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Tibet
The Dalai Lama seeks to protect and strengthen Tibetan culture, not to gain independence for Tibet.(454) Where he seeks to realize genuine local autonomy and a degree of consolidation in the administration of Tibetan territory, China's government and Communist Party have instead applied a substantial degree of division, and
consistently stressed national integration over local autonomy. Chinese leaders have characterized the Dalai Lama's approach as "independence in disguise,"(455) and contend that the Law on Regional National Autonomy protects Tibetan culture.(456) The law inverts the commonly understood concept of autonomy, stating, "The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as a whole above anything else and make positive efforts to fulfill the tasks assigned by state organs at higher levels."(457)
The Chinese government has divided ethnic Tibetan geographic areas into 13 administrative divisions. All are contiguous, and all are entitled to practice local self-government.(458) Tibetans living
throughout these areas have long shared a common culture, religion,
written language, and ethnic identity. The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
makes up about half of the total Tibetan area and is ranked at the
provincial level. Its boundaries approximate the extent of administration
exercised by the Tibetan government in Lhasa when the People's Republic of
China was founded in 1949. The rest of the Chinese-designated Tibetan
autonomous areas are found today in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan
Provinces. Until 1949 they formed a complex and decentralized
administrative mosaic.
Many Tibetans regard oversight by a single Tibetan capital as central to their concept of "Tibet." However, no Tibetan capital has administered the entirety of what is designated by China today as "Tibetan" since the Tibetan empire collapsed in the 9th century. The Tibetan government-in-exile endorses the Dalai Lama's quest for genuine autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. At the same time, it asserts that Tibet is an "occupied country" and that "The Tibetan people, both in and outside Tibet, look to the [Tibetan government-in-exile] as their sole and legitimate government."(459)
The United States government recognizes the TAR and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in other provinces to be part of the People's Republic of China.(460) The territories described above are equally Tibetan under China's Constitution and laws, and are entitled to similar rights under the rubric of regional national autonomy. Ninety percent(461) of the territory that the Tibetan government-in-exile claims as "Tibet" has been officially mapped by China as areas of Tibetan autonomy. Nearly 94 percent(462) of
Tibetans in China are residents of those autonomous Tibetan areas.
Dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama's Representatives
Two representatives of the Dalai Lama, Special Envoy Lodi Gyari,(463) based in Washington, and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen, based in Europe, visited China twice during 2002 and 2003.(464) The delegations were the first to travel to China in nearly 20 years. The envoys visited Beijing, Shanghai, several Chinese provinces, the TAR, and an autonomous Tibetan prefecture in Yunnan Province. They held discussions with central government and provincial-level officials, including top leaders of the United Front Work Department (UFWD)(465) and senior Tibetan officials in the TAR.(466)
The Special Envoy has characterized these developments in terms of cautious optimism and emphasized the importance of international support. Upon his return from the first visit, Lodi Gyari stated, "We have made every effort to create the basis for opening a new chapter in our relationship. We are fully aware that this task cannot be completed during a single visit. It will also need continued persistent effort and support from many sides."(467) After the second visit, he summed up the challenge, saying, "Both
sides agreed that our past relationship had many twists and turns and that many areas of disagreement still exist. The need was felt for more efforts to overcome the existing problems and bring about mutual understanding and trust."(468)
Tibetan Culture and Human Rights
China imposed no major new campaigns
across Tibetan areas during the past year, but economic development, the
education system, and existing initiatives encouraging Han population
migration continue to pressure Tibetans. Friction remains between Tibetan
aspirations to maintain their distinctive culture and religion and Chinese
policies favoring atheism and emphasizing the primacy of national
identity.
Human Rights
Tibetans face systematic restrictions of their basic human rights, including the freedoms of speech, press, association, and religion. The state represses peaceful expression that it considers "splittist," or which is deemed "detrimental to the security, honor and interests of the motherland."(469) The Dalai Lama enjoys unrivaled respect as a cultural and religious leader, but even innocuous expressions
of support for him can result in punishment. According to a March 2003 report by the Tibet Information Network, approximately 150 Tibetan political prisoners were serving sentences or
awaiting disposition of their cases.(470) Seventy-five percent are monks and nuns.
