Tibet 2004 Report

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Executive Commission on China

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CECC 2004 Annual Report

Tibet

VI. Tibet

FINDINGS

Envoys representing the Dalai Lama visited China in September 2004. This visit, the third in recent years, creates an important opportunity to address obstacles and achieve progress through dialogue.
Chinese leaders misrepresent the Dalai Lama’s offer to accept bona fide autonomy under Chinese sovereignty as an attempt to gain independence in a ‘‘disguised form.’’ The Dalai Lama has stated that a solution can be based on China’s Constitution. ^⁹¹⁴
Increasing Han population in Tibetan areas poses a significant challenge to Tibetan culture and heritage. Authorities deny that the ethnic mix is changing, or that there is a negative effect on Tibetan culture.
Most Tibetans live in rural areas where their incomes average one-fifth of those in Tibetan towns and cities. Central government subsidy of development projects in Tibetan areas drives economic growth at a brisk pace, but the Han population benefits disproportionately because most funding is channeled into infrastructure construction or urban development.
Tibet development projects that are discussed, researched, and planned in an open and objective manner, that are based on actual local circumstances, and that take into account the views of the Tibetan stakeholders, will have the best chance to help Tibetans protect their cultural, religious, and environmental heritage.
The rights of Tibetans to constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech, religion, and association are subject to strict constraint. Authorities invoke ‘‘state security’’ to justify repression or punishment of peaceful expression even when there is no threat to the state. However, emerging patterns suggest that local governments in some Tibetan areas are relatively less repressive than others.

The Status of Discussion between China and the Dalai Lama

U.S. policy recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in other provinces to be a part of the People’s Republic of China.^⁹¹⁵ An important objective of the U.S. government is encouraging direct and substantive discussions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. ^⁹¹⁶

The Dalai Lama is in an unmatched position to help ensure the survival and development of Tibetan culture, and to contribute to China’s stability and prosperity. Envoys representing the Dalai Lama visited China, including Tibetan areas, in September 2002 and May 2003. Special Envoy Lodi Gyari expressed cautious optimism after the visits but observed that disagreements are substantial, and that mutual understanding and trust are lacking.^⁹¹⁷ On September 11, 2004, the Tibetan givernment-in-exile announced that the envoys would depart for China the following day on their third visit.^⁹¹⁸ During the past year, Chinese officials have amplified previous criticism of political and territorial formulations raised by the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government-in-exile.^⁹¹⁹

Autonomy

In May 2004, as the Dalai Lama’s envoys waited for permission to travel to China, Beijing published a White Paper^⁹²⁰ that vigorously defends China’s system of ethnic autonomy. The timing and tone of the publication may underscore Chinese government resolve to keep any discussion of Tibetan governance within the parameters of the PRC Regional National Autonomy Law.^⁹²¹ The White Paper is aimed directly at the Dalai Lama and concludes on a note that is blunt and personal:

It is hoped that the Dalai Lama will look reality in the face, make a correct judgment of the situation, truly relinquish his stand for ‘‘Tibet independence,’’ and do something beneficial to the progress of China and the region of Tibet in his remaining years.

In theory, the Regional National Autonomy Law aims to balance central and local interests, and subordination with self-government. In fact, the same law that codifies the autonomous rights of local self-governments sharply curtails them by requiring that they bow to state interests and ‘‘fulfill the tasks assigned by state organs at higher levels.’’ ^⁹²² The White Paper declares that ‘‘under the unified leadership of the state,’’ ethnic minorities in autonomous areas exercise ‘‘the right of self-government to administer local affairs.’’ ^⁹²³ The law authorizes local people’s congresses to enact new laws, as well as modifications, partial exemptions, and postponements to statutes promulgated by higher levels of government. ^⁹²⁴ According to the paper, the TAR legislature has enacted 220 laws tailored to protect local interests since the region was established in 1965, including laws that lower the minimum marriage age, create local holidays, and regulate foreign mountain climbers.^⁹²⁵ Examples such as these point to the insufficient au- thority Tibetans have over their social, economic, and political environment.

