2013 Annual Report


Congressional-Executive Commission on China

2013 ANNUAL REPORT

Table of Contents

 

I. Executive Summary

Overview

Specific Findings and Recommendations

Political Prisoner Database

I. 执行摘要 (Chinese Translation of Executive Summary)

概览

具体调查结果和建议

II. Human Rights

Freedom of Expression

Worker Rights

Criminal Justice

Freedom of Religion

Ethnic Minority Rights

Population Planning

Freedom of Residence and Movement

Status of Women

Human Trafficking

North Korean Refugees in China

Public Health

The Environment

III. Development of the Rule of Law

Civil Society

Institutions of Democratic Governance

Commercial Rule of Law

Access to Justice

IV. Xinjiang

V. Tibet

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

VII. Endnotes (incorporated into each section above)

 

I. Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

The Commission notes China’s lack of progress in guaranteeing Chinese citizens’ freedom of expression, assembly, and religion; re­straining the power of the Chinese Communist Party; and estab­lishing the rule of law under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. Official rhetoric at the start of their tenure suggested openness to reforms and limits on the power of officials, sparking public discussion across China. But the new leadership soon cracked down on growing calls for human rights and the rule of law and reiterated the Party’s dominance over pub­lic affairs. Despite widespread acknowledgement that loosening re­strictions on society to encourage public participation, lessening state control over the economy, and enforcing the rule of law are essential to China’s economic development, China continues to pur­sue economic modernization without political reform or guarantees to fundamental human rights.

The Commission’s reporting year, which covers the period from fall 2012 to fall 2013, began with some potentially hopeful signs. Statements starting in late 2012 by President Xi, Premier Li, and other top leaders pledged to crack down on corruption and rein in official abuses, promised major reforms to the abusive systems of reeducation through labor and household registration, and sug­gested an openness to giving greater authority to China’s Constitu­tion. New and revised laws that took effect, including the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and the PRC Mental Health Law, con­tained significant flaws but also had the potential to improve pro­tection of citizens’ rights. China’s relatively open response to an outbreak of avian flu in early 2013 stood in marked contrast to its poor handling of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis 10 years earlier, a point highlighted at a Commission hearing held in May 2013. Whether buoyed by statements from China’s new leaders or the possibilities accompanying a transition of power, citizens from diverse sectors of society, from elements within the Party to individuals affiliated with the grassroots New Citizens’ Movement, sought to engage in public discussion over China’s fu­ture. They urged their government to give greater force to the Con­stitution as a check on official behavior, make good on its promise to combat corruption by requiring officials to disclose their assets, and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998.

By spring, however, it became clear that hopes China’s new lead­ers would engage with, or even tolerate, public discussion on issues such as constitutionalism and anticorruption would remain unfulfilled. In April, the Office of the Communist Party’s Central Committee reportedly issued Document No. 9, which sought to

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marginalize and silence calls for constitutional checks, anticorruption, universal human rights, and press freedom as the products of ‘‘Western anti-China forces’’ and dissidents, rather than treat them as the legitimate concerns of China’s own citizens and an obligation under China’s commitments to international stand­ards such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By Sep­tember 2013, authorities had detained, arrested, or ‘‘disappeared’’ nearly 60 individuals in an ensuing crackdown on free expression, assembly, and association, including the prominent rights advo­cates Xu Zhiyong and Guo Feixiong. Pro-reform editorials and dis­cussions on the Internet were censored. Citizens who sought infor­mation about the government’s human rights action plan and the submission to the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record scheduled for October 2013 faced harassment, detention, and arrest.

The Party’s harsh response to calls for reform this past year echoed a consistent theme across the 19 issue areas covered in this report—that the Party’s interest in maintaining control and domi­nance over Chinese society still trumps meaningful and lasting progress on transparency, human rights, the rule of law, and eas­ing state control over the economy. To be sure, the Commission documented improvements at the margins throughout this report, including the issuance of a national anti-trafficking plan, the loos­ening of residency restrictions in some localities, the introduction of labor law amendments intended to curb abuse of subcontracted labor, and the discontinuation of reeducation through labor sen­tences in some provinces. But these took place against the back­drop of a Chinese state that still views its citizens with suspicion and still denies them basic freedoms.

This was evident in many of the headline issues that captivated Chinese citizens this past year, from crippling pollution and cor­rupt political figures to widespread concerns over food safety and tensions in ethnic minority regions. Citizens clamored for more in­formation about the safety of their environment and food, but au­thorities deemed soil pollution data a ‘‘state secret.’’ Corruption was a top concern for many in China, but authorities detained anticorruption advocates and censored foreign news stories about the finances of China’s leaders and their families. Despite dozens more self-immolations in Tibetan areas of China and some of the worst unrest in Xinjiang since 2009, Chinese officials continued to rely on heavier security and tighter control instead of dialogue and reconciliation. Another year has passed without resumption of for­mal dialogue with representatives of the Dalai Lama, extending the longest break since talks resumed in 2002. On the surface, the Au­gust trial of Bo Xilai, former Party Central Political Bureau mem­ber and Chongqing Party Secretary, appeared relatively more transparent, but it also was a reminder that when the Party’s in­terests are involved, China remains very much a country ruled by the Party and not by laws.

In addition, China made little progress toward achieving the ‘‘highly efficient modern government that operates under the rule of law’’ recommended in the groundbreaking ‘‘China 2030’’ report released by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of China’s State Council in 2012. The ‘‘China 2030’’ report, which the Commission raised in last year’s annual report, underscored the strong relationship between the human rights and rule of law issues monitored by the Commission and China’s long-term eco­nomic development and stability. The report urged China to take a number of steps to reach the next stage of economic development, including allowing Chinese people greater freedom of movement and public participation, and strengthening the rule of law. The re­port also urged China to reform its state-owned sector, a source of abuses that tests China’s commitment to the rule of law. On this count, this report found that the state continues to play an outsized role in China’s economy, unfairly subsidizing state-owned enter­prises and coordinating an overseas investment strategy, employ­ing policies that favor domestic companies over foreign firms, vio­lating World Trade Organization obligations, undervaluing its cur­rency, and failing to curb the massive theft of foreign intellectual property.

China’s new leaders must undertake significant reforms to meet China’s human rights obligations under international standards and to strengthen the rule of law. To that end, the Commission provides the following main recommendations to Members of the

U.S. Congress and Administration officials outlining ways to en­courage such reforms.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). China signed the ICCPR in 1998 but 15 years later has still not ratified the covenant despite repeatedly stating its intent to do so. China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council not to have acceded to or ratified the ICCPR. China must take a number of concrete steps to come into conformity with the specific provisions of the ICCPR, including the following: Ending arbitrary arrest and detention of political dissidents (Article 9); al­lowing citizens the right to freely choose their place of residence (Article 12); ending the policy of denying passports and restricting the movement of activists and their families as political punish­ment (Article 12); allowing citizens the freedom to not only hold re­ligious beliefs but also to practice them (Article 18); ending press and Internet censorship of peaceful political content and allowing freedom of expression (Article 19); allowing citizens the right to freely associate with others, including through non-governmental organizations and trade unions (Article 22); and allowing genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage (Article 25).

RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and Ad­ministration officials should urge China to commit to a specific date for ratifying the ICCPR, including providing a concrete and trans­parent plan and timetable for ratification developed through gen­uine, democratic, and open public participation and comment from all sectors of civil society. The Administration should raise this rec­ommendation during China’s Universal Periodic Review before the UN Human Rights Council on October 22, 2013, and at future bi­lateral dialogues with China, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Human Rights Dialogue, and the Legal Experts Dia­logue. The Administration should raise China’s qualifications for membership on the UN Human Rights Council prior to and during the upcoming election for Council members at the UN General As­sembly on November 12, 2013.

U.S.-China Trade and Connection to Rule of Law and Human Rights. One of the results of the United States’ extensive trade ties with China is that China’s domestic human rights and rule of law developments impact the public health and economic well-being of Americans to a greater degree than those of any other country. China is the world’s second-largest economy and has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001. China is the United States’ second largest trading partner, and ex­ports a large and growing volume of food, drugs, and products to the United States. The U.S. trade deficit with China reached a record US$315 billion in 2012 and topped US$30 billion in July 2013, the highest monthly deficit ever. China continues to be the world’s largest producer of carbon dioxide emissions, while food continues to be grown in areas of China contaminated by water and soil pollution. In addition, pollutants originating in China, such as mercury and ozone, are reaching the United States. The extent to which the Chinese government is transparent, respects its international trading obligations, and protects Chinese citizens’ human rights affects the safety and quality of goods imported from China, and the ability of American workers and companies to com­pete on a level playing field.

This connection between China’s domestic commercial rule of law and human rights developments and the health and economic pros­perity of Americans as a result of trade is evident in many con­texts. Without a free press and civil society, Chinese consumers cannot effectively uncover and respond to food and drug safety issues, environmental threats, and disease outbreaks that could be exported abroad. Unfair trading practices, such as industrial poli­cies, currency manipulation, quotas and subsidies, forced tech­nology transfer, and intellectual property theft—many of which contravene China’s obligations as a member of the WTO—directly harm American businesses and workers. China’s censorship of the Internet not only denies China’s nearly 600 million Internet users their freedom of expression but also blocks companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Bloomberg, the New York Times, Google, and YouTube from accessing China’s markets. The denial of the basic right of Chinese workers to organize independent unions and the lack of enforcement of minimum labor and environmental stand­ards places American workers and companies at a competitive dis­advantage. Over the last two years, the Commission has held a number of hearings that have highlighted how U.S. trade relations with China should not be viewed in isolation from China’s restric­tions on expression, labor rights, environmental and public health transparency, and civil society, including ‘‘China’s Censorship of the Internet and Social Media: The Human Toll and Trade Im­pact’’; ‘‘Ten Years in the WTO: Has China Kept Its Promises? ’’; ‘‘Working Conditions and Worker Rights in China: Recent Develop­ments’’; ‘‘Food and Drug Safety, Public Health, and the Environ­ment in China’’; and ‘‘Chinese Hacking: Impact on Human Rights and Commercial Rule of Law.’’

RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and Ad­ministration officials should seek to include human rights and rule of law concerns as integral parts of their discussions over trade and commercial issues with their Chinese counterparts during the an­nual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty, and other trade-related venues, pointing out the links between, for example, China’s censorship of the Internet and market access, the rule of law and food safety, and China’s industrial policies and weak enforcement of law and theft of American intellectual property. The Administration should also continue to ensure that China adheres to its WTO obligations, in­cluding by exercising the United States’ rights under the WTO dis­pute settlement process when necessary.

Rule of Law and Democratic Institutions. Early in the Commission’s reporting period, President Xi Jinping drew attention with comments such as, ‘‘[N]o organization or individual should be put above the constitution and the law’’; and, ‘‘[T]he Constitution should be the legal weapon for people to defend their own rights’’ and implemented in order to have ‘‘life and authority.’’ In practice, China’s rule of law development has stalled, as most laws and reg­ulations are developed behind closed doors largely in the absence of democratic input; officials continue to arbitrarily apply laws to punish individuals they deem politically sensitive; and enforcement of laws, such as labor laws, remains uneven. China lacks meaning­ful safeguards, such as an independent judiciary, a free press, and an unrestricted civil society, to ensure that the state’s restrictions on freedom are narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of inter­national law.

RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and Ad­ministration officials should raise President Xi’s statements with Chinese officials and urge them to adopt the true hallmarks of a so­ciety marked by the rule of law, including laws and policies devel­oped through democratic institutions and public participation, and meaningful safeguards such as a free press, independent judiciary, and vibrant civil society. U.S. officials who wish to express support for the new Chinese leadership’s attempts to combat corruption should insist that, in order for such efforts to be sustainable, they must be accompanied by democratic participation, public oversight, and the rule of law. U.S. officials should also cite the ‘‘China 2030’’ report’s assertion that the creation of a ‘‘highly efficient modern gov­ernment that operates under the rule of law’’ is key to China’s eco­nomic future.

Ethnic Minorities. China’s current policy toward ethnic mi­norities, most notably with respect to Tibetans and Uyghurs, has proven ineffective and counterproductive. Instead of promoting the declared national goals of stability and a harmonious society, these policies have led in the opposite direction. Tibetans continue to en­gage in tragic acts of self-immolation at an alarming rate, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has witnessed some of the most severe unrest since 2009.

RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and Ad­ministration officials should note to Chinese officials that instability in Tibetan areas of China and the XUAR is likely to continue and could deteriorate further without a shift in the state’s policy away from a top-down approach that belies China’s constitutional com­mitment to ‘‘ethnic autonomy,’’ and instead relies on heavy-handed security measures and development policies that fail to provide for participation by ethnic minorities in decisionmaking and fail to pro­tect their distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious identity. China should be encouraged to move toward a more inclusive, democratic approach that fully takes into account the views and values of Ti­betans and Uyghurs and respects their culture, language, and reli­gion. U.S. officials should take note of and seek to learn more about what appeared to be more tolerant policy suggestions on the Tibet issue that appeared within the Party this year and should call on the Chinese leadership to promote a more stable and inclusive soci­ety by allowing greater public dialogue and debate among all groups, especially groups such as Tibetans and Uyghurs that are among the most adversely affected by current policies.

Reeducation Through Labor, Population Planning, and Household Registration. Major policies such as the reeducation through labor system, the population planning policy, and the household registration system were the source of great public dis­content in China this past year. These policies not only violate human rights but also contribute to social instability and hold back China’s economy. The reeducation through labor system violates the rule of law by incarcerating citizens without trial or access to legal counsel, and high-profile cases of abuse have led to wide­spread calls for abolishing the policy in China. The population planning policy interferes with and controls the reproductive lives of Chinese citizens, especially women, and involves serious abuses such as forced sterilizations and forced abortions. The policy also exacerbates the country’s demographic challenges, which include an aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex ratio. The household registration system denies Chinese citizens the free­dom to choose a permanent residence and leads to unequal treat­ment and discrimination against migrants from rural areas who move to cities, contributing to social tensions and instability.

RECOMMENDATION: Members of the U.S. Congress and Ad­ministration officials should inquire about indications this past year of possible changes in these policies, including a government restructuring plan that moves population planning policy develop­ment to the National Development and Reform Commission and the announcements of possible major reforms to the reeducation through labor system and the household registration system by the end of 2013. Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should request more details about the changes and proposed reforms and urge Chinese officials to undertake serious reform that would both remedy rights violations and lead to greater social stability by ending policies that are widely opposed in China.

REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

This report is divided into 19 issue areas. Highlights of develop­ments in each area are discussed briefly below.

The Commission observed China’s implementation of practices inconsistent with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as noted in this year’s Freedom of Ex­pression section. As more and more Chinese citizens accessed the Internet to share information and express grievances, Chinese offi­cials responded with overly broad and non-transparent policies to curb ‘‘online rumors’’ and expand the real-name registration re­quirement for online services. Censorship of peaceful political con­tent, a violation of international standards, remained commonplace and targeted everything from foreign news articles on the wealth of former Premier Wen Jiabao’s family to domestic online discus­sion of the 18th Party Congress. New research indicated China was expanding its censorship system and focusing on online activity that could lead to collective movements. The Party continued to ex­ercise broad control over the press, and authorities punished jour­nalists such as Du Bin, who exposed abuses at the Masanjia Wom­en’s Reeducation Through Labor Center, and Deng Yuwen, who criticized China’s North Korea policy. In a rare act, journalists at the Southern Weekend staged a strike in January 2013 over the re­moval of an editorial advocating freedoms and constitutional prin­ciples, news of which itself was censored.

China continued to violate internationally recognized worker rights by not allowing workers the right to freely associate and form independent trade unions. As noted in the Worker Rights section, despite limited efforts to promote the direct election of worker representatives to state-controlled unions, union represent­atives remained generally ineffective in representing workers’ in­terests. Without adequate channels to protect their rights and ex­press workplace grievances, China’s large migrant worker popu­lation, which has provided the low-cost labor to drive China’s growth, continued to suffer exploitation, with studies showing that less than 50 percent had labor contracts, and even fewer had pen­sions and medical insurance. At the same time, rising wages and a tightening labor market led companies in the electronics industry and elsewhere to hire, in some cases with local government co­operation, underage workers and to exploit subcontracted workers in violation of the law. In December 2012, the National People’s Congress amended the PRC Labor Contract Law to address subcon­tracting abuses, but the effectiveness of implementation remains to be seen.

In the Commercial Rule of Law section, the Commission noted heavy state coordination of outbound investment, which has grown significantly in recent years, as part of a ‘‘go out’’ strategy targeting ‘‘strategic industries’’ such as energy resources, metals, advanced technology, and ‘‘famous brands.’’ An official urged Chinese compa­nies investing abroad to keep a low profile to avoid the appearance of state involvement, while the Chinese government offered pref­erential financing that created an uneven playing field in overseas markets. The yuan remained significantly undervalued, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. The WTO found that China had imposed antidumping and countervailing duties on U.S. grain-oriented electrical steel, U.S. chicken products, and European x-ray inspection equipment in ways that were inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations. Chinese officials continued to use technology transfer as a precondition for market access, in violation of China’s WTO obligations and commitments made during the 2012 U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. Weak protection of intellectual property (IP) rights and policies encouraging Chinese acquisition of technology have led China to account for a reported 50 to 80 percent of international IP theft. New information this year revealed a massive cyber theft operation controlled by the People’s Liberation Army. Problems with the rule of law contrib­uted to ongoing food and product safety problems, including the cross-border movement of hazardous and illegal products.

The Commission observed ongoing noncompliance with standards for fair trial rights and the right to be free from arbitrary detention and torture as set forth in the ICCPR and the UDHR, as described in this year’s Criminal Justice section. The revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) took effect on January 1, 2013; while the new CPL is, for the most part, an improvement over its predecessor, it fails to clearly stipulate the rights to remain silent and to be pre­sumed innocent, and the right not to incriminate oneself. Article 73 of the new CPL legalizes enforced disappearance (up to six months) in contravention of international standards. Chinese authorities continue to use the criminal justice system to suppress dissent and punish activists and their family members—the criminal detention of prominent rights activist Xu Zhiyong and the jailing of Chen Kegui, the nephew of Chen Guangcheng, are just two examples. The issue of confessions coerced through torture and wrongful con­victions was once again in the spotlight, but it remains to be seen whether the CPL’s new rule excluding the use of illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials will actually curb the use of torture in criminal investigations.

The Commission notes in the Freedom of Religion section that the Chinese government’s legal and policy framework for religion violates international standards for freedom of religion, including Article 18 of the UDHR. The PRC Constitution limits citizens’ abil­ity to exercise their beliefs by protecting only ‘‘normal religious ac­tivities,’’ and the government continued to recognize only five reli­gions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism— for limited state protections for religious activity. The government and Party maintained strict ideological control and oversight over religious groups, and a top official announced all clergy would be registered with the government by the end of 2013. Chinese citi­zens who sought to practice their faith outside of state-approved parameters continued to face harassment and detention. For exam­ple, Chinese officials revoked the title of auxiliary bishop from bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin after he publicly withdrew from the state-run Catholic Patriotic Association of China at his ordination ceremony. In April 2013, a China-based magazine reported on claims of torture and severe maltreatment of inmates at the Masanjia Women’s Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Center in Liaoning province, many of whom are believed to be Falun Gong practitioners. Muslims were warned against going on Hajj pilgrim­ages not organized by the government. The government also contin­ued to harass members of the Beijing Shouwang Church, a Protes­tant house church in Beijing municipality, and detained house church pastor Cao Nan and others for holding a religious gathering in a public park in Shenzhen municipality.

The Commission observed that Chinese officials continued to fail to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner, instead dealing with the 65 Tibetan self-immolations that occurred from September 2012 through July this year by strengthening a security crackdown that has infringed on Tibetans’ freedom of expression, association, and movement, as noted in the Tibet section. The self-immolations peaked in November during the 18th Party Congress, prompting officials to launch a troubling campaign to hold rel­atives, friends, and associates of the self-immolators criminally lia­ble. Some self-immolators reportedly called for greater use of the Tibetan language as they burned—an apparent indication of the significant threat some Tibetans believe official policies pose to Ti­betan culture’s vibrancy and viability. Officials continued to em­phasize economic development as the key to achieving ‘‘social sta­bility,’’ even though some initiatives resulted in protests or alleged harm to local communities. Talks between China and the Dalai Lama remained stalled, but the publication of a Central Party School academic’s remarks on the potential benefits of improved re­lations with the Dalai Lama suggested that some officials may be interested in greater public discussion on the matter.

The Commission found that instances of unrest in the spring and summer resulted in numerous deaths, with reported death tolls ranging from dozens to 100 or possibly more, and raised concerns about the failure of ethnic policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono­mous Region to address the root causes of instability. As discussed in the Xinjiang section, authorities continued to rely on heavy-handed security measures, including overly broad security sweeps targeting the general population and top-down development that disproportionately excludes Uyghurs, instead of pursuing inclusive, democratic policies that respect religious, cultural, and linguistic rights. Chinese officials violated Uyghurs’ freedom of movement, preventing Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti from traveling abroad and denying passports to some Uyghurs. News surfaced that Mirhemitjan Muzepper had been sentenced to 11 years in prison for serving as a translator for a Hong Kong media organization re­porting on the demolitions taking place in Kashgar’s Old City.

As discussed in the Ethnic Minority Rights section, some Mon­gols continued to face harassment and imprisonment for peaceful protest and assertions of cultural identity, and some nomadic popu­lations were forced to resettle away from grasslands. Authorities continued to hold Mongol rights advocate Hada in extralegal deten­tion, denying him treatment for serious mental health issues; and they ordered Batzangaa, a former medical school principal who or­ganized demonstrations to protest the government’s confiscation of campus property in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, to begin serving a three-year prison sentence.

China’s policy of interfering with and controlling the reproductive lives of Chinese citizens, including through fines, withholding of benefits, and forced sterilizations and abortions, continued to vio­late international human rights standards, as noted in the Popu­lation Planning section. In March 2013, China’s new leaders merged the National Population and Family Planning Commission with the Ministry of Health and transferred the responsibility of developing population planning policy to the National Development and Reform Commission, a move some viewed as an opening for re­form while others saw it as strengthening the family planning sys­tem. Calls for relaxing family planning policy continued, but local authorities continued to aggressively push the policy, and news and social media continued to publicize cases of forced abortions and sterilizations across China.

Chinese authorities continued to enforce a household registration (hukou) system that denies citizens their right to freely determine their permanent place of residence, and contributes to instability by discriminating against rural migrants living in cities by denying them social services because they lack urban hukous. As described in the Freedom of Residence and Movement section, top offi­cials announced that a plan to reform the system would be un­veiled by the end of 2013 as part of a larger push for urbanization to sustain China’s economic growth. Some officials experimented with policies to expand educational and employment opportunities for rural migrants in cities, but experts have said many local gov­ernments lack the resources to fully implement such reforms. China continued to deny its citizens the right to freely leave the country by denying passports to a growing number of politically sensitive individuals, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and political ac­tivists and their family members. Human rights groups estimate that at least 14 million people may be affected. Liu Xia, the wife of the imprisoned 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, con­tinued to be confined to her home, one of many ‘‘politically sen­sitive’’ individuals denied domestic freedom of movement.

The Commission observed that China continued to fall short of commitments in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to ensure female representation in government. As noted in the Status of Women section, female representation at all levels of government continued to be low and did not markedly improve following the leadership transition. Gen­der discrimination in education and employment remains wide­spread. New national-level domestic violence legislation promised in state-run media reports has not materialized, and young female rape victims received inadequate legal protection under the PRC Criminal Law.

China has taken some steps to comply with the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, including the issuance of a new national anti-trafficking action plan this year, as discussed in the Traf­ficking section. After nine consecutive years on the Tier 2 Watch List, China was in June automatically downgraded to Tier 3, the lowest tier ranking, in the U.S. State Department’s 2013 Traf­ficking in Persons Report. Men, women, and children continue to be trafficked to, from, and within China for purposes including forced labor, forced marriage, and sexual exploitation.

In the North Korean Refugees in China section, the Commis­sion noted that China continued to violate the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol by detain­ing and repatriating North Korean refugees to the Democratic Peo­ple’s Republic of Korea despite the severe punishments they face once returned. The Chinese government, in concert with North Ko­rean officials, appeared to strengthen measures to stem the flow of North Korean refugees into China. North Korean women in China continued to be trafficked into forced marriage and commercial sex­ual exploitation. China continued to violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child by repatriating North Korean women and sepa­rating them from their children born in China.

The Commission observed in the Environment section that China faced severe pollution problems but still refused to provide full transparency to its citizens or fully empower citizens through law to enforce their rights. China’s open government information regulations require governments to release information on the envi­ronment. Officials were more forthcoming about the linkage be­tween toxic chemicals and ‘‘cancer villages’’ and began to disclose abridged versions of environmental impact statements, but they re­fused to release information on soil pollution, claiming such infor­mation was a ‘‘state secret’’ in response to at least one citizen’s re­quest. Citizens continued to be largely marginalized in the policy-making process, as authorities detained environmental advocates such as Liu Futang and Chen Yuqian, suppressed anti-pollution demonstrations, and narrowed provisions in a new draft of the En­vironmental Protection Law to allow only a single government-affiliated environmental organization to file public interest suits under the law.

China continued to deny citizens the right to participate in public affairs directly or through freely chosen representatives and to vote in genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage, a standard set forth in Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR. As discussed in the Institutions of Democratic Governance sec­tion, China’s new leaders were chosen in an opaque, non-demo­cratic process. At all levels, from the judiciary and the National People’s Congress to the media and universities, the Chinese Com­munist Party continued to dominate political affairs. Authorities continued to detain or sentence democracy advocates, including Cao Haibo and Liu Benqi, who joined a growing list of those punished in recent years. The Chinese government continued to show little tolerance for citizens considered to be politically sensitive who sought to participate in public affairs. For example, authorities ar­rested Peng Lanlan and harassed others for seeking information regarding China’s submission for its Universal Periodic Review be­fore the UN Human Rights Council in October 2013. Authorities also arrested at least 25 anticorruption and social justice advocates who called for officials to make public their personal assets or ad­vocated on other issues.

In the Civil Society section, the Commission found that the Chinese government’s overly broad restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and informal citizen networks continued to fail to comply with freedom of association standards, as provided under Article 20 of the UDHR and Article 22 of the ICCPR. The government and Party reaffirmed their control over the develop­ment of NGOs in China, expressing preference to groups perceived to support economic growth or provide social welfare services, but harassing those engaged in issue advocacy or matters the govern­ment deems politically sensitive. The government pledged to issue long-awaited regulatory changes by the end of 2013 to make it easi­er for certain types of groups to register with the government, but excluded political, legal, religious, and foreign NGOs.

The Access to Justice section highlighted the Chinese govern­ment’s lack of tolerance for citizens seeking effective remedies to of­ficial violations of their rights, contrary to Article 8 of the UDHR and Article 2 of the ICCPR. During the 18th Party Congress in No­vember 2012, officials reportedly ordered rights advocates, peti­tioners, and Falun Gong practitioners to serve reeducation through labor (RTL) to achieve ‘‘zero petitioning’’ and prevent protest in Beijing during that period. Widespread media, scholarly, and gov­ernment attention has focused on the Chinese government’s vague statements about reform of the RTL system, possibly by the end of this year. Harassment of rights defenders, political activists, and their families continued, and prominent human rights advocates Gao Zhisheng and Ni Yulan continued to serve prison sentences. In spite of the increasing number of individuals reportedly receiving legal aid, the arrest in August 2013 of legal advocate Xu Zhiyong on trumped-up charges of ‘‘gathering a crowd to disrupt public order’’ highlighted the government’s concerns over independent ef­forts to secure justice. Xu had founded the non-governmental orga­nization Open Constitution Initiative in 2003, which authorities banned in 2009, and is a leading proponent of the New Citizens’ Movement, a broad network of individuals promoting legal and po­litical reforms, human rights, and social justice, among other causes.

The Commission noted in the Public Health section that inter­national health organizations commended China’s effective re­sponse to the H7N9 avian influenza outbreak in March 2013 and China’s progress in building an emergency response structure in the decade since the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. The Chinese public, however, continued to ex­press concerns over the government’s capacity to protect public health and regulate food and drug safety. China’s first Mental Health Law was passed in October 2012 and took effect in May 2013. Concerns remained regarding the lack of a guaranteed right to appeal hospitalization and safeguards to prevent the continued abuse of psychiatric commitment to punish petitioners, political ac­tivists, and others. The government also issued draft revisions of regulations on education for persons with disabilities, for which civil society organizations urged more precise definitions and amendments to comply with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Despite laws prohibiting it, health-based discrimination in access to education, medical treatment, and em­ployment remained widespread.

In the Developments in Hong Kong and Macau section, the Commission noted that Hong Kong officials dismissed calls for a early public consultation on electoral reform for the election of the Chief Executive (CE) by universal suffrage, which is set to occur in 2017, despite concern from the UN Human Rights Committee over the ‘‘lack of a clear plan to institute universal suffrage.’’ State­ments from mainland Chinese officials ruled out a CE nominating process involving the broader voting public and stated that CE can­didates in an election by universal suffrage would be required to be trusted by the central government. The Hong Kong government postponed a measure that would have made information about company directors less transparent. Mainland experts and officials continued to dissuade Macau from pursuing universal suffrage. The Chinese government and Macau officials reportedly stepped up ef­forts to regulate Macau’s gambling industry as part of a larger campaign against corruption.

To fulfill the Commission’s mandate to compile and maintain lists of persons believed to be imprisoned, detained, placed under house arrest, tortured, or otherwise persecuted by the Chinese gov­ernment due to the pursuit of internationally recognized human rights, the Commission maintains an extensive database of political prisoners in China. According to the Political Prisoner Database section, as of September 1, 2013, the Commission staff had docu­mented 1,304 cases of political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 6,005 cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that these numbers reflect the ef­forts by the Commission’s staff to document cases for which infor­mation is publicly available and that the actual number of cases of current political and religious imprisonment in China is likely to be much higher.

The Commission’s Executive Branch members have participated in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this Annual Report, including its findings, views, and recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the Administration.

The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 14 to 0.†

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of specific findings follows below for each section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the Commission mon­itors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with the Commission’s legislative mandate, submits for each a set of rec­ommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Findings

  • During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, Chinese offi­cials continued to maintain a broad range of restrictions on free expression that do not comply with international human rights standards, including Article 19 of the International Cov­enant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such stand­ards permit states in limited circumstances to restrict expres­sion to protect interests such as national security and public order, official Chinese restrictions covered a much broader range of activity, including peaceful dissent and expression critical of the Communist Party.
  • According to the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the national-level administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs in China, there were over 590 million Inter­net users in China by the end of June 2013, bringing the Inter­net penetration rate (i.e., the total number of Internet users di­vided by the total population) to 44.1 percent. The Chinese gov­ernment has pledged to expand access to mobile technologies and to increase government control over the Internet.
  • During the 2013 reporting year, China’s Twitter-like microblogging sites continued to see strong growth in the num­ber of users. China’s microblogging sites—including China’s most popular microblog site, Sina Weibo—experienced dra­matic growth with 309 million registered accounts at the end of 2012.
  • The Chinese government reportedly increased pressure on certain popular users of microblogging services, including those who have posted blunt social criticisms or political com­mentaries. The growing popularity of services has allowed some microbloggers to reach millions of users and to poten­tially shape public opinion. With growing concern about ‘‘online rumors,’’ Chinese Internet authorities responded with a crack­down on high profile accounts and with a list of ‘‘seven bottom lines’’ for online activity. Some have alleged the crackdown on prominent microblog users is politically based.
  • • While international and domestic observers continued to note the vibrancy of Internet and cell phone use in China, Chi­nese government and Communist Party officials showed little sign of loosening political control. Chinese officials remained non-transparent in disclosing content that is blocked or why it is blocked, and officials continued to block content arbitrarily for purposes impermissible under international standards. The online censorship and Web site closures, in some cases, ap­peared politically motivated and appeared to counter inter­national standards on freedom of opinion and expression.
  • Officials continued to restrict expression arbitrarily by abus­ing vague criminal law provisions, and imposing broad regula­tions and registration requirements on journalists, publishers, news media, and Internet users.
  • Government and Party officials continue to exercise control over the press in violation of international standards. A Janu­ary 2013 strike at the Southern Weekend, a progressive weekly newspaper in Guangdong province, sparked public outrage and highlighted the media’s lack of editorial independence.
  • This past year the Commission continued to monitor harass­ment of domestic and foreign journalists in China. Chinese au­thorities, for instance, took actions to punish or suspend jour­nalists for independent reporting. In other instances, foreign and Hong Kong journalists were harassed, intimidated, or as­saulted.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Raise concerns over and draw enhanced international atten­tion to the Chinese government’s continued insistence that its restrictions on freedom of expression are consistent with inter­national standards. Æ Emphasize that the Chinese government’s position under­mines international human rights standards for free expres­sion, particularly those contained in Article 19 of the Inter­national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Æ Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party and government censorship of the Internet and the press can lead to instability by eroding public faith in the media and govern­ment. Æ Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese officials on the issue of how governments can best ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to protect national security, minors, and public order. Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such as public participation in the formulation of restrictions on free expression, transparency regarding the implementation of such restrictions, and the independent review of such re­strictions. Æ Urge Chinese officials to implement their calls for greater transparency and public participation in lawmaking. Such dis­cussions may be part of a broader discussion on how the U.S. and Chinese Governments can work together to ensure the protection of common interests on the Internet, including pro­tecting minors, computer security, and privacy. Æ Acknowledge the Chinese government’s efforts to expand ac­cess to the Internet and cell phones, especially in rural areas, while continuing to press officials to comply with international standards. Æ Support the research and development of technologies that enable Chinese citizens to access and share political and reli­gious content that they are entitled to access and share under international human rights standards. Support practices and Chinese-language tools and training materials that enable Chi­nese citizens to access and share content in a way that ensures their security and privacy. Support the dissemination of online Chinese-language information on the Internet, especially through popular Chinese social media sites, that discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese citizens are entitled under international standards. Æ Elevate concern over the increased harassment of foreign journalists, who this past year have been beaten. Raise con­cerns over reports that authorities repeatedly have delayed or denied the approval of journalists’ visa applications.

WORKER RIGHTS

Findings

  • During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese government continued to prevent workers from exercising their constitutional right to freedom of association. Workers in China are not guaranteed, either by law or in practice, full worker rights in accordance with international standards, in­cluding the right to organize into independent unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. Authorities continued this past year to promote direct elections of trade union representa­tives, although questions remained over the ability of elections to engender genuinely representative unions because of contin­ued management influence over candidate selection and re­strictions on worker participation in the election process.
  • Genuine collective bargaining remains limited by the inabil­ity of local-level trade unions to effectively represent and ad­vance the rights of workers in negotiations with employers and a lack of alternative union organizations to the ACFTU. De­spite the ACFTU’s promotion of collective contracts and collec­tive wage bargaining in recent years, the collective contract and consultation process remains problematic in part because trade unions lack autonomy and genuine worker representa­tion.
  • The Commission continued to observe reports in the past year of workers organizing strikes and demonstrations in a va­riety of industries and regions across China, often prompted by systemic labor-related grievances, such as factory closings or relocations, nonpayment of wages and benefits, and abusive management practices. Official unions at the local level fre­quently opposed worker-led actions and did not play an orga­nizing role in them, while media reports indicated that govern­ment officials in some cases used force against or detained demonstrating workers.
  • Changing demographic and economic shifts in recent years have provided workers with greater bargaining power in the workplace, increasing their determination to redress grievances with employers and press for better pay and working condi­tions. Moreover, growing expectations of younger generation migrant workers with regard to working conditions and labor rights are seen as a driving factor behind the increased asser­tiveness of recent protests.
  • Migrant workers remained largely marginalized and vulner­able to exploitation in the workplace, facing problems such as wage arrears, social discrimination, and low levels of labor and social welfare protection. Working predominately in low-end in­dustries requiring little technical skill, migrants face increased risk for occupational injury and disease.
  • Despite China’s laws and commitments under international standards prohibiting child labor, the use of underage workers remained evident in the electronics manufacturing industry, with instances also reported in other sectors. Systemic prob­lems in enforcement and a lack of sufficient resources report­edly continue to constrain efforts to reduce child labor.
  • Subcontracted workers hired through labor employment agencies remain particularly vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace, often receiving lower wages and fewer benefits than workers hired through direct labor contracts with employers. A series of amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law, passed in December 2012, contain provisions that could help reform labor subcontracting practices. Continued poor enforcement and opposition by some state-owned enterprises and national-and local-level government offices, however, could weaken those reforms.
  • Average wage levels in China continued to increase this past year, with reports suggesting that structural changes in Chi­na’s labor market, in particular a decline in the working age population, in combination with sporadic labor shortages and the relocation of manufacturing operations further inland or to Southeast Asia, signify the decline of ‘‘cheap labor’’ in China.
  • Despite continued wage growth, income inequality among different regions and industrial sections has also increased, greatly expanding the disparity between rich and poor. China’s State Council released a long-awaited income distribution plan in February 2013 that seeks to reduce income inequality and increase household income. However, observers questioned whether it can be fully implemented.
  • Wage arrears and nonpayment of wages remained serious problems this past year, particularly for migrant workers. International media reports throughout 2013 indicated that wage arrears were a primary factor behind worker-led protests, especially in the weeks prior to the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday.
  • Chinese workers, especially those in the coal mining sector, continued to face persistent occupational safety and health risks. Fatalities have been consistently reduced over the past few years, but officially reported cases of disease have in­creased during the same period. Despite legal measures aimed

 

at preventing workplace accidents and establishing a regu­latory system to inspect and handle safety violations, systemic problems in implementation and enforcement, as well as the lack of meaningful worker participation in workplace decisions that impact safety and health, continue to constrain efforts to reduce industrial accidents.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Support projects promoting reform of Chinese labor laws and regulations to reflect internationally recognized labor prin­ciples. Prioritize projects that not only focus on legislative drafting and regulatory development but also develop knowl­edge, expertise, and practical solutions to comply with inter­nationally recognized labor principles at the enterprise level. Æ Engage in dialogue with government officials, workers, and trade union officials in locations that have achieved successful cases of collective bargaining; identify ways to increase aware­ness of those experiences; and convey those experiences to offi­cials and trade unions in areas that have had less success with collective bargaining. Where possible, prioritize programs that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective bargaining pilot projects in enterprises with no functioning union present. Æ Convey support for the effective use of worker-management committees, functioning collective bargaining, and direct elec­tions of trade union representatives. Engage in dialogue with government and trade union officials, as well as employers to identify opportunities to increase awareness of successful expe­riences with direct elections of trade union representatives and to provide elected trade union officials with ongoing training and support. Support the U.S. Department of Labor’s (USDOL) exchange with the China National Coal Association regarding industry regulatory compliance, worker representation at coal mines, and safety and health improvements. Æ Encourage the expansion of exchanges between U.S. collec­tive bargaining practitioners and Chinese labor rights advo­cates in non-governmental organizations, the bar, academia, and the official trade union. Prioritize exchanges that empha­size face-to-face meetings with hands-on practitioners and trainers. Æ Support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in defending the rights of workers. Encourage Chinese officials at local levels to develop, maintain, and deepen relationships with labor organi­zations inside and outside of China, and to invite these groups to increase the number of training programs in China. Support programs that train workers in ways to identify problems at the factory-floor level, conducting skills and problem-solving training so they can communicate their concern to employers effectively. Æ Where appropriate, share the United States’ ongoing experi­ence and efforts in protecting worker rights—through legal, regulatory, or non-governmental means—with Chinese offi­cials. Expand site visits and other exchanges for Chinese offi­cials to observe and share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, the USDOL, and other regulatory agencies at all lev­els of the U.S. Government that work on labor issues. Æ Support USDOL’s exchange with China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security with regard to setting and en­forcing minimum wage standards; strengthening social insur­ance; improving employment statistics; and promoting dialogue and exchanges with China’s State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) regarding improving workplace safety and health. Support the annual labor dialogue with China that USDOL started in 2010 and the annual safety dialogue started in 2012. Support USDOL’s technical cooperation program with SAWS on workplace safety and health and the expansion of mining cooperation into broad occupational safety and health areas. Support pilot projects that establish public-private part­nerships to address workplace safety and health concerns, and the introduction of meaningful worker participation in manage­ment decisions important to workplace safety and health.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Findings

  • The revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) took effect on January 1, 2013. While the law as written has many posi­tive aspects, it fails to stipulate an explicit right to remain si­lent and right not to incriminate oneself; nor does it provide a clear right to the presumption of innocence as required by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
  • If implemented effectively, the revised CPL will enhance the ability of lawyers to better defend their clients and further the rights of detained criminal suspects and defendants, for exam­ple, by facilitating meetings between lawyers and their de­tained clients. Preliminary reports based on limited data sug­gest that lawyers are finding it easier to meet with their de­tained clients, but that some problems remain.
  • Chinese authorities continue to use vaguely defined crimes to suppress and punish dissent and perceived challenges to Chinese Communist Party rule. In addition to Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes ‘‘subversion’’ and ‘‘inciting subversion,’’ during this reporting year authorities made ample use of vague crimes such as ‘‘unlawful assembly’’ and ‘‘gathering people to disturb public order’’ to suppress rights advocates and civil society activists. Public security offi­cers arrested prominent rights activist Xu Zhiyong on August 22 on suspicion of ‘‘gathering people to disturb public order.’’
  • • Chinese officials continue to harass and arbitrarily detain rights advocates, civil society activists, writers, lawyers, bloggers, and ordinary citizens who advocate for their own rights or the rights of others. They may be sentenced to prison for the peaceful exercise of their internationally recognized human rights, or subjected to various forms of arbitrary or ex­tralegal detention, including confinement in ‘‘black jails,’’ ad­ministrative detention facilities including reeducation through labor (RTL) centers, unlawful confinement in their homes, or enforced disappearance.
  • The issue of confessions coerced through torture and wrong­ful convictions garnered a great deal of attention during this reporting year as case after case surfaced and senior judicial officials condemned the practice. The revised CPL contains new provisions for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials, which, if implemented effectively, could lead to a reduction in the number of coerced confessions and wrongful convictions.
  • Despite the Chinese government’s continued efforts to ad­dress the problem, torture and abuse in places of detention in China remain widespread. In April, a Chinese magazine pub­lished a detailed account of torture, abuse, and forced labor at the Masanjia Women’s Reeducation Through Labor Center in Liaoning province, which fuelled calls for reform of the RTL system. Torture and the abuse of individuals detained in con­nection with the campaign against organized crime in Chongqing municipality carried out by Bo Xilai, the former Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, have gradually come to light. While some initial steps have been taken to pro­vide redress to some of those wrongfully accused and convicted during the campaign, much more remains to be done.

Although the Chinese government continues to treat data on the use of the death penalty as a state secret, estimates sug­gest that the number is steadily decreasing. Organs are still harvested from executed prisoners. In March 2013, the Min­istry of Health and the Chinese Red Cross formally launched a national voluntary organ donation system, and in August, a senior health official reportedly announced that within two years China would cease relying on organs of executed crimi­nals for organ transplants.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Urge the Chinese government to publicly commit to a spe­cific timetable for ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the Chinese govern­ment signed in 1998 but has not yet ratified. Æ Encourage the Chinese government to move forward on its stated goal to cease using the reeducation through labor (RTL) system and urge the Chinese government to also abolish other forms of extrajudicial administrative detention, and ensure that the rights of Chinese citizens to a fair trial and due proc­ess of law under the UDHR and the ICCPR are guaranteed. Æ Call on the Chinese government to release all Chinese citi­zens who have been detained or imprisoned for the lawful exer­cise of their fundamental human rights of freedom of expres­sion, association, and peaceful assembly, as well as the right to be free from arbitrary detention, including rights advocates Xu Zhiyong, Ni Yulan, Gao Zhisheng, and Wang Bingzhang. Press the government to release relatives of activists who have been unlawfully confined or imprisoned because of the lawful exercise of human rights by their family members, such as Liu Xia, the wife of Liu Xiaobo, and Chen Kegui, nephew of Chen Guangcheng. Æ Press China to sign and ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and to extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on En­forced or Involuntary Disappearances to visit China, which issued a request to visit in February 2013. Æ Support programs and international cooperation on issues relating to the investigation of crimes, including evidence col­lection, in order to reduce Chinese law enforcement agencies’ reliance on confessions in criminal cases.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Findings

  • The Chinese government’s legal and policy framework for re­ligion violates international human rights standards for free­dom of religion, including Article 18 of the Universal Declara­tion of Human Rights. Although the PRC Constitution states that all citizens enjoy ‘‘freedom of religious belief,’’ it limits citi­zens’ ability to exercise their beliefs by protecting only ‘‘normal religious activities.’’ The government continued to recognize only five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism—for limited state protections for religious activ­ity, and the government has continued to outlaw some belief systems, thereby denying members of these communities the right to practice their faith openly and without fear of govern­ment reprisal.
  • Strict ideological control and government oversight over reli­gious groups was maintained through religious affairs bureaus, the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, and the five ‘‘patriotic’’ religious associations, one for each of the recognized religions. All clergy and religious organizations are required to be registered with the government. A top religious official announced that all clergy would be registered by the end of 2013. This past year, central government officials also announced a plan to loosen some registration and administra­tive hurdles on social organizations that explicitly excluded re­ligious organizations.
  • Officials continued to monitor, control, restrict, and ‘‘guide’’ the religious activities of Buddhists in non-Tibetan areas of China, with a top official urging Buddhists to ‘‘embrace the leadership of the Party.’’ At least three sects of Buddhism con­tinue to be banned as cults.
  • • Observers contend Chinese policies have divided Chinese Catholics into ‘‘official’’ and ‘‘underground’’ churches. Catholics in China continue to be denied the freedom to accept the au­thority of the Holy See to select bishops, and a new regulation on the selection of bishops that took effect in April 2013 ex­pands the state’s role in the selection process and explicitly re­quires bishop candidates to ‘‘endorse the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and the socialist system.’’ Officials at state-run Catholic organizations announced in December a decision to revoke the title of auxiliary bishop from bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin after he publicly withdrew from the state-run Catho­lic Patriotic Association at his ordination ceremony in July 2012. Clergy continue to be detained for their underground ac­tivity or refusal to join the patriotic association, including priest Song Wanjun.
  • The Commission continued to observe reports of officials sen­tencing Falun Gong practitioners to long prison terms, harassing lawyers who attempted to assist Falun Gong practi­tioners, and pressuring practitioners to renounce their beliefs. The Commission also observed reports this past year regarding official anti-cult efforts that placed an emphasis on the need to educate the public to ‘‘resist’’ Falun Gong. In April 2013, an ar­ticle published in the China-based Lens Magazine reported on claims of severe torture and maltreatment of inmates at the Masanjia Women’s Reeducation Through Labor Center in Liaoning province, many of whom are believed to be Falun Gong practitioners.
  • Chinese authorities continued to place curbs on Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and to emphasize the role of Islamic clergy in promoting state policies. Authorities also con­tinued to regulate the confirmation of Islamic religious leaders and to monitor overseas pilgrimages in furtherance of state policy. Islamic clergy at a certification ceremony in February 2013 were told to ‘‘resolve to become politically reliable,’’ and local authorities throughout the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) warned religious believers against going on Hajj pilgrimages not organized by the government. Authorities in charge of religious affairs sought to portray violent clashes that took place in the spring and summer of 2013 throughout the XUAR as acts inspired by ‘‘religious extremism,’’ and urged Muslim clergy to work against ‘‘religious extremist forces.’’
  • The Chinese government continued to control the doctrine and activities of its official Protestant church and target mem­bers of unregistered house churches for harassment, detention, and other forms of abuse. The government continued its efforts to prohibit worship gatherings of the Beijing Shouwang Church, a house church of over 1,000 congregants in Beijing municipality, denying the church’s appeal against local public security officials for preventing the church from moving into property it had purchased. State-sanctioned raids on house churches continued. In April 2013, local authorities raided a house church in Alxa League, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re­gion, firing tear gas, detaining members of the congregation, and beating others. Officials in Shenzhen municipality de­tained house church pastor Cao Nan and others for holding a religious gathering in a public park, and officials in Shanxi province sentenced Li Wenxi and Ren Lancheng for ‘‘illegal business operations’’ in connection with the printing and sell­ing of religious publications.
  • The Chinese Taoist Association continued to work with the Chinese government to ensure that Taoist religious groups ‘‘up­hold the leadership of the Communist Party and the socialist system.’’ At a November meeting, a top religious official re­minded Taoist leaders that ‘‘studying and putting into practice the spirit of the 18th Party Congress is the chief political task for religious communities for the coming period of time.’’
  • Despite lacking formal central government recognition, some religious communities have been able to operate inside China and continue to appeal to the Chinese government for greater recognition.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with Article 18 of the Uni­versal Declaration of Human Rights and to remove the govern­ment’s framework for recognizing only select religious commu­nities for limited state protections. Stress to Chinese authori­ties that China’s ideological ‘‘guidance’’ of religious groups and the general public violates its citizens’ freedom of religious be­lief, and that China’s limited protections for ‘‘normal religious activities’’ do not meet international standards for freedom of religion. Stress to the Chinese government that the right to freedom of religion includes: The right of Buddhists to carry out activities in temples independent of state controls over reli­gion, the right of Buddhist clergy to select monastic teachers under Buddhist procedures and standards, and the right of Ti­betan Buddhists to express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See in mat­ters relating to the practice of their faith, including to make bishop appointments; the right of Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in religious outreach and preaching activities inde­pendent of state-set parameters and not face curbs on their internationally protected right to freedom of religion in the name of ‘‘upholding stability’’; the right of Protestants to wor­ship free from state controls over doctrine and to worship in unregistered house churches, free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; the right of Taoists to interpret their teach­ings free from government guidance. Æ Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including the right to hold and exercise spiritual be­liefs). Such prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (a Tibetan Bud­dhist nun sentenced in 2009 to 10 years’ imprisonment after she and other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan inde­pendence and the Dalai Lama’s long life and return to Tibet); Thaddeus Ma Daqin (the auxiliary bishop of the Shanghai dio­cese who has been under confinement since July 2012 for re­nouncing his affiliation with the Catholic Patriotic Associa­tion); Wang Zhiwen (a Falun Gong practitioner serving a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Nurtay Memet (a Muslim man sen­tenced to five years’ imprisonment for ‘‘superstition’’-related ac­tivity connected to his religion); Fan Yafeng (a legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, and house church leader kept under home confinement since November 2010 in connection with his advocacy for unregistered Protestant communities and coinciding with a broader crackdown on rights advocates); and other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commis­sion’s Political Prisoner Database. Æ Call on authorities to allow Chinese lawyers to freely take cases involving religious freedom. Æ Call on officials to eliminate criminal and administrative penalties that target religions and spiritual movements and that have been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of religion. Specifically, call for officials to abolish Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which crim­inalizes using a ‘‘cult’’ to undermine implementation of state laws) and Article 27 of the PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law (which stipulates detention or fines for orga­nizing or inciting others to engage in ‘‘cult’’ activities and for using ‘‘cults’’ or the ‘‘guise of religion’’ to disturb social order or to harm others’ health). Æ Promote legal exchanges that bring Chinese experts to the United States and American experts to China to increase knowledge of international human rights standards for the pro­tection of freedom of religion. Promote cultural exchanges that engage Chinese intellectuals in discussions regarding freedom of religion. Support non-governmental organizations that col­lect information on conditions for religious freedom in China and that inform Chinese citizens how to defend their right to freedom of religion. Support organizations that help religious practitioners appeal prison sentences and orders to serve re­education through labor stemming from citizens’ exercise of freedom of religion; challenge government seizure of property; and challenge job discrimination based on religion. Æ Collaborate with the governments of countries that have trade ties with China and that value freedom of religion, to ad­vocate for freedom of religion within China.

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings

• During the 2013 reporting year, ethnic minorities faced chal­lenges to their rights as provided in the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law. Authorities placed the strictest controls over groups perceived as potential threats to ‘‘stability,’’ including those living in the Tibet Autonomous Re­gion (TAR) and other Tibetan autonomous areas, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR). Authorities continued to detain, harass, and imprison ethnic minority rights advocates who en­gaged in peaceful protest and sought to assert their unique cul­tural identity.

  • Government authorities continued to enforce grasslands poli­cies that require herders and nomads to resettle in urban areas or in larger, compact rural communities, portraying these developments as a move to improve and ‘‘modernize’’ the lives of Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups and to combat grasslands degradation.
  • In several instances in 2013, Mongol herders protested the appropriation of their grazing lands for military use and pri­vate development projects. Security personnel detained and beat some of the herders, and obstructed the protests.
  • Critics of official grasslands policies in the IMAR have raised concerns over increased mining activities and a corresponding loss of water and the production of toxic wastewater.
  • During the 2013 reporting year, authorities in the IMAR continued to hold Mongol rights advocate Hada in extralegal detention and to deny him treatment for serious mental health issues. Authorities in Hohhot city, IMAR, tightened restrictions on the freedoms of movement and communication of Hada’s wife, Xinna, and the couple’s son, Uiles.
  • In April 2013, authorities arrested Batzangaa, a former med­ical school principal who had been under residential surveil­lance in Ordos municipality, IMAR, since January 2011. Au­thorities alleged that Batzangaa was attempting to flee the country with his wife and two children. Following his April 2013 arrest, authorities reportedly ordered Batzangaa, who or­ganized demonstrations in 2009 to protest against the govern­ment’s confiscation of campus property, to begin serving a three-year prison sentence.
  • On July 4, 2013, authorities in Uzumchin Right (Dongwuzhumuqin) Banner, Xilingol League, IMAR, reportedly arrested Yunshaabiin Seevendoo, who had advocated for the rights of Mongol herders, on fraud charges. Family members reportedly said his health has deteriorated during his deten­tion.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Support non-governmental organizations that address human rights conditions for ethnic minorities in China, ena­bling them to continue their research and develop programs to help ethnic minorities increase their capacity to protect their rights. Encourage such organizations to develop training pro­grams on promoting economic development that includes con­sultation with and the participation of ethnic minority commu­nities; to develop programs to protect ethnic minority lan­guages, cultures, and livelihoods; and to develop programs that document conditions and research rights abuses in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, and other autonomous eth­nic minority areas.

Æ Support rule of law programs and exchange programs that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for governance that protect ethnic minorities’ rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in line with both Chinese law and international human rights standards. Æ Call on the Chinese government to examine the efficacy of existing grasslands policies in ameliorating environmental deg­radation and to take steps to ensure that the rights of herders are also protected. Æ Call on the Chinese government to investigate the loss of groundwater and the production of toxic wastewater due to mining activities in the IMAR, and to ensure that mining com­panies operating in the region adhere to state environmental regulations. Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained, imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for advocating ethnic minority rights, including Mongol rights advocate Hada, former medical school principal Batzangaa, herders’ rights ad­vocate Yunshaabiin Seevendoo, and other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Data­base.

POPULATION PLANNING

Findings

  • In March 2013, China’s new leadership unveiled a plan for restructuring agencies within the State Council, and part of this plan involves merging the National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) and the Ministry of Health. The restructure combines most of the responsibilities of the previous two organizations into a new ‘‘National Health and Family Planning Commission,’’ but transfers the responsibility of creating population development policies and strategies— previously held by the NPFPC—to the National Development and Reform Commission. The full impact of these changes on China’s family planning policies and their implementation re­mains to be seen. Meanwhile, government leaders, experts, scholars, and citizens continued calls this year for population policy reform.
  • Chinese government officials continued to implement popu­lation planning policies that interfere with and control the re­productive lives of Chinese citizens, especially women. Officials employed various methods including fines, withholding of so­cial benefits and permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and arbitrary detention to punish policy violators.
  • • The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is not con­sistent with the standards set forth in international agree­ments, including the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families, and additional abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children, also violate standards in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. China is a state party to these treaties and has committed to upholding their terms.
  • Chinese law prohibits official infringement upon the rights and interests of citizens while implementing population plan­ning policies but does not define what constitutes a citizen’s right or interest. Chinese law does not stipulate punishment for officials who demand or implement forced abortions. Pro­vincial population planning regulations in at least 22 of Chi­na’s 31 provinces explicitly endorse mandatory abortions, often referred to as a ‘‘remedial measure’’ (bujiu cuoshi), as an offi­cial policy instrument.
  • The Chinese government’s population planning policies con­tinue to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, which include an aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex ratio.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Urge the Chinese government to seize the window of oppor­tunity provided by the government restructuring and specifi­cally the merger of the NPFPC and the Ministry of Health to cease restrictive family planning policies and population con­trols and begin to employ a human rights-based approach to providing greater reproductive freedom and privacy for all citi­zens, especially women. Æ Urge Chinese officials to reevaluate the PRC Population and Family Planning Law and bring it into conformance with inter­national standards set forth in international agreements, in­cluding the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Æ Urge China’s central and local governments to enforce vigor­ously provisions under Chinese law that provide for punish­ments of officials and other individuals who violate the rights of citizens when implementing population planning policies and to clearly define what these rights entail. Urge the Chi­nese government to establish penalties, including specific criminal and financial penalties, for officials and individuals found to commit abuses such as coercive abortion and coercive sterilization—practices that continue in China. Urge the Chi­nese government to bar material, career, and financial incen­tives and disincentives that motivate officials to use coercive or unlawful practices in implementing family planning policies. Æ Support the development of programs and international co­operation on legal aid and training that help citizens pursue compensation under the PRC State Compensation Law and that help citizens pursue other remedies against the govern­ment for injuries suffered as a result of official abuse related to China’s population planning policies.

FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Findings

  • The Chinese government continued to enforce the household registration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s. This system limits the right of Chinese citizens to freely deter­mine their place of residence. The hukou system classifies Chi­nese citizens as either rural or urban and confers legal rights and access to social services based on that classification. The hukou system discriminates against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban areas by denying them equal access to public services and social security benefits, as well as equal social, employment, and educational opportunities. Such discrimina­tion was especially prevalent this past year with respect to em­ployment and access to urban higher educational opportunities.
  • High- and local-level Chinese government officials continued to emphasize the need for hukou reform, including Premier Li Keqiang, who announced in May 2013 an urbanization plan to be unveiled in late 2013 that would clarify the timing of pro­posed hukou reforms. Reforms could include land management reform, improvements to public services and social security systems, the urbanization of rural residents, and clarifying the application criteria for urban hukous.
  • Some local governments have proposed or implemented poli­cies that, for example, would abolish hukou classifications and include people under a single uniform hukou classification; ex­pand access to school entrance exams in urban areas for the children of rural migrants; establish a points system to award rural migrants more public services and opportunities; or grant an urban hukou to graduates of local colleges. However, schol­ars and journalists have expressed reservations about hukou reform, citing local government opposition to the financial bur­den an influx of rural migrants would impose on public serv­ices and infrastructure.
  • Chinese officials continued to deny citizens who criticize the government their internationally recognized right to leave the country. During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, there were numerous reports of political advocates and their family members being denied exit from China or access to passports.
  • The number of Chinese subject to international travel re­strictions reportedly has jumped in recent years, and human rights groups estimate that at least 14 million people may be affected. Restrictions reportedly fall heaviest on Tibetans and Uyghurs, with the U.S. State Department reporting that mem­bers of these groups ‘‘experienced great difficulty acquiring passports.’’
  • Chinese authorities continued to violate the internationally recognized right which provides that ‘‘Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement . . .’’ by restricting the domestic movement of activists and their families as a form of harass­

 

ment. Restrictions on the movement of activists reportedly in­creased during politically sensitive periods this past year.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with Chi­nese policymakers and academic institutions engaged in re­search and outreach to migrant workers in order to advance legal assistance programs for migrant workers and encourage policy debates on the hukou system. Æ Encourage U.S. academic and public policy institutions to consult with the Commission on avenues for outreach to Chi­nese academic and public policy figures engaged in policy de­bates on reform of the hukou system. Æ Stress to Chinese government officials that noncompliance with international agreements regarding freedom of movement negatively affects confidence outside of China that the Chinese government is committed to complying with international standards more generally. Æ Raise specifically Chinese authorities’ restrictions on the lib­erty of movement of rights defenders, advocates, critics, and their families, including, among others: Tibetan writer Tsering Woeser; Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti; Liu Xia, the wife of im­prisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo; and Chen Mingxian, the wife of democracy advocate Liu Xianbin.

STATUS OF WOMEN

Findings

  • Chinese laws, including the amended PRC Law on the Pro­tection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the amended PRC Marriage Law, contain provisions which aim to protect wom­en’s rights; however, ambiguity and lack of clearly outlined re­sponsibilities in China’s national-level legislation limit progress on concrete protections of women’s rights.
  • In its domestic laws and policy initiatives and through its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Chinese gov­ernment has committed to ensuring female representation in government. After the Chinese Communist Party and govern­ment leadership transitions in November 2012 and March 2013, respectively, some top Party bodies increased female rep­resentation, while others decreased. Female representation de­creased in the newly appointed State Council. Overall, female representation in the central government still falls short of international standards to which China has agreed. Female participation in decisionmaking at the village level remains low, underscoring long-held concerns about protection of rural women’s rights and interests.
  • • China has committed under CEDAW to take ‘‘all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment.’’ While China’s existing laws, such as the PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, and the PRC Employment Pro­motion Law prohibit gender discrimination in employment, women continue to experience widespread discrimination in areas including recruitment, promotion, wages, and retirement.
  • Gender-based discrimination continues in Chinese univer­sities, despite provisions in China’s Constitution and the PRC Education Law that prohibit it. Universities across China im­plement gender quotas that require women to score higher than men on their college entrance exams in order to be admit­ted into certain majors.
  • Chinese national legal provisions on domestic violence lack a clear definition of domestic violence and do not specify the responsibilities of public and private sector organizations in prevention, punishment, and treatment. Domestic violence re­portedly remains pervasive, affecting men, women, and chil­dren. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced plans to issue standardized documents to guide adjudication in domes­tic violence criminal cases, noting insufficiencies in Chinese law. The SPC also established several pilot programs to strengthen trial procedures for domestic violence cases. Despite state media reports that new domestic violence legislation would be on the agenda in 2012, no drafts appear to have been made publicly available.
  • Chinese law fails to adequately define, prevent, and punish acts of sexual violence against women, including rape, forced prostitution, and sexual harassment. Chinese legislation does not provide a clear definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and procedures for prevention, reporting, and pun­ishment, presenting challenges for victims in protecting their rights. Several widely reported cases of sexual violence this re­porting year exposed the need for stronger legal protections and heightened awareness among law enforcement.
  • Officials in localities across China continue to employ coer­cion and violence against women—including forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and forced contraceptive use—in their en­forcement of national and local population planning policies. Chinese law leaves women unprotected against such abuses. Authorities also continue to use violence and abuse against women in the enforcement of anti-prostitution laws. Such treatment is in violation of Chinese law.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Support programs in China that increase women’s political participation and leadership through U.S.-China exchanges and international conferences. Support exchanges, training, and legal programs that promote women’s land rights, espe­cially in rural areas, and urge higher levels of government to increase supervision over village committees to ensure that local rules and regulations are in accordance with national-level laws and policies and to ensure adequate protection of rural women’s rights and interests. Æ Urge the Chinese government to take steps to faithfully en­force provisions in the PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, and the PRC Employment Promotion Law that prohibit gender dis­crimination. Urge Chinese officials in cities across China to supplement these laws with local regulations that address and provide punishments for all forms of gender discrimination in employment. Support programs that teach women how to pro­tect and advocate for their rights and interests in the work­place. Æ Urge Chinese officials to put an end to gender-based quotas that allow preference for men over women in certain fields of study in Chinese universities. Æ Urge the Chinese government to follow through on stated plans to enact comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly defines domestic violence in criminal and civil law, allo­cates adequate resources, assigns responsibilities to govern­ment and civil society organizations in addressing domestic vi­olence, and details punishments for offenders. Urge officials to release drafts of such legislation for public comment. Æ Urge the Chinese government to further revise the PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests or enact new comprehensive national-level legislation to provide a clear definition of sexual harassment and specific standards and pro­cedures for prevention and punishment. Support technical as­sistance programs that increase awareness among judicial and law enforcement personnel of issues pertaining to violence against women. One such area of U.S. technical assistance might be in developing workplace protocols and reporting mechanisms that ensure confidentiality and prevent retalia­tion. Æ Urge the Chinese government to stop coercion and violence against women during population planning implementation and to clarify provisions under Chinese law that would protect women against such rights abuses. Urge the Chinese govern­ment to establish penalties, including specific criminal and fi­nancial penalties, for officials and individuals who engage in coercive or violent population planning enforcement, including forced abortion, forced sterilization, and forced contraceptive use.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Findings

  • China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and children. The majority of human trafficking cases are domestic and involve trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage. The full extent of the forced labor problem in China is unclear.
  • • The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Pre­vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in December 2009 and has since taken steps to revise legislation and update policy ef­forts. In the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the State Council issued a new national anti-trafficking action plan, which appears to contain some improvements in terminology and objectives, and clearly lays out which government agencies are responsible for implementation. It remains to be seen whether authorities will provide adequate resources and train­ing to local authorities for implementing the plan’s objectives.
  • As Chinese law conflates human smuggling, illegal adoption, and child abduction with human trafficking, accurate official statistics on the number of trafficking cases the government in­vestigated and prosecuted during this reporting year are not available. In cooperation with international organizations, Chi­nese authorities took steps to improve protection, services, and care for victims of trafficking, but continued to focus efforts only on women and children. Chinese authorities did not re­lease detailed information on services provided or the number of victims identified and assisted.
  • The Chinese government does not offer legal alternatives to deportation for foreign victims of trafficking and continues to deport North Korean refugees under the classification of ‘‘eco­nomic migrants,’’ regardless of whether or not they are victims of trafficking.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Urge the Chinese government to abide by its commitments under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf­ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and to bring anti-trafficking legislation into alignment with inter­national standards. Specifically, urge the Chinese government to legally distinguish the crimes of human smuggling, child ab­duction, and illegal adoption from that of human trafficking, and to expand the current legal definition of trafficking to in­clude all forms of trafficking, including offenses against adult male victims, certain forms of non-physical coercion, and the commercial sex trade of minors. Æ Urge the Chinese government to implement goals in the 2013–2020 plan to combat trafficking that address root cul­tural and societal factors contributing to China’s trafficking problem. These stated goals include eliminating traditional no­tions of female inferiority, improving women’s education, and ensuring rural women’s property rights. Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide more protective services for trafficking victims. Support expanding training programs for law enforcement personnel and shelter managers that help raise awareness and improve processes for identi­fying, protecting, and assisting trafficking victims. Support legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of both for­eign and Chinese trafficking victims. Æ Object to the continued deportation of North Korean traf­ficking victims as ‘‘economic migrants.’’ Urge the Chinese gov­ernment to abide by its international obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol with regard to North Korean trafficking victims and provide legal alternatives to repatriation.

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

Findings

  • During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese government persisted in detaining and repatriating North Ko­rean asylum seekers and refugees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite the severe punishments ref­ugees face once returned. The Chinese government is obligated under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refu­gees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol to refrain from repatriating North Koreans who left the DPRK for fear of per­secution or who fear persecution upon return to the DPRK.
  • The Chinese government appeared to strengthen measures to stem the flow of North Korean refugees into China this past year, including reportedly increasing security along the North Korean border and implementing new campaigns to seek out and repatriate refugees.
  • Chinese authorities continue to collaborate with North Ko­rean security officials, allowing them to operate within China to apprehend North Korean refugees and disrupt organizations that attempt to assist them. The number of refugees who reached South Korea in 2012 dropped by 50 percent to 1,508 compared with 2,706 in 2011. As of July 2013, the number of refugees entering South Korea was slightly higher than for the same period in 2012.
  • North Korean women in China continue to be sold into forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. The Chi­nese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol).
  • Children born to North Korean women and Chinese men are increasingly being raised in China in households where either the mother or both parents are absent. In some instances, Chi­nese authorities repatriate North Korean mothers to the DPRK, while others flee to South Korea or other parts of China. Several experts and academic studies contend house­hold registration (hukou) policies have largely changed in re­cent years to allow for a greater majority of children born to North Korean women in China to gain access to public edu­cation and social services, but general poverty and the contin­ued threat of repatriation leaves these children and their fami­lies at risk. The Chinese government’s repatriation of North Korean women who have given birth to a child in China vio­lates its international obligations under the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which prohibits separating children from their mothers.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Raise the issue of North Korean refugees in bilateral discus­sions with Chinese officials, particularly the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue. Æ Support the efforts of the United Nations High Commis­sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to gain unfettered access to North Korean refugees in China. Encourage the Chinese gov­ernment to work with the UNHCR in enacting its full mandate and to operate in conformity with China’s obligations under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, as well as immediately cease detaining and repatriating North Korean refugees in China. Æ Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status and related social benefits to North Korean women married to Chinese citi­zens. Urge the Chinese government to allow greater numbers of North Korean refugees to have safe haven and secure transit until they reach third countries. Æ Urge Chinese officials to abide by their obligations under the UN TIP Protocol (Article 9) and CEDAW (Article 6) to pros­ecute human traffickers in northeastern China and along the border with the DPRK. Æ Support the efforts of the United Nations Commission of In­quiry on North Korea to document North Korean human rights violations and determine the extent to which they amount to crimes against humanity.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Findings

  • The Chinese government’s oversight of and response to pub­lic health matters came into sharp focus during the 2013 re­porting year with an outbreak in March of the H7N9 avian in­fluenza. International health organizations commended China’s effective response to the outbreak and China’s progress in building an emergency response structure in the decade since the SARS outbreak in 2003. Two studies released in 2013 pro­vided statistical evidence that link environmental pollution in China to adverse health effects, including cancer and shorter life spans. The Chinese public has expressed concerns over the government’s capacity to protect public health and regulate food and drug safety.
  • • As part of the larger government restructuring announced during the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2013, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the National Population and Family Planning Commission were merged into a single entity, the National Health and Family Planning Commission. Some med­ical professionals expressed disapproval of the name change and the lack of consultation prior to the announcement. Then-MOH Vice-Minister Dr. Huang Jiefu commented that the merged name might cause China ‘‘difficulties in its inter­national exchanges,’’ likely in light of international controversy over China’s population planning policy.
  • China’s first-ever Mental Health Law (MHL) was passed in October 2012 and became effective on May 1, 2013, and aims to ‘‘expand access to mental health services.’’ Another key goal is to prevent cases of being ‘‘misidentified as mentally ill’’ (bei jingshen bing), a practice which has been used by Chinese law enforcement officials to involuntarily detain petitioners and others in psychiatric facilities. International and Chinese civil society organizations and rights advocates have identified prob­lematic provisions in the new MHL that may continue human rights violations.
  • The Chinese government issued draft revisions to the Regu­lations on Education for Persons with Disabilities (1994) for public comment in February 2013, as part of its ongoing legis­lative efforts to strengthen the rights of persons with disabil­ities. Civil society organizations identified language needing more precise definition and amendments that need further work in order to comply with human rights standards in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which China has signed and ratified.
  • China’s existing legislative framework prohibits health-based discrimination in access to employment, medical treatment, and education, but there continues to be widespread discrimi­nation due to a lack of compliance with the laws and inconsist­encies between national laws and local regulations. Rights ad­vocates and non-governmental organizations continue to re­quest revisions to physical eligibility standards that disqualify persons with disabilities and carriers of infectious diseases from employment as civil servants and teachers. Disability rights advocates lauded Guangdong province for removing dis­criminatory provisions in its teacher physical eligibility stand­ards in May 2013.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Commend the Chinese government for its response to the H7N9 avian influenza outbreak and urge its public health and food and drug safety agencies to maintain a high level of vigi­lance and transparency in dealing with infectious disease out­breaks and other public health emergencies. Strengthen sup­port to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for technical exchanges with China, not only on disease surveil­lance and response but also on environment and health moni­toring and response mechanisms. Æ Encourage the development of non-governmental organiza­tions (NGOs) and media groups that advocate for consumer rights in food and drug safety, public health, and disability rights. Support efforts to raise the technical and operational capacity of such NGOs, and provide opportunities for these or­ganizations to participate in international forums on the rights to health, food safety, and education.

