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Tibet
Defining geographical Tibet can be confusing, if not contentious. Although Tibetans make up barely a half percent of China's population, areas designated by the Chinese government as Tibetan account for 23 percent of China's total land mass.(161) They include the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR, sometimes called "Tibet"), which has the same rank as a province. In
addition, there are ten Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and two Tibetan
Autonomous Counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan
Provinces.
China's claim to sovereignty over Tibetan areas derives from the Mongol ascendancy over much of Central and East Asia in the thirteenth century. After crushing Chinese imperial troops, the Mongol Khans established the Yuan Dynasty and ruled their empire from a newly built capital in Beijing. Tibetans avoided conflict with the Mongols, exchanging spiritual instruction by Tibetan lamas for protection by Mongols in a relationship that was later known as "priest and patron." Today, China argues that Mongols were not conquerors, but unifiers, and that Beijing should exercise sovereignty over lands where Tibetans once deferred to Mongols. The Tibetan government-in-exile, based in Dharamsala, India, asserts
that Tibet is an "occupied country"(162) and that the exiled government "is recognized by Tibetans, both in and outside Tibet, as their
sole and legitimate government."(163) The Dalai Lama seeks a
resolution that would accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibetan lands in
exchange for genuinely functional Tibetan autonomy.
Beijing defends its modern administration of Tibetan areas with contentions that under the Chinese Constitution and the Regional National Autonomy Law, Tibetans are "the masters of their state and society."(164) Chinese leaders say that the human rights
of Tibetans are fully protected and that economic and social development
is proceeding rapidly with generous aid from the central
government.
The Chinese government asserts that Tibetans are but one of the 56 "nationalities" comprising the multi-ethnic state of China. Tibetan and other non-Han Chinese groups account for only eight percent of China's population, with the Han Chinese making up the rest.(165) The Chinese Constitution and the Regional National Autonomy
Law stipulate that local areas of "regional autonomy," administered by local "organs of self-government," should be established in areas where minority nationalities live in "concentrated communities."(166) Officials claim that autonomy functions successfully. In practice, the law provides local governments no alternative
but to accept and implement directives from above: "The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as a whole above anything else and make positive efforts to fulfill the tasks assigned by state organs at higher levels."(167)
> The call for independence is the most uncompromising expression of Tibetan interest, and even non-violent, pro-independence activism has been largely crushed by the government. The Chinese Constitution provides the basis for calling "separatists" criminals and requires that citizens protect national and ethnic unity.(168) Repercussions increase as the state broadens its perceptions of threat. Many Tibetans seek a path to modernity that would sidestep struggle with Beijing but allow retention of a functional Tibetan identity. They believe that operational, rather than nominal, autonomy could achieve this. Samdhong Rinpoche, elected last year by Tibetans in exile as their first prime minister,169 said during his July 2002 visit to the United States, "Political separation from China is not important. What is important is to restore Tibetan civilization."(170)
Conflict between Tibetan aspirations and Chinese
policy is found within cultural, religious, and educational spheres. Party
and government are hostile to any practice or expression that they
perceive as nourishing a self-identity that suggests that being Tibetan is
not the same as being Chinese. As the Chinese government seeks to diminish
or eliminate aspects of Tibetan culture that it regards as threatening,
the peaceful exercise of internationally recognized human rights is
systematically suppressed.
