienation, and competing political loyalties.’’ ³⁶¹

Religious Freedom for China’s Protestants

China’s unregistered Protestant house churches suffer continued government intimidation, harassment, and, in some cases, severe repression.³⁶² Although the Party justified some of these actions based on claims of church ties to external forces,³⁶³ in fact they are the product of the Party’s concern about the rapid increase in house church membership and the existence of a loose network linking these congregations through the personal ties of some church leaders. One U.S. scholar has suggested that the Party perceives the house church movement as an especially serious threat because membership, estimated in the tens of millions, has grown as churches have become ‘‘increasingly Sinicized through the inclusion of features of folk religion and traditional cultural forms.’’ ³⁶⁴

Despite the broad appeal of the house church movement, the Party’s fears of a Protestant mass movement challenging its authority seem groundless. Increasing Sinicization has caused division rather than unity among house churches in many cases.³⁶⁵ The highly sectarian tendencies of some congregations led one group of church leaders in 1998 to condemn heretical teachings and ask the government to ‘‘change the definition of a ‘cult’ from meaning simply any Christian group that didn’t register with the (state-authorized) Three Self Patriotic Movement.’’ ³⁶⁶ Although many house church leaders seek unity among congregations, most have shown little inclination to challenge the state, and ‘‘some pastors say their groups are more concerned about internal divisions and attacks by ‘heretics’ and ‘cults’ like the ‘Eastern Lightning’ (whose leader claimed she was the Christ incarnate) than they are about state repression.’’ ³⁶⁷

Despite the apparent lack of any real threat to Party authority or public safety, the Party intensified its ‘‘anti-cult’’ crackdown against the house church movement in 2003 and expanded the campaign in 2004. Xiao Biguang, a leader in the South China Church, and Zhang Yinan, a house church historian, were arrested in September 2003. Police cited Zhang’s ‘‘hopes for the destruction of Chinese government bodies’’ during his sentencing to two years of re-education through labor in October.³⁶⁸ He was reportedly beaten after arriving at the labor camp.³⁶⁹ Xiao Biguang, who was organizing the legal defense for imprisoned South China a Church founder Gong Shengliang and had revealed that prison authorities had nearly beaten Gong to death, was released from detention in October. Pastor Gong was arrested in August 2001 and charged with premeditated assault, using a cult to undermine the implementation of law, and rape. The cult charges were dropped, and Gong’s December 2001 death sentence was commuted to life in prison, but Pastor Gong continues to endure serious abuse from prison authorities in Wuhan.³⁷⁰

In October 2003, Zhang Hongmei, a house church member in Shandong province, was reportedly beaten to death after being detained by police for ‘‘illegal religious activities.’’ The day before her death, police had demanded that Zhang’s family pay the equivalent of a $362 fine for her release.³⁷¹ Three house church leaders—Liu Fenggang, Xu Yonghai and Zhang Shengqi—were tried in secret in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province in March 2004. The original charges of inciting the gathering of state secrets were amended to providing intelligence to organizations outside of China.³⁷² According to a U.S.-based human rights NGO, the arrests were in response to a report released by Liu detailing the severe repression of Christians in Hangzhou. Xu had printed the report and Zhang had disseminated it on the Internet.³⁷³ On August 6, the Intermediate People’s Court in Hangzhou sentenced Zhang, Xu, and Liu to one, two, and three years in prison, respectively. A U.S. NGO that monitors religious freedom in China reported the abduction by police of Three Tiers of Servants church leader Xu Shuangfu in Heilongjiang province and the arrest of scores of his followers during April 2004.³⁷⁴ One of those arrested, Gu Xianggao, was beaten to death while in police custody.³⁷⁵ Xu’s condition and whereabouts remain unknown.