As the Dalai Lama told Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, ‘‘Tibet should be given autonomy, or self-rule, which the Chinese Constitution provided.’’ ^⁹²⁶ But the official Chinese formulation subordinates local interests to the state: ‘‘Minorities, organizations, associations, localities, etc., apart from being subordinate to the leadership of the state, government, or upper-level unit to which they belong, exercise definite rights with respect to their own general affairs.’’ ^⁹²⁷ According to the Times of India, Samdhong Rinpoche, the first prime minister elected by Tibetans living in exile, said last year that his concept of autonomy would provide ‘‘a little more’’ than Hong Kong citizens are promised under ‘‘one county, two systems.’’ ^⁹²⁸ The Tibetan government-in-exile expresses support for the Dalai Lama’s initiatives, but asserts that, ‘‘The Tibetan people, both in and outside Tibet, look to the [Tibetan government-in-exile] as their sole and legitimate government.’’ ^⁹²⁹ Chinese authorities commingle the Dalai Lama’s statements with other voices in the Tibetan community, including those of the Tibetan government-in-exile. They hold the Dalai Lama accountable for inevitable contradictions and accuse him of seeking ‘‘independence in disguised forms.’’ ^⁹³⁰ An official in a Tibetan part of China told a Commission staff delegation in September 2003, ‘‘In our view, the Dalai and the exiled government are part and parcel of the same group. People here believe that the exiled government is the same as the Dalai, and that the Dalai is the same as the exiled government. They are one and the same.’’ In Beijing, an official of the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) referred to the spectrum of views in the exiled Tibetan community and told a Commission staff delegation, ‘‘The Central Government doesn’t know what’s on the Dalai Lama’s mind.’’ ^⁹³¹ The Dalai Lama, who turns 70 next year, has said that he wants to meet Chinese officials face-to-face in an effort to reduce suspicions.^⁹³²

Recent statements by the Dalai Lama underscore the extent of his efforts to initiate a productive dialogue that takes into account the constitutional and geographic framework already shaped by Chinese authorities. His remarks focus on 13 autonomous areas^⁹³³ set up by China where Tibetans are entitled, according to Chinese law, to practice local self-government. According to a 2003 interview with the Voice of America, the Dalai Lama does not claim that the entirety of territory where Tibetans live was a unified administration under Lhasa’s control when the People’s Liberation Army arrived there.^⁹³⁴ He believes that a case can be made within Chinese law for consolidating contiguous areas of Tibetan autonomy. ^⁹³⁵ The Dalai Lama proposes improving the system of autonomy, not discarding it.

Tibetan Culture and Human Rights

China has not initiated major new campaigns across Tibetan areas in the past year. However, existing policy initiatives are gaining momentum, especially the Great Western Development program, formulated to accelerate economic development in China’s western provinces and speed their integration into the political and social mainstream.^⁹³⁶ Government policies that favor atheism and promote strict adherence to a national identity defined in Beijing discourage Tibetan aspirations to maintain their distinctive culture and religion. Rights outlined in the Regional National Autonomy Law are weak in practice.

The central government attempts to ensure that policy is consistent among the five provinces where Tibetans live, but Commission staff and other experts observe that modest distinctions may be emerging in local conditions. Current levels of known political imprisonment of Tibetans have fallen to low levels in Qinghai and Gansu provinces. In Sichuan, the opposite is the case. In the TAR, Tibetan culture and religion continue to face daunting challenges, although the number of known political prisoners is gradually declining. ^⁹³⁷ Concurrent with the lower level of political imprisonment in Qinghai and Gansu, the apparent conditions for religion and education may be relatively less repressive than in Sichuan or the TAR.^⁹³⁸

Culture, Demography, and Development

A significant number of Tibetans seeking increased stewardship over their future avoid the dangers of political expression and focus on protecting their culture and natural environment, or on developing education and sustainable economic resources. Tibetan citizens and NGOs work on the periphery of well-funded government programs^⁹³⁹ that have the capacity to undermine or overwhelm Tibetan culture. Individuals and NGOs understand the risks of researching, planning, and implementing projects that the Party and state could perceive as a challenge. Careful planning can make economic development and cultural preservation coexist, and not be mutually exclusive.