About 60 political prisoners, most serving sentences for the now-defunct
crime of counterrevolution, remain in TAR Prison No. 1, also known as
Drapchi, in Lhasa.
In December 2002, a court in Sichuan Province sentenced two Tibetans to death after a closed trial. Lobsang Dondrub (Chinese: Luorang Dengzhu) was charged with causing a series of explosions; Tenzin Deleg (Chinese: A'an Zhaxi), a Buddhist lama, was accused of conspiracy. A few weeks later, Chinese authorities executed Lobsang Dondrub despite pledges to senior U.S. government officials that the Supreme People's Court (SPC) would undertake a
"lengthy" judicial review of the sentence. A Commission staff paper published in February 2003 outlined the case and highlighted systemic failures in the criminal law and in the legal process for review and approval of death sentences.(471) Tenzin Deleg appealed his conviction and
sentence but may face retrial by the same court that rejected his appeal
and sent Lobsang Dondrub to the executioner. A new hearing before the SPC
would provide the best opportunity for a full, fair, and just
reconsideration of the sentence.
In March 2003 Chinese officials allowed the nun Ngawang Sangdrol to travel to the United States to seek medical care, a welcome development which followed her early release from Drapchi Prison in October 2002. Imprisoned in 1992 at age 14 for peacefully demonstrating, the authorities extended her sentence three times for further political protests inside the prison to a total of 21 years, 6 months. After arriving in the United States, she discussed her experiences with Commission staff. The descriptions of her actions
that police and court officials detailed during interrogation and sentencing sessions were, she said, "accurate." She never denied carrying out acts of protest or dissent, nor did she recant her beliefs while imprisoned, but even when beaten, tortured, or put into
solitary confinement for prolonged periods, she refused to accept that she had committed any "crime." Her views are typical of Tibetan political prisoners, she said.(472)
Many Tibetans find Chinese requirements for obtaining permission to travel legally to Nepal(473) inordinately burdensome and their prospects for approval poor. Tibetans attempting to cross the Chinese-Nepalese frontier without documentation have long faced danger and abuse on both sides of the border. In May 2003, the Chinese government pressured Nepalese officials in Kathmandu to hand over 18 Tibetans who had entered Nepal the previous month to Chinese diplomats to be forcibly repatriated. The U.S. State Department swiftly condemned the action, which Nepalese authorities carried out without the status determination required by international law.(474) In August the Nepalese government articulated a policy toward Tibetan asylum seekers that assures "Nepal will not forcibly return any asylum seekers from its soil."(475)
Ethnicity and economic development
Tibetans living in Tibetan areas, when speaking privately, cite the changing population mix in Tibetan areas as their principal concern. They believe that nothing threatens Tibetan culture more directly than marginalization and minority status in their own territory. Government authorities deny that there is a substantial influx of Han and other ethnic groups. Referring to the 94 percent Tibetan majority reported in the TAR by the 2000 census, Ragdi, then Chairman of the TAR People¡¯s Congress, said, "[S]ome people say that with immigration, the Tibetan population is greatly reduced and Tibetan culture will be extinguished. There is absolutely no basis for such talk."(476) In contrast, another senior official acknowledged the magnitude of undocumented changes, saying last year that migrant Han already made up half of Lhasa's population and their number would continue to rise.(477)
Assessing official population data is difficult because China's census methods hinder meaningful analysis. Data reflect only registered permanent residents, who census officials tabulate as if they were present in their places of registered residence, irrespective of where they in fact live or work.(478) The majority of Chinese in Tibetan areas have not registered as permanent residents and are not enumerated in local census statistics. For example, comparing 1990 and 2000 census data shows a mere 2 percent increase in the Han proportion of the TAR population. Remarkably, official census statistics show that Han population in Qinghai remained virtually flat from 1990 to 2000 while other ethnic groups increased their numbers. The official result is a 4 percent decrease in the Han proportion of Qinghai's population.(479) Tibetans speaking privately continue to express concern about the completion of the Qinghai-Lhasa railway, which stayed on schedule in 2003 for completion in 2007,(480) believing the rail link will accelerate the transformation of the TAR population. Construction of the railroad is providing its own boost to Han immigration - last December Vice-Minister of Railways Sun Yongfu told a news conference that only 700 of the then-current 25,000 project employees were Tibetan.(481)