Compared to the highly vulnerable house churches, China’s authorized Protestant congregations operate comfortably within the state’s religious bureaucracy, in effect enduring ‘‘the constraints imposed on their parishes in exchange for the opportunity to worship in public.’’ ³⁷⁶ Oversight by two Chinese organizations under the SARA, the Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the China Christian Council, ensure that China’s registered Protestant churches conform to state religious guidelines.³⁷⁷ Approximately 13,000 Protestant congregations are registered to hold services in China. Registered pastors are paid by the state and are subject to removal if the government believes they have become too evangelical. Church officials often complain in private about state interference and restrictions. According to these officials, SARA decides ‘‘how many pastors the TSPM may ordain in any six-month period, how many meetings TSPM pastors can hold in any one-month period, and who is permitted to teach at and graduate from China’s 17 official Protestant seminaries.’’ ³⁷⁸

As in other areas of religious affairs, inconsistencies exist in official policy toward Protestants, and some see a few small signs of hope for limited change. Some house churches have reportedly been successful in appealing to the principles of the Chinese Constitution ‘‘to obtain reparations for harm done to their leaders or facili- ties.’’ ³⁷⁹ In 2001, the Party seemed prepared to begin allowing house churches to forego registering with the TSPM,³⁸⁰ but this possibility apparently was abandoned in favor of the current crackdown on house churches.


Notes to Section III(c)—Freedom of Religion

²⁷⁶ ‘‘Chinese Communist Party Policy on Religion Outlined by Party Paper,’’ People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], 14 November 03 (BBC Monitoring, 26 November 03).

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Jiang perfected the solution, but the formulation traces its roots to Deng Xiaoping. In 1982, China’s Constitution was amended to protect ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ a guarantee that would provide ‘‘sufficient’’ religious freedom for the five faiths officially recognized by the Chinese government (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism) while enlarging the Party’s mass base of support. Deng’s new thinking was designed to energize the productive capacity of religious believers by tempering the unrelenting hostility toward religion that had grown out of the Cultural Revolution. The new Party policy on religion was laid out in the 1982 document, ‘‘The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period (Document 19).’’ Mickey Spiegel, ‘‘Control and Containment in the Reform Era,’’ in God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions, eds. Jason Kindopp and Carol Hamrin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Pitman B. Potter, ‘‘Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,’’ 174 China Quarterly 317, 319–321 (2003).

²⁷⁹ Sun Chengbin, ‘‘During Hebei Inspection, Jia Qinglin Emphasizes Commanding Religions Work Through the Important Thinking of the ‘Three Represents,’ Leading Masses of Religious Believers to Devote Themselves to Comprehensively Building Well-off Society,’’ Xinhua, 10 November 03 (FBIS, 10 November 03).

²⁸⁰ Chen Songshao, ‘‘Ruling Party and Religion: An Extremely Important Theoretical Issue,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 January 04 (FBIS, 29 April 04).

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ma Xuejun, ‘‘Do a Good Job of Religious Work in the New Period,’’ Gansu Daily [Gansu ribao], 30 June 04 (FBIS, 2 July 04).

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ambiguity has challenged Party policy on religion from the start. Even Mao commended the anti-religious activities of peasants, while he warned that ‘‘it is wrong’’ for anyone to ‘‘cast aside the idols’’ or ‘‘pull down the temples’’ of others. Mao Zedong, ‘‘An Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan,’’ in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press: 1975), 23–29. See also, Michael A. Lev, ‘‘China Touts New Churches, But Rules Crimp Faithful; Government Still Controls Religion,’’ Chicago Tribune, 3 March 04.

²⁸⁵ Wang Yan, ‘‘Uphold the Use of Important Thinking of the ‘Three Represents’ to Lead Religious Work,’’ Heilongjiang Daily [Heilongjiang ribao], 25 May 04 (FBIS, 28 May 04); Ma Xuejun, ‘‘Do a Good Job of Religious Work in the New Period’’; Hu Shaojie, ‘‘Together They Strike Up the Magnificent Melody of Religious Work,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 March 04 (FBIS, 10 June 04).

²⁸⁶ China’s current ‘‘socialist religious theory’’ is routinely attributed to the third generation leadership, specifically Jiang Zemin, in the Chinese press. At the same time, China’s fourth generation leadership under President and General Secretary Hu Jintao has embraced the theory, and ‘‘stressed using the important thinking of the ‘Three Represents’ to command religion work.’’ ‘‘Study Session of Provincial Leading Cadres on Religious Work Opens in Beijing,’’ Xinhua, 3 June 04 (FBIS, 3 June 04).

²⁸⁷ The official Party line pursued during the Cultural Revolution, the elimination of religion, stands out as an aberration in an otherwise consistent policy focus on ‘‘control of religion’’ since the early 1950s. Holmes Welch surveyed the role of the religious affairs bureaucracy as it was created and institutionalized in the early 1950s. Although the title of the national-level organization has now changed to the State Administration for Religious Affairs, little else regarding doctrinal hostility toward religion or SARA’s implementing guidelines has changed. See, in particular, Homes Welch, Buddhism Under Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 35.