A USAID rangeland expert emphasized the importance of ensuring that development models are sound, sustainable, and create real benefits for their target group. He told a Commission roundtable in March 2004:

In my opinion, the key issues for sustainable development in the Tibetan pastoral areas are widespread poverty, rangeland degradation, unsustainable livestock production practices, poor market development, weak community participation, and lack of integration in addressing all of these problems. The development challenge now is determining how to target funding better to address these issues and to ensure that resources allocated for development and poverty reduction actually reach the Tibetan farmers and nomads.^⁹⁴⁰

Almost 90 percent of the Tibetans in China live in rural areas and engage in farming and herding.^⁹⁴¹ Their incomes are rising, but residents of towns and cities have incomes five times higher.^⁹⁴² The gap deepens the relative poverty of farmers and herders and serves to marginalize them. TAR officials briefing Commission staff delegations in September 2003 and April 2004 said repeatedly that government policy seeks ways to boost the income of rural families.

Tibet’s rural areas urgently need significant investment of government money, but greater government largesse will not resolve the long-term cultural crisis facing Tibetans. A short-term solution for many rural Tibetans is sending a family member to find work in the infrastructure construction boom. At the same time, Tibetans encounter intense competition from Chinese migrants in those labor markets. Professor Melvyn Goldstein told the Commission roundtable:

With respect to such work, we found widespread frustration and anger in the villages about the difficulties villagers face in finding jobs. Villagers commonly complain that there are not enough jobs for them and that, because their skill levels are low, most of the jobs they find pay poorly. The villagers overwhelmingly lay the blame for this on the unrestricted influx of non-Tibetan migrant laborers. Rural Tibetans now find themselves in competition for construction jobs with large numbers of more skilled and experienced Chinese workers, and given the current policy, this competition will certainly increase. How Tibetans will fare in the future, therefore, is less clear. There are some positive signs, but it is hard to be very optimistic. What is really needed is a change in government policy that will give much greater priority to securing jobs for Tibetans, perhaps through a large-scale system of set-aside contracts for them over some period of time.^⁹⁴³

Central government spending fills the gaping shortfall between local government revenue and expenditure.^⁹⁴⁴ Coupled with development projects funded by other provinces, this spending fuels rising incomes, especially in towns and cities, and creates jobs. This situation creates limited opportunities for Tibetans and attracts a substantial influx of additional Chinese migrants. No infrastructure project is accorded a higher priority or larger budget than the Qinghai-Tibet railroad,^⁹⁴⁵ scheduled for completion in 2007. In April 2004, an official involved in the project told Commission staff that Tibetans made up 6,000–8,000 of the 30,000 workers in Qinghai and the TAR. Last year the figure was 6,000 Tibetans in a total of nearly 38,000 workers. Reliable reports also suggest that Tibetans earn significantly less than Han workers; an unskilled Tibetan might earn about $210 per month, but a Han worker of similar skills earns about $700.^⁹⁴⁶

Ragdi (Chinese: Raidi), former head of the TAR People’s Congress and now a Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, denied that Chinese influx into Tibetan areas is taking place or that Tibetan culture is threatened.^⁹⁴⁷ Other senior Tibetan officials acknowledge but play down the rise of migrant populations. Jampa Phuntsog, chairman of the TAR government, observed last year, ‘‘[T]he migrant population in the region is increasing with economic development and the construction of a railway into the region.’’ But, he said, ‘‘bad weather and geographical conditions’’ will keep them from staying permanently, and ‘‘the ratio of ethnic groups in Tibet will not change dramatically.’’ ^⁹⁴⁸

An official in Lhasa responded to a Commission staff comment about the apparent understatement of Han population in census data.^⁹⁴⁹ ‘‘Every day there are more than 200,000 [Han] mobile population in all of [the TAR],’’ he acknowledged. ‘‘Their number is highest from June through October.’’ Some officials were willing to concede that the sustained presence of a substantial non-permanent population can convey significant impact on an indigenous culture, even if the membership of the non-permanent group is in constant flux.