Æ Urge the Chinese government to supervise implementation of the Mental Health Law to ensure that petitioners and others are no longer ‘‘misidentified as mentally ill’’ (bei jingshen bing) and involuntarily committed to psychiatric facilities. Provide support to Chinese civil society organizations and advocates and legal and medical organizations in monitoring the imple­mentation of the Mental Health Law, such as funding for training, research, and publication of findings. Æ Call on the Chinese government to include people with dis­abilities and their representatives, and disability rights organi­zations not necessarily affiliated with the Chinese Federation of Disabled Persons, in the revisions to the Regulations on the Education of Persons with Disabilities. Urge officials to ensure that the revisions are in accord with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on ‘‘reasonable accommoda­tion,’’ ‘‘inclusive education,’’ and other internationally recog­nized standards. Where appropriate, share the United States’ ongoing experience and efforts in promoting the right to edu­cation for persons with disabilities—through legal, regulatory, and non-governmental means—with Chinese officials. Expand site visits and other exchanges for Chinese officials to observe and share ideas with U.S. disability rights groups, lawyers, the

U.S. Department of Education, and other U.S. federal and state agencies that work on ensuring educational opportunities for persons with disabilities. Æ Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on effective imple­mentation of the laws and regulations that prohibit health-based discrimination in access to employment, medical care, education, and a barrier-free environment. Ask Chinese offi­cials about cases in which disability rights advocates have been rebuffed in their applications for open government information.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Findings

  • Despite some progress during the Commission’s 2013 report­ing year, pollution problems remained severe, and the associ­ated financial costs continued to grow. News and other reports highlighted major winter air pollution incidents, groundwater contamination, soil pollution challenges, the link between toxic chemicals and ‘‘cancer villages,’’ and problems associated with the migration of polluting industries to western and poorer re­gions. Authorities were more transparent about the problems of air and groundwater pollution, and toxic chemicals, than they were about soil contamination.
  • • During the reporting period, authorities continued to develop a regulatory framework to address environmental problems, despite significant limitations. Chinese leaders highlighted en­vironmental protection as one of China’s ‘‘four basic principles,’’ and Party leaders added commitments to ‘‘ecological civiliza­tion’’ to the Party constitution. Economic development, how­ever, remains the ‘‘core concern.’’ Authorities released two versions of the draft revisions to the Environmental Protection Law to the public for comments, which contained some incen­tives for greater transparency and official accountability. Envi­ronmental groups, experts, and the environmental ministry pointed out other problems with the drafts related to environ­mental interest lawsuits and numerous other issues. Authori­ties appeared to restart stalled efforts to revise the PRC Air Pollution Law, and to draft a major national soil pollution law. In addition, the State Council issued ten policies on air pollu­tion and an air pollution action plan.
  • Significant challenges for the development of rule of law in the sector remain, including legal violations, lax or arbitrary enforcement, evaluation criteria prioritizing economic growth, corruption, lack of supervision, a weak environmental protec­tion apparatus, and insufficient monitoring and environmental penalties. Development of environmental public interest law came to a standstill when the June draft of the revisions to the Environmental Protection Law stipulated that only the govern­ment-supported All-China Environment Federation would be allowed to bring public interest lawsuits. Legal remedies in en­vironmental cases continue to be unreliable for several reasons, including the reluctance of courts to accept cases, hesitation on the part of lawyers to participate, mediation with a weak legal basis, and the potential for forced mediation agreements. Citi­zens continued to take to the streets in efforts to resolve griev­ances.
  • During the reporting year, Chinese citizens advocated for im­provement of environmental quality, but during the course of protecting their rights or investigating claims of pollution, some people faced detention (Liu Futang), extralegal home con­finement (Zhang Bing), harassment from officials (Chen Yuqian and Mongolian herders), and beatings from unidenti­fied individuals (an environmental journalist). Officials also questioned environmental advocates, took extraordinary meas­ures to prevent anti-pollution demonstrations, and censored Internet postings, including those critical of planned projects.
  • During the 2013 reporting year, citizens called for greater environmental transparency, and environmental authorities issued new internal rules to improve proactive disclosure of abridged environmental impact assessment reports and other information. Authorities in select cities began to make public PM2.5 and air quality data using the revised air quality index. Despite these new rules and measures, authorities’ proactive disclosure of information remains irregular and censorship con­tinues. According to one study, while a greater percentage of environmental authorities responded to information requests, disclosure was less comprehensive in more cases than in the previous year.
  • Grassland herder relocation programs, reportedly conducted by authorities to address grassland degradation as well as modernize the animal husbandry industry, have also in some cases been involuntary.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Call upon the Chinese government to cease punishing citi­zens for their grassroots environmental advocacy, for inves­tigating pollution incidents, or for utilizing official and institu­tionalized channels to voice their environmental grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand awareness of citizens’ envi­ronmental rights and to promote the protection of those rights. Include environmental law issues in the bilateral human rights and legal expert dialogues. In addition, include discussion of human rights dimensions of climate change in the new U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group. Æ Support multilateral exchanges regarding environmental en­forcement and compliance tools, including environmental in­surance, market mechanisms, criminal prosecution of serious environmental infringements, and public interest litigation mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen environ­mental impact assessment processes and citizen participation in those processes. Engage Chinese officials and others who seek to devise a fair compensation system for people harmed by pollution. Æ Support continued expansion of environmental information disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government experiences with the Toxics Release Inventory Program and other U.S. programs that seek to provide more environmental transparency. Sup­port programs that educate Chinese citizens about China’s sys­tem of open government information. In addition, continue

U.S. Government engagement with relevant individuals and organizations in developing China’s capacity to reliably meas­ure, report, publicize, and verify emissions reduction strategies and techniques. Æ Encourage the development of environmental NGOs in China, including by incorporating joint U.S.-China non-govern­mental participation into bilateral projects. Support efforts to raise the technical and operational capacity of Chinese envi­ronmental NGOs. Æ Urge Chinese authorities to end nonvoluntary relocation of nomadic herders and to conduct relocation programs in a man­ner consistent with international scientific and human rights norms. To this end, urge authorities to consider the sugges­tions contained in the 2012 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food; Addendum, Mission to China, to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Findings

• Millions of civil society organizations operate in China, mak­ing contributions to public interest advocacy and the provision of social services, organizing leisure activities, and promoting farming and business development. Government-registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make up a subset of civil society organizations. Many NGOs are registered as busi­nesses or are unregistered due to a restrictive regulatory envi­ronment. Individual advocates and informal networks also en­gage on issues of public interest in China.

  • During the 2013 reporting year, Chinese government and Communist Party policy documents reaffirmed government and Party leadership and control over the development of ‘‘social organizations,’’ the term commonly used to refer to NGOs. Chi­nese scholars have observed differentiated treatment of NGOs; whereas the government is willing to support groups that are perceived to support economic growth or provide social welfare services, the government continues to harass groups and indi­viduals involved in issue advocacy or matters the government deems politically sensitive.
  • Human rights organizations have reported on a crackdown beginning in spring 2013 on individual rights advocates, some of whom have an affiliation with the New Citizens’ Movement, a loose network of individuals who advocate for a range of issues, such as political and legal reforms, human rights, and social justice. In July, the Beijing municipality Bureau of Civil Affairs shut down the Transition Institute, a think tank which conducts research on public interest issues, reportedly because the Institute is not registered as an NGO.
  • The government has pledged to issue long-awaited regu­latory changes to the legal framework for social organization registration and management by the end of 2013, including permitting direct registration to allow organizations to register at civil affairs bureaus without first securing a governmental or quasi-governmental supervisory unit. Direct registration, however, will be limited to business and industry associations, technical and scientific associations, charitable organizations, and community service groups. Political, legal, and religious or­ganizations, and foreign NGOs with representative offices in China, will continue to be required to find a supervisory unit and operate under the existing ‘‘dual management’’ system.
  • Chinese government authorities at national and local levels have allocated funds to procure services from non-governmental organizations as part of the development of a ‘‘non-state serv­ices sector.’’ Scholars and civil society experts have expressed concerns that the fragmentary development of the regulatory framework for government procurement from NGOs has cre­ated problems in the selection of service providers, contract im­plementation, and oversight of projects.
  • China’s government-run charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross of China, continue to face a confidence gap in the eyes of Chinese citizens due to reports of misused donated funds and a lack of transparency in financial reporting. Private (non-governmental) charities have benefited from the credi­bility gap, as illustrated by the large amount of donations to such organizations in response to the Sichuan earthquake in April 2013. The Chinese government reportedly is working on a national Charity Law, but has not yet issued a draft for pub­lic comment.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Urge the Chinese government to revise its regulatory frame­work for social organizations in China to allow all non-govern­mental organizations (NGOs) to benefit from planned reforms in accordance with the rights to freedom of association in Arti­cle 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Stress to Chinese authorities that freedom of associa­tion includes public advocacy on a range of issues. Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of NGOs and civil so­ciety advocates who work on rights protection and public advo­cacy. Æ Encourage the Chinese government to establish a fair and transparent framework for implementation and regulation of government procurement of social services from NGOs. Where appropriate, support technical exchanges for central- and provincial-level Chinese officials to visit the United States to observe U.S. federal and state practice in government procure­ment of services from NGOs. Æ Take measures to facilitate the participation of Chinese citi­zens who work in the NGO sector in relevant international conferences and forums. Increase support for training opportu­nities in the United States to build their leadership capacity in nonprofit management, public policy, and public interest advo­cacy. Expand support to U.S. organizations that partner with Chinese NGOs on projects to build the capacity of civil society organizations in China.

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Findings

  • At the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, a major political power succession took place within the Party, which happens at 10-year inter­vals, and involved the extensive turnover of power to a slightly younger cohort of political leaders in a non-transparent proc­ess. New Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping ap­peared to act quickly in the first few months to move forward with his agenda and leadership style. Some international and Chinese scholars, journalists, and commentators believe that under the new echelon of top leaders, the prospects for political reform in China appear dim.
  • At the 18th Party Congress, the Party amended the Party constitution to embrace ‘‘scientific development’’ (former Party secretary Hu Jintao’s socio-economic theory), to declare that ‘‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’’ is the reason behind all of China’s achievements, and to affirm that ‘‘reform and opening up are the path to a stronger China.’’
  • • Following the 18th Party Congress, top Party leaders as­sumed leading posts in the Chinese government in a transfer of government power that took place in March 2013. The newly installed government leaders issued a plan for a major reshuf­fling of State Council institutions and a ‘‘transformation of gov­ernment functions.’’ The goals of the plan include improving government efficiency, pushing forward reform toward ‘‘super ministries,’’ and resolving issues in the relationships between the government and the market, the government and society, and central and local entities.
  • China’s political institutions do not comply with the stand­ards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Chinese leaders have signed and declared an intention to ratify. Nor do China’s political in­stitutions comply with the standards outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Communist Party continues to dominate political affairs, allows only limited independent political participation, and exerts control over the courts, the National People’s Congress, the media, and state leadership appointments. Officials took a variety of other actions to inter­fere in local congress elections and to prevent independent can­didates from being nominated or elected as delegates. Addition­ally, officials established numerical requirements related to the composition of National People’s Congress delegates. During this reporting year, the Party tried to exert greater influence over university student groups and non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations. In addition, developments suggest that the new Party Central Committee is exerting more efforts to control currents in the ideological realm.
  • Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and sentence democ­racy advocates who exercised their right to freedom of speech, of assembly, of association, and of demonstration as guaran­teed in China’s Constitution and under international human rights standards. This reporting year, authorities detained or imposed prison sentences on democracy advocates Cao Haibo and Liu Benqi. Other democracy advocates given long prison sentences in recent years remain imprisoned, including Chen Wei, Chen Xi, Li Tie, Zhu Yufu, Xue Mingkai, Liu Xiaobo, Liu Xianbin, Guo Quan, Zhou Yongjun, Xie Changfa, and Huang Chengcheng.
  • While top Chinese leaders have voiced support for greater transparency, citizens continue to face challenges in accessing information. In one example, authorities have suppressed cit­izen efforts to obtain information regarding China’s submission for the October 2013 United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process. Individuals seeking infor­mation reportedly were harassed, prevented from leaving their homes, detained, or formally arrested.
  • Authorities have passed or are drafting major laws that have a bearing on when and how citizens may hold their authorities accountable, including the PRC Civil Procedure Law, the PRC Administrative Litigation Law, and the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law. The State Council issued plans to con­tinue to strengthen administrative enforcement of laws and policies, partially by promoting administrative evaluation sys­tems at the local level and strengthening support for ‘‘enforce­ment responsibility systems.’’
  • Chinese leaders and citizens continued to express concern about official corruption, and many foreign and domestic busi­ness people reportedly think China’s legal environment has de­teriorated. Top leaders link the Party’s legitimacy to its ability to manage corruption. Authorities continued to issue regu­latory measures to curb corruption. In September 2013, a court sentenced Bo Xilai, the former Party Central Political Bureau member and Chongqing municipality Party Secretary, to life imprisonment for corruption. Central leaders have not, how­ever, fully supported requirements for top officials to disclose their assets, and continued to have little tolerance for non-governmental anticorruption efforts. Against the backdrop of strong public demand for disclosure of officials’ finances, au­thorities criminally detained or arrested dozens of advocates who made public appeals for top officials to disclose their fi­nances, including anticorruption advocates such as Sun Hanhui, Ding Jiaxi, Hou Xin, Yuan Dong, Zhang Baocheng, Ma Xinli, Liu Ping, Zhao Changqing, and Wang Yonghong.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Take proactive steps to engage with the new cohort of Chi­nese leaders and to understand their plans for the future of governance in China. Conduct reciprocal, high-level parliamen­tary exchanges to share information and hold trainings regard­ing the congressional and political systems in the U.S. and China. Support efforts to research the implications of the Party and government power transition and the restructuring of State Council institutions, and to disseminate that information widely. Support U.S. research programs that shed light on the structure, functions, and development of the Chinese Com­munist Party, including its roles within government institu­tions, China’s legislature, the media, non-state-owned compa­nies, and social organizations (non-governmental groups, foun­dations, and nonprofit organizations). Urge Chinese officials to further increase the transparency of Party affairs. Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of associa­tion and assembly, for engaging in peaceful demonstrations, for calling for transparency of officials’ personal finances, or for calling for political reforms within China. Some of these pris­oners have associated themselves with the New Citizens’ Move­ment and others are democracy advocates who are serving long prison sentences. Æ Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations that seek to work with local Chinese governmental and non-governmental organizations to improve transparency and accountability, es­pecially efforts to expand and improve China’s government in­formation disclosure initiatives. Such projects might include joint efforts to better publicize the Open Government Informa­tion (OGI) Regulations at local levels and to train citizens and groups about how to submit OGI requests. Encourage Party and government officials to ensure regulations, rules, and poli­cies are made public. In addition, support projects that involve an exchange of information about bottom-up mechanisms to evaluate and hold government and Party officials accountable and emphasize the links between efficiency and accountability. Æ Support programs that assist local governments, academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding transparent public hear­ings and other channels for citizens to participate in the policy-making process. Such programs could include pilot projects in China in which citizens’ suggestions to authorities about draft laws, regulations, or policies are made available to the public.

COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW

Findings

  • The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to encourage state coordination of overseas investment activity as part of a policy authorities commonly referred to as the ‘‘go out’’ strategy. Authorities continued to encourage Chinese busi­nesses to invest abroad in part as a way to increase opportuni­ties for Chinese enterprises to move up the value chain. As part of the ‘‘go out’’ strategy, authorities targeted ‘‘strategic’’ in­dustries, such as energy resources, metals, advanced tech­nology, and ‘‘famous brands.’’
  • This past year, authorities took measures to reform China’s banking system, which continued to give state-owned enter­prises preferential access to loans. The People’s Bank of China removed a lower limit on loan interest rates but maintained an upper limit on interest rates payable to depositors, which news media noted could allow state-owned enterprises to secure cheaper loans, as well as reduce the profits of smaller banks and constrain the ability of households to accumulate savings.
  • The yuan appreciated this past year, but the U.S. Treasury Department reported that it ‘‘remains significantly under­valued.’’ Some Chinese officials called for a more market-based approach to exchange rate policy, but the Chinese government continued to interfere with the exchange rate through the ac­cumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
  • During the 2013 reporting year—more than a decade after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)— China continued to face allegations of violations of its WTO ob­ligations, including antidumping and countervailing duties and subsidies inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Since its ac­cession to the WTO, China has been a respondent in 31 WTO Dispute Settlement cases; this past year, the WTO found in favor of U.S. claims in three cases that the United States brought against China, as well as European Union claims in one case that the European Union brought against China.
  • • The Chinese government continued to take steps to improve protection for intellectual property rights (IPR) this past year, but weak protection and enforcement of IPR continued to con­tribute to theft of intellectual property. Theft of trade secrets, in some cases reportedly authorized by the Chinese govern­ment, continued this past year, including the reported theft of large amounts of data by an organization operating under the People’s Liberation Army. In addition, Chinese officials contin­ued to use technology transfer as a precondition for market ac­cess.
  • This past year, the Ministry of Commerce published two new draft regulations for public comment: the Provisions on Addi­tional Restrictive Conditions for the Concentration of Business Operators and the Interim Provisions Regarding the Applica­tion of Standards for Simple Cases of Concentration of Busi­ness Operators. Both reportedly are designed to clarify and streamline the merger review and approval process, but expert commentators expressed doubts that the provisions will have such an effect in practice.
  • During this past year, food safety scandals continued to emerge in different parts of China, and hazardous and illegal Chinese products continued to cross borders. Over a three-month period, Chinese authorities took into custody 904 people allegedly involved in selling rat, mink, and fox meat disguised as mutton. Over a six-week period, authorities in Hong Kong took into custody 879 people allegedly involved in smuggling milk formula from Hong Kong into mainland China, as the quality of milk formula in mainland China remained a concern.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Develop and support a project surveying the role of China’s industrial policies in the Chinese economy, including how the development of these policies and the role they play in direct­ing China’s economy influence transparency, rule of law, and China’s compliance with its international commitments. Æ Include issues of commercial rule of law, investment sub­sidies, and retaliation for excercising legal rights in the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and other commercial dialogues, negotiations, and exchanges with China. Expand dialogue with China through the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. financial regulators, and the Small Business Administration on financial sector reform issues, such as ac­cess to capital for small business, corruption, subsidies, and taxpayer accountability. In addition, when necessary, continue to enforce U.S. rights through mechanisms of the WTO. File a counter notification to the WTO regarding China’s subsidies, including its failure to report subsidies. Æ Obtain details on the amount of Chinese investment (other than in financial instruments) in the United States—including information on the distribution of that investment across dif­ferent sectors of the economy, the criteria Chinese authorities use in approving such investments, and how such investment is financed. Obtain these details through bilateral dialogues between the U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Department of Commerce, and China’s Ministry of Commerce, National De­velopment and Reform Commission, and State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.

Æ Support capacity-building programs for Chinese intellectual property regulators on U.S. best practices in intellectual prop­erty rights protection. Obtain information from Chinese offi­cials on the overarching goals and projected timeline of the Chinese government’s current efforts to reform intellectual property laws and regulations and to curb intellectual property theft, including cyber theft. Support a project that seeks to quantify the scope of damages to the U.S. economy from Chi­nese intellectual property theft, and more aggressively inves­tigate the links between specific companies, organizations, and entities within China and specific theft of U.S. intellectual property. Conduct the project in a manner that protects the privacy and confidentiality of companies, while offering those companies incentives to participate. Æ Strengthen and expand capacity-building programs for Chi­nese food safety regulators on U.S. best practices in food safety programs. Pass legislation authorizing a larger U.S. Food and Drug Administration presence in China, with additional in­spectors; support training programs conducted by U.S. inspec­tors, producers, and food safety experts; and ensure that regu­lated products imported from China into the United States are certified by the relevant entities in China.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Findings

  • At a January 2013 meeting, the new Secretary of the Com­munist Party’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission report­edly announced plans for reform of the justice sector, reeduca­tion through labor (RTL), petitioning, and the hukou (house­hold registration) system. Public calls for reform of the RTL system have been particularly strong during the 2013 report­ing year, but observers are concerned that any changes will be in name only.
  • During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed the Chinese government and Communist Party’s widespread use of ‘‘stability maintenance’’ measures in advance of and dur­ing the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Government and Party officials reportedly ordered rights advocates, petitioners, and Falun Gong practitioners, in­cluding Mao Hengfeng, Pei Fugui, Cui Fufang, Tong Guojing, Shen Yongmei, Shen Lianman, and Qin Wei, to serve RTL sen­tences to achieve ‘‘zero petitioning’’ and prevent protest in Bei­jing during that period.
  • Harassment of weiquan (rights defense) lawyers continued to follow the trend of past years with the Chinese government using a variety of measures, including license suspension, sur­veillance, and illegal detention, to intimidate lawyers. Promi­nent human rights advocates Gao Zhisheng and Ni Yulan con­tinued to serve harsh prison sentences; authorities arrested rights advocate Xu Zhiyong in August 2013 following several months of ‘‘house arrest’’ and criminal detention.
  • • Official sources reported that the number of individuals who received legal aid in China exceeded 1 million in 2012, a 21 percent increase over 2011. The Chinese government has steadily increased funding of legal aid over the years, report­edly by almost 10 percent in 2012. The revised Criminal Proce­dure Law and supporting regulations expand the scope and eli­gibility of criminal suspects and defendants who may receive legal aid, though scholars have raised concerns about whether there are sufficient human, financial, and institutional re­sources to support expected increases in legal aid cases.
  • Official harassment of family members of rights defenders and political activists continued to take place during the 2013 reporting year. Chinese authorities used a range of methods against family members, restricting their rights to freedom of movement, expression, and livelihood.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Object to the continued harassment of rights defenders. Call for the release of lawyers, activists, and others who have been ‘‘disappeared,’’ are incarcerated, or are subject to unlawful home confinement or other forms of extralegal detention, for their activities to defend and promote the rights of Chinese citizens, including Xu Zhiyong, Gao Zhisheng, Ni Yulan, and others mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Polit­ical Prisoner Database. Urge the Chinese government to renew professional licenses to the law firms and individual lawyers denied renewal in 2013 and in past years for their work on cases officials deem to be sensitive. Æ Monitor the Chinese government’s stated plans to reform the reeducation through labor and petitioning systems by asking Chinese officials about the substance of the reforms, and the timeframe and benchmarks to assess progress. Recommend the establishment of independent evaluation mechanisms that in­clude the participation of civil society representatives, rights defenders, and public interest lawyers. Æ Object to the ongoing harassment and abuse of the family members of petitioners and rights defenders. Call for the ces­sation of the denial of rights (including the refusal to issue passports), physical violence, and detention of family members, such as Liu Xia, the wife of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo; Chen Kegui, nephew of the prominent legal advocate Chen Guangcheng; and Ablikim Abdureyim, one of the sons of Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer. Æ Increase support to the U.S. Department of State’s Inter­national Visitors Leadership Program and other similar bilat­eral exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights law­yers, advocates, and scholars to the United States for study and dialogue. Expand support to legal research and exchange programs in the non-governmental and academic sector that partner with China’s human rights lawyers and public interest legal organizations, and technical exchange and training pro­grams with China’s official justice sector that promote court independence.

Æ Encourage the Chinese government (in particular, the Min­istry of Justice and Ministry of Education) to allocate more funding to local bar associations and law school clinical legal education programs to build a stronger foundation for legal aid and public interest law, and enhance legal training to provide legal aid services to persons with disabilities, petitioners, and those seeking legal protection from domestic violence (includ­ing children), among other at-risk populations.

XINJIANG

Findings

  • Clashes that took place in the spring and summer of 2013 throughout the region resulted in numerous deaths, with re­ported death tolls ranging from dozens to 100 or possibly more, and raised concerns about the failure of ethnic policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to address the root causes of regional instability. Overseas media and rights groups reported instances involving security forces shooting into crowds of Uyghurs, resulting in deaths and injuries. In some cases, Uyghur residents of the XUAR reportedly com­mitted deadly attacks on members of security forces, commu­nity workers, and others.
  • Authorities reportedly conducted pervasive house searches throughout the region in order to ‘‘maintain stability’’ and tar­get peaceful expressions of religious belief among the Uyghur population. Human rights advocates assert that widespread se­curity checks have exacerbated tensions in the region.
  • XUAR authorities continued intensive controls over religion, especially Islam, posing a challenge for Uyghurs seeking to practice their religious beliefs outside of state control. Authori­ties continued to enforce tight restrictions over peaceful reli­gious practices among the Uyghur population and carried out targeted surveillance over individual religious believers.
  • State-led development initiatives intensified during the Com­mission’s 2013 reporting year, drawing large amounts of state and private investment and increased migration into the XUAR. Development projects in the region raised concerns that they have brought disproportionately fewer economic, social, and cultural opportunities for Uyghurs and other ethnic mi­norities in the region, as well as concerns over the effects such projects have had on the cultures and languages of these groups.
  • Increased migration to the XUAR in recent years has report­edly heightened ethnic tensions in some areas and sparked concerns among Uyghur residents regarding land rights and employment opportunities. Regional development initiatives brought increased Han Chinese migration to the XUAR during the past year, and state-led programs provided assistance to migrants and workers from other provinces, often in southern areas of the XUAR traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.
  • In the past year, the XUAR government broadened the scope of Mandarin-focused ‘‘bilingual education’’ in the region, a pol­

 

icy some Uyghur students in the XUAR fear is aimed at as­similating young Uyghurs into Chinese society at the expense of their Uyghur identity. Under ‘‘bilingual education,’’ class in­struction takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by ethnic minority groups. In recent years, some Uyghur students and teachers have expressed concern over the compulsory nature of the re­gion’s ‘‘bilingual’’ curriculum and the corresponding loss of young Uyghurs’ ability to speak the Uyghur language.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the XUAR, for protecting Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human rights. Æ Call on the Chinese government to reexamine the effective­ness of official policies toward ethnic minorities in the XUAR and end its reliance on heightened security to respond to clash­es in the region. Call on Chinese authorities to report trans­parently on conflict in the region. Æ Call on the Chinese government to end pervasive house searches in Uyghur neighborhoods throughout the XUAR, which human rights advocates assert have exacerbated ten­sions in the region. Æ Call on the Chinese government to adhere to its domestic laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, as well as international regulations guaranteeing religious practice free from state restrictions. Æ Call on the Chinese government to support development policies in the XUAR that promote democratic decisionmaking processes among local communities affected by development. Call on central and XUAR authorities to ensure equitable de­velopment that not only promotes economic growth but also re­spects the broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents, and engages these communities in democratic decisionmaking. Æ Call on the Chinese government to ensure the rights of eth­nic minorities to protect property and enjoy equal access to em­ployment opportunities in areas of the XUAR affected by devel­opment efforts. Call on central and XUAR authorities to enact programs to actively preserve and maintain the culture and livelihoods of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the face of increased migration. Æ Call on the Chinese government to consult with non-Han parents, teachers, and students regarding what language or languages of instruction should be used in XUAR schools, from the preschool to the university level. Call on Chinese officials to provide parents and students a choice of instruction in the Uyghur language and other non-Chinese languages prevalent in the XUAR, as mandated in Article 4 of the Chinese Con­stitution and Article 10 of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL). Urge Chinese officials to support the develop­ment of educational materials in the Uyghur language and in other non-Chinese languages.

TIBET

Findings

  • Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has been stalled since the January 2010 ninth round, the longest interval since such contacts resumed in 2002. The Commission observed no indication during the 2013 reporting year of offi­cial Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into ac­count Tibetan concerns regarding the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.
  • The Party and government failed this past year to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any accountability for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies. The fre­quency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly focusing on polit­ical and religious issues increased during the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, peaking in October–November with 38 self-immolations preceding and during the 18th National Con­gress of the Chinese Communist Party. During the period Sep­tember 2012 through July 2013, 66 Tibetan self-immolations (60 fatal) took place. As self-immolation frequency increased, authorities strengthened a security crackdown infringing on Ti­betans’ freedoms of expression, association, and movement, and curtailed their ability to communicate or share information. Self-immolations have shifted from an initial pattern of less frequent self-immolations mainly in Sichuan province with a majority of current or former monastics, to a pattern of more frequent self-immolations mostly outside of Sichuan with a ma­jority of laypersons.
  • Tibetan self-immolators this past year continued to call for the Dalai Lama’s return—a demand that when voiced during a suicidal protest may signify intense resentment toward Chi­nese government and Communist Party intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist affairs. The Party and government continued to cre­ate new and unprecedented control over Tibetan Buddhism, along with maintaining established repressive policies. Effec­tive December 2012, national measures required Tibetan Bud­dhist monastic teachers to submit every five years to a reas­sessment conducted by Party- and government-controlled Bud­dhist associations. Criteria include patriotism toward China, supporting Party leadership, and accepting guidance from government- and Party-run offices. Reappointed teachers must sign an agreement acknowledging such obligations. Officials characterize the result of such policies as the ‘‘normal order’’ of Tibetan Buddhism.
  • • This past year, some Tibetan self-immolators reportedly called for greater use of the Tibetan language as they burned— an apparent indication of the significant threat some Tibetans believe Party and government policies pose to Tibetan culture’s vibrancy and viability. In Qinghai province, thousands of Ti­betan tertiary students protested against issues including gov­ernment language policy after authorities required students to study an official booklet that some regarded as ‘‘derogatory’’ to­ward Tibetan language and that promoted using Mandarin. A court sentenced eight of the students to imprisonment. Reports of unofficial Tibetan initiatives to promote Tibetan language emerged in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces.
  • Officials continued to emphasize economic development as the key to achieving ‘‘social stability,’’ even though some initia­tives resulted in protests or alleged harm to local communities. A Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) official said the Lhasa-Shigatse railway will begin operation by the end of 2014. Offi­cial media reported the TAR government had settled (or reset­tled) ‘‘nearly 2.1 million’’ Tibetan farmers and herders during 2006–2012, and that ‘‘all farmers and herders’’ in the TAR would be settled by the end of 2013. Media organizations re­ported on a landslide disaster at a gold mine and on environ­mental pollution that interfered with Tibetans’ ability to farm and maintain livestock. Government plans for construction of hydroelectric projects along major Tibetan rivers attracted the interest of news media and analysts.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Urge the Chinese government to resume contacts with the Dalai Lama or his representatives and engage in dialogue without preconditions. Such a dialogue should aim to protect the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. As tensions continue to rise in Tibetan areas and Tibetans express their respect for the Dalai Lama, a Chinese government decision to engage in dialogue can result in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for the Chinese government and Tibetans that will benefit local and regional security in coming decades. Æ Urge the Chinese government to consider the role of govern­ment regulatory measures and Party policies in the wave of Ti­betan self-immolations. Point out to Chinese officials that, if the government and Party address Tibetan grievances in a con­structive manner, the results could benefit state security and social stability; point out to Chinese officials that strength­ening the measures and policies that Tibetans resent is un­likely to promote ‘‘social stability’’ or a ‘‘harmonious society.’’ Æ Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of refraining from expanding the use of intrusive management and legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan Bud­dhists’ right to the freedom of religion. Point out to Chinese of­ficials that government control over periodic review and re­appointment of Tibetan Buddhist teachers based on criteria such as upholding Communist Party leadership and accepting guidance from government- and Party-run offices is incon­sistent with state respect for ‘‘freedom of religious belief,’’ and that increased pressure on Tibetan Buddhists created by ag­gressive use of regulatory measures, ‘‘patriotic’’ and ‘‘legal’’ education, and anti-Dalai Lama campaigns is likely to harm social stability, not protect it. Urge the government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers in a manner consistent with Tibetan Buddhist pref­erences and traditions. Æ Request that the Chinese government follow up on a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ along with his family. Urge the government to invite a representative of an international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can ex­press to the representative his wishes with respect to privacy; photograph the international representative and Gedun Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s statement and the photograph. Æ Convey to the Chinese government the importance of re­specting and protecting the Tibetan culture and language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant Tibetan culture by honoring the Chinese Constitution’s reference to the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the security establishment, courts, and law to in­fringe upon and repress Tibetans’ exercise of such rights. Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in teaching modern sub­jects and not to consign Tibetan language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in teaching modern subjects. Æ Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into ac­count the views and preferences of Tibetans when the govern­ment plans infrastructure, natural resource development, and settlement or resettlement projects in the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to engage with ap­propriate experts in assessing the impact of such projects and in advising the government on the implementation and progress of such projects. Æ Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their ca­pacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, lan­guage, and heritage; that can help to improve education, eco­nomic, health, and environmental conservation conditions for ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that cre­ate sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. Æ Urge the Chinese government to refrain from using security and judicial institutions to intimidate Tibetan communities by prosecuting and imprisoning Tibetans with alleged links to a self-immolator or for sharing self-immolation information. Con­tinue to convey to the government the importance of distin­guishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters; con­demn the use of security campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the Chinese government to provide complete de­tails about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-related and self-immolation-related ‘‘crimes.’’ Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative exam­ples include: Monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life impris­onment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Ti­betan Buddhists as a reincarnated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’); and nomad Ronggye Adrag (sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public fes­tival).

DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU

Findings

  • The Basic Laws of both Hong Kong and Macau confirm the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit­ical Rights (ICCPR) to both territories. The Basic Law of Hong Kong provides specifically for universal suffrage, while Macau’s Basic Law does not.
  • Public demand grew for a more specific plan for election of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive (CE) through universal suffrage, which is set to occur in 2017. In July 2013, Hong Kong’s cur­rent CE, CY Leung, dismissed calls for early public consulta­tion on electoral reform. Mainland Chinese officials and ex­perts continue to dissuade Macau from pursuing universal suf­frage.
  • Concerns also grew over central government interference in the nomination of CE candidates in elections by universal suf­frage, with statements from mainland Chinese officials ruling out a nominating process involving the broader voting public and stating that candidates would be required to be trusted by the central government.
  • Two incidents this year highlighted ongoing challenges to Hong Kong’s judicial and law enforcement independence. Hong Kong authorities requested that Hong Kong’s highest court refer to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing a key issue in a case involving the right of foreign do­mestic helpers to apply for Hong Kong permanent residence. In another instance, former U.S. National Security Agency con­tractor Edward Snowden was allowed to leave the territory de­spite a U.S. request for his provisional arrest. This incident raises concerns over whether this was done at the request of the central government. If so, it could be interpreted as the central government interfering in what should have been a purely internal Hong Kong law enforcement matter.
  • The Hong Kong government made uneven progress toward maintaining transparency. The government postponed imple­mentation of a measure that would have redacted from public corporate filings important identifying information of company directors.
  • • Self-censorship by journalists and strong media ties to main­land China continued to threaten press freedom in Hong Kong and Macau, although in September 2012 Macau backed away from a controversial plan to set up a ‘‘press accountability board.’’
  • The gambling industry in Macau is reportedly tied to wide­spread corruption and the laundering of large amounts of money out of mainland China. The Chinese government and Macau officials reportedly stepped up efforts to regulate Macau’s gambling industry as part of a larger campaign by the central government against corruption.

 

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are

encouraged to: Æ Urge in meetings with Hong Kong and central government officials for Hong Kong authorities to prepare a clear plan with a specific timetable as soon as practicable for instituting uni­versal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive in 2017 that meets the requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and is developed with full public participation. Include stops in Hong Kong and Macau during trips to mainland China. U.S. Government delegations’ meetings in Hong Kong should include meetings with members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, officials with the Hong Kong government administration, members of the judiciary, and representatives of reporters’ organizations. In Macau, dele­gations should meet with members of the Legislative Assem­bly, especially directly elected members, with the Macau gov­ernment administration, and with leaders outside the govern­ment. Æ Support and encourage agencies and organizations to explore projects to monitor and strengthen democratic practices, press freedom, and the rule of law in Macau. Æ Commend Hong Kong for its commitment to transparency in light of recent measures toward a public archives law and maintaining public access to corporate directors’ identifying in­formation, and emphasize the critical importance of trans­parency for maintaining confidence in business and U.S.-Hong Kong relations. Æ Urge Macau to develop law enforcement mechanisms for combating money laundering, such as a mechanism to freeze suspicious assets, establishing cash declaration requirements for visitors, lowering transaction reporting thresholds for casi­nos, and enhancing legal requirements for casino customer due diligence.

POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

Recommendations

When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a polit­ical or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

  • Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http:// ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner’s database record for more detailed information about the prisoner’s case, including his or her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials have violated, stage in the legal process, and location of deten­tion or imprisonment, if known.
  • Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious prisoners compiled from database records.
  • Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens in­volved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China to explore the database, and to advocate for the release of po­litical and religious prisoners in China.

 

A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY

The Commission’s 2013 Annual Report provides information about Chinese political and religious prisoners 1 in the context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party’s and government’s ap­plication of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Polit­ical Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and rou­tinely uses the database to prepare summaries of information about political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report, and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at http://ppdcecc.gov. (Information about the PPD is avail­able at http://www.cecc.gov/resources/political-prisoner-database.)

The PPD received approximately 84,500 online requests for pris­oner information during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2013—an increase of approximately 36 percent over the 61,900 re­quests during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2012. During the 12-month period ending in August 2013, the United States was the country of origin of the largest share of requests for informa­tion, with approximately 31.9 percent of such requests—a decrease from the 51 percent reported for the United States in the Commis­sion’s 2012 Annual Report. China was second with approximately

29.2 percent (an increase compared to 20 percent in the 2012 re­porting period), followed by Japan with 19.1 percent (compared to 1 percent in the 2012 reporting period), Germany (4.1 percent), France (2.4 percent), the United Kingdom (2.2 percent), the Rus­sian Federation (1.0 percent), Hong Kong (0.8 percent), the Nether­lands (0.8 percent), and India (0.7 percent).

Approximately 56.8 percent of the approximately 84,500 requests for PPD information were from numerical Internet addresses that do not provide information about the name of the registrant or the type of domain. That figure represents a substantial increase over the 36 percent reported for such addresses during the period end­ing in August 2012 and may contribute to the proportional changes reported for the following types of Internet domains.

Approximately 15.5 percent of the online requests for PPD infor­mation during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2013, origi­nated from worldwide commercial (.com) Internet domains—a de­crease from the 19 percent reported in the 2012 Annual Report. Worldwide network (.net) domains were second with approximately

8.8 percent (compared to 16 percent in the 2012 reporting period), followed by U.S. Government (.gov) domains with 6.7 percent (com­pared to 11 percent in the 2012 reporting period), 2.8 percent from domains in Germany (.de), 1.5 percent from worldwide nonprofit or­ganization (.org) domains, 1.4 percent from domains in France (.fr), and 1.3 percent from U.S. education (.edu) domains.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the staff member’s area of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective anal­ysis of information about individual prisoners, and about events and trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China.

As of September 1, 2013, the PPD contained information on 7,309 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of those, 1,304 are cases of political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 6,005 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been re­leased, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after re­lease, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are consid­erably more than 1,304 cases of current political and religious im­prisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the PPD.

The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on in­formation provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and oppos­ing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY

The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and Adminis­tration, other governments, NGOs, educational institutions, and in­dividuals who research political and religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly leveraged the capacity of the Commis­sion’s information and technology resources to support such re­search, reporting, and advocacy.

The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is struc­tured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. Each prisoner’s record describes the type of human rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These types include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of reli­gion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change and to criti­cize government policy or government officials.

The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet to query the database and download prisoner data without pro­viding personal information to the Commission, and without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user’s com­puter. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal information to set up such an ac­count. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a user’s computer as the result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not stored on a user’s computer. A user-specified ID (which can be a nickname) and password are the only information required to set up a user account.

II. Human Rights

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

International Standards on Free Expression

While international standards permit states to restrict expres­sion in limited circumstances, official Chinese restrictions during the Commission’s 2013 reporting year covered a much broader range of activity—including peaceful expression critical of the Chi­nese Communist Party and independent news reporting.1 Many of­ficial Chinese restrictions on free expression fail to comply with international human rights standards. Article 19 of the Inter­national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Arti­cles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights per­mit officials to restrict expression so long as it is (1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting na­tional security, public order, public health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) necessary and the least restric­tive means to achieve the purported aim.2 Regarding the first re­quirement, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has said re­strictions on ‘‘discussion of government policies and political de­bate,’’ ‘‘peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy,’’ and ‘‘expression of . . . dissent’’ are incon­sistent with Article 19 of the ICCPR, which the Chinese govern­ment signed in 1998 but has not yet ratified.3 In June 2012, the UNHRC passed a resolution supporting freedom of expression on the Internet, affirming that ‘‘the same rights that people have off­line must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expres­sion, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice.’’ 4

Growth and Control of the Internet

EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS, INTRODUCING NEW RESTRICTIONS

China’s Internet usage has experienced dramatic growth in re­cent years, particularly in the number of Internet users accessing the Web through mobile devices. According to the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the national-level adminis­trative agency responsible for Internet affairs in China,5 there were over 590 million Internet users in China by the end of June 2013, bringing the Internet penetration rate (the total number of Internet users divided by the total population) to 44.1 percent.6 By mid-2013, China had more than 464 million people accessing the Inter­net from mobile devices—amounting to 78.5 percent of the total Internet population.7 According to information from three of Chi­na’s leading telecommunications operators, there were 1.15 billion mobile phone subscribers by March 2013.8

The Chinese government has pledged to expand access to mobile technologies and the Internet, according to news reports.9 Chinese officials expect the number of Internet users to grow to more than 800 million people by 2015, including more than 200 million rural Internet users.10 In the 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan, the Chinese government sets its target of increasing Internet penetration to more than 45 percent by 2015.11 During the Com­mission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese government continued steps to expand the country’s telecommunications infrastructure. In February 2013, for instance, the Ministry of Industry and Informa­tion Technology announced plans to increase access to broadband services to cover 70 percent of Chinese Internet users by year’s end.12

Despite the stated goals of increasing online access, official state­ments and state-run publications continue to emphasize strength­ening the legal limits and management of Internet information rather than protecting Internet freedoms.13 During the Commis­sion’s 2013 reporting year, Chinese officials and state-run media outlets consistently used the threat of ‘‘online rumors’’ (wangluo yaoyan) and ‘‘unhealthy information’’ (buliang xinxi) as a basis for increased Internet controls and real-name registration require­ments.14 In December 2012, the People’s Daily, the official news media of the Chinese Communist Party, published a front-page commentary on Internet users’ legal obligations.15 The commentary stated, ‘‘Demanding that people all use the correct means to say the correct things is not practical, but they must have a conscious­ness of the law and take responsibility for their words—this is a must.’’ 16 Officials emphasized controlling Internet content over the course of this past year.17 In May 2013, for instance, the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) said that it was ‘‘waging a war against online rumors’’ that ‘‘have impaired the credibility of online media, disrupted normal communication order, and aroused great aversion among the public.’’ 18

State-run media organizations and Chinese officials called for stricter regulations in late 2012, promoting Internet regulations as a necessary step in ‘‘protecting’’ Internet users’ privacy and online information.19 On December 28, 2012, the National People’s Con­gress Standing Committee adopted a 12-article decision, titled ‘‘De­cision on Strengthening Online Information Protection,’’ with new regulations stipulating the collection of online personal informa­tion.20 According to multiple reports, new requirements mandating Internet users to register accounts by using their real names gen­erated controversy.21 In early September, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate also issued an offi­cial interpretation regarding re-posting defamatory content online purportedly to protect users’ rights and reputations.22 The Inter­pretation states that Internet users could face up to three years’ imprisonment if defamatory content is reposted 500 times or is viewed 5,000 times online.23

Despite efforts to control Internet content and regulate account registration, Chinese activists and foreign media have noted the difficulties that officials face in completely controlling this emerg­ing and vibrant space for expression, including criticism of govern­ment policies and discussion of politically sensitive topics.24 An April 2013 Economist article stated that the Internet in China, de­spite controls, has allowed new shifts of public consciousness and new pressures for authoritarian responses: ‘‘. . . [E]ven casual users can be drawn into political debates online, and the internet is one place where people can speak their minds and criticise the government relatively freely. . . . [B]eing able to express diverging views collectively online is new. Millions of users are low-grade subversives, chipping away at the imposing edifice of the party-state with humour, outrage and rueful cynicism.’’ 25

CENSORSHIP OF ONLINE CONTENT

This past year, Chinese authorities appeared to maintain or en­hance policies to block and filter online content, particularly sen­sitive information about rights activists, official corruption, or col­lective organizing.26 According to the Open Net Initiative, the Chi­nese government ‘‘maintains one of the most pervasive and sophis­ticated regimes of Internet filtering and information control in the world.’’ 27 Chinese officials remained non-transparent in disclosing content that is blocked or why it is blocked.28 The online censor­ship and Web site closures, in some cases, appeared politically mo­tivated and appeared to counter international standards on free­doms of opinion and expression.29 For example, in October 2012, Chinese censors blocked access to the New York Times’ English-and Chinese-language Web sites in response to articles describing ‘‘hidden’’ wealth accumulated by former Premier Wen Jiabao’s fam­ily members.30 Also, international news media and foreign Web sites reported that Chinese Internet censors blocked or partially blocked a range of political names and phrases related to the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and to the an­niversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.31

International reporting and research continued to illustrate how Chinese officials, Internet companies, and state-sponsored agents are able to control access to and content on the Web.32 During the reporting year, the Chinese government allegedly enhanced its na­tional system of surveillance and censorship (commonly known as the Great Firewall or GFW), especially leading up to and through­out the 18th Party Congress.33 One U.S.-based study found that Chinese censors ‘‘actively manipulated’’ search results related to 18th Party Congress delegates.34 Another study argued that Chi­nese authorities censored comments online ‘‘to reduce the prob­ability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any col­lective movements are in evidence or expected’’—and ‘‘not to sup­press criticism of the state or the Communist Party.’’ 35 Another study addressed the speed and efficiency of censors on China’s pop­ular microblog platforms, finding that 30 percent of the deletions took place within 30 minutes and 90 percent within the first 24 hours.36 A different study demonstrated how the China-only version of Skype, the popular Internet-based communication soft­ware, allowed officials to intercept thousands of politically sensitive text messages, while monitoring users’ communications.37

Chinese regulatory and legal measures do not clearly define pro­hibited online content. Internet regulations contain vague and broad prohibitions on content that ‘‘harms the honor or interests of the nation,’’ ‘‘spreads rumors,’’ or ‘‘disrupts national policies on reli­gion.’’ 38 Chinese law does not define these concepts, nor does it contain specific criteria to establish whether an action presents ‘‘harm’’ to the ‘‘honor or interests of the nation.’’ 39 Since the con­cepts remain undefined, Chinese authorities broadly apply these and other vague legal provisions to punish those seeking to express opinions or share information.40 At the same time, the Chinese government places the burden on Internet service and content pro­viders to monitor and remove content based on these vague stand­ards and to maintain records of such activity and report it to the government.41

CITIZEN AND GOVERNMENT USE OF MICROBLOGS

China’s Twitter-like microblogging (weibo) sites continued to see strong growth in the number of users during this reporting year.42 By the end of 2012, according to the CNNIC, China’s microblogging sites—including China’s two leading microblog platforms Sina Weibo and Tencent (QQ) Weibo—had an estimated 309 million reg­istered accounts, an increase of 58.73 million users from the end of 2011.43 While most weibo users access the microblogging sites for entertainment or social purposes,44 many Chinese citizens con­tinued to use the sites for individual expression, to raise issues of public accountability, and to publicize important political develop­ments.45 Despite China’s sophisticated censorship system, Chinese citizens have consistently used the microblogging sites to bypass conventional media constraints and circumvent censorship restric­tions.46 In addition, businesses, journalists, and microbloggers used virtual private networks (VPNs), among other techniques, to access the U.S.-based microblogging service provider Twitter (which has been blocked in China since July 2009 47), as well as other foreign-based social networking sites blocked in China.48

In the absence of independent domestic media, microblogging has emerged as an alternative outlet for a range of independent opin­ions and news reporting. During this reporting year, microblog users utilized the services to publicize various incidents or news events—from air quality monitoring in Beijing 49 to the April 2013 earthquake in Ya’an municipality, Sichuan province.50 In Novem­ber 2012, microblog users circulated information from a New York Times article on the financial assets of former Premier Wen Jiabao’s family members while official censors blocked the news­paper’s Web site and search terms related to the story.51 In re­sponse to the censorship, microblog users employed various related ‘‘code words’’ and posted screenshots of the article to circumvent re­strictions.52

The circulation of independent news and information on microblogs appears, in some instances, to have sparked outrage over official abuses, particularly over local-level corruption.53 Microbloggers and citizen journalists have increasingly used microblogging platforms to uncover official abuses or expose corrup­tion, such as ill-gotten real estate assets or luxury items.54 In one of the highest profile cases, Chinese authorities investigated Na­tional Development and Reform Commission Vice Chairman Liu Tienan after a journalist publicly accused Liu of corruption and various wrongdoings on Sina Weibo.55 China’s new leadership and state-run media appear to have acknowledged microblogging’s growing utility in exposing corruption and in promoting trans­parency.56 In March 2013, for instance, Premier Li Keqiang said, ‘‘There are already hundreds of millions of weibo users. If govern­ment information is not released in a timely manner this generates animated discussion and speculation, and this can easily cause re­sentment among the people and give rise to negative influences, ul­timately putting the government on its back foot in doing its work.’’ 57

In mid-2013, international media organizations reported in­creased government pressure on certain popular users of microblogging services (commonly referred to as ‘‘Big V’s’’ because of their large followings and verified status), including those who have posted blunt social criticisms or political commentaries.58 The growing popularity of services has allowed some microbloggers to reach millions of users and to potentially shape public opinion.59 With growing concern about ‘‘online rumors,’’ 60 Chinese Internet authorities responded with a crackdown on high-profile accounts 61 and with a list of ‘‘seven bottom-lines’’ for online activity.62 The ‘‘seven bottom-lines,’’ according to state-run media, include uphold­ing or maintaining: Laws and regulations, the system of socialism, the national interest, the people’s legitimate rights and interests, social order, morality, and the accuracy of information.63 In an Au­gust 2013 Xinhua editorial, the official state-run news agency ar­gued that, ‘‘as recognizable figures in the online world, ‘Big V’s’ must have a stronger sense of social responsibility than ordinary users.’’ 64 Some commentators, however, have alleged the crack­down on prominent microblog users is politically based.65 A Sep­tember 2013 South China Morning Post article, for instance, re­ported that ‘‘[the] clampdown has been widely interpreted as an at­tempt to silence prominent liberal commentators.’’ 66

 ‘‘Are we still a university if we are not allowed to talk about civil rights and press freedom? ’’ 70 Some ob-servers later linked this directive to a Party memo referred to as ‘‘Docu-ment No. 9,’’ which identified seven similar areas of concern.71 [For more information on ‘‘Document No. 9,’’ see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.]<br />

While China’s social media and microblogging sphere has pro­vided space for citizens’ voices, the Chinese government has also made use of the tools for official purposes. According to a report by the Chinese Academy of Governance, the Chinese government had more than 176,000 microblog accounts at the end of December 2012.72 The government microblogs were created ‘‘to communicate with the public and provide services,’’ according to a research re­port cited by Xinhua.73 Official statements, in recent years, have emphasized enhancing government presence on social media sites and ‘‘promoting social harmony and stability’’ through microblogging accounts.74

Punishment of Citizens’ Free Expression

CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

Chinese authorities continued to use the criminal justice system to detain and punish citizens exercising their constitutional rights to ‘‘freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.’’ 75 Some of those punished during the reporting year had previous records of criticizing the Chinese government and Communist Party and of advocating for democracy and human rights.76 In addition, Chinese criminal defense lawyers and suspects in free speech cases continued to face substantial ob­stacles in ensuring that courts upheld procedural safeguards and the right to a fair trial, as required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.77 [For more information on rights abuses related to criminal suspects, see Section II—Criminal Jus­tice.]

Officials used vaguely worded criminal charges to detain rights advocates,78 Internet writers,79 human rights lawyers,80 and cit­izen journalists 81 who engaged in peaceful expression and assem­bly. The following cases represent select detentions from the report­ing year:

  • In November 2012, Beijing public security authorities crimi­nally detained blogger Zhai Xiaobing on suspicion of ‘‘spreading terrorist information’’ after he allegedly posted a satirical tweet about the 18th Party Congress.82 Authorities released him weeks later.83
  • On August 2, 2013, Beijing state security officials detained journalist Chen Min, also known as Xiao Shu, after he helped to organize a petition advocating the release of Xu Zhiyong, a legal scholar and rights advocate criminally detained in July 2013.84 According to an online statement released after the de­tention, Chen claimed authorities held him for 48 hours and that ‘‘[a]t no point were any legal procedures undertaken.’’ 85
  • In May 2013, Beijing officials detained independent jour­nalist, author, and filmmaker Du Bin after he released a book on the 1989 Tiananmen protests and a documentary exposing abuses within the Masanjia Women’s Reeducation Through Labor Center, located in Liaoning province.86 According to statements made by Hu Jia, a prominent human rights activ­ist, authorities allegedly criminally detained Du for his recent work exposing human rights abuses.87 Authorities released Du on bail five weeks after his detention.88 As of September 2013, he was awaiting trial on charges of ‘‘creating disturbances,’’ which can carry a criminal sentence of up to 10 years’ impris­onment.89

 

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities released jour­nalist and democracy advocate Shi Tao from prison in late August, after he served less than nine years of an April 2005 10-year prison sentence for disclosing ‘‘state secrets’’ abroad.90

OFFICIAL HARASSMENT

This past reporting year, the Commission observed a range of abuses related to the extralegal harassment of rights advocates,91 Internet writers,92 and family members of advocates,93 who sought to exercise their rights to freedom of speech and assembly.94 The following examples illustrate forms of official harassment:

  • In November 2012, Chinese authorities sent journalist Li Yuanlong on forced ‘‘vacation’’ after he published a story about children who died of carbon monoxide poisoning in a Guizhou province dumpster.95
  • In June 2013, Beijing authorities placed Tsering Woeser, a Tibetan writer, blogger, and rights advocate, under ‘‘soft deten­tion,’’ an extralegal form of home confinement, reportedly in connection with her efforts to highlight Chinese human rights abuses against Tibetans. She was reportedly also held under ‘‘soft detention’’ in March 2013.96
  • In August 2013, East China University of Political Science suspended outspoken Professor Zhang Xuezhong from teaching at the university, in apparent connection with his advocacy for constitutionalism.97

 

In suppressing free speech rights, Chinese authorities not only targeted Chinese citizens who sought to express their opinions peacefully but also targeted their family members and acquaint­ances.98 In December 2012, Associated Press (AP) journalists vis­ited Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo’s wife, Liu Xia, whom authorities continue to hold under an extralegal form of home con­finement.99 According to AP, ‘‘Liu Xia trembled uncontrollably and cried as she described how absurd and emotionally draining her confinement under house arrest has been . . . .’’ 100

Press Freedom

Chinese government and Communist Party officials continue to exercise control over the press in violation of international stand­ards. International experts have identified media serving ‘‘as gov­ernment mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the public interest’’ as a major challenge to free expression.101 In its 2013 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked China 173rd out of 179 countries in terms of press free­doms, noting that ‘‘China shows no sign of improving. Its prisons still hold many journalists and netizens, while increasingly un­popular Internet censorship continues to be a major obstacle to ac­cess to information.’’ 102

In the reporting year, Chinese officials called for enhancing con­trols over traditional media, specifically domestic media organiza­tions quoting or reproducing content from foreign media.103 In an April 2013 edition of the Red Flag Journal, a prominent Party pub­lication, Ren Xianliang, Vice Chairman of the All-China Journalists Association and Deputy Director of the Shaanxi Provincial Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department, argued that traditional media and new media tools form ‘‘two distinct fields of public opin­ion’’ and that the Party must ‘‘have the courage to be hands on in its control’’ of the media.104 Top-level Chinese officials reportedly took new steps to denounce press freedoms. For example, in an April 2013 internal Party document (referred to as ‘‘Document No. 9’’), central Party authorities reportedly warned against ‘‘subver­sive trends,’’ including the Western concept of press freedoms.105

 ‘‘Are we still a university if we are not allowed to talk about civil rights and press freedom? ’’ 70 Some ob-servers later linked this directive to a Party memo referred to as ‘‘Docu-ment No. 9,’’ which identified seven similar areas of concern.71 [For more information on ‘‘Document No. 9,’’ see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.]<br />

POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH REGULATION OF EDITORS AND JOURNALISTS

China’s media regulator, the State Administration of Press, Pub­lication, Radio, Film, and Television, continued to enforce a system of strict controls and licensing requirements. (In 2013, the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) and the State Ad­ministration of Radio, Film, and Television merged to create the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Tele­vision.115) All media organizations in China are subject to an ex­tensive licensing system and government supervision.116 In order to report the news legally, domestic newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and journalists must obtain a license or accreditation from the government.117 Radio and television broadcast journalists, for instance, must pass a government-sponsored exam that tests them on subjects including basic knowledge of Marxist views of news and Communist Party principles.118

In recent years, China’s media regulator has issued a range of regulations to ‘‘strengthen management’’ and address official con­cerns over ‘‘false information’’ in news reports. In October 2011, the GAPP, the former government agency responsible for monitoring and regulating print-based media, released regulations on control­ling use of ‘‘unverified information’’ by prohibiting journalists from directly referencing information obtained from the Internet or so­cial media in their reporting.119 Less than two years later, in April 2013, the newly merged State General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television issued a directive that offi­cially bans journalists from using foreign media reports without au­thorization and forbids news editors from reporting information on­line that has not been verified through official channels.120 Accord­ing to a Hong Kong-based media expert, officials may face chal­lenges enforcing the regulations, as information often moves quick­ly on microblogs: ‘‘[Controlling press content] is very difficult to achieve when foreign stories are breaking over on Sina Weibo be­fore [government agents] can put a stop to this whole process.’’ 121

PUNISHMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS

While the 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan an­nounced official intentions to safeguard ‘‘the legitimate rights and interests of news agencies, journalists, editors and other persons concerned,’’ 122 during this reporting year, Chinese authorities took actions to punish, suspend, or remove outspoken and independent journalists and newspaper staff.123 In March 2013, Deng Yuwen, an editor at a prominent Chinese Communist Party journal, was ‘‘suspended indefinitely’’ after publishing an editorial that criticized China’s ‘‘outdated’’ alliance with North Korea in the U.K.-based Fi­nancial Times.124 In August 2013, authorities in Chongqing mu­nicipality detained Liu Hu, a journalist for a Guangdong province-based newspaper,125 under suspicion of ‘‘fabricating and spreading rumors’’ in apparent connection with his online request that au­thorities investigate a former Chongqing official for corruption.126 In other instances, Chinese journalists faced threats or violence in attempting to investigate news stories.127 In July 2013, for in­stance, public security authorities in Hunan province threatened and then assaulted two journalists attempting to report on protests sparked by the death of a citizen assaulted by local chengguan, or urban management officials.128 According to the Beijing News, a popular newspaper, the public security officers threatened the jour­nalists by saying, ‘‘Take no photos, or if you take any, you will die here.’’ 129

Chinese journalists working for foreign-based Web sites and newspapers also faced the threat of official reprisals for inde­pendent news reporting. In April 2013, Chinese authorities de­tained journalist Sun Lin, a reporter with the foreign-based Chi­nese news Web site Boxun, after he distributed online footage of a protest over an elementary school’s expulsion of a rights advocate’s daughter.130

HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN AND HONG KONG JOURNALISTS

This past year, the Commission continued to monitor harassment of foreign journalists in China. In March 2013, unidentified men in Beijing beat two Hong Kong journalists who were filming a Hong Kong rights advocate’s attempt to visit Liu Xia, wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo.131 Reports claim that as many as a dozen unidentified men beat the journalists as they at­tempted to access the building where Liu Xia was being illegally detained.132 After the attack, police authorities took away the Hong Kong rights advocate.133 Also in March, Radio Free Asia reported that a television crew working for Germany’s public broadcaster ARD was pursued, forced off the road, and attacked following in­vestigative reporting on urbanization in Hebei province.134 Fol­lowing these actions, the International Federation of Journalists issued a statement saying, ‘‘The media should be allowed to carry out its professional responsibilities in a public place without fear of harassment, intimidation or assault—particularly if the media is investigating suspicious activity.’’ 135 According to the Foreign Cor­respondent’s Club of China (FCCC), foreign journalists overall con­tinued to face challenging work conditions and various forms of harassment.136 In an FCCC annual survey released in July 2013, 70 percent of journalists surveyed agreed that ‘‘conditions have worsened or stayed the same as the year before.’’ 137

WORKER RIGHTS

Freedom of Association

The Chinese government continued to prevent workers from ex­ercising their constitutional right to freedom of association 1 this past year. Although the PRC Trade Union Law provides workers with the right to participate in and form trade unions, it also re­stricts workers’ rights to freedom of association by requiring that all union activity be approved by and structured under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), an organization under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party.2 Leading trade union officials hold concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party and central and local government, undermining union autonomy and giving the Party and government undue influence over union policy and decisionmaking.3 The ACFTU constitution and the PRC Trade Union Law highlight the dual mandates of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the Party and broader goals and interests of the government,4 a problematic arrangement that labor experts claim constrains the ACFTU from protecting the interests of workers.5 Generally speaking, unions at the enterprise level remain weak and non-democratic, with the majority of union officials appointed directly or indirectly by employers and higher level trade unions.6 Increased labor activism in recent years has reportedly put mount­ing pressure on the ACFTU to institute union reform, yet contin­ued structural weaknesses of trade union branches make improve­ments to union autonomy and worker advocacy difficult to achieve.7

Collective Bargaining

Genuine collective bargaining remains limited by the inability of local-level trade unions to effectively represent and advance the rights of workers in negotiations with employers. The PRC Labor Law and related legislation provide a legal framework for trade unions to negotiate collective contracts and engage in collective consultations with employers on a wide range of issues.8 In recent years, the ACFTU has vigorously promoted collective contracts and collective wage bargaining as essential means for upholding ‘‘har­monious’’ labor relations and addressing workers’ grievances.9 De­spite these developments, collective contract and consultation mechanisms remain problematic, in part because trade unions lack autonomy and genuine worker representation.10 A 2013 research study conducted by a Yunnan provincial government inspection group on the implementation of provincial measures for collective wage consultations identified a number of problems in the con­sultation process, despite an overall increase in collective wage con­tracts signed since 2011, including a lack of expertise in wage and contract negotiations by union officials and a general misunder­standing and shortsightedness by employers of the benefits of col­lective negotiations.11 An official with the Yunnan provincial Bu­reau of Human Resources and Social Security further asserted that because workers in general continued to occupy a weaker position in relation to employers in the collective consultation process, many choose not to push for collective negotiations, while in other in­stances employers and union officials were found to put more em­phasis on negotiating than on signing collective contracts, leading to a process the official argued was ‘‘heavy on form, light on re­sults.’’ 12 In one case in March 2013, workers at the Nanhai Honda automotive plant in Guangdong province rejected what they consid­ered to be an unfair collective wage agreement negotiated by plant managers and the trade union, initiating a strike to pressure man­agement to agree to higher wage increases.13 In other instances, workers lacked knowledge of union functions altogether, preventing them from accessing union representation. For example, a 2013 study jointly conducted by several Chinese universities found over 80 percent of workers polled at three different factories did not know who their union representatives were.14

 Union Elections Expand as Problems Persist<br />
Authorities continued to promote direct election of trade union offi¬cials in pilot programs at several enterprises, mainly located in Guangdong province.15 In January 2013, Zhao Xiaosui, Chairman of the Guangzhou Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, announced plans to hold pilot trade union elections in 8 to 10 Guangzhou municipality-based enterprises.16 In other cases, officials called for expanding already established union election programs. In May 2013, Zhan Zhenbiao, Vice Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, called on officials to strengthen existing union election programs at 162 enterprises in Foshan municipality and further expand direct union elections to an additional 61 enterprises in the area.17 In addition, Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned multinational electronics manufacturer, publicized plans in February 2013 to ‘‘increas[e] the number of junior employee’’ union representatives in its factories through direct elec-tions.18 Despite these developments, recognition by Chinese and international labor scholars of continued restrictions on worker participation in the nomination and election process have led to questions over the ability of direct elections to engender genuinely representative unions.19 More¬over, individuals involved in organizing union elections have stated that significant challenges remain in educating workers on the election proc¬ess and the responsibilities of the elected union committees.20 A number of observers have also indicated that recently elected union representa¬tives lack necessary skills and experience needed to effectively run a union and represent and advance the rights of workers.21 In one case in February 2013, workers at the Ohms electronics factory in Shenzhen municipality demanded the recall and reelection of their union chairman after only recently electing him through direct elections in May 2012.22 According to a petition letter written by workers, demands for the recall of the union chairman stemmed from his inability to ‘‘fulfill his duties’’ and failure to effectively intervene in several contract disputes.23 A non-governmental labor organization based in Hong Kong suggested the chairman lacked the necessary skills and support needed to play an ef¬fective role, further stating that demands for his recall highlighted ‘‘the importance of not just holding elections but of ensuring that the elected officials can actually perform the tasks they were entrusted with.’’ 24<br />

Worker Actions

During the past reporting year, the Commission continued to ob­serve reports of workers organizing strikes and demonstrations in a variety of industries and regions across China.25 Strikes were often prompted by systemic labor-related grievances, such as fac­tory closings or relocation,26 nonpayment of wages and benefits,27 and abusive management practices.28 Official trade unions have played no role in organizing strikes or demonstrations; instead, unions frequently oppose worker-led actions and urge workers to resolve their grievances through established legal channels.29 In one case in March 2013, union officials at a Honda manufacturing plant in Foshan municipality, Guangdong province, criticized worker- organized protests as illegal and unproductive.30 Media reports in­dicated officials in some cases used force against or detained dem­onstrating workers. For example in January 2013, public security officials in Mayong city, Dongguan municipality, Guangdong, re­portedly detained 27 worker representatives after they sought as­sistance from the local government in recovering wage arrears to­taling 1.38 billion yuan (US$224 million) on behalf of 3,000 mi­grant construction workers.31 The Commission has observed re­ports in 2013 of officials using force to stop worker demonstrations in locations including Shenzhen municipality; 32 Guangzhou mu­nicipality, Guangdong; 33 and Fengcheng city, Jiangxi province.34

Commentators in China and abroad have argued that demo­graphic and economic shifts in recent years have provided workers with greater bargaining power in the workplace, increasing their determination to redress grievances with employers and press for better pay and working conditions.35 Moreover, experts contend the growing expectations of younger generation migrant workers with regard to working conditions and labor rights is a driving factor be­hind the increased boldness of recent protests.36 Compared with earlier generations, younger generation migrant workers have higher levels of education, greater access to technology, and a deep­er understanding of their rights.37 A number of reports indicate that these workers have been at the forefront of recent strikes, in­cluding a demonstration in September 2012 at a Foxconn factory in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi province, in which over 40 people were hospitalized after clashes with local authorities.38

Migrant Workers

Migrant workers—rural residents who have left their original place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in cities—remain largely marginalized and vulnerable to exploitation, facing prob­lems such as wage arrears,39 social discrimination,40 and low levels of labor and social welfare protection.41 China’s total migrant popu­lation grew 3.9 percent in 2012 from the previous year to more than 262 million.42 Working predominately in low-end industries requiring little technical skill, such as construction, mining, and manufacturing, migrants face increased risk for occupational injury and disease.43 According to a report published in May 2013 by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, over 50 percent of migrant workers in 2012 did not sign labor contracts with their employ­ers,44 leaving them vulnerable to abuse in the workplace and se­verely disadvantaged should they seek to recover wages or injury compensation through the court system.45 The report also indicated that even with a slight overall increase from the previous year, only a minority of migrants in 2012 had pensions (14.3 percent), medical insurance (16.9 percent), occupational injury insurance (24 percent), and unemployment insurance (8.4 percent).46 Moreover, migrants often lack urban residency status, preventing them from accessing public services in the cities where they live and work.47 A study published in February 2013 by Renmin University found migrants continued to consider themselves outsiders despite having worked and lived in a city for many years, presenting a challenge to government efforts to improve migrant integration into urban so­ciety.48

Child Labor

Despite China’s laws and commitments under international con­ventions prohibiting child labor, employers continued to hire under­age workers this past year. As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conven­tions on the elimination of child labor.49 The PRC Labor Law and related legislation also prohibit the employment of minors under 16 years old.50 Despite these legal measures, systemic problems in en­forcement and lack of sufficient resources reportedly continue to constrain efforts to reduce child labor.51 At a two-day high-level seminar on child labor held in September 2012, officials from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security acknowledged for the first time within China the challenge child labor posed, stating a need for improved legal enforcement and increased awareness of protection of children’s rights.52 While the extent of child labor in China is unclear, in part because the government does not release data on the issue,53 domestic and international media reports from the past year indicate that the use of child labor remained evident in the electronics manufacturing industry, with instances also re­ported in other sectors.54 Apple’s January 2013 Supplier Responsi­bility Report noted 74 cases of underage workers at one of its sup­plier facilities in Guangdong province, stating that a third-party labor agency had ‘‘willfully and illegally recruited young workers,’’ reportedly conspiring with families to forge age verification docu­ments.55

The perpetuation of child labor through the misuse of student workers in ‘‘work-study’’ programs and other related activities also continues to be a concern. National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that ‘‘education practice labor’’ and vocational skills training labor organized by schools and other educational and voca­tional institutions do not constitute child labor when such activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of students.56 The PRC Education Law also supports schools that establish work-study programs, provided they do not negatively affect normal studies.57 The Commission, however, has continued to observe re­ports 58 of ‘‘work-study’’ programs that violate Chinese law and ap­pear inconsistent with ILO standards that permit vocational train­ing programs for young persons so long as they relate to a course of education under a school’s supervision or facilitate choice of an occupation, among other requirements.59 Throughout the reporting year, Chinese and international media reported on vocational schools organizing compulsory internship programs of questionable educational benefit in which students worked long hours under physically demanding conditions. In March 2013, Chinese media reported on a compulsory internship program in Guangdong prov­ince where technical school students were tasked with working long hours at an electronics factory in violation of legal limits.60 Ac­cording to reports, students who refused to participate in the in­ternship program would not graduate from the technical school. The school’s principal defended the program, stating that it strengthened students’ ability to ‘‘endure hardships and work hard.’’ 61 In October 2012, a Foxconn subsidiary in Yantai munici­pality, Shandong province, was found to have hired 56 underage in­terns.62 According to reports, students complained of working ex­cessive overtime on tasks unrelated to their areas of study and re­ceiving significantly lower wages than adult workers despite per­forming the same tasks.63 A vocational college, reportedly impli­cated in the Foxconn internship program, stated that students had been working at the factory since 2010 as part of a government ini­tiative to alleviate labor shortages.64 Some observers have noted that a gradual tightening of the labor market in recent years has prompted many companies to increasingly rely on student workers to resolve labor shortages, often working with local governments to put pressure on vocational schools to provide student interns.65

Subcontracted Labor

Subcontracted workers hired through labor employment agencies remain particularly vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace, often receiving lower wages and fewer benefits than workers hired through direct labor contracts with employers.66 Following imple­mentation of the PRC Labor Contract Law in 2008, employers in­creasingly have used subcontracted workers, also known as dis­patch labor, to circumvent the legal obligations and related finan­cial costs associated with direct labor contracts.67 While the PRC Labor Contract Law stipulates that subcontracted workers gen­erally should be used only for ‘‘temporary, auxiliary, or substitute positions,’’ they continue to be hired as long-term substitutes for regular employment in violation of the law.68 According to data re­leased by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in 2011 and 2012, China has between 27 and 37 million subcontracted workers, working primarily in state-owned enterprises, in some cases accounting for two-thirds of the total workforce.69

In December 2012, the National People’s Congress passed amendments to the PRC Labor Contract Law, effective July 1, 2013, focusing on provisions related to labor subcontracting.70 The amendments include clearer definitions of the three types of posi­tions that subcontracted workers can be used for and requires em­ployers to apply the same compensation standards to both directly hired and subcontracted laborers.71 Moreover, the amendments raise business standards for employment agencies, requiring them to obtain operating permits from local labor authorities.72 Despite these changes, Chinese labor experts and union officials have ques­tioned whether upcoming regulations designed to implement the amendments may weaken reforms as a result of lobbying by state-owned enterprises.73 Poor regulation of the labor subcontracting in­dustry also continues to be a problem. Labor employment agencies have been identified by observers in China and abroad as a com­mon outlet through which child workers end up in factories.74 In May 2013, Chinese media reported on the death of a 14-year-old boy at an electronics factory in Dongguan city, Guangdong prov­ince, stating that the boy had been hired through an employment agency which knowingly forged his identification documents.75

Prison Labor

The use of forced labor in China’s prison system remains incon­sistent with Chinese law and in violation of international stand­ards. The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) core conven­tions on forced and compulsory labor provide an exception for pris­on labor on condition that the use of such labor is consistent with ILO guidelines.76 While China has not ratified either of the core conventions on forced and compulsory labor, as a member of the ILO, it remains obligated to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor rights, including those associated with forced and compulsory labor.77 Despite these obligations, exploitation of prison labor, particularly in reeducation through labor (RTL) facilities, re­mains widespread, in part due to official corruption and the eco­nomic incentives prison labor offers local government.78 During the reporting year, Chinese and international media have reported on abusive working conditions at RTL facilities throughout China, stating that inmates are routinely forced to work long hours under threat of physical abuse with little or no compensation.79 RTL offi­cers reportedly solicit bribes from the families of inmates for their early release or better treatment.80 In a report published in May 2013 by Southern Weekend, a newspaper based in Guangzhou mu­nicipality, Guangdong province, former RTL officials acknowledged using ‘‘high-pressure policies such as beatings and [other] corporal punishment’’ to enforce larger production quotas on uncooperative prisoners, stating that the amount they could earn depended on whether or not prisoners could meet or surpass given production quotas.81

The export of prison products from China reportedly continues despite China’s 1991 Provisions Reiterating the Prohibition on the Export of Products Made by Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through Labor.82 While the extent of prison labor in China re­mains unclear, U.S. government assessments, as well as inter­national media reports from the past year, indicate prison labor has been used to manufacture, among other products, toys, elec­tronics, and clothing.83 The 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor and 1994 Statement of Cooperation between the United States and China established mechanisms to safeguard against the export of prison products to the United States.84 De­spite these agreements, Chinese cooperation has reportedly been slow and irregular in responding to U.S. concerns.85

Wages

Average wage levels in China continued to increase this past year, continuing a trend over the decade from 2000 to 2010 that saw real average wages more than triple.86 Reports suggest struc­tural changes in China’s labor market, in particular a decline in the growth of the working age population, are partially responsible for the upward pressure on wages.87 Sporadic labor shortages in 2013 88 and the relocation of manufacturing operations further in­land or to Southeast Asia to offset rising costs, among other factors, also suggest tightening labor market conditions.89 According to some Chinese and international observers this combination of fac­tors suggests the decline of ‘‘cheap labor’’ in China, as wages will continue to increase for the foreseeable future.90

Despite continued wage growth, income inequality among dif­ferent regions and industrial sectors has also increased in recent years, greatly expanding the disparity between rich and poor peo­ple.91 Chinese and international economists indicate that the an­nual rate of wage growth in China continues to fall in proportion to gross domestic product,92 while wages for migrant workers re­main far behind the national average.93 China’s State Council re­leased a long-awaited income distribution plan in February 2013 that seeks to reduce income inequality and increase household in­come through a series of measures, including doubling income lev­els by 2020 and broadening social welfare programs; 94 however, ob­servers from China and abroad have criticized the plan for its lack of binding commitments and questioned whether it can be fully im­plemented.95

MINIMUM WAGE RATES

Local governments continued to raise minimum-wage levels this past year in keeping with growth targets outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan on Employment Promotion issued in 2011, which called for minimum-wage levels to increase annually by 13 percent and reach 40 percent of the average wage of local urban workers by 2015.96 During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed reports from Chinese media of increases in the statutory minimum wage in 23 provincial-level jurisdictions and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.97 Despite these increases, minimum-wage levels in many locations continue to be below the 40-percent target outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan.98 Moreover, reports indicate rising liv­ing costs continue to erode wage gains as workers spend a greater portion of their income on everyday necessities.99 In March 2013, more than 250 workers from a wide range of professions in Shenzhen municipality signed a petition protesting newly imple­mented minimum-wage standards, arguing that the increase was insufficient to cover rising living costs in Shenzhen.100

WAGE ARREARS AND NONPAYMENT OF WAGES

Wage arrears and nonpayment of wages remained serious prob­lems this past year, particularly for migrant workers.101 According to a report from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Secu­rity, wage arrears cases increased 7.5 percent in 2012 from the pre­vious year, concentrated predominantly in the construction and manufacturing industries.102 Widespread use of subcontracting, among other factors, including tight credit controls and declining export demand, remain the underlying causes for wage arrears cases.103 As bank lending rates rise, debt-burdened industries face increased difficulty paying workers, delaying payments, and in some instances defaulting and declaring bankruptcy, leaving work­ers with little recourse to recover unpaid wages.104 Central- and provincial-level government officials have taken steps in the past year to reduce cases of wage arrears, including streamlining proce­dures for investigating and resolving wage arrears claims, estab­lishing contingency funds,105 and pursuing criminal charges against employers guilty of nonpayment of wages.106 Despite these measures, international media reports throughout 2013 indicated that wage arrears continued to be a primary factor behind worker-led protests, especially in the weeks prior to the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday.107

Occupational Safety

Workers in China continued to face occupational safety risks this past year. The 2002 PRC Law on Production Safety and related legislation contains a number of occupational health and safety provisions aimed at preventing workplace accidents and estab­lishing a regulatory system to inspect and handle safety viola­tions.108 Despite these legal measures, systemic problems in imple­mentation and enforcement, as well as the lack of meaningful worker participation in workplace decisions that have an impact on safety and health, continue to constrain efforts to reduce industrial accidents.109 Moreover, unregistered and illegal manufacturing and mining operations continue to be prevalent throughout the coun­try.110 Chinese officials have indicated that corruption and govern­ment protectionism for local industries has also hindered effective safety oversight, causing many industrial accidents.111 Research published in the Harvard Business Review in 2013 found workers employed at enterprises in China with political connections were five times as likely to die in an industrial accident.112 At a forum held on production safety in May 2013, Director of the State Ad­ministration of Work Safety, Yang Dongliang, emphasized that greater efforts were needed to ‘‘resolve problems of lax enforcement and implementation.’’ 113

Workers in the construction, manufacturing, service, and mining industries are most at risk for sustaining occupational injury or disease.114 Although officially reported deaths from industrial acci­dents declined by 4.7 percent to 71,983 in 2012,115 Chinese scholars and labor activists suggest the actual number could be significantly higher due to underreporting.116 Chinese media continued to report on cases in which mine managers and local officials concealed in­formation about mine accidents.117 Despite a claimed 33 percent decline in reported mine deaths in 2012,118 the death toll for work­ers in China’s coal industry remains more than 10 times the rate in developed countries.119

Reports from non-governmental labor organizations and Chinese and international media continue to highlight workplace abuses and poor working conditions throughout China. Workers often cited low wages, forced overtime, and harsh management practices as some of the major problems that they face.120 Allegations of abu­sive working conditions, for example, continued to surface at fac­tories operated by Foxconn.121 While the Commission reported last year that Foxconn agreed to improve working conditions at its fac­tories, including reducing overtime and ensuring overtime wages, a number of labor experts in China and abroad indicate changes have been minimal.122 Reports also indicated that some workers are exposed to chemicals known to be harmful.123 In June 2013, a fire at a poultry factory in Jilin province killed 120 people and left 77 injured.124 According to an investigation by Chinese officials, locked emergency exits prevented workers from escaping, a prob­lem that had been highlighted in previous industrial accidents. In­vestigators also identified poor safety supervision and insufficient safety equipment and fire prevention training for workers as fac­tors in the high number of casualties.125

Occupational Health

Officially reported cases of occupational disease have grown at increasing rates in recent years, particularly for the lung disease pneumoconiosis.126 According to figures from the Ministry of Health, out of a total of 749,970 reported cases of occupation-related disease at the end of 2010, 90 percent, or over 676,000, were cases of pneumoconiosis.127 According to Chinese labor ex­perts and lawyers, the total number could be closer to six mil­lion.128 Inadequate government supervision of industry compliance with occupational health standards,129 illegal actions by employ­ers,130 and a lack of knowledge among workers about health in the workplace reportedly have contributed to high rates of occupational disease.131

Workers’ Compensation

Obtaining compensation for work-related injury or occupational disease in general remains a difficult and protracted process. Chi­nese labor and occupational-disease advocates contend that the legal framework regulating compensation continues to be overly complicated and time-consuming, taking anywhere between 2 to more than 10 years for compensation claims to be processed, with no guarantee of success.132 Moreover, illegal practices and intran­sigence by employers and local governments, including refusing to hand over documents required for processing compensation claims, failing to sign labor contracts or provide workers with statutory in­jury insurance, and refusing to accept liability for hazardous work­ing conditions, further delay and complicate prospects for obtaining compensation.133 Occupational-disease advocates insist processing delays can be particularly harmful to workers suffering from pneu­moconiosis—only 10 to 20 percent of patients reportedly obtain an official diagnosis needed to receive benefits—contributing to the high death rate among sufferers.134 In some cases, workers with pneumoconiosis settled for one-off compensation payments to pay for medical care, even though the compensation fails to cover costs for ongoing treatment.135 A health expert with the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention stated that only 10 percent of employees in China receive regular occupational-health services.136

Variations in local implementing regulations for national legisla­tion on compensation also indicate that actual benefits can differ significantly from region to region. In October 2012, the family of Zhang Tingzhen, an employee at a Foxconn factory in Shenzhen municipality who was severely disabled in a work-related accident, brought a case before a labor arbitration tribunal over the com­pany’s demands that Zhang travel to Huizhou municipality for a disability assessment, where compensation levels are substantially lower than in Shenzhen.137 Zhang’s father reported that he re­ceived text messages from the company threatening to cut off fund­ing for his son’s treatment if they did not travel to Huizhou, and that he was beaten at one point by security officials when he tried to retrieve his son’s personal items from the factory.138 Labor activ­ists insist that Zhang’s case underlines a common practice by com­panies in China, in which employers sign labor contracts with em­ployees in areas where compensation levels are comparatively low, and then dispatch them to work in areas with higher compensation rates.139

Amendments to the PRC Administrative Measures for the Diag­nosis and Evaluation of Occupational Disease, effective April 10, 2013, contain provisions that could make it easier for workers to raise occupational disease claims, while also increasing the liability of employers.140 Most significantly, it gives workers the right to se­lect the official hospital they will be diagnosed by, whereas pre­viously local authorities would usually only accept a diagnosis from a hospital in the same jurisdiction as an employer, a prospect par­ticularly problematic for migrant workers who may have already left the area after an illness developed.141

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, as in previous years, developments in criminal justice were driven by the Chinese government’s and Communist Party’s top priorities: maintaining ‘‘social stability’’ and ensuring the Party’s continued monopoly on political power.1 The Commission observed the politically motivated use of criminal law and police power to suppress dissent and per­ceived challenges to Party rule. The arrest of anticorruption cam­paigners and well-known rights activist Xu Zhiyong, as well as the criminal detention of prominent human rights advocate Guo Feixiong (aka Yang Maodong), are just several examples from this reporting year of the Party’s use of criminal law to silence its crit­ics.2

In a major legal development this year, the new PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which was adopted in March 2012 after being discussed for many years, took effect on January 1, 2013. While the revised law as written has numerous positive aspects, it fails to incorporate several key rights for suspects and defendants, such as a clear presumption of innocence and an explicit right to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself. Although it is too early to determine if the new CPL is being effectively implemented, preliminary reports suggest that new provisions aimed at enhanc­ing the ability of lawyers to meet with detained clients are being implemented, albeit unevenly.3 The 2012 CPL also contains new provisions for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. If imple­mented, these measures could help address a major challenge for the judicial system—confessions coerced through torture and wrongful convictions—a problem that took center stage this year as numerous cases surfaced of individuals wrongfully convicted based on coerced confessions.

