• In March 2004, the National People’s Congress adopted amendments to China’s Constitution that in theory confirm the state’s protection of human rights and enhance property rights. Having adopted such language, the government will have to deliver some limited practical improvements in the human rights arena or risk damaging its legitimacy.
• Chinese citizens lack a legal mechanism through which to enforce their constitutional rights, and the Chinese govern­ment is unlikely to create such a mechanism in the near-term.
• Chinese lawyers and scholars continue to discuss constitu­tional reform and constitutional enforcement in conferences, scholarly journals, and in some online forums. Chinese citizens are making use of language in the recent constitutional amend­ments to promote further reform and protest violations of their rights. The government has harassed some reform advocates for discussions on constitutional reform that it considers too far-reaching.

The 2004 Constitutional Amendments

In March 2004, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a slate of constitutional amendments that the Central Committee of the Communist Party approved in October 2003.⁵⁸⁵  The 14 amend­ments include new provisions that, on paper, enhance constitu­tional protections for private property and declare explicitly that “the State respects and safeguards human rights.”⁵⁸⁶  Other provi­sions incorporate Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” theory into the Constitution as a guiding ideology of the state,⁵⁸⁷clarify the state’s role in directing the private economy, and call for the implementa­tion of “political civilization,” a term widely associated with the rule of law and more accountable governance.⁵⁸⁸

Foreign observers and some Chinese experts reacted to the constitutional amendments with caution, welcoming them as a symbolic step forward but warning that their practical impact would be minimal without a working constitutional enforcement mechanism.⁵⁸⁹In interviews with Commission staff, other Chinese scholars attached greater significance to the amendments, arguing that even without an enforcement mechanism in place, the amend­ments will encourage the discussion of human rights issues and lay a foundation for further reform.⁵⁹⁰ One leading scholar told Com­mission staff that the human rights amendments would provide a necessary theoretical basis for ratification of the International Cov­enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).⁵⁹¹

The adoption of the 2004 amendments capped an active year of discussion over the scope of constitutional reform. Some of this dis­cussion was too far-reaching for authorities. In mid-2003 and again in January, the Chinese government issued directives to curtail un­authorized publication on or discussion of constitutional amend­ments, and it harassed reform advocates such as Cao Siyuan after senior leaders became concerned that academic and media dis­course was raising expectations for broad-ranging reform.⁵⁹² In ad­dition, the Party Central Committee’s General Office reportedly issued a document warning that “hostile forces” had infiltrated the domestic debate on constitutional reform and directing Chinese organizations to exercise caution in rule of law exchanges with foreign entities.⁵⁹³ Official papers and Web sites promoted the “bot-tom-up” nature of the Party-approved constitutional amendment proposals and expert commentary on the need for constitutional “stability.”⁵⁹⁴

While continuing to exert controls over the media and expression [see Section III(d)—Freedom of Expression], however, the govern­ment tolerated some discourse on constitutional issues that was critical of the limited nature of official reform efforts. For example, the Legal Daily, a Ministry of Justice newspaper, and Caijing, a liberal-minded financial weekly, published relatively candid articles calling for the establishment of a working constitutional enforce­ment mechanism and noting that citizens should have the right to compel constitutional review.⁵⁹⁵ At academic conferences, in legal journals, and in some online forums, leading Chinese scholars dis­cussed the nature of constitutionalism and mechanisms of constitu­tional enforcement.⁵⁹⁶  Reform advocates maintained a progressive Web site called the “Open Constitution Initiative” until the govern­ment shut it down in 2004 (most likely because it criticized the prosecution of the editors of the Southern Metropolitan Daily), then re-established it in Hong Kong on a site that is currently accessible to mainland Internet users.⁵⁹⁷ Finally, average citizens began to draw on new constitutional provisions as they protested official abuses and made efforts to protect their rights. Property rights protestors in Hangzhou, Beijing, Henan, and Guangzhou, for exam­ple, explicitly invoked new constitutional protections in pressing their claims against developers and local governments.⁵⁹⁸ Some of these protests received favorable coverage in the Chinese press.⁵⁹⁹  Free expression advocates have also invoked constitutional pro­tections to challenge the application of anti-subversion laws.⁶⁰⁰

Constitutional Enforcement

President Hu Jintao’s emphasis on constitutional supremacy in late 2002 raised hopes that the Chinese government would take steps to establish a working constitutional mechanism in 2004. The NPC Standing Committee has the formal power to supervise en­forcement of the Constitution and invalidate laws and regulations that conflict with it, but has failed to fulfill this constitutional role in practice.⁶⁰¹ This failure has long been a key complaint of legal reformers in China and came into sharper relief in 2004, as many asked what good new constitutional rights would be without a mechanism through which to enforce them.