China's prime requirement is unity and stability for the nation and among ethnic groups. This is enforced by constraining Tibetan political, cultural, educational, and religious life. Human rights and rule of law in Tibet are configured to accommodate party and state interests. Dr. Dong Yunhu, a senior human rights official in the State Council Information Office, explained the Chinese position: "The West stressed personal and individual rights; we stress the need for harmony between the individual and the collective."(171)
Despite unrelenting effort by the Chinese government to discourage or prevent expressions of loyalty and devotion to the Dalai Lama, he remains the most respected and influential Tibetan anywhere. More than any other figure or institution, he is seen to embody not just Buddhism but vital elements of Tibetan identity. The Chinese government regards any expression of support for him as a form of opposition to official policy. Zhu Xiaoming, a senior Party official with oversight on Tibetan policy, told visiting Commission
staff, "The Dalai Lama uses religion as a pretext for harming the country. He carries people away [from the Motherland] under the signboard of religion."(172) An ethnic Tibetan Communist Party official in Lhasa described the Dalai Lama as "just a person who is engaged in politically subversive activities," adding that "he has never done anything for the Tibetan people in 40 years."(173)
Professor Elliot Sperling of Indiana University told a Commission roundtable that he believes Chinese leaders are awaiting the Dalai Lama's death and intend to choose a successor who will be molded to suit the interests of the state.(174) The State Council's management of the
enthronement of Gyaltsen Norbu as Panchen Lama in 1995 may provide a
model. He was enthroned a few months after the Dalai Lama recognized then
five-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the true reincarnation of the Panchen
Lama - after the Dalai Lama, the most important figure in the dominant
sect of Tibetan Buddhism. Infuriated, Beijing rejected the Dalai Lama's
decision and installed Gyaltsen Norbu instead. Chinese officials continue
to assert that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, held incommunicado along with his
parents for the last seven years, is living a "normal" life. His current
location is unknown and his status is unverified. If waiting for the Dalai
Lama's death is the strategy of the Chinese government, it could
exacerbate tension as Tibetans focus on what they may perceive as a
destructive affront to their heritage and religion. In the belief that
both sides will benefit, the Congress and the Administration have
repeatedly urged Chinese leaders to engage in substantive dialogue with
the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
Due to sustained repression and harsh punishment, fewer Tibetans risk any form of peaceful protest. The number of Tibetan political prisoners has declined since 1996 to less than 200 according to a recent report by the Tibet Information Network (TIN),(175) a London-based independent news
organization that monitors human rights inside Tibet. Three-quarters are
Buddhist monks and nuns. Approximately 100 Tibetan political prisoners are
known to be currently serving sentences at TAR Prison No.1 in Lhasa,
better known as Drapchi. They include high-profile cases such as monks
Ngawang Phuljung, Jamphel Jangchub, and Ngawang Oezer, and nuns Ngawang
Sangdrol and Phuntsog Nyidrol, all of whom have served at least ten years
of sentences which range from 16 to more than 20 years for
counterrevolutionary activities. According to the Tibet Information
Network report, 22 of Drapchi's political prisoners have died as a result
of severe abuse since 1989.
As political detention decreases and China becomes more adept at blocking information flow, fewer new reports of mistreatment of political prisoners emerge. Abuses experienced by Tibetans attempting to cross the Tibet-Nepal frontier without proper documentation are common on both sides of the border. Several releases on medical parole of Tibetan political prisoners have occurred this year.(176) Former prisoners remaining in Tibet are
subject to close police control, and if they were released on medical
parole they risk return to prison until their sentences have
expired.
Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution
provides for the freedom of "normal" religious practice. Party official
Zhu Xiaoming explained to Commission staff that this must be based on
seamlessness between religion and patriotism. "Loving the country is
identical to loving religion," he said. The "Patriotic Education"
campaign, carried out from 1996 to 2000, resulted in the expulsion or
displacement of thousands of monks and nuns. Although the formally
designated campaign is reportedly complete, routine forms of patriotic
education continue at monasteries, nunneries, schools, and
workplaces.
The Chinese government exercises
administrative authority over each Tibetan monastery and nunnery
indirectly through a Democratic Management Committee (DMC) made up
primarily of monks and nuns elected from among themselves. A DMC generally
includes at least one representative of the local government, and local
authorities must approve important decisions. Members of the DMC of Sera
Monastery in Lhasa told Commission staff that boosting monastic enrollment
depends primarily on whether income from monastery-run commercial
enterprises is rising. The view held widely by officials and many Han
Chinese citizens - that religious institutions and practitioners are
unproductive and hinder economic development - underlies this
requirement.
Official hostility toward religion
also may play a role in a series of detentions of locally popular Buddhist
figures implicated or charged with links to violence. They include Sonam
Phuntsog and Tenzin Deleg of the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
(Tibetan: Kardze) in Sichuan Province and Jigme Tenzin of Lhasa. Officials
have shown a tendency to equate separatism and terrorism. Details about
charges or legal proceedings are unavailable for these cases.
Although there is conspicuous evidence that material living standards of Tibetans are rising, statistics showing sustained double-digit increases in local economic production(177) and massive infusions of government funding(178) are misleading. Article 9 of the Constitution appropriates natural resources as state property.(179)
Government policy compels farmers and herders to sell their meat and grain
to the government at low, fixed prices. Thus, after the government has
taken much of the value of both extracted natural resources and
agricultural production, the local Tibetan economies have little
left.