²⁸⁸ See, e.g., regulations posted on the Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau Web site, , and the United Front Work Department’s Web site, .

²⁸⁹ ‘‘Chinese Religious Leaders Condemn U.S. Religious Freedom Report,’’ Xinhua, 21 May 04 (FBIS, 21 May 04).

²⁹⁰ ‘‘China Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes U.S. Accusations Against Religious Policy,’’ Xinhua, 14 May 04 (FBIS, 14 May 04).

²⁹¹ These laws and regulations include: Implementing Measures on Managing the Registration of Religious Social Organizations [Zongjiao shehui tuanti dengji guanli shishi banfa], issued 6 May 91; Regulations on Managing Places for Religious Activities [Zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli tiaoli], issued 31 January 94; Measures for the Registration of Places for Religious Activities [Zongjiao huodong changsuo dengji banfa], issued 13 April 94; Provisions on Managing the Religious Activities of Aliens in China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued 31 January 94; Measures for the Annual Inspection of Places of Religious Activities [Zongjiao huodong changsuo niandu jiancha banfa], issued 30 July 96; and Detailed Rules on Implementing the Provisions on Managing the Religious Activities of Aliens in the People’s Republic of China [Zhongguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00. For an in-depth analysis of the Chinese legal structure controlling religion, see Potter, ‘‘Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China.’’ Also see the CECC Web site, www.cecc.gov, for a more complete listing of these laws and regulations, with translations.

²⁹² Ye Xiaowen’s statement as referenced in, Magda Hornemann, ‘‘China: Religious Freedom and the Legal System: Continuing Struggle,’’ Forum 18 News Service, 28 April 04, .

²⁹³ Potter, ‘‘Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China.’’

²⁹⁴ ‘‘PRC Official on ‘Three Represents’ Commanding Religion in China,’’ Xinhua, 3 June 04 (FBIS, 3 June 04), Ma Xuejun, ‘‘Do a Good Job of Religious Work in the New Period.’’

²⁹⁵ Yu Kai, ‘‘Hubei Holds Forum on ‘Cults’ in Wuhan, Remarks Against Falungong, Li Hongzhi,’’ Hubei Daily [Hubei ribao], 3 Jul 04 (FBIS, 6 July 04).

²⁹⁶ For an extensive treatment of PRC government abuses against Falun Gong practitioners, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2003, China (including Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau), 25 February 04.

²⁹⁷ For an analytical treatment of the impact of the Party’s handling of the Falun Gong movement on criminal justice reform in China, see Ronald C. Keith and Lin Zhiqiu, ‘‘The ‘Falun Gong Problem’: Politics and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in China,’’ 175 China Quarterly 623 (2003).

²⁹⁸ ‘‘Beijing Steps up Campaign Against ‘Cults’ in Rural Areas,’’ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 21 May 04 (FBIS, 21 May 04). See in particular the FBIS reference to a Politiburolevel commentator in the 17 April 2004 edition of People’s Daily calling for more localities to enforce the crackdown.

²⁹⁹ See analytical comments in ‘‘Beijing Steps up Campaign Against ‘Cults’ in Rural Areas,’’ Foreign Broadcast Information Service. See, in particular, the FBIS description of an article on the Web site of the Beijing Association of Science Technology referencing a central directive titled ‘‘Circular on Launching Anti-Cult Warning Education in Rural Areas Throughout the Country.’’

³⁰⁰ Xu Hong, ‘‘China Anticult Association Holds Ninth Public Lecture and Academic Symposium in Chengdu to Discuss Ways to Prevent Cults From Breeding and Infesting Rural Villages,’’ Sichuan Daily [Sichuan ribao], 30 May 04 (FBIS, 02 June 04). See analytical comments in ‘‘Beijing Steps up Campaign Against ‘Cults’ in Rural Areas,’’ Foreign Broadcast Information Service. See in particular FBIS description of an article on the Web site of the Beijing Association of Science Technology referencing a central directive titled ‘‘Circular on Launching Anti- Cult Warning Education in Rural Areas Throughout the Country.’’