Chinese scholars have discussed several models of constitutional enforcement, including improved constitutional enforcement by the NPC Standing Committee, a special constitutional committee under the NPC Standing Committee, a German-style constitutional court, and proposals to vest China’s courts with the power of constitu­tional review.⁶⁰² Many scholars seem to agree that in the current political climate, constitutional enforcement powers are unlikely to be wrested from the NPC. These experts see an NPC constitutional committee composed of legal experts as the mechanism most likely to be adopted.⁶⁰³

The Chinese government has taken some limited steps toward this initial goal. During the March 2004 NPC meeting, a Chinese report suggested that “relevant departments” were considering pro­posals to establish a human rights commission within the NPC and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.⁶⁰⁴ There has been little public discussion of this proposal in the Chinese news media, however, and it is unclear what powers such a com­mission would have if it were established.⁶⁰⁵  More recently, in June 2004, the NPC Standing Committee announced the creation of a special legislative review panel tasked with reviewing legisla­tion and regulations for consistency with the Constitution.⁶⁰⁶  The creation of this panel may improve the handling of citizen petitions on conflicts between the Constitution and laws or regulations and could be a first step toward more robust constitutional enforce­ment.

Over the past year, reform-minded scholars, lawyers, and judges have also continued their efforts to establish case precedents for constitutional review by the courts. At present, Chinese courts lack the power to apply constitutional provisions to individual cases or to strike down laws or regulations that are inconsistent with the Constitution.⁶⁰⁷ Nevertheless, advocates at legal aid centers in Bei­jing and Chengdu are actively searching for and bringing test cases with constitutional claims as their basis.⁶⁰⁸ For example, lawyers have filed lawsuits challenging local government policies that pro­hibit the employment of individuals with hepatitis B or require job applicants to be a certain height, claiming that such policies violate the equal protection clause of China’s Constitution.⁶⁰⁹ Other cases have involved unlawful property seizures. In several of these cases, plaintiffs have achieved success in the form of settlements or court victories on non-constitutional grounds, and some of the lawsuits have prompted legislative remedies to address the problems at issue.⁶¹⁰ To date, however, courts have been unwilling to accept or apply legal arguments based on the Constitution. Although some legal scholars have criticized the courts for this reluctance, others promoting constitutional litigation believe the courts are wise to take a cautious approach in order to avoid unnecessary political conflicts that could set back reform efforts.⁶¹¹

One notable legal case last year provided an example of such po­tential political conflicts. In September 2003, an intermediate court judge in Luoyang ruled that a Henan regulation on seed prices was invalid because it conflicted with the national “Seed Law.” ⁶¹²The decision elicited an angry response from the Henan Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee, which charged that the judge had exceeded her power and demanded that she be disciplined for her “illegal” review of the local regulation.⁶¹³Although the case did not involve a constitutional question, the controversy over judicial power had clear constitutional overtones, and it sparked a national debate in legal circles on the problem of constitutional review in China.⁶¹⁴ In addition, four lawyers filed a petition with the NPC Standing Committee challenging the effectiveness of the local seed price regulations and calling on the NPC Standing Committee to resolve the legislative conflict.⁶¹⁵ At the time of publication, neither the case itself, which was appealed, nor the petition, had been re­solved.

Despite these developments and continued discussion of constitu­tional issues, progress on constitutional enforcement is likely to be slow. The creation of the NPC legislative review panel is a positive step toward this goal, but the principal function of the panel ap­pears to be to review existing laws and regulations for consistency with the Constitution, rather than to review constitutional viola­tions in individual cases.⁶¹⁶ The NPC is unlikely in the near term to create a broader constitutional enforcement mechanism with these powers and responsibilities. In May 2004, a member of the NPC Legal Committee explicitly ruled out the possibility that a constitutional court would be established.⁶¹⁷According to Commis­sion sources, the Party leadership has not yet put forth any con­crete proposals for a broadly empowered constitutional review insti­tution and is not expected to approve plans for such an institution in the near future.⁶¹⁸