Some academics and experts, including those who testified at a Commission roundtable, observe that Chinese authorities favor projects in natural resource extraction and large-scale infrastructure construction, and that beneficiaries of current development
practices are concentrated among the urban, largely non-Tibetan population.(180) For economic development to benefit the 80 percent majority of Tibetans who live in rural areas,(181) small-scale models are needed that are environmentally and culturally friendly. Arthur Holcombe of the Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund pointed out at the roundtable that Chinese statistics show urban per capita income rising much faster than rural incomes.(182) Bhuchung Tsering of the International Campaign for Tibet told the roundtable that economic development must not further dilute Tibetan identity.(183)
The Great Western Development campaign (Xibu Da Kaifa) has the most profound implications for western China of any official policy formulation to emerge in the post-Deng era. Ten provincial entities making up more than half of China's total area will be integrated into the national mainstream at a sharply accelerated pace through economic and social transformation. Of particular concern to indigenous populations is Western Development's effort to boost the influx of Han Chinese into the region under the rubric
of promoting "two-way population flow." Li Dezhu, Minister of the State Council Commission on Ethnic Affairs stated, "There will be some changes in the proportions of the nationalities. There will also be some conflicts and clashes in their contacts. If this is not handled well, it will have a deleterious effect on national unity and social stability."(184)
The project raising the greatest alarm is construction of a rail link between Golmud (in Qinghai Province) and Lhasa scheduled for completion in 2007. Arthur Holcombe told the roundtable, "The new railway to Tibet will only intensify existing migratory trends, exacerbate ethnic income disparities and further marginalize Tibetans in traditional economic pursuits."(185)
China has made progress at establishing public education infrastructure across a vast, lightly populated area. Credible reports, however, explain that poverty, as well as fees introduced during the 1990s, create significant barriers to school attendance.(186) A senior Tibetan academic at the Chinese
Center for Tibetan Studies in Beijing disputed this, telling Commission
staff that Tibetan schools are "free for all the people." Parents and
students, however, contend that public schools in Tibetan areas impart low
levels of literacy in both the Tibetan and Chinese languages, leaving
students disadvantaged within their own culture and in China's economic
mainstream. Educational models are needed that will prepare Tibetans for
entry into a job market largely created and dominated by Han Chinese, yet
facilitate retention of their self-identity, especially through competence
in the Tibetan language. Witnesses before the Commission expressed their
belief that international and U.S. government assistance is vital as
Tibetans seek to acquire the educational tools to cope with a competitive,
bicultural environment.
(Illustrative legal
provisions include: PRC Constitution, Articles 36, 51, 52, 53, 54,
112-C122, and 134; PRC Law on Regional National Autonomy - 1984, amended
2001, Article 7; PRC Criminal Law - 1979, amended 1997, Articles 13 and
102-C113. For an illustrative list of national laws and regulations
affecting religious organizations, see the Religious Freedom section.)
Footnotes
161: Steven D. Marshall and Susette Ternent Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development with Chinese Characteristics (Washington D.C.: Self-published CD-CROM, 1997), 2564-66. Table 7 provides land area figures cited to seven Chinese sources including provincial statistical yearbooks. The thirteen areas designated as Tibetan and autonomous total 2.24 million square kilometers (865,000 square miles). Complete 2000 census data for ethnic populations in China is not yet available. The official 1990 census reported a total population of 1.13 billion, including 4.59 million Tibetans (0.4 percent of the total), of whom 2.09 million resided in the TAR. China's area is approximately 9.6 million square kilometers (3.7 million square miles).
162: Tibetan Government-in-Exile, "Facts - Occupied Tibet," http://www.tibet.net/eng/tgie/tibet/ (7 August 2002). The area of "occupied Tibet" is reported as 2.5 million square kilometers (965,000 square miles). Political status is given as "occupied country." The Tibetan population is reported as six million, 2.09 million of which is in the TAR.
163: Tibetan Government-in-Exile, "Background," http://www.tibet.net/eng/tgie/background/ (7 August 2002).
164: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region," February 1998, (20 August 2002).