Chinese officials point to years of surging economic growth in Tibetan areas, but unofficial reports show that most Tibetan incomes, while rising, are trailing regional economic indicators. Legchog, head of the TAR government, said in January that the TAR GDP
had averaged 10.9 percent annual growth for the past 5 years.(482)
Observers say that the engine of growth is central government funding of large-scale infrastructure construction projects and of the service sector, which is dominated by government-run workplaces, and not local production. Unofficial reports show that the
gap between urban and rural incomes has doubled in the past decade, leaving the majority of Tibetans increasingly disadvantaged.(483)
The Great Western Development policy (Xibu da kaifa), the ambitious development program announced by President Jiang Zemin in 1999, will present far-reaching challenges to Tibetans. An article in a prominent Party journal featured a senior official declaring, "Development is the last word." He recognized the social risks, however, and warned, "We should correctly handle the relations between reform, development, and stability."(484) The paper outlined a vision for a reconfigured demographic landscape, calling for herders and farmers to be resettled in compact, urbanized communities.(485)
Education and culture
If Tibetans are to adapt successfully to their new environment, then they must have access to significantly improved educational resources. If their culture is to survive, then the Tibetan language must play an important role in their education. Education in the
TAR trails every other province. Official data report that nearly half the population (46 percent) has "no schooling."(496) Barely
more than 1 percent has attended junior college or above. Educational
prospects for Tibetans in rural and urban communities differ sharply.
Farmers and herders in the TAR attend primary school at a rate similar to
city dwellers, but urbanites are 25 times more likely to reach junior
college or higher. Some experts have observed that rural schools are often
poorly funded, leading to shortages of staff and supplies. Fees linked to
schooling can discourage or prevent parents from sending children to
class.
In May 2002 the TAR People's Congress enacted regulations encouraging use of the Tibetan language. The rules also stress the equal status Chinese language shall have with Tibetan, and allow for one or both to be used in most official work.(487) Professor Nicolas Tournadre of the University of Paris 8 informed a Commission roundtable that, while well-intentioned, "It is likely that the present regulation concerning [use of the] Tibetan [language] will have no significant impact and that only a far-reaching reform introducing a real Tibetan-Chinese bilingualism will be capable of changing the ecolinguistic situation."(488) At the same event, Professor David Germano of the University of Virginia summarized a strategy for supporting Tibetan language:What is important is not simply an exchange where Tibetans are taken out of Tibet and brought to the United States, but investment in Tibet, working with dedicated professionals in the institutions which survive our departure and presence...I think these emerging partnerships, if adequately supported, offer another vision of a better tomorrow, not one in which Tibetan triumphs over Chinese, but one in which Tibetan and Chinese can co-exist. Economic development during the period of "opening
up to the outside world" has produced impressive results in certain
respects, but the predicament of the Tibetan people continues to be a
matter of concern to the President and the Congress. China's Constitution
and laws could provide an obvious and direct avenue toward improved
circumstances for Tibetans - but only if Party and state privilege does
not eclipse the authority of local autonomous governments and the rights
of individual citizens.
Footnotes
454: Zhang Lifen, "Dalai Lama: Holding out Hope," BBC, 4 February 2003, (9 July 2003). ("I am not seeking separation or independence of Tibet from the People's Republic of China. All I want is a genuine self-rule for Tibet within China. This is my 'middle way' approach.")
455: "Tibetan Chairman Condemns Dalai's Separatist Acts," China Daily, 13 November 2002, (9 July 2003). While attending the 16th CCP Congress, the Chairman of the TAR government, Legchog, said, "[T]he Dalai Lama now adopts a new strategy of playing down separatist sentiments while
trumpeting the highest degree of autonomy of the so-called 'greater Tibet.'" Legchog labeled the Dalai Lama's initiative "another form of his separatist stance." Ibid.