Abuse of Police Power

As the Commission noted in its 2012 annual report, China’s do­mestic security apparatus has grown significantly in stature and influence since 2007.4 Zhou Yongkang, who retired in fall 2012 as the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC), had amassed enormous power.5 The PLAC, which is responsible for maintaining law and order, has direct control over the police, prosecutors, and the courts.6 Meng Jianzhu, former Minister of Public Security, is the new PLAC secretary—a position that no longer has a seat on the downsized Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Com­munist Party Central Committee, a move likely designed to pre­vent any one leader from becoming too powerful.7

Unchecked police power in Chongqing municipality under Bo Xilai (who had close ties with Zhou Yongkang) was a defining char­acteristic of his campaign against organized crime in Chongqing from 2008 to 2011.8 Over 3,000 people were convicted of various crimes during the campaign, and many were tortured.9 Bo used the law not just to crack down on major criminals in Chongqing but also to target his political rivals and seize private assets.10 Some efforts are being made to provide redress for those wronged by Bo and his former police chief Wang Lijun; for example, the Chongqing Public Security Bureau is reinstating or otherwise providing re­dress to approximately 900 police officers who suffered unjust treatment during the campaign.11 But, for those who have filed ap­peals claiming they were wrongfully convicted, the matter has been deemed ‘‘sensitive,’’ and there has been little progress in redressing these wrongs.12

Chinese authorities continue to use vaguely defined crimes to suppress and punish dissent and perceived challenges to Party rule. In addition to Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes ‘‘subversion’’ and ‘‘inciting subversion,’’ 13 during this reporting year authorities made ample use of such vague crimes as ‘‘gathering people to disturb public order’’ and ‘‘unlawful assembly’’ to suppress rights advocates and civil society activists.14 In mid-July, the Beijing Public Security Bureau (PSB) detained Xu Zhiyong, a leading proponent of the New Citizens’ Movement—a loose network of individuals promoting a broad range of ideas in­cluding legal and political reforms, human rights, and social jus­tice—on suspicion of ‘‘gathering people to disturb public order.’’ 15 On August 22, the Beijing PSB arrested him on the same charge.16 Guangzhou-based activist Guo Feixiong was detained on the same charge on August 8.17 As of late August, dozens of anticorruption advocates and other citizens reportedly affiliated with the New Citizens’ Movement had been detained or arrested for peaceful as­sembly on various charges, including ‘‘unlawful assembly’’ and ‘‘in­citing subversion.’’ 18

Authorities also continued to abuse their power to persecute rel­atives of activists.19 Chen Guangcheng’s nephew, Chen Kegui, was sentenced in November 2012 to three years and three months in prison for the ‘‘intentional wounding’’ of several township officials in what international and domestic observers maintain was an act of self-defense, after a trial that one legal expert described ‘‘as a judicial farce.’’ 20 Liu Xia, the wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, remains unlawfully detained in her home.21 In June, Liu Xia’s brother, Liu Hui, was sentenced to 11 years in pris­on for financial fraud; his appeal was denied in August.22

A symbol of unchecked police power is the urban management law enforcement corps or ‘‘para-police’’ (chengguan), which has be­come synonymous with lawlessness and brutality in China.23 Chengguan enforce administrative regulations in the cities, often using violent methods.24 In 2009, the Commission reported on the increasing number of violent incidents perpetrated by chengguan against unlicensed street vendors and others.25 In July 2013, the issue of the unregulated power of chengguan was once again in the spotlight when chengguan in Linwu county, Hunan province, beat an unlicensed watermelon vendor to death, and, in a separate inci­dent, when a man in a wheelchair, reportedly paralyzed by a chengguan beating in 2005, detonated a bomb in the Beijing Inter­national Airport to draw attention to his unsuccessful efforts to seek redress.26 As in 2009, such incidents of chengguan violence have prompted calls for reform of the chengguan system.27

Arbitrary Detention

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention defines the dep­rivation of personal liberty to be ‘‘arbitrary’’ if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) There is clearly no basis in law for such dep­rivation; (2) an individual is deprived of his or her liberty for hav­ing exercised rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit­ical Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is grave noncompliance with fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international human rights instruments.28

In addition to the many democracy and human rights advocates who continue to be arbitrarily detained in prison under the second and/or third criteria of the Working Group’s definition above (e.g., Liu Xiaobo, Chen Wei, Chen Xi, Guo Quan, Li Tie, Zhu Yufu, Liu Xianbin, Gao Zhisheng, Ni Yulan, Wang Bingzhang), authorities also detain Chinese citizens arbitrarily using other venues and methods.29 Forms of arbitrary detention include, among others, ‘‘soft detention’’ (ruanjin), ‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu), shuanggui (a form of Party discipline), enforced disappearance, and various forms of administrative detention such as reeducation through labor, ‘‘custody and education’’ (for sex workers and their clients), and compulsory drug treatment centers. Many forms of arbitrary detention violate China’s own laws.30

SOFT DETENTION

Soft detention (ruanjin) includes a range of extralegal controls to which an individual may be subjected, such as home confinement, surveillance, restricted movement, and limitations on contact with others.31 During this reporting year, authorities continued to use ruanjin against individuals deemed ‘‘sensitive,’’ such as dissidents, rights defense lawyers, activists, civil society actors, and sometimes their family members as well.32 Liu Xia’s ongoing unlawful home confinement (since October 2010) is an example of the use of ruanjin against an activist’s spouse.33 Before Xu Zhiyong was taken into custody in mid-July, he was unlawfully confined to his home for three months.34 Police aim to keep ‘‘sensitive’’ individuals under control and out of sight around major events or anniver­saries such as the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Com­munist Party and the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen pro­tests.35

SECRET DETENTION: ‘‘BLACK JAILS,’’ SHUANGGUI, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

According to the UN Committee against Torture, detention of in­dividuals in secret detention facilities ‘‘constitutes per se disappear­ance.’’ 36 ‘‘Black jails’’ are secret detention facilities that operate completely outside of China’s official judicial and administrative detention systems.37 Chinese authorities primarily use ‘‘black jails’’ to detain petitioners who leave their hometown to seek redress at higher levels for complaints they have relating to actions taken by local government officials, such as forced evictions and land sei­zures.38 Although Chinese officials have occasionally taken legal action against individuals involved in operating ‘‘black jails,’’ the facilities continue to exist because, as the Economist observed in March, ‘‘[b]lack jails serve the interests of every level of govern­ment.’’ 39 The central government is determined to keep petitioners off the streets of Beijing in order to ‘‘maintain stability,’’ and local officials want to ensure that their careers are not adversely af­fected by disgruntled local residents causing ‘‘trouble’’ in Beijing.40

There were several hopeful signs with respect to ‘‘black jails’’ during this reporting year.41 In a rare move, Chinese authorities released hundreds of petitioners detained in Jiujingzhuang, one of Beijing’s largest ‘‘black jails,’’ in connection with Rule of Law Pro­motion Day on December 4.42 And, in February 2013, Xinhua re­ported that a Beijing court convicted 10 men from Henan province for illegally detaining 11 petitioners from Henan in Beijing.43 Seven of the defendants received sentences ranging from six months to two years; the other three were juveniles and given sus­pended sentences. Global Times reported that the petitioners were not satisfied with the sentences, and believed that local officials who were responsible for their illegal detention should have been charged.44 Despite these and other efforts by the central govern­ment to rein in ‘‘black jails,’’ observers caution it is unlikely that the Chinese government will dismantle the system anytime soon.45

Shuanggui (‘‘double regulation’’ or ‘‘double designation’’) is a form of extralegal detention used primarily for Chinese Communist Party officials who are suspected of corruption or other infractions, but also for ‘‘cadres who have transgressed politically.’’ 46 Detainees are held incommunicado with no access to a lawyer or family mem­bers.47 Secrecy and harsh interrogation methods further the main objectives of shuanggui: the extraction of confessions.48 Former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai was held under shuanggui from March 2012 at least until his case was turned over to prosecu­tors in late September 2012.49 During Bo’s trial in late August 2013, Bo recanted confessions he had made while reportedly ‘‘under pressure’’ in shuanggui detention.50 On September 22, the Jinan Municipal People’s Intermediate Court in Shandong province, con­victed Bo of bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power and sen­tenced him to life imprisonment; the court rejected Bo’s argument that his earlier confessions should be excluded as unlawfully ob­tained.51 During this reporting year, three Chinese officials died within a three-month period while under shuanggui. Six Party in­vestigators were put on trial in September for the ‘‘intentional in­fliction of harm leading to death’’ in connection with one of those cases.52

Police relied on enforced disappearance (usually in the name of ‘‘residential surveillance’’) in the crackdown following the calls for Tunisian-style ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests in China in February 2011 to such an extent that the UN Working Group on Enforced or Invol­untary Disappearances issued a statement in April of that year ex­pressing ‘‘serious concern’’ about the wave of disappearances in China.53 The practice of enforced disappearance has not only con­tinued since 2011, but is now codified in one of the most controver­sial revisions to the recently amended PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which took effect on January 1, 2013.54 Article 73, or ‘‘the disappearance clause,’’ provides that ‘‘residential surveillance’’ of up to six months may be carried out in a ‘‘designated residence’’ (zhiding jusuo)—i.e., a place of the public security bureau’s choos­ing that is not an officially recognized place of detention—when there is suspicion of the crime of endangering ‘‘national security, terrorism, or serious bribery’’ and residential surveillance at the suspect’s domicile may impede the investigation.55 Family mem­bers must be notified within 24 hours only of the fact of ‘‘residen­tial surveillance in a designated location’’ and not of the person’s whereabouts or the basis of detention.56 Even this minimal notifi­cation requirement may be waived if there is no way of notifying the family (wufa tongzhi).57 The individual is thus held incommuni­cado, increasing the likelihood that he or she will suffer torture or abuse.58

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

There are several different forms of administrative detention in China, including reeducation through labor (RTL); ‘‘custody and education’’ (shourong jiaoyu), which is applied to sex workers and their clients; and ‘‘custody and rehabilitation’’ (shourong jiaoyang), which targets juvenile delinquents (under the age of 16).59 These and other forms of extrajudicial administrative detention are arbi­trary under international human rights standards because they permit the deprivation of personal liberty without trial or conform­ance with other fair trial standards.60 In addition, they violate Chi­na’s own laws.61

The most prominent form of administrative detention in China, RTL, has been the subject of intense public debate during this past year,62 and the Chinese government has vowed to reform RTL by the end of 2013.63 [See Section III—Access to Justice for more in­formation.] Under the RTL system—which has become synonymous with rampant official abuses—Chinese public security officers are authorized to detain individuals without trial for a maximum term of three years, with the possibility of up to a one-year extension.64 There have been reports of RTL centers releasing detainees ahead of their scheduled release dates and of centers being repurposed as compulsory drug treatment centers.65 Compulsory drug treatment centers, however, present the same legal problems and human rights issues as RTL, and they violate both Chinese and inter­national law.66

Two other ‘‘quasi-RTL’’ measures are the relatively unknown ‘‘custody and education’’ (C&E) and ‘‘custody and rehabilitation’’ (C&R). C&E is a form of administrative detention that permits Chinese police to send sex workers and their clients to detention facilities for up to two years without trial or judicial oversight.67 As with RTL and compulsory drug treatment, C&E inmates are subjected to forced labor, and rights abuses are rampant.68 Under C&R, police may send juvenile offenders under the age of 16 to de­tention facilities for periods between one and three years without due process of law. A recent editorial in the Southern Metropolitan Daily argued that, because C&E and C&R suffer from the same legal infirmities as RTL, they must be considered together in any discussion of RTL reform.69

Access to Counsel

The 2012 PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) contains several positive developments with respect to access to counsel. For exam­ple, it expands the circumstances under which legal aid must be provided for suspects and defendants (for example, if the suspect is facing a possible life sentence or death)—a revision that may raise the generally low rate of representation of defendants in criminal trials.70 The new CPL incorporates provisions from the 2007 PRC Lawyers’ Law that seek to ameliorate the ‘‘three difficul­ties’’ defense attorneys typically face—gaining access both to de­tained clients and to prosecutor’s case files, and collecting evi­dence.71 Because the CPL clearly applies to the public security ap­paratus (the police had argued previously that the Lawyers’ Law only applied to lawyers), the new CPL may ease the ‘‘three difficul­ties.’’ 72 The new CPL stipulates that a lawyer need only show ‘‘three certificates’’ (i.e., a lawyers’ license, a law firm certificate, and a client engagement letter), and the detention center must ar­range for a meeting with the detainee within 48 hours of the re­quest.73 Although it is too early to draw conclusions, preliminary research conducted by Shangquan Law Firm, a Beijing-based firm that specializes in criminal defense, suggests that there has been substantial improvement in the ability of defense lawyers to meet with their detained clients.74

The Shangquan report notes, however, that some problems still exist in certain locations. For example, several detention centers in different jurisdictions require the presence of two lawyers before a meeting will be arranged.75 Reminiscent of the ‘‘state secrets’’ ex­ception under the prior CPL, public security officials can rely on a vague exception in the new CPL to require defense attorneys to first obtain permission before they may meet with a detained sus­pect.76 Article 37 of the 2012 CPL requires prior permission in cases involving the crimes of endangering state security, terrorism, or serious bribery.77 The law firm’s research found that public se­curity agencies are interpreting these ‘‘three categories of cases’’ (sanlei anjian) broadly and are invoking sanlei anjian as an excuse to restrict or prohibit meetings between lawyers and their clients.78 The unevenness of implementation of the CPL provisions that ad­dress the ‘‘three difficulties’’ was highlighted in July by Cao Jianming, the president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, who referred to ‘‘local problems’’ as the cause.79

In ‘‘politically sensitive’’ cases, defendants still have difficulty not only gaining access to counsel but also retaining counsel of their own choosing. Authorities twice rejected requests by Xu Zhiyong’s attorney, Liu Weiguo, to meet with Xu, and on one occasion even held Liu for six hours.80 Eventually a different attorney, Zhang Qingfang, was permitted to meet with Xu.81 In August, lawyers for Guo Feixiong were denied access to their detained client.82 Bo Xilai was denied access to counsel for many months while he was held in shuanggui,83 and lawyers retained by Bo’s family were denied permission to represent him in court.84

Torture and Abuse in Custody

Despite the Chinese government’s continued efforts to address the problem, torture and abuse in police stations, detention centers, prisons, administrative detention facilities, and secret detention sites remain widespread in China.85 In April 2013, a Chinese mag­azine published a detailed account of torture, abuse, and forced labor at the Masanjia Women’s RTL Center in Liaoning province, sparking a great deal of online commentary and fueling calls for the reform or abolition of RTL.86 In May, Southern Weekend pub­lished an expose´ on corruption and forced labor in RTL centers based on interviews with former RTL guards, one of whom is quoted as saying: ‘‘The reality is that we force RTL detainees to work and make money [for us]. That’s what every RTL center does.’’ 87

Torture by police in the course of criminal investigations remains a common problem.88 The government relies overwhelmingly on confessions as evidence in criminal cases.89 Sex workers inter­viewed by Human Rights Watch describe how police beat them after taking them into custody to try to force them to confess to prostitution.90 Many of the targets of Bo Xilai’s crackdown on orga­nized crime in Chongqing have alleged that police tortured them to confess.91 Gong Gangmo was reportedly tortured by police in part to coerce him to frame his lawyer, Li Zhuang, of the crime of sub­orning perjury.92 Gong has filed an appeal seeking to have his ver­dict overturned, as has Li. Gong, who has since apologized to Li Zhuang for setting him up, will be assisted by Li in his appeal.93

The Chinese government has attempted to address the persistent problem of forced confessions since at least 1997, without much success.94 During the 2013 reporting year, the issue of coerced con­fessions and wrongful convictions garnered a great deal of public attention after a number of wrongful convictions came to light and high-level court officials made statements condemning the phe­nomenon.95 The 2012 PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) contains new provisions that aim to prevent confessions obtained through torture.96 The law incorporates a June 2010 rule prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal proceedings.97 More­over, Article 50 of the 2012 CPL contains a provision that prohibits police, prosecutors, and judicial personnel from forcing a suspect to incriminate himself.98 Article 50 is not framed as a right held by the suspect, however, and its potential for curbing abuse during in­terrogation is diminished by the retention of a provision from the prior CPL requiring that suspects have an obligation to answer the interrogator’s questions ‘‘truthfully.’’ 99 The absence of an explicit right to remain silent and a presumption of innocence may well un­dermine efforts to prevent coerced confessions, and the absence of a right to legal counsel during a detained suspect’s first interroga­tion also increases the likelihood of abuse.100

It remains to be seen how the provisions in the new CPL regard­ing the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will be implemented in practice.101 Since the exclusionary rule was first issued in June 2010, there have been few reports of successfully excluded illegally obtained evidence.102 It was only in September 2012 that the media reported on the first case in Beijing in which a court ex­cluded evidence that had been illegally obtained.103 At his trial Bo Xilai argued, without success, that his shuanggui confession had been illegally obtained and thus should be excluded.104

Wrongful convictions, as the president of the Zhejiang Province High People’s Court stated in a media interview in March, ‘‘are ba­sically all related to the coercion of confessions through torture.’’ 105 At the time of the interview, his court was dealing with two high-profile wrongful conviction cases, both of which involved confes­sions obtained through torture. In March, the court reversed the convictions of Zhang Gaoping and his nephew, who had spent 10 years in prison for a rape and murder they did not commit.106 In July, the court also overturned the convictions of five men who had already served 18 years in prison for the robbery and murder of two taxi drivers based on fingerprint evidence that was uncovered in 2011.107 All five men said that their confessions were the result of torture.108

In an article published in May, Shen Deyong, the Executive Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court, wrote that wrongful con­victions posed an ‘‘unprecedented challenge’’ to the court system.109 In addition to the harm wrongly decided decisions cause the parties involved, Shen wrote, they also damage judicial authority and the public’s faith in the law and rule of law.110 In July, the head of the Guangdong Province High People’s Court criticized the funda­mental structure of the judicial system as outdated and reflecting a Soviet model in which courts are treated like any other govern­ment agency and thus are subject to various kinds of interference and influence.111 In August, reportedly in response to the spate of wrongful convictions that surfaced in 2013, the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission issued, for the first time, guidelines on the prevention of wrongful judg­ments that mandate lifelong responsibility for police, prosecutors, and judges involved in judgments later demonstrated to be wrong.112

Death Penalty

As in previous years, the Chinese government continues to treat data on the use of the death penalty as a state secret.113 Amnesty International concluded, based on available information, that the Chinese government executed more people in 2012 than the rest of the world combined.114 The number of executions in China is stead­ily decreasing, however. The Dui Hua Foundation estimates that 3,000 prisoners were executed in China in 2012, a decrease of 25 percent from the 4,000 cases estimated for 2011.115 Tsinghua Uni­versity law professor Yi Yanyou puts the figure at over 2,000.116

Despite the lack of transparency regarding many aspects of the death penalty, including the Supreme People’s Court review of death penalty sentences,117 the Chinese media and public are pay­ing increasing attention to fairness and procedural justice in death penalty cases.118 In a case that received a great deal of attention in the media and on the popular microblog site Sina Weibo, Zeng Chengjie, a businessman and property developer from Hunan prov­ince, was convicted of fraudulent fundraising and executed on July

12.119 In contravention of Chinese law, authorities failed to notify his family until after the fact.120 Within a few days after his daughter posted this news on Sina Weibo, it was forwarded more than 70,000 times and had generated nearly 50,000 comments.121

Organs are still harvested from executed prisoners in China,122 and the extent to which rules requiring prior informed consent are followed is unclear.123 In March 2012, then-Vice Minister of Chi­na’s Ministry of Health, Huang Jiefu, wrote that, of the organ transplant operations performed in China using organs from de­ceased donors (the majority of such operations), more than 90 per­cent of the donors were executed prisoners.124 In March 2013, the Ministry of Health and the Chinese Red Cross formally launched a national voluntary organ donation system, but the number of or­gans donated during the three-year pilot program before the launch was low—only 659 people donated a total of 1,804 major organs.125 According to the newly created National Health and Family Plan­ning Commission (NHFPC), each year an estimated 300,000 people need organ transplants, but only about 10,000 transplants are per­formed annually.126 In August 2013, Huang Jiefu, now the director of a human organ transplant committee at the NHFPC, reportedly announced that China would cease relying on the organs of exe­cuted prisoners within the next two years.127

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

International Standards

The Chinese government’s legal and policy framework for reli­gion violates the protections for freedom of religion set forth in Ar­ticle 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international human rights instruments.1 Although the PRC Constitution states that all citizens enjoy ‘‘freedom of religious be­lief,’’ it limits citizens’ ability to exercise their beliefs by protecting only ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ 2 a vaguely defined term that has been used to suppress forms of religious activity protected under international human rights standards.3 The government has cre­ated a regulatory framework that recognizes only five religions— Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism—for limited state protections for religious activity,4 and the government has continued to outlaw some belief systems,5 thereby denying members of these communities the right to practice their faith openly and without fear of government reprisal.

Regulatory and Policy Framework

During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese gov­ernment continued to use law and policy as tools to restrain rather than protect Chinese citizens’ right to freedom of religion. Although the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) and local govern­ment regulations protect some religious activities, such protection is limited in scope and applies only to the five state-sanctioned reli­gious communities.6 The RRA does not include criminal penalties for violation of its provisions,7 but authorities use the PRC Crimi­nal Law,8 anti-cult regulations,9 and various administrative pun­ishments, including reeducation through labor,10 to punish or de­tain citizens for forms of religious practice deemed to fall outside of approved parameters. Chinese government and Communist Party control over religious affairs is exercised through the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and lower level reli­gious affairs bureaus (RABs) under the State Council,11 the Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD),12 and the five ‘‘patriotic’’ religious associations: The Buddhist Association of China (BAC), the Catholic Patriotic Association of China (CPA), the Islamic Asso­ciation of China (IAC), the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches in China (TSPM), and the Chinese Taoist As­sociation (CTA).13 All religious clergy are required to be registered with the government.14 In January 2013, a top religious official an­nounced that all clergy would be registered by the end of the year.15

CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION REGISTRATION

Registration requirements for religious organizations 16 in China continue to be highly restrictive, limiting the growth of religious communities and the right to freedom of religion, assembly, and as­sociation.17 During the 2013 reporting year, the Chinese govern­ment announced an institutional reform plan that will loosen reg­istration and administrative strictures on some social organiza­tions, including charities and social services organizations, but which explicitly excludes religious organizations, among others.18 Religious organizations will continue to be required to operate under a legal framework that requires the approval and oversight of a supervisory unit and registration with the relevant level of civil affairs bureau.19 A February 2012 opinion issued by SARA, the UFWD, and four other government departments called for ‘‘equal treatment’’ of religious groups in establishing charitable or­ganizations and noted that ‘‘some localities and departments had not yet adequately recognized the positive significance of religious communities’ participation in charitable activities.’’ 20 It is unclear how the government will facilitate religious communities’ legal par­ticipation in charitable and public interest activities given the ex­clusion of religious groups from the current social organization re­form plan.21

China’s Religious Communities

BUDDHISM (NON-TIBETAN)

During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese gov­ernment and Communist Party, through the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), local religious affairs bureaus, and the state-run Buddhist Association of China (BAC), continued to monitor, control, restrict, and ‘‘guide’’ the religious activities of Buddhists in non-Tibetan areas of China.22 [For information on Ti­betan Buddhists, see Section V—Tibet.] In a speech delivered at a ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the BAC in Au­gust 2013, Vice Premier and member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) Liu Yandong stat­ed her hope that Buddhists in China ‘‘adhere to the tradition of lov­ing the country and loving religion, embrace the leadership of the Party’’; ‘‘love deeply’’ (re’ai) the Party, the nation, socialism, and the masses; and ‘‘adhere to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics.’’ 23 In October 2012, SARA and nine other central-level government agencies issued a joint opinion on the handling of problems involved in the management of Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples, calling for tighter control and regulation of re­ligious sites and personnel, and prohibiting unregistered organiza­tions and religious sites from conducting religious activities or col­lecting religious donations.24

The Chinese government continues to ban at least three sects of Buddhism it has labeled as ‘‘cults’’ (xiejiao): 25 Guanyin Famen,26 the True Buddha School (lingxian zhen fozong),27 and Yuandun Famen.28 A prominent Guangdong province-based Buddhist leader, Wu Zeheng, also known as Zen Master Xing Wu, has been mon­itored and harassed since his release from prison for ‘‘economic crimes’’ in 2010.29 The Chinese government has also refused to issue Wu a passport, thereby preventing him from lecturing abroad: ‘‘It’s just another way to punish people they don’t like,’’ Wu told the New York Times in February.30

CATHOLICISM

Government control and interference. The Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese raised concerns about the Chinese government’s policies toward the Catholic Church in China in an ‘‘Opinion on Religious Freedom in China for the UN Human Rights Council’s October 2013 Universal Periodic Review’’ of the Chinese government’s human rights record. Accord­ing to the opinion, the government’s policy of an ‘‘independent, au­tonomous, and self-administered’’ Church managed by two state-controlled entities—the Catholic Patriotic Association of China (CPA) and the Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCC) 31—violates ‘‘the consciences of the faithful and basic Catholic doctrine.’’ 32 The opinion asserts, moreover, that Chinese government policies have divided Chinese Catholics into an ‘‘offi­cial’’ church and an ‘‘underground’’ church.33 An unofficial estimate of the total number of Catholics in China is approximately 12 mil­lion people, split more or less evenly between the official and un­derground churches.34

The Chinese government and Communist Party deny Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to se­lect bishops. Although the Commission reported that the Holy See has had a quiet role in jointly approving some bishops in recent years,35 four bishops were ordained in China between November 2010 and July 2012 without Holy See approval.36 In late 2012, the BCCC adopted a new national regulation on the selection and ordi­nation of bishops that took effect in April 2013; the Holy See and international observers suggest the new regulation strengthens a hardline approach.37 The regulation explicitly requires bishop can­didates to ‘‘endorse the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and the socialist system.’’ 38 The new regulation also expands the au­thority of the BCCC and the role of provincial-level religious affairs bureaus in the selection and consecration process compared with an earlier (1993) regulation.39 In a recent example of government interference, the Union of Asian Catholic News reported that provincial-level officials in Hubei province overruled Wuhan city church leaders’ November 2012 decisions on upcoming parish as­signments and transfers, dismissed two priests from the CPA, and warned individual priests not to leave their parishes for their new assignments.40

Detention of Catholic clergy. The detention of auxiliary bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin from the diocese of Shanghai munici­pality, was a prominent focus of international media coverage dur­ing the 2013 reporting year.41 Bishop Ma has been confined to the Sheshan Seminary in Shanghai since his public withdrawal from the Catholic Patriotic Association of China (CPA) at his ordination on July 7, 2012.42 The CPA and the BCCC subsequently announced in December their decision to revoke Ma’s title of auxiliary bishop and his membership as a clergyman in the CPA,43 noting their ‘‘hope that the Shanghai diocese . . . learns a lesson from the inci­dent.’’ 44 The Holy See denounced the state-run church’s action, stating that ‘‘no episcopal conference, in any part of the world, has the power to overrule the pontifical mandate . . .,’’ and asserted that the Holy See continues to recognize Ma as auxiliary bishop of Shanghai.45 Bishop Ma, whose selection and ordination were ap­proved by both the Holy See and the CPA, was in line to succeed bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian.46 Bishop Jin’s death in late April 2013 at the age of 96 47 reportedly has left the Shanghai diocese—one of the largest in China—without a bishop.48

The Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese noted cases of underground clergy who have been detained and ‘‘disappeared’’ for their pastoral activity and refusal to join the CPA,49 such as priests Ma Wuyong, Liu Honggeng, Lu Genjun, and elderly bishops Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang.50 In a recent example, the Cardinal Kung Foundation reported that, on August 7, 2013, 10 public security officers from Zhangjiakou city, Hebei province, took into custody Song Wanjun, a priest with the underground church.51 As of August 2013, his whereabouts were unknown.52 Other priests reportedly serving prison sentences are Li Huisheng and Wang Zhong.53

China-Holy See relations. The Chinese government does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Holy See, and there was no apparent progress in the normalization of relations during the 2013 reporting year.54 An October 2012 article by a senior cleric at the Holy See, Cardinal Fernando Filoni, however, raised his hope for ‘‘sincere and respectful dialogue’’ by invoking a 2007 pastoral letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Chinese Catholics that had launched a brief period of improved relations between China and the Holy See.55 During a press conference in March 2013, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that China’s policy has been ‘‘con­sistent and clear’’ that the Holy See must cut its ties with Taiwan and ‘‘should not interfere in China’s internal affairs under the name of religion.’’ 56

FALUN GONG

The Commission continued to observe reports of arbitrary treat­ment of Falun Gong practitioners by Chinese security and judicial authorities, in some cases involving physical and mental abuse. Courts continued to sentence Falun Gong practitioners to long terms in prison.57 Authorities detained and harassed persons who attempted to assist Falun Gong practitioners, including lawyers Wang Quanzhang 58 and Cheng Hai.59 The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to pressure Falun Gong practi­tioners to renounce their belief and practice. The Party and govern­ment refer to this process as ‘‘transformation through reeducation,’’ or simply ‘‘transformation.’’ 60 From 2010 to 2012, the government implemented a three-year, national campaign to increase efforts to ‘‘transform’’ Falun Gong practitioners.61

The Commission also observed reports this past year regarding official anti-cult efforts that placed an emphasis on the need to educate the public to ‘‘resist’’ Falun Gong.62 An All-China Women’s Federation report stressed the need for the expansion of anti-cult campaigns directed against Falun Gong throughout Chongqing mu­nicipality, including through mobile schools and mobile teams of anti-cult educators.63 At an anti-cult symposium in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, held in May, a provincial official emphasized the need to bring anti-cult efforts ‘‘deep into the grassroots and into the heart of the masses,’’ and to ‘‘vigorously carry out’’ education against Falun Gong.64

In April 2013, an article published in the China-based Lens Mag­azine reported on claims of torture and severe maltreatment of in­mates at the Masanjia Women’s Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Center in Liaoning province.65 According to the New York Times, former detainees reported that approximately half of the people de­tained at the center are Falun Gong practitioners or members of underground churches.66 Former detainees at the center said au­thorities regularly tortured them with electric batons, handcuffed them in painful positions for long periods of time, and locked them in tiny ‘‘punishment cells,’’ among other forms of mistreatment.67 Beginning in June 2013, Beijing authorities detained journalist Du Bin for five weeks, on allegations he said were partly a result of his film about the abuses at the Masanjia Women’s RTL Center.68

At a Commission hearing on December 18, 2012, Falun Gong practitioner Hu Zhiming testified that, during the eight years and two months he spent in detention in several different locations in China for practicing Falun Gong, authorities allowed prisoners to beat him and subjected him to sleep deprivation, denial of medical care, and other types of abuse.69 At the same hearing, Bruce Chung, a Falun Gong practitioner from Taiwan, testified about how Chinese state security officials detained him for 54 days during a visit to Jiangxi province in the summer of 2012 and subjected him to lengthy interrogation sessions without access to a lawyer in con­nection with his earlier efforts to broadcast Falun Gong materials into China.70

ISLAM

Chinese authorities continued to place curbs on Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and continued to emphasize the role of Is­lamic clergy in promoting state policies. In December 2012, at the conclusion of a training session for ‘‘Muslim patriotic religious fig­ures,’’ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party Com­mittee member Shavket Imin stressed that ‘‘patriotic religious fig­ures’’ should ‘‘relentlessly study the Party’s general and specific policies’’ and ‘‘actively guide the broad masses of religious believers to continuously strengthen their national consciousness.’’ 71 In Au­gust 2013, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) Party Sec­retary Li Jianhua told local Muslims in Yongning county, Yinchuan city, to ‘‘unite to respond positively to the call of the Party and the government,’’ and stressed the role of Muslims in the NHAR in pro­moting ethnic unity, social harmony, and stability.72

During the 2013 reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to regulate the confirmation of religious leaders and to monitor over­seas pilgrimages in furtherance of state policy. Chinese authorities guided the training of imams at 10 state-run Islamic institutes 73 and conducted regular training courses for Muslim clergy that stressed adherence to Party religious and ethnic policies.74 Under the 2006 Measures for Accrediting Islamic Clergy, the first require­ment listed for government recognition of imams is that they must ‘‘love the motherland, support the socialist system and the leader­ship of the Communist Party of China, comply with national laws, [and] safeguard national unity, ethnic unity, and social stability.’’ 75 At an Islamic Association of China (IAC) certification ceremony for Muslim religious clergy in February, Ma Jin, Deputy Director of the Islamic Department of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), told the newly accredited Islamic clergy he hoped they would ‘‘resolve to become politically reliable.’’ 76 The IAC worked to strengthen its system for organizing Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca,77 and local authorities throughout the XUAR warned reli­gious believers against going on Hajj pilgrimages not organized by the government.78

Authorities also continued to exert influence over the teachings of Muslim clergy, such as through the interpretation of Islamic scripture. SARA reported in February 2013 that Chinese authori­ties had engaged in efforts to interpret Islamic scripture for more than 10 years.79 SARA also reported that authorities had recently distributed copies of compilations of state-prescribed teachings of Islam to every mosque in the XUAR.80

Authorities in charge of religious affairs sought to portray violent clashes that took place in the spring and summer of 2013 through­out the XUAR as acts inspired by ‘‘religious extremism,’’ and urged Muslim clergy to work against ‘‘religious extremist forces’’ 81 and the ‘‘three evil forces’’ 82 of terrorism, separatism, and religious ex­tremism. In an August 2013 article on ‘‘religious extremism,’’ XUAR United Front Work Department Deputy Inspector Azat Omer wrote that the ‘‘struggle with religious extremist forces’’ was a ‘‘serious political struggle to defend the unification of the mother­land and safeguard ethnic unity.’’ 83

[For more information on state controls over Islam in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang.]

PROTESTANTISM

The Chinese government continued to control the doctrine and activities of its official Protestant church and to target members of unregistered Protestant groups for harassment, detention, and other forms of abuse. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protes­tant Churches in China (TSPM) and the China Christian Council

(CCC) are the Protestant associations that manage registered Protestants on behalf of the government and Party.84 Protestants who choose not to affiliate with the TSPM must worship with un­registered ‘‘house churches,’’ which are often subject to inter­ference, harassment, and abuses during peaceful religious activi­ties. According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) 2013 Annual Report, ‘‘[t]he govern­ment largely tolerates groups that meet in homes or in small groups, but continues to view with suspicion religious organizations with extensive foreign ties, whose memberships grow too quickly, whose leadership becomes too popular or organizes across provin­cial lines, or whose religious activities allegedly disrupt ethnic or social ‘harmony.’ ’’ 85

Interference with places of worship. Authorities continued to interfere with the religious activities of registered and unregistered Protestant congregations by pressuring landlords to terminate their leases, conducting raids during religious gatherings, and threat­ening demolition of their buildings. The government continued its efforts to prohibit worship gatherings of the Beijing Shouwang Church, a house church of over 1,000 congregants in Beijing mu­nicipality that has endured ongoing official harassment since at least 2006.86 In September 2012, the church’s pastor applied for ad­ministrative review of actions the Beijing Public Security Bureau had taken against the church, including preventing the church from moving into property it had purchased.87 Two weeks later, the Beijing Municipal Government rejected the application, citing lack of evidence.88 In August 2013, the church reported that it was still being forced to meet outdoors in public spaces.89 [For additional in­formation on the ongoing detention and harassment of Shouwang leaders and congregants, see Harassment and Detention below in this section.]

Reports continued to emerge this year regarding state-sanctioned raids on house churches across China. In Shandong province in April and May, for example, authorities raided two house churches in Linshu county, Linyi city, and Yutai county, Jining city, issued ban orders to both on grounds of ‘‘illegal assembly,’’ confiscated do­nations, and imposed fines on members.90 According to Radio Free Asia, these actions may have been part of an informal crackdown against Protestant house churches launched by Shandong authori­ties in March.91 Also during this reporting year, authorities con­ducted raids on house church meetings—in some cases threatening or questioning attendees, and in other cases fining, beating, or de­taining them—in other areas of China, including Beijing,92 Guizhou province,93 Heilongjiang province,94 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,95 and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re­gion.96

Authorities in locations including Hubei,97 Jilin,98 and Henan provinces also reportedly threatened churches with demolition or eviction. In one case in Zhengzhou city, Henan province, authori­ties repeatedly threatened a registered TSPM church with eviction and demolition of their newly constructed, government-approved building.99 In connection with these threats, the church building has reportedly lost power and water, and has been rendered inac­cessible twice after government-owned trucks blocked its doors with piles of dirt and rocks.100

Harassment and detention. The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to harass and detain Protestants who worship outside of state-approved parameters. According to the USCIRF 2013 Annual Report (USCIRF Report), authorities de­tained close to 1,500 Protestants over the 2013 reporting period.101 Members of house church congregations in particular remained subject to official harassment and maltreatment. Throughout the reporting year, local- and national-level government offices issued directives calling for the need to further monitor and control house churches, in one case alluding to the alleged ‘‘instability’’ posed by their proliferation in recent years.102 Reported cases of harassment throughout 2013 suggest authorities have heightened pressure on house churches to register with local religious affairs bureaus and join state-sanctioned churches, in some instances leading to vio­lence and the detention of house church members.103 In April 2013, local authorities raided a house church in Alashan (Alxa) League, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, firing tear gas, detaining members of the congregation, and beating others in a move observ­ers contend was part of a greater push at the time by officials to pressure house churches into joining state-sanctioned churches.104 Authorities also continued to detain and harass members of Bei­jing’s Shouwang Church. According to the USCIRF Report, authori­ties detained 900 Shouwang Church members over the 2013 report­ing period, while others faced eviction from their homes, dismissal from government jobs, and the confiscation of Beijing residency permits by authorities.105

In other cases, authorities imposed criminal penalties or impris­oned Protestants who worshipped or promoted religious activities outside of state-approved parameters. The USCIRF Report indi­cated authorities sentenced up to 18 Protestant leaders to reeduca­tion through labor or prison terms during the 2013 reporting year.106 In December 2012, authorities in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, detained house church pastor Cao Nan and several other house church members on two separate occasions for holding a religious gathering in a public park.107 In the second in­stance of detention, authorities ordered Cao to serve 12 days of ad­ministrative detention for ‘‘falsely using the name of religion to dis­turb social order.’’ 108 In June 2013, the Xiaodian District People’s Court in Taiyuan city, Shanxi province, sentenced Li Wenxi to two years in prison and Ren Lacheng to a five-year prison term on charges of ‘‘illegal business operations’’ connected to the printing and selling of religious publications at the Taiyuan-based Enyu bookstore.109 According to media reports, the Enyu bookstore sold Christian literature and had a joint venture with a Beijing-based Christian bookstore, where Li was a deputy manager.110 Ren was also reportedly a central figure in unofficial university-based Chris­tian associations in Taiyuan and had used Enyu as a meeting place.111

Banned Protestant groups and designation of groups as ‘‘cults.’’ The Chinese government and Party continue to prohibit categorically some Protestant groups from exercising their right to religious belief by criminalizing their communities as ‘‘cult organi­zations’’ (xiejiao zuzhi). The government has designated at least 18 Protestant groups as ‘‘cult organizations,’’ banning their practice throughout the country.112 Moreover, the PRC Criminal Law in­cludes provisions authorizing fines and imprisonment of up to seven years for forming or associating with ‘‘cult organizations.’’ 113 According to one Chinese freedom of religion advocate, authorities have increasingly utilized criminal law statutes, including those provisions related to ‘‘cult organizations,’’ to detain and imprison house church leaders.114 In April 2013, authorities in Ye county, Pingdingshan municipality, Henan province, sentenced house church pastor Hu Linpo and congregation members Han Hai, Yang Lianbing, Zhang Mian, Cao Xia, Wang En, and Li Dan to prison sentences ranging from three years to more than seven years for ‘‘using a cult organization to undermine implementation of the law.’’ 115 Authorities reportedly first detained all seven individuals in April 2012 during a house church raid.116 According to the Ye County Procuratorate indictment notice, authorities accused the de­fendants of belonging to the Local Church, referred to by authori­ties as the ‘‘Shouters.’’ 117

In December 2012, authorities throughout the country engaged in a wide-ranging crackdown on followers of the Church of the Al­mighty God (CAG) in connection with their belief that December 21 was prophesied to be the date of the apocalypse.118 According to Chinese official media, authorities in 16 provinces detained more than 1,300 CAG followers in December 2012.119 In one case, au­thorities in Shaoguan city, Guangdong province, sentenced CAG adherent Lai Yiwa to seven years’ imprisonment in April 2013 for reportedly photocopying and distributing pamphlets in December 2012 related to the apocalypse prophesy.120

TAOISM

The Chinese government continued its control over Taoists and Taoist activities. As in the past, the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) continued to work with the Chinese government to ensure that Taoist religious groups ‘‘uphold the leadership of the Com­munist Party and the socialist system,’’ ‘‘actively participate in so­cialist material, political, and spiritual civilization,’’ and ‘‘make a contribution to the protection of religious harmony, ethnic unity, social harmony, unity of the motherland, and world peace.’’ 121 Gov­ernment agencies and the CTA continued to hold training sessions for Taoist leaders, including a November 2012 meeting of the CTA executive council to ‘‘study the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China’’ 122 and a May 2013 study class led by the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and attended by over 130 Taoist leaders from localities across China.123 In the November meeting, SARA Director Wang Zuo’an reminded Taoist leaders in attendance that ‘‘studying and putting into prac­tice the spirit of the 18th Party Congress is the chief political task for religious communities for the coming period of time.’’ 124 He fur­ther noted that he hoped the Taoist community would gain a ‘‘deep­er understanding of the greatness of the Chinese Communist Party,’’ ‘‘more conscientiously accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party,’’ and ‘‘take the path that conforms to socialist society,’’ among other goals.125

OTHER RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

In the past year, the central government maintained its frame­work for recognizing only select religious communities for limited government protections, and it did not enlarge this framework to accommodate additional groups. Despite lacking formal central gov­ernment recognition, however, some religious communities have been able to operate inside China.126 The Orthodox Church holds services in some areas,127 and at least one provincial-level jurisdic­tion recognizes the Orthodox Church.128 In May 2013, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, made an official visit to China and met with top offi­cials, including President Xi Jinping.129 During his visit, Kirill ex­pressed his hope that Orthodox parishes would be permitted to reg­ister, and that a Chinese bishop would be appointed who could set locations for worship and ordain priests.130 Under current Chinese government regulations, foreign religious communities, including communities not recognized as domestic religions by the govern­ment, may hold services for expatriates, subject to certain limita­tions and government control.131

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

During the 2013 reporting year, ethnic minorities faced chal­lenges to their rights as provided in the PRC Regional Ethnic Au­tonomy Law and international law.1 Authorities placed the strictest controls over groups perceived as potential threats to ‘‘stability,’’ 2 including those living in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan autonomous areas, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR). Authorities continued to detain, harass, and imprison eth­nic minority rights advocates who engaged in peaceful protest and sought to assert their unique cultural identity. [See Section IV— Xinjiang and Section V—Tibet for additional information on these areas. See text below for information on broader government poli­cies toward ethnic minorities and on conditions in the IMAR.]

State Policy on Ethnic Minorities

Government and private development projects in ethnic minority regions, together with the absence of institutionalized forums for ethnic minorities to discuss and seek redress for their grievances, led to tensions between local residents, railway workers, and gov­ernment authorities.3 The expansion of top-down development ini­tiatives 4 in the IMAR, while bringing some economic improvement to areas inhabited by Mongols,5 has weakened Mongols’ ability to preserve their unique culture, language, and livelihoods.6

Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia

Central and regional government authorities continued to enforce grasslands policies that require herders and nomads to resettle in urban areas or in larger, compact rural communities, portraying these developments as a move to improve and ‘‘modernize’’ the lives of Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups, and combat grasslands degradation.7 Local governments throughout the IMAR carried out propaganda campaigns in 2013 to promote na­tional and regional regulations regarding the protection of grass­lands.8 The regulations stipulate penalties for unauthorized use of grasslands 9 but lack protections for the rights of herders.10 Critics of official grasslands policies in the IMAR have raised concerns over increased mining activities and a corresponding loss of water in the region,11 while the policies are officially aimed at easing the degradation of grasslands.12 In a report published in July 2013, Greenpeace criticized state-owned coal mining company Shenhua Group for draining the water supply 13 and causing the destruction of grasslands 14 in areas inhabited by Mongol farmers and herders in the IMAR. The report states that Shenhua has extracted more than 50 million tons of groundwater since 2007 in an area encom­passing five villages in Uushin (Wushen) Banner, Ordos (E’erduosi) municipality, IMAR,15 and produces an estimated 4.79 million tons of toxic industrial wastewater per year.16 This wastewater is re­portedly dumped into open sand pits in Ulan Moron (Wulanmulun) township, Ejin Horo (Yijinhuoluo) Banner, Ordos (E’erduosi) mu­nicipality, IMAR,17 contradicting Shenhua’s claims that its coal-to-liquid operations have ‘‘low water consumption’’ and ‘‘zero dis­charge.’’ 18 [For more information on rights abuses related to grass­lands policies, see Section II—The Environment.]

In several instances during the 2013 reporting year, Mongol herders sought to protest the appropriation of their grazing lands for military use and private development projects.19 On August 19 in Uushin (Wushen) Banner, workers from China Railway 23rd Bu­reau reportedly beat to death Mongolian herder Bayanbaatar, who was one of several herders protesting the railway bureau’s use of his and other herders’ grazing land.20 In March 2013, herders from Durbed (Siziwang) Banner, Wulanchabu municipality, IMAR, re­portedly gathered at the train station in Hohhot city, seeking to travel to Beijing to protest the appropriation of their land for the Beijing Military Command’s Zhurihe military training base.21 Po­lice and government officials from Durbed traveled to Hohhot to stop the herders 22 and reportedly physically assaulted several herders who resisted their orders to return to Durbed.23 Local au­thorities reportedly had sold the land to Chinese firms, including two major mining companies.24 In July 2013, 38 Mongol herders re­portedly gathered at the train station in Tongliao city, IMAR, seek­ing to travel to Beijing to protest their community’s September 2008 forced resettlement from the Khan Uul (Hanshan) Forest Area to Lubei township, Zaruud Banner.25 Security personnel re­portedly detained the 38 herders and beat those who resisted de­tention.26 In 2008, Tongliao city officials resettled 963 people from Khan Uul, a government-designated nature preserve, with the stat­ed aim of creating an area free of people and livestock.27 However, resettled herders from Khan Uul reportedly complained in March 2013 that miners had begun operations in the area.28 Local govern­ment officials have positively assessed the prospects for mining ex­ploration in the area.29

In July 2013, a herder in Ongniud (Wengniute) Banner, Chifeng municipality, reportedly killed the head of a ‘‘livestock grazing pro­hibition team’’ and seriously injured another official while ‘‘defend­ing his right to graze his livestock on his grazing land,’’ before com­mitting suicide.30

Political Prisoners

The continued extralegal detention of Mongol rights advocate Hada underscores the official repercussions Mongols may face for promoting their rights. During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, authorities in Hohhot city, IMAR, tightened restrictions on the movement and communications of Hada’s wife, Xinna, and the couple’s son, Uiles.31 The heightened restrictions began after Xinna gave interviews to international media and rights groups about Chinese authorities’ treatment of Hada in extralegal detention and its harmful impact on his mental health.32 Xinna stated in the interviews that Hada is suffering from depression and that authori­ties refused to allow him access to psychiatric care that was rec­ommended by a physician.33 As of September 23, 2013, the where­abouts of Xinna and Uiles are unclear.34 As of the same date, Hada remained in official custody without apparent legal basis 35 despite his completion of a 15-year prison sentence on December 10, 2010.36 Authorities imprisoned Hada in 1995 after he organized peaceful protests for Mongols’ rights.37 Additional representative cases follow:

 

  • On July 4, 2013, authorities in Uzumchin Right (Dongwuzhumuqin) Banner, Xilingol League, IMAR, reportedly arrested Yunshaabiin Seevendoo, who had advocated for the rights of Mongol herders, on fraud charges.38 Family members reportedly said his health has deteriorated during his deten­tion.39 Prior to his detention, Seevendoo had organized Mongol herders to protest against illegal government and corporate ex­propriation of their grazing lands.40
  • On April 13, 2013, authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly arrested Batzangaa, a former medical school principal, after he allegedly attempted to flee the country with his wife and two children.41 Batzangaa had been under residential surveillance in Dongsheng district, Ordos (E’erduosi) municipality, IMAR, since January 2011. Ac­cording to Radio Free Asia, authorities ordered Batzangaa to begin serving a three-year prison sentence, starting on April 25, 2013, that had been handed down as a suspended sentence in 2011.42 Batzangaa had attempted to seek refugee status in Mongolia in October 2009 after organizing demonstrations to protest against the government’s confiscation of campus prop­erty.43
  • In November 2012, the Tongliao Municipality People’s Court in Tongliao city, IMAR, reportedly convicted author and rights advocate Govruud Huuchinhuu on charges of ‘‘providing state secrets to a foreign organization,’’ 44 a crime under Article 111 of the PRC Criminal Law that ordinarily is punishable by no less than five years in prison and by life imprisonment in ‘‘es­pecially serious’’ cases.45 Authorities originally placed Huuchinhuu under home confinement in November 2010 after she published calls on the Internet for Mongols to show sup­port for the release of Hada.46

 

A number of other ethnic Mongols remain in prison or detention or are presumed to remain in prison or detention for political rea­sons, including Erden-uul (pen name Unaga), who was detained in December 2010, and Sodmongol, who was detained in April 2010.47

POPULATION PLANNING

International Standards and China’s Population Policies

Chinese officials continue to actively promote and implement population planning policies which, in both their nature and imple­mentation, violate international standards. The PRC Population and Family Planning Law and provincial implementing guidelines limit couples’ freedom of reproductive choice by stipulating if, when, and how often they may bear children.1 China’s current pop­ulation planning policies still require married couples to obtain a birth permit to lawfully bear a child.2 The population planning policies of all of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions limit cou­ples to bearing one child.3 According to one team of demographic experts, ‘‘[The Chinese government’s] policy of allowing all couples to have only one child finds no equal in the world and it may be one of the most draconian examples of government social engineer­ing ever seen.’’ 4 Exceptions for couples who meet certain criteria vary province-by-province,5 and include some exceptions for ethnic minorities.6 Officials continue to coerce compliance with population planning targets using methods including heavy fines,7 forced abor­tions,8 and forced sterilizations.9

Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families, and ad­ditional abuses engendered by China’s population and family plan­ning system, violate standards in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 10 and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development.11 China participated as a state party in the negotiations and adop­tion of both.12 Acts of official violence committed in the implemen­tation of population planning policies 13 and the fact that these acts are not clearly punishable under Chinese law 14 contravene provi­sions under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu­man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,15 which China has signed and ratified.16 Further, discriminatory policies 17 against ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children are in violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 18 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.19 China is a state party to these trea­ties and has committed to uphold their terms.

Institutional Developments

Amid calls by Chinese government leaders,20 experts and schol­ars,21 and citizens 22 for the loosening or reform of China’s popu­lation policies, China’s new leadership unveiled a plan in March 2013 for restructuring agencies within the State Council, including merging the National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) and the Ministry of Health.23 The restructure combines most of the responsibilities of the previous two organizations into a new ‘‘National Health and Family Planning Commission’’ (NHFPC),24 but transfers the responsibility of creating population development policies and strategies—previously held by the NPFPC—to the National Development and Reform Commission.25 Some domestic and overseas experts say that the restructuring and transfer of certain population planning responsibilities suggests a significant loss of power for the nation’s family planning body and a greater potential for population policy reform and eventual can­cellation,26 while at least one Chinese academic expressed belief that the merger ‘‘is in fact making the family planning body more powerful.’’ 27

The government restructuring plan itself has a stated aim to ‘‘better uphold the basic national family planning policy,’’ 28 and top-level officials have reinforced in speeches that family planning will be ‘‘beefed up, not weakened.’’ 29 The full impact of the dissolu­tion of the NPFPC on family planning policies and local implemen­tation remains to be seen. The NHFPC released an ‘‘Action Plan’’ in August which ignited afresh citizens’ hopes for policy relax-ation,30 but an NHFPC spokesman later clarified that the plan’s call for ‘‘improving the family-planning policy’’ should not be viewed ‘‘as a renewed sign of relaxing the policy to allow for a sec­ond child’’ 31—a hope held by many Chinese citizens.32 The spokes­man also restated that China would adhere to its basic family plan­ning policies for the long term.33

Coercive Implementation

Chinese law prohibits officials from infringing upon the rights and interests of citizens while implementing population planning policies but does not define what constitutes a citizen’s right or in­terest.34 Chinese law reportedly does not stipulate punishment for officials who demand or implement forced abortion.35 Furthermore, provincial-level population planning regulations in at least 22 of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions explicitly endorse the prac­tice, often referred to as a ‘‘remedial measure’’ (bujiu cuoshi), as an official policy instrument.36 Officials also reportedly continue to use other coercive methods—including forced abortion under arbitrary detention,37 forced implantation of long-term birth control de­vices,38 and forced sterilization 39—to implement population plan­ning policies.

OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS

Language used in official speeches and government reports from jurisdictions across China continued to reflect an emphasis on strengthening enforcement measures with apparent disregard for restraint. Between October 2012 and July 2013, the Commission noted reports from at least eight provinces (Hubei,40 Guangdong,41 Anhui,42 Shandong,43 Henan,44 Guizhou,45 Hunan,46 and Fujian 47) using phrases such as ‘‘spare no efforts’’ (quanli yifu or fenli), ‘‘use all means necessary’’ (qian fang bai ji), ‘‘implement ‘man-on-man’ military tactics’’ (shixing ‘‘rendingren’’ zhanshu), ‘‘fight the family planning battle’’ (dahao jisheng gongjianzhan), and ‘‘assault and storm the fortifications’’ (tuji gongjian) to urge officials to imple­ment family planning measures. The implementation measures promoted in these reports were harsh and invasive, including ‘‘re­medial measures,’’ the ‘‘two inspections’’ (intrauterine device (IUD) and pregnancy inspections),48 the ‘‘four procedures’’ (IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and steriliza­tion),49 and the collection of ‘‘social maintenance fees.’’ 50 For exam­ple, one report regarding population planning work in Gangkou town, Chongyang county, Xianning municipality, Hubei province, recounted a local Party cadre’s speech in which he urged officials to ‘‘overcome the slackening of efforts and war-weariness’’ and ‘‘con­tinue to maintain a situation of high temperatures and high pres­sure’’ while implementing family planning work, which included the ‘‘four procedures.’’ 51 Following his speech, 13 ‘‘team members’’ went into local villages to ‘‘find out the truth’’ on population plan­ning compliance, implement ‘‘ ‘man-on-man’ military tactics,’’ re­trieve those who had ‘‘skipped town,’’ and ‘‘take backwards villages by storm,’’ according to the report.52

 • Guizhou. In July 2013, local family planning officials reportedly forced 18-weeks-pregnant Li Fengfei to the local family planning office for a forced abortion. After beating her and breaking one of her teeth, the officials reportedly forced her to fingerprint an abortion consent form and subsequently injected her with several medications to induce the abortion. The medications reportedly killed the fetus, but did not successfully induce labor. Nine days following the induction, reports in¬dicated that Li remained in the hospital in critical condition, as her body had still not gone into labor.55 According to a September ChinaAid report, authorities arrested Li on charges of embezzlement after she spread information about her forced abortion on the Internet.56 • Hubei. In May 2013, local family planning officials reportedly forced Zhang Yinping, who was six months pregnant with an ‘‘out-of-plan’’ child, to accompany them to the family planning office for an abortion. Following the surgery, Zhang reportedly suffered from severe hem¬orrhaging, which caused her to die the next day. Zhang’s family report¬edly protested at the family planning office following her death, and the county government mobilized public security personnel to stop the pro¬test. Officials investigated the matter as a ‘‘medical accident’’ and or¬dered the surgery unit to suspend its practice.57 • Anhui. In March 2013, local family planning officials reportedly de¬tained a woman surnamed Lu, who was seven months pregnant with an ‘‘out-of-plan’’ child, and took her to a local hospital for an abortion. Med¬ical personnel at the hospital injected her with a substance that caused an abortion two days later.58 In an interview cited in a March 25 ChinaAid report, Lu’s husband said that the family was seeking com¬pensation from the government.59 • Shandong. In October 2012, seven local family planning officials re¬portedly detained a woman surnamed Song who was six months preg¬nant with her third child. The officials took her to a hospital, stripped her, tied her down, confiscated her belongings, forced her fingerprint onto an abortion consent form, and injected her with a substance that caused an abortion. Reports noted that the experience caused her to suf¬fer severe psychological trauma.60<br />

 • Guizhou. In February 2013, seven or eight local family planning offi¬cials took Nie Changmin to a local family planning office and forced her to undergo a sterilization procedure. Due to a mistake made during the procedure, Nie required several additional weeks of medical treatment in a nearby hospital. Nie reportedly had two ‘‘in-plan’’ daughters and subsequently had an IUD inserted, all in compliance with local regula¬tions.61 • Hubei. In March 2013, local family planning officials visited the home of 42-year-old Shen Hongxia and her husband and threatened court ac¬tion if she did not undergo a surgical sterilization. Shen’s doctor had de¬clared her medically unfit for sterilization, but she and her husband con¬sented to further examination at the local family planning office. In¬stead of examining her, officials performed a sterilization surgery on her, resulting in her death.62 • Henan. In March 2013, local family planning officials ordered Wan Liqiao to pay a 6,000 yuan (US$980) ‘‘protection fee’’ to avoid having to undergo a tubal ligation after her third pregnancy. One day later, and before she could come up with the fee, officials forced her into a van and took her to the local family planning office, where they performed a tubal ligation surgery on her without prior medical examination (she has a rare blood type) and without obtaining her or her family’s written consent.63 • Yunnan. In July 2013, local family planning officials took away Guo Xingcong for a sterilization procedure. Later the same day, his wife found him dead at the door of their home after apparently having been severely beaten. Officials reportedly claimed that he had committed sui¬cide and buried the body quickly without the family’s approval. Accord¬ing to Guo’s family, even though he had never violated population plan¬ning policies, authorities had targeted him for years, demanding that he be sterilized and that he pay a fine of 10,000 yuan (US$1,633) for ex¬ceeding the birth quota.64<br />

Punishments for Non-Compliance

Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of punish­ment and reward to manage citizens’ compliance with population planning policies. In accordance with national measures,65 local governments direct officials to punish non-compliance with heavy fines, termed ‘‘social maintenance fees’’ (shehui fuyang fei), which force many couples to choose between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring a fine much greater than the average an­nual income of their locality.66 Furthermore, despite provisions in the PRC Population and Family Planning Law that prohibit in­fringements on citizens’ personal, property, and other rights,67 offi­cials in some cases threatened or imposed job termination,68 expul­sion from the Communist Party,69 and violence 70 for family plan­ning violations. In past years, reports have documented officials’ use of methods such as destruction of personal property and arbi­trary detention to punish couples who did not comply with popu­lation planning policies.71

Authorities in some cases deny hukous—household registration permits—to children based on their parents’ lack of compliance with local population planning policies. Children who are born ‘‘out-of-plan’’ may go without hukous until their parents pay the nec­essary ‘‘social maintenance fees’’ associated with their birth.72 These children are commonly referred to as ‘‘illegal residents’’ (heihu) 73 and face considerable difficulty accessing social benefits typically afforded to registered citizens, including health insurance, public education, and pensions.74 A December 2012 South China Morning Post report claimed that authorities in many Chinese cit­ies also refuse to give hukous to ‘‘in-plan’’ newborns if their parents had not immediately implemented contraceptive measures fol­lowing the birth.75 [For additional discussion of China’s hukou sys­tem, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.]

Demographic Consequences

The Chinese government’s population planning policies continue to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, which include an aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex ratio. Affected in recent decades by government restrictions on the num­ber of births per couple, China’s total fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 births per woman in 1949 76 to an estimated 1.55 births per woman in 2013,77 resulting in a serious demographic imbalance with regard to China’s growing elderly population and shrinking working-age population.78 Chinese authorities continue to imple­ment a ban 79 on ‘‘non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abortion,’’ 80 which some people reportedly continue to practice 81 in response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons.82 As a result of ongoing violations of the ban on sex-selective abortion, China’s male-female ratio at birth is severely skewed.83 While Chinese media reports that China’s sex ratio at birth has decreased in the past few years,84 according to the UN Population Division, it re­mains the highest in the world.85 A 2010 study issued by the Chi­nese Academy of Social Sciences reported that by 2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age may exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.86 Reports have also suggested a link between China’s large number of ‘‘sur­plus males’’ and an increase in the trafficking of women and chil­dren for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.87

Reports indicate that China’s family planning policies and policy implementers have contributed in part to what the state-controlled Global Times has called China’s ‘‘massive and lucrative baby mar­ket.’’ 88 In one such case, state media reported in December 2012 that a family planning official in Anxi county, Quanzhou munici­pality, Fujian province, faced charges for selling four infants as part of a child laundering ring.89 Another local government official in Quanzhou was implicated in the same ring for purchasing a baby boy with his wife.90 A January 2013 Chinese investigative re­port uncovered a separate case of hospital, civil affairs, health bu­reau, and orphanage officials in Guixi city, Yingtan municipality, Jiangxi province, working together to illegally acquire babies from local hospitals or elsewhere and place them for either domestic or international adoption at a profit.91 An additional case emerged in August involving an obstetrician in Shaanxi province who allegedly convinced a mother to relinquish her newborn son, claiming he was seriously ill.92 The doctor reportedly sold the healthy newborn for 21,600 yuan (US$3,528) one day after his birth.93 Authorities de­tained the doctor and five other suspects, retrieved the baby from nearby Henan province, and launched an investigation into several similar cases connected to the same hospital.94 For years, reports have indicated that Chinese children are viewed as commodities which yield considerable profit in adoption 95 or forced labor situa­tions.96

FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Freedom of Residence

The Chinese government continued to enforce the household reg­istration (hukou) system, established in the 1950s.1 Initially used to control migration of the rural population to China’s cities, the hukou system has developed into a ‘‘mechanism determining one’s eligibility for full citizenship, social welfare, and opportunities for social mobility.’’ 2 The hukou system classifies Chinese citizens as either rural or urban and accordingly confers legal rights and ac­cess to social services.3 The implementation of these regulations discriminates against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban areas by denying them equal access to public services and social se­curity benefits, as well as equal social, employment, and edu­cational opportunities.4 China’s hukou system conflicts with inter­national human rights standards that guarantee freedom to choose one’s residence and prohibit discrimination on the basis of ‘‘na­tional or social origin[,] . . . birth or other status.’’ 5

Government officials and journalists estimate that there are be­tween 170 and 260 million rural migrants living in cities; 6 these people face challenges accessing social services because they lack urban hukous. According to a 2013 survey commissioned by the Na­tional Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), nearly 45 percent of migrant workers living in cities reported not receiving social benefits, including health care and unemployment benefits.7 In cities including Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Xi’an, Hangzhou, and Zhengzhou, migrants (even those educated in the city) faced restrictions when seeking employment,8 such as hiring policies fa­voring local hukou holders 9 or denial of employment due to lack of a local hukou.10 Similarly, migrants working alongside local urban hukou holders reportedly received lower salaries for performing similar work.11 Moreover, children of migrants continued to be de­nied equal access to urban public education and higher educational opportunities.12 Government efforts toward urbanization have fos­tered anger among rural residents 13 at the same time that com­petition for public resources and systemic discrimination stemming from the hukou system has exacerbated tensions between urban and rural residents.14

As in recent years, high-level officials and state-run media con­tinued to emphasize the need for hukou reform as a part of a larger urbanization policy, and China’s new leadership appeared to prioritize this urbanization policy with an aim to spur economic growth.15 In May 2013, Premier Li Keqiang announced that a re­form plan will be unveiled in late 2013 that will clarify the timing of proposed reforms and push ‘‘improvements to public services and the social security system.’’ 16 In December 2012, the NDRC indi­cated that hukou reform, along with ‘‘improving’’ the land manage­ment system and research on measures to push the ‘‘urbanization’’ of rural migrants, would be accelerated in 2013.17 One expert pre­dicted that these reforms would provide ‘‘specific administrative measures’’ to clarify application criteria for urban hukous.18 Ac­cording to a June 2013 report on urbanization development deliv­ered by the head of the NDRC, Xu Shaoshi, the government should ‘‘gradually tear down household registration obstacles to facilitate the orderly migration of people from rural to urban areas.’’ 19 An August 2012 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stressed the difficulty of incorporating an estimated 500 million rural residents into urban society over the next 20 years in part because of the increasing need for limited resources.20 Scholars and journalists have expressed reservations about the central govern­ment’s approach to hukou reform, citing local government opposi­tion to the financial burden an influx of rural migrants would im­pose on public services and infrastructure.21

The Commission noted in its 2012 Annual Report a February 2011 State Council General Office circular outlining a series of re­forms including relaxing hukou registration standards in county-and prefectural-level cities, prohibiting coercive requisition and conversion of rural residents’ land in exchange for urban hukous, and prohibiting any future policy attempting to use hukou status as a prerequisite for access to social services.22 During the 2013 re­porting year, several prefectural- and provincial-level jurisdictions released implementation plans and opinions with respect to the cir­cular.23

The Commission has observed implementation and expressions of intent to implement hukou reform in the 2013 reporting year with varying degrees of reception and success. In November 2012, the Ministry of Education expressed its intention to broaden education access to children of migrants and other non-residents in urban areas.24 Some local governments continued to relax hukou restric­tions consistent with ongoing reform efforts. Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai municipalities issued measures to expand and pro­mote equal access to educational opportunities for children of mi­grants.25 Despite efforts like these, thousands of migrant children continued to be prohibited from taking entrance exams in their lo­cations of residence and returned to their hometowns to take these exams.26 In April 2013, authorities in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, issued an opinion that allows college graduates who have been employed in Wuhan within two years following graduation to apply for a local hukou.27 In May 2013, Shanghai authorities issued measures that provided a points system designed to allow non-Shanghai residents to apply for a residence permit (juzhu zheng) if they meet certain criteria. The measures went into effect in July.28 In May 2013, Guangzhou municipal authorities issued measures to abolish hukou classifications and incorporate all resi­dents under a single uniform hukou classification by 2014.29 At the provincial level, the Guangdong provincial government continued to promote a work plan calling for all residents of Guangdong prov­ince to be included under a single uniform hukou classification by 2014.30 The actual implementation and results of these policies re­main unclear.