Implications of Developments in Constitutional Law

Constitutional reform developments in 2003–4 should be inter­preted with caution. Despite official statements on rights protec­tion, the NPC’s adoption of the new constitutional amendments should be seen more as an attempt to shore up Party legitimacy than a move to enhance individual rights in practice. A Party communiqué lists strengthening Party leadership, maintaining na­tional unity and social stability, and promoting economic reform as the principal purposes for amending the Constitution, not enhanc­ing and enforcing individual rights.⁶¹⁹  That senior Chinese leaders have not taken any concrete steps toward establishing a constitu­tional enforcement mechanism, and appear unlikely to do so in the near future, counsels caution in assessing leadership motives for the new amendments and official pronouncements on human rights.

The constitutional reforms should not be viewed as merely empty rhetoric, however.  Not long ago, the Party rejected discussion of “human rights” altogether.⁶²⁰  By incorporating human rights into the Constitution and publicizing official human rights campaigns, the government has legitimized discussion of human rights in China. This rhetoric provides important political cover for reform­ers both inside and outside the government and Party. Interviews by Commission staff suggest that the amendments have already helped to lay the groundwork for ratification of the ICCPR, to with­stand calls to reinstate a controversial form of administrative de­tention that was abolished last year, and to promote other reform initiatives.⁶²¹  Moreover, several cases over the past two years dem­onstrate that reformers outside the government are adept at co-opting official rhetoric and casting their initiatives as efforts to advance the leadership’s goals.⁶²²  The constitutional revisions will provide additional cover for such efforts.

More importantly, the adoption of the amendments and publicity on constitutional reform have raised public expectations for change. In the short term, China’s leaders will have to show some modest practical improvements in the areas addressed by the constitu­tional amendments to sustain Party legitimacy and diffuse social anger over issues such as property seizures and law enforcement abuse. In the long term, the amendments and accompanying dis­cussion are likely to contribute to grassroots pressure for the government to deliver a working mechanism for constitutional en­forcement. As a writer in the official China Youth Daily declared last October, “rights without guarantees are worthless. We need to strengthen our effort to perfect mechanisms for [challenging] viola­tions of rights. Only if we do this will the rights of citizens be more than ‘rights on paper.”’⁶²³ As citizens mobilize to protect their property interests and challenge abuses that seem inconsistent with new constitutional guarantees, such calls are likely only to grow.

Notes to Constitutional Reform

585 The NPC made only three minor changes to the text of the amendments approved at the Third Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee in October 2003.

586 A chart detailing the amendments and the minor changes made by the NPC is available at <www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/rol/NPCApproveConstAmendChart.pdf>.

587 According to the Theory of Three Represents, the Party must represent advanced produc­tive forces, advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the majority of China’s citizens. It is intended to provide a theoretical basis for incorporating the entrepreneurs into the Party. The other guiding ideologies of the state are Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory. Notably, Jiang Zemin is not mentioned by name in the amendment.

588 Commission Staff Interviews; Yin Jinhua, “There Will be No Political Civilization in the Absence of the Rule of Law,” Study Times [Xuexi ribao], 16 February 04 (FBIS, 3 April 04).

589 See, e.g., Robert Saiget, “Scholars Say Amendments to PRC Constitution Fall Far Short of Expectation,” Agence France-Presse, 12 October 03 (FBIS, 12 October 03); Freda Wan, “Changes Could Be Just Symbolic, Observers Fear,” South China Morning Post, 15 March 04, <www.scmp.com>; Veron Hung, “China’s Constitutional Amendment Is Flawed,” International-Herald Tribune, 4 March 04, <www.iht.com>.

590 Commission Staff Interviews.

591 Commission Staff Interview. China signed the ICCPR in 1998, but the National People’s Congress has yet to ratify it. The scholar predicts that the NPC will ratify the ICCPR within two years.