Tibetans speaking privately often express grave concern about the changing population mix. Many fear that the completion of the railroad could result in a transformation similar to that of Inner Mongolia, where rail links were built before the PRC was established, ^⁹⁵⁰ and Han today outnumber Mongols by nearly five to one.^⁹⁵¹ In the TAR, there are 15 times as many Tibetans as Han, according to the census. Outside the TAR there are only three autonomous Tibetan areas that have been penetrated by rail lines. In all, the Han population surpasses the Tibetan population by multiples. ^⁹⁵²

Ragdi, a member of the Party Central Committee and an honorary president of the newly created Association for the Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture,^⁹⁵³ endorsed the White Paper on autonomy and described the changes to the TAR and its ‘‘social look’’ as ‘‘earth-shaking.’’ ^⁹⁵⁴ If Tibetan culture is to withstand the profound transformation, Tibetans will need a fully functional role in their future—from legislation and governance, down to grassroots implementation. A USAID expert told the Commission roundtable on Tibetan development:

To date, most Tibetan farmers and nomads have not participated fully in the assessment, planning, and implementation of development programs and the policies that affect their lives. Government development programs have generally taken a top-down approach and, despite many of their good intentions, have often been hampered because Tibetan farmers and nomads were not involved in both the design and implementation of activities.^⁹⁵⁵

Human Rights, Law, and Religion

The Chinese government severely restricts the rights of Tibetans to exercise constitutionally guaranteed human rights, including the freedoms of speech, press, association, and religion. China’s constitution also bans actions deemed ‘‘detrimental to the security, honor and interests of the motherland.’’ ^⁹⁵⁶ The state represses or punishes peaceful expression by Tibetans deemed to ‘‘endanger state security’’ ^⁹⁵⁷ or to be ‘‘splittist,’’ ^⁹⁵⁸ even if the expression is non-violent and poses no threat to the state.

An official in Beijing explained the Chinese view of the roles of ‘‘violence’’ and ‘‘consequence’’ in crime to Commission staff in September 2003. ‘‘There is not a distinct line between violent and non-violent,’’ he said. ‘‘A non-violent action can result in eventual violence. If someone advocates an idea that could later become a threat to the country, then the statement is a form of violence, and it is a crime to be punished . . . Social consequence determines whether it is a crime (emphasis added).’’ A provincial official told Commission staff, ‘‘All criminal acts must have four elements to be crime.’’ One of the elements, he said, is ‘‘consequence.’’ But he emphasized that in the case of Tibetans, ‘‘You have to understand the background. It is necessary to take Tibetan history into account. Tibetans combine religion and politics.’’ Another official defended the notion of crimes without consequence succinctly: ‘‘Some actions that are crimes have consequences. Some don’t.’’ ^⁹⁵⁹

The number of known Tibetan political prisoners serving sentences or awaiting disposition of their cases is almost unchanged from a year ago, according to a February 2004 report by Tibet Information Network (TIN).^⁹⁶⁰ According to TIN, a surge of Tibetan political imprisonment in Sichuan has offset declines elsewhere and stalled the overall decline in political prisoner numbers that began in 1997. Two-thirds of the 145 prisoners listed are monks or nuns. About 60 are serving sentences of ten years or longer. In April 2004, an official in Lhasa indicated to Commission staff that roughly 75 Tibetans are serving sentences in the TAR for endangering state security, or counterrevolution for convictions before 1997.^⁹⁶¹ Most of them are incarcerated in Lhasa’s TAR Prison, also known as Drapchi, and formerly as TAR Prison No. 1.

Authorities released Buddhist nun Phuntsog Nyidrol from TAR Prison on February 24, 2004, after she served more than 14 years of a sentence extended from nine to 17 years, which was then reduced for good behavior. After she joined other nuns in a peaceful demonstration in Lhasa in 1989, an intermediate people’s court convicted her of counterrevolution. Her sentence extension was punishment for helping to smuggle a cassette recording of imprisoned nuns singing songs with politically tinged lyrics out of the prison. Fourteen nuns received sentence extensions for the cassette incident. She was the first detained and the last released. According to a report in August 2004, she is kept under constant police surveillance and is not permitted to leave her home without an escort. ^⁹⁶²

Commission staff discussed cases of current Tibetan political prisoners with provincial officials in the TAR, and in Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces, during visits in 2003 and 2004. The level of known political imprisonment in Qinghai and Gansu provinces has dropped to pre-1989 levels.^⁹⁶³ Authorities in Qinghai, Gansu, and the TAR provided information about the general prison situation and commented on some individual cases. Staff discussions with officials in Sichuan province were less constructive.