International Travel

Chinese officials continued to deny citizens who criticize the gov­ernment their internationally recognized right to leave the country. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and committed to ratify, provides that ‘‘[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.’’ 31 Under Article 12, countries may restrict this right but only in narrow circumstances to protect national security and certain other public interests.32 Chinese law allows officials to bar those who threaten state security from leaving the country,33 but in prac­tice officials target a much broader range of activity, including the expression of views critical of the government, or having a family association with individuals expressing such views.34 A February 2013 article in the New York Times compared the Chinese govern­ment’s use of passport restrictions on political opponents to the practices of the former Soviet Union.35 The number of Chinese sub­ject to these restrictions reportedly has jumped in recent years, and human rights groups estimate that at least 14 million people may be affected.36 Restrictions reportedly fall heaviest on Tibetans and Uyghurs, with the U.S. State Department reporting that members of these groups ‘‘experienced great difficulty acquiring passports.’’ 37 Tsering Woeser, the noted Tibetan writer, told the New York Times that authorities feared these ethnic minorities, once abroad, would expose harsh ethnic policies or interact with exile groups.38 In March 2013, authorities blocked Woeser, who has been docu­menting Tibetan self-immolations, from traveling to the United States to receive the U.S. Department of State’s International Women of Courage Award.39 In February, public security officials prevented Ilham Tohti, the Uyghur academic and advocate for the reform of ethnic minority policies, from traveling to the United States for a fellowship at Indiana University.40

During the 2013 reporting year, there continued to be numerous reports of political advocates and their family members being de­nied exit from China or access to passports. In April 2013, police prevented prominent legal scholar and rights advocate Xu Zhiyong from traveling to Hong Kong to attend a legal symposium.41 Ac­cording to a February 2013 report, officials prevented the wife of imprisoned democracy advocate Liu Xianbin from obtaining her passport without explanation.42 Authorities also prevented the daughter of democracy advocate Lu Gengsong from traveling to Hong Kong in July 2013.43 The Chinese government granted pass­ports to the brother and mother of legal advocate Chen Guangcheng on the eve of a meeting between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping in June 2013, after repeatedly de­nying their earlier passport requests.44

Domestic Movement

Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that ‘‘[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of move­ment and freedom to choose his residence.’’ 45 Chinese authorities continue to violate this right by restricting the domestic movement of rights advocates 46 and their families 47 as a form of harassment, frequently under the guise of ‘‘stability maintenance.’’ 48 A com­bination of police and guards reportedly confined Liu Xia, the wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, to her home without a legal basis, a situation that has persisted for more than two-and-a-half years since her husband was awarded the prize in 2010.49 Roughly two dozen police guarded the home of Feng Zhenghu, a Shanghai human rights activist, and enforced his ex­tralegal home confinement for 268 days from February to Novem­ber 2012. During that time Feng was allowed to leave his home only for police interrogations.50 Public security officials unlawfully confined prominent legal scholar and rights advocate Xu Zhiyong to his home for three months after police officers stopped him in the airport to prevent him from traveling to Hong Kong in April 2013.51 Authorities increased restrictions on freedom of movement during politically sensitive periods this past year, including the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in No­vember,52 the March meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress,53 and the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests on June 4.54 For ex­ample, public security officials held Hubei-based rights defender Liu Feiyue in a hotel and only allowed him out for meals through­out the 18th Party Congress,55 while shifts of three to four guards monitored Anhui activist Wang Yixiang 24 hours a day around June 4.56

STATUS OF WOMEN

Women’s Political Decisionmaking

Through its international commitments and domestic laws and policies, the Chinese government has committed to ensure gender-equal political participation; however, women remained underrep­resented in government and Communist Party positions after lead­ership changes during this reporting year. In accordance with its commitments under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,1 the Chinese government has passed several laws 2 and policy initiatives 3 to promote gender equality in government. According to one UN expert, ‘‘Gender bal­ance in public administration ensures that a wide enough range of perspectives are consulted in policymaking to make tangible con­tributions to sustainable development.’’ 4 During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, female representation increased slightly at the highest levels of the central government but decreased in the Com­munist Party, and continued to fall far short of the 30 percent tar­get that China has agreed to under international standards.5 Dur­ing the November 2012 meeting of the 18th Party Congress, the Communist Party appointed a new set of leaders for its top deci­sionmaking bodies, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) and the Politburo Standing Com­mittee. Men continued to hold all seven positions 6 in the Politburo Standing Committee, as has been the case since the Party’s estab­lishment in 1949.7 Women held 2 out of 25 positions in the Polit­buro, up from 1 in the previous 17th Party Congress in 2007.8 Fe­male members in the 205-person Communist Party Central Com­mittee decreased from 13 to 10,9 but the ratio of female to male delegates to the 18th Party Congress increased to 23 percent, up from 20 percent in the previous congress.10 Similarly, the percent­age of female delegates to National People’s Congresses has shown little growth since the early 1970s.11 In March 2013, the govern­ment appointed a new set of ministers to the State Council, with women holding 2 out of 35 ministerial-level positions, down from 4 in the previous State Council.12 On the 10-person State Council Standing Committee there is now 1 female vice premier, Liu Yandong.13

Women’s participation in decisionmaking at the village level re­mains low, underscoring long-held concerns about protection of rural women’s rights and interests. Women reportedly led only 2.7 percent of local village committees as of November 2012.14 Wom­en’s rights advocates have continued to raise concerns regarding violations of women’s land use rights in rural areas due in part to unlawful village rules and agreements,15 rapid urbanization,16 and low female representation in village committees.17

Gender-Based Discrimination

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

China has committed under international standards to taking ‘‘all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment,’’ 18 yet women in China’s work­force continue to face many forms of discrimination. Several studies and reports released this year showed that gender discrimination in recruitment remained widespread and may have even in­creased,19 in some cases due to perceptions about gender dif­ferences in physical and mental capacities 20 and in other cases due to women’s ‘‘pregnancy potential.’’ 21 Reports also highlighted the intrusive gynecological examinations and related questioning that women face when applying for civil service positions.22 An October 2012 study documented continued and significant wage discrimina­tion in favor of men,23 and Chinese law continues to subject women to mandatory retirement 5 to 10 years earlier than men.24 China’s first local regulations on gender equality took effect in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, in January 2013,25 and, in Feb­ruary, China Daily reported that authorities in Beijing munici­pality released similar draft regulations for public comment.26 Such local provisions, if implemented, could fill significant gaps in na­tional-level legislation as they stipulate punishments for employers who engage in discriminatory hiring practices.27 In January 2013, a company in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong, paid the first reported compensation in a gender discrimination case in China after the local department of human resources and social security investigated Wen Yuxuan’s (alias) complaint that recruiters denied her job application based on her gender. The case was resolved in mediation, and the company reportedly paid Wen 601 yuan (US$97) and issued an apology, but did not appear to offer her a job.28

EDUCATION DISCRIMINATION

Gender-based discrimination remains a barrier for some young women pursuing a university education in China, despite provi­sions in the PRC Education Law that prohibit discrimination on several grounds including gender.29 Reports indicate that univer­sities across China continue to implement long-administered gen­der quotas that require women to score higher than men on the col­lege entrance exam (gaokao) for acceptance into certain majors.30 Advocates for gender equality in education reportedly filed an Open Government Information request in July 2012, asking the Ministry of Education to clarify which majors are permitted to have gender quotas for enrollment.31 In response, the Ministry of Education re­ported that gender quotas are permitted in military and national defense, marine and mining, and some less-commonly studied for­eign language majors.32

Violence Against Women

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Domestic violence is prohibited and punishable under Chinese law,33 yet the problem of domestic violence in China remains wide­spread.34 Current national-level legal provisions regarding domes­tic violence leave many victims unprotected by prohibiting domestic violence without defining the term or clarifying the specific respon­sibilities of public and private sector organizations in prevention, punishment, and treatment.35 As of December 2012, 28 provincial-level jurisdictions and more than 90 cities across China had insti­tuted local anti-domestic violence regulations or policies that ad­dress gaps in national-level legislation.36 Amid several high-profile domestic violence cases involving women and children this year,37 Chinese advocates continued calls for national-level legislation that specifically addresses domestic violence.38 China’s 2012–2015 Na­tional Human Rights Action Plan, issued in June 2012, included the goal to ‘‘formulate’’ a domestic violence law.39 State media also reported in 2012 that domestic violence would be on the National People’s Congress legislative agenda in 2012,40 but no drafts ap­pear to have been made publicly available.41 A January 2013 Legal Daily article reported that the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) plans to issue standardized documents to guide adjudication in domestic violence criminal cases. The article did not provide a timeline for the release of these documents, but reported that the SPC had set up pilot programs and trainings in six courts around the country to strengthen trial procedures in criminal cases involving domestic violence.42 A January 2013 Caixin Media report also noted that Chinese courts have issued 200 protection orders since pilot pro­grams on civil law protection orders began in 2008.43 Other Chi­nese state media and non-governmental organization (NGO) arti­cles indicate, however, that many courts and law enforcement offi­cials continue to treat reports of domestic violence as a private family matter and do not take legal action in response to those re­ports.44

SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Women and children subjected to sexual violence 45 in China face difficulties defending their rights. Reports regarding officials’ or their associates’ involvement in sexual violence against women and girls continued to emerge during the Commission’s reporting year, igniting public fury at the lack of transparency and abuse of power displayed among China’s elite.46 The May 2013 case of an official and a primary school principal sexually assaulting six primary school girls overnight at a hotel in Hainan province,47 as well as several similar cases reported shortly thereafter,48 exposed loop­holes in China’s criminal law that protect perpetrators from the more serious charges of rape if they claim the act was consensual or if money was involved.49 Authorities beat and detained women’s rights activist Ye Haiyan after she carried out a peaceful protest outside of the Hainan principal’s school.50 In response to these sex­ual abuse cases, a group of women lawyers from across China re­portedly joined together to provide legal assistance to victims of sexual abuse.51

Sexual harassment, considered a form of violence against women under international standards,52 is prohibited under Chinese law; 53 however, due in part to the lack of a clear legal definition and standards for prevention, reporting, and punishment,54 legal experts continued calls this year for strengthened legislation on the issue.55 Chinese media reporting on sexual harassment this year included a survey showing a perceived increase of sexual harass­ment in urban areas,56 a case of sexual harassment involving Foxconn employees,57 and a case implicating a Guangdong province official.58

STATE-AUTHORIZED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Officials in localities across China also continue to employ other forms of coercion and violence against women—including forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and forced contraceptive use—in their enforcement of national and local population planning poli­cies, in contradiction with international standards to which China has agreed.59 Chinese law leaves women unprotected against such abuses; for even though it prohibits officials from infringing upon citizens’ rights and interests during population planning implemen­tation, the law does not define what constitutes a citizen’s right or interest,60 nor does it stipulate punishments for violations.61 Women engaging in sex work in China also report suffering fre­quent violence at the hands of authorities, including beatings and other forms of physical abuse, in order to coerce confessions.62 Al­though sex work is illegal under Chinese law,63 authorities are not permitted to use physical violence or abuse against suspects when enforcing these laws.64 According to a joint report issued by several international non-governmental organizations regarding the imple­mentation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in China ‘‘[w]omen have few ave­nues for pursuing rights claims when their rights and interests conflict with those of the government or its officials, or when dis­criminatory treatment they have suffered is perpetrated by a gov­ernment agency. . . . [T]he absence of legal remedies and restric­tions on freedom of association and expression leave women with little opportunity for challenging lack of government action or vio­lations of their own rights.’’ 65 [For additional information on vio­lence against women in the implementation of population planning policies, including specific case examples, see Section II—Popu­lation Planning.]

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Trends

China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and children, as defined under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per­sons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol).1 The ma­jority of trafficking cases are domestic; 2 however, human traf­fickers continue to traffic women and children from China to coun­tries around the world.3 Women and girls also continue to be traf­ficked into China from countries across Asia, as well as from the Americas, Europe, and Africa, for the purpose of forced marriage, forced labor, and sexual exploitation.4 Cases of men and children in China working under forced or otherwise exploitative labor con­ditions that constitute human trafficking under the UN TIP Pro­tocol 5 also emerged during the Commission’s 2013 reporting year.6 The full extent of the forced labor problem in China remains un­clear, as the Chinese government has not traditionally released statistics on forced labor or trafficking of male victims.7 [See Sec­tion II—Worker Rights for more information on cases of forced labor and child labor this year.]

Anti-Trafficking Efforts

Since its accession to the UN TIP Protocol in 2009,8 the Chinese government has steadily taken steps, in concert with other country governments 9 and international non-governmental organizations,10 to revise domestic legislation, policies, and anti-trafficking efforts to come into compliance. For example, in 2011, the National Peo­ple’s Congress Standing Committee issued a revised PRC Criminal Law strengthening provisions on forced labor.11 In January 2013, the State Council took an additional step to bring government ef­forts into compliance with international standards by issuing the China Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2013–2020),12 which is a revised version of its predecessor, the China Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012).13 The new Action Plan appears to contain some improvements in termi­nology and objectives, and clearly lays out which government agen­cies are responsible for implementation.14 It remains to be seen whether the State Council has provided adequate resources and training to local authorities for implementing the plan’s objectives.

Chinese authorities took limited steps this year to improve pre­vention, protection, and services for victims of trafficking, but did not release detailed information on the services provided or the number of victims identified and assisted.15 Chinese officials re­portedly established two shelters dedicated to assisting foreign traf­ficking victims in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, but did not pro­vide data on the number of victims assisted at these shelters or the types of services provided there.16 While the government reportedly maintained four nationwide anti-trafficking hotlines,17 continued training for law enforcement officials,18 and stepped up efforts to cooperate with the governments of bordering countries such as Laos 19 and Burma,20 it is difficult to assess China’s progress in anti-trafficking efforts, as the government does not release data on the overall number of victims identified or assisted.21 After nine consecutive years on the Tier 2 Watch List, China was in June automatically downgraded to Tier 3, the lowest tier ranking, in the

 

  •  State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Re­port.22 The U.S. State Department’s 2013 TIP report stated that China has been ‘‘deemed not to be making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards [for the elimination of traf­ficking].’’ 23 As a Tier 3 country, China could be subject to certain
  •  government sanctions and penalties.24

 

 • Calls for strengthening population planning services and manage¬ment, while reducing unplanned pregnancies and ‘‘out-of-plan’’ births as preventative measures in key regions of human trafficking.33 (The Com¬mission notes that the Chinese government’s usage of the term ‘‘human trafficking’’ here includes illegal adoption.34) • Calls for the regulation of marriage registration and of adoption chan-nels.35 • Calls upon specific government departments and the All-China Wom¬en’s Federation to ‘‘comprehensively tackle’’ China’s sex ratio imbal-ance; 36 revise local regulations and launch trainings to protect women’s rights and interests and promote gender equality; 37 eliminate tradi¬tional notions of female inferiority and continuance of the family line (through male heirs); 38 improve girls’ education; 39 and guarantee rural women’s right to gender-equal land contracts, land distribution, com¬pensation for land expropriation, and collective profit distribution.40 • Calls for greater awareness, education, and training, including adding anti-trafficking material to primary, middle, and secondary school cur¬ricula 41 and strengthening public education campaigns in border areas.42<br />

43 • Clarifies responsibilities and calls upon officials not to abandon or cease investigations in child abduction cases; 44 clarifies procedures for rescued children; and calls for the use of China’s Anti-Trafficking DNA Database to help match parents with rescued children. • Calls for an ‘‘assistance and protection mechanism for vagrant mi-nors,’’ with reliance on experts in social work and other fields for serv-ices, including psychological counseling, behavioral correction, cultural education, skills training, and employment assistance.45 • Expands available rehabilitation services—such as employment skills training, guidance, and networking—to adult male trafficking victims.46 The previous plan had limited these employment services to women and minors over age 16.47<br />

Anti-Trafficking Challenges

Additional revisions are needed to bring China’s domestic legisla­tion into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol.48 For example, while the PRC Criminal Law prohibits human trafficking,49 its pro­visions do not appear to cover all forms of trafficking, such as cer­tain types of non-physical coercion 50 and the commercial sex trade of minors.51 Nor does the definition of trafficking provided under Article 240 of the PRC Criminal Law clearly include offenses against male victims,52 although other articles in the same law ad­dress some aspects of these crimes.53 Each of these forms of traf­ficking are covered under Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol.54 The PRC Criminal Law’s trafficking definition is also overly broad in some aspects compared with the UN TIP Protocol, as it includes the purchase or abduction of children for subsequent sale without specifying the end purpose of these actions.55 Due to these key in­consistencies between the Chinese legal definition and inter­national standards on human trafficking, Chinese official reports and statistics on trafficking cases 56 do not provide an accurate pic­ture of the number of trafficking cases being handled through the criminal justice system in China.57

Several Chinese media reports in the past year highlighted cases involving the purchase and sale of children—misidentifying them as ‘‘trafficking’’ cases—and indicated that a significant amount of ‘‘anti-trafficking’’ work in China remains focused on these types of cases.58 Under the UN TIP Protocol, the purchase or abduction of children for subsequent sale constitutes trafficking only if the end purpose of the sale is exploitation, such as sexual exploitation, labor, or servitude.59

In addition, Chinese officials’ anti-trafficking work reflects a con­tinued misalignment with international standards, especially in of­ficials’ conflation of human trafficking with human smuggling and their subsequent treatment of trafficking victims as criminals.60 According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the main inter­national body responsible for implementing the UN TIP Protocol, ‘‘human trafficking’’ and ‘‘migrant smuggling’’ mainly differ with respect to consent, exploitation, and transnationality.61 Commonly, human trafficking involves the exploitation of an individual (either domestically or after they have crossed borders) without the indi­vidual’s consent, or if the individual initially consented, the consent was ‘‘rendered meaningless by the coercive, deceptive, or abusive actions of the traffickers,’’ whereas migrant smuggling involves the cross-border transport of an individual with the individual’s con­sent and ends when the migrant arrives at his or her destination.62 In conflating the two, Chinese officials may consider an individual’s illegal entry into China to be a crime of ‘‘human smuggling’’ and punish the individual accordingly, while giving less consideration to the role exploitation may have played in the border crossing.63 The Chinese government continues to deport all undocumented North Koreans as illegal ‘‘economic migrants’’ and does not provide legal alternatives to repatriation for foreign victims of trafficking.64 [For more information, see Section II—North Korean Refugees in China.]

Risk Factors

Chinese and international experts link China’s ongoing human trafficking problem to several political, demographic, economic, and social factors. Reports indicate that China’s sex ratio 65—which has become severely skewed against the backdrop of China’s population planning policies and Chinese families’ preference for sons 66—has increased the demand for trafficking of women for forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.67 A 2010 study issued by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported that, by 2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age may exceed the num­ber of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.68 In recent years, domestic and international observers have also linked China’s trafficking problem with a lack of awareness among potential victims, lack of education on trafficking prevention for vulnerable women and parents,69 challenging conditions in bor­dering countries such as poverty and limited job opportunities in Burma and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,70 and cor­ruption among Chinese law enforcement officials.71 [For additional information on China’s skewed sex ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.]

 Representative Human Trafficking Cases From the 2012 Reporting Year (Arranged by Province)<br />
• Guangdong. In October 2012, officials in Guangdong province report-edly rescued four Colombian women who had been forced into sex work during a raid on local entertainment venues.72 The women had report-edly been trafficked into China by a criminal syndicate operating out of Colombia. The case raised concerns that trafficking syndicates are choosing new countries of origin as other countries’ anti-trafficking ef-forts have strengthened.73<br />

 Union Elections Expand as Problems Persist<br />
Authorities continued to promote direct election of trade union offi¬cials in pilot programs at several enterprises, mainly located in Guangdong province.15 In January 2013, Zhao Xiaosui, Chairman of the Guangzhou Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, announced plans to hold pilot trade union elections in 8 to 10 Guangzhou municipality-based enterprises.16 In other cases, officials called for expanding already established union election programs. In May 2013, Zhan Zhenbiao, Vice Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, called on officials to strengthen existing union election programs at 162 enterprises in Foshan municipality and further expand direct union elections to an additional 61 enterprises in the area.17 In addition, Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned multinational electronics manufacturer, publicized plans in February 2013 to ‘‘increas[e] the number of junior employee’’ union representatives in its factories through direct elec-tions.18 Despite these developments, recognition by Chinese and international labor scholars of continued restrictions on worker participation in the nomination and election process have led to questions over the ability of direct elections to engender genuinely representative unions.19 More¬over, individuals involved in organizing union elections have stated that significant challenges remain in educating workers on the election proc¬ess and the responsibilities of the elected union committees.20 A number of observers have also indicated that recently elected union representa¬tives lack necessary skills and experience needed to effectively run a union and represent and advance the rights of workers.21 In one case in February 2013, workers at the Ohms electronics factory in Shenzhen municipality demanded the recall and reelection of their union chairman after only recently electing him through direct elections in May 2012.22 According to a petition letter written by workers, demands for the recall of the union chairman stemmed from his inability to ‘‘fulfill his duties’’ and failure to effectively intervene in several contract disputes.23 A non-governmental labor organization based in Hong Kong suggested the chairman lacked the necessary skills and support needed to play an ef¬fective role, further stating that demands for his recall highlighted ‘‘the importance of not just holding elections but of ensuring that the elected officials can actually perform the tasks they were entrusted with.’’ 24<br />

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

Unlawful Repatriation

During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese gov­ernment continued to detain and repatriate North Korean refugees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite the severe punishments refugees reportedly face once returned. The Chinese government maintains that North Korean refugees in China are illegal economic migrants 1 and continues its repatriation policy based on a 1961 treaty with the DPRK and a subsequent 1986 border protocol.2 China’s repatriation of North Korean refu­gees, including those who leave the DPRK for fear of persecution, contravenes its international obligations under the 1951 UN Con­vention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol, to which China has acceded.3 While there is no reliable information available on the number of North Korean refu­gees living in China—Chinese authorities do not release informa­tion on refugees, nor do they permit the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to operate along China’s northeastern border with the DPRK—international scholars and media estimate the total number is currently between 11,000 and 50,000.4

During this reporting year, the Chinese government appeared to strengthen measures to stem the flow of North Korean refugees into China, including increasing security along the North Korean border and continuing campaigns to seek out and repatriate refu­gees.5 Sources cited by Chinese and South Korean media reported that authorities in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, initiated a program in March offering financial rewards of up to 2,000 yuan (US$326) to Chinese citizens who provide infor­mation leading to the arrest of refugees.6 According to official re­ports, the program specifically aimed to ‘‘stop the illegal trans-boundary criminal situation at Yanbian . . . and strike at illegal border crossers.’’ 7 Chinese villagers living in Yanbian attested to the success of such programs, stating that the number of refugees in the area had decreased significantly in comparison to previous years.8 While trans-border criminal activity, including drug and human trafficking, remains a serious concern,9 Chinese security of­ficials do not distinguish between criminals and refugees, leaving North Koreans who enter China as asylum seekers and refugees at risk of detention and repatriation.

International media reports also indicate Chinese authorities continued to collaborate with North Korean security officials, allow­ing them to operate within China to apprehend North Korean refu­gees and disrupt organizations that attempt to assist them.10 Sources cited by South Korean media noted the presence of North Korean security agents at places commonly frequented by North Koreans in China.11 One report further stated that four North Ko­reans were detained and repatriated by North Korean security agents near Shenyang municipality, Liaoning province, in late 2012.12 According to human rights and refugee advocates, coordi­nated efforts by China and North Korea have made it increasingly difficult for refugee advocates to operate on both sides of the bor­der.13 In January 2013, the South Korean Ministry of Unification announced the number of refugees reaching South Korea dropped in 2012 by 50 percent to 1,508 compared with 2,706 in 2011.14 Ex­perts suggest China’s tougher border security and crackdowns were in part responsible for the decline.15 As of July 2013, the number of refugees entering South Korea was slightly higher than for the same period in 2012.16

Punishment in the DPRK

North Koreans forcibly repatriated by the Chinese government face the threat of imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment in the DPRK.17 Under North Korean Criminal Law, citizens who leave the country without official permission can receive sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment in a ‘‘labor-training camp.’’ 18 The North Korean Ministry of Public Security adopted measures in 2010 making defection a crime of ‘‘treachery against the nation,’’ carrying a sentence of no less than five years’ imprisonment.19 North Koreans sentenced to prison terms reportedly face a com­bination of forced labor, physical abuse, and induced malnutrition that results in a high number of deaths in detention.20 According to interviews with former refugees, the severity of interrogation, torture, and other punishments repatriated North Koreans face de­pends on North Korean authorities’ assessments of their conduct while outside the country.21 North Korean authorities dispense harsher punishment, including long sentences and possible execu­tion, to repatriated North Koreans deemed to have committed ‘‘po­litical’’ crimes, which include attempted defection; conversion to Christianity; exposure to South Korean culture; and contact with religious groups, South Koreans, or Americans.22 According to most recent estimates, North Korea’s prison population is believed to be between 80,000 and 120,000 people.23

The North Korean government’s imprisonment and torture of re­patriated North Koreans renders North Koreans in China refugees ‘‘sur place,’’ or those who fear persecution upon return to their country of origin.24 Under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Pro­tocol, China is obligated to refrain from repatriating refugees ‘‘sur place.’’ China is also obligated under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to refrain from repatriating refugees if there are ‘‘grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being sub­ject to torture.’’ 25

North Korean Women and Trafficking

Lacking legal status and under constant threat of forced repatri­ation, North Korean women who stay in China and do not travel directly to a third country remain vulnerable to abuse, trafficking, and exploitation. Independent experts estimate a majority of North Korean refugees in China are women, of which some have been trafficked into forced marriages or commercial sexual exploi­tation.26 Traffickers have used false promises to lure North Korean women into China and in some cases have resorted to kidnap­ping.27 In some regions of northeast China, particularly in rural areas, a shortage of marriageable women has created a market for trafficked North Korean brides.28 Some women reportedly have been sold and resold multiple times, and trafficked North Korean women have testified to being beaten and sexually abused.29

The Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Ko­rean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Pro­tocol.30 China is obligated under Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) to ‘‘consider adopting legis­lative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of traf­ficking to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently . . . giving appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compas­sionate factors.’’ 31 [See Section II—Human Trafficking for more in­formation.]

Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents

Children born to North Korean women and Chinese men are in­creasingly being raised in China in households where either the mother or both parents are absent.32 In some instances, Chinese authorities repatriate North Korean mothers to the DPRK, while others flee to South Korea or other parts of China.33 One demo­graphic study published in 2013 estimated the population in north­east China of children born to North Korean women and Chinese men since the late 1990s was between 15,000 and 25,000.34 Several experts and academic studies contend household registration (hukou) policies have changed in recent years to allow for a greater majority of children born to North Korean women in China to ob­tain official documentation needed to attend public school and gain access to other social services.35 Despite these changes, general poverty and the continued threat of repatriation leaves these chil­dren and their families at risk.36 China’s repatriation policy is in violation of its international obligations under the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which prohibits separating children from their mothers.37

PUBLIC HEALTH

Public Health Challenges

The Chinese government’s oversight of and response to public health matters came into sharp focus during the Commission’s 2013 reporting year with an outbreak in March of the H7N9 avian influenza.1 Despite initial questions about possible delays in gov­ernment reporting,2 international experts favorably assessed the Chinese government’s response to the outbreak and its coordination with international health agencies,3 and remarked on China’s over­all progress in building an infrastructure for emergency response to epidemics since the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003.4 Adverse health effects of environmental pollu­tion continue to be a public health challenge in China; 5 research studies published in 2013 confirmed links between water pollution and higher cancer rates along the Huai River,6 and between air pollution and shorter life spans in north China.7 In addition, citi­zens’ increasing concerns over food safety 8 and the quality of med­ical care 9 have ‘‘eroded trust in the government’s ability to regu­late state and private enterprises and protect public health.’’ 10 Some government officials and a state-run media outlet reportedly have attempted to censor information 11 or deny the severity of the public’s concerns.12

Institutional and Legislative Developments

During the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2013, the State Council announced the merger of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the National Population and Family Planning Commission into the National Health and Family Planning Commission, as a part of its larger governmental restruc­turing plan.13 At least 90 medical professionals from the CPPCC reportedly disapproved of the change and the lack of public con­sultation over the selected name, arguing that the name ‘‘Ministry of Health’’ should be kept as is, since population planning is only one part of the larger public health system.14 Dr. Huang Jiefu, then-MOH Vice Minister, reportedly commented that using the combined name might cause China to ‘‘encounter difficulties’’ in its international exchanges,15 because of international controversy over China’s population planning policy.16 [For further information on the organizational merger, see Section II—Population Planning.]

China’s first-ever Mental Health Law (MHL) became effective on May 1, 2013,17 and aims to ‘‘expand access to mental health serv­ices,’’ though one international expert noted that the MHL does not sufficiently address the ‘‘stigma associated with mental illness’’ and the ‘‘low rate of care-seeking.’’ 18 A Chinese civil society report re­leased in mid-May 2013 highlighted concerns with rights protec­tions in the new MHL for persons with mental illness, such as guardians’ legal authority in the commitment process and the lack of a guaranteed right to appeal hospitalization.19 Discrepancies be­tween the MHL and national and local legislation, according to the U.S.-based Dui Hua Foundation, create ‘‘the potential for continued use of abusive psychiatric commitment against petitioners, dis­sidents, and others deemed to threaten China’s social and political order.’’ 20 Local Chinese officials reportedly committed a petitioner from Hunan province, Zhang Zhi, to a psychiatric facility sometime around October 31, 2012,21 despite passage of the MHL in October 2012.

Strengthening the rights of persons with disabilities continued to be an ongoing legislative focus in China.22 In February 2013, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office released a draft revision of the 1994 Regulations on Education for Disabled Persons for public comment.23 Chinese and international non-governmental organiza­tions (NGOs) submitted recommendations and comments in re­sponse, many of which incorporated input from Chinese disability rights advocates and persons with disabilities.24 Human Rights Watch noted in its submission that use of ‘‘reasonable accommoda­tion’’ in the draft, a term that promotes the right to equality for persons with disabilities,25 lacks the clarity needed to comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) standard of ‘‘necessary and appropriate modification and adjust­ments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden . . . to en­sure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental free­doms.’’ 26 Chinese domestic organizations raised a concern that the local-level advisory committees, which are responsible for assessing students, do not require the inclusion of legal experts, or disabled persons and their representatives.27 In addition, these organiza­tions identified potential problems with mechanisms to remedy parent grievances.28 The UN committee that reviewed China’s com­pliance with the CRPD in September 2012 recommended that the Chinese government ‘‘reallocate resources from the special edu­cation system to promote . . . inclusive education in mainstream schools, so as to ensure that more children with disabilities can at­tend mainstream education.’’ 29

Rights Protection and Health-Based Discrimination

China’s existing legislative framework prohibits health-based dis­crimination,30 yet discrimination in employment,31 access to med­ical treatment,32 and access to education 33 continued during the 2013 reporting year, partially due to a lack of compliance with the laws 34 and inconsistencies between national laws and local regula­tions.35 A 2012 National People’s Congress report found that, be­tween 2007 and 2011, government departments in 29 provinces had hired a total of only 92 persons with disabilities for civil servant jobs, far below the government’s mandated provision that 1.5 per­cent of government and private enterprise jobs go to persons with disabilities.36 In spite of compulsory education regulations and rights protections for disabled persons, official Chinese statistics from 2010 estimate only 71 percent of children with disabilities at­tend school.37

Employment: During the 2013 reporting year, NGOs and dis­ability rights advocates continued to focus attention on physical eli­gibility standards that have been used to refuse employment to persons with disabilities and those living with infectious diseases.38 In a November 2012 letter to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office, a group of lawyers wrote that discriminatory provisions in the Civil Servant Recruitment Physical Examination Standards contravene the Chinese Constitution’s protection of citizens’ right to work.39 A local court reportedly upheld a decision that cited state secrets as the reason to refuse an application for open govern­ment information on the number of civil servants with disabil­ities.40 As a State Party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, China has agreed to ‘‘take appropriate measures to employ teachers, including teachers with disabilities’’ and ‘‘[p]rohibit discrimination on the basis of disability with regard to all matters concerning all forms of employment.’’ 41 Although Guangdong province removed discriminatory provisions against people with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS in its physical standards for teachers in May 2013,42 according to a 2011 study, at least 19 provinces reportedly maintain discriminatory provisions in physical standards for teachers.43 Human Rights Watch pointed out that an amended article in the national draft Regulations for the Education of Persons with Disabilities may allow government departments and schools to ‘‘discriminate against individuals on the basis of physical requirements.’’ 44

Access to Medical Treatment: Discrimination in access to medical treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) con­tinues to be a challenge in China.45 In October 2012, a Chinese NGO in Tianjin reported on a local man who had been denied treatment for lung cancer at several hospitals due to his HIV-positive status.46 In November 2012, the Ministry of Health (MOH)—reportedly at the behest of Premier Li Keqiang 47—issued a directive ordering hospitals to ‘‘take steps to guarantee the right to medical treatment’’ for PLWHA.48 Beijing Aizhixing Institute, a public health advocacy organization, however, raised a concern that the MOH directive lacked enforcement provisions, such as punish­ments for hospitals that refuse treatment to PLWHA.49

THE ENVIRONMENT

Pollution Challenges and Government Disclosure

Despite some progress in protecting the environment,1 environ­mental problems remain a major challenge, and in recent years, the associated costs reportedly have increased.2 During 2012, there were 542 environmental accidents, five of which were serious.3 News reports emphasized the highly visible ‘‘foggy and hazy’’ skies that affected 20 provinces in early 2013,4 and which reportedly reached Japan.5 The pollution events reportedly garnered extraor­dinary attention from citizens, the media, the government,6 and deputies at the March meeting of the National People’s Congress,7 as well as increased forward momentum on some relevant legisla­tion.8 These were not isolated incidents; outdoor air pollution has been an ongoing challenge, posing serious health risks.9

Authorities irregularly disclosed information on pollution prob­lems and their health impacts. Continuing a positive trend, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) acknowledged that toxic chemicals have caused numerous acute air pollution inci­dents,10 posed a danger to numerous drinking water sources, and led to the emergence of ‘‘cancer villages,’’ among other health prob­lems.11 Groundwater pollution continued to present difficulties,12 and officials publicly disclosed some groundwater contamination data.13 Authorities reportedly classified as bad nearly 60 percent of the groundwater tested at monitoring sites in 198 cities during 2012.14 Soil pollution reportedly is also widespread. It possibly af­fects as much as one-fifth of China’s arable land based on 2010 data 15 and its possible impact on the food supply has been cause for some concern,16 but authorities have so far been much less forthcoming with soil contamination data.17

The problems created by the migration of polluting industries to China’s western and poorer areas continue, including fast-paced scaling up of mining in Tibet.18 Migration practices leave behind contaminated sites,19 as well as create new problems in areas where major pollutant reduction targets may be lower, and envi­ronmental protection capacity may lag behind more developed coastal areas.20 Reportedly, only 2.8 percent of China’s 600,000 vil­lages are included in environmental comprehensive control ef­forts.21

Regulatory Developments and Challenges to Rule of Law and Accountability

CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS

During the reporting period, top Chinese Communist Party and government leaders highlighted ‘‘ecological civilization’’ (shengtai wenming) (apparently a complex concept that includes ecological and environmental protection, resource conservation, and sustain­able development), as being tied to the four basic goals of a ‘‘xiaokang’’ society (an all-around well-off society), and mandated the establishment of ‘‘target systems,’’ ‘‘assessment measures,’’ and ‘‘rewards and punishment mechanisms’’ related to the concept.22 Economic development, however, remains the ‘‘core concern.’’ 23 At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, leaders revised the Chinese Communist Party Constitution to include one new sen­tence and a new paragraph that urge the promotion of ‘‘ecological civilization’’ within the overall context of ‘‘China’s special socialist enterprise.’’ 24 In addition, former President Hu Jintao 25 and Pre­mier Li Keqiang 26 gave prominence to ‘‘ecological civilization’’ and environmental quality in national speeches.

In June, court and procuratorate authorities issued a joint inter­pretation clarifying the application of criminal provisions to envi­ronmental violations; it outlines specific standards for classifying the severity of the impacts of environmental pollution, which then determines application of the sentencing guidelines in the PRC Criminal Law.27 Other authorities focused some regulatory meas­ures on issues of concern to Chinese citizens, including air pollu­tion and soil pollution. In December, MEP mandated that 117 cities will be responsible for specified pollutant reduction targets not al­ready listed in the 12th Five-Year Plan, including PM2.5 and PM10.28 These reduction targets will be included in government re­sponsibility assessments.29 After the winter air pollution events, authorities reportedly restarted 30 stalled efforts to revise the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.31 In June, the State Council reportedly issued ten policies intended to strengthen con­trol over air pollution and in September issued the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan.32 During the report­ing period, while authorities were not forthcoming with soil con­tamination data, legislators appeared to resuscitate efforts to draft a major national soil pollution law by establishing a new drafting group,33 and the State Council announced designs for a new soil contamination survey and a partial monitoring network,34 and plans for soil cleanup efforts.35

In addition, leaders took regulatory steps to address climate change, some outlined in the ‘‘China 2012 Annual Report on Poli­cies and Actions To Address Climate Change’’ 36 and in the white paper, ‘‘China’s Energy Policy 2012.’’ 37 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone passed local legislation to restrict greenhouse gas emissions, the first location in China to do so.38 Authorities also began to ‘‘re­search and establish’’ a national carbon emissions trading scheme and pilot trading markets.39 China also issued its first greenhouse gas bulletin.40 In April 2013, China and the United States signed a joint statement on climate change announcing the formation of a Climate Change Working Group,41 and in June, agreed to work together to reduce hydrofluorocarbons.42

Authorities opened the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) draft revision for public comment in September 2012 43 and col­lected 11,748 comments.44 The draft revisions reportedly were widely criticized.45 Governmental and non-governmental organiza­tions (NGOs) submitted suggestions regarding the draft, some urg­ing for provisions providing for greater transparency and strength­ening enforcement of laws and regulations and channels for public participation.46 One Chinese environmental group commented that a June 2013 draft of the revised EPL contained language in line with the group’s previous suggestions, including ones that related to the pollution permit management system and daily penalties.47 The group and environmental experts, however, found other areas in need of improvement and suggested placing greater emphasis on protecting citizens’ environmental rights; modifying the article re­lated to public interest lawsuits to bring it more in line with the Civil Procedure Law; strengthening public participation in environ­mental impact assessments; and disclosing enterprise pollution monitoring information.48

CHALLENGES TO RULE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Significant challenges hinder the development of rule of law in the area of environmental protection. Official reports highlighted the number of environmental legal violations investigated and han­dled during 2012.49 Government interference, local protectionism, and lax or arbitrary enforcement are problematic.50 Related and additional challenges include:

  • Official evaluation criteria and incentives that overempha­size economic development; 51
  • Inept or unethical behavior, disregard for environmental reg­ulations, and corruption; 52
  • The lack of supervision over governments and individual offi­cials acting above the law; 53
  • Investment in environmental protection is lower as a percent of GDP than some Chinese scientists believe it should be (it hovers around 1.3 to 1.5 percent of GDP) and environmental protection officials lack authority in some cases; 54 and
  • Insufficient monitoring as well as environmental penalties that are too light to deter polluting behavior.55

 

Development of Environmental Public Interest Law Comes to a Standstill

The PRC Civil Procedure Law issued in August 2012 contained an article permitting public interest suits by ‘‘agencies and relevant organizations stipulated by law.’’ 56 The general legal foundation for these types of cases, however, remains vague,57 the number of en­vironmental cases remains minimal,58 and the June 2013 draft of the Environmental Protection Law stipulated that only one govern­ment-supported environmental group, the All-China Environment Federation, will be allowed to bring environmental public interest lawsuits.59 Other barriers to the development of public interest law persist,60 including difficulties in obtaining evidence,61 the costs of pursuing such suits by organizations,62 and the lack of authority and capacity of the courts that take these cases.63

Despite these barriers, during the reporting period, the Chinese media noted key environmental public interest cases. In a first, in late September 2012, the Qingzhen Environmental Tribunal of the People’s Court in Qingzhen city, Guizhou province, heard a case brought by an individual citizen, ‘‘supported’’ by the local procuratorate.64 A second case involving illegal dumping of chro­mium sludge in Yunnan province, brought in part by two NGOs not directly affiliated with government agencies,65 is pending. The par­ties to this case reached an initial pre-trial agreement in late 2012,66 but the defendant refused to sign the mediation decision at the last moment.67 In a third case, officials reportedly pressured lawyers representing an association to withdraw two cross-provin­cial cases against a company linked to an aniline chemical spill in Shanxi province; local news called the cases ‘‘harmonized.’’ 68

Role of Environmental Courts and Unreliable Legal Remedies

China’s specialized environmental courts continue to pro­liferate—reportedly reaching at least 95 by 2013. These courts ap­pear to be providing different functions from place to place 69 and some of them are not handling many cases.70 Legal remedies in en­vironmental cases continue to be unreliable as courts remain un­willing to accept some cases.71 Over 70 percent of grassroots envi­ronmental disputes reportedly are handled through mediation, which has an ambiguous legal foundation and which may be forced upon disputants.72 Sometimes citizens have taken to the streets in an effort to resolve grievances. Pollution and degradation problems reportedly are among the primary triggers of environmental mass incidents,73 and such incidents increased 30 percent in 2012.74 En­vironmental protests continued to be the largest in scale among in­cidents of unrest, and over 70 percent of the 47 environmental pro­tests tracked by one organization involved clashes with police.75 In some cases, authorities halted plans for projects after public pro­tests.76

Suppression of Environmental Advocates and Protests

Chinese citizens advocated for the improvement of environmental quality, but during the course of protecting their rights or inves­tigating claims of pollution, some people faced detention, harass­ment from officials, or beatings:

  • In December 2012, authorities gave former forestry official and environmentalist Liu Futang a three-year suspended sen­tence for allegedly engaging in ‘‘illegal business activities’’ linked to his self-publication—with a Hong Kong publication number—of environmental expose´s that may have embar­rassed local government leaders.77
  • In January 2013, a journalist was reportedly beaten when he went with staff from the All-China Environmental Federa­tion—a government-funded non-governmental organization (NGO) 78—to take pictures of pollution linked to a paper com­pany in Hunan province.79 County leaders investigated the de­layed dispatch of police officers and inadequate environmental oversight in the case,80 and police later detained two suspects in the beating.81
  • In February, Chen Yuqian, an environmental advocate in Zhejiang province, reported being attacked in his home and beaten by more than 40 unidentified men after he publicly challenged a local environmental official to swim in a polluted local river.82 Chen had campaigned for years to get officials to address water pollution problems.83 He blamed officials for the five beatings he has endured over the last 10 years.84
  • As of late July 2013, farmer and environmentalist Zhang Bing’s case remains in limbo. Zhang claimed pollution killed nearly 2,000 kilos of his fish in 2009, and when he was not compensated, he petitioned higher level authorities and talked to the press.85 Authorities sentenced Zhang to two years in

 

prison and three years’ probation on the charge of ‘‘extortion’’ linked to his petitioning activities, but a higher court over­turned that sentence twice.86 The procuratorate in Lujiang county, Anhui province, as of July 2013, had not yet issued an official decision declaring that it was not granting an indict­ment against Zhang, even though the Lujiang court had issued a decision granting the procuratorate permission to withdraw the suit against Zhang.87

Officials also questioned environmental advocates, took extraor­dinary measures to prevent anti-pollution and other demonstra­tions, and censored Internet postings.

  • In November 2012, authorities questioned Chen Zuoliang about giving foreign reporters pictures of the protests over con­struction of a paraxylene (PX) plant in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, and forced rights defender Wu Bin to return to his home, possibly because he went to Ningbo to investigate the protests.88
  • In May, authorities in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan prov­ince, reportedly took a variety of measures 89 and amassed a strong police presence to prevent a ‘‘walk’’ to protest against a petrochemical plant in nearby Pengzhou city,90 although they claimed the police deployment was an exercise to ‘‘support earthquake relief.’’ 91 Officials reportedly restricted the freedom of movement of a number of rights advocates,92 deleted weibo postings opposing the plant, and also warned a Chengdu blogger to delete a petition voicing opposition to the plant, which she had posted on the public comment page of the U.S. White House Web site.93

 

During the reporting period, officials in various locations in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region reportedly suppressed, some­times using force, protests and appeal efforts by herders who were unhappy about the loss of grasslands, land confiscation, and mine pollution.94 Authorities reportedly also deleted Internet postings re­garding herders’ grievances.95

Environmental Transparency and Public Participation

During the 2013 reporting year, citizens called for greater envi­ronmental transparency, and environmental authorities took steps to improve proactive disclosure of information. In March, 23 envi­ronmental groups issued a plea for greater transparency regarding pollution sources.96 The MEP issued an internal rule that environ­mental protection agencies at all levels post the abridged version of environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports online as of Sep­tember 1, 2012,97 and in October, rescinded a 2008 decision to ex­clude construction project EIA documents from the list of informa­tion subject to Open Government Information (OGI) requests.98 In the same month, MEP issued a circular,99 which if implemented, could potentially improve proactive disclosure of certain types of EIA documents, ‘‘supervisory type’’ monitoring data, and informa­tion about specified types of environmental accidents.100 The cir­cular, however, has numerous limitations.101 In steps forward, in 2012, select cities began to make public PM2.5 and air quality data using the revised air quality index 102 and in 2013 officials released some information from an environmental impact assessment report for a refinery project in Kunming municipality.103

Despite these new rules and some progress, authorities’ proactive disclosure of information remains irregular. According to one re­port, while there has been ‘‘definite’’ progress in disclosing air qual­ity data, the number of cities that performed poorly outnumbered the cities that performed relatively well.104 In January 2013, the State Council outlined plans to ‘‘actively push forward with orderly hydropower development,’’ 105 including projects on the Nu River.106 In relation to the plans, articles highlighted concerns about transparency,107 as well as environmental protection,108 so­cial impacts, downstream and cross-border impacts,109 and seismic risks.110

During the reporting period, instances of environmental news censorship include the following:

  • In March, officials in Changzhi city, Shanxi province, waited for five days to report an aniline chemical spill at a fertilizer factory that affected more than one million people down­stream.111
  • In May, authorities reportedly censored news of anti-pollu­tion protests over construction of a lithium-ion battery plant in Shanghai,112 and the ‘‘walk’’ in protest of a petrochemical plant poised to open in Chengdu, Sichuan province.113
  • Authorities in Kunming, Yunnan province, allowed a protest of hundreds of people against construction of an oil refinery in May, but they reportedly censored critical comments about the project and told state-owned enterprise employees not to par­ticipate or post comments online about the protest.114 Kunming officials also blocked access to a related EIA report on the grounds that it involved ‘‘secret documents.’’ 115

 

OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

Since the passage of the Open Government Information Regula­tion (OGI) in 2007,116 citizens have become more proactive in re­questing environmental data, with some success, but barriers to transparency remain. In April 2013, the Ministry of Land and Re­sources responded to an OGI request regarding groundwater qual­ity by sending 400 pages of data.117 In another positive develop­ment, a government-funded environmental group won a court case against an environmental protection bureau for not releasing infor­mation.118 One OGI study found that a greater percentage of envi­ronmental authorities responded to information requests than in the previous year; however, the depth of transparency dropped in 35 percent of the locations surveyed.119 In some cases, city govern­ment officials refused to provide lists of companies that had been punished for polluting behaviors.120 Despite public calls by Premier Li Keqiang to proactively disclose environmental pollution informa­tion that affects citizens’ interests,121 central officials refused to provide information about soil contamination in response to a re­quest, stating that the data was a ‘‘state secret,’’ 122 which report­edly prompted criticism.123

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESSES

Central authorities expressed aspirations to expand public par­ticipation in decisions about environmental assessments of projects. In fall 2012, central authorities issued guiding opinions 124 or measures 125 stipulating that specified agencies should establish so­cial risk assessment mechanisms during the preparatory phase of domestic large-scale fixed asset investment projects, reportedly at least in part to reduce the number of environmental mass inci­dents.126 During the reporting period, MEP announced plans in August 2012 127 and in January 2013 128 to clarify processes for public participation and expanding transparency of EIA processes. The 2012–2017 MEP work plan for key projects, however, did not appear to contain concrete mechanisms to achieve these goals, al­though it included the aims of ‘‘mobilizing’’ and ‘‘proactively guid­ing participation by all people.’’ 129 Despite authorities’ declarations of support for participation, considerable barriers remain.130

III. Development of the Rule of Law

CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) number in the millions,1 and illustrate wide breadth and increasingly complex lev­els of organization on issue advocacy,2 social service provision,3 and shared interests,4 as well as in business promotion 5 and farming.6 Government-registered social organizations 7 (shehui zuzhi) make up a subset of Chinese NGOs: Official statistics reported 491,961 registered social organizations in 2012, an increase of approxi­mately 13.3 percent over 2011,8 that consist of 268,000 social asso­ciations (shehui tuanti) such as membership groups and trade asso­ciations, 221,000 non-governmental, nonprofit organizations (minban feiqiye danwei) such as community development and social services providers, and 2,961 foundations (jijinhui) such as public and private organizations engaged in charitable and philanthropic work.9 Many Chinese NGOs are registered as business entities or remain unregistered due to obstacles in registering as social orga­nizations,10 yet they play an active role in promoting the public in­terest in environmental protection, protecting the rights of migrant workers, and fighting health-based discrimination, among other ad­vocacy issues.11 Chinese scholars estimate between 3 to 10 million unregistered NGOs.12 Nor is civil society activity found only within organizations: During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission ob­served individuals and informal networks engaging the government on issues of public interest.13

Government and Party Control

The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to ac­knowledge the developing role of social organizations in China, yet an April 2013 Party document leaked in August portrays civil soci­ety and public participation as threats to the government and Party for which stricter ideological control is necessary.14 The sen­ior leadership’s public policy statements during the 2013 reporting year repeat earlier policy guidance in the government and Party’s approach toward control of social organization growth: The govern­ment should (1) ‘‘lead in the healthy and orderly development of so­cial organizations’’ 15 and (2) accelerate the ‘‘establishment of Party leadership, government responsibility, societal support and public participation.’’ 16 A Central Party School researcher, however, an­ticipates a potentially more dynamic relationship between the gov­ernment and non-governmental organizations based on the 18th Party Congress report’s instruction that the government and Party ‘‘accelerate the formation of a system of modern social organiza­tions in which government functions are separated from those of social organizations, rights and responsibilities are clearly delin­eated, and social organizations exercise autonomy in accordance with the law.’’ 17

Chinese scholars and civil society advocates describe a system of ‘‘graduated control,’’ or differentiated treatment by the government, based upon where an organization falls along a spectrum of polit­ical sensitivity, which can range from ‘‘low-level’’ and ‘‘infrequent’’ monitoring to ‘‘ruthlessly crack[ing] down’’ on operations, activities and individuals.18 One aspect of this control can be illustrated by efforts to build up the presence of the Communist Party (‘‘Party-building’’) to guide and monitor social organizations,19 and poten­tially exert influence that might compromise organizations’ deci­sionmaking and activities.20 For example, in May 2013, Foshan city, Guangdong province, issued draft regulations on government procurement of services that suggest authorities will give pref­erence in awarding contracts to social organizations which meet Party-building requirements, such as having Party members among the organizations’ full-time staff or establishing an internal Party branch.21 [See Section III—Institutions of Democratic Gov­ernance for further examples.]

Civil society organizations that the government perceives as po­litically sensitive face government interference under the guise of ‘‘stability maintenance,’’ particularly during anniversaries and large-scale political events.22 In advance of the 18th National Con­gress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 23 and the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2013, inter­national media reported on heightened surveillance, harassment, and extralegal detention of civil society advocates.24 Chinese and international human rights organizations have drawn attention to a government crackdown on citizen rights’ advocates beginning in spring 2013.25 Chinese authorities reportedly have detained or ar­rested dozens of rights advocates, including Xu Zhiyong, a leading proponent of the New Citizens’ Movement, a loose network of indi­viduals who advocate for legal and political reforms, human rights, and social justice.26 On July 18, officials from the Beijing munici­pality Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA) shut down the Transition In­stitute, a think tank established in 2007 that researches public in­terest issues such as the taxation system, industry regulation, pub­lic participation, and economic development.27 The BCA officials re­portedly shut down the think tank because it had not registered with the BCA, although the think tank’s founder noted that it was registered as a business entity, similar to many other think tanks in China.28

During the 2013 reporting year, several civil society organiza­tions sought legal or administrative redress in response to govern­ment harassment. A public interest organization that works on anti-discrimination advocacy won a legal case in March 2013 against a hotel in Suzhou city for breach of contract due to the can­cellation of the group’s hotel reservation for a public interest law­yers’ workshop in the spring of 2012.29 Local police acknowledged that they had demanded the cancellation because of a ‘‘stability maintenance’’ order.30 In contrast, in December 2012, a court in Shenzhen municipality dismissed a lawsuit brought by a migrant workers’ services organization in Shenzhen that had been forcibly evicted from multiple locations during a crackdown on labor NGOs in 2012.31 The Beijing Shouwang Church, an unregistered Protes­tant house church in Beijing municipality, took legal action against the Beijing police in late September 2012 for preventing the con­gregation’s worship for more than one year, but the Beijing govern­ment’s legal affairs office reportedly rejected the church’s applica­tion for administrative review.32

Regulatory and Legislative Developments

The central government’s institutional reform plan (fang’an) issued in March 33 has scheduled the release of long-awaited revi­sions 34 to the three key administrative regulations on social orga­nization management 35 for the end of 2013.36 An official from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) stated in an interview that the re­visions will address registration,37 lay out a division of functions between the government (e.g., inter-bureau coordination, policy and guidance, oversight, and legal enforcement) and social organiza­tions (e.g., sector-based codes of conduct), and encourage self-regulation and mutual support.38 MCA officials reportedly are en­couraging local governments to formulate implementation policies in advance of the forthcoming revisions.39 In July, the Yunnan pro­vincial government, for example, released drafts of four regulatory documents that include provisions to forbid current government of­ficials to be the ‘‘responsible person’’ (i.e., a person with legal re­sponsibilities) for non-governmental organizations; bar the govern­ment from engaging in public fundraising, except in case of natural disaster; and increase the number of representatives from social or­ganizations in Yunnan’s provincial leadership entities, e.g., the Party, the People’s Congress, and the People’s Consultative Con­gress.40

At the March 2013 session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), Vice Premier Ma Kai announced that direct registration— whereby social organizations would no longer require a government or quasi-governmental sponsor for registration as required under the current regulations (‘‘dual management’’) 41—will be permitted for business and industry associations, technical and scientific or­ganizations, charities, and rural and urban community develop­ment groups under the government’s institutional reform plan.42 The plan, moreover, may allow the registration of more than one social organization per jurisdiction working on a particular indus­try,43 which is a limitation on registration in the current regula­tions.44 Yet Ma added that ‘‘[p]olitical and legal groups, religious groups, and foreign NGOs with [a] domestic representative office . . . will continue to be required to secure sponsor organizations’’ for the existing dual management process.45 The exclusion of polit­ical and legal groups 46 from the new policy appears to contradict comments made in March 2012 by Minister of Civil Affairs Li Liguo on equal treatment for human rights and political groups in the registration and review process.47 The Chinese government’s limitations on NGO registration contravene the right to freedom of association provided in China’s constitution and in Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which pro­vides that: ‘‘No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of [the freedom of association] other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or public safety . . .’’ 48

Local authorities began experiments in direct registration of so­cial organizations in Shenzhen municipality and Guangdong prov­ince in 2009, and in 19 provinces 49 in 2011,50 though reports sug­gest that the implementation of direct registration has been un­even. Guangdong reportedly experienced a 15.1 percent increase in the number of social organizations by the end of 2012,51 but a uni­versity survey in 2012 of public interest organizations that were newly registered as non-governmental, nonprofit organizations in Guangdong found that many faced increased taxes, expenses, and administrative work following registration.52 While some of these post-registration challenges may derive from ‘‘growing pains’’ re­lated to NGO operational capacity,53 local civil affairs bureaus re­portedly face challenges due to insufficient staffing and regulatory guidance on how to process applications for registration.54 Accord­ing to NGO advocates, some bureaus are not registering public in­terest groups and service providers because of a ‘‘conservative’’ 55 approach in authorizing registration. For example, organizations working on rural women’s rights, service provision to persons with developmental disabilities, and outreach to populations at greater risk of HIV/AIDS infection, have reported being unable to directly register as social organizations in Beijing despite Beijing munici­pality’s early participation as a direct registration site.56

GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES FROM NGOS

Over the past decade, several Chinese municipalities launched experiments in government procurement of public services (e.g., elder care, community corrections, and poverty alleviation) from so­cial organizations,57 reflecting the Chinese government’s efforts to transfer some government functions to NGOs 58 and develop a ‘‘non-state social service sector.’’ 59 Local governments have begun formulating project catalogues and budgets, selection and oversight processes, and standards of transparency and accountability.60 The piecemeal development of the regulatory framework, however, has negatively affected the implementation and supervision of procure­ment processes and service delivery, according to some commenta­tors.61 In a May 2013 speech, Premier Li Keqiang urged officials to ‘‘increase efforts to purchase basic public services, and promptly formulate and introduce guiding opinions for the government to purchase services from social organizations.’’ 62 The central govern­ment reportedly has allocated about 200 million yuan (US$32.08 million) to procure services and training from NGOs in 2013, ap­proximately the same amount of funding allocated in 2012.63

Some civil society advocates have raised concerns that direct reg­istration and the expansion of government procurement of public services from NGOs will not necessarily benefit grassroots (caogen) NGOs. NGOs unable to register as social organizations are ineli­gible for government contracts, tax-exempt status, and public fund-raising, among other possible benefits of formal registration.64 Some grassroots NGOs in Foshan city, Guangdong province, for ex­ample, believe that eligibility requirements for government pro­curement projects are too difficult to meet, current policy is un­clear, and communication channels are lacking.65 In an analysis of 60 grassroots organizations in 2011 and 2012, scholars from the Chinese University of Hong Kong speculated that grassroots NGOs may be ‘‘further marginalized by losing out in the new game of competing for official funding and support.’’ 66

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHARITY SECTOR

Chinese legal scholars have identified ‘‘conspicuous problems’’ in the regulatory framework for charities, despite central and local government efforts in 2012 to improve transparency and account­ability.67 These problems, such as a lack of a ‘‘[legal] definition and identity’’ for charitable organizations or uniform legal rules in fundraising; haphazard approaches to handling volunteers and their services; a high threshold for charitable organizations’ reg­istration and management; and a tax exemption policy without supporting mechanisms for implementation,68 have hindered the development of the charitable sector.69 Registration for religious or­ganizations, many of which have made charitable contributions to disaster relief and poverty alleviation, remains a ‘‘forbidden zone,’’ according to a scholar from Anhui province.70 A national charity law has been on the State Council and National People’s Congress legislative agenda for several years 71 and China’s state-run media agency Xinhua reported in December 2012 that a draft is under way.72 The Commission has not observed official announcements on a timeframe for the Charity Law’s completion. Wang Zhenyao, director of the Philanthropy Research Institute at Beijing Normal University, has recommended that the draft be made public in order to benefit from public opinion.73

Reports of financial mismanagement at the Red Cross of China 74 and other state-run foundations 75 since the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province have diminished the credibility of China’s government-run charitable organizations,76 and prompted calls for stronger regulation of the charitable sector.77 Official statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs China Charity Donation Informa­tion Center showed an almost 20 percent overall reduction in chari­table donations in 2012 from 2011.78 Despite information disclosure regulations, 60 percent of China’s foundations reportedly ‘‘failed to make public their annual financial report, although they are legally obliged to do so.’’ 79 In the wake of the April 2013 earthquake in Ya’an city, Sichuan province, public debates on the lack of trans­parency and accountability in state-run charities reportedly led to the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s initial refusal to donate HKD100 million (US$12,887,300) 80 to relief efforts and to Hong Kongers’ launch of a ‘‘Not One Cent’’ campaign.81 ‘‘Non-governmental’’ charitable organizations have benefited from government-run char­ities’ credibility crisis; 82 the Global Times, an English-language arm of China’s state-run media agency Xinhua, reported that in the days after the Ya’an earthquake, donations to a private foundation were more than 10 million yuan (US$1,592,230) compared to 30,000 yuan (US$4,783) donated to the Red Cross of China.83

 HIV/AIDS Grassroots Organizations<br />
China’s grassroots (caogen) organizations working on HIV/AIDS issues are of particular relevance during the 2013 reporting year in light of the cessation of major international funding from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund) at the close of 2013.84 Grassroots NGOs have played a significant role in China in HIV/AIDS health prevention and control, and the protection of the legal rights of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), yet UNAIDS reported in 2012 that ‘‘to date, only a small fraction of HIV [NGOs] have legal status.’’ 85 Although The Global Fund spurred the Chinese government to engage more deeply with domestic civil society organizations over the past decade,86 resulting in some successful cooperation between the gov-ernment and grassroots organizations,87 grassroots HIV/AIDS NGOs re-portedly are ‘‘heavily dependent’’ on funding from international organi-zations.88 The government gradually has acknowledged the importance of HIV/AIDS non-governmental organizations,89 notably on November 26, 2012, when then-Vice Premier Li Keqiang met with HIV/AIDS NGO representatives 90 and reportedly stated ‘‘non-governmental organiza-tions, ‘grassroots organizations,’ best understand the conditions and needs of PLWHA’’ and play an ‘‘indispensable’’ role in the fight against HIV/AIDS.91 An October 2012 report from The Global Fund, however, raised concerns that ‘‘there is still no strong and sustainable national funding mechanism or technical support for ensuring service quality is in place to support CBOs [community-based organizations].’’ 92<br />

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

18th Party Congress: Leadership Transition, Party Constitution Amendment, and Reform

During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, a major political power succession took place within the Chinese Communist Party, which happens at 10-year intervals.1 This top leadership transition, timed with the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, involved the extensive turnover of power to a slightly younger cohort 2 of political leaders in a non-trans­parent process.3 Propaganda officials dictated how news outlets were to cover the 18th Party Congress and the transfer of power.4 Some international scholars called the transition peaceful and or­derly, and a ‘‘step forward in the institutionalization of Chinese leadership politics.’’ 5 The transition took place amid factional struggles and a scandal resulting in the downfall of Bo Xilai, a high-ranking official many believed was in contention for a top leadership position, and his wife Gu Kailai.6 [See Corruption and Anticorruption Measures in this section.] One international scholar believes the transition denoted an advance in the ‘‘institutionaliza­tion of leadership politics,’’ and reinforced collective leadership at the top of the Party, meaning Xi Jinping—Party General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Military Commission—is the ‘‘first among equals.’’ 7 The former Prime Minister of Australia believed that Xi would be a strong leader and a key political player.8 Xi ap­peared to act quickly in the first few months to move forward with his agenda and leadership style,9 although some sources point out that retired Chinese leaders still may play a role in political af­fairs.10

At the 18th Party Congress, Party leaders also passed a resolu­tion 11 to amend the Party constitution to include the following re­visions, among others: 12

  • To uphold ‘‘scientific development’’ (former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao’s socio-economic theory that ‘‘puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable de­velopment’’ 13) as a guiding ideology;
  • To adhere to the idea that ‘‘the fundamental reason behind all of China’s achievements and progress since the reform and opening up policy was introduced is, in the final analysis, that the Party has blazed a path of socialism with Chinese charac­teristics . . . .’’

 

Some international and Chinese scholars, journalists, and com­mentators believe that under the new echelon of top leaders, the prospects for political reform in China appear dim, although there is some variance of opinion,14 and some note that it is too early to tell.15 In speeches, leaders have defended the Party’s hold on power,16 promised to combat corruption,17 pledged to make the gov­ernment more efficient,18 and vowed to promote the ‘‘China dream,’’ which includes ‘‘national rejuvenation’’ and a more pro­nounced role for China in the international arena.19 While early in 2013, Xi Jinping reportedly emphasized that ‘‘no organization or in­dividual should be put above the constitution and the law,’’ 20 he also ‘‘demanded a return to traditional Leninist discipline’’ in a talk in a private setting.21 Xi said the Party should be able ‘‘to put up with’’ criticism and correct mistakes,22 but he also urged officials not to ‘‘allow any subversive errors when it comes to the funda­mental issues.’’ 23 An international scholar pointed out that au­thorities appear not to have abandoned the Party’s fundamental Maoist approach to divide people into the vague and undefined cat­egories of friend or foe and to deal with perceived enemies harsh­ly,24 which may lead to the abuse of authority.

New Government Leadership and Government Structural Reform

After the fall 2012 political power transition within the Party, the new cohort of top Party leaders assumed the most senior posts in the government in March 2013 during the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) meetings (Two Sessions).25 During the Two Sessions, Chinese leaders also passed a plan for a major reshuffling of State Council institutions and a ‘‘transformation of government functions,’’ after the plan had been approved by the Party Central Committee in November 2012.26 Authorities provided numerous reasons for the restructuring, including: 27

  • Improving government efficiency;
  • Reducing special transfer payments and fee collections;
  • Eliminating overlapping government responsibilities;
  • Pushing forward reform toward ‘‘super ministries’’; and

 

• Reducing micro-management. At the heart of the reforms are plans to complete 72 changes to government functions and other tasks,28 which are assigned to spe­cific government organizations for completion over the next three

to five years.29 As part of the plan, authorities made the following major changes: 30

  • Reduced by 2 the number of ministries and commissions that make up the State Council, bringing the total to 25, and re­duced by 2 the number of other ministerial-level organs;
  • Separated the commercial and non-commercial aspects of managing China’s railways;
  • Merged the National Population and Family Planning Com­mission and the Ministry of Health into a new National Health and Family Planning Commission;
  • Established the State Food and Drug Supervision and Man­agement Administration; and
  • Reorganized the National Oceanic Administration and the National Energy Administration.

 

Reach of the State Under One-Party Rule

China’s political institutions continue to be out of compliance with the standards defined in Article 25 of the International Cov­enant on Civil and Political Rights,31 which China has signed and declared an intention to ratify; 32 nor have Chinese officials com­plied with the standards outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.33

The Communist Party continues to dominate political affairs, al­lows only limited independent political participation, and exerts control over the courts,34 the NPC, the media,35 and state leader­ship appointments.36 For example, this can be seen at the NPC meeting this year where nearly 35 percent of the delegates concur­rently held positions as leading officials in the Party and govern­ment.37 In another example, in September 2012, central Party lead­ers issued an opinion that may further strengthen the Party’s con­trol over human resources affairs.38 Party-building and Party-loy­alty efforts focused on accounting firms,39 the People’s Armed Po-lice,40 and Internet companies, such as the Sina Corporation.41

The Party also exerts influence over non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, including university student groups,42 in part through its Party-building efforts within these or­ganizations, as well as by establishing its own Party-organized so­cial organizations.43 For example, various Party organizations in different locations over the last few years have established, are running, or are supporting ‘‘social affairs (or work) committees’’ 44 and Party-sponsored community service and nonprofit organiza­tions, among others.45 Through these organizations, the Party may engage in the monitoring of groups and activities.46

In addition, developments suggest the Party is exerting more ef­fort to control the ideological realm. In April, the Office of the Party Central Committee reportedly issued a circular to select Party officials around China, titled Document No. 9, which dis­cusses seven ideological threats to the Party’s grip on power that ‘‘require attention.’’ 47 These threats are preaching about Western constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neo-lib­eralism, journalistic freedom, historical nihilism—negating the his­tory of the Party, and questioning socialism with Chinese charac­teristics.48 One account of the circular said officials need to ‘‘cut off at the source channels for disseminating erroneous currents of thought.’’ 49 In addition, state media suggests that the Party be­lieves China is in a ‘‘struggle in the ideological sphere’’ 50 and the Party has initiated an ideological ‘‘rectification campaign.’’ 51 For example, in May and August 2013, a wave of articles, which one report considered to have some powerful political backing, ap­peared on the Internet attacking constitutionalism, after other arti­cles were posted that had more positive views of constitu­tionalism.52 Also in May, Party and education leaders jointly issued an additional opinion with 16 requirements to ‘‘strengthen the ranks of young university teachers and improve (their) ideological and political qualities . . . .’’ 53

‘‘Social Stability’’ and ‘‘Social Risk Assessments’’

In August 2012, to prevent and resolve ‘‘social contradictions’’ 54 and apparently to ‘‘maintain social stability,’’ the National Develop­ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a provisional meas­ure that stipulates central and provincial authorities should estab­lish and utilize ‘‘social stability risk assessment’’ mechanisms to in­vestigate and analyze the ‘‘social stability’’ risks associated with large-scale fixed asset investment projects that affect the interests of citizens.55 If implemented, the NDRC will not examine and ap­prove projects assessed to be of medium or high social risk.56 In Nanjing municipality, enterprises reportedly do their own assess­ment reports for their own projects and send them to the govern­ment for examination and approval.57 Nanjing officials reportedly conduct these assessments for 700 to 900 ‘‘incidents’’ or projects an­nually.58

Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates

During the reporting period, authorities detained or arrested more than 60 citizens 59 exercising their right to freedom of speech, association, and assembly, some of whom reportedly associated themselves with the New Citizens’ Movement. The New Citizens’ Movement is a loose network of individuals promoting a broad range of ideas including legal and political reforms, human rights, and social justice.60 Some people who associated themselves with the Movement assembled in groups for meals and engaged in advo­cacy or peaceful demonstration activities.61 One international non-governmental organization linked these detentions and arrests with a notice issued by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate calling on prosecutors to combat activities construed as ‘‘unlawful assem­bly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order,’’ which are asso­ciated with the ‘‘goal of subverting state power.’’ 62 Another news article linked these detentions to the central Party Document No. 9 issued in April, which reportedly says activists ‘‘have stirred up trouble about disclosing officials’ assets, using the Internet to fight corruption, media controls and other sensitive topics, to provoke discontent with the party and government.’’ 63 [See Official Corrup­tion and Anticorruption Measures in this section.] Authorities also continued to harass, detain, and impose prison sentences on democ­racy advocates and their families who exercised their rights to free­doms of speech, assembly, association, and demonstration. A list of representative cases follows:

  • Democracy advocate Zhu Yufu, jailed in February 2012 for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power,’’ reportedly is seriously ill, but authorities have denied him access to medicine and turned down repeated requests for medical parole.64 Reports also sug­gest Zhu may be being abused in prison.65 Officials reportedly have kept some members of Zhu’s family under surveillance, and harassed and warned them to keep quiet about Zhu’s case.66
  • In December 2012, villagers Song Jianzhong, Luo Yonghong, Ma Zhizheng, Hao Sen, Zhao Daqing, Zhao Zhenhai, and Ma Huimei lost their court case contesting their sentences imposed in relation to 2010 protests against alleged voting irregularities in a village committee election in Raolefu, a village in subur­ban Beijing. On appeal, however, the court reduced their pris­on terms.67 Authorities also changed the charges against them from ‘‘gathering to assault state organs’’ to the lesser crime of ‘‘gathering to disturb social order.’’ 68
  • In October 2012, court officials sentenced Cao Haibo, an Internet cafe owner in Kunming municipality, Yunnan prov­ince, who founded an online discussion group that discussed democracy and constitutionalism, to eight years in prison on the charge of ‘‘subversion of state power.’’ 69 The case involved questionable legal procedures and officials warned Cao’s wife not to talk about her husband’s situation.70
  • Authorities indicted democracy advocate Liu Benqi in March 2013 on the charge of ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ 71 Reports asserted he had been tortured and abused while in de­tention.72 In addition, authorities ordered Liu Benqi’s ex-wife, Liu Ying, to serve one year of reeducation through labor, pos­sibly in connection to her conversations with international media about her ex-husband’s case.73

 

In addition, officials restricted the movements of, harassed, or beat up several other democracy and human rights advocates, in­cluding Guizhou province resident Liao Shuangyuan.74 Yao Lifa, an independent elections advocate, went missing on March 4 for more than 13 days and authorities reportedly have restricted his move­ments since February 2013.75 Officials also intimidated or detained family members of other advocates, including Zhang Anni, the daughter of democracy activist Zhang Lin.76 In July, authorities criminally detained Zhang Lin on charges of ‘‘gathering a crowd to disrupt social order’’ and questioned him about who was organizing and funding rights defender activities on behalf of his daughter.77 In August, authorities formally arrested Zhang on the same charge.78

Party and Government Accountability and Transparency

LIMITS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

While top Chinese leaders have voiced support for greater trans­parency, citizens continue to face challenges in accessing govern­ment information. In a speech in March 2013, Premier Li Keqiang reportedly raised six demands for anticorruption and clean govern­ment work for 2013, including open government affairs and making the exercise of authority transparent.79 Some ministries and local governments reportedly improved communications with the pub­lic,80 but according to one Chinese research institute’s report, sev­eral problems persist, including officials who do not proactively offer information, do not provide information when rules say they should, or do not provide full information.81 In October 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied a request under the Open Government Information (OGI) regulation regarding China’s report for its UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in October 2013, saying some of the information was ‘‘secret’’ and not ‘‘suited’’ to be released.82 Beijing resident Shi Hongping tried to sue the MFA, but the Beijing Municipal No. 2 Intermediate Peo­ple’s Court refused to accept the case on the grounds that submit­ting a report for the UPR is a diplomatic action involving foreign affairs and legislation dictates that courts ‘‘cannot accept litigation brought by citizens against state actors [in areas] such as national defense and foreign affairs.’’ 83 Authorities also reportedly harassed, prevented from leaving their homes, or detained individuals seek­ing information about the formulation of China’s second National Human Rights Action Plan (2012–2015) (HRAP).84 Authorities eventually lifted the restrictions on all of these individuals except for Peng Lanlan, whom they formally arrested on charges of ‘‘ob­structing official business’’ and held in detention for a year before releasing her.85 Peng surveyed petitioners for their opinions about human rights conditions in China and collected signatures as part of the OGI application for information about the HRAP.86

PEOPLE’S CONGRESSES

Towards the end of 2012, China completed the most recent cycle of direct elections for local people’s congress delegates. During the election cycle the Internet provided a new platform for ‘‘inde­pendent candidates,’’ but authorities took a variety of steps to sup­press their election efforts. At the lowest administrative levels, in­cluding the county and township levels, citizens, in theory, directly vote for people’s congress delegates.87 Above this level, people’s con­gresses elect delegates for congresses at the next highest level.88 Ten or more citizens may nominate ‘‘independent candidates,’’ oth­erwise known as ‘‘voter-nominated’’ candidates.89 One source re­ported that during the 2011–2012 election cycle there were thou­sands of independent candidates, known partially because of their presence on the Internet.90 Reports surfaced, however, noting that authorities in some locations did not accept the nomination of some of these ‘‘voter-nominated’’ candidates.91 In this election cycle, as in previous cycles, large numbers of ‘‘independent candidates’’ were winnowed out, leaving few to compete in elections.92 One source considers this cycle of elections the darkest (for independent can­didates) in the last 30 years.93

In 2012, Chinese authorities issued a draft decision with numer­ical requirements related to characteristics of delegates to be cho­sen for the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013. Four main goals reportedly guided the numerical requirements for the composition of the Congresses’ delegates: equity among rural and urban areas, equity among regions, equity among nationalities, and that they ‘‘should be broadly representative’’ and ‘‘include an appro­priate number of grassroots, worker, farmer, and intellectual dele­gates.’’ 94 The resulting composition of the Congress’s delegates roughly mirror the requirements.95 For example, the numerical re­quirement for delegates from minority populations was ‘‘around 12 percent’’ with at least one delegate from each of China’s official mi­nority groups.96 After selection processes were completed, nearly

13.7 percent of the delegates were from minority populations and all 55 of the minority groups were represented.97 The percentages of ‘‘front line workers and farmers, and professional and technical delegates’’ were slated to increase, which they did by over 5 and

1.2 percent respectively.98

This year at the meetings of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Two Sessions), delegates voted on six work reports and overall, there were 30 per­cent more negative votes for all of the reports combined than there were last year.99 In one example, out of 2,948 delegates, 120 dele­gates abstained from voting on the work report of the Supreme People’s Court and 605 delegates voted to oppose the report, which received the highest number of negative votes during the Two Ses­sions.100

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

Authorities are drafting or have passed national laws that regu­late when and how citizens may hold authorities accountable. Work to discuss and revise the PRC Administrative Litigation Law 101 is ongoing and the State Council work plan for the upcoming year re­portedly includes the task of reviewing the PRC Administrative Re­consideration Law.102

During the reporting period, the State Council issued plans to improve top-down accountability systems and strengthen adminis­trative enforcement of laws and regulations. In April, the State Council issued an opinion that included the goal of ‘‘improving a system to constrain and supervise the operation of authority.’’ 103 The State Council also reported that it took steps to strengthen evaluations of local governments and officials, incorporated admin­istrative work into the comprehensive government work assess­ment systems, and ‘‘guided’’ local governments and ministries to in­troduce administrative ‘‘enforcement responsibility systems.’’ 104

In line with these goals, central authorities continued to take steps to promote the use of only legal and standardized ‘‘red letter documents’’ (‘‘hongtou wenjian’’)—rules issued by local govern­ments.105 During 2012, the State Council reportedly registered 1,393 regulations and rules of local congresses, governments, and departments, and took steps to resolve conflicts between the local rules and major laws.106 One international academic report noted that citizens have the right to request a review of legislative con­flicts, but relevant agencies have not formally responded to such re­quests.107 In some cases, however, central authorities reportedly have reacted by amending the regulations in question, by making statements in the media about the requests, or by inviting the citi­zens who made the request to participate in consultations.108

OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES

Chinese leaders 109 and citizens 110 continued to express concern about official corruption, and some foreign and local business peo­ple reportedly believe China’s legal environment has deterio­rated.111 Top leaders link the Party’s legitimacy to its ability to manage corruption. In a speech to the Central Committee on No­vember 19, 2012, President Xi Jinping said, ‘‘facts have shown that if corruption becomes increasingly severe, it will ultimately lead to the ruin of the Party and the country!’’ and ‘‘[c]orruption was among the most important of the reasons’’ for ‘‘social contradic­tions’’ leading to social unrest and the collapse of political power in some countries.112 The corruption case against Bo Xilai, former Party Central Political Bureau member and Chongqing Party Sec­retary, who was charged with bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power, opened for trial on August 22, 2013.113 On September 22, 2013, the Jinan Municipal People’s Intermediate Court, Shandong province, sentenced Bo to life imprisonment, deprivation of political rights for life, mandatory return of specified stolen monies, and confiscation of all personal assets.114 Authorities reportedly denied Bo his choice of a lawyer and he was held by Party disciplinary of­ficials for months under shuanggui,115 a form of arbitrary deten­tion utilized by the Party to investigate officials.116

Authorities continued to highlight anticorruption efforts and to issue regulatory measures to curb corruption. Premier Li Keqiang reportedly indicated that anticorruption work would be included in local government, administrative departments, and leading cadre performance evaluations.117 In addition, in November 2012, procuratorate provisions included a new standard for the crime of ‘‘especially serious bribery,’’ and stipulated heavier sentences for this crime.118 In January 2013, two judicial interpretations issued jointly by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate came into force; one regarding the application of the law in handling criminal bribery cases,119 and the other an inter­pretation on the handling of dereliction of duty criminal cases, which reportedly clarified the standards for categorizing specific crimes.120

SUPPRESSION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS & DEMANDS FOR DISCLOSURE OF OFFICIALS’ ASSETS

During the reporting period, officials have detained a number of online corruption whistleblowers 121 and have had little tolerance for citizens and non-governmental organizations in various loca­tions that have expressed demands for disclosure of officials’ assets. As of mid-September 2013, officials in various locations reportedly had detained nearly 60 people who participated in petition drives or demonstrations calling for more transparency of government offi­cials’ finances, who called for the release of detained advocates, or who engaged in other related political advocacy efforts, and au­thorities formally arrested 29 of those people.122 Information on some of those cases follows:

  • In November 2012, a group of petitioners sent a letter to former Premier Wen Jiabao asking him to disclose his financial assets. At least one of the petitioners reported being locked in a detention center in Beijing municipality for 40 days for sign­ing the letter.123
  • In December 2012, more than 2,000 people took to the streets of Shanghai municipality calling on officials to disclose their personal assets, income, and investments, as well as those of their spouses and children.124
  • Officials detained anticorruption advocates Sun Hanhui and Ding Jiaxi,125 who reportedly were involved in collecting thou­sands of signatures for an open letter to the National People’s Congress, urging members of the Party Central Committee to disclose to the public their family assets to reassure citizens that they are not corrupt.126 Authorities reportedly censored the letter and deleted blog postings by the organizers.127
  • In late March, Beijing officials criminally detained anticorruption advocates Hou Xin, Yuan Dong, Zhang Baocheng, and Ma Xinli on suspicion of ‘‘unlawful assembly’’ for unfurling a banner with anticorruption slogans in a busy shopping area along with a number of other people.128 Authori­ties later released Hou Xin on bail pending investigation.129
  • In April, officials detained other anticorruption advocates, in­cluding Zhao Changqing and Wang Yonghong, on suspicion of ‘‘unlawful assembly,’’ 130 and Li Wei, another anticorruption advocate.131 In response, individuals and a group issued open letters demanding that authorities release the anticorruption advocates.132 In addition, public security personnel detained former independent people’s congress candidate Liu Ping and in July indicted Liu on charges of ‘‘unlawful assembly,’’ ‘‘gath­

 

ering a crowd to disrupt public order,’’ and ‘‘using a cult to

damage enforcement of the law.’’ 133

Despite strong public demand for disclosure of officials’ fi­nances,134 some of China’s elite appear to be resistant to moving forward with requirements for top officials to disclose their as­sets.135 One member of the Central Commission for Discipline In­spection reportedly pointed to the extensive wealth of officials and noted that ‘‘to publicize any of them would lead to public anger.’’ 136 A limited number of locations have initiated pilot projects wherein officials disclose their assets within the Party or to their own orga­nizations, but rarely to the public at large.137 Many local govern­ments and administrative institutions also have not disclosed infor­mation on expenditures for overseas trips, official receptions and entertainment, and vehicles, otherwise known as the ‘‘three publics,’’ despite requirements to do so.138

COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW

During the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, the Chinese gov­ernment and Communist Party continued to promote and develop a state-led growth model, 12 years after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 5 years after the onset of the global financial crisis. Authorities encouraged national coordination of overseas investment activity, including targeted investment in industries they deemed strategic, and China’s state-owned enter­prises continued to play a leading role in that investment activity. Authorities implemented banking reforms, although state-owned enterprises maintained preferential access to loans. China’s cur­rency—the yuan—appreciated during the past year, but it re­mained undervalued, and the Chinese government continued to interfere with the exchange rate. The United States and other countries continued to pursue action against China through WTO mechanisms, and China faced allegations of trade violations, in­cluding antidumping and countervailing duties and subsidies incon­sistent with its WTO obligations. Intellectual property rights viola­tions, including state-authorized theft of trade secrets, remained a significant issue of concern this past year, and problems with the rule of law contributed to ongoing food and product safety prob­lems, including the cross-border movement of hazardous and illegal products.

