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CECC 2004 Annual Report Xinjiang-Uighurs Religious Freedom for China’s Muslims The Chinese government continues to strictly regulate Islamic education and practice, particularly in Xinjiang, where regional policies on religion are designed in part to ensure that Uighur Muslim children do not develop a strong Islamic identity.339 Private madrassas and mosques are prohibited in Xinjiang,340 and children under 18 years of age cannot receive religious instruction, including private Koranic study at home.341 Chinese authorities impose harsh travel restrictions on imams in Xinjiang,342 and they must demonstrate ‘‘good political quality’’ 343 before they can participate in the state-run propaganda classes that are mandatory for preaching or leading prayer.344 The state-authorized China Islamic Association has begun implementing a policy that directs Muslims to interpretations of the Koran and Hadith that conform to Party guidelines.345 Following a gradual increase in Party tolerance of religion beginning in 1978, Islamic education and practice surged in Xinjiang. By the late 1980s, regional authorities became concerned that Islam was weakening the Party’s influence.346 In response, the Xinjiang government issued a series of laws and regulations to ‘‘control’’ Islam.347 These laws and regulations, and their successors, continue to govern Islamic education and practice today. They prohibit Muslims from unauthorized organizing,348 accepting foreign contributions, 349 or printing or distributing religious materials without explicit permission from authorities.350 Authorities in Xinjiang have also cracked down on the construction of mosques. Chinese government rhetoric attempts to cast suspicion on Muslims in Xinjiang. For example, according to one official in Urumqi, before 1999 the number of mosques in Xinjiang far exceeded the ‘‘the needs of normal religious activity,’’ 351 and ‘‘nearly all the illegal activities or disturbances in Xinjiang are connected to religion.’’ 352 According to a member of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, the most prevalent ‘‘illegal religious activities’’ in the region include private underground Koranic study, trans-regional missionary work, and Talib (student) activities.353 Chinese authorities seem to be implementing policies likely to generate further Uighur alienation and resentment rather than national unity. A recent Party Central Committee document noted that the major dangers to maintaining stability in Xinjiang are ethnic separatism and illegal religious activity.354 Chinese authorities accuse ‘‘ethnic separatists’’ of trying to ‘‘politicize the problem of religion,’’ and emphasize the importance of drawing a clear distinction between these two ‘‘dangers.’’ 355 However, strict and often insensitive Chinese policies toward Uighurs and government efforts to categorize long-held Uighur aspirations for increased autonomy as ‘‘splittism’’ or ‘‘terrorism,’’ may be just as responsible for linking the two issues. According to one U.S. scholar, Islamic piety or practice cannot be understood in isolation from politics, but it should also not be simply reduced to politics.356 ‘‘Uighur religiosity has political content, but state interventions have, indeed, politicized it further.’’ 357 Public security officers reportedly arrested a young Muslim poet in January 2003 for chanting a verse in public. ‘‘Security officials told foreign journalists . . . (that) . . . the young man was guilty of ‘spiritual terrorism.’ Officials said the poem ‘attacked our government policy’ regarding ethnic minorities.’’ 358 Chinese authorities may have overreached in the continuing crackdown on Uighur ‘‘separatism.’’ According to a recent study by a U.S.-based human rights NGO, ‘‘the Chinese authorities are sowing the seeds of an ethnic resentment so profound as to jeopardize the very stability they claim to defend.’’ 359 Rather than focusing attention on ‘‘the extremely small number of ethnic separatists . . . (engaged) in violent terrorist activities,’’ 360 Chinese authorities have instituted harsh religious policies that discriminate against all Uighurs, based on the false premise that most Uighurs support radical and violent Islamist separatism and terrorism. In fact, Uighurs are ‘‘divided from within by religious conflicts, in this case competing Sufi and non-Sufi factions, territorial conflicts, linguistic discrepancies, common-elite alienation, and competing political loyalties.’’ 361 339 See, e.g., ‘‘Chairman Simayi Tieliwaerdi Promotes National Unity Education Month Drive,’’ Xinjiang Daily [Xinjiang ribao], 09 May 04 (FBIS, 22 June 04) and Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities,’’ Social Sciences in Xinjiang [Xinjiang shehui kexue], 25 August 03 (FBIS, 1 December 03). 340 The Xinjiang Regional Government issued a ‘‘special regulation’’ in 1988 ‘‘strictly prohibiting underground Koran schools and classes on the Koran.’’ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 341 Practicing Islam in Today’s China: Differing Realities for the Uighurs and the Hui, Testimony of Jonathan Lipman, Professor of History, Mount Holyoke College. 342 The Provisional Regulations for Controlling Religious Activity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region state, ‘‘professional religious personnel cannot engage in missionary activity across prefectures, municipalities or counties without the approval of the religious affairs bureau of the government.’’ Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 343 Zhao Zhiyun, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi: Actively Protect Stability, Guide Religion for The Benefit of the Country,’’ Tianshan Net [Tianshan wang], 15 July 03 (FBIS, 26 July 03). 344 Ibid. 345 ‘‘Hui Liangyu Speech at China Islamic Association’s 50th Founding Anniversary,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 November 03 (FBIS, 20 January 04). See also, Practicing Islam in Today’s China, Testimony of Kahar Barat, Lecturer in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Yale University. 346 Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 347 These include Provisional Regulations for Managing Venues for Religious Activities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1988, Provisional Regulations for Managing Religious Activity in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1990, Provisional Regulations for Managing Religious Professional Personnel in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1990, and Ordinances for Managing Religious Affairs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, issued 1990. Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 348 Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 349 These activities are governed by the Regulations on the Control of the Religious Activity of Foreigners Within the Territory of the People’s Republic of China. Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 350 Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 351 Ibid. 352 Ghupur Reshit, ‘‘Reflections on the Work of Cultivating Patriotic Religious Personnel.’’ 353 Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 354 This document is cited in Ma Pinyan, ‘‘A Study of Xinjiang’s Opposing Illegal Religious Activities.’’ 355 Ibid. 356 Practicing Islam in Today’s China, Testimony of Gardner Bovingdon, Assistant Professor of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University at Bloomington. 357 Ibid. 358 Robert Marquand, ‘‘Pressure to Conform in West China,’’ Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 03. 359 Nicholas Becquelin, ‘‘Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang,’’ China Rights Forum No. 1, 2004, 39. 360 Hui Liangyu, ‘‘Inheriting Fine Traditions and Writing a New Chapter of History,’’ China Religion [Zhongguo zongjiao], 26 November 03 (FBIS, 20 January 04). 361 Dru C. Gladney, ‘‘Islam in China: Accomodation or Separatism,’’ 174 China Quarterly 451, 457 (2003).

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