³⁰¹ The U.S.-based Falun Dafa Information Center reported that one of the highest tolls in official violence and indoctrination against China’s Falun Gong practitioners occurred in April 2004. ‘‘62 Cases of Falun Gong Practitioners Killed from Torture, Abuse Reported in April and May 2004,’’ Falun Dafa Information Center, 9 June 04, .

³⁰² See analytical comments in ‘‘Beijing Steps up Campaign Against ‘Cults’ in Rural Areas,’’ Foreign Broadcast Information Service. See, in particular, the FBIS reference to a Politiburolevel commentator in the 17 April 2004 edition of People’s Daily identifying Falun Gong as a target of the campaign, and the FBIS description of an article posted on the PRC Ministry of Agriculture Web site outlining the campaign. The crackdown in Deqing county, Zhejiang province resulted in 10 small churches and 392 temples being closed between September and October 2003. ‘‘Deqing County in Zhejiang Province Has Closed Down 392 Temples and 10 Churches,’’ Hong Kong Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 8 November 03 (FBIS, 12 November 03).

³⁰³ Ma Xuejun, ‘‘Do a Good Job of Religious Work in the New Period.’’

³⁰⁴ Wu Qingcai, ‘‘Beijing Experts Call for Emphasis on Education in Scientific Atheism Directed at Youth,’’ China News [Zhongguo xinwen], 31 May 04 (FBIS, 2 June 04).

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid. See also, Tian Yu, ‘‘It is the Good Spring Time in Jiaodong—What I Have Seen and Heard About the Anti-Cult Education Campaign Through Admonition and Instruction in the Rural Areas of Yantai City, Shandong Province,’’ Xinhua, 16 April 04 (FBIS, 21 April 04).

³⁰⁷ Ghupur Reshit, ‘‘Reflections on the Work of Cultivating Patriotic Religious Personnel,’’ Social Sciences in Xinjiang [Xinjiang shehui kexue], 25 November 03 (FBIS 08 January 04).

³⁰⁸ Tian Yu, ‘‘It is the Good Spring Time in Jiaodong—What I Have Seen and Heard About the Anti-Cult Education Campaign Through Admonition and Instruction in the Rural Areas of Yantai City, Shandong Province.’’

³⁰⁹ Ma Xuejun, ‘‘Do a Good Job of Religious Work in the New Period.’’

³¹⁰ Yue Zong, ‘‘Constantly Raise the Level of Religious Work and Resist Foreign Religious Infiltration,’’ Southern Metropolitan Daily [Nanfang dushibao], 22 May 04 (FBIS, 22 May 04); Chen Songchao, ‘‘Ruling Party and Religion—An Extremely Important Theoretical Issue,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 January 04 (FBIS, 29 April 04).

³¹¹ Yu Kai, ‘‘Hubei Holds Forum on ‘Cults’ in Wuhan, Remarks Against Falungong, Li Hongzhi.’’

³¹² ‘‘Chinese Communist Party Policy on Religion Outlined by Party Paper,’’ People’s Daily.

³¹³ Wang Yan, ‘‘Uphold the Use of Important Thinking of the ‘Three Represents’ to Lead Religious Work.’’

³¹⁴ For a more extensive treatment of this subject, see the CECC 2003 Annual Report. See also infra, Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists and Religious Freedom for China’s Muslims.

³¹⁵ TAR Leading Committee for Patriotic Education in Monasteries, TAR Patriotic Education for Monasteries Propaganda Book No. 4. Handbook for Education in Policy on Religion, May 2002, Section 2, 14(d). (The International Campaign for Tibet obtained an official Tibetan-language version as distributed in the monasteries. English translation by ICT on file with the Commission.)

³¹⁶ Commission Staff Interviews. An official in the TAR said there are 46,000 monks and nuns in the TAR, and that this figure ‘‘accounts for two percent of the Tibetan population.’’ (46,000 would be about 1.9 percent of the TAR’s 2.43 million Tibetans in 2000.) An official in Qinghai said there are about 21,000 Tibetan monks and nuns in the province. (21,000 would be about 1.9 percent of Qinghai’s 1.09 million Tibetans in 2000.) An official in Gansu said there are about 10,000 Tibetan monks and nuns. (10,000 would be about 2.3 percent of Gansu’s 443,000 Tibetans in 2000.)

³¹⁷ TAR Patriotic Education for Monasteries Propaganda Book No. 4, Section 1, Question 7.