Buddhist lama Tenzin Deleg (Chinese: A’an Zhaxi) is Sichuan’s best-known Tibetan political prisoner. In December 2002, he was sentenced to death along with another Tibetan, Lobsang Dondrub (Chinese: Luorang Dengzhu), after a closed trial on charges of causing a series of explosions and inciting separatism. Authorities executed Lobsang Dondrub a few weeks later despite assurances to senior officials of the U.S. and other governments that the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) would review his sentence. SPC officials in Beijing told Commission staff that the case was prosecuted in full accordance with Chinese law, and dismissed suggestions that evidence may have been inadequate and legal procedures were flawed. In Chengdu, authorities told Commission staff that China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast a show featuring Tenzin Deleg admitting guilt and comparing the prosecutors and judges to ‘‘his own mother’’ since they ‘‘helped him and taught him.’’ In September 2003, Commission staff requested the assistance of the Sichuan authorities to obtain a copy of the alleged CCTV broadcast. The Commission has not received a tape or transcript. Authorities confirmed that Tenzin Deleg’s two-year reprieve of execution would expire in January 2005.^⁹⁶⁴

State restrictions on religion, including devotion to the Dalai Lama, interfere with the normal practice of religion for Tibetans. Suspicious authorities can impute subversive motives to Tibetans’ dedication to their religion, as well to their enthusiasm for Tibetan culture, language, and self-identity. Provinces where political imprisonment rates are lower, however, also appear to have a somewhat less repressive environment for Tibetan culture. Conversely, provinces where political detention rates are higher are known to deal with Tibetans and their culture more harshly.

The unrestricted power that the Party and state enjoy to characterize peaceful expression as a threat to state security, when in fact no threat or consequence to the state is present, undermines Tibetan human rights. Modern states regularly update assessments of actions that could pose a bona fide threat to state security and adjust levels of tolerance and response accordingly. Prosecuting and punishing peaceful expression are inconsistent with international human rights practices and the rule of law. If Chinese police, prosecutors, and courts successfully implement China’s constitutional articles and laws that protect human rights and the rule of law, then Tibetans and Chinese will both benefit.

Notes to Section VI—Tibet

^⁹¹⁴ International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Dalai Lama Explains His Position on China’s Preconditions on Negotiations on Tibet,’’ 15 September 03, . Interview conducted by reporter Zhang Jing, Voice of America Mandarin Service, 11 September 03. In response to a question on the state of China-Tibet relations, the Dalai Lama responded, in part, ‘‘. . . [W]ithin the Chinese constitutional framework, I see there is a way to solve this unhappy situation . . .’’

^⁹¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Report on Tibet Negotiations,’’ 23 June 04, .

^⁹¹⁶ Ibid. ‘‘Encouraging substantive dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama is an important objective of this Administration. The United States encourages China and the Dalai Lama to hold substantive discussions aimed at resolution of differences at an early date, without preconditions.’’

^⁹¹⁷ Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation sent by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to China,’’ 11 June 03, : ‘‘Both sides agreed that our past relationship had many twists and turns and that many areas of disagreement still exist. The need was felt for more efforts to overcome the existing problems and bring about mutual understanding and trust.’’

^⁹¹⁸ Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘Two Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Visit China in Continuation of the Process to Deepen Contacts With the Chinese,’’ 11 September 04, .

^⁹¹⁹ ‘‘On Dalai Lama’s ‘Greater Tibet,’ China’s Tibet,’’ Tibet Magazine, No.1, 2004, : ‘‘Referring to the point of the ‘middle road’ made by the 14th Dalai Lama, there is a concept of ‘Greater Tibet’ which covers the existing Tibet Autonomous Region, the entire area of Qinghai province, one-fifth of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, two-thirds of Gansu province, two-thirds of Sichuan province and half of Yunnan province, with an area extending 2.4 million square kilometers and taking up nearly a quarter of the total territory of China.’’