592 According to CECC sources, the Propaganda Department issued a directive banning discus­sion of the “three unmentionables,” (constitutional amendments, political reform, and June 4) in news reports and in unapproved "academic papers or forums on constitutional amendment.” Authorities reportedly harassed vocal constitutional reform advocates such as Cao Siyuan and Jiang Ping in the wake of the directive. Jiang Xun, “Scholar Put Under Round-the-Clock Watch for Voicing Opinion of Constitutional Reforms,” Asia Weekly [Yazhou zhoukan], 26 October 03 (FBIS, 22 October 03); Jason Leow, “ ‘Banned’ Economist Returns to China,” The Straits Times, 13 July 04 (FBIS, 13 July 04). In January, the General Administration on Press and Publication issued a directive explicitly prohibiting the unauthorized publication of books, articles, and audio or video materials concerning "amendment of the Constitution.” Notice on Strengthening the Administration of Guidance Over Published Material Relating to Constitutional Amendment [Guanyu jiaqiang dui sheji xiugai xianfa fudao duwu chuban guanli de tongzhi], issued 21 Janu­ary 04.

593 Kathy Chen, “China Cracks Down on Growing Debate Over Political Reform,” Wall Street Journal, 24 September 03, <www.wsj.com>.

594 Zhuang Huining, “Include Important Theoretical Viewpoints, Principles, and Policies Es­tablished at the 16th CPC National Congress Into the Constitution; Play a Better Role of the Basic Law of the Country—Three Noted Legal Experts on Constitutional Amendments,” Outlook [Liaowang], 20 October 03 (FBIS, 28 October 04); Hua Hua, “Balance Between Consistency, Adaptability,” China Daily, 30 October 03 (FBIS, 30 October 03).

595 Ji Weidong, “From Emphasizing Private Property Rights to Improving Governance: Inter­preting the Draft of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution,” Finance [Caijing] (English Edi­tion), 12 January 04, <www.caijing.com.cn>; Hu Jianmiao, Jin Chengdong, “The Predicament of a Right to Call for Review of Laws and Regulations for Constitutional Violations” [Fagui weixian shencha jianyiquan de kunjing], Legal Daily [Fazhi ribao], 12 February 04, <www.legaldaily.com.cn>. Although more reserved, the China Daily also called for a more robust system of constitutional review. “Laws Must Fit Constitution,” China Daily, 16 January 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>. See also Chen Feng, “Rights Without Guarantees Are Worthless” [Meiyou baozhang de quanli dengyu ling], China Youth Daily [Zhongguo qingnian bao], re­printed in Guangming Daily [Guangming ribao], 17 October 03. Although the China Youth Daily article discussed the failure to respect the rights of criminal suspects and not specifically con­stitutional reform, it closed with a general warning that “Rights without guarantees are worth­less. We need to strengthen our effort to perfect mechanisms for [challenging] violations of rights. Only if we do this will the rights of citizens be more than ‘rights on paper.”’

596 Commission Staff Interviews. See, e.g., Li Yajing, “China Stands At the Entrance of the Constitutional Age” [Zhongguo zhan zai xianzheng jieduan menkou], Southern Metropolitan Daily [Nanfang dushibao], 31 July 04 (discussing the ideas of Professor Cai Dingjian, a leading constitutional scholar). Professor Cai believes that four forces will push forward the development of constitutionalism in China: (1) the challenges of judicial practice and the need for constitu­tional review; (2) a high degree of spontaneous, direct participation by citizens; (3) participation by the media and public debates as checks on government power; and (4) local experiments with democracy.

597 The Open Constitution Initiative is a non-profit law center established by a Beijing legal scholar. The Web site was shut down in June 2004 following a series of aggressive stories on the prosecution of reporters from the Southern Metropolitan Daily [see Section III(d)—Freedom of Expression]. The site has been reposted at www.xianzheng.org.

598 Commission Staff Interview; “Retired Hangzhou Teacher Detained for 10 Days for ‘Pro­moting the Constitution”’ [Hangzhou tuixiu laoshi shenchuan bai dagua xuanchuan xianfa bei juliu 10 tian], Peacehall Web site, 25 January 04, <www.peacehall.com>; “Resisting Demolition and Relocation, 38 Residents Bring Out the Constitution” [Ju chaiqian, 38 hu jumin banchu xianfa], Chengdu Evening News [Chengdu wanbao], 30 April 04; Bao Limin, “An Old Man in Beijing Defies Relocation Order with a Copy of the Constitution in Hand,” China Youth Daily, 5 April 04 (FBIS, 6 April 04); “Guangdong Homeowners Use Constitution to Fight Eviction,” Agence France-Presse, 5 April 04 (FBIS, 5 April 04). Some Chinese scholars have expressed con­cern that in the wake of the constitutional amendments on property rights, the PRC Land Ad­ministration Law and other statutes conflict with the Constitution. Ye Xinfeng, Gu Xiuyan, Gong Chang, “How to Link the Amended Constitution and the ‘Land Administration Law”’ [“Tudi guanli fa” zenme yu xiuxian xianan], Theoretical Exploration [Lilun yu tansuo], No. 5, 2004, 28–9.