Outbound Investment

China’s outbound investment continued to grow during the Com­mission’s 2013 reporting year, setting new records. Based on data provided by the Heritage Foundation, China’s outbound investment grew by an average of 39.59 percent per year from 2005 to 2012,1 reaching a record annual high of US$79.7 billion in 2012.2 Some sources reportedly estimated different outbound investment figures for 2012; 3 for example, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated a figure of US$115 billion in 2012.4 According to the same Econo­mist Intelligence Unit report, from 2011 to 2012, China’s outbound investment (excluding tax havens) jumped from 16th place to 3rd place worldwide, behind the United States and Japan.5

The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to en­courage state-led coordination of overseas investment activity as part of a policy authorities commonly referred to as the ‘‘go out’’ strategy (‘‘zou chu qu’’ zhanlue). As GDP growth in China has largely slowed since 2007,6 authorities have encouraged Chinese businesses to invest abroad in part as a way to increase opportuni­ties for Chinese enterprises to move up the value chain.7 In a Jan­uary 2013 Caixin article, Yi Gang—Deputy Governor of the Peo­ple’s Bank of China 8 and Administrator of the State Administra­tion of Foreign Exchange 9—said that the ‘‘go out’’ strategy ‘‘was elevated to the level of national strategy’’ between 2000 and 2008, and that, beginning in 2008, the ‘‘go out’’ strategy became a way to guard against the vulnerability of China’s export-led growth model and take advantage of cheaper, post-financial crisis assets in developed countries.10 Yi added that Chinese enterprises should ‘‘be low profile . . . and minimize the appearance of government in­volvement to avoid policy resistance and barriers to approval.’’ 11 The 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Develop­ment (‘‘12th Five-Year Plan’’)—a Party-initiated plan that outlines broadly, inter alia, strategies for economic growth for the period from 2011 to 2015 12—outlined the ‘‘go out’’ strategy at the national level.13 State-owned enterprises continued to account for the major­ity of China’s overseas investment,14 although the role of private enterprises reportedly increased last year.15

The government and Party also continued to emphasize the im­portance of investment abroad in certain ‘‘strategic’’ industries this past year. The 12th Five-Year Plan noted the importance of ‘‘fos­tering the development of strategic emerging industries,’’ 16 such as new information technology and new energy,17 as well as the im­portance of overseas investment generally in energy resources, technology, and ‘‘famous brands.’’ 18 According to state-run broad­caster China Central Television, Chen Yuan, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,19 Chairman and Party Secretary of the China Development Bank,20 and head of the China Enterprises Investment Association (CEIA) 21—an or­ganization that operates under the ‘‘guidance and supervision’’ of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Ministry of Civil Affairs 22—emphasized at a December 2012 CEIA meeting that sec­tors such as energy, mining, electricity, telecommunications, petro­chemicals, and machinery manufacturing were important.23 Chi­nese enterprises reportedly continued to seek investment opportu­nities abroad in at least some of the above sectors this past year.24 In 2012, China invested more money overseas in the energy sector than in any other sector,25 followed by the metals sector.26 In April 2013, China signed a free-trade agreement with Iceland,27 a devel­opment that some sources described as an attempt to gain access to energy reserves, rare earths and other minerals, and strategic shipping lanes.28

State-controlled organizations continued to offer preferential terms for investment and export project financing in locations around the world this past year. In July 2012 testimony before the

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fred Hochberg, Chair­man and President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, argued that the state-owned Export-Import Bank of China 29 (‘‘China Exim Bank’’) was able to create an uneven ‘‘play­ing field’’ in Africa in part by offering financing on ‘‘terms and con­ditions better than commercial banks’’ 30 and by requiring ‘‘pref­erential access to natural resources’’ in the host country in return for financing.31 This past year, construction continued on a re­ported US$5 billion project to build a city near Minsk, the capital of Belarus, for which Chinese authorities agreed to provide low-in­terest financing.32 Both China Exim Bank and the China Develop­ment Bank—which operates under the State Council 33—reportedly agreed to provide financing for the project.34 One former Belarusian official reportedly said that Chinese authorities agreed to provide low-interest financing on the condition that half the value of that financing was spent on Chinese materials, technology, or labor.35 The same former official said, ‘‘The loan conditions are highly advantageous . . . . It doesn’t make sense for us to even consider financing from other banks.’’ 36

Financial Reforms

This past year, authorities took measures to reform China’s banking system, which continued to give state-owned enterprises (SOEs) preferential access to loans. For example, in late July 2013, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) removed a lower limit on loan interest rates,37 but it maintained an upper limit on interest rates payable to depositors.38 Chinese and non-Chinese media noted that this combination of policies could allow SOEs—who reportedly al­ready enjoyed preferential access to loans compared to smaller bor­rowers 39—to secure cheaper loans, as well as reduce the profits of smaller banks and constrain the ability of households to accumu­late savings.40 Faced with difficulties securing financing, some smaller businesses in recent years reportedly have relied on lend­ing outside the regulated banking system,41 some forms of which are referred to as ‘‘shadow banking.’’ 42 A May 2013 report by JPMorgan Chase Bank, Hong Kong, estimated ‘‘shadow banking’’ in China at 69 percent of GDP and 27 percent of bank assets at the end of 2012.43 In some cases, small businesses that turned to loans outside the regulated banking system paid significantly high­er rates than those with access to formal bank loans.44 For exam­ple, one financial analyst estimated that small businesses pay a premium of 20 to 30 percent over a base lending rate, while state-owned borrowers typically borrow at a discount from the base rate.45

In a July 28, 2013, announcement, the National Audit Office said that it would ‘‘organize auditing offices nationwide to conduct au­diting of government debt.’’ 46 The announcement did not elaborate further, but according to international media sources, the audit may reflect official concerns over debt held by SOEs and local gov­ernments,47 which some sources estimated at US$2 trillion to US$3 trillion.48 From late 2008 to August 2013, authorities reportedly made ‘‘[US$6.2] trillion of bank loans available to state-owned com­panies and local governments.’’ 49 In one case, in early August 2013, the state-owned Agricultural Bank of China reportedly agreed to lend 250 billion yuan (US$40.8 billion) 50 to Shanghai municipality.51 According to unidentified sources reportedly within the Shanghai city government, the loan was part of an ‘‘unofficial economic stimulus’’ that would support projects including the es­tablishment of a Disneyland theme park and a ‘‘free-trade zone’’ in Shanghai.52 Many local governments, which retain 25 percent of value-added tax revenue—75 percent goes to the central govern-ment—and whose officials depend on economic growth for political success, reportedly continued to borrow heavily to finance local de­velopment projects without devising plans to avoid default.53

Foreign Exchange Control

The yuan remained undervalued this past year, despite an in­crease in its value and calls by Chinese authorities to liberalize ex­change rate controls. In an April 2013 report, the U.S. Treasury Department said that the yuan ‘‘remains significantly under­valued’’ 54 and that the ‘‘process of exchange rate adjustment re­mains incomplete,’’ 55 although the yuan reportedly appreciated against the U.S. dollar this past year.56 The Wall Street Journal reported that the yuan appreciated 1 percent against the U.S. dol­lar in 2012 and 1.6 percent from January to May 2013.57 In a re­port to the National People’s Congress in March 2013, then-Pre­mier Wen Jiabao said that the government ‘‘should steadily carry out reforms to make interest rates and the RMB exchange rate more market-based,’’ 58 but exchange rate policy this past year did not necessarily reflect a more market-based approach. For example, the U.S. Treasury Department cited accumulations of foreign ex­change reserves—reportedly US$34.7 billion in the fourth quarter of 2012 59 and US$128 billion in the first quarter of 2013 60—as signs of increasing Chinese government intervention in the ex­change rate.61 In March 2013, Xia Bin, then-adviser to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)—the central bank of China, which operates under the State Council 62—reportedly called for ‘‘more power [for the PBOC] in the areas of some short-term and specific monetary policy adjustment and operations,’’ 63 although he did not call for a more market-based approach in these areas.

This past year, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued the Circular Regarding Improving and Adjusting Policies on the Management of Direct Investment and Foreign Ex­change,64 which loosened several aspects of foreign exchange con­trol in an attempt to facilitate trade and overseas investment.65 For example, the circular removed the requirement that SAFE ap­prove the establishment of several kinds of foreign exchange ac­counts,66 as well as the requirement that SAFE approve the rein­vestment of yuan revenues by foreign investors.67 The circular also allowed foreign-invested enterprises to make loans to their foreign parent companies under certain conditions.68

China in the World Trade Organization

During this reporting year—more than a decade after China’s ac­cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 69—China contin­ued to face allegations from multiple countries of violations of its WTO obligations. Since its accession to the WTO, China has been a respondent in 31 WTO Dispute Settlement cases; 70 this past year, the WTO found in favor of U.S. claims in three cases that the United States brought against China, as well European Union claims in one case that the European Union brought against China.71 WTO panels found that the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had imposed antidumping and countervailing duties on

  •  grain-oriented electrical steel, U.S. chicken products, and Eu­ropean x-ray inspection equipment in ways that were inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations.72 China did not appeal the findings in the chicken case or x-ray case this past year; 73 in the steel case, the WTO’s Appellate Body upheld the panel report’s findings in Oc­tober 2012 upon appeal.74 A July 2013 MOFCOM statement an­nounced MOFCOM had ‘‘re-examined some procedures and phys­ical issues, on which the original antidumping measures and the original countervailing measures were based.’’ 75 The statement an­nounced a revised set of antidumping and countervailing duties on
  •  grain-oriented electrical steel, but it did not identify or discuss the ‘‘issues’’ in the original examination.76 In July 2012, the United States requested consultations with China regarding antidumping and countervailing duties affecting U.S. automobiles,77 while a case

 

involving alleged subsidies to Chinese manufacturers of auto­mobiles and automobile parts remained in consultations.78 In Feb­ruary 2013, the WTO Secretary General composed a panel to con­sider the claims of the United States.79 In another case, a WTO panel found that China acted inconsistently with its WTO obliga­tions by maintaining China UnionPay—a Chinese company—as a monopoly supplier for yuan-denominated transactions with bank cards issued in China and used in Hong Kong and Macau.80 Ac­cording to the WTO, China reported in July 2013 that it had ‘‘fully implemented’’ the findings in this case, but the United States ‘‘did not agree’’ and ‘‘would monitor and review China’s actions.’’ 81

China did not fulfill its notification obligations under the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agree­ment) this past year. The SCM Agreement requires WTO members to submit notifications of their subsidies by June 30 of each year,82 but a February 2013 joint report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Commerce found that China’s most recent notification was in 2011, covering the pe­riod 2005 to 2008, and was incomplete.83 On September 17, 2012, the United States requested consultations with China regarding al­leged subsidies in the automobile and auto parts industries,84 in­cluding ‘‘grants, reduced corporate income tax rates and low-cost lending from state-owned banks.’’ 85

Non-Chinese companies continued to report an unequal business environment in China when competing against Chinese companies. For example, according to a US-China Business Council (USCBC) report from 2012, some U.S. companies surveyed by the USCBC re­ported their Chinese competitors ‘‘may have preferential access from licensing approvals to government contracts to financing and other areas, giving them a competitive edge.’’ 86 According to the USCBC, ‘‘nearly half’’ of U.S. companies surveyed reported that they ‘‘see protectionism in the way the administrative licensing process is managed,’’ 87 some reported that they experienced un­equal enforcement of laws when compared to Chinese companies,88 and some reported they continued to face market access barriers in the investment and service sectors.89 Such practices appear to vio­late the core WTO principle of national treatment.90 [See Antitrust Developments below for discussion of possible unequal treatment in pricing and bribery investigations.]

 Fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue<br />
Chinese officials reportedly announced plans to undertake several new commercial reforms during the fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (‘‘the Dialogue’’), held in July 2013. For example, Chinese offi-cials pledged to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States and address market access issues in the negotiations.91 Chinese officials reportedly committed to negotiate using a ‘‘negative list’’ approach, through which China would begin with a ‘‘presumption of openness’’ and then create exceptions to open market access on a case-by-case basis.92<br />

 Fifth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue—Continued<br />
In addition, Chinese officials reportedly pledged to include ‘‘substan¬tial improvements’’ in their next offer to join the Government Procure¬ment Agreement (GPA), which they said they planned to submit later in 2013.93 The GPA is a WTO agreement designed to increase trans¬parency in government procurement, prevent protection of domestic products or suppliers, and prevent discrimination against foreign prod¬ucts or suppliers.94 The United States, the European Union, and other parties to the GPA previously called for several improvements to Chi¬na’s proposal to join the GPA, including coverage for state-owned enter¬prises, expanded coverage for businesses below the central-government level, and lower thresholds for the application of non-discrimination pro-visions.95 During the Dialogue, Chinese officials reportedly said ‘‘they would be responsive to U.S. requests [. . .] to increase the coverage of sub-central entities in [the] new offer, and [. . .] might lower the thresholds above which the GPA’s non-discrimination disciplines apply.’’ 96 According to a May 2013 Global Times article, the total gov¬ernment procurement market in China was an estimated US$1 trillion, growing at over 20 percent per year.97<br />

Intellectual Property Rights

The Chinese government continued to take steps to improve in­tellectual property rights (IPR) protections this past year, but weak protection and enforcement of IPR continued to contribute to IPR violations. This past year, the State Intellectual Property Office outlined broad guidelines for protecting intellectual property (IP) as part of its 2013 National Intellectual Property Strategy,98 and the number of civil and criminal IPR cases, as well as county-level courts that can hear IPR cases, reportedly increased this past year.99 IPR violations remained widespread, however. In a May 2013 report, the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property noted that efforts to improve IPR protections were too slow to prevent increasing theft 100 and that Chinese policies en­couraging the acquisition of technology created incentives for IPR violations.101 According to the same report, China accounted for an estimated 50 to 80 percent of international IP theft.102 This year, China remained on the Priority Watch List of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR),103 where it has been every year since 2006.104 Countries on the Priority Watch List are the ‘‘focus of increased bilateral attention’’ regarding problems with ‘‘IPR protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on intellectual property.’’ 105 USTR noted this past year that ‘‘sales of IPR-intensive goods and services in China remain disproportion­ately low when compared to sales in similar markets that provide a stronger environment for IPR protection and market access.’’ 106

Theft of trade secrets, in some cases reportedly authorized by the Chinese government, continued this past year. USTR noted in its 2013 Special 301 Report that the theft of trade secrets is a growing area of concern 107 and that such theft continued to occur in China through circumstances involving ‘‘departing employees, failed joint ventures, cyber intrusion and hacking, and misuse of information submitted to government entities for purposes of complying with regulatory obligations.’’ 108 U.S. information security company Mandiant noted in a February 2013 report that, since 2006, an or­ganization operating under the People’s Liberation Army that the Mandiant report referred to as ‘‘Unit 61398’’ 109 stole ‘‘hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organizations’’ 110—of which 115 were located in the United States 111—from a ‘‘wide range of indus­tries.’’ 112 The 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and So­cial Development designated several industries as ‘‘strategic emerg­ing industries,’’ 113 and the Mandiant report noted that, of the seven industries in which Mandiant observed cyber-attacks from Unit 61398, four matched those ‘‘strategic emerging industries.’’ 114 [See Outbound Investment above for more information.]

Chinese officials continued to use technology transfer as a pre­condition for market access this past year. According to a 2013 re­port by the American Chamber of Commerce, in the People’s Re­public of China, 35 percent of companies surveyed reported they were ‘‘still concerned about de facto technology transfer as a re­quirement for market access.’’ 115 The percentage of survey re­spondents that said de facto requirements for technology transfer were increasing rose from 27 percent in 2012 to 37 percent in 2013.116 Using technology transfer as a precondition for certain forms of market access violates commitments in China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO 117 and commitments that China reportedly made during the 23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in late December 2012.118

The Chinese government continued to revise a wide variety of IP laws and regulations this past year as part of a process that USTR referred to as a ‘‘sweeping legal reform effort.’’ 119 In January 2013, the State Council amended the PRC Copyright Law Implementing Regulations,120 the Information Network Broadcasting Rights Pro­tection Regulations,121 and the Computer Software Protection Reg­ulations,122 increasing the administrative penalties authorized under each.123 The State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), Na­tional People’s Congress Standing Committee, and National Copy­right Administration reportedly continued to deliberate on draft amendments to the PRC Patent Law,124 PRC Trademark Law,125 and PRC Copyright Law,126 respectively, this past year. The draft amendment to the Trademark Law contains provisions that require trademark applicants to adhere to the ‘‘principle of good faith,’’ 127 and it increases maximum damages in cases where violations are deemed ‘‘serious.’’ 128 The draft amendment to the Patent Law ex­pands the role of administrative authorities responsible for man­aging patents. For example, under the proposed amendment, ad­ministrative agencies would have the authority to investigate cases of patent violations that ‘‘allegedly disrupt market order,’’ 129 as well as additional authority to fine perpetrators in certain cases.130 According to SIPO, granting additional authority to administrative authorities would, among other things, help reduce ‘‘litigation fa­tigue’’ 131 and high costs 132 associated with bringing patent in­fringement cases to court. Some commentators, however, expressed concern that the amendment would shift authority away from the courts to administrative authorities. For example, Liu Chuntian, Professor at the Renmin University of China Law School,133 report­edly said the proposed amendments might ‘‘hurt the balance of power and the rule of law. . . . If the administrative agencies are given more power, then there is some concern that the courts might become more like an administrative agency instead of acting as an independent judiciary.’’ 134 Other examples of legislative re­form include SIPO’s November 2012 publication for public comment of a draft of the Service Invention Regulations 135—designed to clarify and protect the rights of inventors and their employers 136— and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce’s August 2012 release of the fifth draft of the Guide on Antimonopoly En­forcement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights (the Guide).137 The Commission did not observe an official draft of the Guide, but according to the Legal Daily, the fifth draft of the guide, inter alia, prohibits price fixing of products with intellectual prop­erty by competing companies.138

 HIV/AIDS Grassroots Organizations<br />
China’s grassroots (caogen) organizations working on HIV/AIDS issues are of particular relevance during the 2013 reporting year in light of the cessation of major international funding from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund) at the close of 2013.84 Grassroots NGOs have played a significant role in China in HIV/AIDS health prevention and control, and the protection of the legal rights of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), yet UNAIDS reported in 2012 that ‘‘to date, only a small fraction of HIV [NGOs] have legal status.’’ 85 Although The Global Fund spurred the Chinese government to engage more deeply with domestic civil society organizations over the past decade,86 resulting in some successful cooperation between the gov-ernment and grassroots organizations,87 grassroots HIV/AIDS NGOs re-portedly are ‘‘heavily dependent’’ on funding from international organi-zations.88 The government gradually has acknowledged the importance of HIV/AIDS non-governmental organizations,89 notably on November 26, 2012, when then-Vice Premier Li Keqiang met with HIV/AIDS NGO representatives 90 and reportedly stated ‘‘non-governmental organiza-tions, ‘grassroots organizations,’ best understand the conditions and needs of PLWHA’’ and play an ‘‘indispensable’’ role in the fight against HIV/AIDS.91 An October 2012 report from The Global Fund, however, raised concerns that ‘‘there is still no strong and sustainable national funding mechanism or technical support for ensuring service quality is in place to support CBOs [community-based organizations].’’ 92<br />

Antitrust Developments

This past year, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) published for public comment two new draft regulations—the Provisions on Additional Restrictive Conditions for the Concentration of Business Operators (‘‘Restrictive Conditions Provisions’’) 146 and the Interim Provisions Regarding the Application of Standards for Simple Cases of Concentration of Business Operators (‘‘Simple Cases Pro­visions’’) 147—both reportedly designed to clarify and streamline merger review and approval processes.148 This past year, expert commentators continued to criticize the merger review and ap­proval processes for being long and for advancing industrial pol­icy,149 and noted that the two new provisions had shortcomings. For example, law firm Clifford Chance noted in an April 2013 anal­ysis that it is unclear whether or not the Restrictive Conditions Provisions will shorten the merger review process, given that in at least two recent cases reviews have exceeded statutory limits.150 The Simple Cases Provisions outline criteria by which MOFCOM may or may not classify certain kinds of mergers as ‘‘simple cases,’’ 151 but, as law firm Herbert Smith Freehills noted in a May 2013 analysis, the Simple Cases Provisions do not provide guide­lines for the treatment of cases after they are classified as ‘‘simple cases.’’ 152

This past year, the National Development and Reform Commis­sion (NDRC) imposed penalties on companies operating outside of China, reportedly the first time it had done so.153 On January 4, 2013, the NDRC reported that it had fined six companies a total of 353 million yuan (US$56.5 million) 154 for participating in a car­tel (‘‘LCD Cartel’’) to fix prices of liquid crystal display (LCD) screens sold into the Chinese market.155 According to the NDRC report, during the period from 2001 to 2006, representatives of the six companies—LG and Samsung of South Korea and Chimei, AU Optronics, Chunghwa Picture Tubes, and Hannstar of Taiwan— met in Taiwan and South Korea a total of 53 times to exchange in­formation on the worldwide LCD market and to set prices for LCD screens.156 The NDRC reported that it brought the action against the LCD Cartel under the 1998 PRC Pricing Law 157—which covers collusion to manipulate market prices 158—rather than the 2008 PRC Antimonopoly Law,159 because the Antimonopoly Law did not come into effect until 2008,160 after the activities in question alleg­edly took place.

The NDRC action raised certain issues concerning the NDRC’s adherence to the letter of the law. For example, Article 2 of the Pricing Law provides that it shall apply to pricing acts carried out inside China.161 The Pricing Law does not forbid extraterritorial application, but it does not provide for such extraterritoriality. In addition, under the PRC Administrative Punishment Law, the ap­plicable statute of limitations within which authorities would have needed to take action is two years,162 but the NDRC brought this action long after the conduct occurred. Regarding when the limita­tion period begins if the conduct has not been discovered, antitrust lawyer Marc Waha reportedly said, ‘‘At least in other legal systems, when one speaks of a two year limitation period you are talking about a four year maximum period. That is how it would work in other jurisdictions, but the rules are not clear in China.’’ 163 Fi­nally, the NDRC reportedly announced that the members of the LCD Cartel ‘‘proposed’’ corrective actions reportedly similar to those the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has imposed in merg­er filing cases under the Antimonopoly Law.164 As a January 7, 2013, commentary by O’Melveny & Myers noted, however, the NDRC had not issued measures that ‘‘[govern] the enforcement of remedial commitments in the merger context.’’ 165

China’s pricing and bribery investigations in subsequent cases involving dairy suppliers and drug manufacturers reportedly have raised concerns over unequal treatment in favor of Chinese busi­nesses and, in particular, large state-owned enterprises. In Sep­tember the President of the European Union Chamber of Com­merce in China, David Cucino, said, ‘‘In pricing investigations, some of the chamber’s member companies believe there is dis­proportion in how foreign companies are covered on this issue when compared with Chinese rivals.’’ 166 Jeremie Waterman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said that Chinese authorities had initiated cases against Chinese companies, but that ‘‘nearly all large State-owned enterprises have been exempt from enforcement actions to date.’’ 167 [For more information on unequal treatment of Chinese and non-Chinese businesses, see China in the World Trade Organi­zation in this section.]

Consumer Product Safety

During this past year, food safety scandals continued to emerge in different parts of China. For example, the Ministry of Public Se­curity reported that, over the course of a three-month campaign that began on January 25, 2013, public security authorities took into custody 904 people allegedly involved in various ‘‘meat product offenses,’’ including the sale of fake meat products.168 Later reports from Chinese and international media revealed that those involved were suspected of selling rat, fox, and mink meat disguised as mut­ton and beef, among other offenses.169 In another case, authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly found that over 44 percent of rice and rice products they tested contained unsafe levels of cadmium.170 Authorities at the Guangzhou Munic­ipal Food and Drug Supervision and Management Bureau report­edly said that it was ‘‘not convenient to reveal’’ which brands car­ried the affected rice.171 In another case, the Nanchang County People’s Court, in Nanchang municipality, Jiangxi province, report­edly sentenced six people to up to five years in prison for disguising used cooking oil—which reportedly can contain carcinogens—as new and selling it.172 Similarly, a court in Guangdong reportedly sentenced three people for buying and reselling used oil.173

Hazardous and illegal Chinese products continued to cross bor­ders into other markets during this past reporting year. In May 2013 testimony before the Commission, Steven Solomon, Associate Director for Global Operations and Policy in the Office of Global Regulatory Operations and Policy of the U.S. Food and Drug Ad­ministration, reported that 3 percent of food, 8 percent of animal food, and 5 percent of drugs and biologics imported into the United States came from China.174 In one case, according to a report from

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), authorities in New York reportedly charged five individuals and five corporations after they allegedly imported ‘‘hazardous and counterfeit’’ toys from China into the United States.175 One ICE official reportedly said, ‘‘The people and companies involved in this illegal trade not only allegedly infringed on intellectual property rights, they placed the lives of innocent children in danger. . . . They allegedly sold toys with high lead content and cheap knock offs with substandard parts that break easily and pose a choking hazard.’’ 176 According to an October 2012 Der Spiegel article, hazardous Chinese prod­ucts—including glass chips among pumpkin seeds, maggots in pasta, cadmium in dried anchovies, contaminated strawberries, and antibiotics in shrimp—reached a variety of European Union coun­tries in late 2012.177

In addition, concerns over contaminated milk powder in main­land China 178 prompted mainland Chinese travelers to bring ille­gal quantities of milk powder from Hong Kong back to mainland China. Between March 1 and April 23, 2013, authorities in Hong Kong reportedly took into custody 879 people allegedly involved in smuggling milk powder from Hong Kong into mainland China.179 According to an April 2013 Bloomberg article, on March 1, Hong Kong authorities limited the amount of milk powder that travelers may take out of Hong Kong after concerns about the quality of milk powder in mainland China prompted large numbers of Chinese travelers to buy milk powder in Hong Kong and take it back to mainland China.180 According to central government news agency Xinhua, the State Council announced plans to increase safety measures in China’s milk industry.181 Under the plan, the govern­ment reportedly would adopt new quality standards and would ‘‘in­tensify the crackdown on milk powder-related violations.’’ 182

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Introduction

Chinese citizens face formidable obstacles in seeking remedies to government actions that violate their legal rights and constitu­tionally protected freedoms. International human rights standards require effective remedies for official violations of citizens’ rights. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.’’ 1 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed but not yet ratified, requires that all parties to the ICCPR ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated ‘‘have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been com­mitted by persons acting in an official capacity.’’ 2

Legal Reform

During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed key leadership changes in the Chinese Communist Party and govern­ment’s legal sectors, and official statements on the potential reform of controversial mechanisms within the legal system. The new Su­preme People’s Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang has academic and professional training in legal affairs, unlike his predecessor, Wang Shengjun, who had a security background.3 The new Sec­retary of the Communist Party Central Committee’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC), Meng Jianzhu, does not have a concurrent government appointment as head of public security or a seat among the seven-member Standing Committee of the Cen­tral Committee’s Political Bureau as did his predecessor, Zhou Yongkang, which suggests a downgrade of the PLAC after a decade of powerful growth.4 At a January 2013 meeting of the PLAC, four areas of legal reform for the coming year were announced: The jus­tice sector,5 the reeducation through labor (RTL) system,6 citizen petitioning, and the household registration (hukou) system.7 [For information on hukou system reform, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.]

JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM

While China’s Constitution provides for the exercise of judicial independence in Article 126, the Constitution’s preamble estab­lishes the leadership of the Communist Party over all other institu­tions.8 An academic report on justice sector reform during the lat­est round of judicial reforms (2008–2012) concludes that ‘‘fun­damentally, there has been no progress in judicial fairness, credi­bility, or authority’’ and ‘‘judicial independence has deteriorated,’’ even though there was some progress on technical matters, such as court fee guarantees, uniformity of adjudication, disclosure, and regulatory constraints.9 Achieving judicial independence, it goes on to say, will require ‘‘clarifying’’ (liqing) the relationship between the judiciary and the Party.10 The State Council’s October 2012 white paper on judicial reform in China states that the ‘‘objectives of Chi­na’s judicial reform’’ include ‘‘ensur[ing] that the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates exercise adjudicative power and procu­ratorial power fairly and independently’’ and ‘‘establish[ing] an im­partial, efficient and authoritative socialist judicial system,’’ 11 but makes no mention of the Communist Party or the role of the Par­ty’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC) over the courts.12 References to judicial independence in the departing Su­preme People’s Court (SPC) president Wang Shengjun’s work re­port in March,13 led at least one commentator to suggest that judi­cial independence may be a key agenda item for future judicial re­form.14 The focus of the next round of judicial reforms will likely be spelled out in the SPC’s next five-year plan covering 2014– 2019 15 as well as in forthcoming PLAC announcement(s) on its in­stitutional priorities for legal reform.16

REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR

The reeducation through labor (RTL) system operates entirely outside of the judicial system and is influenced but not constrained by the PRC Criminal Law. RTL is a system of administrative pun­ishment that enables law enforcement officials to incarcerate Chi­nese citizens at RTL centers for a maximum initial period of three years, with the possibility of an extension of up to one year.17 Chi­nese and international legal commentators state that RTL not only violates China’s international human rights obligations,18 but also violates its own laws and constitutional protections.19 With a re­ported 350 RTL detention centers nationwide and estimates of more than 100,000 detainees,20 authorities use the RTL system to detain petitioners seeking redress for official abuses, practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual movement,21 and minor offenders—in­cluding drug users and sex workers—whose alleged misconduct is not a criminal offense under Chinese law.22

During the 2013 reporting year, high-profile individual cases 23 and an expose´ on harsh conditions at a women’s RTL center in Liaoning province 24 focused national attention in China on the use of RTL and strengthened calls for its reform and even abolition.25 Although several provinces reportedly began to ‘‘transition’’ RTL centers into compulsory drug treatment facilities,26 to discontinue issuing RTL sentences,27 and to operate rehabilitation and correc­tions pilot sites,28 the government and Party’s position on RTL re­form, nevertheless, remains ambiguous. PLAC Secretary Meng Jianzhu’s reported comment in January to ‘‘halt’’ RTL has shifted to vague plans for reform,29 as when Premier Li Keqiang told a March press conference in Beijing that plans to reform China’s RTL system ‘‘might be unveiled’’ by the end of the year.30 Simi­larly, the government’s submission to the UN Human Rights Coun­cil for the October 2013 Universal Periodic Review affirms an in­tention to reform RTL but provides no timeframe for reform.31 The vagueness of official pronouncements has raised concerns that ex­tralegal detention may continue, albeit under a different name.32

CITIZEN PETITIONING

The petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for citizens to appeal government, court, and Communist Party decisions and to present their grievances.33 Citizens often turn to petitioning as a means to seek redress for a wide range of disputes—such as forced evictions and land expropriation,34 wage arrears,35 unpaid pensions to mili­tary veterans,36 and unpaid compensation required under health-related regulations 37—due to institutional weaknesses in the judi­ciary and limits on citizens’ ability to air grievances. A prominent Chinese economist reportedly estimated 20 million petitioners in 2012, including repeated filings and petitions at various levels of government.38 Chinese authorities, however, announced an 11-per­cent decrease in the total number of petitions during 2012 at a teleconference of the heads of Letters and Visits Bureaus in Janu­ary 2013, a continuation of an eight-year decrease from 2005, when

12.6 million petitions were officially reported.39

Prior to and during the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, the Commission observed nationwide ‘‘petitioning stability mainte­nance work’’ (xinfang weiwen gongzuo) to achieve ‘‘zero peti­tioning,’’ particularly targeting potential petitioners’ travel to Bei­jing.40 While some localities advised officials to mobilize into work teams 41 and resolve petitioner grievances with more service-ori­ented attitudes,42 some official guidance also suggested 24-hour surveillance of long-time petitioners and other ‘‘stability mainte­nance’’ measures.43 A Chinese rights advocate described the control of petitioners for the 18th Party Congress as ‘‘comparatively much bigger than in the past,’’ 44 borne out by reports of evictions from ‘‘petitioner villages’’ in Beijing,45 detention in ‘‘black jails,’’ 46 and RTL detention for several Shanghai petitioners 47 and rights advo­cates, including Mao Hengfeng,48 Cui Fufang,49 Tong Guojing,50 Shen Yongmei,51 and Shen Lianman.52 Caixin Media, a domestic Chinese news organization known for its investigative work, re­ported on the beating death of a petitioner from Henan province as he was taken from Beijing by provincial ‘‘black security guards’’ on the eve of the Party Congress.53

Even with increased repression of petitioners throughout the fall of 2012 54 and in early 2013 prior to the annual meetings of the Na­tional People’s Congress (NPC) and China People’s Political Con­sultative Conference (CPPCC) (Two Sessions) in March,55 govern­ment officials at the Two Sessions nevertheless discussed possible reform of the petitioning system. Former CPPCC head Jia Qinglin called for establishing a mechanism to end ‘‘abnormal peti­tioning,’’ 56 a broad term that denotes repeated petitioning, disrup­tive conduct, multiple participants, or ‘‘leap-frogging administrative levels’’ to complain to higher level officials.57 One CPPCC official recommended hearings or assessments for complex cases.58 Peti­tioning bureaus and other agencies with petitioning offices appear to be strengthening prohibitions against intercepting ‘‘ordinary’’ pe­titioners, characterizing interceptions as an ‘‘incorrect practice’’ (cuowu zuofa).59 In May, Chinese state media reported that, begin­ning in March 2013, the State Letters and Visits Bureau had tem­porarily suspended issuance of the monthly ranking of provinces based on the number of ‘‘abnormal petitioning’’ incidents each month.60 A journalist from Yunnan province, however, illustrated the lack of central-local policy coordination by reporting on the Anhui Provincial Communist Party Standing Committee’s rec­ommendation to start ‘‘abnormal petitioning’’ rankings for Anhui county- and district-level governments on June 1, 2013.61

Harassment of Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders

The Commission observed instances of government harass-ment,62 detention,63 and physical violence against weiquan (rights defense) 64 lawyers during the 2013 reporting year, continuing a pattern of human rights violations against rights defenders docu­mented in prior years.65 During the annual license renewal period in May 2013, the Beijing Justice Bureau reportedly did not renew licenses of approximately 10 law firms and possibly dozens of weiquan lawyers,66 many of whom have provided legal counsel in religious freedom, state security, and reeducation through labor cases.67 International news media also reported that authorities have shut down the blogs of lawyers involved in rights defense,68 and placed at least one lawyer on a government list of so-called ‘‘key persons’’ (zhongdian renyuan, i.e., a person of ‘‘key’’ interest to security authorities).69 Local law enforcement also reportedly de­tained and beat a group of weiquan lawyers who went to Sichuan province in May 2013 to investigate an allegedly illegal detention center.70

The Commission continues to monitor the cases of Chinese law­yers and rights defenders detained and imprisoned for their human rights advocacy, such as Xu Zhiyong,71 Gao Zhisheng,72 and Ni Yulan.73 In July 2013, authorities detained and subsequently ar­rested prominent rights advocate, Xu Zhiyong, reportedly in con­nection with his advocacy of citizen rights and official trans­parency.74 Gao Zhisheng, well-known for his legal defense of marginalized citizens and religious practitioners,75 is serving a prison term in Akesu (Aksu) prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autono­mous Region, on the charge of ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ 76 His brother and father-in-law visited him in January 2013 at the prison—the first time authorities permitted them to do so in nine months 77—but authorities prohibited any discussion of Gao’s prison conditions, legal case, or wife and children.78 In April 2012, authorities in Beijing sentenced Ni Yulan, a housing rights advocate, and her husband Dong Jiqin, to two years and eight months 79 and two years in prison, respectively, following a crack­down on rights defenders and others in spring 2011.80 Authorities refused a medical parole request for Ni submitted in October 2012: 81 Ni is permanently disabled as a result of police abuse,82 and reportedly suffers from thyroid disorders.83

Efforts To Expand Legal Aid

The Chinese government continues to increase funding available for legal aid in order to expand access to institutions that assist citizens with legal claims and disputes.84 According to official sta­tistics, in 2012 there was a 21-percent increase over 2011 in the provision of legal aid in China, with more than 1,140,000 recipients of legal aid and total national funding of 1.4 billion yuan (US$224 million), an increase of 9.9 percent.85 Although approximately 60,000 persons with disabilities received legal aid in 2012—an in­crease of 11.5 percent 86—the UN Committee on the Rights of Per­sons with Disabilities raised concerns that China has not allocated sufficient ‘‘human and financial resources’’ to provide legal aid services to persons with disabilities in its review of China’s compli­ance with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in September 2012.87 Scholars currently estimate that the rate of legal representation for defendants in criminal cases is less than 30 percent,88 yet the expansion of legal aid under the revised Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) is likely to multiply the number of criminal cases, thus resulting in a need for even more funding and criminal defense lawyers.89 Under the Regulations Regarding Criminal Pro­cedure Law Legal Aid Work issued in February 2013 (effective on March 1) 90 that provide guidance to legal practitioners on imple­mentation of the revised CPL,91 investigating agencies (e.g., the Procuratorate or public security bureau) are required to inform de­fendants of their right to counsel; and defendants—and their family members—may apply for legal aid at all stages of a case.92 The new regulations also stipulate that criminal suspects or defendants will not have to show economic need to apply for legal aid in cases where there is evidence of mental disability; where other defend­ants in the same case have employed defense counsel; where the ‘‘procuratorate has appealed’’; or where the case may have ‘‘signifi­cant social impact.’’ 93

 Abuse of Family Members of Rights Defenders and Political Ac¬tivists<br />
During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed reports of ongoing official harassment of family members of rights defenders and political activists. Chinese authorities used a range of methods, such as intimidation, extralegal detention, imprisonment, and physical violence against these individuals.94 • Chen Guangcheng.95 Multiple family members of the prominent legal advocate Chen Guangcheng have suffered abuse in connection with Chen’s rights advocacy in China and his departure to the United States in 2012.96 These include his nephew, Chen Kegui, who was sentenced in 2012 to three years and three months in prison for an alleged assault on a group of plainclothes officials and hired personnel who broke into his home in the middle of the night; 97 his elder brother, Chen Guangfu; 98 his sister-in-law, Ren Zongju; 99 and his mother, Wang Jinxiang.100 • Hada.101 Xinna, the wife of rights advocate Hada, and the couple’s son, Uiles, have spent years under surveillance, sometimes in detention centers,102 in connection to Hada’s efforts to preserve Mongolian ethnic identity in Inner Mongolia.103 During this reporting year, authorities limited their rights to freedom of movement and communication.104 • Liu Xiaobo.105 Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, reportedly has been confined to her home under 24-hour surveil¬lance since October 2010, without cell phone or Internet access.106 In June 2013, Chinese authorities sentenced Liu Xia’s brother, Liu Hui, to 11 years in prison for fraud, but Liu Xia and others assert that Liu Hui’s sentence is retribution against Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia.107<br />

 Abuse of Family Members of Rights Defenders and Political Activists— Continued<br />
• Rebiya Kadeer.108 Family members of Uyghur human rights activist Rebiya Kadeer have faced official persecution,109 including home evic-tion,110 loss of livelihood,111 and extralegal detention.112 One of her sons, Ablikim Abdureyim, is serving a nine-year prison term on the charge of ‘‘instigating and engaging in secessionist activities.’’ 113 Other family members of rights defenders and political activists who have been harassed and are mentioned in this report include Zhang Anni, the daughter of Zhang Lin; 114 Liu Ying, the ex-wife of Liu Benqi; 115 and some relatives of Zhu Yufu.116 [For further information, see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.]<br />

IV. Xinjiang

Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor during the Commission’s 2013 re­porting year. Central and regional Chinese Communist Party and government authorities carried out campaigns focused on security and stability to enforce harsh security controls and limit the free­doms of movement and expression throughout the XUAR. Deadly clashes that took place in the spring and summer raised concerns about the failure of ethnic policy in the XUAR to address the root causes of regional instability. Overseas media and rights groups re­ported instances during which security forces shot into crowds of Uyghurs, resulting in deaths and injuries. In some cases, Uyghur residents of the XUAR reportedly committed deadly attacks on members of security forces, community workers, and others. Perva­sive house searches throughout the region, as well as surveillance of individual religious believers, reportedly targeted peaceful ex­pressions of religious belief among the Uyghur population, height­ening tensions in the region. Intensified regional development projects raised concerns over disproportionate economic, social, and cultural opportunities for Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the region, as well as concerns over the effect such projects have had on the cultures and languages of these groups.

Security Measures and Conflict

XUAR officials strengthened security measures in a bid to ‘‘main­tain stability’’ and ‘‘fight terrorism’’ in the region, using methods some observers criticized as repressive and counterproductive.1 In November 2012, on the sidelines of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, XUAR government chair­person Nur Bekri warned of the ‘‘three evil forces’’ (terrorism, sepa­ratism, and religious extremism) in the region, saying the fight against separatism in the region would be ‘‘long-term, complicated and fierce.’’ 2 According to official statistics released in January 2013, regional authorities allocated 9.34 billion yuan (US$1.5 bil­lion) to the public security sector in 2012, a 23-percent increase over 2011.3

Instances of violence throughout the spring and summer report­edly resulted in numerous deaths, both Han Chinese and Uyghur, with reported death tolls ranging from dozens to 100 or possibly more. An April 23, 2013, clash between local residents, community workers, and police in Siriqbuya (Selibuya) township, Maralbeshi (Bachu) county, Kashgar prefecture, reportedly resulted in the deaths of 21 people.4 Official media accounts of the incident de­scribed it as a terrorist attack during which the attackers killed 15 community workers and police.5 Some reports from overseas media and human rights groups questioned authorities’ portrayal of events as terrorist in nature.6 A Uyghur rights advocate reportedly asserted that a search of residents’ homes had sparked the vio­lence.7 Similar searches are routinely conducted throughout the XUAR to ‘‘maintain stability.’’ 8 On August 12, 2013, the Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court sentenced two Uyghur men to death and three others to terms ranging from nine years to life for taking part in the violence.9

Xinhua reported that on June 26, 2013, in Lukchun (Lukeqin) township, Pichan (Shanshan) county, Turpan prefecture, ‘‘knife-wielding rioters’’ attacked police stations and other government buildings before police fired on them.10 Official media reported on June 28 that 35 people had died, including 24 killed by assailants and 11 shot and killed by police, and 21 people had been injured in the incident.11 Regional officials reported that on August 15, attackers killed Turpan Islamic Association Vice Chairman Abdurehim Damolla in front of his home.12 According to Radio Free Asia (RFA), attackers targeted Damolla for supporting a govern­ment crackdown in the wake of the June 26 violence.13

Some overseas media reports and human rights advocates ques­tioned the official narrative regarding the incident on June 26 in Turpan prefecture, including the death toll 14 and details of what took place,15 and raised concerns about the role that repressive policies had played in contributing to deadly clashes in the re­gion.16 Media reports and human rights advocates cited religious repression,17 house searches,18 and housing redevelopment poli­cies 19 among the factors exacerbating regional tension.

House searches were reportedly also related to two separate deadly incidents in May and June. On May 9, a Uyghur farmer, whom authorities believed had been involved in an earlier deadly clash, reportedly stabbed two village officials to death in Uchar (Wuqia) township, Yengisar (Yingjisha) county, Kashgar prefecture, while they were conducting house searches, and authorities subse­quently beat the farmer to death.20 On June 30, authorities report­edly shot and killed a Uyghur man in Artush (Atushi) city, Qizilsu Kyrgyz (Kezilesu Kirghiz) Autonomous Prefecture, after he fatally stabbed a police officer and injured two others during a house search.21 Additionally, on June 28, security forces reportedly shot and killed a Uyghur man in Uchturpan (Wushi) county, Aksu pre­fecture, after he stabbed and injured two people, including at least one police officer, when they pressed him to shave off his beard.22

On June 28, 2013, President Xi Jinping reportedly convened a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) to discuss the clashes in the XUAR, and two Politburo members, Meng Jianzhu and Yu Zhengsheng, subsequently traveled to the region.23 In June and July, in the lead-up to the anniversary of demonstrations and riots that took place on July 5, 2009, in Urumqi city,24 officials car­ried out displays of military and paramilitary force in Urumqi and other areas of the XUAR, and instituted 24-hour security patrols in some locations.25 Some human rights advocates and inter­national observers expressed concern about the security buildup, together with what they viewed as authorities’ failure to address the root causes of violence.26

In June and August, several incidents reportedly occurred involv­ing security forces’ deadly use of force against crowds of Uyghurs. According to official media, on June 28, security forces detained people involved in a ‘‘group disturbance’’ in Hanerik (Hanairike) township, Hotan county.27 Overseas media and rights groups re­ported that security forces fired on a crowd of Uyghurs in Hanerik, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries, with reported death tolls ranging from up to 15 people to more than 100.28 RFA re­ported that on August 8, a clash between police and local residents in Aykol township, Aksu city, Aksu prefecture, over religious re­strictions led to the deaths of at least three Uyghurs when security forces fired on a crowd of protestors.29 [See Freedom of Religion in this section for more information on the clash in Aksu.] Overseas media reported that on August 20 in Yilikqi township, Kargilik (Yecheng) county, Kashgar prefecture, Chinese police shot and killed 22 Uyghurs they suspected of terrorism, while the Uyghurs were performing prayers.30 Official media confirmed the raid, pro­viding information about a Chinese police officer killed in the inci­dent, but did not confirm or deny the 22 Uyghur casualties.31

On August 23, in Kuybagh (Kuiyibage) township, Poskam (Zepu) county, Kashgar prefecture, security forces reportedly shot and killed 12 Uyghurs and injured 20 authorities said were engaging in building and testing explosives at a ‘‘terrorist’’ facility.32

Official media reported in March that courts in Kashgar prefec­ture and the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture had sen­tenced 20 Uyghurs to prison terms ranging from five years to life for their involvement in ‘‘terrorist’’ and ‘‘separatist’’ activities.33 Chinese authorities stated that the 20 men had used the Internet and cell phones to commit ‘‘terrorist’’ and ‘‘separatist’’ crimes, in addition to organizing religious activities, buying weapons, and planning to attack police officers.34 Some overseas media and human rights groups criticized the sentences given to the 20 men, questioning official accusations of terrorism and expressing doubts over authorities’ use of criminal charges to prosecute Internet and cell phone use.35

Criminal Law and Access to Justice

Chinese government and official media reports in 2013 under­scored the XUAR criminal justice system’s frequent use of charges of ‘‘endangering state security’’ (ESS).36 An article published by the Dui Hua Foundation, a human rights advocacy organization, in March 2013 stressed that, while ESS trials had declined in the XUAR, the number of these trials in the XUAR continued to rep­resent a highly disproportionate ratio of the total number of ESS trials throughout China.37 According to Dui Hua estimates, based on official statistics, the XUAR accounted for half of first-instance ESS trials throughout China between 2008 and 2010, although less than 2 percent of China’s population lives in the XUAR.38 Accord­ing to the second annual work report of the XUAR High People’s Court, issued in January 2013, 314 criminal trials involving ESS crimes were conducted in 2012, a 24 percent decline from 2011 fig­ures.39

Authorities reportedly detained 12 students in early May 2013 at Tarim University, located in Ala’er city, Aksu prefecture.40 On May 27, authorities reportedly released all 12 students.41 Ablimit, Dilshat, Alimjan, Ekber, and Abdureshit were released on bail.42 The conditions of their bail, which will remain in place until May 27, 2014, include restrictions on their movement.43 Alimjan was re­portedly detained again by Ala’er public security officials for about a day beginning on June 21,44 and was beaten during both periods of detention.45

Development Policy

During the 2013 reporting year, XUAR officials accelerated large-scale development plans throughout the region, including in the areas of infrastructure,46 transportation,47 energy exploitation,48 urban and rural construction,49 education,50 and employment.51 XUAR authorities oversaw billions of yuan in investment in state-led development projects and sought to attract private domestic and foreign investment in the region, touting it as an economic hub for central, western, and southern Asia.52 Regional officials reiter­ated development goals first announced at the Xinjiang Work Forum in 2010 53 and reiterated strategies for economic and polit­ical development that prioritize state economic and political goals over respecting the rights of XUAR residents,54 including those outlined in the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.55 Inter­national observers have expressed concerns over the expropriation and destruction of ethnic minority residents’ property and a lack of protections for cultural heritage related to urban development ini­tiatives in the region.56

In 2013, regional officials oversaw the growth of ‘‘counterpart support’’ programs that bring funding and personnel assistance to the XUAR for development initiatives from provinces and cities outside of the region,57 stressing the patriotic nature of promoting regional economic development.58 Counterpart provinces and cities reportedly provided 149.3 billion yuan (US$24.3 billion) in aid to the XUAR in 2012, a 37.3-percent increase over the previous year.59

Increased migration to the XUAR in recent years has reportedly heightened ethnic tensions in some areas and sparked concerns among Uyghur residents regarding land rights and employment op­portunities.60 Regional development initiatives brought increased Han Chinese migration to the XUAR during the past year, often into southern areas of the XUAR traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, and state-led programs pro­vided assistance to migrants and workers from other provinces.61 This past year, reports cited Uyghurs’ concerns over government authorities’ expropriation of their land,62 inadequate government compensation for expropriated land then sold at a higher price to Chinese buyers,63 and government subsidies given only to new Han Chinese migrants that allowed them to save money to purchase more land.64 The growth of the Xinjiang Production and Construc­tion Corps (XPCC) 65 in southern areas of the XUAR, billed by Chi­nese leaders as a conduit for regional development in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, has brought thousands of Han Chinese migrants into areas near the majority-Uyghur city of Hotan.66

During the reporting period, authorities intensified housing con­struction and demolition projects in rural and urban areas of the XUAR, in areas inhabited by Uyghurs and other ethnic minori­ties.67 ‘‘Counterpart support’’ projects provided hundreds of millions of yuan for construction and resettlement efforts.68 In 2013, re­gional authorities continued work to relocate and resettle farmers and herders away from grasslands, as part of programs that XUAR authorities publicize as improving farmers’ and herders’ living con­ditions.69 These policies have impacted affected groups with liveli­hoods based on traditional nomadic herding practices.70 According to official statistics released in May 2013, authorities resettled 136,800 herders in the XUAR between 2010 and 2012, comprising

49.2 percent of the total population of herders in the XUAR.71

Demolitions in Kashgar’s Old City

Authorities continued to demolish and redevelop the Old City section of Kashgar city,72 raising concerns over the corresponding loss of unique cultural heritage 73 and the resettlement of 220,000 Uyghur residents.74 The Old City demolitions, along with demolitions in other areas of the XUAR, have been carried out in line with broader development initiatives and a five-year demoli­tion project launched in 2009.75 Since demolitions began in 2009, authorities have reportedly disregarded Uyghur residents’ concerns over demolition efforts,76 in spite of official pledges to consult resi­dents for their opinions.77 Groups promoting the protection of cul­tural heritage have outlined concerns over a lack of transparency in the process of planning and implementing the demolitions, and have expressed concern over officials’ failure to consider alter­natives to the wholesale demolition of Old City buildings.78

Labor

DISCRIMINATION

Some government and private employers in the XUAR continued to discriminate against non-Han job candidates. As in past years, some job announcements reserved positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs, in contraven­tion of provisions in Chinese law that forbid ethnic discrimina­tion.79 Private and public employers also continued to reserve more positions for men, leaving non-Han women to face both ethnic and gender discrimination in the employment process.80 A study con­ducted by the University of Melbourne, Australia, and published in November 2012, found that Han Chinese residents of the XUAR are much more likely than Uyghur residents to secure employment in high-paying, high-status occupations, a trend that has exacer­bated ethnic tensions in the region.81

LABOR TRANSFERS AND FORCED LABOR

Regional officials continued to carry out programs that send young non-Han men and women outside of the XUAR for employ­ment, under the slogan of ‘‘transferring the excess rural labor force.’’ According to a January 2013 official news report, more than

2.7 million people had been transferred to jobs outside of their home area or outside of the XUAR in 2012,82 an increase from 2.58 million people in 2011.83 As documented by the Commission in re­cent years, some participants and their family members have re­ported coercion to participate in the programs, the use of underage workers, and exploitative working conditions.84 XUAR authorities also reportedly forced some Uyghur farmers to perform road-build­ing and agricultural work without pay, although such ‘‘free labor’’ programs officially had been abolished.85

Freedom of Expression

Local governments in the XUAR continued to implement censor­ship campaigns focused on religious and political publications dur­ing the reporting period. The campaigns have targeted pirated and pornographic items in addition to publications deemed ‘‘illegal’’ solely because of their religious or political content.86 For instance, in March 2013, the XUAR Transportation Department published a statement indicating that, in 2012, regional transportation officials had uncovered 4,469 copies of ‘‘illegal religious publications,’’ as part of a campaign to ‘‘sweep away pornography.’’ 87

Uyghurs continued to serve prison sentences as a result of exer­cising their right to free speech. In February 2013, Uyghur Online, a Web site focused on Uyghur issues, reported that, in April 2009, the Kashgar Municipality Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Uyghur translator Mirhemitjan Muzepper to 11 years in prison for ‘‘inciting splittism of the state,’’ information that authorities had not publicized.88 The court had connected Muzepper’s sentence to his work as a temporary translator for a Hong Kong media organi­zation reporting on the demolitions taking place in Kashgar’s Old City.89

Passport and Exit Restrictions

During the reporting year, Chinese officials implemented restric­tions on passports and international and domestic travel for Uyghurs, highlighting official restrictions on Uyghurs’ freedom of movement.90 In February 2013, Chinese authorities reportedly de­tained Beijing-based Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, who founded the Web site Uyghur Online, at the Beijing Capital International Air­port, preventing him from boarding a flight to the United States.91 Tohti reportedly held a valid passport and had been issued a visa for educational exchange to the United States, where he planned to take up a visiting scholar position at Indiana University.92 Au­thorities also held and interrogated Uyghur university student Atikem Rozi in February 2013, after she attempted to apply for a passport for the second time in order to study abroad.93 The Toqsu (Xinhe) County Foreign Affairs Office in Aksu prefecture reportedly informed Rozi that the passport denial was due to the fact that she was ‘‘politically unqualified.’’ 94 In July 2013, Rozi reported her be­lief that police had detained her friend Mutellip Imin—a Uyghur studying abroad in Turkey who had performed volunteer work for Uyghur Online 95—on July 15 at the Beijing Capital International Airport as he prepared to fly back to Turkey from Beijing.96 As of September 23, 2013, the Commission had not observed any news regarding Mutellip’s release from detention. [See Section II—Free­dom of Residence and Movement for additional information on free­dom of movement in China.]

Forced Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and Migrants

The deportation and reports of the sentencing of Uyghur asylum seekers this past year highlighted the dangers facing Uyghur refu­gees and asylum seekers in neighboring countries that are under the influence of Chinese economic and diplomatic power. In Decem­ber 2012, Malaysian authorities deported six Uyghur asylum seek­ers to China, although the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was still reviewing their asylum claims.97 Malaysian authorities re­portedly had detained the six Uyghurs earlier in 2012 for allegedly attempting to leave Malaysia on forged passports.98 Two inter­national human rights groups raised questions regarding the Chi­nese government’s role in the forced return, one of several docu­mented cases of forced deportation of Uyghurs to China in recent years.99 In another case, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported in Decem­ber 2012 that, according to a Malaysian lawyer, 11 Uyghurs pre­viously deported from Malaysia in August 2011 had been charged with terrorism and separatism; according to relatives and friends, the men had been sentenced to prison for terms of up to 15 years on charges of separatism.100

Freedom of Religion

XUAR authorities continued intensive controls over religion, es­pecially Islam, posing a challenge for Uyghurs seeking to maintain their religious beliefs outside of state control.101 Authorities contin­ued to enforce tight restrictions over peaceful religious practices among the Uyghur population, and carried out targeted surveil­lance of individual religious believers.102 A report issued by a Uyghur human rights organization in April 2013 outlined concerns over religious policies implemented by central and local authorities, which the group said ‘‘have progressively narrowed the definition of lawful [religious] activity’’ among Uyghurs.103 The report also highlighted concerns over a lack of transparency in religious regu­lations, official limitations on religious pilgrimages, and other issues related to official restrictions on Uyghurs’ religious prac­tices.104

On August 7, on the eve of the Eid holiday marking the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, police in Aykol township, Aksu prefecture, reportedly sought to prevent residents from an­other village from engaging in cross-village worship,105 and de­tained several Uyghur men for engaging in ‘‘illegal religious activi­ties.’’ 106 In the early morning hours of August 8, after hundreds of people gathered in protest, throwing stones and bricks, security forces reportedly fired on the crowd, killing at least three Uyghurs and injuring at least a dozen.107 Around 10 to 12 police officers re­portedly also sustained injuries in the clash.108 Police reportedly arrested more than 90 people after the incident.109 Central govern­ment propaganda authorities reportedly forbade Chinese media from reporting on the confrontation, which officials described as ‘‘ri­oting and looting.’’ 110

Together with widespread security checks, police raids, and house searches among the Uyghur population aimed partially at cracking down on ‘‘illegal religious activities,’’ 111 authorities in the XUAR reportedly subjected Uyghurs practicing traditional Islamic customs to close scrutiny. Authorities in Bulaqsu township, Shufu county, Kashgar prefecture, reportedly kept registers related to ‘‘stability maintenance’’ efforts that detailed the personal informa­tion of local religious believers and their family members.112 The registers included information such as whether or not female Mus­lims wore a veil and when they started wearing it, as well as what time a student of the Quran received Quranic instruction.113 A Uyghur resident of Keriya (Yutian) county, Hotan prefecture, told RFA in May 2013 that local officials in his township maintained registration books documenting religious believers,114 and a resi­dent of Urumqi city reportedly told RFA that officials maintained such documents throughout the XUAR.115

Regional authorities carried out training sessions for religious clergy throughout the XUAR, placing an emphasis on reinforcing patriotism and opposing ‘‘illegal religious activities.’’ 116 At a train­ing session for ‘‘patriotic religious figures’’ in Urumqi in March 2013, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri expressed hopes that attendees would become ‘‘politically reliable’’ ‘‘patriotic reli­gious figures’’ who would ‘‘guide religion to adapt to socialist soci­ety.’’ 117 Chinese government- and Communist Party-led ideological campaigns encouraging students and youth in the XUAR to refrain from engaging in ‘‘illegal religious activities’’ were frequent and widespread throughout this reporting period.118

Local governments in 2013 also continued to train women reli­gious specialists, known as bu¨wi,119 using legal restrictions that place them under strict state control.120 According to an official media report, in December 2012, the Kashgar Women’s Federation sent 19 bu¨wi and other female religious figures to trainings in six eastern Chinese cities, stressing that the women should, upon their return, transmit the Party’s policies on ethnic minorities and reli­gion, and propagate ethnic unity.121

Authorities in Kashgar city reportedly detained 23-year-old Uyghur Nurmemet Ismail without charge for 63 days beginning on March 1, 2013, for selling the Quran and Quranic study aids.122 Authorities’ exact reasons for detaining Ismail are unclear,123 but regional religious regulations stipulate that government approval is required for the sale and distribution of religious material, and these regulations may have been a factor in Ismail’s detention.124

Some Uyghur Muslims and Christians continued to serve prison sentences as a result of exercising their faith.125 According to a January 2013 RFA report, authorities reduced family visits to jailed Uyghur pastor Alimjan Yimit from once a month to once every three months.126

As in 2012,127 local government officials throughout the XUAR reportedly maintained restrictions over Uyghurs’ observance of Ramadan, prohibiting minors from entering mosques,128 and for­bidding government officials, students, and teachers from fast­ing.129 According to Uyghur Online, in July 2013, county officials fired Abduhelil Ablimit, a staff member at a county government of­fice in Shule county, Kashgar prefecture, for fasting.130 Local offi­cials also placed restrictions on cross-village worship during the Ramadan period.131 [See Section II—Freedom of Religion for addi­tional information on religion in China, including cases of religious repression in the XUAR.]

Language Policy and ‘‘Bilingual Education’’

In the past year, the XUAR government broadened the scope of Mandarin-focused ‘‘bilingual education’’ in the region, a policy some Uyghur students in the XUAR fear is aimed at assimilating young Uyghurs into Chinese society at the expense of their Uyghur iden­tity.132 The expansion of the policy was carried out in line with tar­gets set in 2010 to universalize and develop ‘‘bilingual education’’ in preschool through secondary school instruction throughout the region.133 Under ‘‘bilingual education,’’ class instruction takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by ethnic minority groups.134 In recent years, some Uyghur students and teachers have expressed concern over the compulsory nature of the region’s ‘‘bilingual’’ curriculum and the corresponding loss of young Uyghurs’ ability to speak the Uyghur language.135

The number of students enrolled in ‘‘bilingual education’’ has in­creased rapidly in the past several years. According to the People’s Daily, at the end of 2012, 1.41 million students were enrolled in ‘‘bilingual education’’ from the preschool through the secondary school level in the XUAR, making up 55 percent of the XUAR eth­nic minority student population.136 This represents a 41.6-percent increase in the ‘‘bilingual’’ student population over 2009.137 Accord­ing to China News Service, from 2008 to 2012, central and regional authorities invested 5 billion yuan (US$816 million) on preschool ‘‘bilingual education’’ initiatives, establishing 2,237 ‘‘bilingual’’ nursery schools throughout the region.138

Population Planning Policies

Government authorities throughout the XUAR promoted family planning campaigns targeting Muslim ethnic minorities, and com­pelling Islamic religious figures to promote state family planning policies. Authorities continued to issue monetary rewards to ethnic minority households who have fewer children than allowed under XUAR population and family planning regulations.139 The rewards are issued according to a ‘‘special rewards system’’ for non-Han households that includes a ‘‘fewer births, faster wealth’’ (shaosheng kuaifu) program.140 The system is one of the reward mechanisms present throughout China’s population planning system, though with special focus on ethnic minority households.141

In 2013, authorities in the XUAR and some other regions of China with Muslim populations continued to report on the imple­mentation of a program entitled ‘‘Muslim Reproductive Health Project’’ (musilin shengzhi jiankang xiangmu).142 Official reports have described the project’s aims as providing reproductive health information and health checks for Muslim women of reproductive age while ‘‘creating a harmonious happy family.’’ 143 Official media reports this past year emphasized the need to improve the effec­tiveness of project efforts, including through Islamic religious lead­ers’ promotion of the project among local Muslims.144

V. Tibet

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has been stalled since the January 2010 ninth round,1 the longest interval since such contacts resumed in 2002.2 The Commission observed no indication during the 2013 reporting year of official Chinese inter­est in resuming a dialogue that takes into account Tibetan con­cerns in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.3 In December 2012, then-U.S. Department of State Special Coordinator for Ti­betan Issues Maria Otero called on the Chinese government to ‘‘en­gage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives with­out preconditions.’’ 4

In June 2013, Professor Jin Wei, with the Central Party School, stated in an interview that, if the Party ‘‘can use creative ideas to break the impasse’’ in dialogue, it would ‘‘promote social stability and prevent the creation of long-lasting nationality wounds.’’ 5 Jin noted that the Party ‘‘cannot simply treat [the Dalai Lama] as an enemy,’’ recommended ‘‘restarting the talks,’’ and suggested dis­cussing that the Dalai Lama visit Hong Kong ‘‘in his capacity as a religious leader.’’ 6

Tibetan Self-Immolation

The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly focusing on political and religious issues increased during the Commission’s 2013 reporting year, peaking in October–November 2012 with 38 self-immolations 7 preceding and during the Communist Party Cen­tral Committee’s 18th Congress.8 Reports of self-immolators’ calls for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama’s return continued 9 and remained concurrent with government use of regulatory measures to control and repress principal elements of Tibetan culture, includ­ing Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions,10 and with the appar­ent collapse of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue.11 Tibetans have self-immolated in 10 of 17 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan auton­omy and 1 ordinary prefecture.12

 

For a list of Commission summaries on Tibetan self-immolations that contain maps such as this one, please visit http:// www.cecc.gov/tibetan-self-immolations-0.

The Party and government failed this past year to respond to Ti­betan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any account­ability for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies. Officials character­ized the crisis as the result of an external conspiracy to undermine China’s internal security and social stability.13 In response, officials maintained policies and practices that exacerbate tension.14 In De­cember 2012, then-Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero cited examples: 15

  • ‘‘Severe government controls on Tibetan Buddhist religious practice and monastic institutions’’;
  • ‘‘Education practices that undermine the preservation of Ti­betan language’’;
  • ‘‘Intensive surveillance, arbitrary detentions and disappear­ances of Tibetans, including youth and Tibetan intellectual and cultural leaders’’;
  • ‘‘Escalating restrictions on news, media and communica­tions’’; and
  • ‘‘The use of force against Tibetans seeking peacefully to exer­cise their universal human rights.’’

 

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson in December 2012 de­nied that issues regarding Tibetan culture, language, and religion had a role in what a reporter called ‘‘the current tense situation.’’ 16 The spokesperson blamed ‘‘the Dalai clique’’—the Dalai Lama and organizations and individuals the Party associates with him—as­serting that ‘‘Tibet-related issues are not issues of ethnicity, reli­gion, or human rights’’ but of ‘‘China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’’ 17 Officials continued to use state-run media to discredit self-immolators, depicting them in a pejorative manner (e.g., as a weak, flawed, or distressed individual,18 ‘‘copy-cat,’’ 19 or ter­rorist 20).

TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2012–JULY 2013)

See CECC 2012 Annual Report for Self-Immolations 1–50 (February 2009–August 2012) 21

 No. 	Date of Self-Immolation 	Name Sex / Approx. Age 	Occupation Affiliation 	Self-Immolation Loca¬tion (Prov. / Pref./ County) 	Status<br />
	2012<br />
51 	September 29 	Yungdrung M/27 	Layperson 	Qinghai / Yushu TAP / Zaduo county 	Deceased 22<br />
52 	October 4 	Gudrub M/43 	Layperson (writer) 	TAR / Naqu pref. / Naqu county 	Deceased 23<br />
53 	October 6 	Sanggye Gyatso M/27 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan TAP / Hezuo city 	Deceased 24<br />
54 	October 13 	Tamdrin Dorje M/early 50s 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan / Hezuo 	Deceased 25<br />
55 	October 20 	Lhamo Kyab M/27 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe county 	Deceased 26<br />

TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON POLIT­ICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2012–JULY 2013)—CONTINUED

See CECC 2012 Annual Report for Self-Immolations 1–50 (February 2009–August 2012) 21

 No. 	Date of Self-Immolation 	Name Sex / Approx. Age 	Occupation Affiliation 	Self-Immolation Loca¬tion (Prov. / Pref./ County) 	Status<br />
56 	October 22 	Dondrub M/about 65 	Husband 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 27<br />
57 	October 23 	Dorje Rinchen M/58 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 28<br />
58 59 	October 25 	Tsepo, M/20 Tenzin, M/25 	Laypersons (cousins) 	TAR / Naqu / Biru county 	Deceased Unknown 29<br />
60 	October 26 	Lhamo Tseten M/24 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 30<br />
61 	October 26 	Thubwang Kyab M/23 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 31<br />
62 	November 4 	Dorje Lhundrub M/25 	Husband, fa¬ther, artist 	Qinghai / Huangnan TAP / Tongren county 	Deceased 32<br />
63 64 65 	November 7 	Dorje, M/15 Samdrub, M/16 Dorje Kyab, M/16 	Monks Ngoshul Monastery 	Sichuan / Aba T&QAP / Aba county 	Deceased Hospitalized Hospital-ized 33<br />
66 	November 7 	Tamdrin Tso F/23 	Mother 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 34<br />
67 	November 7 	Tsegyal M/27 	Father 	TAR / Naqu / Biru 	Deceased 35<br />
68 	November 8 	Kalsang Jinpa M/18 	Former monk Rongbo Mon¬astery 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 36<br />
69 	November 10 	Gonpo Tsering M/19 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan / Hezuo 	Deceased 37<br />
70 	November 12 	Nyingkar Tashi M/24 	Husband 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 38<br />
71 	November 12 	Nyingchag Bum M/16 	Layperson 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 39<br />
72 	November 15 	Tenzin Drolma F/23 	Layperson 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 40<br />
73 	November 15 	Khabum Gyal M/18 	Layperson 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 41<br />
74 	November 17 	Chagmo Kyi F/26 	Mother 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 42<br />

TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON POLIT­ICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2012–JULY 2013)—CONTINUED

See CECC 2012 Annual Report for Self-Immolations 1–50 (February 2009–August 2012) 21

 No. 	Date of Self-Immolation 	Name Sex / Approx. Age 	Occupation Affiliation 	Self-Immolation Loca¬tion (Prov. / Pref./ County) 	Status<br />
75 	November 17 	Sangdrag Tsering M/24 	Husband and father 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 43<br />
76 	November 19 	Wangchen Norbu M/25 	Layperson 	Qinghai / Haidong pref. / Xunhua SAC 	Deceased 44<br />
77 	November 20 	Tsering Dondrub M/35 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 45<br />
78 	November 22 	Lubum Gyal M/18 	Layperson 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Tongren 	Deceased 46<br />
79 	November 22 	Tamdrin Kyab M/23 	Former monk Shitsang Monastery 	Gansu / Gannan / Luqu county 	Deceased 47<br />
80 	November 23 	Tamdrin Dorje M/29 	Head of household 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Zeku county 	Deceased 48<br />
81 	November 25 	Sanggye Drolma F/17 	Nun Mindrol Dargyling Nunnery 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Zeku 	Deceased 49<br />
82 	November 26 	Wanggyal M/about 20 	Student 	Sichuan / Ganzi TAP / Seda county 	Unknown 50<br />
83 	November 26 	Konchog Tsering M/18 	Husband 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 51<br />
84 	November 26 	Gonpo Tsering M/24 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Luqu 	Deceased 52<br />
85 	November 27 	Kalsang Kyab M/24 	Nomad 	Sichuan / Aba / Ruo’ergai county 	Deceased 53<br />
86 	November 27 	Sanggye Tashi M/18 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 54<br />
87 	November 28 	Bande Khar (Wangden Khar) M/21 	Layperson 	Gansu / Gannan / Hezuo 	Deceased 55<br />
88 	November 29 	Tsering Namgyal (Tsering Tashi) M/31 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Luqu 	Deceased 56<br />
89 	November 30 	Konchog Kyab M/29 	Father 	Sichuan / Aba / Ruo’ergai 	Deceased 57<br />
90 	December 2 	Sungdu Kyab M/17 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Hospital-ized 58<br />

TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON POLIT­ICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2012–JULY 2013)—CONTINUED

See CECC 2012 Annual Report for Self-Immolations 1–50 (February 2009–August 2012) 21

 No. 	Date of Self-Immolation 	Name Sex / Approx. Age 	Occupation Affiliation 	Self-Immolation Loca¬tion (Prov. / Pref./ County) 	Status<br />
91 	December 3 	Lobsang Gedun (Lobsang Geleg) M/29 	Monk Penag Mon-astery 	Qinghai / Guoluo TAP / Banma county 	Deceased 59<br />
92 	December 8 	Pema Dorje M/23 	Farmer 	Gansu / Gannan / Luqu 	Deceased 60<br />
93 	December 8 	Konchog Phelgyal (Konchog Phelgye) M/24 	Monk Sumdo Mon¬astery 	Sichuan / Aba / Ruo’ergai 	Deceased 61<br />
94 	December 9 	Wangchen Kyi (Rinchen Kyi) F/17 	Student 	Qinghai / Huangnan / Zeku 	Deceased 62<br />
	2013<br />
95 	January 12 	Tsering Tashi (Tsebe) M/22 	Husband 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 63<br />
96 	January 18 	Tsering Phuntsog (Drubchog) M/28 	Husband and father 	Sichuan / Aba / Hongyuan county 	Deceased 64<br />
97 	January 22 	Konchog Kyab M/23 	Husband, fa¬ther, farm¬er 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 65<br />
98 	February 3 	Lobsang Namgyal M/37 	Monk Kirti Mon¬astery 	Sichuan / Aba / Ruo’ergai 	Deceased 66<br />
99 	February 13 	Drugpa Khar M/26 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 67<br />
100 	February 17 	Namlha Tsering M/49 	Husband and father 	Gansu / Gannan / Xiahe 	Deceased 68<br />
101 102 	February 19 	Rinchen, M/17 Sonam Dargye, M/18 	Laypersons 	Sichuan / Aba / Ruo’ergai 	Both deceased 69<br />
103 	February 24 	Phagmo Dondrub M/early 20s 	Farmer 	Qinghai / Haidong / Hualong HAC 	Deceased 70<br />
104 	February 25 	Tsezung Kyab M/27 	Farmer and nomad 	Gansu / Gannan / Luqu 	Deceased 71<br />
105 	February 25 	Sangdrag M/unknown 	Monk Diphu Mon-astery 	Sichuan / Aba / Aba 	Hospital-ized 72<br />

TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON POLIT­ICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2012–JULY 2013)—CONTINUED

See CECC 2012 Annual Report for Self-Immolations 1–50 (February 2009–August 2012) 21

 Abuse of Family Members of Rights Defenders and Political Ac¬tivists<br />
During the 2013 reporting year, the Commission observed reports of ongoing official harassment of family members of rights defenders and political activists. Chinese authorities used a range of methods, such as intimidation, extralegal detention, imprisonment, and physical violence against these individuals.94 • Chen Guangcheng.95 Multiple family members of the prominent legal advocate Chen Guangcheng have suffered abuse in connection with Chen’s rights advocacy in China and his departure to the United States in 2012.96 These include his nephew, Chen Kegui, who was sentenced in 2012 to three years and three months in prison for an alleged assault on a group of plainclothes officials and hired personnel who broke into his home in the middle of the night; 97 his elder brother, Chen Guangfu; 98 his sister-in-law, Ren Zongju; 99 and his mother, Wang Jinxiang.100 • Hada.101 Xinna, the wife of rights advocate Hada, and the couple’s son, Uiles, have spent years under surveillance, sometimes in detention centers,102 in connection to Hada’s efforts to preserve Mongolian ethnic identity in Inner Mongolia.103 During this reporting year, authorities limited their rights to freedom of movement and communication.104 • Liu Xiaobo.105 Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, reportedly has been confined to her home under 24-hour surveil¬lance since October 2010, without cell phone or Internet access.106 In June 2013, Chinese authorities sentenced Liu Xia’s brother, Liu Hui, to 11 years in prison for fraud, but Liu Xia and others assert that Liu Hui’s sentence is retribution against Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia.107<br />

 

THE ‘‘OPINION’’

Information in this report and the Commission’s 2012 Annual Report 83 demonstrates a shift from an initial pattern of less fre­quent self-immolations mainly in Sichuan with a majority of cur­rent or former monastics,84 to a pattern of more frequent self-immolations mostly outside of Sichuan with a majority of laypersons.85 The shift was pronounced during the October–Novem­ber surge: of 38 self-immolations reported, 32 were outside Sichuan, and 29 of the 32 were laypersons.86

Coinciding with that shift, on or about December 3, 2012, the Su­preme People’s Procuratorate, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the ‘‘Opinion on Handling Self-Immolation Cases in Tibetan Areas in Accordance With the Law’’ (the Opinion).87 The Opinion called for persons officials char­acterize as ‘‘principal culprits’’ linked to self-immolation to face prosecution for ‘‘intentional homicide,’’ as well as for criminal pros­ecution for activities including gathering at self-immolation sites to mourn, or offering donations to self-immolators’ relatives.88 The relative sizes of the Tibetan monastic and secular communities sug­gest one basis for official concern over the spread of self-immolation from one community to the other. The lay Tibetan population is about 44 times greater than the monastic population—approxi­mately 140,000 monks and nuns 89 among a total Tibetan popu­lation of approximately 6.28 million.90

By early February 2013, official media reported nearly 90 formal arrests linked to self-immolation cases since October–November 2012 in Gansu and Qinghai provinces.91 Indicative examples of Ti­betans detained (some imprisoned) for alleged links to a self-immo­lator or self-immolation, or for sharing self-immolation information, with timelines at least in part after the Opinion’s issue, follow.

  • October 23, 2012. Officials detained six Tibetans at the site of Dorje Rinchen’s self-immolation in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP).92 On January 31, 2013, the Gannan Intermediate People’s Court sentenced four of them to up to 12 years’ imprisonment for ‘‘intentional homicide’’ and two to up to 4 years for ‘‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles.’’ 93
  • After November 19. Following his detention, on February 8, 2013, the Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court in Huangnan (Malho) TAP sentenced a monk to 13 years’ impris­onment for ‘‘inciting’’ homicide and separatism in a case where someone decided not to self-immolate.94
  • Likely December. Officials detained at least nine Tibetans in connection with Tsering Namgyal’s November 29 self-immo­lation in Luqu (Luchu) county, Gannan.95 On February 28, 2013, the Gannan Intermediate People’s Court sentenced three of them to up to 15 years’ imprisonment for ‘‘intentional homi­cide.’’ 96
  • Possibly December. Officials detained three Tibetans in Haidong prefecture, Qinghai.97 On March 18, 2013, the Haidong Intermediate People’s Court sentenced them to up to six years’ imprisonment for using ‘‘self-immolation incidents’’ to disseminate pro-independence information.98
  • December 3. After the December 2 self-immolation of Sangdu Kyab in Xiahe on December 3, security officials report­edly detained five Bora Monastery monks for interrogation.99
  • After December 9. After the December 9 self-immolation of Wangchen Kyi in Zeku (Tsekhog) county, Huangnan, officials detained five Tibetans described as friends or family of self-im­molators.100
  • Around December 24. Following the November 29 self-immolation of Tsering Namgyal in Luqu county, security offi­
  • cials reportedly detained eight Tibetans for sharing informa­tion on the self-immolation.101
  • Possibly early 2013. Following the detention of four Tibet­ans in Huangnan, on April 13, 2013, the Huangnan Inter­mediate People’s Court sentenced the Tibetans to up to six years’ imprisonment for ‘‘inciting separatism’’ by sharing self-immolation information with domestic and overseas groups.102
  • January. Officials detained seven Tibetans in connection with Sanggye Gyatso’s October 6, 2012, self-immolation in Hezuo (Tsoe) city, Gannan.103 Police characterized the case as ‘‘organized and premeditated homicide’’ because three detain­ees allegedly discussed self-immolation, contacted a Tibetan or­ganization in India, and sent self-immolation information out of China.104
  • July. In a Sichuan province case, officials reportedly de­tained six Tibetans, including five monks, after monk Konchog Sonam self-immolated on July 20 in Ruo’ergai (Dzoege) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture.105

 

The examples above are among 112 cases 106 in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database as of September 1, 2013, of detention or imprisonment linked to self-immolation or the issue of self-immolation since August 2012.107

THE CRACKDOWN

As self-immolation frequency increased, authorities strengthened a security crackdown based on the premise of ‘‘stability mainte­nance’’ 108 that infringed on Tibetans’ freedoms of expression, asso­ciation, and movement, and curtailed their ability to communicate or share information.109 Examples follow.

  • Expression. The Opinion established a legal pretext for punishing Tibetans who expressed views sympathetic to self-immolators or self-immolation 110 by providing a broad basis for characterizing such expression as ‘‘inciting’’ self-immola­tion.111
  • Association, movement. Authorities interfered with Tibet­ans’ right to associate with other Tibetans within local commu­nities,112 within wider Tibetan areas,113 and with persons liv­ing abroad.114 Human Rights Watch reported establishment of neighborhood security ‘‘grids’’ in the TAR,115 and a program to classify Tibetan villagers individually based on religious and political factors.116
  • Communication, information. Authorities interfered with communication,117 preventing Tibetans from sharing or receiv­ing information on self-immolations and other topics deemed harmful to ‘‘social stability,’’ 118 as well as accessing inter­national news.119

 

Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists

Tibetan self-immolators this past year continued to call for the Dalai Lama’s return 120—a demand that when voiced during a sui­cidal protest may signify intense resentment toward Chinese gov­ernment and Communist Party intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist af­fairs. The trend of creating new and unprecedented control 121 over the religion continued,122 along with maintaining established re­pressive policies.123 Officials characterize the result of such policies as the ‘‘normal order’’ of Tibetan Buddhism.124

Unofficial reports in June 2013, if accurate, indicated a poten­tially positive development. Beginning in August 2013, officials in Hainan (Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai province, said they would ‘‘experiment’’ with allowing monks and nuns to ‘‘revere, respect, and follow’’ the Dalai Lama in his capacity as a religious leader.125 The reports emerged the same month as remarks by a Central Party School professor calling for engage­ment with the Dalai Lama in his capacity as ‘‘a religious leader’’ and ceasing to treat him ‘‘as an enemy.’’ 126

By July 2013 official reports discounted prospects for a less hos­tile policy toward the Dalai Lama.127 A July 11 notice reportedly issued by the Guoluo (Golog) TAP United Front Work Department warned Tibetans not to believe ‘‘rumors’’ of a ‘‘new policy’’ permit­ting ‘‘freedom to venerate the Dalai Lama’s portraits, and so on.’’ 128 The notice cited Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee 129 and Head of the Central Committee Coordinating Group for Tibet Affairs,130 stating that the Dalai Lama is ‘‘always engaged in secessionist activities.’’ 131 The notice instructed Tibetan Buddhists to ‘‘separate themselves politically’’ from the Dalai Lama,132 but did not address the Dalai Lama’s status as a religious figure.

On July 6, 2013, the Dalai Lama’s birthday, People’s Armed Po­lice (PAP) in Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan province, reportedly ‘‘opened fire’’ on ‘‘hundreds’’ of Tibetans re­turning from a hillside location where they conducted religious ob­servances.133 PAP reportedly wounded 10–16 Tibetans with what may have been anti-riot projectiles and beat or tortured other Ti­betans.134

Developments consistent with established policies this past year include the following examples.

  • Reassessment, reappointment of Tibetan Buddhist teachers. Effective December 2012, national measures re­quired Tibetan Buddhist monastic teachers 135 to submit, every five years, to a reassessment 136 conducted by Party-137 and government-controlled Buddhist associations.138 Criteria in­clude patriotism toward China,139 supporting Party leader­ship,140 and accepting guidance from government- and Party-run offices.141 Reappointed teachers must sign an agreement acknowledging such obligations.142 Teachers who ‘‘forfeit’’ ap­pointment credentials are deemed unqualified to teach.143
  • More ‘‘harmonious model monastery’’ awards. Fol­lowing the May 2012 initial round of such awards,144 officials recognized 100 TAR monasteries and nunneries and over 7,500 ‘‘patriotic, law-abiding, and advanced monks and nuns’’ in De­cember.145 An abbot speaking at the ceremony described patri­otism toward China as ‘‘an unshirkable responsibility’’ of Ti­betan Buddhists and likened ‘‘safeguarding the unification of the motherland’’ to a duty of ‘‘disciples of Buddha.’’ 146
  • Aggressive ‘‘legal education’’ campaigns. Officials con­tinued to enforce ‘‘education’’ focusing on government legal

 

measures to pressure Tibetans into complying with policies that obstruct their freedom of religion.147 On January 14, 2013, authorities reportedly ‘‘detained’’ or ‘‘disappeared’’ 14 senior monastic officials from four of Lhasa’s premier Tibetan Bud­dhist institutions after summoning them to a local meeting. Authorities removed them to a monastery in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture for ‘‘political education.’’ 148

Status of Tibetan Culture

This past year, some Tibetan self-immolators reportedly called for greater use of the Tibetan language as they burned 149—an ap­parent indication of the significant threat some Tibetans believe Party and government policies pose to Tibetan culture’s vibrancy and viability. The Commission’s 2012 Annual Report noted that a senior Party official 150 advocated in February 2012 for ethnic ‘‘amalgamation,’’ 151 ending minority-language education programs to achieve ‘‘desegregation,’’ 152 and ‘‘popularizing’’ the use of Man­darin Chinese ‘‘without fail.’’ 153 In December 2012, then-Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Maria Otero observed that ‘‘official rhetoric that denigrates the Tibetan language’’ is a factor that ‘‘has further exacerbated tensions.’’ 154

Indicative developments this past year include the following ex­amples.

  • More language protests in Qinghai Province.155 On No­vember 26 156 and 28,157 2012, thousands of Tibetan tertiary students protested against issues including government lan­guage policy. Authorities had required students to study an of­ficial booklet that some regarded as ‘‘derogatory’’ toward Ti­betan language and that promoted using Mandarin.158 Accord­ing to the booklet, bilingual education 159 would help ‘‘ethnic minorities to promote their culture and reach its pinnacle.’’ 160 A November 9 protest involving thousands of Tibetan middle school students at another Qinghai location also involved lan­guage rights, among other things.161
  • Qinghai student protesters imprisoned. On April 10, 2013, the Gonghe (Chabcha) County People’s Court sentenced eight Hainan Professional Training School 162 students to im­prisonment 163 for ‘‘illegal assembly’’ 164 during the November 26 protest.165 One report described them as ‘‘school prefects or class monitors’’ 166 and noted that students resented the book­let’s use in ‘‘political education’’ classes.167 An unidentified Qinghai court reportedly sentenced a middle school student ac­cused of ‘‘organizing’’ the November 9 protests to four years’ imprisonment.168
  • Citizens promote Tibetan language. Reports of unofficial Tibetan initiatives to promote Tibetan language emerged in Qinghai, where organizers of the Mother Tongue Protection As­sociation observed UN-recognized International Mother Lan­guage Day; 169 in Gansu, where posters described the language as ‘‘the golden cup that holds the essence of Tibetan culture’’ and urged Tibetans to ‘‘give up impure mixed speech for­ever’’; 170 and in Sichuan, where township authorities banned informal classes on Tibetan language and culture.171

 

Economic Development Policy and Implementation

Officials continued to emphasize economic development as the key to achieving ‘‘social stability’’ 172 even though some initiatives resulted in protests 173 or alleged harm to local communities 174— including a reported self-immolator’s call for protection of Tibet’s ‘‘fragile environment.’’ 175 The Party and government maintained the development strategy announced at the January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum 176—adherence to a model based on ‘‘Chinese characteristics’’ and retaining ‘‘Tibetan traits.’’ 177 Government ‘‘in­vestment’’ in China’s western areas—a program launched in 2000 as ‘‘Great Western Development’’ (xibu da kaifa) 178—almost tripled in 2012 compared with 2011, state-run media reported.179

Indicative developments this past year include the following ex­amples.

  • Railroad construction. A Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) official said the Lhasa-Shigatse railway will begin operation by the end of 2014.180 Previous estimates ranged from 2010 181 to 2015.182 TAR officials expressed concern that a National Peo­ple’s Congress decision to dismantle the Ministry of Rail­roads 183 could hinder railroad construction on the Tibetan pla­teau by making unprofitable services harder to finance.184
  • Forced settlement.185 Official media reported that the TAR government would settle 460,000 farmers and herders in 2013, and that ‘‘nearly 2.1 million’’ had been settled (or resettled) during 2006–2012.186 Party Secretary Chen Quanguo said in September 2012 that ‘‘all farmers and herders’’ in the TAR would be settled by the end of 2013.187 A 2011 government opinion called for nationwide settlement of herders to be ‘‘basi­cally’’ accomplished by 2015.188
  • Mining. International media organizations reported on a March 2013 landslide disaster at a TAR gold mine in Lhasa municipality,189 and on environmental pollution that interfered with Tibetans’ ability to farm and maintain livestock.190 In a May 2013 protest, 3,500 Tibetans in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, reportedly confronted arriving workers they suspected to be miners and asked them to ‘‘leave our re­sources where they are.’’ 191 Such reports are concurrent with TAR policy to increase the mining share of TAR GDP from about 3 percent in 2010 to between 30 and 50 percent by 2020.192
  • Hydropower. Government plans for construction of hydro­electric projects along major Tibetan rivers attracted the inter­est of news media and analysts.193 A blog maintained by a Canada-based Tibetan published detailed information in March 2013 on each project’s location, capacity, and status.194

 

Summary: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment

As of September 1, 2013, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,531 records—a figure certain to be far from complete—of Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008, the beginning of a period of mostly peaceful polit­ical protests that swept across the Tibetan plateau.

Among the 1,531 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions re­ported since March 2008 are 28 Tibetans ordered to serve reeduca­tion through labor (23 are believed released upon completing their terms) and 328 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to imprisonment ranging from six months to life (142 are believed released upon sentence completion).195 Of the 328 Tibetan political prisoners sen­tenced to imprisonment since March 2008, sentencing information is available for 315 prisoners, including 309 with fixed-term sen­tences averaging 4 years and 8 months, based on PPD data as of September 1, 2013.

CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT

As of September 1, 2013, the PPD contained records of 642 Ti­betan political prisoners believed or presumed currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 622 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008; 196 20 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete.

Of the 622 Tibetan political prisoners who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, and who were believed or presumed to re­main detained or imprisoned as of September 1, 2013, PPD data indicated that:

  • 314 (51 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teach­ers, or trulkus.197
  • 550 (88 percent) are male, 46 (7 percent) are female, and 26 are of unknown gender.
  • 288 (46 percent) are believed or presumed detained or im­prisoned in Sichuan province; the rest are believed or pre­sumed detained or imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous Region (143), Qinghai province (122), Gansu province (68), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1).
  • Sentencing information is available for 182 prisoners: 176 re­portedly were sentenced to fixed terms ranging from 1 year and 6 months to 20 years,198 and 6 were sentenced to life im­prisonment or death with a 2-year reprieve.199 The average fixed-term sentence is 6 years and 3 months. Seventy-nine (43 percent) of the prisoners with known sentences are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus.

 

Sentencing information is available for 16 of the 20 Tibetan polit­ical prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed im­prisoned as of September 1, 2013. Their sentences range from 8 years to life imprisonment; the average fixed-term sentence is 13 years and 1 month.

 

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong

While in practice Hong Kong residents enjoy greater freedom than citizens of mainland China, the Commission continued to ob­serve developments that raise concerns about the commitment of the central and Hong Kong governments to Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms. Hong Kong’s Basic Law guarantees the freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly, promises Hong Kong a ‘‘high degree of autonomy,’’ and confirms the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to Hong Kong.1 The Basic Law also states that the ‘‘ultimate aim’’ is the election by universal suffrage of Hong Kong’s top official—the Chief Execu­tive (CE)—and Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo).2 In March 2013, the UN Human Rights Committee reviewed Hong Kong for compliance with the ICCPR and expressed ‘‘concern about the lack of a clear plan to institute universal suffrage and to ensure the right of all persons to vote and to stand for election without unrea­sonable limitations.’’ 3 The committee urged the Hong Kong govern­ment to ‘‘outline clear and detailed plans on how universal and equal suffrage might be instituted.’’ 4

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND AUTONOMY

The Basic Law states that the CE is to be elected by universal suffrage ‘‘upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.’’ 5 A 2007 Na­tional People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) decision further specified that the CE ‘‘may’’ be elected through universal suffrage in 2017, after which LegCo member elections may follow suit.6 In its submission to the UN Human Rights Committee re­garding Hong Kong’s compliance with the ICCPR, the Hong Kong government confirmed the 2017 time frame for implementation of universal suffrage for electing the CE and indicated that universal suffrage for elections of all LegCo members would be implemented in 2020.7 Currently 35 of the 70 LegCo members are elected through Functional Constituencies, most with fewer than 1,500 vot­ers that can include companies with multiple votes; a similarly dis­proportionate system is used to select the 1,200 members of the election committee that chooses the CE.8

Large numbers of Hong Kong residents continued advocating for universal suffrage as local officials deferred discussion of electoral reform. Public support grew 9 for the Occupy Central movement, which plans to mobilize 10,000 protesters to occupy Hong Kong’s fi­nancial district in July 2014 if the government has not issued a universal suffrage plan meeting international standards by that time.10 Other mass demonstrations have recently compelled gov­ernment action. In October 2012, for example, the Hong Kong gov­ernment formally shelved a patriotic education curriculum 11 that had been criticized by tens of thousands of protestors as political indoctrination.12 In July 2013, Chief Executive CY Leung dis­missed calls for early public consultation on electoral reform while maintaining that he did not need the central government’s permis­sion to launch such consultations.13 Pro-democracy advocates fear that delays will leave insufficient time for public consultation.14

Statements by central government officials this past year raised concerns over central government interference in the nomination of CE candidates to run in elections by universal suffrage. During the most recent CE election in March 2012, the central government re­portedly wielded heavy influence in the selection of its favored can­didate CY Leung, after dropping support for Henry Tang, who had become the subject of controversies.15 In August 2013, the director of the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong rejected a pro-democracy party legislator’s proposal to allow candidates who receive a certain number of voters’ nominations to run for CE, in­stead saying that the election committee that currently selects the CE should form the basis of the committee that selects the CE can­didates in an election by universal suffrage.16 A pro-democracy leg­islator criticized the current election committee as ‘‘based on a very narrow electorate’’ and ‘‘not a broadly representative committee.’’ 17 In March, the chairman of the Law Committee under the National People’s Congress Standing Committee listed a set of requirements for CE candidates to meet, one of which is that they must be trust­ed by the central government.18 The chairman said such candidates could criticize the central government, but they could not, for ex­ample, consider the central government an opponent, citing a pro-democracy legislator as an example.19

Two incidents this year highlighted ongoing challenges to Hong Kong’s judicial and law enforcement independence. In a case in­volving the rights of domestic helpers to seek permanent residency, the Hong Kong government took the unusual step of requesting that Hong Kong’s highest court refer a key issue for interpretation to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, which was expected to side with the Hong Kong government’s position.20 The court sided with the Hong Kong government by ruling in March 2013 against permanent residency for domestic helpers while say­ing it did not need to seek the central government’s interpretation in this particular instance.21 In another case, local authorities de­layed action on a U.S. request for the provisional arrest of former

U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, which allowed him to leave Hong Kong.22 Unnamed sources cited in a New York Times article claimed the Chinese government directed local authorities to allow Snowden’s departure.23 Local officials maintained that their law enforcement process remained inde­pendent.24

PRESS FREEDOM

Despite enjoying greater press freedom than mainland China, Hong Kong journalists and media organizations continued to report pressure and harassment. Assaults or instances of harassment against Hong Kong journalists reportedly rose to 18 (7 occurring in mainland China), an increase over the 1 to 2 assaults reported on average in recent years.25 Among the most heavily targeted media outlets was the Next Media group, which reported four incidents in June 2013.26 The Hong Kong Journalists Association claims that Hong Kong and central government authorities have been largely unresponsive to inquiries regarding the attacks.27 According to a 2012 survey, more than one-third of Hong Kong journalists report­edly admitted to self-censorship,28 which they attribute in part to editorial pressure from media owners with significant political and economic interests in mainland China.29 Over half the owners of Hong Kong’s 30 major media outlets have been appointed as rep­resentatives to either the central government’s top legislative or po­litical advisory body.30 Several major newspapers have reportedly set up special committees of largely mainland Chinese membership to vet articles before publication, which bears similarities to edi­torial practices in media outlets in mainland China.31

TRANSPARENCY

During the last year, the Hong Kong government made uneven progress toward maintaining transparency. Access to government records was hampered by the loss or destruction of public docu­ments by government offices.32 Local activists say that civil serv­ants may dispose of files because there is no existing legislation to regulate recordkeeping.33 In June 2013, a Hong Kong Law Reform Commission sub-committee began work to review the current state of management of government records, study relevant laws in other jurisdictions, and make recommendations for possible regulatory reforms.34 In addition, the Ombudsman of Hong Kong opened an investigation into the ‘‘access to information regime and Govern­ment’s records management system’’ in January 2013.35

The government postponed implementation of a measure in March 2013 that would have redacted from public corporate filings important identifying information about company directors—the type of information that was used by Bloomberg and the New York Times to uncover the alleged vast wealth of China’s top political families.36 Proponents of the measure cited the privacy rights of di­rectors while opponents warned that it would harm the reputation of Hong Kong’s financial markets for transparency and ‘‘risk turn­ing Hong Kong into an opaque offshore tax shelter for China’s plu­tocrats.’’ 37

Macau

Macau’s Basic Law differs from Hong Kong in several aspects, in­cluding the absence of any language regarding ‘‘universal suffrage,’’ although it does include a provision making the International Cov­enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applicable to Macau.38 The Commission observed that while Macau residents continued to enjoy greater freedom than citizens of mainland China, the lack of democratic elections in line with the ICCPR and threats to the freedoms of press and assembly in Macau remain ongoing chal­lenges. In its Concluding Observations on Macau’s compliance with the ICCPR issued earlier this year, the UN Human Rights Com­mittee urged Macau to ‘‘outline a clear and comprehensive plan of action and set timelines for the transition to an electoral system based on universal and equal suffrage . . . .’’ 39

POLITICAL AND PRESS FREEDOMS

Mainland experts and officials have dissuaded Macau from pur­suing universal suffrage.40 In March 2013, Political Bureau Stand­ing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng advised a private audience of Hong Kong and Macau officials that their governing administra­tions could not be opposed to the central government.41 The chair­person of the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern in March 2013 that despite public consultation, the government had made no further efforts toward universal suffrage.42 Self-censorship and heavy local government funding of Macau media persist, and journalists report that articles with dissenting views are sometimes altered or deleted.43 In September 2012, the Macau government withdrew parts of a bill that would have established a ‘‘press ac­countability board.’’ 44 Macau residents continued to organize pro­tests on a range of social and political issues, but in some cases faced police retaliation, including confiscation of news materials and detention.45

CORRUPTION

The gambling industry in Macau is reportedly tied to widespread corruption and the laundering of large amounts of money out of mainland China.46 This movement of money through Macau is fueled by a ‘‘junket’’ system, which reportedly aids mainland VIP patrons in bypassing China’s limits on how much money can be taken out of China.47 Casinos and junkets account for a large por­tion of Macau’s annual revenue,48 and one Macau academic esti­mates that US$202 billion in ill-gotten funds are channeled through Macau each year.49

During the reporting year, the Chinese government and Macau officials reportedly stepped up efforts to regulate Macau’s gambling industry as part of a larger campaign by the central government against corruption.50 In November 2012, authorities issued updated guidelines to junket operators intended to increase reporting on the transactions of gaming clients and, in a high-profile incident, de­tained more than half a dozen people in the junket business.51 In July 2013, a U.S. official told the U.S.-China Security and Eco­nomic Review Commission that Macau had taken some steps to ad­dress money laundering deficiencies noted in a 2007 evaluation by a regional anti-money laundering group, including performing reg­ular risk assessments of gaming operators and junkets and enhanc­ing the oversight of junkets operators.52 The official noted, how­ever, that Macau still needed to incorporate a ‘‘freezing mecha­nism’’ into its anti-money laundering framework, lower its report­ing threshold for large transactions, and implement an ‘‘effective cross-border cash declaration system.’’ 53 In June 2013, Macau’s Fi­nancial Intelligence Office announced that it was considering a ‘‘cross-border cash declaration system.’’ 54

VII. Endnotes

†Voted to adopt: Senators Brown, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, and Merkley; Representatives Smith, Wolf, Meadows, Pittenger, Walz, Kaptur, and Honda; Under Secretary Sa´nchez and As­sistant Administrator Biswal.

Did not vote: Deputy Secretary Harris.

Notes to Section I—Political Prisoner Database

1 The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exer­cising his or her human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful so­cial or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China’s Constitution and law, or by international law, or both. Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as China’s Crimi­nal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel’s access to evidence, and not provide the counsel ade­quate time to prepare a defense.

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression

1 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘World Report 2013—Events of 2012,’’ 31 January 13; Freedom House, ‘‘Freedom of the Press 2013: China,’’ May 2013.

2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General As­sembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3).China has signed and stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the standardfor determining when a restriction is permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 24.

3 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i); State Council Information Office, ‘‘Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2012,’’ reprinted in Xinhua, 14 May 13.

4 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 20th Sess., Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Agenda Item 3, A/HRC/20/L.13, 29 June 12; ‘‘Human Rights Council Backs Internet Freedom,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 5 July 12.

5 Lu Wei, ‘‘Chinese Domain Set To Surf,’’ China Daily, 7 July 10.

6 China Internet Network Information Center, ‘‘The 32nd Statistical Report on Internet Devel­opment in China’’ [Di 32 ci zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], July 2013, 5.

7 Ibid.

8 Christina Lo, ‘‘China Mobile Subscribers Up 1.2 Pct to 1.15 Bln in March,’’ Reuters, 26 April

13. 9 For more information, see ‘‘Faster Internet To Reach More Parts of China,’’ Xinhua, 17 April 13; Shen Jingting, ‘‘China Mobile To Expand 4G Network,’’ China Daily, 21 June 12.

10 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ‘‘Internet Industry ‘12th Five-Year’ Devel­opment Plan’’ [Hulianwang hangye ‘‘shi’er wu’’ fazhan guihua], 4 May 12; ‘‘Chinese Internet Users To Hit 800m by 2015,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 5 May 12.

11 State Council Information Office, ‘‘National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012– 2015),’’ 11 June 12, sec. I(6).

12 ‘‘4M Broadband To Cover 70% of Chinese Users,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 27 Feb­ruary 13.

13 ‘‘Chinese Official Media Focuses on Internet Management; Internet Users Worry About Limits to Anticorruption’’ [Zhongguo guan mei jujiao wangguan wangmin danxin fanfu shou xian], BBC, 23 December 12; ‘‘Opinion: Strengthening of Internet Management Has Won Pop­ular Support’’ [Sheping: jiaqiang hulianwang guanli shi de renxin de], Global Times, 21 Decem­ber 12; ‘‘China Continues To Strengthen Internet Management; Internet Spring Difficult Now’’ [Zhongguo chixu jiaqiang wangguan wangluo chuntian nan xian], BBC, 21 December 12.

14 See, e.g., ‘‘Expert: Three Characteristics of Online Rumors Cause Great Harm; Should Heavily Punish Rumor Mongers’’ [Zhuanjia: san tedian zhi wangluo yaoyan weihai da ying jiazhong chengzhi zaoyao zhe], People’s Daily, 4 June 13; Liu Chang, ‘‘Use Laws and Super­vision To Control Online Rumors’’ [Yong falu he jianguan ezhi wangluo yaoyan], Global Times, 27 May 13; Jing Ping, ‘‘The Fundamental Policy of Curbing Online Rumors’’ [Ezhi wangluo yaoyan de zhiben zhi ce], Beijing Daily, 9 April 13.

15 Mo Jinjin, ‘‘The Internet Is Not Outside the Law’’ [Wangluo bushi fawai zhidi], People’s Daily, 18 December 12.

16 David Bandurski, ‘‘People’s Daily: Be Good Online,’’ China Media Project, 18 December 12.

17 See, e.g., John Kennedy, ‘‘New Propaganda Chief Reappears, Calls for Greater Internet Con­trol,’’ South China Morning Post, 7 December 12; Jia Ruijin, ‘‘Wang Junmin’s Research on Inter­net Propaganda and Management Work’’ [Wang junmin diaoyan hulianwang xuanchuan guanli gongzuo], Dazhong Net, 15 June 13; ‘‘Wu Bangguo: All Areas of Society Strongly Appeal for Strengthened Internet Management’’ [Wu bangguo: shehui ge fangmian qianglie huyu jiaqiang wangguan], BBC, 8 March 13.

18 ‘‘China Waging War Against Online Rumors,’’ Xinhua, 2 May 13. 19 ‘‘NPC Reviews Internet Info Protection Law,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 24 Decem­ber 12; ‘‘China’s Top Legislature Mulls Internet Regulatory Measures,’’ Xinhua, 24 December 12. 20 ‘‘China’s Legislature Adopts Online Info Rules To Protect Privacy,’’ Xinhua, 28 December

12.

21 See, e.g., Joe McDonald, ‘‘China Real-Name Registration Is Now Law in Country,’’ Associ­ated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post, 28 December 12; Keith Bradsher, ‘‘China Toughens Its Restrictions on Use of the Internet,’’ New York Times, 28 December 12; Zhao Yinan and Zhang Chunyan, ‘‘Real Names Required,’’ China Daily, 29 December 12.

22 Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Interpretation on Some Ques­tions Regarding Applicable Law When Handling Uses of Information Networks To Commit Defa­mation and Other Such Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi feibang deng xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], passed 2 September 13 (SPP), 5 September 13 (SPC), effective 10 September 13; Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Cracks Down on Online Opinion Makers,’’ New York Times, 10 September 13.

23 Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Interpretation on Some Ques­tions Regarding Applicable Law When Handling Uses of Information Networks To Commit Defa­mation and Other Such Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi feibang deng xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], passed 2 September 13 (SPP), 5 September 13 (SPC), effective 10 September 13, art. 2.

24 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘China’s New Leadership Faces Censorship Challenge,’’ 11 March 13; Ai Weiwei, ‘‘China’s Censorship Can Never Defeat the Internet,’’ Guardian, 15April 12; Sophie Beach, ‘‘Challenged in China: Beyond Censors’ Reach, Free Expression Thrives, To a Point,’’ Committee to Protect Journalists, 11 March 13; Gary King et al., ‘‘How Censorshipin China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,’’ American Political Science Review, May 2013, 1–18; ‘‘China’s Internet: ‘A Giant Cage,’ ’’ Economist, 6 April 13.

25 ‘‘China’s Internet: ‘A Giant Cage,’ ’’ Economist, 6 April 13.

26 Vernon Silver, ‘‘Cracking China’s Skype Surveillance Software,’’ Bloomberg, 8 March 13; An­drew Phelps, Nieman Journalism Lab, ‘‘Reverse Engineering Chinese Censorship: When and Why Are Controversial Tweets Deleted? ’’ 30 May 12; Gary King et al., ‘‘How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,’’ American Political Science Review, May 2013, 1–18; David Bamman et al., ‘‘Censorship and Deletion Practices inChinese Social Media,’’ First Monday, Vol. 17, No. 3, 5 March 12; Wang Xinyu, ‘‘ ‘Naked Official’ Keywords Censored in China,’’ New Tang Dynasty Television, 1 March 13.

27 Open Net Initiative, ‘‘Country Report: China,’’ 9 August 12, 271.

28 Oiwan Lam, ‘‘China: Various Aspects of Censorship,’’ Global Voices Online, 17 March 10;Jedidiah R. Crandall et al., ‘‘Chat Program Censorship and Surveillance in China: Tracking TOM-Skype and Sina UC,’’ First Monday, Vol. 18, No. 7 (1 July 13); Adam Taylor, ‘‘Why China’sEnormous Twitter Rival Blocks Searches Related to ‘Hair Bacon,’ ’’ Business Insider, 4 Sep­tember 13. These sources provide information about the types of ongoing censorship in Chinaand the lack of censorship transparency.

29 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec­tion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/ 17/27, para. 24.

30 Keith Bradsher, ‘‘China Blocks Access to Times After Article,’’ New York Times, 25 October

12.

31 See, e.g., Michelle FlorCruz, ‘‘China’s Twitter Censors Party Congress Chatter,’’ Inter­national Business Times, 9 November 12; Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘Tiananmen Square OnlineSearches Censored by Chinese Authorities,’’ Guardian, 4 June 13; ‘‘Censors Ban Talk Online of Tiananmen Massacre,’’ Radio Free Asia, 28 May 13. For Commission analysis, see ‘‘Chinese Cen­sors Limit Online Content for the 18th Party Congress,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 December 12.

32 For previous reporting on this issue, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 50–

53.

33 Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘Chinese Authorities Putting Pressure on Businesses To Help Censor the Web,’’ New York Times, 13 November 12; Brian Spegele and Paul Mozur, ‘‘China HardensGrip Ahead of Party Meeting,’’ Wall Street Journal, 10 November 12; Zhang Zihan, ‘‘Foreign-Run VPNs Illegal in China: Govt,’’ Global Times, 14 December 12.

34 Jason Ng and Pierre Landry, ‘‘The Political Hierarchy of Censorship: An Analysis of Key­word Blocking of CCP Officials’ Names on Sina Weibo Before and After the 2012 National Con­gress (S)election,’’ Eleventh Chinese Internet Research Conference, 15 June 13.

35 Gary King et al., ‘‘How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Col­lective Expression,’’ American Political Science Review, May 2013, 1–18.

36 Tao Zhu et al., ‘‘The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity Detection of Microblog Post Dele­tions,’’ Arvix.org, 4 March 13.

37 Jeffrey Knockel, Jedidiah R. Crandall, and Jared Saia, ‘‘Three Researchers, Five Conjec­tures: An Empirical Analysis of TOM-Skype Censorship and Surveillance,’’ University of New Mexico, Department of Computer Science; Jeffrey Knockel, ‘‘What Keywords Trigger TOM-SkypeCensorship and Surveillance? ’’ Jeffrey Knockel’s Personal Web site, last visited 24 September 13; Vernon Silver, ‘‘Cracking China’s Skype Surveillance Software,’’ Businessweek, 8 March 13.

38 State Council, Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued and effective 25 September 00, art. 15.

39 Ibid. For more information on non-transparent censorship legislation, see Freedom House, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2012: China,’’ 24 September 12, 17–18.

40 Freedom House, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2012: China,’’ 24 September 12, 18.

41 State Council, Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued and effective 25 September 00, arts. 15–16; Provi­sions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxifuwu guanli guiding], issued and effective 25 September 05, arts. 19–21.

42 China Internet Network Information Center, ‘‘The 31st Statistical Report on Internet Devel­opment in China’’ [Di 31 ci zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], Janu­ary 2013, 36; Yang Cheng, ‘‘New Media Development Report: Are Most Microblog Users From the ‘Three Lows? ’ ’’ [Xin meiti fazhan baogao: weibo yonghu duoshi ‘‘sandi renqun? ’’] China Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 5 July 13.

43 China Internet Network Information Center, ‘‘The 31st Statistical Report on Internet Devel­opment in China’’ [Di 31 ci zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], Janu­ary 2013, 36.

44 David Barboza, ‘‘Despite Restrictions, Microblogs Catch on in China,’’ New York Times, 15 May 11.

45 See, e.g., Brice Pedroletti, ‘‘China’s Citizen Journalists Finding the Mouse Is Mightier Than the Pen,’’ Guardian Weekly, 11 April 13; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Renewed Restrictions Send Online Chill,’’ 4 January 13; Jill Levine, ‘‘Microblogs in China: Digital Democracy,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 4 July 13.

46 Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘In China, Microblogging Sites Become Free-Speech Platform,’’ Wash­ington Post, 27 March 11; Rachel Lu, ‘‘What Happens to Free Speech on Weibo After Real Name Registration,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 28 February 12.

47 Owen Fletcher and Dan Nystedt, ‘‘Internet, Twitter Blocked in China City After Ethnic Riot,’’ CIO, 6 July 09.

48 Mark McDonald, ‘‘Adding More Bricks to the Great Firewall of China,’’ New York Times, 23 December 12.

49 ‘‘Microblogs: Small Beginnings,’’ Economist, 6 April 13; Edward Wong, ‘‘China Lets Media Report on Air Pollution Crisis,’’ New York Times, 14 January 13; Wayne Ma, ‘‘Beijing PollutionHits Highs,’’ Wall Street Journal, 14 January 13.

50 Ning Hui, ‘‘Social Media’s Role in Earthquake Aftermath Is Revealing,’’ Tea Leaf Nation,22 April 13.

51 Anne Henochowicz, China Digital Times, ‘‘Sensitive Words: Wen Jiabao’s Family Wealth,’’26 October 12; Rachel Lu, ‘‘Some Call NYT an Inadvertent ‘Puppet’ in Wake of Expose´ on Chi­nese PM,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 26 October 12; Minami Funakoshi, ‘‘Chinese Online Reaction to New York Times Pulitzer Becomes Case Study in Censorship,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 16 April 13.

52 Rachel Lu, ‘‘Some Call NYT an Inadvertent ‘Puppet’ in Wake of Expose´ on Chinese PM,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 26 October 12; Minami Funakoshi, ‘‘Chinese Online Reaction to New York Times Pulitzer Becomes Case Study in Censorship,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 16 April 13.

53 For more information, see ‘‘Weibo: An Eye on Corruption,’’ CNTV, 11 March 13; Gu Yongqiang, ‘‘Bringing Down ‘Watch Brother’: China’s Online Corruption-Busters Tread a FineLine,’’ Time, 10 October 12; Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘Chinese Official Sacked After ‘Citizen Journal­ists’ Expose Extravagant Banquet,’’ Guardian, 25 April 13; Jonas Parello-Plesner and MichaelAnti, ‘‘The Weibo Generation Can Reboot China,’’ Financial Times, 21 January 13.

54 For more information, see Brice Pedroletti, ‘‘China’s Citizen Journalists Finding the MouseIs Mightier Than the Pen,’’ Guardian Weekly, 11 April 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Officials Find Misbehavior Now Carries Cost,’’ New York Times, 25 December 12.

55 ‘‘Xinhua Insight: Real-Name Whistleblowing Fuels China’s Online Anti-Corruption Efforts,’’ Xinhua, 14 May 13.

56 Guo Jinchao, ‘‘Li Keqiang Talks Open Government, Must ‘Tell the Truth, Be Completely Honest’ With the Masses’’ [Li keqiang tan zhengwu gongkai: yao xiang qunzhong ‘‘shuozhenhua, jiao shidi’’], China News Service, 26 March 13; Charles Zhu, ‘‘Social Media’s Potential To Transform Chinese Governance,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 9 May 12.

57 Guo Jinchao, ‘‘Li Keqiang Talks Open Government, Must ‘Tell the Truth, Be Completely Honest’ With the Masses’’ [Li keqiang tan zhengwu gongkai: yao xiang qunzhong ‘‘shuozhenhua, jiao shidi’’], China News Service, 26 March 13; David Bandurski, ‘‘Li Keqiang Urges More Information Openness,’’ China Media Project, 27 March 13.

58 Brian Spegele, ‘‘Party Urges Popular Weibo Users To Think of ‘National Interests,’ ’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 26 August 13; ‘‘Big Vs and Bottom Lines,’’ Econo­mist, 31 August 13; ‘‘China Steps Up Campaign Against Major Opinion-Leading Bloggers, To Wrest Control of Internet,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 19 August 13.

59 ‘‘Big Vs and Bottom Lines,’’ Economist, 31 August 13.

60 Yiqin Fu, ‘‘China’s Crackdown on Social Media: Who Is in Danger? ’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 2 Sep­tember 13; Adam Taylor, ‘‘China’s War on Online Gossip Is Starting To Get Scary,’’ Business Insider, 31 August 13; ‘‘China Voice: China Resolves To Root Out Online Rumors,’’ Xinhua, 21August 13.

61 Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China Launches New Crackdown on Internet Celebrities,’’ Telegraph, 13May 13; ‘‘Big Vs and Bottom Lines,’’ Economist, 31 August 13.

62 ‘‘Seven Bottom Lines That All Internet Users Should Observe’’ [Qitiao dixian quantiwangmin yinggai gong shou], Xinhua, 14 August 13; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists, Critics Multiply,’’ 30 August 13; Adam Minter, ‘‘China’s Top TweetersUnder Fire,’’ Bloomberg, 27 August 13; Dong Haibo, ‘‘Web Celebrities Should Follow Bottom Line,’’ China Daily, 21 August 13.

63 ‘‘Seven Bottom Lines That All Internet Users Should Observe’’ [Qitiao dixian quanti wangmin yinggai gong shou], Xinhua, 14 August 13.

64 Wu Dingping, ‘‘Xinhua Commentary: Why Microblogging’s ‘Big V’s’ Must Discuss Social Re­sponsibility’’ [Xinhuawang ping: weibo ‘‘da V’’ wei he geng yao jiang shehui zeren], Xinhua, 11August 13.

65 ‘‘Outspoken Chinese American Investor Charles Xue Detained in Beijing ‘ProstitutionBust,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 26 August 13; Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Opponents Turn to Chinese Classics To Protest Anti-Rumour Crackdown,’’ South China Morning Post, 2 September 13.

66 Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Opponents Turn to Chinese Classics To Protest Anti-Rumour Crackdown,’’ South China Morning Post, 2 September 13.

67 Sophie Beach, China Digital Times, ‘‘Press Freedom, Other Topics Off Limits for Aca­demics,’’ 10 May 13; ‘‘Exposure of Universities’ ‘Seven Don’t Mentions’ Sparks Heated Debate’’ [Zhongguo gaoxiao ‘‘qi bu jiang’’ bei puguang yinfa re yi], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 13.

68 Benjamin Carlson, ‘‘7 Things You Can’t Talk About in China,’’ Global Post, 3 June 13; ‘‘Ex­posure of Universities’ ‘Seven Don’t Mentions’ Sparks Heated Debate’’ [Zhongguo gaoxiao ‘‘qi bu jiang’’ bei puguang yinfa re yi], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 13.

69 Raymond Li, ‘‘Seven Subjects Off Limits for Teaching, Chinese Universities Told,’’ South China Morning Post, 11 May 13.

70 Ibid.

71 Willy Lam, ‘‘Xi and China’s Seven Taboos,’’ Deutsche Welle, 10 June 13; ‘‘Xi Jinping’s New Policy: After the Seven Unmentionables, There Are Another 16 Articles’’ [Xi jinping xinzheng: qi bu jiang hou you you shiliu tiao], BBC, 28 May 13.

72 ‘‘China Has Over 170,000 Govt Microblogs,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 27 March

13. 73 Ibid. 74 See, e.g., ‘‘Government Microblogging ‘Choir’ Sings the Positive Energies of a Harmonious

Society’’ [Zhengwu weibo ‘‘hechang tuan’’ chang xiang hexie shehui zheng nengliang], Star On­line, 20 June 13; Liu Fengping, Suichuan Political-Legal Committee, ‘‘Suichuan County Political-Legal Committee Opens Government Microblog To Maintain Stability and Promote Social Har­mony’’ [Sui chuan xianwei zhengfa wei kaitong zhengwu wei bo weiwen cu hexie], 28 April 13.

75 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35. See also CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 54.

76 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials’ Assets,’’ 19 April 13; Human Rights in China, ‘‘Activist Detained on Suspicion of ‘Inciting Subversion of State Power’ After Calling for Disclosure of Officials’ As­sets,’’ 9 May 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘China: End Escalating Criminalizing Peace­ful Assembly and Free Expression,’’ 17 July 13; ‘‘China Detains Activist Xu Zhiyong,’’ BBC, 17 July 13.

77 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General As­sembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 14. China has signed and stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR. Human Rights in China, ‘‘Online Activist Sentenced to 8 Years for Subversion; Lawyer Raises Procedural Concerns,’’ 5 November 12.

78 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials’ Assets,’’ 19 April 13; Human Rights in China, ‘‘Online Activist Sentenced to 8 Years for Subversion; Lawyer Raises Procedural Concerns,’’ 5 November 12; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists, Critics Multiply,’’ 30 August 13.

79 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Jiangsu Citizen Gu Yimin Arrested for ‘Inciting Subversion of State Power,’ ’’ 18 June 13; Gillian Wong, ‘‘Zhai Xiaobing, Chinese Blogger, Arrested For Twitter Joke About China’s Government,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post, 21 November

12.

80 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Nationwide Arrests of Activists, Critics Multiply,’’ 30 August 13; Human Rights in China, ‘‘Criminally Detained: Zhao Changqing and Six Other Advocates of Public Disclosure of Officials’ Assets,’’ 19 April 13; ‘‘Veteran Chinese Rights Lawyer Held on Public Order Charges,’’ Radio Free Asia, 19 August 13.

81 ‘‘China Detains Journalist and Photographer Du Bin,’’ BBC, 13 June 13; Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Citizen Journalist on Trial Over Self-Published Books About Environment,’’ 11 Octo­ber 12; ‘‘Chinese Journalist Held For Filming School Campaign,’’ Radio Free Asia, 25 April 13.

82 Gillian Wong, ‘‘Zhai Xiaobing, Chinese Blogger, Arrested For Twitter Joke About China’s Government,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post, 21 November 12. See also ‘‘Beijing Authorities Detain Blogger for Satirical Tweet About 18th Party Congress,’’ Congressional-Exec­utive Commission on China, 21 December 12.

83 ‘‘Qin Yongmin, Zhai Xiaobing Released in Succession’’ [Qin yongmin, zhai xiaobing xianhou huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 12 December 12. See also ‘‘Beijing Authorities Detain Blogger for Sa­tirical Tweet About 18th Party Congress,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 December 12.

84 Jane Perlez, ‘‘Chinese Journalist Detained in Beijing, One Day After Human Rights Talk With U.S.,’’ New York Times, 2 August 13; Luisetta Mudie, ‘‘Chinese Journalist Vows To Fight For Anti-Graft Detainees,’’ Radio Free Asia, 5 August 13.

85 Luisetta Mudie, ‘‘Chinese Journalist Vows To Fight For Anti-Graft Detainees,’’ Radio Free Asia, 5 August 13.

86 Edward Wong, ‘‘Journalist Held in Beijing, Friends Say,’’ New York Times, 12 June 13; ‘‘China Detains Journalist and Photographer Du Bin,’’ BBC, 13 June 13.

87 ‘‘China Detains Journalist and Photographer Du Bin,’’ BBC, 13 June 13; ‘‘Beijing Police For First Time Confirm Criminal Detention of Independent Reporter Du Bin’’ [Beijing jingfang shouci zhengshi duli jizhe du bin bei xingju], BBC, 13 June 13.

88 Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Independent Filmmaker Du Bin Released on Bail in Beijing,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 July 13.

89 Ibid.

90 Neil Gough, ‘‘Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Freed After 8 Years in Prison,’’ New York Times, 7 September 13; ‘‘China Releases Prominent Dissident Early—Group,’’ Reuters, 8 Sep­tember 13. For more information on this case, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004–05482.

91 See, e.g., Mimi Lau, ‘‘Sex-Worker Rights Activist Ye Haiyan and Family Kicked Out of Guangdong,’’ South China Morning Post, 8 July 13; Wei De, ‘‘Well-Known Human Rights Activ­ist Hu Jia Beaten Until Bleeding by Beijing Domestic Security Protection Officers’’ [Zhuming weiquan renshi hu jia bei beijing guobao ouda chuxie], China Free Press, 15 March 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Presses Crackdown on Campaign Against Graft,’’ New York Times, 21 April 13; ‘‘Gansu Lawyer Wang Fengjun Drugged and Beaten by Police Investigators for Handling Case­work; Another Internet User Calling for Disclosure of Public Property Criminally Detained’’ [Gansu lushi wang fengjun ban’an zao xingjing duda beijing you yi wangyou xu caichan gongshi bei xingju], Radio Free Asia, 8 July 13.

92 ‘‘Tibetan Writer Woeser Again Placed Under House Arrest,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Blogger Thrives as Muckraker,’’ New York Times, 5 February 13; Tom Phillips, ‘‘Chinese Blogger ‘Gagged’ After Attacking Government for Treatment of Poor,’’ Tele­graph, 19 July 13.

93 Isolda Morillo and Alexa Olesen, ‘‘AP Exclusive: China Nobel Wife Speaks on Detention,’’ Associated Press, 6 December 12; ‘‘Clashes as Activist’s Daughter Is Denied Schooling,’’ Radio Free Asia, 8 April 13.

94 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.

95 Josh Chin, ‘‘Forced ‘Vacation’ for Man Who Broke Dumpster Death Story,’’ Wall Street Jour­nal, China Real Time Report (blog), 23 November 12.

96 ‘‘Tibetan Writer Woeser Again Placed Under House Arrest,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13.

97 ‘‘Chinese Professor Banned From Classrooms Over Speech,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in

Asahi Shimbun, 24 August 13; ‘‘Law Professor Suspended From Teaching for Pro-Constitu­tionalism Expressions,’’ China Change, 25 August 13; ‘‘Shanghai Lawyer Suspended Over Con­stitutional Campaigns,’’ Radio Free Asia, 29 August 13.

98 See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Blogger Thrives as Muckraker,’’ New York Times, 5 Feb­ruary 13.

99 Isolda Morillo and Alexa Olesen, ‘‘AP Exclusive: China Nobel Wife Speaks on Detention,’’ Associated Press, 6 December 12.

100 Ibid.

101 UN Human Rights Council, ‘‘Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade,’’ Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add. 2, art. 1(a).

102 Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘2013 World Press Freedom Index’’ 30 January 13; Olga Khazan, ‘‘Map: Where Reporters Have the Least Freedom,’’ Washington Post, 30 January 13.

103 Gao Yu, ‘‘Beijing Observation: Regressing Further From ‘Five Nos,’ ’’ Seeing Red in China (blog), 16 May 13; ‘‘China’s Control of the Internet Activities of Media Professionals Causes Con­cern’’ [Zhongguo kongzhi meitiren wangluo huodong yin guanzhu] BBC, 17 April 13; Ren Xianliang, ‘‘Comprehensively Planning Two Public Opinion Fields, Concentrating Positive Social Energy’’ [Tongchou liang ge yulun chang ningju shehui zheng nengliang], Red Flag Journal, re­printed in Seeking Truth, 13 April 13.

104 Ren Xianliang, ‘‘Comprehensively Planning Two Public Opinion Fields, Concentrating Posi­tive Social Energy’’ [Tongchou liang ge yulun chang ningju shehui zheng nengliang], Red Flag Journal, reprinted in Seeking Truth, 13 April 13. For an English translation of Ren Xianliang’s remarks, see David Bandurski, ‘‘Party Must Grab the Agenda, Says Official,’’ China Media Project, 12 April 13; Gao Yu, ‘‘Beijing Observation: Regressing Further From ‘Five Nos,’ ’’ Seeing Red in China (blog), 16 May 13.

105 Chen Xi, ‘‘ ‘Mingjing Magazine’: Exclusive Entire Text of Disseminated Chinese Communist Document No. 9’’ [‘‘Mingjing yuekan’’ dujia quanwen kan fa zhonggong 9 hao wenjian], Mingjing Magazine, 19 August 13; Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,’’ New York Times, 19 August 13.

106 ‘‘China Newspaper Journalists Stage Rare Strike,’’ BBC, 7 January 13.

107 ‘‘ ‘Southern Weekend’ New Year’s Message, Comparison of the Two Versions’’ [‘‘Nanfang zhoumo’’ yuandan xianci liang banben bijiao], BBC, 4 January 13; ‘‘Journalists Confront China Censors Over Editorial,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in USA Today, 4 January 13; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘Chinese Journalists Mount Rare Protest Over an Alleged Act of Government Censor­ship,’’ Washington Post, 4 January 13; International Federation of Journalists, ‘‘Journalists Strike Against Censorship in Mainland China,’’ 7 January 13.

108 Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘Chinese Journalists Mount Rare Protest Over an Alleged Act of Gov­ernment Censorship,’’ Washington Post, 4 January 13.

109 Edward Wong, ‘‘Protest Grows Over Censoring of China Paper,’’ New York Times, 7 Janu­ary 13; Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘China Anti-Censorship Protest Attracts Support Across Country,’’ Guardian, 7 January 13.

110 Ibid.

111 Edward Wong, ‘‘Protest Grows Over Censoring of China Paper,’’ New York Times, 7 Janu­ary 13.

112 International Federation of Journalists, ‘‘Journalists Strike Against Censorship in Main­land China,’’ 7 January 13.

113 ‘‘Southern Weekend Issue Prompts Soul-Searching Over Media’s Role,’’ Global Times, 8 January 13.

114 Xiao Shu, ‘‘Dim Hopes for a Free Press in China,’’ New York Times, 14 January 13.

115 ‘‘China To Merge Press, Broadcasting Regulators,’’ Xinhua, 10 March 13; ‘‘State General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television Hangs a Sign; Cai Fuchao and Jiang Jianguo Joint Photo’’ [Guojia xinwen chuban guangdian zongju guapai cai fuchao jiang jianguo heying], China News Service, 22 March 13.

116 He Qinglian, The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China (New York: Human Rights in China, 2008), 25.

117 State Council Information Office and Ministry of Information Industry, Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued and effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 8, 11; General Administration of Press and Publication, Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 15; General Administration of Press and Publica­tion, Measures for Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen jizhe zheng guanli banfa], issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 09, arts. 11, 12, 16.

118 Zhejiang Province Radio, Film and Television Bureau, ‘‘2010 Nationwide Radio and Tele­vision Editors and Reporters, Broadcasters, and Hosts Qualification Exam’’ [2010 nian quanguo guangbo dianshi bianji jizhe, boyin yuan zhuchi ren zige kaoshi dagang], 30 July 10, chap. 2, art. 6.

119 General Administration of Press and Publication, ‘‘Several Provisions To Prevent and Guard Against False Reporting’’ [Guanyu yanfang xujia xinwen baodao de ruogan guiding], 19 October 11, art. 1(4); Michael Wines, ‘‘China Rolls Out Tighter Rules on Reporting,’’ New York Times, 11 November 11.

120 Pu Yasu, ‘‘SARFT to Enhance Control Over Editors’ Online Activities’’ [Xinwen chuban guangdian zongju jiang jiaqiang caibian renyuan wangluo huodong guanli], China Press and Publishing Journal, reprinted in Xinhua, 16 April 13.

121 Tom Phillips, ‘‘Chinese Journalists Banned from Quoting Foreign Media,’’ Telegraph, 17 April 13.

122 State Council Information Office, ‘‘National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012– 2015),’’ 11 June 12, sec. I (6).

123 For more information, see Deng Yuwen, ‘‘China Should Abandon North Korea,’’ Financial Times, 27 February 13; ‘‘Chinese Editor Fired Over Call To Abandon N.Korea,’’ Chosun Ilbo, 1 April 13; Kentaro Koyama, ‘‘China Magazine Spikes Taiwan Issue, Fires Staff,’’ Asahi Shimbun, 23 March 13.

124 Deng Yuwen, ‘‘China Should Abandon North Korea,’’ Financial Times, 27 February 13; ‘‘Chinese Editor Fired Over Call To Abandon N.Korea,’’ Chosun Ilbo, 1 April 13; Jane Perlez, ‘‘Penalty for Chinese Editor Critical of Korea Stance,’’ New York Times, 1 April 13.

125 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Chinese Journalist Who Raised Corruption Charges Jailed,’’ 29 August 13.

126 ‘‘Police Hold Chongqing Journalist Who Exposed Graft,’’ Radio Free Asia, 23 August 13; Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Chinese Journalist Who Raised Corruption Charges Jailed,’’ 29 August 13.

127 Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Take No Photos or You Will Die Here,’’ 19 July 13.

128 Ibid.; Liu Gang, ‘‘In Hunan, Two Reporters Interviewing Melon Vendors About Death Beat­en by Police’’ [Hunan 2 ming jizhe caifang gua fan siwang shijian bei jingcha ouda], Oriental Daily, 18 July 13.

129 Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Take No Photos or You Will Die Here,’’ 19 July 13; Liu Gang, ‘‘In Hunan, Two Reporters Interviewing Melon Vendors About Death Beaten by Police’’ [Hunan 2 ming jizhe caifang gua fan siwang shijian bei jingcha ouda], Oriental Daily, 18 July 13.

130 Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘RWB Calls for the Immediate and Unconditional Release of Boxun Journalist Sun Lin,’’ reprinted in Boxun, 26 April 13.

131 Verna Yu, ‘‘Hong Kong Journalists, Activist Beaten Outside Home of Wife of Dissident Liu Xiaobo,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 March 13.

132 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Hong Kong Journalists Beaten in Beijing,’’ 11 March 13; Verna Yu, ‘‘Hong Kong Journalists, Activist Beaten Outside Home of Wife of Dissident Liu Xiaobo,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 March 13.

133 Verna Yu, ‘‘Hong Kong Journalists, Activist Beaten Outside Home of Wife of Dissident Liu Xiaobo,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 March 13.

134 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Top Chinese Reporter Fired as Thugs Attack Film Crew,’’ Radio Free Asia, 1 March 13; ‘‘German TV Crew Attacked While Filming in China,’’ 4 March 13.

135 International Federation of Journalists, ‘‘Journalists Attacked in Hong Kong and Mainland China,’’ 23 April 13.

136 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, ‘‘Annual Working Conditions Survey,’’ reprinted in Committee to Protect Journalists, 11 July 13.

137 Ibid.

Notes to Section II—Worker Rights

1 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.

2 PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], issued and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 3; Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions [Zhongguo gonghui zhangcheng], adopted 26 September 03, amended 21 October 08, General Provisions.

3 For example, during the past year, ACFTU Chairman Li Jianguo was concurrently a mem­ber of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee. See All-China Federa­tion of Trade Unions, Yan Yan, ‘‘Li Jianguo Elected Chairman of All-China Federation of Trade Unions’’ [Li jianguo dangxuan zhonghua quanguo zong gonghui zhuxi], People’s Daily, 1 March

13. See also Lu Jianmin, ‘‘The Trade Union System Within Collective Bargaining in China’’ [Lu jianmin: zhongguo jiti tanpan zhong de tizhi gonghui], Leader, reprinted in Consensus Net, 7 May 13; Li Honghuo, ‘‘The System Really Has To Operate in Order To Contain Conflict’’ [Zhidu zhenshi yunzhuan caineng kongzhi chongtu], Dongguan Daily, 20 May 13.

4 PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], issued and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 4; Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions [Zhongguo gonghui zhangcheng], effective 26 September 03, amended 21 October 08, General Provisions.

5 Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, ‘‘How Direct Are the ‘Direct Elections’ of Trade Union Officials in China? ’’ Global Labour Column, Number 109, October 2012; Working Conditions and Worker Rights in China: Recent Developments, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 July 12, Written Statement Submitted by Mary E. Gallagher, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 10.

6 Wu Jiajie, ‘‘Trade Unions Must Return to Their Functional Role’’ [Gonghui yao xiang zishen zhineng juese huigui], Dongguan Daily, 20 May 13; Lu Jianmin, ‘‘The Trade Union System Within Collective Bargaining in China’’ [Lu jianmin: zhongguo jiti tanpan zhong de tizhi gonghui], Leader, reprinted in Consensus Net, 7 May 13; Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, ‘‘How Direct Are the ‘Direct Elections’ of Trade Union Officials in China? ’’ Global Labour Column, Number 109, October 2012.

7 Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, ‘‘How Direct Are the ‘Direct Elections’ of Trade Union Officials in China? ’’ Global Labour Column, Number 109, October 2012.

8 PRC Labor Law [Zhongguo renmin gongheguo laodong fa], issued 5 July 94, effective 1 Janu­ary 95, arts. 8, 33. See also PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], issued and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 18; PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhongguo renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], issued 29 June 07, effective 1 January 08, amended 28 December 12, arts. 6, 51–56.

9 Suo Hanxue, ‘‘70 Percent of Line Workers Not Satisfied With Existing Wages, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Intends To Push for Wage Negotiations’’ [Qi cheng yixian gongren buman xianyou gongzi renshibu ni tui gongzi xieshang], China Business, reprinted in Sina, 9 March 13; Yang Mingqing, ‘‘Vigorously Promote Collective Wage Negotiations, Actively Advance Harmonious Labor Relations’’ [Dali tuixing gongzi jiti xieshang jiji cujin laodong guanxi hexie], Workers’ Daily, 23 January 13; Fan Xi and Chu Hang, ‘‘Collective Wage Negotiations Allow Workers To Enjoy ‘the Right To Speak’ on Income’’ [Gongzi jiti xieshang, rang laodongzhe xiangyou shouru ‘‘huayu quan’’], Xinhua, 1 May 13.

10 Lu Jianmin, ‘‘The Trade Union System Within Collective Bargaining in China’’ [Lu jianmin: zhongguo jiti tanpan zhong de tizhi gonghui], Leader, reprinted in Consensus Net, 7 May 13; Wu Jiajie, ‘‘Trade Unions Must Return to Their Functional Role’’ [Gonghui yao xiang zishen zhineng juese huigui], Dongguan Daily, 20 May 13; Lei Xiaotian, ‘‘Reshaping the Government’s Role in Collective Consultations’’ [Zhengfu zai jiti xieshang zhong zai juese chongsu], Chinese Cadres Tribune, reprinted in Theory Net, 7 May 13.

11 Chen Xiaobo and Zhang Xiaoyu, ‘‘Awkward Situation of Collective Wage Consultations’’ [Gongzi jiti xieshang yu ganga], Yunnan Daily, reprinted in Collective Bargaining Forum, 1 Au­gust 13.

12 Ibid.

13 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Nanhai Honda Workers Obtain Higher Salaries After One Day Strike’’ [Nanhai bentian gongren zai wei qi yitian de bagong hou huode geng gao gongzi], 25 March 13.

14 Zhang Ke, ‘‘Research Report Uncovers Foxconn ‘Real Trade Unions’ Merely for Decoration’’ [Diaoyan baogao jiemi: fushikang ‘‘zhenzheng gonghui’’ zhishi baishe], First Financial, 1 May

13.

15 Zheng Caixiong, ‘‘Trial Begins To Elect Trade Union Chiefs,’’ China Daily, 15 January 13; Wang Daobin, ‘‘Trial Direct Elections of Union Chairpersons Will Be Carried Out This Year’’ [Jinnian jiang shidian gonghui zhuxi zhixuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 January 13; Zhu Jun, ‘‘Ningbo, Yingzhou District, Tangxi Town Attempts Direct Elections of Enterprise Union Chairpersons’’ [Ningbo yingzhou qu tangxi zhen changshi qiye gonghui zhuxi zhixuan], Ningbo Net, reprinted in Collective Bargaining Forum, 20 May 13; Yao Xuepei, ‘‘61 Enterprises Carry Out Direct Elections of Union Chairpersons’’ [61 jia qiye tuixing zhixuan gonghui zhuxi], Gaoming Today, 10 May 13. For previous reporting on direct union elections, see, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 60.

16 Zheng Caixiong, ‘‘Trial Begins To Elect Trade Union Chiefs,’’ China Daily, 15 January 13; Wang Daobin, ‘‘Trial Direct Elections of Union Chairpersons Will Be Carried Out This Year’’ [Jinnian jiang shidian gonghui zhuxi zhixuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 January 13.

17 Yao Xuepei, ‘‘61 Enterprises Carry Out Direct Elections of Union Chairpersons’’ [61 jia qiye tuixing zhixuan gonghui zhuxi], Gaoming Today, 10 May 13.

18 Clare Jim and Jonathan Standing, ‘‘Foxconn Says To Boost China Worker Participation in Union,’’ Reuters, 4 February 13; Michelle Chan, ‘‘Can We Trust Foxconn’s New ‘Democratic’ Chi­nese Factories? ’’ In These Times, 11 February 13.

19 ‘‘Foxconn Plans To Establish Genuinely Representative Trade Unions in Chinese Factories’’ [Fushikang zhongguo gongchang ni chengli zhenzheng ju daibiaoxing gonghui], Voice of Amer­ica, 5 February 13; ‘‘Foxconn Prepares To Establish Trade Unions in China That Are Genuinely Representative of Worker Rights and Interests’’ [Fushikang zhunbei zai zhongguo chenglizhenzheng daibiao gongren quanyi de gonghui], Radio Free Asia, 4 February 13; Clare Jim and Jonathan Standing, ‘‘Foxconn Says To Boost China Worker Participation in Union,’’ Reuters, 4February 13.

20 Kathrin Hille and Rahul Jacob, ‘‘China Wary Amid Push for Workers’ Union Poll,’’ Finan­cial Times, 3 February 13.

21 Li Yulin, ‘‘After the Direct Election of Unions’’ [Zhixuan gonghui zhihou], China Fortune,3 September 12; China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Shenzhen Workers Demand Ouster of Trade Union Chairman After ‘Model Election,’ ’’ 8 March 13; Sun Tianming, ‘‘Enterprise Direct Union Elec­tions: A Rare Democratic Practice’’ [Qiye gonghui zhixuan: nande de minzhu caolian], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 June 13.

22 Li Xiaoxu, ‘‘First Directly Elected Union Chairman in Shenzhen Suspected of Not Doing Enough To Defend Legal Rights Faces Joint Declaration for His Dismissal’’ [Shenzhen shouweizhixuan gonghui zhuxi yi yin weiquan bu li zao lianming bamian], Yangcheng Evening News, 1 March 13; ‘‘Why We Want To Recall the Labour Union Chairman,’’ China Labour Net, 12March 13.

23 ‘‘Why We Want To Recall the Labour Union Chairman,’’ China Labour Net, 12 March 13.

24 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Shenzhen Workers Demand Ouster of Trade Union Chairman After ‘Model Election,’ ’’ 8 March 13.

25 ‘‘Worker Protests Continue To Emerge in Guangdong’’ [Guangdong lianxu chuxian gong chao], Radio Free Asia, 24 April 13; ‘‘Multiple Worker Protests Emerge in Guangdong’’[Guangdong gong chao duo chu yongxian], Radio Free Asia, 8 March 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘China Sees Upsurge in Worker Protests Prior to Lunar New Year,’’ 8 Feb­ruary 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Strikes and Worker Protests in China’s Service Sector on the Increase,’’ 7 May 13.

26 ‘‘Over a Thousand Workers in Shenzhen Block Roads, Riot Police Release Tear Gas To Drive Away Workers’’ [Shenzhen yu qian gongren du lu fangbaojing fang cuileidan qugan], Radio FreeAsia, 23 May 13; ‘‘Shenzhen Shoe Factory Goes Bankrupt, 500 Workers Demanding Back Wages Assaulted by Riot Police’’ [Shenzhen xie chang daobi wu bai gongren taoxin zao tejing ouda],Radio Free Asia, 27 May 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Strike and Worker Pro­tests in China’s Service Sector on the Increase,’’ 7 May 13; ‘‘A Thousand Workers in FoshanStrike for Two Days, Factory Threatens To Fire Those Workers Who Don’t Return to Work’’ [Foshan qian ming gongren lianxu liang ri bagong gongchang weixie bu fugong jiu kaichu],Radio Free Asia, 7 June 13; ‘‘Longgang District, Shenzhen Workers From Two Factories Stage Collective Strikes’’ [Shenzhen longgang qu liang chang yuangong jiti bagong], Radio Free Asia,21 June 13.

27 ‘‘Several Hundred Dye Factory Workers Block Roads Seeking Back Wages’’ [Shubairanchang gongren du lu zhui tao qianxin], Radio Free Asia, 1 May 13; ‘‘Labor Rights Damaged, Chongqing and Shenzhen Have Labor Strikes’’ [Laogong quanyi shousun chongqing, shenzhenxian gong chao], Radio Free Asia, 30 April 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘China Sees Upsurge in Worker Protests Prior to Lunar New Year,’’ 8 February 13.

28 ‘‘Thousand Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied With Wages and Treatment Demonstrate’’ [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang qian ren buman xinzi daiyu shangjie youxing],West Net, reprinted in First Financial, 13 January 13; Fiona Tam, ‘‘1,000 Workers Hold Man­agers Hostage in Shanghai Labour Row,’’ South China Morning Post, 21 January 13.

29 Eli Friedman, ‘‘China in Revolt,’’ Jacobin, Issue 7–8, August 2012.

30 Huang Xiaoqing et al., ‘‘Workers at Nanhai Honda Stop Working Seeking Raise in Salary’’[Nanhai bentian gongren tinggong qiu jiaxin], Yangcheng Evening News, 20 March 13; China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘China’s Workers Demand a Better Trade Union,’’ 22 March 13.

31 According to media reports, authorities released 19 of the 27 workers a day later. The Com­mission has not observed subsequent reports on the eight workers not released. ‘‘GuangdongHighway Owner Withholds Hunan Migrant Workers’ Billion Yuan in Wages Leading to Mass Incident’’ [Guangdong gaosulu yezhu tuoqian hunan mingong shang yi yuan gongzi yinfa quntishijian], Radio Free Asia, 3 February 13; ‘‘Migrant Worker Salary Demands Frequent In All Parts of the Country, Government Blindly Suppresses To Maintain Stability’’ [Nongmingongtaoxin gedi pin fa zhengfu wei weiwen yiwei da ya], Radio Free Asia, 4 February 13.