^⁹²⁰ State Council Information Office, ‘‘Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,’’ Xinhua, 23 May 04, .

^⁹²¹ PRC Law on Regional National Autonomy, adopted 31 May 1984, amended 28 February 2001, art. 2: ‘‘Regional autonomy shall be practiced in areas where minority nationalities live in concentrated communities. National autonomous areas shall be classified into autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People’s Republic of China.’’

^⁹²² Ibid., art. 7: ‘‘The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as a whole above anything else and make positive efforts to fulfill the tasks assigned by state organs at higher levels.’’

^⁹²³ ‘‘Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,’’ Xinhua, 24 May 04: ‘‘Regional ethnic autonomy means, under the unified leadership of the state, regional autonomy is exercised and organs of self-government are established in areas where various ethnic minorities live in compact communities, so that the people of ethnic minorities are their own masters exercising the right of self-government to administer local affairs and the internal affairs of their own ethnic groups.’’

^⁹²⁴ Regional National Autonomy Law, arts. 19, 20. Article 19 provides, ‘‘The people’s congresses of national autonomous areas have the authority to formulate autonomous regulations and specific regulations in light of the characteristics of the politics, economy, and culture of local nationalities. After being submitted to and approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), these autonomous regulations and specific regulations can become effective.’’ Article 20 provides, ‘‘If the resolutions, decision, orders, and directives of higher- level state organs are not suitable for the actual conditions of national autonomous areas, organs of self-government can report this to higher-level state organs for approval to flexibly enforce or stop enforcing them. The higher-level state organs should give a reply within 60 days of the reception of this report.’’

^⁹²⁵ ‘‘Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,’’ Xinhua.

^⁹²⁶ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘‘Prime Minister Meets with Dalai Lama,’’ 23 April 04, .

^⁹²⁷ ‘‘Minorities, organizations, associations, localities, etc., apart from being subordinate to the leadership of the state, government, or upper-level unit to which they belong, exercise definite rights with respect to their own general affairs.’’ Chinese Dictionary [Hanyu¨ da cidian] (Shanghai: Chinese Dictionary Press, 1997), 5,284 (Definition 5).

^⁹²⁸ ‘‘Options in Exile,’’ Times of India, 6 June 03, . The interviewer asked Samdhong Rinpoche, ‘‘What does ‘genuine autonomy’ mean?’’ He replied, ‘‘A little more than what Hong Kong enjoys. For visiting Hong Kong, you need a special permit. For going to the mainland, a visa or a permit is necessary. This controls population influx. But Hong Kong also has a considerable degree of democracy and a free press.’’

^⁹²⁹ Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘An Introduction: Central Tibetan Administration,’’ and ‘‘Facts—Occupied Tibet,’’ . The Web site describes Tibet as an ‘‘occupied country’’ with an area of 2.5 million square kilometers (965,000 square miles).

^⁹³⁰ ‘‘Signed Article Criticizing U.S. Policy on Tibet,’’ Xinhua, 9 June 03 (FBIS, 9 June 03). ‘‘At present, the ‘Tibet issue’ would not exist, if the United States and other western countries don’t support the Dalai clique, if the Dalai clique gives up its intention of seeking ‘Tibet independence’ or independence in disguised forms, and stops activities of splitting the country.’’

^⁹³¹ Commission Staff Interviews with Chinese officials.

^⁹³² ‘‘Dalai Lama Seeks Talks with China over Tibet,’’ Reuters, 16 March 04, . The Dalai Lama said in an interview conducted in India, ‘‘It’s very important to have face-to-face meetings . . . The best way to eliminate suspicion is to meet face to face.’’

^⁹³³ Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, D.C.: Self-published CDROM, 1997), Table 7. The 13 autonomous areas include the provincial-level Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as ten Tibetan autonomous prefectures and two Tibetan autonomous counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The 13 areas are contiguous and total 2.24 million square kilometers [865,000 square miles].