599 For example, the Chengdu Evening News and China Youth Daily stories cited above paint­ed such protests in a positive light.

600 Jim Yardley and Chris Buckley, “Chinese Reformers Petition for Review of Subversion Law,” New York Times, 1 February 04, <www.nytimes.com>. The petitions are available at <http://sky.prohosting.com/liudiorg/DuDaobin01e.htm>.

601 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2003, 2 October 03, Section V(e).

602 Commission Staff Interviews. In April 2004, Commission staff members also completed a survey of Chinese scholarly articles on constitutional enforcement mechanisms published in 2002 and 2003. A list of such articles is available on the Commission Web site at <www.cecc.gov/ pages/virtualAcad/rol/JournalArticlesIndex.pdf>.

603 Commission Staff Interviews. One criticism of such a committee is that it is unlikely that citizens would be able to compel review. See also Liu Yunlong, “On Constitutional Lawsuits and Their Application to China” [Yelun xianfa susong ji qi zai woguo de yingyong], Law Review [Faxue pinglun], No. 13, 2002, 21–2. One prominent constitutional law scholar suggests that if such a committee is formed, it is likely to evolve into a German-style constitutional court in the long term. Commission Staff Interview.

604 Wang Chenbo and Sun Zifa, “An Interview with Lin Bocheng, Secretary General, China Foundation for Human Rights Development—Where Does the Road of Human Rights in China Lead After These Rights Are Written Into China’s Constitution?,” China News Agency [Zhongguo xinwen she], 11 March 04.

605 This story was published during the NPC meetings and could have been intended to deflect criticism that the constitutional amendments adopted at the meeting were merely symbolic. The Chinese government could also have been posturing to create the impression that it was making progress on human rights in the run-up to the meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in April, 2004. According to China law expert Randall Peerenboom, several Asian countries have established national human rights commissions, including Thailand, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, but on the whole, the effectiveness of such domestic com­missions in enforcing human rights protections has been mixed. Randall Peerenboom, Posting to China Law Net, 1 June 04 (cited with permission of author).

606 Meng Yan, “New Agency to See to Constitution Application,” China Daily, 21 June 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>; “China Sets Up New Agency to See to Constitutional Application,” Xinhua, 21 June 04 (FBIS, 21 June 04). Reports differ on the number of staff members that the panel will have. The China Daily reports that the panel will have 10 staff members. The Xinhua report puts the number at 50.

607 Commission Staff Interviews. In 2001, the Supreme People’s Court authorized a court in Shandong province to rely on constitutional provisions on the right to education in deciding a case. Shen Kui, “Is it the Beginning or the End of the Era of the Run of the Constitution? Rein­terpreting China’s First Constitutional Case,” 12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 200, 209– 10 (January 2003). Although it was considered a potentially precedent-setting case on judicial application of the Constitution, the case involved a tort claim between two private parties and not a claim against the government or an effort to overturn a law or regulation. The power to directly apply constitutional provisions in the absence of concrete implementing legislation has not been given to the courts generally.

608 The Human Rights Legal Research Center at Sichuan University in Chengdu and the Con­stitutional Law and Civil Rights Center at Qinghua University in Beijing are both involved in such work. The Qinghua center operates in cooperation with the Constitutional and Human Rights Committee of the Beijing Lawyers Association. Commission Staff Interviews.

609 Commission Staff Interviews. At least two height discrimination cases have been filed, one in Sichuan against a branch of the People’s Bank, and one against the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. “Authentic Records of the Court Hearing for China’s First Constitutional Equal Protection Case” [Zhongguo xianfa pingdengquan diyi an tingshen shilu], China Lawyer Net[Zhongguo lu¨ shi wang], 12 December 02, <www.chineselawyer.com.cn>; Commission Staff Inter­views.