³¹⁸ Ibid., Question 8(i).

³¹⁹ Propaganda Department of the Committee of the Communist Party of the TAR, A Reader for Advocating Science and Technology and Doing Away with Superstitions, 2002, Section 1, Question 17. (The International Campaign for Tibet obtained an official Chinese-language version of the Reader after it had been distributed to county-level Education Offices in the TAR. English translation by ICT on file with the Commission.)

³²⁰ TAR Leading Committee for Patriotic Education in Monasteries, TAR Patriotic Education for Monasteries Propaganda Book No. 2. Handbook for Education in Anti-Splittism, May 2002, Section 2, 2(d). (The International Campaign for Tibet obtained an official Tibetan-language version as distributed to monasteries. English translation by ICT on file with the Commission.)

³²¹ The Gelug sect’s spiritual head is the Dalai Lama. There are three other major sects of Tibetan Buddhism: the Kagyu, Sakya, and Nyingma.

³²² The Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Criminal Verdict of the Sichuan Province Ganzi Tibetan Minority Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court, 2000. Ganzi Intermediate Court Verdict No. 11,’’ in Selection of Cases from the Criminal Law, August 2003, 42–55. Dui Hua’s translation of the official sentencing document shows that the court agreed that Sonam Phuntsog had not explicitly called for ‘‘Tibetan independence,’’ but nonetheless sentenced him for inciting splittism because he ‘‘incited the masses to believe in the Dalai Lama.’’

³²³ TAR Patriotic Education for Monasteries Propaganda Book No. 4. Handbook for Education in Policy on Religion, Section 3, Question 29: ‘‘How should the internal management of monasteries be strengthened? ’’ The answer, in part: ‘‘Monasteries are not permitted to impose any burden on ordinary people by whatever means.’’ Section 4, Question 42: ‘‘What is the general procedure for diligently guiding the adaptation of Tibetan Buddhism to Socialist society in the Tibet region? ’’ The answer, in part: ‘‘The monks and nuns in general became self-sufficient workers in the Socialist family, and the economic burden on the masses was reduced by an ascertained measure.’’ (The International Campaign for Tibet obtained an official Tibetan-language version as distributed to monasteries. English translation by ICT on file with the Commisison.)

³²⁴ Entry fees are rising rapidly. ‘‘New Metal Barricades in Lhasa’s Jokhang Control Access to Inner Temple,’’ Tibet Information Network, 12 May 04, . Lhasa’s Jokhang Temple, Tibetan Buddhism’s oldest and most important temple, charges 70 yuan for entry, 10 yuan more than Beijing’s Forbidden City. Metal barricades have been erected to control Tibetan worshippers and ensure that non-Tibetans, including Han, pay the steep fee.

³²⁵ ‘‘Tibet Receives More Tourists in First Half,’’ Xinhua, 31 July 04, . 505,000 tourists visited the TAR in the first half of 2004. 470,000 were from elsewhere in China; 37,000 were from ‘‘overseas regions and countries.’’ (Tourists from inside China outnumbered those from outside China by nearly 13 to 1.)

³²⁶ In the late 1950s, the Chinese government organized the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), gave it control of all Church property, and convinced a small group of bishops and priests to proclaim their independence from the Holy See and subordinate themselves to the CPA. Since that time, the government has worked to persuade and coerce Catholic clergy and laity to register with this ‘‘official Church.’’ The majority refused to do so and went ‘‘underground,’’ where, persisting in their fidelity to the Holy See, they refused to attend Masses offered by priests of the ‘‘official Church.’’ China today has an estimated 8 million unregistered and 4 million registered Catholics.

³²⁷ ‘‘Beijing Says the Bishop Went Abroad Illegally,’’ AsiaNews, 11 March 04, ; Bernardo Cervellera, P.I.M.E., ‘‘New Churches Built to Destroy Even More,’’ AsiaNews, 4 February 04, ; Teresa Ricci, ‘‘Forced Demolitions: an Attempt on Man and Culture,’’ AsiaNews, 2 March 04, ; ‘‘Dramatic Account of a Church Destroyed in Zhejiang,’’ AsiaNews, 26 February 04, . Li Junru interview with Chen Songshao, ‘‘Ruling Party and Religion-an Extremely Important Theoretical Issue’’ [Zhizhengdang yu zongjiao: Yi ge ji qi zhongyao de lilun wenti zuanfang zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao fuxiaozhang li junru], China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 January 04.