^⁹³⁴ ‘‘Dalai Lama Reiterates He Will Not Seek Tibetan Independence,’’ Hong Kong Journal [Hong Kong Kai Fang], 1 August 03 (FBIS, 13 August 03). Responding to a question about the scope and political status of Tibetan territory, the Dalai Lama referred to ‘‘the areas directly ruled by the original Tibetan government.’’ When asked if he meant the TAR, he said that he was referring to ‘‘the areas under the control of the Tibetan government at the time of the signing of the 17-Article Agreement.’’ He explained that in 1951 that territory did not include areas such as Chamdo, the far eastern end what is today the TAR, or the Tibetan territory east of the Jinsha River (Tibetan: Drichu) in what is today Sichuan province.

^⁹³⁵ International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Dalai Lama Explains His Position on China’s Preconditions on Negotiations on Tibet,’’ 15 September 03, . Interview conducted by Voice of America, Mandarin Service, 11 September 03. Responding to a question about his views on consolidating autonomous Tibetan areas in different provinces, the Dalai Lama responded, in part, ‘‘. . . [S]ince I’m asking for a certain right which the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provided, [I’m asking that] within that, they be joined from small pieces, like autonomous regions, autonomous districts, autonomous prefectures, like that. So instead of many small, small autonomies, the self-administration, actually, as far as work is concerned, or effectiveness, is concerned, is more difficult. So a broader administration could be more effective . . .’’

^⁹³⁶ Li Dezhu, ‘‘Large-Scale Development of Western China and China’s Nationality Problem,’’ Seeking Truth [Qiushi], 15 June 00 (FBIS, 15 June 00) (addressing social and ethnic implications of the campaign that Jiang Zemin launched in 1999).

^⁹³⁷ ‘‘Current Trends in Tibetan Political Imprisonment: Increase in Sichuan, Decline in Qinghai and Gansu,’’ Tibet Information Network, 6 February 04, . The report listed a total of seven Tibetan political prisoners for Qinghai and Gansu provinces. TIN listed 106 Tibetan political prisoners in the TAR in a March 2003 report, compared to 90 in February 2004. The number reported for Sichuan province rose from 34 in the 2003 report to 46 in 2004.

^⁹³⁸ Commission staff visited Malho (Chinese: Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai province in September 2003 and Kanlho (Chinese: Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in April 2004. Sites visited included secondary and tertiary ethnic Tibetan educational facilities as well as Buddhist monasteries. Commission staff have heard assessments from experts and regular visitors.

^⁹³⁹ Commission Staff Interview. For example, officials said that in 2001–05, 117 peer-to-peer projects set up between other parts of China and the TAR will spend 70 billion yuan ($8.5 billion) on infrastructure projects, including roads, schools, and medical facilities. The figure does not include spending on the Tibet-Qinghai railroad.

^⁹⁴⁰ Development Projects in Tibetan Areas of China: Articulating Clear Goals and Achieving Sustainable Results, Rountable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 19 March 04, Testimony of Daniel J. Miller, Agriculture Development Office, U.S. Agency for International Development.

^⁹⁴¹ ‘‘Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China,’’ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003). The total Tibetan population in China was 5,416,021. 5,373,339 were classified as either ‘‘agricultural’’ or ‘‘non-agricultural.’’ Of that number, 4,792,676 (88.5 percent of the total Tibetan population) were designated ‘‘agricultural.’’ In the TAR, the total population was 2,616,329. 2,427,168 (92.8 percent) were Tibetan. The total agricultural population in the TAR, including all ethnic groups, was 2,185,851 (83.5 percent of the total TAR population).

^⁹⁴² ‘‘Tibet Ranks 2nd in W. China Urban Residents’ Income,’’ Xinhua, 17 May 04, . Urban income in the TAR (8,058 yuan) was second only to Chongqing (8,093 Yuan). Rural income in the TAR averaged 1,690 yuan. (Based on these figures, urban income was 4.8 times higher than rural income.)

^⁹⁴³ Development Projects in Tibetan Areas of China, Testimony of Melvyn Goldstein, Professor of Anthropology at Case Western Reserve University.

^⁹⁴⁴ Commission Staff Interview. For example, an official said that TAR government revenues should reach 800 million yuan in 2004, but expenditures will be 12.9 billion yuan.

^⁹⁴⁵ Commission Staff Interview. An official said that the total Central Government investment spending in the TAR for 2003 had been 17 billion yuan. Of that, 3.5 billion yuan was for work on the Qinghai-Tibet railroad. The cost of the railroad is currently estimated at 30 billion yuan ($3.6 billion).