456: People's Republic of China Regional National Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minqu quyufa], enacted 31 May 1984, art 2. "Regional autonomy shall be practiced in areas where minority nationalities live in concentrated communities. National autonomous areas shall be classified into autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China."
457: Regional National Autonomy Law, art. 7.
458: Steven D. Marshall and Susette Ternent Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development with Chinese Characteristics (Washington D.C.: self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7. The 13 areas total 2.24 million square kilometers (865,000 square miles).
459: Tibetan Government-in-Exile, "Facts - Occupied Tibet," (13 August 2003). "Background," (13 August 2003). "Tibet at a Glance," (13 August 2003). The
area of "occupied Tibet" is reported as 2.5 million square kilometers (965,000 square miles) with Lhasa as the capital.
460: Department of State International Religious Freedom Report on Tibet, 2003.
461: The Tibetan government-in-exile's representation of Tibet exceeds the total area of Chinese-designated Tibetan autonomy by about 100,000 square miles. Aside from pockets of longterm Tibetan settlement in Qinghai, most of that is made up of autonomous prefectures or counties allocated to other ethnic groups. These include the Nu, Lisu, Bai, and Naxi in Yunnan Province; the Yi and Qiang in Sichuan Province; the Hui, Kazak, Mongol, and Yugur in Gansu Province; the Hui, Tu, Salar, and Mongol in Qinghai Province; and, according to some maps, Mongol in Xinjiang. Substantial Han Chinese populations are also included, some established for centuries.
462: According to 1990 census data there were 4.6 million Tibetans in China, of whom 4.3 million lived in autonomous Tibetan areas. More than half of Tibetans living outside autonomous Tibetan areas were in Haidong Prefecture and Xining, in Qinghai Province, where they make up about 7 percent of the population. In parts of Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces that the Tibetan government-in-exile represents as "Tibet," but that are not within autonomous Tibetan areas, Tibetans generally make up 1 percent or less of prefectural populations.
463: International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), (13 August 2003). Lodi Gyari is also the Executive Chairman of ICT. ICT has offices in Washington, Amsterdam, and Berlin and "works to promote human rights and self-determination for Tibetans and to protect their culture and environment."
464: Tibetan Government-in-Exile, "Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation Sent by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to China," 11 June 2003, (13 August 2003); "Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation," 28 September 2002, (13 August 2003).
465: In September 2002 the envoys met with United Front Work Department Director Wang Zhaoguo in Beijing. In May 2003 the delegation met Liu Yandong, Wang's successor as head of the UFWD. Ibid. The UFWD is the Party organ charged with dealing with groups outside of the Chinese communist mainstream, including ethnic and religious groups, non-communist political parties, and non-Party leaders and intellectuals.
466: In September 2002 the envoys met with Tibetans Ragdi and Legchog (Chinese: Raidi and Lieque) in Lhasa. Ibid. Ragdi was then Chairman of the TAR People's Congress and is now a Vice-chairman of the NPC. Legchog was then Chairman of the TAR government and is now Chairman of the Standing Committee of the TAR People's Congress. Both are Deputy Secretaries of the TAR Party Committee.
467: Tibetan Government-in-Exile, "Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation," 28 September 2002, (9 July 2003).
468: Tibetan Government-in-Exile, "Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation sent by his Holiness the Dalai Lama to China," 11 June 2003, (9 July 2003).
469: Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art. 54.
470: "Changes in pattern of political detention," Tibet Information Network, 10 March 2003, (9 July 2003).
471: Congressional-Executive Commission on China Staff Paper, The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality, 10 February 2003, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/lobsang.php (13 August 2003). Tenzin Deleg was sentenced to death with a two-year suspension and is believed to be held in Sichuan.
472: Ngawang Sangdrol's statements were made at an interview conducted by Commission staff.
473: Chinese authorities rarely grant permission for Tibetans to travel to India. Tibetans wishing to do so often apply to travel to Nepal and then make the onward journey to India without official documentation.
474: Press Statement of Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, 2 June 2003, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21136.htm (9 July 2003): "We condemn the behavior of Nepalese officials and Chinese diplomats for their role in forcibly returning the asylum seekers to China. We call on Nepal to return to its previous long-term practice of allowing Tibetans to seek protection in Nepal for onward resettlement."