32 ‘‘Shenzhen Shoe Factory Goes Bankrupt, 500 Workers Demanding Back Wages Assaultedby Riot Police’’ [Shenzhen xie chang daobi wu bai gongren taoxin zao tejing ouda], Radio Free Asia, 27 May 13; ‘‘Over a Thousand Workers in Shenzhen Block Roads, Riot Police Release Tear Gas To Drive Away Workers’’ [Shenzhen yu qian gongren du lu fangbaojing fang cuileidan qugan], Radio Free Asia, 23 May 13; ‘‘Taiwanese Enterprise Closes Still Owing Wages, Over Hundred Petitioning Workers Arrested’’ [Tai qi jieye qianxin shangfang gongren bai duo ren beibu], Radio Free Asia, 20 March 13.

33 ‘‘Thousands Striking in Guangzhou in Bloody Clash With Police; Hundreds of Workers at Guizhou Weapons Factory Go to the Streets Seeking Pay’’ [Guangzhou qian ren bagong yu jing liuxue chongtu guizhou jun xie chang shubai yuangong shangjie zheng xinchou], Radio Free Asia, 30 January 13; ‘‘Hundreds of Migrant Workers at Guangdong Provincial Government De­manding Back Wages Dispersed, Over a Hundred Petitioners in Shanxi Imprisoned for Peti­tioning at Two Sessions’’ [Shubai nongmingong yue fu taoxin zao qusan shanxi yu bai fangmin lianghui qingyuan bei guanya], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 13.

34 ‘‘Thousands of Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied With Wages Demonstrate on the Streets’’ [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang qian ren buman xin zi daiyu shangjie youxing], West Net, reprinted in First Financial, 13 January 13.

35 Eli Friedman, ‘‘China in Revolt,’’ Jacobin, Issue 7–8, August 2012; Working Conditions and Worker Rights in China: Recent Developments, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Com­mission on China, 31 July 12, Written Statement Submitted by Mary E. Gallagher, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Chinese Studies, University ofMichigan, 3–4; ‘‘Worker Strikes Break Out in Hangzhou and Other Places, Citizens Rights De­fense Awareness Gradually Increasing’’ [Hangzhou deng di fasheng yuangong bagong shijiangongmin weiquan yishi zhujian zengqiang], Radio Free Asia, 4 March 13.

36 ‘‘Investigation States Not Paying Migrant Workers Overtime Wages Is Still ComparativelyCommon Occurrence’’ [Diaocha cheng bu zhifu nongmingong jiaban gongzi xianxiang reng jiaowei changjian], China Youth Daily, reprinted in Sina, 7 February 13; Han Dongfang, ‘‘Chi­na’s Workers Unite,’’ New York Times, 8 November 12.

37 Kevin Voigt, ‘‘China’s Workforce at a Crossroads,’’ CNN, 21 March 13; William Wan,‘‘Foxconn Riots in China Seen as Likely To Recur,’’ Washington Post, 25 September 12; Yu Ran, ‘‘Young Job Seekers Expect More Than Just Wages,’’ China Daily, 21 February 13; National Bu­reau of Statistics of China, ‘‘2012 Nationwide Migrant Worker Monitoring Survey Report’’ [2012 nian quanguo nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.

38 William Wan, ‘‘Foxconn Riots in China Seen as Likely To Recur,’’ Washington Post, 25 Sep­tember 12; Alexandra Ho and Tim Culpan, ‘‘Foxconn Workers Labor Under Guard After RiotShuts Plant,’’ Bloomberg, 26 September 12; Lin Qiling, ‘‘Taiyuan Foxconn Brawl Persists for Four Hours; Alleged Beating by Security Guards Lead to Brawl’’ [Taiyuan fushikang qun ouchixu 4 xiaoshi jucheng yin baoan daren yinfa], Beijing News, reprinted in Xinhua, 25 Sep­tember 12.

39 Li Li, ‘‘Legal Expert: Evidence Is the Achilles Heel in Migrant Workers’ Difficulty Obtaining Back Wages’’ [Falu zhuanjia: zhengju shi nongmingong taoxin nan de sixue], China Youth Daily,28 February 13; ‘‘For Migrant Workers Seeking To Recover Wages in Hebei, 95 Percent of Wage Arrears Occur in the Construction Sector’’ [Hebei sheng wei nongmingong zhui tao gongzi 95%qianxin fasheng zai jianzhu lingyu], Great Wall Net, reprinted in China News Service, 16 Janu­ary 13.

40 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 20 November 12; Jiang Chunyuan, ‘‘ ‘Migrant Workers Prohibited From Using Toilet’: Discrimination and Arrogance Be­hind Signboard’’ [‘‘Nongmingong jinzhi ruce’’: gaoshipai hou de aoman yu pianjian], Xinhua, 26 March 13.

41 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 20 November 12; Zi Xiuchun, ‘‘Lawyer Huang Leping’s Letter: The Five Main Problems in Migrant Workers’ LivesI Hope Committee Delegates Address’’ [Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers’ Daily, reprinted in Beijing YilianLabor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13.

42 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘2012 Nationwide Migrant Worker Monitoring Sur­vey Report’’ [2012 nian quanguo nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.

43 Zi Xiuchun, ‘‘Lawyer Huang Leping’s Letter: The Five Main Problems in Migrant Workers’Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address’’ [Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers’ Daily, reprinted in BeijingYilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13.

44 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘2012 Nationwide Migrant Worker Monitoring Sur­vey Report’’ [2012 nian quanguo nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.

45 Li Li, ‘‘Legal Expert: Evidence Is the Achilles Heel in Migrant Workers’ Difficulty ObtainingBack Wages’’ [Falu zhuanjia: zhengju shi nongmingong taoxin nan de sixue], China Youth Daily, 28 February 13; Li Keyong, Fu Yongtao et al., ‘‘Labor Law, Those Clauses That Are Ignored(Policy Focus)’’ [Laodong fa, na xie bei moshi de tiaokuan (zhengce jujiao)], People’s Daily, 1 March 13.

46 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘2012 Nationwide Migrant Worker Monitoring Sur­vey Report’’ [2012 nian quanguo nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao], 27 March 13.

47 Zi Xiuchun, ‘‘Lawyer Huang Leping’s Letter: The Five Main Problems in Migrant Workers’ Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address’’ [Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuowu da nanti xiwang dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers’ Daily, reprinted in Beijing Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13; Sun Yangshuang, ‘‘New GenerationMigrant Workers ‘Merge Into the City,’ a Long Road’’ [Xinshengdai nongmingong ‘‘rong cheng,’’ lu you duo yuan], Jilin Daily, reprinted in Worker’s Daily, 25 March 13; ‘‘China’s Hukou SystemPuts Migrant Workers at Severe Economic Disadvantage,’’ Public Radio International, 1 May

13.

48 Zhuang Pinghui, ‘‘Migrant Workers Feel Like Outsiders in Mainland Cities, Says Survey,’’ South China Morning Post, 3 March 13; Huang Chen, ‘‘Investigation of Migrant Worker Happi­ness: Although Income Has Increased, Still Consider Themselves the Lowest Rung of Society’’ [Nongmingong xingfu gan diaocha: shouru sui zeng reng ziren ‘‘diceng’’], Caixin, 28 February

13.

49 ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimi­nation of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99.

50 PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], issued 5 July 94, effective 1 Jan­uary 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 15. See also PRC Law on the Protection of Minors [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wei chengnian ren baohu fa], issued 4 September 91, effective 1 January 92, art. 28. See generally Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02.

51 International Trade Union Confederation, ‘‘Report for the WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies of the People’s Republic of China,’’ June 2012, 16; International Labour Orga­nization, ‘‘Observation (CEACR)—adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011) C138—Min­imum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)—China,’’ adopted 2010, published 100th ILC Session 2011.

52 International Labour Organization, ‘‘Address at the High-Level Meeting on the Application of Child Labour Conventions Ratified by China,’’ 6 September 12; International Labour Organi­zation, ‘‘Information Document on Ratifications and Standards-Related Activities,’’ International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013, 17.

53 International Labour Organization, ‘‘Observation (CEACR)—C138—Minimum Age Conven­tion, 1973 (No. 138)—China,’’ adopted 2010, published 100th ILC Session 2011.

54 See, e.g., Apple Inc., ‘‘Apple Supplier Responsibility 2013 Progress Report,’’ January 2013, 18; ‘‘Underage Foxconn Interns Return to School,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 17 October12; Min-Jeong Lee, ‘‘Samsung Under Watch for China Labor Practices,’’ Wall Street Journal, 18 December 12; ‘‘Unable To Recruit Workers, Child Laborers Used as Substitutes, Clothing Fac­tory in Jiaozhou Reformed’’ [Zhao budao gongren na tonggong dingshang jiaozhou yi fuzhuang chang bei zhenggai], Online Textile City, 12 April 13; Rao Dehong, ‘‘7 Female Primary SchoolStudents From Liangshan Lured To Work in Dongguan Will Be Returned to School’’ [7 ming liangshan xiaoxue nu sheng bei you zhi dongguan wugong jiang bei jiehui fanxiao shangxue],Southern Metropolitan Daily, 6 December 12.

55 John Paczkowski, ‘‘Apple Busts Supplier for Underage Labor in Latest Responsibility Re­port,’’ All Things Digital, 24 January 13; Apple Inc., ‘‘Apple Supplier Responsibility 2013 Progress Report,’’ January 2013, 18.

56 State Council, Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 13.

57 PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], issued 18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, amended 27 August 09, art. 58.

58 See, e.g., Raymond Li, ‘‘Foxconn Flouts Labour Law With Under-16 Interns in Shandong,’’ South China Morning Post, 17 October 12; Lin Yimin and He Daolan, ‘‘Young Student InternsBecome Assembly Line Workers? ’’ [Xuesheng zi shixi bian liushui gong?], Guangzhou Daily, 14 March 13.

59 See International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention concerning Minimum Age for Ad­mission to Employment (No. 138), adopted by 58th Session ILC 26 June 73, entry into force 19June 76, art. 6. ILO guidelines on the subject of vocational training, apprenticeships and related internships vis-a`-vis child labor permits such work ‘‘in accordance with conditions prescribed bythe competent authority’’ and in programs involving education, training, or ‘‘guidance or orienta­tion [on] . . . the choice of an occupation or of a line of training.’’ See also ILO Recommendation 146 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, item 12.2. The General Conference of the ILO adopted Recommendation 146 relating to the 1973 Minimum Age Convention, whichurged that measures ‘‘be taken to safeguard and supervise the conditions in which children and young persons undergo vocational orientation and training within undertakings, training insti­tutions and schools for vocation or technical education and to formulate standards for their pro­tection and development.’’ See also International Labour Organization, Convention concerningForced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), adopted by 14th ILC Session 28 June 30, entry into force 1 May 32; International Labour Office, General Survey Concerning the Forced Labour Conven­tion, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105), International Labour Conference, 96th Session, 2007, 19–20. ILO’s Committee of Experts noted that voca­tional training does not necessarily constitute compulsory work or service within the meaning of the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), but states that ‘‘. . . vocational training usually en­tails a certain amount of practical work, and for that reason, the distinction between training and employment is sometimes difficult to draw. It is therefore only by reference to the variouselements involved in the general context of a particular scheme of training that it becomes pos­sible to determine whether such scheme is unequivocally one of vocational training or on thecontrary involves the exaction of work or service within the definition of ‘forced or compulsory labor.’ ’’

60 Lin Yimin and He Daolan, ‘‘Young Student Interns Become Assembly Line Workers? ’’ [Xuesheng zi shixi bian liushui gong?], Guangzhou Daily, 14 March 13; Lin Yimin and HeDaolan, ‘‘Student Factory Interns Act as Laborers, Working 11 Hour Days, Schools Do the Nego­tiating’’ [Xuesheng gongchang shixi bei dang laogong meitian gan 11 xiaoshi xiao fang yijiaoshe], Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 15 March 13.

61 Lin Yimin and He Daolan, ‘‘Young Student Interns Become Assembly Line Workers? ’’ [Xuesheng zi shixi bian liushui gong?], Guangzhou Daily, 14 March 13.

62 ‘‘Underage Foxconn Interns Return to School,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 17 October

12. 63 Ibid.; David Pierson, ‘‘Chinese Factory Giant Employed Underage Interns on AssemblyLine,’’ Los Angeles Times, 30 October 12. 64 Raymond Li, ‘‘Foxconn Flouts Labour Law With Under-16 Interns in Shandong,’’ SouthChina Morning Post, 17 October 12.

65 Lucy Hornby, ‘‘Use of Student Interns Highlights China Labor Shortage,’’ Reuters, 6 Janu­ary 13; Wang Xian and Li Nan, ‘‘Foxconn Stages Recruitment Frenzy, Numerous University Students ‘Forced Into Internships’ ’’ [Fushikang shangyan zhao gong kuangchao duodi gaoxiao xuesheng ‘‘bei shixi’’], China National Radio, 7 September 12.

66 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Debate on Revisions to Labour Contract Law Delayed Because of Deluge of Submissions,’’ 31 October 12; Pang Le, ‘‘Dispatch Laborers Hope for Equal Pay for Equal Work’’ [Laowu paiqian panwang tonggongtongchou], Xi’an Daily, reprinted in NetEase, 11 September 12.

67 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Debate on Revisions to Labour Contract Law Delayed Because of Deluge of Submissions,’’ 31 October 12.

68 Article 66 of the PRC Labor Contract Law states that ‘‘labor dispatch generally carries out temporary, supplementary, or substitution work positions.’’ PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhongguo renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], issued 29 June 07, effective 1 January 08, amended 28 December 12, art. 66; ‘‘China Aims To Ensure ‘Equal Pay for Same Job,’ ’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily, 25 December 12; Chu He, ‘‘Workers’ Daily Commentary: Who Should Be Alert to the ‘Reverse of Labor Dispatch? ’ ’’ [Gongbao shiping: ‘‘nixiang laowu paiqian’’ shei gai jingxing?], Workers’ Daily, 17 June 13.

69 Sources citing data from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in 2011 and 2012 report the total number of subcontracted workers in China as between 27 and 37 million;however, other reports state the total number is closer to 60 million. See Chen Xin, ‘‘Legislators Review Labor Law Revision on Regulating Outsourcing,’’ China Daily, 25 December 12; KevinSlaten and Xue Chao, ‘‘Wages Rising in Chinese Factories? Only for Some,’’ In These Times, 18 March 13; Liu Xiaojie and Liu Chunxiu, ‘‘Dispatch Labor Industry Thresholds To Rise’’[Laowu paiqian hangye menkan jiang tigao], 21st Century Business Herald, 22 November 12; Huang Yan, et al., ‘‘Flood of Labor Dispatch in Enterprises Common Phenomenon, DispatchWorkers Face Unequal Pay for Equal Work’’ [Qiye laowu paiqian fanlan xianxiang pubian laowugong mianlin tonggong butong chou], Economic Information, reprinted in People’s Daily,6 July 12; Zhang Zhilong, et al., ‘‘Xinhua Viewpoint: Labor Dispatch Personnel ‘Unequal Pay for Equal Work’ Problem Draws Concern’’ [Xinhua shidian: laowu paiqian renyuan ‘‘tonggongbutong chou’’ wenti yin guanzhu], Xinhua, 16 January 13.

70 National People’s Congress, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress DecisionRegarding Amendments to PRC Labor Contract Law [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwuweiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ‘‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa’’ dejueding], 29 December 12.

71 Ibid., arts. 66, 63.

72 Ibid., art. 57.

73 Zou Mingqiang, ‘‘On the Eve of the Implementation of Amendments to PRC Labor ContractLaw, the Public Looks Forward To Improving the Unfair Circumstances of Dispatch Laborers’’ [‘‘Laodong hetong fa (xiuzheng an)’’ jijiang zhengshi shishi, gaishan laowu paiqiangong de bugongping jingyu cheng gongzhong qidai], Workers’ Daily, 16 June 13; Jiang Yunzhang, ‘‘Second Examination of Amendments to Labor Contract Law Postponed’’ [Laodong hetong fa xiugai ershen tuiyan], Economic Observer, 27 October 12.

74 Kevin Slaten and Xue Chao, ‘‘Wages Rising in Chinese Factories? Only for Some,’’ In TheseTimes, 18 March 13; Li Shulong, ‘‘Dongguan Child Laborer Dies: 14-Year-Old Country Boy on the Assembly Line’’ [Dongguan tonggong zhi si: zou shang liushui xian de 14 sui xiangxia haizi],Southern Daily, 31 May 13.

75 Li Shulong, ‘‘Dongguan Child Laborer Dies: 14-Year-Old Country Boy on the AssemblyLine’’ [Dongguan tonggong zhi si: zou shang liushui xian de 14 sui xiangxia haizi], Southern Daily, 31 May 13.

76 International Labour Organization, Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), adopted by 14th ILC Session, 28 June 30, entry into force 1 May 32, art. 2.2(c); Inter­national Labour Organization, Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), adopted by 40th ILC Session, 25 June 57, entry into force 17 January 59, art. 1. Article 2.2(c)of the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour allows for ‘‘any work or service ex­acted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the saidwork or service is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies orassociations.’’

77 International Labour Organization, ‘‘Ratifications of the Fundamental Human Rights Con­ventions by Country,’’ last visited on 6 September 13; International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 98, art. 2. Other rightsmember countries are obligated to respect include the effective abolition of child labor; the elimi­nation of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; and freedom of associationand the ‘‘effective recognition’’ of the right to collective bargaining.

78 Frank Langfitt, ‘‘Ex-Inmates Speak Out About Labor Camps as China Considers ‘Reforms,’ ’’ National Public Radio, 22 February 13; Chai Huiqun, ‘‘Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers’’ [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Behind Cryfor Help From China Labor Camp,’’ New York Times, 11 June 13.

79 Chai Huiqun, ‘‘Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers’’ [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao],Southern Weekend, 2 May 13; Lisa Murray and Angus Grigg, ‘‘Qantas in China Prison Labour Row,’’ Australian Financial Review, 26 June 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Behind Cry for Help FromChina Labor Camp,’’ New York Times, 11 June 13.

80 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Behind Cry for Help From China Labor Camp,’’ New York Times, 11 June13; Chai Huiqun, ‘‘Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers’’ [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13.

81 Chai Huiqun, ‘‘Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers’’ [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13.

82 State Council, Provisions Reiterating the Prohibition on the Export of Products Made by Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through Labor [Guanyu chongshen jinzhi laogai chanpin chukou de guiding], issued and effective 5 October 91, art. 4.

83 U.S. Department of Labor, List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, Sep­tember 2012, 17; Lisa Murray and Angus Grigg, ‘‘Qantas in China Prison Labour Row,’’ Aus­tralian Financial Review, 26 June 13; Frank Langfitt, ‘‘Ex-Inmates Speak Out About Labor Camps As China Considers ‘Reforms,’ ’’ National Public Radio, 22 February 13.

84 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the People’s Re­public of China on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade In Prison Labor Products, effective 7 August 92; Statement of Cooperation on the Implementation of the Memorandum of Under­standing Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on Prohib­iting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products, 14 March 94.

85 ‘‘Experts Say Products Made By Chinese Prison Labor Still Enter US,’’ Voice of America, 1 November 09.

86 International Labour Organization, ‘‘Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and Equitable Growth,’’ 2013, 20.

87 The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported in January 2013 that China’s working-age population shrank by 3.45 million in 2012. National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘China’s Economy Achieved a Stabilized and Accelerated Development in the Year of 2012,’’ 18 January

13. According to Cai Fang, director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics underthe Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the working-age population will fall by as much as 30 million by 2020. Chen Xin, ‘‘Labor Force ‘At Turning Point,’ ’’ China Daily, 6 November 12. See also Tom Orlik, ‘‘China: The Jobs Report,’’ Wall Street Journal, 15 March 13; Kathrin Hille and Rahul Jacob, ‘‘China: Beyond the Conveyor Belt,’’ Financial Times, 14 October 12; China LabourBulletin, ‘‘Wages in China,’’ 10 June 13.

88 Xu Weiwei, ‘‘China’s Labor Shortage Worsens as Migrants Find Work at Home,’’ MorningWhistle, 19 February 13.

89 Ding Qingfen and Qiu Quanlin, ‘‘Higher Costs Forcing Firms To Relocate,’’ China Daily, 21October 12; Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Wary of China, Companies Head to Cambodia,’’ New York Times, 8 April 13; Tim Culpan, ‘‘Foxconn Inland Push Spurred by Labor, BI Says,’’ Bloomberg, 3 March

13.

90 These changes have also prompted observers to question whether China has reached theLewis Turning Point, the point when a country’s excess labor is exhausted, industrial wages rise, industrial profits shrink, and investment declines. See International Monetary Fund, MitaliDas and Papa N’ Diaye, ‘‘Chronicle of a Decline Foretold: Has China Reached the Lewis Turning Point? ’’ IMF Working Paper, January 2013, 3, 17; International Labour Organization, ‘‘Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and Equitable Growth,’’ 2013, 20; ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Labor Income as Proportion of GDP Continues 22-Year Decline’’ [Zhongguo zonggonghui: laodongzhe shouru zai GDP zhong zhan bi lianxu 22 nian xiajiang], Gu Hantai Net, 14 March 13.

91 Kevin Yao and Aileen Wang, ‘‘China Lets Gini Out of the Bottle; Wide Wealth Gap,’’ Reu­ters, 18 January 13; China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Wages in China,’’ 10 June 13.

92 International Labour Organization, ‘‘Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and Equitable Growth,’’ 2013, 42; ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Labor Income as Proportion of GDPContinues 22-Year Decline’’ [Zhongguo zong gonghui: laodongzhe shouru zai GDP zhong zhan bi lianxu 22 nian xiajiang], Gu Hantai Net, 14 March 13.

93 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Wages in China,’’ 10 June 13.

94 State Council, ‘‘Several Opinions Regarding Deepening Reform of the Income DistributionSystem’’ [Guanyu shenhua shouru fenpei zhidu gaige ruogan yijian], issued 3 February 13.

95 ‘‘China Approves Income Plan as Wealth Divide Poses Risks,’’ Bloomberg, 5 February 13;‘‘China’s Inequality,’’ Financial Times, 10 February 13.

96 State Council, ‘‘12th-Five Year Plan on Employment Promotion (2011–2015)’’ [Cujin jiuyeguihua (2011–2015 nian)], 24 January 12.

97 Li Jinlei, ‘‘24 Provinces and Cities Raise Minimum Wage Standards, Shanghai LeadingWith 1,620 Yuan (Chart Attached)’’ [24 sheng shi shangtiao zuidi gongzi biaozhun shanghai 1620 yuan jushou (fubiao)], China News Service, 1 September 13; Zhang Jun, ‘‘Fujian RaisesMinimum Wage Levels, Monthly Minimum Wage in Quanzhou and Other Areas is 1,050 Yuan’’ [Fujian shangtiao zuidi gongzi biaozhun quanzhou gedi zuidi meiyue 1050 yuan], Dongnan Net,reprinted in Sohu, 14 August 13. As of September 9, 2013, the Commission had not observed reports of minimum wage increases in Qinghai and Hunan provinces, the Tibet Autonomous Re­gion, or Chongqing municipality.

98 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Wages in China,’’ 10 June 13.

99 Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘China’s Workers Continue To Demand Higher Pay,’’ 9 April 13; Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Minimum Wage Increases in 2012Fail To Provide Workers With a Living Wage,’’ 13 December 12; China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Wages in China,’’ 10 June 13.

100 Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘China’s Workers Continue To Demand Higher Pay,’’ 9 April 13.

101 Li Li, ‘‘Legal Expert: Evidence is the Achilles Heel in Migrant Workers’ Difficulty Obtain­ing Back Wages’’ [Falu zhuanjia: zhengju shi nongmingong taoxin nan de sixue], China YouthDaily, 28 February 13.

102 He Yong and Pan Yue, ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Problem of Wage ArrearsRebounds, Debt Settling Situation Increasingly Grim’’ [Quanguo zonggonghui: tuoqian gongzi wenti fantan qing qian xingshi qu yanjun], People’s Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 16January 13.

103 Fan Zhengwei, ‘‘Wage Arrears Problem is Multiple Layers of Subcontracting, Little LegalPrecedence in Punishing Malicious Wage Arrears Causes Inadequate Deterrence’’ [Qianxin wenti cengceng zhuan bao eyi qianxin zui pan li shao weishe li buzu], People’s Daily, reprintedin China News Service, 16 January 13; Yu Hu et al., ‘‘Migrant Workers’ Rights Report’’ [Nongmingong weiquan baogao], Chongqing Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily, 14 December 12; Zhao Lei, ‘‘Workers Assured of Wages Ahead of Festival,’’ Changjiang Daily, reprinted in Peo­ple’s Daily, 21 January 13.

104 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Wages in China,’’ 10 June 13.

105 Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, ‘‘General Office of the Sichuan Provincial People’s Government Notification Regarding Establishing System of Accountability for Handling Wage Arrears In the Construction Field’’ [Sichuan sheng renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu jianli jianshe shigong lingyu qianxin chuli zerenzhi de tongzhi], 3 December 12; ‘‘Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security Discusses Migrant Workers’ Wage Claims: Establish a ‘Green Channel’ for Speedy Recovery’’ [Renshi bu tan nongmingong taoxin: jian ‘‘luse tongdao’’ kuaisu jiejue], China News Service, 25 January 13; Yu Lixiao and Chen Jian, ‘‘Beijing Official: Must Maintain High Pressure Posture on Wage Arrears Activity’’ [Beijing guanyuan: yao dui qianxin xingwei baochi gaoya taishi], China News Service, 26 January 13.

106 Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Court Interpretation Regarding Several Ques­tions in the Application of the Law in the Trial of Criminal Cases for the Refusal to Pay Labor Remuneration [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli ju bu zhifu laodong baochou xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 14 January 13, effective 23 January 13.

107 Jennifer Cheung, China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘China Sees Upsurge in Worker Protests Prior to Lunar New Year,’’ 8 February 13; ‘‘Migrant Worker Salary Demands Frequent in All Partsof the Country, Government Blindly Suppresses to Maintain Stability’’ [Nongmingong taoxin gedi pin fa zhengfu wei weiwen yiwei daya], Radio Free Asia, 4 February 13.

108 For more information, see PRC Production Safety Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo anquan shengchan fa], passed 29 June 02, effective 1 November 02; PRC Mine Safety Law[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kuangshan anquan fa], passed 7 November 92, effective 1 May 93; State Council, Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplace Where Toxic Substances areUsed [Shiyong youdu shipin zuoye changsuo laodong baohu tiaolie], issued and effective 30 April

02.

109 See, e.g., Fiona Tam, ‘‘Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China’s ‘Black Factories,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 21 November 12; Christina Larson, ‘‘In China, Politically ConnectedFirms Have Higher Worker Death Rates,’’ Business Week, 28 January 13; Chen Xin, ‘‘Sites Still Hold Dangers for Construction Crews,’’ China Daily, 17 September 12.

110 Wang Huan, ‘‘China Will Ban or Close 20,000 Non-Coal Mines Over the Next Three Years’’ [Woguo weilai san nian jiang qudi guancai yue 2 wan zuo fei meikuang shan], Yicai Net, 19September 12; Fiona Tam, ‘‘Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China’s ‘Black Fac­tories,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 21 November 12.

111 Wang Xiaodong, ‘‘Risks of Accident are ‘Striking,’ ’’ China Daily, 19 June 13; Christina Larson, ‘‘In China, Politically Connected Firms Have Higher Worker Death Rates,’’ Bloomberg,28 January 13.

112 Raymond Fisman and Yongxiang Wang, ‘‘The Unsafe Side of Chinese Crony Capitalism,’’Harvard Business Review, January–February 2013.

113 Office of Safety Administration, ‘‘Yang Dongliang: Strict Pledge to Constantly Open UpNew Phase for Production Safety Work’’ [Yang Dongliang: yan zi dang tou buduan kaichuang anquan shengchan gongzuo xin jumian], reprinted on PRC Central People’s Government Website, 10 May 13.

114 Zi Xiuchun, ‘‘Lawyer Huang Leping’s Letter: The Five Main Problems in Migrant Workers’Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address’’ [Huang Leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers’ Daily, reprinted in BeijingYilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13.

115 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘China Economic and Social Development Statistics2012 Report’’ [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2012 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 22 February 13.

116 Fiona Tam, ‘‘Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China’s ‘Black Factories,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 21 November 12; ‘‘China Cuts Coal Deaths,’’ Radio Free Asia, 25 February

13.

117 ‘‘China Cuts Coal Deaths,’’ Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13; Chao Xiangrong, ‘‘JilinJiapigou Gold Mine Fire Incident Only Reported 9 Hours After Developed’’ [Jilin jiapigou jinkuang huozai shi fa 9 xiaoshi cai shangbao], China Radio International, 16 January 13; ChenWeiwei and Zhu Liyi, ‘‘State Coal Supervision Bureau Reports on Three Recent Coal Mine Acci­dents, Requires Reports Not Be Delayed or Concealed’’ [Guojia mei jian ju tongbao jinqi san qimeikuang shigu yaoqiu bude chi bao manbao], Xinhua, 25 September 12.

118 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘China Economic and Social Development Statistics2012 Report’’ [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2012 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 22 February 13.

119 ‘‘China Cuts Coal Deaths,’’ Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13; ‘‘2012 Coal Mine Mortality Rate Dropped to 0.374 Per Million Tons’’ [2012 nian meikuang baiwandun siwanglu jiang zhi0.374], International Coal Net, 28 January 13; China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Report Claims Coal Mine Deaths in China Fell By One-Third in 2012,’’ 29 January 13.

120 Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior, ‘‘[Report] Apple Fails in Its Respon­sibility To Monitor Suppliers,’’ 26 February 13; Students and Scholars Against Corporate Mis­behavior, ‘‘Widespread Labour Abuses at Disney and Mattel Factories ICTI Doesn’t Care About Labour Rights Standards,’’ reprinted in Scribd, 7 January 13; China Labor Watch, ‘‘InvestigativeReport of HTNS Shenzhen CO., Ltd. (Huizhou Branch),’’ 14 December 12; Charles Kernaghan, Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, ‘‘Toys From Hell: Walmart & Disney,’’ December2012.

121 ‘‘Thousands of Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied With Wages and TreatmentDemonstrate’’ [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang qian ren buman xinzi daiyu shangjie youxing], West Net, reprinted in Caijing, 13 January 13; David Barboza, ‘‘Group Says Deaths Show Prob­lems Remain at Foxconn,’’ New York Times, 20 May 13.

122 CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 66–67; ‘‘Have Foxconn Working Conditions Im­proved? ’’ [Fushikang de gongzuo tiaojian gaishan le ma?], Radio Free Asia, 17 May 13; ‘‘Thou­sands of Workers at Foxconn Jiangxi Factory Unsatisfied With Wages and Treatment Dem­onstrate’’ [Fushikang jiangxi gongchang qian ren buman xinzi daiyu shangjie youxing], West Net, reprinted in Caijing, 13 January 13; Isaac Shapiro and Scott Nova, ‘‘Still Polishing Apple: Second FLA Report Misleads on Labor Rights Progress,’’ Economic Policy Institute Blog, 7 June

13.

123 Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior, ‘‘[Report] Apple Fails in its Respon­sibility to Monitor Suppliers,’’ 26 February 13; ‘‘34 Workers Poisoned by Alkane Used to Clean Cellphone Screens, Some Cases So Severe Workers Unable to Take Care of Themselves’’ [34 gongren caxi shouji pingmu wan zhongdu yanzhong zhe shenghuo buneng zili], Legal Daily, re­printed in Phoenix Net, 26 September 12; Students and Scholars Against Corporate Mis­behavior, ‘‘Widespread Labour Abuses at Disney and Mattel Factories ICTI Doesn’t Care About Labour Rights Standards,’’ 7 January 13.

124 ‘‘Xinhua Insight: Fatal Fire Rings Alarm For Factory Safety,’’ Xinhua, 5 June 13; ‘‘China Gov’t Blames Company, Inspectors for ‘Extremely Chaotic’ Safety at Poultry Plant in Fire,’’ As­sociated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 6 June 13.

125 Ibid.

126 CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 65; Zheng Li, ‘‘Work-Related Injury Insurance ‘Too High to Reach’; Migrant Workers with Pneumoconiosis Urgently Need ‘Survival Money’ ’’ [Gongshang baoxian ‘‘gao buke pan’’ chenfei nongmingong jixu ‘‘huoming qian’’], Workers’ Daily, 28 February 13; Pan Qi, ‘‘Migrant Workers With Pneumoconiosis Exceed 6 Million in China, Lack of Labor Contracts Makes Defending Rights Difficult’’ [Woguo chenfeibing nongmingong chao 600 wan wu laodong hetong zhi weiquan nan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Sina, 6 February

13.

127 Pan Qi, ‘‘Migrant Workers With Pneumoconiosis Exceed 6 Million in China, Lack of Labor Contracts Makes Defending Rights Difficult’’ [Woguo chenfeibing nongmingong chao 600 wan wu laodong hetong zhi weiquan nan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Sina, 6 February 13.

128 ‘‘Black Lung Patients Often Face A Long Wait For Compensation,’’ China Daily, 25 March 13; Lan Fang, ‘‘Public Interest Group Indicates Rate of Occupational Injury Perhaps Higher Than Official Statistics’’ [Gongyi tuanti zhi gongshang fashang lu huo gaoyu guanfang tongji], Caixin, 28 April 13.

129 See, e.g., He Huifeng, ‘‘Toxic Gas Cloud at Honghu Factory Leaves 20 in Hospital,’’ South China Morning Post, 24 October 12; C. Custer and L. Li, ‘‘The Real Dangers in China’s Mines,’’ 2Non, 18 December 12.

130 Li Keyong, Zhou Rui et al., ‘‘Labor Law, Those Clauses That Are Ignored (Policy Focus)’’ [Laodong fa, na xie bei moshi de tiaokuan (zhengce jujiao)], People’s Daily, 1 May 13; ‘‘Investiga­tion States That Defending the Rights of Pneumoconiosis Sufferers Stuck in Difficult Situation, Majority Have Not Signed Labor Contracts’’ [Diaocha cheng chenfeibing ren weiquan xian kunju duoshu mei qianding laodong hetong], Guiyang Evening News, reprinted in China News Service, 22 January 13.

131 Chen Xin, ‘‘Sites Still Hold Dangers for Construction Crews,’’ China Daily, 17 September 12; C. Custer and L. Li, ‘‘The Real Dangers in China’s Mines,’’ 2Non, 18 December 12.

132 Zi Xiuchun, ‘‘Lawyer Huang Leping’s Letter: The Five Main Problems in Migrant Workers’ Lives I Hope Committee Delegates Address’’ [Huang leping lushi laixin: nongmingong shenghuo wu da nanti xiwang dedao daibiao weiyuan guanzhu], Workers’ Daily, reprinted in Beijing Yilian Labor Law Aid and Research Center, 6 March 13; Chen Xin and He Dan, ‘‘Black Lung Patients Often Face a Long Wait for Compensation,’’ China Daily, 25 March 13.

133 Echo Hui, ‘‘In China, Losing Battle Against Lung Disease and Workers’ Rights,’’ South China Morning Post, 3 July 13; Fiona Tam, ‘‘Grim Fate of Migrant Workers Maimed in China’s ‘Black Factories,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 21 November 12; ‘‘Female Worker Becomes Tem­porary Worker After Injury, Judge: Gate Card Proves Labor Relation’’ [Nu gong shoushang hou cheng linshigong faguan: menka ke zhengming laodong guanxi], Dahe Net, reprinted in China News Service, 4 July 13; Jiang Jie, ‘‘Black Lung Sufferers Receive Govt Damages,’’ Global Times, 8 July 13.

134 ‘‘Work Related Injury Insurance ‘Too High to Reach’; Migrant Workers With Pneumo­coniosis Urgently Need ‘Survival Money’ ’’[Gongshang baoxian ‘‘gao buke pan’’ chenfei nongmingong jixu ‘‘huoming qian’’] Workers’ Daily, 28 February 13; Pan Qi, ‘‘Migrant Workers With Pneumoconiosis Exceed 6 Million in China, Lack of Labor Contracts Makes Defending Rights Difficult’’ [Woguo chenfeibing nongmingong chao 600 wan wu laodong hetong zhi weiquan nan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Sina, 6 February 13. The PRC Regulations on Occupa­tional Injury Insurance stipulate that workers must obtain an official occupational disease or injury diagnosis to be considered for compensation. See PRC Regulations on Occupational Injury Insurance [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongshang baoxian tiaoli], issued 27 April 03, amended 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11, art. 18.

135 Jiang Jie, ‘‘Black Lung Sufferers Receive Govt Damages,’’ Global Times, 8 July 13.

136 Chen Xin and He Dan, ‘‘Black Lung Patients Often Face a Long Wait for Compensation,’’ China Daily, 25 March 13.

137 Huang Yuli, ‘‘Tribunal Hears Case of Injured Foxconn Worker,’’ China Daily, 31 October 12; Tan Ee Lyn, ‘‘Family of Brain-Damaged Worker Takes Foxconn to Court in China,’’ Reuters, 30 October 12.

138 Tan Ee Lyn, ‘‘Worker’s Injury Casts Harsh New Light on Foxconn and China,’’ Reuters, 10 October 12; ‘‘Foxconn Engineer’s Workplace Injury Leads to Compensation Dispute, Father Beaten by Security’’ [Fushikang gongchengshi gongshang yin peichang jiufen fuqin ceng zao baoan bao da], Shenzhen News, 28 September 12.

139 Tan Ee Lyn, ‘‘Family of Brain-Damaged Worker Takes Foxconn to Court in China,’’ Reu­ters, 30 October 12.

140 Measures on the Administration of Diagnosis and Evaluation of Occupational Diseases [Zhiyebing zhenduan yu jianding guanli banfa], issued 28 March 02, amended 19 February 13, effective 10 April 13, art. 19, 22, 23–28, 44.

141 Ibid., art. 19. See also China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Compensation for Work-Related Injury and Occupational Disease in China,’’ last visited 16 August 13.

Notes to Section II—Criminal Justice

1 ‘‘Bizarrely Consistent: A Crackdown on Legal Activists,’’ Economist, 27 July 13.

2 ‘‘China’s Wrong Turn,’’ Washington Post, 22 July 13; Jeffrey Wasserstrom, ‘‘A Reformist Chi­nese Leader? Stop Fooling Yourself,’’ Time, 22 July 13; Donald Clarke et al., ‘‘Xu Zhiyong Ar­rested: How Serious Can Beijing Be About Political Reform? ’’ ChinaFile, 18 July 13; Chris Buck-ley, ‘‘Prominent Advocate Held in Southern China,’’ New York Times, 17 August 13; ‘‘Chinese Police Arrest Rights Activist Xu Zhiyong,’’ Reuters, reprinted in Radio Australia, 23 August 13. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2005–00199 on Xu Zhiyong and 2005– 00143 on Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) for more information on these cases.

3 Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13, 11; Shangquan Law Firm, ‘‘Investigative Report on the Implementation of the New Criminal Procedure Law (2013, Q1)’’ [Xin xingsufa shishi zhuangkuang diaoyan baogao (2013 nian diyi jidu)], 4 June 13.

4 CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 69–70. The authority, staff, and budgets of law enforcement agencies have grown substantially since 2008.

5 Ibid.; Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Reins in New Security Boss’s Clout,’’ Wall Street Journal, 20 No­vember 12; Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13, 6.

6 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘‘The Politics of Liu Xiaobo’s Trial,’’ in Liu Xiaobo, Charter 08 and the Challenges of Political Reform in China, eds. Jean-Philippe Be´ja et al. (Aberdeen, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 261.

7 ‘‘Meng Jianzhu Appointed Head of CPC Political and Legal Affairs Commission,’’ Xinhua, 19 November 12; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 70; Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Reins in New Security Boss’s Clout,’’ Wall Street Journal, 20 November 12; Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13, 6– 7; Keith Zhai, ‘‘Security Tsar Meng Jianzhu Criticises Interference in Court Proceedings,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 January 13.

8 ‘‘Zhou Yongkang, Former Security Tsar Linked to Bo Xilai, Faces Corruption Probe,’’ South China Morning Post, 30 August 13; Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘Zhou Yongkang, China Security Chief, Investigated as Bo Xilai Scandal Expands,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post, 19 April 12; Luo Jieqi and He Xin, ‘‘In Bo Xilai’s City, a Legacy of Backstabbing,’’ Caixin, 7 Decem­ber 12; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘After Bo’s Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek Justice,’’ Washington Post, 19 April 12.

9 Luo Jieqi and He Xin, ‘‘In Bo Xilai’s City, a Legacy of Backstabbing,’’ Caixin, 7 December 12; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘After Bo’s Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek Justice,’’ Washington Post, 19 April 12.

10 Tania Branigan, ‘‘China Indicts Bo Xilai for Corruption,’’ Guardian, 25 July 13; Keith B. Richburg and Andrew Higgins, ‘‘Bo Xilai’s Ouster Seen as Victory for Chinese Reformers,’’ Washington Post, 15 March 12; Gillian Wong, ‘‘China Moves To Right Wrongs in City Bo Once Ruled,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 3 December 12; Yu Xiaodong, ‘‘Policing the Police,’’ NewsChina Magazine, March 2013.

11 Gillian Wong, ‘‘China Moves To Right Wrongs in City Bo Once Ruled,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 3 December 12.

12 Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘After Bo’s Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek Justice,’’ Washington Post, 19 April 12; Louisa Lim, ‘‘Targets of Disgraced Bo Xilai Still Languish in Jail,’’ National Public Radio, 27 May 13; Gillian Wong, ‘‘China Moves To Right Wrongs in City Bo Once Ruled,’’ Associ­ated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 2 December 12.

13 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], issued 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 105(1) and (2).

14 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘China: End Escalating Crackdown Criminalizing Peace­ful Assembly and Free Expression,’’ 17 July 13; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Crackdown on Anticorruption Activists Escalates,’’ 9 June 13; ‘‘Beijing Scholar Xu Zhiyong Criminally De­tained; Rights Defense Lawyer Says Types of Political Cases Are Expanding’’ [Beijing xuezhe xu zhiyong bei jingfang xingshi juliu weiquan lushi cheng zhengzhi lei anjian you kuoda qushi], Voice of America, 16 July 13; ‘‘In Videotaped Message, Jailed Chinese Activist Urges Citizens To Unite for Democracy,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 8 August 13.

15 Front Line Defenders, ‘‘China: Formal Arrest of Human Rights Defender Mr. Xu Zhiyong,’’ 27 August 13; Chris Buckley, ‘‘Formal Arrest of Advocate Is Approved by China,’’ New York Times, 23 August 13; Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Leading Citizen Movement Activist Xu Zhiyong Ar­rested,’’ South China Morning Post, 31 July 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Individuals Detained in Crackdown on Peaceful Assembly & Association,’’ 18 September 13; Xu Zhiyong, ‘‘China’s New Citizens’ Movement’’ [Zhongguo xin gongmin yundong], Xu Zhiyong’s Blog, 15 No­vember 12.

16 Ibid.

17 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Urgent: Well-Known Rights Defender Guo Feixiong Is Criminally Detained’’ [Jinji guanzhu: zhuming weiquan renshi guo feixiong bei xing ju], 17 Au­gust 13. For more information on Guo Feixiong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Data­base record 2005–00143.

18 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Individuals Detained in Crackdown on Peaceful Assem­bly & Association,’’ 28 August 13; ‘‘Officials Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individ­uals Calling for Greater Government Accountability,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 August 13; Calum MacLeod, ‘‘China Silences Anti-Corruption Activists,’’ USA Today, 30 July 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘China: End Escalating Crackdown Criminalizing Peaceful Assembly and Free Expression,’’ 17 July 13.

19 Peter Ford, ‘‘Briefing: 5 Things To Know About China’s Crackdown on Critics,’’ Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 13.

20 Jerome A. Cohen, ‘‘Will 2013 See Progress in China’s Rights Protection? ’’ South China Morning Post, reprinted in Council on Foreign Relations, 11 December 12; Peter Ford, ‘‘Familyof Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng ‘Tormented’ in China,’’ Christian Science Monitor, 2 May

13.

21 Edward Wong, ‘‘China Sentences Brother-in-Law of Nobel Laureate to 11 Years on Fraud Charges,’’ New York Times, 9 June 13; Michael Martina, ‘‘Kin of Jailed Chinese Nobel WinnerLiu Xiaobo Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison,’’ Reuters, reprinted in NBC News, 9 June 13.

22 Ibid.; ‘‘Beijing Court Rejects Appeal by Nobel Laureate’s Liu Xiaobo’s Brother-in-Law,’’ Reu­ters and Associated Press, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 17 August 13.

23 Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Above the Law? China’s Bully Law-Enforcement Officers,’’ Time, 21 May09; Joel Martinsen, ‘‘A Practical Handbook for Beating Street Vendors,’’ Danwei, 22 April 09; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Beat Him, Take Everything Away’: Abuses by China’s Chengguan Para- Police,’’ 23 May 12.

24 David Bandurski, ‘‘Brutal Killing of (Citizen Journalist) Wei Wenhua Underscores the Evilsof China’s ‘Urban Management’ System,’’ China Media Project, 10 January 08; ‘‘Beijing Guide on How To Beat Law-Breakers Sparks Outrage,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Asia One,23 April 09; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Death of Watermelon Vendor Sets Off Outcry in China,’’ New York Times, 20 July 13; Peter Ford, ‘‘China’s ‘Para-Police’ Brutality Under Scrutiny,’’ ChristianScience Monitor, 22 July 13; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘The Ticking Bomb of China’s Urban Para-Po­lice,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 8 August 13; Human Rights Watch,‘‘ ‘Beat Him, Take Everything Away’: Abuses by China’s Chengguan Para-Police,’’ 23 May 12.

25 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 93.

26 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Death of Watermelon Vendor Sets Off Outcry in China,’’ New York Times, 20 July 13; Michelle FlorCruz, ‘‘Beijing Airport Explosion Caused by Man Disgruntled About Ac­cident That Left Him Paralyzed,’’ International Business Times, 22 July 13; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘The Ticking Bomb of China’s Urban Para-Police,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report(blog), 8 August 13; Kevin McGeary, ‘‘Beijing Airport Bomber Is an Aggrieved Chengguan Victim From Dongguan,’’ Nanfang Insider, 22 July 13.

27 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing, July 19–25,’’ 25 July 13; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘The Ticking Bomb of China’s Urban Para-Police,’’ Wall Street Journal, ChinaReal Time Report (blog), 8 August 13; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Beat Him, Take Everything Away’: Abuses by China’s Chengguan Para-Police,’’ 23 May 12; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10October 12, 131; Jeremy Chan, ‘‘China To Revise Policy Toward Peddlers,’’ Wall Street Journal, 11 August 09; ‘‘Legal Status To Be Granted to Street Vendors’’ [Liudong tanfan youwang hefashengcun], Caijing, 22 July 09.

28 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary De­tention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV(B); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66,entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December48, arts. 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21. The rights and freedoms protected under the second category include those in Articles 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21 of the UDHR and in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27 of the ICCPR; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 70–71.

29 See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2004–03114 on Liu Xiaobo, 2011– 00175 on Chen Wei, 2008–00379 on Chen Xi, 2008–00668 on Guo Quan, 2010–00616 on Li Tie, 2004–02253 on Zhu Yufu, 2004–04614 on Liu Xianbin, 2005–00291 on Gao Zhisheng, 2005–00285 on Ni Yulan, and 2004–04650 on Wang Bingzhang, for more information on these cases.

30 See, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 71; PRC Constitution, issued 4 Decem­ber 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35, 37, 41; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79,amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 3; PRC Public Security Admin­istration Punishment Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhian guanli chufa fa], passed 28 Au­gust 05, effective 1 March 06, arts. 3, 9, 10, 16; PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, art. 8(v).

31 CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 71.

32 See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From theGang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘In the Name of ‘Sta­bility’: 2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,’’ March 2013,1; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2012, China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),’’ 19 April 13,

1.

33 Michael Martina, ‘‘Kin of Jailed Chinese Nobel Winner Liu Xiaobo Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison,’’ Reuters, 9 June 13. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, record 2010– 00629, for more information on Liu Xia.

34 David Bandurski, ‘‘Citizens Issue Statement on Xu Zhiyong Detention,’’ China Media Project, 21 July 13.

35 See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Weighty Times, Aggressive Measures: China Must End Heightened Crackdown Ahead of Party Congress,’’ 1 November 12; ‘‘China Cracks Down Ahead of Leadership Meeting,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in CBC News, 6 November 12; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘ ‘Charter 08’ Signatories Launch Anti-Soft Detention Anti- Surveillance United Movement’’ [Lingba xianzhang qianshu ren faqi ‘‘fan ruanjin fan jiankong lianhe da xingdong’’], 20 June 09; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 88, 95.

36 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14. The 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Pro­tection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides that an ‘‘enforced disappearance’’ occurs when individuals are detained or abducted ‘‘or otherwise deprived of their liberty by offi­cials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individualsacting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Gov­ernment, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned ora refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law.’’ UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Protection of all Persons fromEnforced Disappearance, A/RES/47/133, 18 December 92. In February 2009, during its Universal Periodic Review by the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review at the UN HumanRights Council, the Chinese government rejected the recommendation that it should consider ratifying the International Convention for Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappear­ance, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2006. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 38, 84, 117. The delegations from Mexico and Argentina offered this rec­ommendation.

37 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘An Alleyway in Hell’: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ November 2009, 40–43.

38 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Silencing Complaints: Human Rights Abuses Against Petitioners in China,’’ 14 March 08, 5–7.

39 ‘‘Urban Stability: Treating the Symptoms,’’ Economist, 2 March 13.

40 Ibid.; Ren Zhongyuan, ‘‘The Death of a Petitioner,’’ Caixin, 14 December 12; Josh Chin,‘‘Beijing Court Takes Rare Swipe at ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 5 February 13.

41 Mandy Zuo and Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Many Freed From Beijing’s Biggest ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 December 12; ‘‘Urban Stability: Treating the Symptoms,’’ Economist, 2March 13; Verna Yu, ‘‘Rare Victory for Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 February 13.

42 Mandy Zuo and Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Many Freed From Beijing’s Biggest ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 December 12.

43 ‘‘10 People Sentenced for Illegally Detaining Petitioners in Beijing’’ [Shi ming feifa jujin lai jing shangfang renyuan zhe bei panxing], Xinhua, 5 February 13; Verna Yu, ‘‘Rare Victory forPetitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 February 13; Josh Chin, ‘‘Beijing Court Takes Rare Swipe at ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 5 February 13; ‘‘Unhappy With Sentences,’’ Global Times, 7 Feb­ruary 13.

44 ‘‘Unhappy With Sentences,’’ Global Times, 7 February 13; Verna Yu, ‘‘Rare Victory for Peti­tioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 Feb­ruary 13.

45 Mandy Zuo and Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Many Freed From Beijing’s Biggest ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 December 12; ‘‘Urban Stability: Treating the Symptoms,’’ Economist, 2 March 13; Verna Yu, ‘‘Rare Victory for Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted Over ‘BlackJail,’ ’’ South China Morning Post, 6 February 13.

46 ‘‘Official Discipline: Policing the Party,’’ Economist, 1 September 12; CECC, 2008 AnnualReport, 31 October 08, 35; Flora Sapio, ‘‘Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,’’ China Information, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), 7, 12.

47 ‘‘Official Discipline: Policing the Party,’’ Economist, 1 September 12; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Ac­cused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh Discipline,’’ New York Times, 15 June 12.

48 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Accused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh Discipline,’’ New York Times, 15 June 12; Steven Jiang, ‘‘Investigators Who Drowned Chinese Official Charged With Assault,’’CNN, 6 September 13.

49 Donald Clarke, ‘‘The Bo Xilai Trial and China’s ‘Rule of Law’: Same Old, Same Old,’’ Atlan­tic, 21 August 13.

50 Keith Zhai, ‘‘Defiant Bo Xilai Claims He Was Coerced Into Graft Confession,’’ South China Morning Post, 23 August 13; Steven Jiang, ‘‘Investigators Who Drowned Chinese Official Charged With Assault,’’ CNN, 6 September 13; Donald Clarke, ‘‘The Bo Xilai Trial and China’s‘Rule of Law’: Same Old, Same Old,’’ Atlantic, 21 August 13; Keith Zhai, ‘‘Bo Xilai Trial Tran­scripts Censored, Say Court Sources,’’ South China Morning Post, 26 August 13; Jerome A.Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13, 2.

51 Bai Tiantian, ‘‘Life in Jail for Bo Xilai,’’ Global Times, 23 September 13; ‘‘Judgment in First Instance Trial of Bo Xilai for Bribery, Embezzlement, and Abuse of Power (Full Text)’’ [Bo xilaishouhui, tanwu, lanyong zhiquan an yishen panjueshu (quanwen)], People’s Daily, reprinted in China News Service, 22 September 13.

52 Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘Six Chinese Officials Stand Trial for Torture in Landmark Case,’’ Reuters, 16 September 13.

53 Joshua D. Rosenzweig et al., ‘‘Comments on the 2012 Revision of the Chinese Criminal Pro­cedure Law,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 461–62; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘In the Name of ‘Stability’: 2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,’’ March 2013, 5; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘‘China: UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced Disappearances,’’ 8 April 11.

54 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘In the Name of ‘Stability’: 2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,’’ March 2013, 5–7; Amnesty International, ‘‘Briefing on China’s 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards? ’’ July 2013, 16.

55 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 73.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Amnesty International, ‘‘Briefing on China’s 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards? ’’ July 2013, 16–17; Joshua D. Rosenzweig et al., ‘‘Comments on the 2012 Revision of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Crimi­nal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub­lishing Ltd., 2013), 461–462, 464; Conor Foley, The Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, ‘‘Combating Torture: A Manual for Judges and Prosecutors,’’ last visited 13 August 13, paras. 2.12, 2.13; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7) 03/10/1992, CCPR General Comment No. 20 (General Comments) Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), para. 11.

59 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘RTL Reform Underway, but Undercover,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 June 13; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Swept Away’: Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,’’ May 2013, 17.

60 See, e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Arbi­trary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV(B); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 Decem­ber 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 9, 14; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 8–11; CECC 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 70–71. China became a signatory to the ICCPR on October 5, 1998, but has yet to ratify the treaty. As a signatory, the Chinese government is obligated as a matter of international law to refrain from taking actions that would undermine the purpose of the treaty.

61 See, e.g., The End of Reeducation Through Labor? Recent Developments and Prospects for Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 May 13, Writ­ten Statement Submitted by Ira Belkin, Executive Director, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law; ‘‘Special Topic Paper: Prospects for Reforming China’s Reeducation Through Labor System,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 May 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Re-Education Through Labor Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,’’ 4 February 09.

62 ‘‘Special Topic Paper: Prospects for Reforming China’s Reeducation Through Labor System,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 May 13, 2.

63 Ibid.

64 State Council, ‘‘Supplementary Decision of the State Council Regarding Reeducation Through Labor’’ [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang wenti de buchong jueding], issued 29 No­vember 79, art. 3; see also ‘‘Special Topic Paper: Prospects for Reforming China’s Reeducation Through Labor System,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 9 May 13, 2–3.

65 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘RTL Reform Underway, but Undercover,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 19 June 13; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Swept Away’: Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,’’ May 2013, 17.

66 See Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Where Darkness Knows No Limits’: Incarceration, Ill-Treat­ment and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,’’ 7 January 10, 1–3, 19. The 2008 Anti-Drug Law authorizes police to send suspected drug users to compulsory treatment centers for a minimum of two years with a possible extension of an additional year without trial or judicial supervision. PRC Anti-Drug Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jindufa], enacted 29 December 07, effective 1 June 09, art. 47. In practice, deprivation of personal liberty in drug detention centers can last up to six years. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Court Ruling Deals Public Blow to China’s Labor-Camp System,’’ 15 July 13. In March 2012, 12 UN agencies issued a joint statement call­ing for an end to compulsory drug treatment and rehabilitation centers, finding not only that they violate a wide range of human rights but also that they threaten the health of those de­tained. See UNAIDS, ‘‘Joint UN Statement Calls for the Closure of Compulsory Drug Detention and Rehabilitation Centers,’’ 8 March 12.

67 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Swept Away’: Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,’’ May 2013, 15–16.

68 Ibid., 16.

69 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Limits of Public Outrage: RTL and Custody and Education,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 July 13, translating ‘‘In the Name of Rule of Law, Sort Out ‘Quasi-RTL Measures’ as One Package’’ [(Shelun) yi fazhi mingyi yi lanzi qingli ‘‘lei laojiao cuoshi’’], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 29 June 13.

70 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 34; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ‘‘Who Will Be Watched: Margaret K. Lewis on China’s New CPL and Residential Surveil­lance,’’ China Law and Policy (blog), 25 September 12.

71 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 37–41. See also Sun Jibin, ‘‘How ‘Three Difficulties’ of Criminal Defense Became ‘10 Difficulties’ ’’ [Xingshi bianhu ‘‘san nan’’ weihe bian ‘‘shi nan’’], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 83.

72 Joshua D. Rosenzweig et al., ‘‘Comments on the 2012 Revision of the Chinese Criminal Pro­cedure Law,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 491–93; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ‘‘Who Will Be Watched: Margaret K. Lewis on China’s New CPL and Residential Surveil­lance,’’ China Law and Policy (blog), 25 September 12; Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13, 11.

73 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 37.

74 Shangquan Law Firm, ‘‘Investigative Report on the Implementation of the New Criminal Procedure Law (2013, Q1)’’ [Xin xingshi susongfa shishi qingkuang diaoyan baogao (2013 diyi jidu)], 23 April 13.

75 Ibid.

76 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 37.

77 Ibid.

78 Shangquan Law Firm, ‘‘Investigative Report on the Implementation of the New Criminal Procedure Law (2013, Q1)’’ [Xin xingshi susongfa shishi qingkuang diaoyan baogao (2013 diyi jidu)], 23 April 13.

79 ‘‘Supreme People’s Procuratorate: Protect Lawyers’ Right To Review Case Files and Right To Know; Promote the Profession According to Law’’ [Zuigaojian: baozhang lushi yuejuan quan he zhiqing quan cujin yifa zhiye], Xinhua, reprinted in China Law Info, 17 July 13.

80 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Xu Zhiyong’s Lawyer Accuses Police and Detention Center of Rights Violations,’’ 22 July 13; Human Rights in China, ‘‘Xu Zhiyong’s Lawyer Liu Weiguo in Custody, Rights Group Is Shut Down,’’ 18 July 13; ‘‘Despite Detentions, Chinese Anti-Corruption Activists Press On,’’ Voice of America, 19 July 13.

81 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Lawyer Meets With Xu Zhiyong,’’ 25 July 13 (lawyer not identi­fied); ‘‘In Videotaped Message, Jailed Chinese Activist Urges Citizens To Unite for Democracy,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 8 August 13. During attorney Zhang Qingfang’s meeting with Xu on August 1, Zhang shot a short video of Xu calling on Chinese citizens to work together as citizens to promote democracy and rule of law in China. Chris Buckley, ‘‘For­mal Arrest of Advocate Is Approved by China,’’ New York Times, 23 August 13.

82 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Support Group Says Police Unlawfully Block Lawyers From Meet­ing With Guo Feixiong,’’ 27 August 13.

83 ‘‘Lawyer Gu Yushu Says Not Allowed To Represent Bo Xilai,’’ Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 8 August 13; Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Criminal Justice in China: From the Gang of Four to Bo Xilai,’’ 25 July 13, 5.

84 ‘‘Lawyer Gu Yushu Says Not Allowed To Represent Bo Xilai,’’ Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 8 August 13. According to the South China Morning Post, two lawyers, Li Xiaolin and Shen Zhigeng, whom the Bo family reportedly hired earlier, said in 2012 that they were not permitted ‘‘to either see Bo or represent him.’’ In August 2013, Gu Yushu, a law­yer whom Bo’s sister had retained, said that authorities had not granted him permission to rep­resent Bo in court. See also Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘Lawyer Says Not Allowed To Represent China’s Dis­graced Bo Xilai,’’ Reuters, reprinted in Guardian, 8 August 13; Barbara Demick, ‘‘Bo Xilai’s Wealth on Trial in China,’’ Los Angeles Times, 11 August 13; Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Answers One Question About Trial: A Date,’’ New York Times, 18 August 13; Donald Clarke, ‘‘The Bo Xilai Trial and China’s ‘Rule of Law’: Same Old, Same Old,’’ Atlantic, 21 August 13.

85 Wu Danhong, ‘‘Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal Reforms,’’ Global Times, 20 August 12; Chen Weijun, ‘‘The Scourge of Torture ‘Still Widespread’ in Chinese Social Sys­tem,’’ Asia News, 24 July 13; Ira Belkin, ‘‘China’s Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in Criminal Investigations,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 93; Amnesty International, ‘‘Briefing on China’s 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards? ’’ July 2013, 21; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘(En)countering Torture in China [Part 1 of 2],’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 30 August 12. See also UN Committee against Torture, 41st Session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Con­vention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture—China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, paras. 11–12.

86 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Magazine Expose´ Reinvigorates Calls To End RTL,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 11 April 13; Chris Luo, ‘‘Women ‘Chained Up and Tortured’ in Labour Camp,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 April 13.

87 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘RTL Detainees Pressed To Work, Paying To Leave, Officers Say,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 5 August 13, translating Chai Huiqun, ‘‘Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers; RTL Centers: Labor First? ’’ [Luoma laojiao jingcha de jiantao; laojiaosuo: laodong di yi?], Southern Weekend, 2 May 13. See also Tom Phillips, ‘‘Chinese Official Speaks Out After Being Jailed for Criticising Bo Xilai,’’ Telegraph, 22 November 12.

88 Wu Danhong, ‘‘Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal Reforms,’’ Global Times, 20 August 12; Chen Weijun, ‘‘The Scourge of Torture ‘Still Widespread’ in Chinese Social Sys­tem,’’ Asia News, 24 July 13; Ira Belkin, ‘‘China’s Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in Criminal Investigations,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 93; Amnesty International, ‘‘Briefing on China’s 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards? ’’ July 2013, 21; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘(En)countering Torture in China [Part 1 of 2],’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 30 August 12.

89 Wu Danhong, ‘‘Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal Reforms,’’ Global Times, 20 August 12; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ‘‘Margaret K. Lewis: What To Expect With China’s New CPL,’’ China Law and Policy (blog), 23 September 12 (observing that ‘‘[c]onfessions are still king in China’’); Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘(En)countering Torture in China [Part 1 of 2],’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 30 August 12. See also Ira Belkin, ‘‘China’s Tortuous Path Toward End­ing Torture in Criminal Investigations,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 94, 116–17.

90 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘Swept Away’: Abuses Against Sex Workers in China,’’ May 2013, 24–25.

91 Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘After Bo’s Fall, Chongqing Victims Seek Justice,’’ Washington Post, 19 April 12.

92 Luo Jieqi and He Xin, ‘‘In Bo Xilai’s City, a Legacy of Backstabbing,’’ Caixin, 7 December 12; Luo Jieqi, ‘‘Days of Pain on Chongqing’s Torture Mountain,’’ Caixin, 7 December 12; Wang Heyan, ‘‘Defense Lawyer Seeks To Clear His Name—and Accuser’s,’’ Caixin, 6 November 12.

93 Wang Heyan, ‘‘Defense Lawyer Seeks To Clear His Name—and Accuser’s,’’ Caixin, 6 No­vember 12.

94 Ira Belkin, ‘‘China’s Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in Criminal Investigations,’’ in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, eds. Mike McConville and Eva Pils (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013), 94–95.

95 Stanley Lubman, ‘‘What China’s Wrongful Convictions Mean for Legal Reform,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17 July 13; ‘‘Bizarrely Consistent: A Crackdown on Legal Activists,’’ Economist, 27 July 13.

96 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 54–58; Amnesty International, ‘‘Briefing on China’s 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards? ’’ July 2013, 18–19.

97 Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Provi­sions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], issued 24 June 10, effective 1 July 10.

98 PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 50.

99 Ibid., art. 118; Wu Danhong, ‘‘Dependence on Confessions Persists Despite Legal Reforms,’’ Global Times, 20 August 12; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ‘‘Margaret K. Lewis: What To Expect With China’s New CPL,’’ China Law and Policy (blog), 23 September 12.

100 Amnesty International, ‘‘Briefing on China’s 2013 Criminal Procedure Law: In Line With International Standards? ’’ July 2013, 13, 15.

101 Ibid., 18–19.

102 Elizabeth M. Lynch, ‘‘Margaret K. Lewis: What To Expect With China’s New CPL,’’ China Law and Policy (blog), 23 September 12; ‘‘First Case of a Beijing Court Activating Procedures To Exclude Illegally Obtained Evidence’’ [Beijing fayuan shouci qidong feifa zhengju paichu chengxu pan’an], China National Radio, reprinted in China Law Info, 16 September 12.

103 ‘‘First Case of a Beijing Court Deciding To Exclude Illegally Obtained Evidence’’ [Beijing fayuan shouci qidong feifa zhengju paichu chengxu pan’an], China National Radio, reprinted in China Law Info, 16 September 12. The court nevertheless convicted the defendant of drug traf­ficking and sentenced him to life, based on other evidence.

104 Yuan Yuan, ‘‘All Eyes Focused,’’ Beijing Review, No. 36, 5 September 13; Donald Clarke, ‘‘Random Thoughts From Day 2 of the Bo Xilai Trial,’’ Chinese Law Prof Blog, 23 August 13.

105 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Targeting Evidence To End Wrongful Execution,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 14 March 13.

106 Liu Dong, ‘‘Efficient Injustice,’’ Global Times, 31 March 13; Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘China Sus­pects Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent,’’ Guardian, 20 May 13.

107 Stanley Lubman, ‘‘What China’s Wrongful Convictions Mean for Legal Reform,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17 July 13; ‘‘18 Years Later, 5 Acquitted of Taxi Slayings,’’ China Daily, 2 July 13.

108 ‘‘18 Years Later, 5 Acquitted of Taxi Slayings,’’ China Daily, 2 July 13.

109 Shen Deyong, ‘‘How We Should Guard Against Wrongful Convictions’’ [Women yingdang ruhe fangfan yuanjia cuoan], China Court News, reprinted in People’s Daily, 6 May 13 (English translation available at the ChinaLawTranslate Web site, titled ‘‘SPC Executive Vice-President Shen Deyong on Wrongful Cases,’’ 10 July 13); Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘How Many More Sacrifices Until Rule of Law Reigns? ’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 May 13; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘What China’s Wrongful Convictions Mean for Legal Reform,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17 July 13.

110 Shen Deyong, ‘‘How We Should Guard Against Wrongful Convictions’’ [Women yingdang ruhe fangfan yuanjia cuoan], China Court News, reprinted in People’s Daily, 6 May 13 (English translation available at the ChinaLawTranslate Web site, titled ‘‘SPC Executive Vice-President Shen Deyong on Wrongful Cases,’’ 10 July 13).

111 Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Guangdong Chief Justice Calls for Reform of China’s ‘Soviet’ Court Sys­tem,’’ South China Morning Post, 3 July 13; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘What China’s Wrongful Convic­tions Mean for Legal Reform,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 17 July 13; ‘‘Bizarrely Consistent: A Crackdown on Legal Activists,’’ Economist, 27 July 13.

112 ‘‘New Guideline Can Safeguard Judicial Independence,’’ Xinhua, 13 August 13; ‘‘Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission Issues First Guiding Opinion on Preventing Wrongful Judgments’’ [Zhongyang zhengfawei chutai shou ge fang yuanjia cuoan zhidao yijian], Xinhua, 13 August 13; ‘‘Lifelong Responsibility,’’ China Daily, 15 August 13; Wang Zhenghua, ‘‘Court Strikes Down Murder Conviction,’’ China Daily, 15 August 13.

113 Biao Teng, ‘‘Chinese Death Penalty: Overview and Prospect,’’ East Asian Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), 87; Amnesty International, ‘‘Death Sentences and Executions 2012,’’ April 2013, 2; ‘‘The Death Penalty: Strike Less Hard,’’ Economist, 3 August 13.

114 Amnesty International, ‘‘Death Sentences and Executions 2012,’’ April 2013, 18–19.

115 John Kamm, ‘‘Trying Juveniles,’’ New York Times, 29 November 12; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘China Under the Microscope: The Second Universal Periodic Review,’’ 28 February 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Our Work: Criminal Justice,’’ last visited 8 August 13; ‘‘The Death Penalty: Strike Less Hard,’’ Economist, 3 August 13.

116 Xiaoqing Pi, ‘‘Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles Execution,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 July 13.

117 Joshua Rosenzweig, ‘‘China’s National Verdict Database and the Death Penalty,’’ Siweiluozi’s Blog, 3 July 13.

118 See, e.g., Xiaoqing Pi, ‘‘Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles Execution,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 July 13; World Coalition, China Against the Death Penalty, Report 2012, last visited 27 September 13, 1, 4; Biao Teng, ‘‘Chinese Death Pen­alty: Overview and Prospect,’’ East Asian Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), 90; Zi Heng Lim, ‘‘Why China Executes So Many People,’’ Atlantic, 9 May 13; Josh Chin, ‘‘Video Reignites Death Penalty Debate in China,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 13 August 13.

119 See, e.g., Xiaoqing Pi, ‘‘Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles Execution,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 July 13; ‘‘The Death Penalty: Strike Less Hard,’’ Economist, 3 August 13; ‘‘Court Blasted for Failure To Notify Family in Swift Execution,’’ Global Times, 15 July 13; Ren Zhongyuan, ‘‘Executed Businessman’s Assets Sold for a Bargain, Lawyer Says,’’ Caixin, 16 July 13; Ren Zhongyuan, ‘‘Closer Look: When Hunan Didn’t Bother To Tell a Family It Was Killing One of Theirs,’’ Caixin, 15 July 13; Voice of America, ‘‘Zeng Chengjie Secretly Executed; Internet Users Paying Attention to Hidden Details Behind the Case’’ [Zeng chengjie bei mimi chujue wangyou guanzhu anzi beihou heimu], 15 July 13.

120 Xiaoqing Pi, ‘‘Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles Execution,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 July 13; ‘‘Court Blasted for Failure To Notify Family in Swift Execution,’’ Global Times, 15 July 13; ‘‘China’s Implementation of the Death Penalty Explained: Prisoner Has Right To See Family Before Execution’’ [Zhongguo sixing zhixing chengxu jiedu: zuifan xing xing qian you jian jiashu quanli], Chengdu Business Daily, reprinted in China Law Info, 17 July 13.

121 Xiaoqing Pi, ‘‘Tough Questions After Chinese Court Mishandles Execution,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 July 13; Liang Chao, ‘‘Zeng Chengjie’s Daughter Apologizes to Changsha Intermediate Court, Says She Only Wants To Get Her Father’s Re­mains’’ [Zeng chengjie nuer xiang changsha zhongyuan zhi qian cheng zhi xiang nadao fuqin guhui], Jinghua Net, reprinted in Xinhua, 14 July 13. Zeng’s case is similar to that of Wu Ying, a woman entrepreneur from Wenzhou who was initially sentenced to death for illegal fund-raising in 2009. Following a protest on the Internet in which people questioned the severity of Wu Ying’s punishment, she was given a suspended death sentence (i.e., death with a two-year reprieve) instead. Another Wenzhou businesswoman, Lin Haiyan, was also sentenced to death earlier this year for illegal fundraising (US$100 million). The Supreme People’s Court is cur­rently reviewing her death sentence. See ‘‘Underground Lender Gets Death Sentence in China,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times, 20 May 13.

122 Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China Eliminating Reliance on Executed Prisoners for Organs, but Cultural Attitudes a Barrier,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Vancouver Sun, 17 May 13.

123 Biao Teng, ‘‘Chinese Death Penalty: Overview and Prospect,’’ East Asian Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), 87, 89; Ying Yang, ‘‘Death Row Inmates Number One Organ Donors in China,’’ Deutsche Welle, 9 March 12.

124 Jiefu Huang et al., ‘‘A Pilot Programme of Organ Donation After Cardiac Death in China,’’ Lancet, Vol. 379, No. 9818 (2012), 862–63. As part of the institutional reforms approved by the National People’s Congress during its meeting in March 2013, the Ministry of Health was merged with the National Population and Family Planning Commission to create the new Na­tional Health and Family Planning Commission. See ‘‘National Health and Family Planning Commission,’’ Global Times, last visited 14 August 13.

125 Yaqiu Wang, ‘‘In China Execution Done Behind Closed Doors Raises Questions About Du­bious Organ Transplant Practices,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 18 July 13; ‘‘China Will Formally Launch Organ Transplantation [Donor System]; Organs Will Be Allocated According to 3 Main Prin­ciples’’ [Woguo jiang zhengshi qidong qiguan yizhi; qiguan fenpei jiang zuncong 3 da yuanze], Beijing Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua, 26 February 13; ‘‘Ministry of Health: China’s Organ Donation Pilot Site Only Received 659 Voluntary Donations in 3 Years’’ [Weishengbu: zhongguo qiguan juanxian shidian 3 nian jin 659 lie ziyuan juanxian], People’s Daily, reprinted in China Law Info, 19 April 13.

126 Wen Ya, ‘‘Organ Sourcing To See Overhaul,’’ Global Times, 16 August 13; ‘‘China To Phase Out Use of Executed Prisoners’ Organs for Transplants,’’ Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 16 August 13.

127 Ibid. See also ‘‘Executed Prisoners Are Still Main Source for Organ Transplants in China,’’ Deutsche Welle, 21 December 12; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 113.

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Religion

1 The term ‘‘freedom of religion’’ used in this section encompasses the more broadly articulated freedom of ‘‘thought, conscience, and religion.’’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.

18. For protections in international law, see Article 18 in the UDHR; International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ‘‘ensurethe religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convic­tions’’); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratifica­tion, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 93, para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commit­ment on April 13, 2006, in its application for membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China’s top leaders have also stated on other occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in March 18, 2008, press conference remarks by then Premier Wen Jiabao; in a September 6, 2005, statement by Luo Gan, State Councilor and member of the Polit­ical Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, at the 22nd World Congress on Law; in statements by Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour; and in a January 27, 2004, speech by former Chinese President Hu Jintao before the French National Assembly. In 2009, China affirmed this commitment during the Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record before the UN Human Rights Council. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Com., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 29 May 09, para. 114 (1). In addition, China’s first National Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010) affirms the principles in the ICCPR, and China’s second National Human Rights Action Plan (2012–2015) states that the government ‘‘has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval’’ of the ICCPR. See State Council Information Office, ‘‘National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010),’’ reprinted in China Daily, 13 April 09; State Council Information Office, ‘‘National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015),’’ 11 June 12, sec. V(1).

2 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.