610 The Sichuan height discrimination case was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff had no standing to sue under the Administrative Litigation Law. The SPP case is pending. A Hepatitis B case in Anhui is currently being appealed. At least six other provinces, including Zhejiang, Guangdong, Guizhou, Sichuan, Jiangxi, and Hunan, have lifted bans on hiring non-infections Hepatitis B carriers. Commission Staff Interviews; “One More Chinese Province Dis­continues Hepatitis Discrimination in Civil Service,” Xinhua, 17 May 04 (FBIS, 17 May 04);Alice Yan, “Hunan Lifts Ban on Hiring Hepatitis B Carriers,” South China Morning Post, 5 March 04, <www.scmp.com>. The Chinese government is reportedly drafting guidelines on health qualifications for employment that would bar discrimination against Hepatitis B and C carriers. Liang Chao, “Law Drafted to Help Fight Discrimination,” China Daily, 11 August 04(FBIS, 11 August 04).

611 Commission Staff Interviews.

612 For a description of the case, see Meng Yan, “Judge Sows Seeds of Lawmaking Dispute,” China Daily, 24 November 03 (FBIS, 24 November 04); Guo Guosong, “A Judge Declares a Local Regulation Invalid: Violating the Law or Upholding the Law” [Faguan pan difangxing fagui wuxiao: weifa haishi hufa] Southern Daily [Nanfang ribao], 20 November 03.

613 Judge Li’s presiding judge status was revoked by the court Party committee, and she was eventually dismissed from her job. After an outcry from legal experts and calls for leniency, how­ever, she was quietly invited back to work in early 2004. According to Commission sources, she declined to return. Commission Staff Interview.

614 See, e.g., Cheng Jie, “How to Understand LPC Supervision Over the Courts—Some Thoughts on the Li Huijuan Case” [Ruhe lijie difang renda dui fayuan de jiandu—li huijian shijian falu sikao zhi san], 21st Century Economic Herald [21 shiji jingji baodao], 3 December 03, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>; He Weifang, “NPC Supervision and Judicial Independence” [Renda jiandu yu faguan duli shenpan], China Lawyer Net [Zhongguo lu¨ shi wang], 4 December 03, <www.chineselawyer.com.cn>. Legal scholars at Qinghua University held a conference to dis­cuss the implications of the case. “Qinghua Conference: Many Scholars Discuss the Judge Li Huijuan Incident” [Qinghua huiyi: zhong xuezhe fenshuo “li huijian faguan” shijian], 21st Cen­tury Economic Herald [21 shiji jingji baodao], 26 November 03, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>.

615 Tian Yi, Wang Yin, “Four Lawyers Petition the National People’s Congress to Examine a Local Regulation” [Si lu¨ shi shangshu quanguo renda shencha difang fagui], 21st Century Busi­ness Herald [21 shiji jingji baodao], 24 November 03, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>. Under Arti­cle 90 of the PRC Legislation Law, citizens have the right to petition the National People’s Con­gress for review of administrative regulations that conflict with national law or the Constitution. PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 90.

616 Chinese legal scholars praised the government for creating the new panel, but suggested that the NPC consider creating a constitutional committee or constitutional court to undertake a function similar to that of judicial review in the United States and Great Britain. “NPC Body to Address Conflicts,” China Daily, 21 June 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>.

617 Harry Doran, “Beijing Rules Out Constitutional Court,” South China Morning Post, 22 May 04, <www.scmp.com>.

618 In its 2003 Annual Report, the Commission reported that the Party, the NPC, and the SPC were studying reforms related to constitutional review. According to Commission sources, how­ever, no concrete proposals are likely to be made in the near future.

619 Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Com­munist Party, approved 14 October 03. Specifically, the amendments are intended to “be helpful in strengthening and improving the Party’s leadership, bringing into play the superiority of the socialist system, mobilizing the enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people, maintaining na­tional unity, ethnic unity, and social stability, and promoting economic development and overall social progress.”

620 See the introduction to the Commission’s 2003 Annual Report for a summary of the evolv­ing Party stance toward “human rights.” CECC, 2003 Annual Report, October 2003, 5–10.

621 Commission Staff Interviews.  In Chengdu, for example, public security officials cited the new amendment on human rights as justification for loosening controls on migrant workers.

622 Last year, for example, reformers deftly seized on public anger over the death in custody of a young man named Sun Zhigang, government rhetoric promoting the rule of law, and an embryonic legal mechanism for NPC Standing Committee review of legislative conflicts to create pressure that led the State Council to abolish a controversial form of administrative detention called custody and repatriation. CECC, 2003 Annual Report, October 2003, Section V(e).

623 Chen Feng, “Rights Without Guarantees Are Worthless.”