475: International Campaign for Tibet, "Nepal Adopts New Policy on Tibetan Refugees," 26 August 2003, (27 August 2003). The ICT report includes a letter dated August 4, 2003, from Nepal's Foreign Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya to Senator Dianne Feinstein which sets out the policy.
476: "Raidi Meets Hong Kong Journalists, Gives Interview," Lhasa Tibet Daily [Lasa Xizang Ribao], 7 August 2001, translated in FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20010809000073.
477: "Chinese to Outnumber Tibetans in Lhasa," Reuters, 8 August 2002, (30 August 2003). Jin Shixun, deputy director general of the TAR Development and Planning Commission, said at a news conference, "At the moment the population here in Lhasa stands at around 200,000. About half of them are the [Han] migrant population. There will certainly be a large increase in these numbers." Ibid.
478: "Notes from the Editor," Population Census Office, National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, Major Figures on 2000 Population Census of China, 1 June 2001. "The 2000 population census covered all persons with the nationality of, and a permanent residing place in, China. The census took the de jure approach by which each person should be enumerated at his/her permanent residence and should be enumerated at only one place."
479: Tabulation on 1990 Census of TAR; China Population Statistics Yearbook 1990; Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China, China Statistics Press, Beijing, August 2002. Han population in the TAR increased from 3.7 percent in 1990 to 6.1 percent in 2000; the Han proportion of Qinghai's population fell from 57.9 percent to 54.0 percent. In Qinghai the official number of Han increased from 2.580 million in 1990 to 2.606 million in 2000, an increase of only 1 percent in 10 years.
480: "Environmental Concerns Paramount in Qinghai-Tibet Railway Construction," People's Daily, June 2003, (7 August 2003).
481: "Laying Tracks To China's Future," Associated Press, 23 December 2002, (30 August 2003).
482: "Tibet Reports Double-digit Economic Growth," Xinhua, 13 January 2003, (9 July 2003).
483: "Deciphering Economic Growth in the Tibet Autonomous Region," Tibet Information Network, 8 April 2003, http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/2003/0804.htm (9 July 2003). "In 2001, the average urban income in the TAR was more than five and a half times the average rural income. In 1990 this ratio was only about two and a half to one." Ibid. "Despite economic boom, rural standards of living in the Tibet Autonomous Region still below 1992 levels," Tibet
Information Network, 6 February 2003, http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/2003/
0602.htm (9 July 2003). "The consumer price index of the rural areas, available from the official Tibet Bureau of Statistics, shows that the cost of living in rural TAR rose by 97 percent between 1992 and 2001. However, rural incomes rose by only 69 percent over the same period." Ibid.
484: Four articles presented together under the
title, "There Must Be New Ideas for the Largescale Development of the
Western Region," Seeking Truth [Qiushi], 16 February 2003, translated in
FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20030222000011 (also available at http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20030216/GB/qs%5E353%5E0%5E11.htm). Article 1, "Blaze a New Road of Faster Development," Li Zibin, Vice-minister, State Development Planning Commission.
485: Ibid. Article 2, "Industrialize Ecological Construction and Make Industrial Development Eco-Friendly," Professor Shi Peijun, Vice-president, Beijing Teachers' University, and Professor Liu Xuemin, Institute of Resource Science, Beijing Teachers' University.
486: Population Census Office, National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, Major Figures on 2000 Population Census of China, 1 June 2001. Educational statistics, Tables 9-13, pages 24-29.
487: "TAR Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language" [Xizang zizhiqu xuexi: shiyong he fazhan zangyuwen de ruogan guiding], passed 22 May 2002, art. 4: "Important conferences and meetings of state organs at all levels in the TAR are to simultaneously use the Tibetan and common national languages, or to use one of them. Work meetings of units in TAR enterprises will, according to need, use one or both of the commonly used languages...."
488:
Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable: Teaching and
Learning Tibetan: The Role of Tibetan Language in Tibet's Future, 7 April
2003. Prepared Statement of Professor Nicolas Tournadre, Associate
Professor of Linguistics, University of Paris 8. First published in China
Perspectives, No. 45 January-February 2003, Hong
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