³²⁸ Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Prisoners of Religious Conscience for the Underground Roman Catholic Church in China,’’ 27 May 04, ; ‘‘In Custody: People Imprisoned for Their Religious Beliefs,’’ China Rights Forum, No. 4, 2003, 93–123; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Underground Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church in China ‘Lost’ for More than 6 Years Found Very Ill in Government Detention,’’ 19 November 03, ; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Approximately A Dozen Underground Roman Catholic Priests and Seminarians Were Arrested and Another Church Was Demolished in China,’’ 26 October 03, ; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Another Arrest of an Underground Catholic Bishop,’’ 8 March 04, ; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Another Arrest of an Underground Catholic Bishop,’’ 6 April 04, ; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Arrest of Two Young Underground Roman Catholic Priests,’’ 16 May 04, .

³²⁹ The documents, entitled A Management System for Catholic Dioceses in China, Work Regulations for the Catholic Patriotic Association and The System for the Joint Conference of Chairpersons of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Asociation and of the Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church in China, are available in Tripod XXIII, No. 130 (Autumn 2003), .

³³⁰ On the control of registered Catholics, see ‘‘Year 2003 Witnesses Greater Control Over Open Church,’’ UCAN, 29 December 03, ; Bernardo Cervellera, P.I.M.E., Missione Cina: viaggio nell’impero tra mercato e repressione (Milan: Ancora, 2003), 157ff. On Catholic charitable activity see the Web site of Beifang Jinde Catholic Social Service Center at ; Angelo Lazzarotto, ‘‘Mature Laity in the Faith: an Urgent Matter in the Chinese Church,’’ AsiaNews, 3 December 04, . On Web sites, see ‘‘Catholic Web sites Flourish Depite Obstacles,’’ UCAN, 11 August 03, . On Feng Xinmao see, ‘‘First Bishop Ordained in Decades With Graduate Degree,’’ AsiaNews, 8 January 04, . The Commission has received reliable private reports of CPA corruption.

³³¹ John Paul II, ‘‘Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Fourth Centenary of the Arrival in Beijing of the Great Missionary and Scientist Matteo Ricci, S.J.,’’ 24 October 01, . Nailene Chou Wiest, ‘‘U.S. Cardinal Tests Water on Visit to Beijing,’’ South China Morning Post, 2 August 03, ; ‘‘Chinese and U.S. Catholic Leaders Meet in Beijing,’’ Xinhua, 30 July 03, ; Theodore Cardinal McCarrick, ‘‘China,’’ Catholic Standard, 31 July 03, .

³³² ‘‘Holy See Statement on Bishop Arrested in China,’’ Vatican Information Service, 10 March 04; ‘‘Bishop Wei Jingyi released last March 14,’’ AsiaNews, 16 March 04, ; ‘‘Press Office Statement on Bishop Imprisoned in China,’’ Vatican Information Service, 7 April 04; ‘‘Underground Bishop Julius Jia Zhiguo Released,’’ AsiaNews, 14 April 04, ; Sandro Magister, ‘‘The Bishop of Xi’an’s Long March from Beijing to Rome,’’ L’espresso Online, 15 March 04, ; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Prisoners of Religious Conscience for the Underground Roman Catholic Church in China’’; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Underground Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church in China ‘Lost’ for More than 6 Years Found Very Ill in Government Detention’’; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Approximately A Dozen Underground Roman Catholic Priests and Seminarians Were Arrested and Another Church Was Demolished in China’’; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Another Arrest of an Underground Catholic Bishop’’; Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Arrest of Two Young Underground Roman Catholic Priests.’’

³³³ ‘‘Abducted Bishops Forced to Obey Government and Not Pope,’’ AsiaNews, 25 June 04, .

³³⁴ ‘‘C’e` un risveglio religioso in Cina? ’’ La Civilta` Cattolica 155, no. 3689 (6 March 04) (every line of this authoritative Vatican journal is approved by the Secretary of State prior to publication).

³³⁵ ‘‘Allegiance to Peter at All Costs: an Interview with Anthony Li Du’an, Bishop of Xi’an,’’ in Sandro Magister, ‘‘The Bishop of Xi’an’s Long March from Beijing to Rome.’’