^⁹⁴⁶ Philip P. Pan, ‘‘Tibet Torn Between Tradition and China’s Bounty,’’ Washington Post, 10 September 03.

⁹⁴⁷ ‘‘Raidi Meets Hong Kong Journalists, Gives Interview,’’ Lhasa Tibet Daily [Lhasa xizang ribao], 7 August 01 (FBIS, 9 August 01). ‘‘[S]ome people say that with immigration, the Tibetan population is greatly reduced and Tibetan culture will be extinguished. There is absolutely no basis for such talk.’’

^⁹⁴⁸ ‘‘No Immigration of Other Ethnic Groups: Tibetan official,’’ Xinhua, 26 September 03, .

^⁹⁴⁹ Tabulation on Nationalities 2000 Population of China. 158,570 Han residents were recorded in the TAR.

^⁹⁵⁰ John K. Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 368: ‘‘Map 7. Railway Construction between 1949 and 1960.’’ The railroads linking Jining, Hohhot, and Baotou in Inner Mongolia were built before the PRC was founded.

^⁹⁵¹ Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. Total population of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 2000 was 23,323,347. Han numbered 18,465,586 and Mongols 3,995,349.

^⁹⁵² Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. In Tsonub (Haixi) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, Han numbered 215,706 and Tibetans 40,371, a ratio of about five-to-one. In Pari (Tianzhu) Tibetan Autonomous County, Gansu province, Han numbered 139,190 and Tibetans 66,125, a ratio of about two-to-one. In Tsojang (Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai, there were 94,841 Han and 62,520 Tibetans, a ratio of about 1.5 to one.

^⁹⁵³ ‘‘Leaders of Tibetan Culture Protection Association Elected,’’ Xinhua, 23 June 04, . The Association for the Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture was established on 21 June 2004 and is headed by senior Tibetan and Han officials from the Party, NPC, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, etc.

^⁹⁵⁴ ‘‘Regional Ethnic Autonomy Accords with Interests of Tibetans,’’ People’s Daily, 24 May 04, .

^⁹⁵⁵ Development Projects in Tibetan Areas of China, Testimony of Daniel J. Miller.

^⁹⁵⁶ PRC Constitution, art. 54.

^⁹⁵⁷ PRC Criminal Law. Articles 101–113 deal with ‘‘endangering state security.’’

^⁹⁵⁸ PRC Criminal Law, art. 103. Punishment is set out for ‘‘those who organize, plot or carry out the scheme of splitting the State or undermining unity of the country.’’

^⁹⁵⁹ Commission Staff Interviews in 2004.

^⁹⁶⁰ ‘‘Current Trends in Tibetan Political Imprisonment: Increase in Sichuan, Decline in Qinghai and Gansu,’’ Tibet Information Network, 6 February 04, .

^⁹⁶¹ Commission Staff Interview. An official said that a total of about 2,500 prisoners are in the TAR’s three formally designated prisons: TAR Prison, Lhasa Prison, and Bomi Prison. Three percent have sentences that include counterrevolution or endangering state security.

^⁹⁶² Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Another ‘Singing Nun’ Home But Not Free,’’ 3 August 04, .

^⁹⁶³ TIN records contain seven cases of Tibetan political imprisonment in Qinghai and Gansu in 1987–88.

^⁹⁶⁴ Article 51 of the PRC Criminal Law specifies that a two-year reprieve of execution is ‘‘counted from the date the judgment becomes final.’’ Article 208 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law specifies that the judgment becomes effective in the case of a death sentence with two-year reprieve when it is affirmed by the provincial High People’s Court. Tenzin Deleg’s sentence was affirmed by the Sichuan Province High People’s Court on 26 January 2003. Article 50 of the PRC Criminal Law stipulates that a prisoner who ‘‘commits no intentional crime during the period of suspension’’ will receive a commutation to life imprisonment, and that a prisoner who ‘‘truly performed major meritorious service’’ will receive commutation to a fixed term of 15 to 20 years imprisonment.

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The page was last modified on April 5, 2006