165: Population Census Office, National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, Major Figures on 2000 Population Census of China, 1 June 2001, 30. Han population for the 2000 census is given as 1.159 billion of a total population of 1.266 billion for mainland China.
166: Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyufa], adopted 31 May 1984, amended 28 February 2001, art. 2 [hereinafter "Regional National Autonomy Law"]. "Regional autonomy shall be practiced in areas where minority nationalities live in concentrated communities. National autonomous areas shall be classified into autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China."
167: Regional National Autonomy Law, art. 7.
168: Chinese Constitution, art. 52. "It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the unity of the country and the unity of all its nationalities."
169: Department of Information and International Relations, Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Dharamsala, India, "It is Samdhong Rinpoche," 20 August 2001, (20 August 2002) (Samdhong Rinpoche received about 29,000 votes, 85 percent of those cast). According to "Tibet in Exile at a Glance," (20 August 2002), the exiled government reports that 131,000 Tibetans are in exile and that 125,000 of them are in India or Nepal.
170: Barbara Crossette, "Tibetan Monk Prepares Exiles for a Political Shift," The New York Times, 21 July 2002, Section A4.
171: Erik Eckholm and Elisabeth Rosenthal, "The Bright Young Stars of China's Future," The New York Times, 28 September 1999, Section A1.
172: Commission Staff Meeting with Zhu Xiaoming, Deputy Secretary-General, United Front Work Department, 9 May 2002.
173: Commission Staff Meeting with Shoulang Rezhen (Tibetan: Sonam Rigzin), Vice-Director, United Front Work Department, TAR Communist Party Committee, 13 May 2002.
174: Ethnic Minorities in China: Tibetans and Uighurs: Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 June 2002 [hereinafter "Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable"], Written Statement Submitted by Professor Elliot Sperling, Associate Professor of Tibetan Studies and Chair, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University.
175: Steven D. Marshall, In the Interests of the State: Hostile Elements III - Political Imprisonment in Tibet, 1987-2001 (London: Tibet Information Network, 2002), 3.
176: Ngawang Choephel, an ethnomusicologist who had studied in Vermont, was released and allowed to return to the United States in January 2002. Nuns Gyaltsen Drolkar, Tenzin Thubten, Ngawang Choekyi and Ngawang Choezom were released during March-June 2002 and remain in Tibet. The elderly Tagna Jigme Zangpo was released in March and allowed to travel to the United States in July 2002.
177: China Today, "Tibet: Nearer and Nearer - an interview with Raidi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of [the] Tibet Autonomous Region," May 2001, (20 August 2002). According to Raidi [Tibetan: Ragdi], "Over the past six years [1994-2000] Tibet's [GDP] has increased at a rate of more than 10 percent annually, averaging 12.9 percent, ranking [it] at the national forefront."
178: "Tibet Chairman Legqog on Ways Tibet Will Use Assistance from Other Parts of Nation," Ta Kung Pao, 10 August 2001, translated in FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20010810000064. Legqog [Tibetan: Legchog], Chairman of the TAR Government states that "the central treasury's assistance and subsidies for Tibet during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period will reach 37.9 billion yuan," or doubling the amount provided under the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996 to 2000). This is to say that each of the region's 2.62 million people will receive 26,700 yuan of assistance on the average."
179: Chinese Constitution, art. 9. "Mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by collectives in accordance with the law....The appropriation or damage of natural resources by any organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited."
180: See generally, Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable.
181: China County and City Population Statistics 1992 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1993). Statistics from the 1990 census show 3.43 million Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas classified as rural and 854,000 living in Tibetan autonomous areas classified as urban.
182: Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, Written Statement Submitted by Arthur Holcombe, President, Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund. Holcombe states that authorities "estimated average per capita family income in urban areas of Tibet to be the equivalent of $606 in 1996, in comparison to only $117 in rural areas, and growing at about 5 times the rate in rural areas."
183: Ibid., Testimony of Bhuchung Tsering, Director, International Campaign for Tibet.
184: Li Dezhu, "Large-Scale Development of Western China and China's Nationality Problem," Beijing Qiushi, 1 June 2000, translated in FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20000615000057.
185: Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, Holcombe Written Statement.
186: Catriona Bass,
Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice Since 1950 (London: Tibet
Information Network and Zed Books, 1998), 90-92, 123.
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