³³⁶ ‘‘First Catholic Named Vice Chairman of National People’s Congress,’’ UCAN, 8 April 03, .

³³⁷ ‘‘Re-election of the Jiang Zemin Era Leadership at the National Congress of Catholics,’’ AsiaNews, 15 July 04, ; ‘‘National Catholic Congress Re-elects Top ‘Open’ Church Leaders,’’ UCAN, 13 July 04, .

³³⁸ Joseph Han Zhihai, Bishop of Lanzhou, ‘‘Letter to my Friends,’’ published in Tripod XXIII, No. 131 (winter 2003), ; ‘‘A Time for Reconciliation,’’ Hong Kong Sunday Examiner, 21 March 04, ; ‘‘ ‘Open’ and ‘Underground’ Communities Hold Separate Services Side-by-Side,’’ UCAN, 16 April 04, ; ‘‘Division in Church Pains Both ‘Open’ and ‘Underground’ Communities,’’ UCAN, 22 January 04, .

³³⁹ See, e.g., ‘‘Chairman Simayi Tieliwaerdi Promotes National Unity Education Month Drive,’’ Xinjiang Daily [Xinjiang ribao], 09 May 04 (FBIS, 22 June 04) and Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities,’’ Social Sciences in Xinjiang [Xinjiang shehui kexue], 25 August 03 (FBIS, 1 December 03).

³⁴⁰ The Xinjiang Regional Government issued a ‘‘special regulation’’ in 1988 ‘‘strictly prohibiting underground Koran schools and classes on the Koran.’’ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁴¹ Practicing Islam in Today’s China: Differing Realities for the Uighurs and the Hui, Testimony of Jonathan Lipman, Professor of History, Mount Holyoke College.

³⁴² The Provisional Regulations for Controlling Religious Activity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region state, ‘‘professional religious personnel cannot engage in missionary activity across prefectures, municipalities or counties without the approval of the religious affairs bureau of the government.’’ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁴³ Zhao Zhiyun, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi: Actively Protect Stability, Guide Religion for The Benefit of the Country,’’ Tianshan Net [Tianshan wang], 15 July 03 (FBIS, 26 July 03).

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ ‘‘Hui Liangyu Speech at China Islamic Association’s 50th Founding Anniversary,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 November 03 (FBIS, 20 January 04). See also, Practicing Islam in Today’s China, Testimony of Kahar Barat, Lecturer in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Yale University.

³⁴⁶ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁴⁷ These include Provisional Regulations for Managing Venues for Religious Activities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1988, Provisional Regulations for Managing Religious Activity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1990, Provisional Regulations for Managing Religious Professional Personnel in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1990, and Ordinances for Managing Religious Affairs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1990. Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁴⁸ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁴⁹ These activities are governed by the Regulations on the Control of the Religious Activity of Foreigners Within the Territory of the People’s Republic of China. Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁵⁰ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ghupur Reshit, ‘‘Reflections on the Work of Cultivating Patriotic Religious Personnel.’’

³⁵³ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁵⁴ This document is cited in Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Practicing Islam in Today’s China, Testimony of Gardner Bovingdon, Assistant Professor of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University at Bloomington.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Robert Marquand, ‘‘Pressure to Conform in West China,’’ Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 03.

³⁵⁹ Nicholas Becquelin, ‘‘Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang,’’ China Rights Forum No. 1, 2004, 39.

³⁶⁰ Hui Liangyu, ‘‘Inheriting Fine Traditions and Writing a New Chapter of History,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 November 03 (FBIS, 20 January 04).

³⁶¹ Dru C. Gladney, ‘‘Islam in China: Accomodation or Separatism,’’ 174 China Quarterly 451, 457 (2003).

³⁶² For information on a crackdown against house church members in Guangxi Autonomous Region in November 2003, see ‘‘Christians Sent to Chinese Labor Camps for Owning Bibles,’’ Agence France-Presse, 25 November 03 (FBIS, 25 November 03). For information on a crackdown launched against the ‘‘Little Flock’’ in Zhejiang province in December 2003 and the Tu Du Sha Church in June 2003, see Bill Savadove, ‘‘Little Flock is Resisting State Control From Pastures New,’’ South China Morning Post, 1 December 03 (FBIS, 20 January 03), and ‘‘Chinese Government Officials Bulldoze God’s House,’’ AgapePress, 24 February 04, . For information on Henan province house church arrests during January, March, and August 2004, see ‘‘Three Christian Leaders Arrested in China in Crackdown,’’ Wall Street Journal, 16 February 04; ‘‘House Church Leader Zeng Guangbo Re-Arrested; Deborah Xu Confirmed in Custody,’’ ChinaAid, 10 March 04, ; ‘‘More Than 100 House Church Leaders Arrested in Henan,’’ ChinaAid, 06 August 04, . For information on the arrest and later release of a house church pastor in Anhui province during May 2004 and earlier arrests in February 2004, see Center for Religious Freedom, ‘‘China Releases Some Christian Leaders,’’ 1 June 04, and ‘‘One Chinese House Church Leader on the Run, Three Others Formally Prosecuted,’’ ChinaAid, February 04, . For information on the arrest and later release of China Gospel Fellowship members in Hubei province, see ‘‘More Than 100 More House Church Leaders Arrested: High Level Government Meeting in Religion Reported,’’ ChinaAid, 13 June 04, . For information on the arrest and beating death while in custody of a house church member in Guizhou province in July 2004, see ‘‘Chinese Woman Beaten to Death After Arrest for Handing Out Bibles,’’ Agence France-Presse, 4 July 04. For information on a mass arrest of Christians in Xinjiang Autonomous Region during July 2004, see ‘‘Relatives Arrested in Henan; One More Leader Held in Anhui,’’ ChinaAid, 18 August 04, and ‘‘More than 100 House Church Leaders Arrested in Xinjiang; Once Arrested Leader Tortured in Henan,’’ ChinaAid, 20 July 04, www.chinaaid.org.

³⁶³ Rooting out ‘‘foreign infiltration’’ is a particular goal of the campaign. Note the Heilongjiang reference in Wang Yan, ‘‘Uphold the Use of Important Thinking of the ‘Three Represents’ to Lead Religious Work.’’

³⁶⁴ Potter, ‘‘Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,’’ 334.

³⁶⁵ For more information on the development of sectarianism in rural house churches, see Daniel H. Bays, ‘‘Chinese Protestant Christianity Today,’’ 174 China Quarterly 488, 493–497 (2003).

³⁶⁶ In 1998, a number of house church leaders produced a document calling on the government ‘‘to change the definition of a ‘cult’ from meaning simply any Christian group that didn’t register with the Three Self . . . (and) to stop attacking the house churches.’’ David Aikman, Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of Power (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2003), 90. See also Daniel H. Bays, ‘‘Chinese Protestant Christianity Today.’’

³⁶⁷ Magda Hornemann, ‘‘China: For Religious Freedom, Patience May Be a Virtue,’’ Forum 18 News Service, 31 March 04, .

³⁶⁸ ‘‘Zhang Sentenced to Two Years in Labor Camp,’’ Voice of the Martyrs News, 3 November 03, .

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ China Aid Association, 2 April 04, ‘‘The Life of Imprisoned House Church Pastor in Danger: Just Come Pick Up My Corpse,’’ 19 May 04, .

³⁷¹ ‘‘A Christian in Shandong Was Beaten to Death by the Public Security Personnel,’’ Hong Kong Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 4 November 03 (FBIS, 5 November 03).

³⁷² Human Rights in China Press Release, ‘‘Christians Face Long Sentences in Secret Trial,’’ 16 March 04, .

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ The Committee for Investigation on Persecution of Religion in China, China: Crackdown on a Million-Member House Church—The Leader Kidnapped, Over 50 Co-Workers Arrested, and One Tortured to Death, 14 May 04, .

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Jason Kindopp, ‘‘Policy Dilemmas in Chinas Church-State Relations: An Introduction,’’ 3.

³⁷⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China Christian Council, see Yihua Xu, ‘‘Patriotic Protestants: The Making of an Official Church,’’ and Jason Kindopp, ‘‘Fragmented Yet Defiant: Protestant Resilience under Chinese Communist Party Rule,’’ in God and Caesar in China, eds. Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin.

³⁷⁸ David Aikman, Jesus in Beijing, 175.

³⁷⁹ Jeff M. Sellers, ‘‘Crushing House Churches: Chinese Intelligence and Security Forces Attack Anew,’’ Christianity Today, 13 January 04, .

³⁸⁰ Ibid.