3 For specific examples of the range of religious activities protected under international law, see, e.g., General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit­ical Rights. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Reli­gion (Art. 18), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 93, paras. 1, 2, 4. The Chinese government de­nies protected activities such as the ‘‘freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publi­cations’’ (General Comment No. 22, para. 4). For restrictions on the publication of religious ma­terials, see State Administration for Religious Affairs, Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 7. For an interpretation of the provision protecting ‘‘normal religious activities’’ in the Regulation on Religious Affairs, written by drafters of the regulation, see Shuai Feng and Li Jian, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli shiyi], (Beijing: Beijing Religious Culture Press, 2005),

19. See also page 6 of the preface of the book, noting the authors’ status as drafters of the RRA.

4 The central government has referred to the five religions as China’s main religions, but in practice the state has created a regulatory system that institutionalizes only these five religions for recognition and legal protection. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], re­printed in China Net, 1 October 97. This white paper states that there is a ‘‘great diversity of religious beliefs’’ in China, with the ‘‘main religions’’ being Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholi­cism, and Protestantism. Wording from this white paper is also posted as a statement of current policy on the Web sites of the United Front Work Department, the agency that oversees reli­gious affairs within the Communist Party, and the State Administration for Religious Affairs. Some local regulations on religious affairs define ‘‘religion’’ to mean only these five religions. See, e.g., Sichuan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Sichuansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 9 May 00, amended 30 November 06, art. 2; Henan Province Regulation on Religious Af­fairs [Henansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05, effective 1 January 06, art. 2. There is limited formal tolerance outside this framework for some ethnic minority and ‘‘folk’’ religious practices. Kim-Kwong Chan and Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy, Adminis­tration, and Regulation (Santa Barbara: Institute for the Study of American Religion, 2005), 9– 10, 15–16.

5 See Falun Gong within this section for detailed information.

6 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effec­tive 1 March 05. For an overview of the general requirements within the RRA and an analysis of several provincial-level regulations, see ‘‘Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10.

7 The Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) provides administrative penalties, such as fines, for violations of its stipulations. Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 40, 41. Such administrative penalties also include the possibility of limited short-term detention under the Public Security Administration Punish­ment Law. Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effec­tive 1 March 05, arts. 39, 40, 43; Public Security Administration Punishment Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhi’an guanli chufa fa], issued 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, art. 27. The RRA is not authorized to provide for criminal penalties. At the same time, like other regula­tions, the RRA includes boilerplate language referring to the necessity of pursuing a criminal investigation if a ‘‘crime is constituted.’’ For example, where ‘‘anyone uses religion to carry out such illegal activities as harm state security or public security, infringe upon citizens’ right of the person and democratic rights, impair the administration of public order, or infringe upon public or private property,’’ criminal charges are to be pursued where a ‘‘crime is constituted.’’ Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 40.

8 The government uses Article 300 of the Criminal Law to punish activities deemed to be cult-related. Chinese authorities also punish religious adherents by prosecuting them under other Criminal Law provisions, such as by portraying the printing and distribution of religious lit­erature, a freedom protected under international human rights law, as the crime of ‘‘illegal oper­ation of a business’’ (art. 225). PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 225, 300. See discussion of the cases of Li Wenxi and Ren Lacheng in Protestantism within this section for examples of authorities’ use of Art. 225 to punish persons who distribute religious literature.

9 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing and Punishing Cult Organizations [Guanyu chudi xiejiao zuzhi, fangfan he chengzhi xiejiao huodong de jueding], issued 30 October 99.

10 Administrative punishments can range from a warning or fine to detention in a reeducation through labor (RTL) center for up to three years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. Forms of administrative detention include, among others, short-term detention under the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, RTL, forced psychiatric commitment, forced drug de­toxification, and work-study schools.

11 Fenggeng Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 78–84.

12 The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is directly subordinate to the Communist Party Central Committee and is the key organization through which the Party implements con­trol of religion. See Fenggeng Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 78–79. The senior officials of the UFWD are listed in ‘‘Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Committee,’’ Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Committee, reprinted in Sina, 18 April 13.

13 Fenggeng Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 81. According to this book, ‘‘In practice, the SARA and lower-level RABs usually rule through the so-called patriotic religious associations. The associa­tions of the five official religions are nongovernmental organizations in name, but they function as an extension and delegation of the RAB.’’

14 ‘‘China To Register All Clergy,’’ Xinhua, 8 January 13.

15 The official claimed the requirement would protect the rights of religious worshippers and ‘‘help the public identify fake staff.’’ ‘‘China To Register All Clergy,’’ Xinhua, 8 January 13.

16 The term ‘‘religious organization’’ (zongjiao tuanti) or ‘‘religious-type of social organization’’ (zongjiaolei shehui zuzhi or shehui tuanti) refer here to registered religious groups, such as Catholic dioceses, Muslim congregations, Protestant congregations, as well as to charitable orga­nizations established by registered religious organizations, all of which are under the oversight of the five Patriotic religious associations, the relevant level religious affairs bureau, and the relevant civil affairs bureau.

17 Zhang Qianfan and Zhu Yinping, ‘‘Religious Freedom and Its Legal Restrictions in China,’’ Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 3, 790–95 (recent online version of arti­cle dated 31 January 13); Fenggang Yang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Com­munist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 74–78. For a discussion of how the re­strictive regulatory framework has limited the growth of religious venues, materials, and clergy, see Yang, Religion in China, 149–154. For registration challenges to religious organizations’ es­tablishing charitable organizations, see Zhang Zhipeng, ‘‘Let Legal Entity Status Help Advance the ‘Rapid Development’ of the Religious Charity Sector’’ [Rang falu shiti diwei zhutui zongjiao gongyi cishan shiye ‘‘tengfei’’], China Ethnicity News, reprinted in China Ethnic Religions Net, 18 June 13.

18 ‘‘Third Plenary Meeting of the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress: Full Text Record’’ [Shierjie quanguo renda yici huiyi disan quanti huiyi wenzi shilu], Xinhua, 10 March 13.

19 Ibid. See State Administration for Religious Affairs, Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, chap. 2; State Council Reli­gious Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Implementing Measures on the Management of the Registration of Religious Social Organizations [Zongjiao shehui tuanti dengji guanli shishi banfa], issued 6 May 91, arts. 2–7, 9–10; State Council, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, arts. 3, 7–19.

20 State Administration for Religious Affairs, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee United Front Work Department, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and State Administration of Taxation, Opinion Encouraging and Standardizing Involvement by Religious Organizations in Charitable Activities [Guanyu guli he guifan zongjiaojie congshi gongyi cishan huodong de yijian], 16 February 12, paras. 1, 2(2)–(3).

21 See Zhang Zhipeng, ‘‘Let Legal Entity Status Help Advance the ‘Rapid Development’ of the Religious Charity Sector’’ [Rang falu shiti diwei zhutui zongjiao gongyi cishan shiye ‘‘tengfei’’], China Ethnicity News, reprinted in China Ethnic Religions Net, 18 June 13.

22 This sub-section addresses what official sources refer to as hanchuan fojiao, i.e., ‘‘Han’’ or Mahayana Buddhism, and nanchuan fojiao, i.e., Pali (Theravada) Buddhism, which is practiced mainly by the Dai ethnic group and other ethnic minorities in Yunnan province. Tibetan Bud­dhism, the third major school of Buddhism in China, is discussed in Section V—Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism is not practiced solely by Tibetans; recently a growing number of Han Chinese have embarked on the study of Tibetan Buddhism. Calum MacLeod, ‘‘In China, Tensions Rising Over Buddhism’s Quiet Resurgence,’’ USA Today, 2 November 11. For information on the different schools of Buddhism recognized by the Chinese government, see, e.g., State Council Information Office, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], reprinted in China Net, 1 October 97, sec. I; David A. Palmer, ‘‘China’s Religious Danwei: Institutionalising Religion in the People’s Republic,’’ China Perspectives, No. 4 (2009), 26; ‘‘Three Main Schools Discuss Buddhist Doctrine: Experience Buddhism’s Wisdom’’ [San da yuxi tan fofa: ganshou fojiao de zhihui], China Net, 26 April 12. For examples of contin­ued state control over religious activities and practices of Buddhists during this reporting year, see, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘State Administration for Religious Affairs 2013 Main Work Points’’ [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2013 nian gongzuo yaodian], 18 January 13; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Opinion on Handling Problems Involved With the Management of Buddhist Monasteries and Taoist Temples [Guanyu chuli sheji fojiao simiao, daojiao gongguan guanli youguan wenti de yijian], 8 October 12; State Administration for Reli­gious Affairs, ‘‘Notice Regarding the Issuing of ‘Measures Regarding Evaluation and Commenda­tion of the Nationwide Establishment of Advanced Units and Advanced Individuals in Harmo­nious Buddhist and Taoist Temples and Churches’ ’’ [Quanguo chuangjian hexie siguan jiaotang xianjin jiti he xianjin geren pingbi biaozhang banfa], 6 July 13.

23 ‘‘Vice Premier Liu Yandong: Speech at Meeting Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Buddhist Association of China’’ [Liu yandong fuzongli: zai zhongguo fojiao xiehui chengli 60 zhounian jinianhui shang de jianghua], Buddhist Association of China, 26 August 13.

24 State Administration for Religious Affairs, Opinion on Handling Problems Involved With the Management of Buddhist Monasteries and Daoist Temples [Guanyu chuli sheji fojiao simiao, daojiao gongguan guanli youguan wenti de yijian], 8 October 12; ‘‘China Bans Profiteering From Religious Activity,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 22 October 12.

25 Qi Zhijiang, ‘‘A Discussion of the Connections and Differences Between Religions and Cults,’’ Kaifeng Network, reprinted in China Anti-Cult Association, 11 November 11.

26 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘The Cult of Buddha,’’ Dialogue, Issue 52, 29 August 13; ‘‘Introduction to the China Anti-Cult Association,’’ China Anti-Cult Association, 9 February 13; Tianjin Anti-Cult Association, ‘‘Which Organizations Has the Ministry of Public Security Designated as Cults? ’’ 22 October 12; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 115.

27 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘The Cult of Buddha,’’ Dialogue, Issue 52, 29 August 13; ‘‘Introduction to the China Anti-Cult Association,’’ China Anti-Cult Association, 9 February 13; Tianjin Anti-Cult Association, ‘‘Which Organizations Has the Ministry of Public Security Designated as Cults? ’’ 22 October 12.

28 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘The Cult of Buddha,’’ Dialogue, Issue 52, 29 August 13; Tianjin Anti-Cult Association, ‘‘Which Organizations Has the Ministry of Public Security Designated as Cults? ’’ 22 October 12.

29 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ‘‘Wu Zeheng, A Buddhist Patriarch, Suffers Ongoing Har­assment After Serving Eleven Years in Prison,’’ 22 March 12; Human Rights in China, ‘‘Three Documents Related to the Case of Buddhist Leader Wu Zeheng,’’ 22 September 11.

30 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political Cudgel,’’ New York Times, 22 February 13.

31 For background information on the history and function of the state-led patriotic religious associations, see David A. Palmer, ‘‘China’s Religious Danwei,’’ China Perspectives, Vol. 4 (2009), 19–21, 25.

32 Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, ‘‘Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Di­ocese Opinion on Religious Freedom in China for the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review’’ [Xianggang tianzhujiao zhengyi heping weiyuanhui jiu lianheguo renquan lishihui pubian dingqi shenyi jizhi you guan zhonghua renmin gongheguo zongjiao ziyou de yijianshu], 18 July 13.

33 Ibid.

34 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Reportedly Strips Shanghai Bishop of His Title,’’ New York Times, 12 December 12.

35The´re`se Postel, ‘‘Can Pope Francis Go to China?’’ Century Foundation (blog), 13 March 13. See also CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 80; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 96; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 101; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 119; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 78.

36 Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, ‘‘Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Di­ocese Opinion on Religious Freedom in China for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Universal Periodic Review’’ [Xianggang tianzhujiao zhengyi heping weiyuanhui jiu lianheguo renquan lishihui pubian dingqi shenyi jizhi, you guan zhonghua renmin gongheguo zongjiao ziyou de yijianshu], 18 July 13.

37 Anthony E. Clark, ‘‘China Renews Tension With the Vatican,’’ Catholic World Report, 24 May 13; Michelle FlorCruz, ‘‘China Quietly Revises Church Regulations Requiring Government-Approved Catholic Bishops,’’ International Business Times, 24 May 13.

38 Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church of China, Regulation on the Election and Con­secration of Bishops [Zhongguo tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan guanyu xuansheng zhujiao de guiding], adopted 12 December 12, effective 8 April 13.

39 Ibid.; Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church of China Regulation on the Election and Consecration of Bishops [Zhongguo tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan guanyu xuansheng zhujiao de guid­ing], passed 17 May 93. The new regulation requires local dioceses to apply in writing to the provincial-level Bureaus of Religious Affairs for permission to elect new bishops. Moreover, a bishop election work committee shall be formed—under the guidance of the Bureau of Religious Affairs—responsible for formulating election measures, recommending representatives to the election committee and the total number of representatives, selecting one to three candidates, and overseeing of the election process.

40 ‘‘Two Priests Dismissed in Wuhan,’’ Union of Asian Catholic News, 21 December 12.

41 See, e.g., Sandro Magister, ‘‘Shanghai, a Strong and Hard-Pressed Diocese,’’ Chiesa Espress Online (blog), 3 May 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Reportedly Strips Shanghai Bishop of His Title,’’ New York Times, 12 December 12; ‘‘Vatican Slams Chinese Official Church in Bishop Row,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 14 December 12; N.J. Viehland, ‘‘With No Bishop, Shanghai Priests Concerned About Masses, Pilgrimages,’’ Catholic News Service, 22 May 13; Tom Phillips, ‘‘Shanghai’s Catholic Church in Disarray,’’ Telegraph, 12 July 13.

42 Sandro Magister, ‘‘Shanghai, a Strong and Hard-Pressed Diocese,’’ Chiesa Espress Online (blog), 3 May 13; ‘‘Aloysius Jin Luxian Dies at 96; Shanghai Bishop,’’ Associated Press, 30 April

13. A media source reported that Bishop Ma may have been transferred temporarily to Beijing during funeral services for Bishop Jin. See Wang Zhicheng, ‘‘Msgr. Jin Luxian’s Funeral With­out Bishop Ma Daqin,’’ Asia News, 29 April 13.

43 ‘‘Chinese Catholic Association and [Bishops] Conference Spokesperson Comments’’ [Zhongguo tianzhujiao yihui yituan fayanren tanhua], Catholic Church in China, 14 December 12; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Reportedly Strips Shanghai Bishop of His Title,’’ New York Times, 12 December 12; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘‘Farewell to an Enigmatic Chinese Bishop,’’ New York Times, 29 April 13.

44 ‘‘Chinese Catholic Association and [Bishops] Conference Spokesperson Comments’’ [Zhongguo tianzhujiao yihui yituan fayanren tanhua], Catholic Church in China, 14 December

12.

45 Sandro Magister, ‘‘Shanghai, a Strong and Hard-Pressed Diocese,’’ Chiesa Espress Online (blog), 3 May 13; ‘‘Vatican Slams Chinese Official Church in Bishop Row,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 14 December 12.

46 ‘‘Aloysius Jin Luxian Dies at 96; Shanghai Bishop,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Los An­geles Times, 30 April 13.

47 Although several international media sources have noted Bishop Jin’s age at death as 97, the Vatican Radio news item on his death provides his date of birth—June 20, 1916—confirming that Bishop Jin was 96 at his death. See ‘‘China: Secretary of State Note on Death of Bishop Jin Luxian,’’ Vatican Radio, 30 April 13.

48 N.J. Viehland, ‘‘With No Bishop, Shanghai Priests Concerned About Masses, Pilgrimages,’’ Catholic News Service, 22 May 13; Tom Phillips, ‘‘Shanghai’s Catholic Church in Disarray,’’ Telegraph, 12 July 13.

49 Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, ‘‘Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Di­ocese Opinion on Religious Freedom in China for the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review’’ [Xianggang tianzhujiao zhengyi heping weiyuanhui jiu lianheguo renquan lishihui pubian dingqi shenyi jizhi, you guan zhonghua renmin gongheguo zongjiao ziyou de yijianshu], 18 July 13, paras. 19, 26.

50 Ibid., paras. 18, 20. For further information on the case of Bishop Su Zhimin, see the Com­mission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004–05380. For further information on the case of Bishop Shi Enxiang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004–05378.

51 The Cardinal Kung Foundation, ‘‘Arrest of an Underground Catholic Priest in Hebei Prov­ince and an Appeal to the Chinese Authorit[ies] To Release Religious Prisoners,’’ 9 August 13; ‘‘Hebei Underground Catholic Priest Arrested,’’ AsiaNews, 10 August 13.

52 Ibid.

53 ‘‘Hebei Underground Catholic Priest Arrested,’’ AsiaNews, 10 August 13.

54 Nailene Chou Wiest, ‘‘Time for Sino-Vatican Rapprochement,’’ Caixin, 18 March 13; Chris­topher Bodeen, ‘‘China Maintains Hard Line on Ties With Vatican,’’ Associated Press, 14 March 13; Wang Zhaokun and Mauro Lovecchio, ‘‘Beijing-Vatican Breakthrough Not Expected,’’ Global Times, 15 March 13.

55 Pope Benedict XVI, ‘‘Letter of the Holy Father to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China,’’ 27 May 07; Cardinal Fernando Filoni, ‘‘Five Years After the Publication of Benedict XVI’s Letter to the Church in China,’’ Tripod, Winter 2012, Vol. 32, No. 167. Cardinal Filoni lived in Hong Kong from 1992– 2001. He currently is prefect of the Rome-based Congregation for Evangelization of Peoples which is responsible for international missionary work. See Profile of The Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, The Vatican, last visited 3 September 13. See also The´re`se Postel, ‘‘Can Pope Francis Go to China? ’’ Century Foundation (blog), 13 March 13.

56 Wang Zhaokun and Mauro Lovecchio, ‘‘Beijing-Vatican Breakthrough Not Expected,’’ Global Times, 15 March 13.

57 See, e.g., ‘‘Illegal Second Instance Trial at Ningxia’s Intermediate Court; Lawyers Defend Ma Xiongde’s Innocence’’ [Ningxia wuzhong zhongyuan feifa ershen; lushi wei ma xiongde wuzui bianhu], Clear Wisdom, 20 March 13; ‘‘Mr. Yang Wenqing, Ms. Qu Zebi, and Ms. Zhou Xulin Sentenced to Prison,’’ Clear Wisdom, 21 February 13; ‘‘Six Practitioners Sentenced to Prison in Penglai City,’’ Clear Wisdom, 6 February 13; ‘‘Zhang Lin and Three Other Falun Gong Practi­tioners from Xi’an Municipality Illegally Sentenced,’’ Clear Wisdom, 5 February 13; ‘‘Retired Teacher Ms. Pei Shanzhen From Shanghai Once Again Secretly Sentenced to Prison,’’ Clear Wisdom, 3 January 13.

58 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Rights Defense Lawyer Detained After Court Appearance,’’ 5 April 13; ‘‘Lawyer Wang Quanzhang Is Released Two Days Early from Detention’’ [Lushi wangquanzhang bei ju liang ri tiqian huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 8 April 13.

59 Malcolm Moore, ‘‘Chinese Lawyers Targeted As Xi Jinping Tightens Control,’’ Telegraph, 20August 13; Maya Wang, ‘‘Xi Jinping’s First 100 Days: Still Waiting for Human Rights Progress,’’ Global Post, 9 July 13.

60 See, e.g., Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, ‘‘Basic Thoughts on Preparing for the Transformation Through Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Battle’’ [Dahao jiaoyuzhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10; Gao Peiquan, ‘‘Our School Holds General Assembly To Commend the Conclusion of the Work in the TransformationThrough Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Battle’’ [Woxiao zhaokai jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo zongjie biaozhang dahui], Journal of Shihezi Univer­sity, 30 November 12.

61 CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 99–101.

62 All-China Women’s Federation, ‘‘The Vigorous Anti-Cult Work of All Levels of Women’s Fed­eration Organizations in Chongqing Has Achieved Outstanding Results’’ [Chongqing shi gejifulian zuzhi dali kaizhan fan xiejiao gongzuo chengxiao xianzhu], 1 August 13; Pucheng County Public Security Bureau, ‘‘In Order To Resist Cults, One Must Adhere to the Four Combinations’’[Jujue xiejiao bixu jianchi sige jiehe], 6 June 13.

63 All-China Women’s Federation, ‘‘The Vigorous Anti-Cult Work of All Levels of Women’s Fed­eration Organizations in Chongqing Has Achieved Remarkable Results’’ [Chongqing shi geji fulian zuzhi dali kaizhan fan xiejiao gongzuo chengxiao xianzhu], 1 August 13.

64 ‘‘First Meeting of Zhejiang Public Anti-Cult Work Meeting and Anti-Cult Symposium Held in Hangzhou’’ [Shoujie zhejiang sheng minjian fan xiejiao gongzuo huiyi jifan xiejiao xueshuyantaohui zai hangzhou zhaokai], Qianjiang Tide, 3 May 13.

65 ‘‘Lens Magazine: Expose´ on Liaoning’s Masanjia Women’s RTL Center’’ [Shijue zazhi: jiemiliaoning masanjia nuzi laojiaosuo], Lens Magazine, reprinted in China Digital Times, 7 April 13.

66 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Behind Cry for Help From China Labor Camp,’’ New York Times, 11 June 13.

67 Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Dui Hua: Magazine Expose´ Reinvigorates Calls to End RTL,’’ 11 April 13; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘‘Story of Women’s Labor Camp Abuse Unnerves Even China,’’New York Times, 11 April 13; Chris Luo, ‘‘Women ‘Chained Up and Tortured’ in Labour Camp,’’ South China Morning Post, 9 April 13; ‘‘Lens Magazine: Expose´ on Liaoning’s Masanjia Wom­en’s RTL Center’’ [Shijue zazhi: jiemi liaoning masanjia nuzi laojiaosuo], Lens Magazine, re­printed in China Digital Times, 7 April 13.

68 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Journalist Is Released on Bail,’’ New York Times, 8 July 13; ‘‘China Releases Journalist Du Bin From Detention,’’ BBC, 9 July 13. See the Commission’s Po­litical Prisoner Database, record 2013–00206, for more information on Du Bin’s case.

69 Falun Gong in China: Review and Update, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commis­sion on China, 18 December 12, Testimony of Mr. Hu Zhiming, Twice-Imprisoned Falun Gong Practitioner.

70 Falun Gong in China: Review and Update, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commis­sion on China, 18 December 12, Testimony of Mr. Bruce Chung, Falun Gong Practitioner De­tained in China [in 2012].

71 ‘‘Xinjiang’s Third Round of Training for Islamic Patriotic Religious Figures Trains 38,000People’’ [Xinjiang di san lun yisilan jiao aiguo zongjiao renshi peixun 3.8 wan renci], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, 26 December 12.

72 Zhang Xiaofang et al., ‘‘Ningxia Muslims Celebrate Eid, Li Jianhua, Liu Hui and Others Visit and Pay Respects to Muslim Public’’ [Ningxia musilin huandu kai zhaijie li jianhua liuhui deng kanwang weiwen musilin qunzhong], Ningxia Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily, 10 Au­gust 13.

73 State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘2013 National Islamic Institute Work Situation Seminar Held in Beijing’’ [2013 nian quanguo yisilan jiao jingxueyuan gongzuo qingkuangjiaoliuhui zai jing zhaokai], 31 January 13.

74 ‘‘Xinjiang’s Third Round of Training for Islamic Patriotic Religious Figures Trains 38,000People’’ [Xinjiang di san lun yisilan jiao aiguo zongjiao renshi peixun 3.8 wan renci], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, 26 December 12; ‘‘Strengthen the Popu­larization of the Field of Religion and Thematic Education, Promote Ethnic Unity and Religious Harmony’’ [Jiaqiang zongjiao lingyu pufa he zhuti jiaoyu cujin minzu tuanjie, zongjiao hexie],China Ethnicity and Religion Net, 16 July 13.

75 State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘Measures for Accrediting Islamic Clergy’’[Yisilan jiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], 20 December 10.

76 State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘Islamic Association of China Convenes Associa­tion Certification Ceremony for Muslim Clergy’’ [Zhongguo yisilan jiao xiehui juban ben xiehui yisilan jiao jiaozhi renyuan banzheng yishi], 25 February 13.

77 Islamic Association of China, Circular Regarding the Launch of the Islamic Association of China’s Hajj Personnel Management System [Guanyu zhongguo yixie chaojin renyuan guanli xitong kaitong shiyong de tongzhi], 27 June 13; State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘2012 Work Situation Report of the State Administration for Religious Affairs’’ [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2012 nian gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 18 January 13.

78 See, e.g., Liu Zhenxiang, Dorbiljin (Emin) County Government, ‘‘Emin County Adopts a Number of Measures To Safeguard the Ramadan Period’’ [Emin xian caiqu duo xiang cuoshi quebao zhaiyue qijian], 5 July 13; ‘‘Yining County Issues Leaflets Regarding the ‘10 Prohibited’ Illegal Religious Activities’’ [Yining xian fabu zhizhi feifa zongjiao huodong ‘‘shi bu zhun’’ xuanchuan dan], Uyghur Online, 15 July 13.

79 State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘Strengthen the Results and Application of Scrip­tural Interpretation and Promote the Harmonious Development of Society’’ [Qianghua jiejing chengguo yingyong cujin shehui hexie fazhan], 4 February 13.

80 Ibid.

81 Gu Ruizhen, ‘‘Yu Zhengsheng: Fully Implement Central Policies and Arrangements, Strong­ly Complete Stability and Prosperity Work in Xinjiang’’ [Yu zhengsheng: quanmian guanchezhongyang juece bushu, zhashi zuohao wen jiang xing jiang gongzuo], Xinhua, 28 May 13.

82 Islamic Association of China, ‘‘IAC Press Spokesperson Issues Statement Regarding the Vio­lent Terrorist Attacks in Xinjiang’’ [Zhongguo yisilan jiao xiehui xinwen fayanren jiu xinjiang fasheng de baoli kongbu xiji anjian fabiao tanhua], reprinted in State Administration for Reli­gious Affairs, 30 July 13.

83 Azat Omer, ‘‘Religious Extremist Ideology Is a ‘Cancer’ Harming Society’’ [Zongjiao jiduansixiang shi weihai shehui de ‘‘duliu’’], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily, 16 August 13.

84 According to the charters of the TSPM and CCC, among each organization’s duties are to:‘‘Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Government, unite all the country’s Protestants; fervently love socialism and the motherland; respect the country’sConstitution, laws, regulations, and policies; [and] actively participate in the construction of a socialist society with Chinese characteristics.’’ Three-Self Patriotic Movement, Charter of theNational Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China [Zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong weiyuanhui zhangcheng], issued 12 January 08, art.6(1); China Christian Council, Charter of the China Christian Council [Zhongguo jidu jiao xiehui zhangcheng], passed 12 January 08, art. 7(1).

85 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), ‘‘Tier 1 Countries of Par­ticular Concern—China,’’ Annual Report 2013, 30 April 13, 36–37.

86 See e.g., ‘‘Beijing’s Shouwang Church Denounces Police Repression,’’ Asia News, 21 Sep­tember 12; ‘‘Police Stop Illegal House Church Service,’’ Global Times, reprinted in Beijing News,22 August 12; Carsten T. Vala, ‘‘Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian China,’’ China Perspectives, No. 3 (2012), 50; Liu Peng, Pu Shi Institute for Social Sciences,‘‘How To Treat House Churches: A Review of the Beijing Shouwang Church Incident,’’ 16 Feb­ruary 12; ‘‘Update: New Year Brings Renewed Efforts To Prevent Worship at ShouwangChurch,’’ Voice of the Martyrs, 19 January 12; Beijing Shouwang Church, ‘‘An Explanation of the Issue of Worshiping Outside’’ [Huwai jingbai wenti jieda], 4 April 11; Chris Buckley andSui-Lee Wee, ‘‘Beijing Church Faces Eviction in Tense Times,’’ Reuters, 3 April 11; Verna Yu, ‘‘Fears of More Pressure on Underground Churches,’’ South China Morning Post, 1 April 11; Bei­jing Shouwang Church, ‘‘Beijing Shouwang Church March 2011 Open Letter to Congregation’’ [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 11 nian 3 yue gao huizhong shu], reprinted in ChinaAid, 4 April 11.See also ‘‘Beijing Authorities Harass and Detain Shouwang Church Members,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

87 ChinaAid, ‘‘Shouwang Church Applies for Administrative Review, Using the Law To Defend Religious Rights,’’ 20 September 12; Verna Yu, ‘‘Shouwang Church Takes Legal Action AgainstCops for Religious Persecution,’’ South China Morning Post, 21 September 12.

88 Beijing Shouwang Church, ‘‘Shouwang Church Announcement Concerning the Applicationfor Administrative Reconsideration,’’ reprinted in ChinaAid, 6 October 12.

89 Beijing Shouwang Church, ‘‘Beijing Shouwang Church Announcement on Outdoor WorshipService on August 11,’’ reprinted in ChinaAid, 13 August 13. For other examples of authorities detaining Shouwang church members or otherwise preventing them from attending services dur­ing this reporting year, see Beijing Shouwang Church, ‘‘Beijing Shouwang Church Announce­ment on Outdoor Worship Service on July 21,’’ reprinted in ChinaAid, 24 July 13; BeijingShouwang Church, ‘‘Beijing Shouwang Church Announcement on Outdoor Worship Service on March 17, 2013,’’ reprinted in ChinaAid, 19 March 13; Beijing Shouwang Church, ‘‘BeijingShouwang Church Announcement on Outdoor Worship Service on December 30, 2012,’’ reprinted in ChinaAid, 4 January 13.

90 ‘‘China’s House Church Crackdown Gathers Pace,’’ Radio Free Asia, 11 June 13.

91 Ibid.

92 ‘‘Beijing Chaoyang Police Raid House Church Symposium, Force Registration’’ [Beijing chaoyang jingcha chuangru jiating jiaohui yantaohui qiangxing dengji], Radio Free Asia, 27 Feb­ruary 13.

93 ‘‘Guizhou, Tongren House Church Gathering Suffers Assault’’ [Guizhou tongren jiatingjiaohui juhui zao chongji], Radio Free Asia, 22 August 13.

94 ChinaAid, ‘‘Vicious Persecution of House Churches in Heilongjiang and Shandong, Pres­byterian Federation of Beijing Calls for Prayers (photo),’’ 21 February 13.

95 ChinaAid, ‘‘Two More House Churches Raided in Xinjiang,’’ 22 July 13; ‘‘China: HouseChurch Accused of Being Religious Cult Raided,’’ Christian Today, 1 April 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Xinjiang Kucha House Church Raided,’’ 28 September 12.

96 ChinaAid, ‘‘House Church in Alxa Left Banner, Inner Mongolia, Violently Banned in Late April’’ [Neimenggu azuoqi yi jiating jiaohui si yuedi bei baoli qudi], 23 May 13.

97 ChinaAid, ‘‘Christian Salvation Church in Wuhan City Faces Illegal Forced Demolition,’’ 25 September 12.

98 ChinaAid, ‘‘A TSPM Church in Yushu City, Jilin Province Is Persecuted by Both the Gov­ernment and the Developer Due to Demolition and Removal,’’ 27 September 12.

99 ‘‘Officially-Recognized Church Threatened With Forced Eviction’’ [Guanfang renke jiaotang zao bi qian bei konghe], Radio Free Asia, 7 August 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Zhengzhou: Sunzhuang Chris­tian Church Doorway Blocked by Transported Dirt Again’’ [Zhengzhou: sunzhuang jidu jiaotang zaici bei yuntu dumen], 6 August 13.

100 Ibid.

101 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), ‘‘Tier 1 Countries of Par­ticular Concern—China,’’ Annual Report 2013, 30 April 13, 36.

102 See, e.g., Lu Huaying, Xihu District People’s Congress Standing Committee Office, ‘‘Reflec­tions Regarding Strengthening and Innovation of Management of Places of Worship’’ [Guangyu jiaqiang he chuangxin zongjiao changsuo guanli de sikao], reprinted in Hangzhou People’s Con­gress, 26 June 13; State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘State Administration for Reli­gious Affairs 2013 Main Work Points’’ [Guojia zongjiao shiwuju 2013 nian gongzuo yaodian], 18 January 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Local Government in Shandong Province Launches City-Wide Investiga­tion of ‘Privately Established Religious Meeting Sites,’ ’’ 1 April 13.

103 See, e.g., ‘‘A Number of House Church Gatherings in Shandong, Linzi Attacked’’ [Shandong linzi duo jia jiating jiaohui juhui zaodao chongji], Radio Free Asia, 16 August 13; ‘‘China ProbesHouse Churches in Intelligence Sweep,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 March 13; ‘‘Guizhou, Tongren House Church Gathering Attacked’’ [Guizhou tongren jiating juhui zao chongji], Radio FreeAsia, 22 August 13; ‘‘Inner Mongolian House Church Suppressed’’ [Neimenggu jiating jiaohui shou daya], Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13.

104 ‘‘Inner Mongolian House Church Suppressed’’ [Neimenggu jiating jiaohui shou daya], Radio Free Asia, 20 June 13.

105 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), ‘‘Tier 1 Countries of Par­ticular Concern—China,’’ Annual Report 2013, 30 April 13, 37.

106 Ibid., 36.

107 Tom Phillips, ‘‘Chinese Preacher Arrested for Hymn Session,’’ Telegraph, 6 February 13;ChinaAid, ‘‘Shenzhen House Church’s Cao Nan Brings Administrative Suit Against Futian Pub­lic Security Branch’’ [Shenzhen jiating jiaohui de cao nan, yifa xingzheng qisu futian gonganfenju], 4 February 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Well-Known Preacher Detained for Second Time This Month for Preaching in Shenzhen Park,’’ 21 December 12.

108 Tom Phillips, ‘‘Chinese Preacher Arrested for Hymn Session,’’ Telegraph, 6 February 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Shenzhen House Church’s Cao Nan Brings Administrative Suit Against Futian Pub­lic Security Branch’’ [Shenzhen jiating jiaohui de cao nan, yifa xingzheng qisu futian gongan fenju], 4 February 13.

109 ‘‘Christian Booksellers Li Wenxi Sentenced to 2 Years, Ren Lacheng Sentenced to 5 Years’’ [Jidutu shu shang li wen xi bei pan 2 nian ren la cheng bei pan 5 nian], Radio Free Asia, 19June 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Verdict Regarding Enyu Bookstore’s Case Has Been Determined: Lacheng Ren Sentenced to Five Years in Prison, Wenxi Li to Two Years,’’ 19 June 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Newsflash: Shanxi Enyu Bookstore Case Announce Sentences Ren Lacheng 5 Years and Li Wenxi 2 Years’’ [Kuaixun: shanxi en yu shufang jiao an xuanpan ren la cheng 5 nian li wenxi 2 nian], 18 June 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Well-known Human Rights Lawyer Zhu Jihu’s Argument at Trial of Imprisoned Christian Bookstore Manager Li Wenxi,’’ 29 May 13; ‘‘Two Christians inTaiyuan Sentenced for ‘Illegally Operating a Bookstore’ ’’ [Taiyuan liang jidutu yin ‘‘feifa jingying shudian’’ bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 19 June 13. See the Commission’s PoliticalPrisoner Database, records 2013–00217 on Ren Lacheng and 2013–00216 on Li Wenxi, for more information on these cases.

110 Ibid. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2013–00217 on Ren Lacheng and 2013–00216 on Li Wenxi, for more information on these cases.

111 Ibid. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2013–00217 on Ren Lacheng and 2013–00216 on Li Wenxi, for more information on these cases.

112 Tianjin Anti-Cult Organization, ‘‘What Are the Cult Organizations the Ministry of Public Security Has Identified? ’’ [Gonganbu rending de xiejiao zuzhi you na xie?], 22 October 12. See also Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘The ‘Cult’ of Buddha,’’ Dialogue, 29 August 13.

113 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 300.

114 ‘‘Guizhou, Tongren House Church Gathering Assaulted’’ [Guizhou tongren jiating juhui zao chongji], Radio Free Asia, 22 August 13.

115 ChinaAid, ‘‘7 House Church Leaders in Henan, Pingdingshan Receive Heavy Sentences Year After Arrest and Criminal Detention, Triggering International Mainstream Media Atten­tion’’ [Henan pingdingshan 7 wei jiating jiaohui lingxiu xingjiu daibu yi nian hou zaodao zhongpan, yinfa guoji zhuliu meiti guanzhu], 22 April 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Update: Pingdingshan,Henan Province Prosecution Case Escalates, 7 Christians Arrested for ‘Cult Crimes,’ ’’ 4 June 12; ChinaAid, ‘‘Seven Christians in Henan Province Convicted of Cult Crimes, Sentenced to Pris­on Terms of Three to 7–1/2 Years,’’ 27 April 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Seven House Church Christians in Henan Province Have Been Charged with Engaging in Cult Activities,’’ 25 November 12. Seethe Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2013–00168 on Han Hai, 2013–00172 on Hu Linpo, 2013–00173 on Yang Lianbing, 2013–00174 on Zhang Mian, 2013–00175 on Cao Xia,2013–00176 on Wang En, and 2013–00177 on Li Dan, for more information on these cases. See also PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 300.

116 ChinaAid, ‘‘7 House Church Leaders in Henan, Pingdingshan Receive Heavy Sentences Year After Arrest and Criminal Detention, Triggering International Mainstream Media Atten­tion’’ [Henan pingdingshan 7 wei jiating jiaohui lingxiu xingjiu daibu yi nian hou zaodao zhongpan, yinfa guoji zhuliu meiti guanzhu], 22 April 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Update: Pingdingshan, Henan Province Prosecution Case Escalates, 7 Christians Arrested for ‘Cult Crimes,’ ’’ 4 June 12; ChinaAid, ‘‘Seven Christians in Henan Province Convicted of Cult Crimes, Sentenced to Pris­on Terms of Three to 7–1/2 Years,’’ 27 April 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Seven House Church Christians in Henan Province Have Been Charged with Engaging in Cult Activities,’’ 25 November 12. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2013–00168 on Han Hai, 2013–00172 on Hu Linpo, 2013–00173 on Yang Lianbing, 2013–00174 on Zhang Mian, 2013–00175 on Cao Xia, 2013–00176 on Wang En, and 2013–00177 on Li Dan, for more information on these cases.

117 Ibid. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2013–00168 on Han Hai, 2013–00172 on Hu Linpo, 2013–00173 on Yang Lianbing, 2013–00174 on Zhang Mian, 2013– 00175 on Cao Xia, 2013–00176 on Wang En, and 2013–00177 on Li Dan, for more information on these cases.

118 ‘‘More Than 1300 People from ‘Almighty God’ Cult Organization Contained, Most From Qinghai and Guizhou’’ [‘‘Quanneng shen’’ xiejiao zuzhi 1300 duo ren bei kongzhi qinghai guizhou zui duo], China Network, reprinted in Xinhua, 21 December 12; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘China’s ‘Almighty God’ Rises With Threat of Apocalypse,’’ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 17 December

12.

119 ‘‘More Than 1300 People From ‘Almighty God’ Cult Organization Detained, Most From Qinghai and Guizhou’’ [‘‘Quanneng shen’’ xiejiao zuzhi 1300 duo ren bei kongzhi qinghai guizhou zui duo], China Network, reprinted in Xinhua, 21 December 12.

120 Li Ling and Wang Cian, ‘‘ ‘Almighty God’ Cult Believer From Shaoguan, Guangdong Sen­tenced to 7 Years’’ [Guangdong shaoguan yi ‘‘quan neng shen’’ xiejiao xintu huoxing qi nian], China News Service, 2 April 13; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Prisoner Update,’’ 29 August 13. See also the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, records 2013–00293 on Lai Yiwa, for more information on this case.

121 Chinese Taoist Association, ‘‘Introduction to the Association’’ [Xiehui jianjie], last visited 27 August 13.

122 China Religion, ‘‘China Taoist Association Convenes the Third Meeting of the Eighth Exec­utive Council To Study the Spirit of the 18th National Congress’’ [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhaokai bajie sanci changwu lishihui xuexi dang de shibada jingshen], 26 November 12.

123 PRC Central Government, ‘‘SARA Hosts 2013 Study Class for Taoist Representatives Na­tionwide’’ [Guojia zongjiaoju juban 2013 nian quanguo daojiao jie daibiao renshi dushu ban], 21 May 13. See also An Baijie, ‘‘Taoist Leaders Focus on Preserving Values,’’ China Daily, 5 June 13.

124 China Religion, ‘‘China Taoist Association Convenes the Third Meeting of the Eighth Exec­utive Council To Study the Spirit of the 18th National Congress’’ [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhaokai bajie sanci changwu lishihui xuexi dang de shibada jingshen], 26 November 12.

125 Ibid.

126 For example, see the discussion in this section on the Orthodox Church in China. In addi­tion, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints reported in March 2013 that worship serv­ices for Chinese citizens are held separately from those for foreign passport holders and that branches for Chinese citizens ‘‘are directed by their own local priesthood leaders.’’ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Newsroom, ‘‘New Church Website Will Help Chinese Nation­als, Church Leaders Around the World,’’ 15 March 13.

127 Xuyang Jingjing, ‘‘Orthodox Christians in China Seeking Official Recognition,’’ Global Times, 15 May 13. According to the Global Times, there are four Orthodox churches in China that are approved for religious activities. These churches are located in Harbin municipality, Heilongjiang province; Erguna city, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; Urumqi city, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); and Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR.

128 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activity [Neimenggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, effective 23 January 96, art. 2.

129 Gianni Valente, ‘‘Patriarch Kirill Pays Historical Visit to China,’’ Vatican Insider, 11 May 13.

130 Russian Orthodox Church, Department for External Church Relations, ‘‘Patriarch Kirill: The Dreams of the Chinese Orthodox Church’s Bright Future Begins To Come True,’’ 13 May 13.

131 Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued 31 January 94, effective 31 January 94, art. 4; Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, effective 26 September 00, arts. 7, 17(5).

Notes to Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights

1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly reso­lution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 27. See generally PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01.

2 ‘‘Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: Resolutely Crack Down on Harmful Separatist Activities’’ [Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan zhengwei: jianjue daji fenlie pohuai huodong], China News Service, reprinted in Sohu, 6 May 13; ‘‘China President Calls for Stability in Xinjiang,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in West Australian, 26 April

13. 3 See ‘‘Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia’’ below for more information. 4 See, e.g., ‘‘Inner Mongolia’s Two Sessions: Acceleration of Development in Tertiary Industries

Has Become a Bright Spot’’ [Nei menggu lianghui: jiakuai fazhan disan chanye cheng liangdian], New Northern Net, reprinted in Imosi.com, 31 January 13; Zhao Yunping and Han Shumei, ‘‘Inner Mongolia: Accelerate the Development of County Economic Coordination for Urban and Rural Development’’ [Nei menggu: jiakuai fazhan xianyu jingji tongchou chengxiang quyu fazhan], Inner Mongolia Daily, reprinted in China County Economics, 18 January 13.

5 See, e.g., ‘‘Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands,’’ Economist, 14 July 12; Lin Chao, ‘‘Salary of Rural Herders in Inner Mongolia Surpasses That of Urban Residents for Two Con­secutive Years’’ [Nei menggu nongmumin shouru zengsu lianxu liang nian chaoguo chengzhen jumin], Xinhua, reprinted in Central Government of the People’s Republic of China, 20 February 13; Yang Zuokun et al., ‘‘Striving To Improve the Lives of the People—Inner Mongolian Rep­resentatives to the 18th Party Congress Discuss People’s Livelihood’’ [Nuli rang renmin guoshang genghao shenghuo—nei menggu shibada daibiao tan minsheng], Inner Mongolia Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 10 November 12.

6 See, e.g., ‘‘Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands,’’ Economist, 14 July 12; Human Rights in China, ‘‘China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions,’’ 2007, 14, 26–28; Richard Fraser, ‘‘Forced Relocation Amongst the Reindeer—Evenki of Inner Mongolia,’’ Inner Asia, Vol. 12, Issue 2 (2010), reprinted in Academia.edu.

7 Wang Hao et al., ‘‘Farmers Turn Urban in Ordos,’’ China Daily, 19 February 13; ‘‘Herdsman on New Road to a Happy Life,’’ China Daily, reprinted in CRIenglish, 20 November 12; Li Baozhen and Liu Ning, ‘‘Bayingol, Luntai County Herders Move Into Peaceful Resident, Pros­perous Citizen Houses, Enjoy ‘New Life’ ’’ [Bazhou luntai xian nongmumin banjin anju fumin fang xiangshou ‘‘xin shenghuo’’], Xinhua, 5 November 12; Li Li, ‘‘(A Winter View of Tibet-Linzhi) Herders on the Bangjietang Grassland’’ [(Dongji kan xizang-linzhi) bangjietang caoyuan shang de mumin renjia], China Tibet Online, 26 January 13; Wang Jianting, ‘‘Xinjiang Wuqia Herders Put Down Their Whips and Use Modernized Agriculture To Become Rich’’ [Xinjiang wuqia mumin fangxia mabian liyong xiandaihua nongye zhifu], China News Service, 27 May 13; Wei Zhiyuan, ‘‘Kazakh-Style Small ‘Villas’ Make Xinjiang Burqin County ‘Nomad Settlement’ Full of Spring’’ [Hasake shi xiao ‘‘bieshu’’ rang xinjiang buerjin xian ‘‘mumin dingju’’ manmu chun], People’s Daily, 11 May 13. For information on grasslands policy in earlier years, see, e.g., CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 88–89, 119, 149.

8 Hulunbeir City Grassland Bureau of Supervision and Management, ‘‘The Three Levels of Districts, Cities and Banners in Inner Mongolia Jointly Held a Publicity Activity on the Grass­lands Law’’ [Nei menggu qu shi qi sanji lianhe juban caoyuan pufa xuanchuan huodong], 16 April 13; ‘‘The City Launches Activities for 2013 Grasslands Law Awareness Month’’ [Quanshi qidong 2013 nian caoyuan pufa xuanchuan yue huodong], Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureau of Ulanqab City, reprinted in Ulanqab Government, 8 April 13.

9 See, e.g., ‘‘The Newly Revised ‘Regulations on the Protection of Inner Mongolian Grasslands’ Take Effect Today’’ [Xin xiuding de ‘‘nei menggu zizhiqu jiben caoyuan baohu tiaoli’’ jinri qi zhengshi shixing], Xinhua, 1 December 11; ‘‘Chinese Pasture Region Charges Fees for Grassland Exploitation,’’ Xinhua, 28 February 12.

10 China’s Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University. For Commission analysis, see ‘‘State Council Opinion Bolsters Grazing Ban, Herder Resettlement,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 October 11.

11 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Dr. Chuluu Ujiyediin Speaks at ‘Promoting Human Rights, Democracy and Freedom in East Turkistan, Tibet, Southern Mon­golia and the People’s Republic of China,’ ’’ 31 March 13; Nick Holdstock, ‘‘China Says It Is Im­proving the Lives of Ethnic Minorities in Inner Mongolia. Don’t Be Fooled,’’ Independent, 16 April 13; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, ‘‘Unrepresented Nations and Peo­ples Organization (UNPO) Individual Stakeholder Submission to the Office of the High Commis­sioner for Human Rights regarding the Universal Periodic Review of the People’s Republic of China During the 17th Session, Oct–Nov 2013,’’ February 2013; J. Carl Ganter, ‘‘J. Carl Ganter: The Biggest Story of Our Lifetime Is Water,’’ Circle of Blue, 28 March 13.

12 ‘‘The Newly Revised ‘Regulations on the Protection of Inner Mongolian Grasslands’ Take Ef­fect Today’’ [Xin xiuding de ‘‘nei menggu zizhiqu jiben caoyuan baohu tiaoli’’ jinri qi zhengshi shixing], Xinhua, 1 December 11.

13 Greenpeace, ‘‘Thirsty Coal 2,’’ 23 July 13, 17–37.

14 Ibid., 5, 12, 18–25, 28–32, 36–37, 53–54, 65.

15 Ibid., 18–20, 34.

16 Ibid., 39, 41–51.

17 Ibid., 38–51.

18 ‘‘Chinese Coal Company Releasing Toxic Wastewater, Greenpeace Says,’’ Reuters, reprinted

in Guardian, 23 July 13; ‘‘Greenpeace Accuses Chinese Coal Company of Draining Water Re­sources,’’ Voice of America, 23 July 13; Greenpeace, ‘‘Thirsty Coal 2,’’ 23 July 13, Report Sum­mary, 39, 41.

19 ‘‘Herders Blocked From Protest Marches to Beijing,’’ Radio Free Asia, 7 March 13; ‘‘Herders Protest Loss of Land,’’ Radio Free Asia, 9 October 12; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Infor­mation Center, ‘‘Herders’ Protests Put Down, Internet Posts Removed,’’ 6 March 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Mongolian Herders Protest China’s Illegal Occu­pation of Their Land and Defamation of Their Ancestors,’’ 8 October 12; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Thirty Eight Displaced Herders from Zaruud Banner Ar­rested and Detained in Protest,’’ 19 July 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Mongolian Herders Beaten and Injured in a Clash With the Chinese,’’ 20 May 13; ‘‘Po­lice Probe Fresh Clashes in Inner Mongolia,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 May 13.

20 Rachel Vandenbrink, ‘‘Inner Mongolian Herder Beaten to Death in Land Clash,’’ Radio FreeAsia, 23 August 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Update to the Murder of Bayanbaatar: Central Government Involved, Family Rejects Negotiation,’’ 22 August13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘One More Mongolian Herder Killed by the Chinese Defending His Grazing Land,’’ 20 August 13. Bayanbaatar’s daughter-in-law re­portedly stated that government authorities subsequently confined around 80 of his family mem­bers to a funeral home and kept them under heavy police surveillance. Bayanbaatar’s deathmarks the first reported killing of a Mongol herder who was protesting corporate use of grazing land since two coal workers hit and killed herder Mergen on May 10, 2011, an incident thatcontributed to protests involving thousands of people in the following weeks. For Commission analysis, see ‘‘Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, MiningOperations,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11. See also CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 108.

21 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Herders’ Protests Put Down, Internet Posts Removed,’’ 6 March 13; ‘‘Herders Blocked From Protest Marches to Beijing,’’Radio Free Asia, 7 March 13.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Thirty Eight Displaced Herders from Zaruud Banner Arrested and Detained in Protest,’’ 19 July 13; ‘‘Herders Blocked fromTravel to Beijing,’’ Radio Free Asia, 19 July 13.

26 Ibid.

27 State Forestry Administration Sanbei Forest Construction Bureau, ‘‘For the Inner Mongolia Hanshan Nature Preserve, the Effects of Contraction and Transfer Are Positive’’ [Nei mengguhanshan ziran baohu qu shousuo zhuanyi xiaoguo hao], reprinted in China Forestry Net, 15 De­cember 09.

28 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Thirty Eight Displaced Herders from Zaruud Banner Arrested and Detained in Protest,’’ 19 July 13; ‘‘Herders Blocked FromTravel to Beijing,’’ Radio Free Asia, 19 July 13.

29 Wang Jinlong, ‘‘Non-Ferrous Geological Exploration’’ [Youse dizhi kancha], Inner MongoliaRegional News Net, 11 November 12. See also ‘‘List of Achievements of the Inner Mongolia Bu­reau of Non-Ferrous Geological Exploration Prospecting’’ [Nei menggu youse dikanju zhao kuangchengguo yi lan], China Non-Ferrous Metals Mineral Resources Information Net, 20 March 13.

30 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘One More Mongolian HerderKilled by the Chinese Defending His Grazing Land,’’ 20 August 13. The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center reported that the attack and suicide took place in Ongniud(Wengniute) Banner, Ulanhot (Wulanhaote) municipality, but Ongniud Banner is located in Chifeng municipality.

31 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Hada and Family Members Still Missing,’’ 24 February 13; Human Rights in China, ‘‘Lawyer Asks for Immediate Release ofMongolian Dissident Hada; Family Provides Further Details on Hada’s Condition,’’ 29 January

13.

32 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Mongolian Dissident Hada in 23rd Month of Unlawful Detention After Long Prison Term; Family Appeals for International Attention,’’ 22 October 12; ‘‘Wife ofMongolian Activist Speaks Out Against Chinese Harassment,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, 15 October 12.

33 Ibid.

34 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Hada and Family Members StillMissing,’’ 24 February 13; ‘‘Profiles in Dissidence: Why China Is Crushing a Mongolian Intellec­tual,’’ Global Post, 5 March 13.

35 Ibid.

36 ‘‘Inner Mongolian Activist in Safe, Healthy State: Official,’’ Xinhua, 6 March 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Hada and Family Members Still Missing,’’ 24 February 13.

37 For Commission analysis on Hada, Xinna, and Uiles, see ‘‘Authorities Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights Advocate’s Wife and Son,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 December 12. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, record 2004–02045 (Hada), record 2010–00704 (Xinna), and record 2010–00705 (Uiles) for more information on these cases.

38 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Mongolian Herder’s Rights De­fender in Poor Health at Chinese Detention Center,’’ 2 September 13; Richard Finney, ‘‘Advocate for Inner Mongolian Herdsmen in ‘Failing Health’ in Jail,’’ Radio Free Asia, 3 September 13.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Mongol-Tibetan Medical School

Principal Imprisoned for Alleged Escape Attempt,’’ 10 May 13.

42 ‘‘Mongolian Medical College Founder Jailed for Three Years,’’ Radio Free Asia, 10 May 13.

43 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Mongol-Tibetan Medical School Principal Imprisoned for Alleged Escape Attempt,’’ 10 May 13; ‘‘Founder of Mongolian Medicine College in Inner Mongolia Detained’’ [Nei menggu yi meng zang yiyao xuexiao chuangshi ren beibu], Radio Free Asia, 20 October 09; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Deported United Nations Refugee Applicant Batzangaa Tried in China,’’ 17 January 11. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, record 2009–00435, for more information on the case.

44 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer Wins Hellman/Hammett Grant,’’ 20 December 12.

45 Ibid.; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 111.

46 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Dissident Writer Huuchinhuu Beaten Repeatedly,’’ 29 September 11; ‘‘Dissident Suffers Beatings in Detention,’’ Radio Free Asia, 29 September 11. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, record 2010–00597, for more information on the case.

47 For more information on these cases, see, e.g., ‘‘Inner Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly De­tained for Publishing New Book’’ [Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi daibu], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 11; ‘‘Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly Arrested in Inner Mongolia’’ [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki mongghulda mexpiy tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer, Author of ‘Forefront of Independence’ Arrested and Detained,’’ 23 January 11; UN Human Rights Council, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Cases Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009–July 2010), A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, reprinted in UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 15 September 10. Official Chinese information is not available regarding the current legal status of Erden-uul and Sodmongol. See also the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases of Erden-uul (record 2011–00072) and Sodmongol (record 2010–00146).

Notes to Section II—Population Planning

1 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 18. According to Article18, ‘‘The State maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where the requirements specified by laws andregulations are met, plans for a second child, if requested, may be made.’’ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 6–7. Imple­menting regulations in different provinces vary on the ages at which couples may give birth and the number of children they are permitted to have.

2 See, e.g., Beijing Municipal Commission on Population and Family Planning, ‘‘Beijing Munic­ipal Birth Services Certificate Management Measures’’ [Beijing shi shengyu fuwu zheng guanli banfa], 7 April 12; Guizhou Province Ninth People’s Congress Standing Committee, ‘‘Guizhou Province Population and Family Planning Regulations’’ [Guizhou sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], 29 September 02; Population and Family Planning Commission of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, ‘‘Regional Population and Family Planning Work Guide’’ [Qunei renkou jihua shengyu banshi zhinan], last visited 10 September 13.

3 See Gu Baochang et al., ‘‘China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,’’ Population and Development Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, Table 1 (2007).

4 Feng Wang et al., ‘‘Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child Policy? ’’ Population and Development Review, Vol. 38 (2012), 115–16.

5 These criteria include such conditions as: the first child was medically diagnosed as handi­capped, both members of the couple are only children, the couple are rural residents and their first child was a girl, the couple are remarried, and so forth. Gu Baochang et al., ‘‘China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,’’ Population and Develop­ment Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, Table 1 (2007).

6 Ethnic minority couples (couples in which at least one parent belongs to an officially recog­nized ethnic minority group) are permitted to bear a second child in all provincial-level jurisdic­tions except Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing. Ethnic minority couples are permitted to bear a third child if they meet certain criteria in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; the Tibet Autonomous Region; the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and Heilongjiang, Fujian, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Ningxia provinces. Gu Baochang et al., ‘‘Chi­na’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,’’ Population and Development Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, Table 1 (2007). In Hubei province, both members of the couple must belong to an ethnic minority to be able to bear a second child. Population and Fam­ily Planning Commission of Hubei Province, ‘‘Hubei Provincial Population and Family Planning Regulations’’ [Hubei sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], 2 February 09.

7 See, e.g., Shaanxi Provincial Government, Shaanxi Provincial Implementing Measures for Collection and Management of Social Maintenance Fees [Shaanxi sheng shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli shishi banfa], issued 8 June 04, effective 1 August 04, art. 5(1). In Shaanxi province, individuals in violation of local population planning regulations can each be fined three to six times the amount of the average annual income of a resident in their locality, some­times more, based on statistics from the previous year. ‘‘Fengdu County Population and Family Planning Administrative Fines, Administrative Penalties Program and Standards’’ [Fengdu xian renkou he jihua shengyu xingzheng zhengshou, xingzheng chufa xiangmu ji biaozhun], Fengdu County Population and Family Planning Network, 27 November 11. As noted in this document, residents of Fengdu county, Chongqing municipality, are subject to fines amounting to two to nine times the local average annual income from the previous year if they have an out-of-plan child or illegally adopt (two to six times the local average annual income) or have a child out of wedlock (six to nine times the local average annual income). See also ‘‘Cost of a Second Child: Pair Fined 1.3m Yuan,’’ Shanghai Daily, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 31 May 12; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 De­cember 10, 19–20.

8 See, e.g., ChinaAid, ‘‘Hubei Jiayu—Pregnant Woman Forced To Abort on May 23 Dies’’ [Hubei jiayu—yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; ‘‘Anhui Fengyang Seven-Month Fetus Forcibly Aborted, Shocking Bloody Photo’’ [Anhui fengyang 7 yue da taier bei qiangzhi liuchan xielinlin tupian chumu jingxin], Sound of Hope, 25 March 13; Women’s Rights in China, ‘‘Women’s Rights in China: Forced Abortion Phenomenon in China’s Rural Areas Still Serious’’ [Zhongguo fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong], reprinted in Monitor China, 28 October 12.

9 ChinaAid, ‘‘In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed by Family Planning Officials in Guizhou in Early 2013,’’ 26 February 13; Zhan Caiqiang, ‘‘Hubei Tongshan Woman ‘Sterilized to Death,’ Officials Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims’] ‘Right To Hold [Them] Accountable’ ’’ [Hubei tongshan—funu ‘‘jieza zhisi’’ guanfang 100 wan maiduan ‘‘zhuize quanli’’], Yunnan Info Daily, 9 April 13; ‘‘Henan—Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection Fee, Forcibly Sterilized’’ [Henan—buru qi funu wei jiao 6 qian yuan baohu fei bei qiangzhi jieza], China Net, reprinted in Southern Daily, 24 April 13.

10 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 95, and endorsed by UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 22 December 95, paras. 9, 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments which partici­pated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their commitment to ‘‘Ensure the full implementation of the human rights of women and of the girl child as an inalienable, inte­gral and indivisible part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; . . .’’ (para. 9) and ‘‘are convinced that . . . [t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to con­trol all aspects of their health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment; . . .’’ (para. 17).

11 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, 18 October 94, paras. 7.2, 8.25. Paragraph 7.2 of the Programme of Action of the Cairo Inter­national Conference on Population and Development states that, ‘‘Reproductive health therefore implies that people . . . have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, whenand how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family plan­ning of their choice . . . .’’ Paragraph 8.25 states, ‘‘In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.’’

12 United Nations, ‘‘Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women,’’ 1996, Chap. II., para. 3; Chap. VI, para. 12. China was a state party at the Fourth World Conference on Women,which adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. United Nations Population In­formation Network, A/Conf.171/13: Report of the International Conference on Population andDevelopment, 18 October 94, Chap. II, sec. C, Chap. VI, sec. 1. China was one of the partici­pating States at the International Conference on Population and Development, which reachedgeneral agreement on the Programme of Action. The Programme of Action is provided as an annex to the above ICPD report.

13 For two recent examples of acts of official violence in the implementation of population plan­ning policies, see ChinaAid, ‘‘Hubei Jiayu—Pregnant Woman Forced To Abort on May 23 Dies’’[Hubei jiayu—yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed by Family Planning Officials in Guizhou in Early2013,’’ 26 February 13.

14 Yan Shuang, ‘‘Fury Over Forced Abortion,’’ Global Times, 14 June 12. For one U.S. scholar’sanalysis of Chinese law with regard to forced abortions, see Stanley Lubman, ‘‘The Law on Forced Abortion in China: Few Options for Victims,’’ Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Re­port (blog), 4 July 12. PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, arts. 4, 39. Arti­cle 4 of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states that officials ‘‘shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civilmanner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.’’ Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal or administrative punishment if he ‘‘infringeson a citizen’s personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests’’ or ‘‘abuses his power, neglects his duty, or engages in malpractices for personal gain’’ in the imple­mentation of population planning policies.

15 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun­ishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, arts. 1, 4. In 2008, the Committee against Torture noted with concern China’s ‘‘lack of investigation into thealleged use of coercive and violent measures to implement the population policy.’’ UN Committee against Torture, 41st Session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Arti­cle 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture—China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 29.

16 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Tor­ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, last visited 10 Sep­tember 13. China signed the convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.

17 Children born ‘‘out-of-plan’’ in China may be denied household registration (hukou) and thus face barriers to accessing social benefits including health insurance and education. See ChineseHuman Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 26.

18 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratifi­cation, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, China signed 29 August 90, ratified 2 March 92, arts. 2–4, 6, 24, 26, 28.Article 2 of the CRC calls upon States Parties to ‘‘respect and ensure the rights set forth . . . to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of thechild’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s . . . national, ethnic or social origin . . . birth or other status.’’ Article 24 sets forth the right of the child to access healthcare, Article 26 setsforth the right of the child to social security, and Article 28 sets forth the right of the child to free primary education and accessible secondary education and higher education.

19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, Chinasigned 27 October 97, ratified 27 March 01, art. 10(3). Article 10(3) calls upon States Parties to recognize that ‘‘Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf ofall children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other con­ditions.’’

20 Sui-Lee Wee and Hui Li, ‘‘Insight: The Backroom Battle Delaying Reform of China’s One-Child Policy,’’ Reuters, 8 April 13; ‘‘National People’s Congress Representative Suggests Relax­ing to a Two-Child Policy, Says No Reply to Previous Two Times She Proposed This’’ [Renmin daibiao jianyi kaifang ertai cheng qian liangci ti an wei huo huifu], Sina, 5 April 13; Laurie Burkitt, ‘‘Pressure Rises on China To Scrap One-Child Policy,’’ Wall Street Journal, 18 January

13.

21 ‘‘Think Tank Calls for Loosening of One-Child Policy,’’ Xinhua, 27 October 12; Laurie Burkitt, ‘‘Pressure Rises on China To Scrap One-Child Policy,’’ Wall Street Journal, 18 January 13; Fang Xiao, ‘‘China’s One-Child Policy May Be Relaxed Province by Province,’’ Epoch Times, 5 March 13.

22 David Wertime, ‘‘Online Poll Shows Overwhelming Support for End to China’s One-Child Policy,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 2 November 12; Kim Wall, ‘‘What China’s ‘One-Child Policy’ Really Looks Like—A View From the Grassroots,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, 17 March 13.

23 ‘‘State Council Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan’’ [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang’an], Xinhua, 10 March 13, item II; ‘‘China To Merge Health Ministry, Family Planning Commission,’’ Xinhua, 10 March 13; ‘‘Explanation of the State Coun­cil Institutional Reform and Functional Change Plan’’ [Guanyu guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang’an de shuoming], Xinhua, 10 March 13.

24 ‘‘State Council Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan’’ [Guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang’an], Xinhua, 10 March 13 (Open Source Center, 10 March 13),item II. The plan states that the responsibilities of the new National Health and Family Plan­ning Commission will include ‘‘unified planning on resource allocation for medical care, publichealth, and family planning services, organize and establish a national basic drug system, for­mulate the family planning policy, oversee and regulate public health and medical care services,and take charge of such work as family planning administration and services.’’

25 Ibid. The plan states that, ‘‘the State Population and Family Planning Commission’s dutiesof studying and drawing up the population development strategy and program and the popu­lation policy will be taken up by the National Development and Reform Commission.’’ See alsoMou Xu, ‘‘Xinhua Insight: Combining Population and Economic Policy To Push Development,’’ Xinhua, 13 March 13.

26 Laurie Burkitt, ‘‘One-Child Policy: Law Still in Effect, but Police, Judges Fired,’’ Wall Street Journal, 12 March 13. According to population expert Wang Feng, cited in the Wall Street Jour­nal, ‘‘My reading is that will mean that population control targets will be weaker and weaker over time. And we will see that the one-child policy era is over. The way to interpret this isthat the laws are still in effect, but the judges and the policemen have all been fired. Soon the laws will also change.’’ Laurie Burkitt, ‘‘Agency Move Hints at Shift in China’s One-Child Pol­icy,’’ Wall Street Journal, 11 March 13. According to Cheng Li, cited in the Wall Street Journal, ‘‘This is a signal to an end of a policy that in reality isn’t in line with China’s other reforms.’’

27 Bai Tiantian, ‘‘Govt Shake-Up for Efficiency,’’ Global Times, 11 March 13. According to one professor of demography cited in the Global Times, ‘‘The merge with the health ministry is infact making the family planning body more powerful.’’

28 ‘‘State Council Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan’’ [Guowuyuan jigougaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang’an], Xinhua, 10 March 13, item II.

29 These officials included Wang Feng, deputy head of the State Commission Office for PublicSector Reform, Ma Kai, secretary-general of the State Council, and Vice Premier Liu Yandong. See, e.g., Mou Xu, ‘‘Xinhua Insight: Combining Population and Economic Policy To Push Devel­opment,’’ Xinhua, 13 March 13; ‘‘China To Merge Health Ministry, Family Planning Commis­sion,’’ Xinhua, 10 March 13; ‘‘Vice Premier Urges Reform for Health, Family Planning Organs,’’Xinhua, 18 March 13.

30 National Health and Family Planning Commission, ‘‘National Health and Family PlanningCommission Implements ‘Serving the People’s Health Action [Plan]’ ’’ [Guojia weisheng jisheng wei shishi ‘‘fuwu baixing jiankang xingdong’’], 6 August 13; He Huifeng, ‘‘Hopes for One-ChildPolicy Fix Tempered,’’ South China Morning Post, 8 August 13.

31 He Huifeng, ‘‘Hopes for One-Child Policy Fix Tempered,’’ South China Morning Post, 8 Au­gust 13.

32 Wan Mi et al., ‘‘Over Fifty Percent of 1400 People [Surveyed] Wish To Have Second Child’’[1400 ren chaoguo wucheng yuan sheng ertai], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 4 August 13; Pat­rick Boehler, ‘‘Most Chinese Want To Have Second Child, Says Survey,’’ South China MorningPost, 5 August 13.

33 ‘‘Relaxation of One-Child Policy Still Being Mulled,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 3August 13.

34 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihuashengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, arts. 4, 39. Article 4 of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states that officials ‘‘shall perform their adminis­trative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.’’ Article 39 states thatan official is subject to criminal or administrative punishment if he ‘‘infringes on a citizen’s per­sonal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests’’ or ‘‘abuses his power, ne­glects his duty, or engages in malpractices for personal gain’’ in the implementation of popu­lation planning policies.

35 Yan Shuang, ‘‘Fury Over Forced Abortion,’’ Global Times, 14 June 12. For one U.S. scholar’s analysis of Chinese law with regard to forced abortions, see Stanley Lubman, ‘‘The Law onForced Abortion in China: Few Options for Victims,’’ Wall Street Journal, 4 July 12.

36 This number is based on Commission analysis of population planning measures. These ju­risdictions include Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, Guangdong, Fujian, Hebei, Hubei, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Henan, Qinghai, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Anhui, Gansu, Yunnan,and Guizhou. For two specific examples, see ‘‘Revised ‘Guangdong Province Population and Fam­ily Planning Regulations’ Published’’ [Xiuding hou de ‘‘guangdong sheng renkou yu jihuashengyu tiaoli’’ gongbu], Guangzhou Beiyun District Zhongloutian Public Information Net, 29 June 09 and ‘‘Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning Regulations’’ [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], Jiangxi News Net, 11 April 09. The Beijing Municipal Popu­lation and Family Planning Commission clearly draws the link between the term ‘‘remedial measures’’ and abortion: ‘‘Early term abortion refers to the use of surgery or pharmaceutics to terminate a pregnancy before the 12th week of gestation; it is a remedial measure taken after the failure of contraception.’’ Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, ‘‘Early Term Abortion’’ [Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 April 09.

37 See, e.g., ChinaAid, ‘‘Hubei Jiayu—Pregnant Woman Forced To Abort on May 23 Dies’’ [Hubei jiayu—yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Another Bloody One-Child Case in China: Seven-Months Pregnant Mother in Anhui Forcibly Aborted by Lethal Injection (Warning: Graphic Photo),’’ 25 March 13; Women’s Rights in China, ‘‘Women’s Rights in China: Forced Abortion Phenomenon in China’s Rural Areas Still Serious’’ [Zhongguo fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong], 28 October 12.

38 Peony Lui, ‘‘Outcry Over Blunders of China’s One-Child Policy,’’ South China Morning Post, 19 December 12.

39 ChinaAid, ‘‘In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed by Family Planning Offi­cials in Guizhou in Early 2013,’’ 26 February 13; Zhan Caiqiang, ‘‘Hubei Tongshan Woman ‘Sterilized to Death,’ Officials Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims’] ‘Right To Hold [Them] Ac­countable’ ’’ [Hubei tongshan—funu ‘‘jieza zhisi’’ guanfang 100 wan maiduan ‘‘zhuize quanli’’], Yunnan Info Daily, 9 April 13; ‘‘Henan—Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection Fee, Forcibly Sterilized’’ [Henan—buru qi funu wei jiao 6 qian yuan baohu fei bei qiangzhijieza], China Net, reprinted in Southern Daily, 24 April 13.

40 ‘‘Yuyue Town Spares No Efforts in Promoting Health and Family Planning Work’’ [Yuyuezhen quanli yifu tuijin chuang wei he jisheng gongzuo], Jiayu Net, 15 April 13; Luo Hongwei, Population and Family Planning Commission of Huanggang, ‘‘Hongan County Prominent ‘FiveKey Points’ Vigorous Promotion of the Present Population and Family Planning Work’’ [Hongan xian tuchu ‘‘wuge zhongdian’’ jiji tuijin dangqian renkou jisheng gongzuo], 19 July 13;Chongyang County People’s Government, ‘‘Gangkou Township Uses All Its Strength To Promote Family Planning Work’’ [Gangkou xiang quanli tuijin jihua shengyu gongzuo], 28 March 13.

41 Lechang City Population and Family Planning Bureau, ‘‘Lechang City Pingshi Town Sound a Mobilization Order for the Spring Family Planning Concentrated Services Activities’’ [Lechangshi pingshi zhen chuixiang chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong dongyuan ling], last visited 19 September 13; Zhuhai City Xiangzhou District Family Planning Bureau, ‘‘City, District Popu­lation and Family Planning Department Leaders Go to Qianshan Neighborhood To Inspect Fam­ily Planning Welcoming and Inspection Work’’ [Shi, qu renkou jisheng ju lingdao dao qianshanjiedao jiancha jisheng yingjian gongzuo], 1 February 13.

42 Linquan County People’s Government, ‘‘Speech at the County Government Fourth PlenaryConference on Honest and Clean Government Work’’ [Zai xian zhengfu disi ci quanti huiyi ji lianzheng gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 26 February 13.

43 Zhang Xuan, ‘‘Huayu Town Four Measures To Help Spring Family Planning Services Work Reach the Desired Goal’’ [Huayu zhen si cuoshi zhuli chunji jisheng fuwu gongzuo daowei], Ori­ental Holy City Net, 19 April 13; Shanting District Family Planning Bureau, ‘‘District Family Planning Bureau’s Four Measures for Making Great Efforts in Implementing Present Work’’ [Qujishengju sixiang cuoshi zhuahao dangqian gongzuo luoshi], 22 April 13.

44 People’s Government of Henan Province, ‘‘Hebi City Population and Family Planning WorkMeeting Requirements’’ [Hebi shi renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi yaoqiu], 1 April 13.

45 Huang He and Chen Longbin, Guizhou Population Net, ‘‘Youmai Township Strictly ControlsEarly Marriages and Early Pregnancies, Urges Family Planning Work To Ascend the Stairs’’ [Youmai xiang yankong zaohun zaoyu cu jisheng gongzuo shang taijie], 13 March 13; ZhangMiaohui, Hongfenghu Town Party and Government Administration Office, ‘‘Storm the Fortifica­tions and Overcome Difficulties, Strongly Grasp the Ten Links of Work, Spare No Efforts ToPromote Achievement of the ‘Three Years Three Strides’ Goals in Family Planning Work’’ [Gongjian ke’nan zhashi zhuahao shi huanjie gongzuo fenli tuijin jisheng gongzuo ‘‘sannian sankuayue’’ mubiao shixian], 19 April 13.

46 Wang Hongbin, Pingjiang County People’s Government, ‘‘Speech at Central Pingjiang Coun­ty Committee Work Meeting’’ [Zai zhonggong pingjiang xianwei gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 25 February 13.

47 Jianou City People’s Government, ‘‘Xiaoqiao Town Launches Focused Publicity Activities on Implementation of ‘Four Procedures’ ’’ [Xiaoqiao zhen kaizhan luoshi ‘‘sishu’’ jizhong xuanchuan huodong], 27 May 13; Jin’an District Population and Family Planning Bureau, ‘‘Entire District Population and Family Planning Work Regular Meeting Convenes’’ [Quanqu renkou jishenggongzuo lihui zhaokai], 7 December 12.

48 For two such examples in which authorities reported on the implementation of the ‘‘two ex­aminations and four procedures,’’ see Jianou City People’s Government, ‘‘Xiaoqiao Town Launches Focused Publicity Activities on Implementation of ‘Four Procedures’ ’’ [Xiaoqiao zhen kaizhan luoshi ‘‘sishu’’ jizhong xuanchuan huodong], 27 May 13; Jin’an District Population and Family Planning Bureau, ‘‘Entire District Population and Family Planning Work Regular Meet­ing Convenes’’ [Quanqu renkou jisheng gongzuo lihui zhaokai], 7 December 12. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 2. Accordingto Chinese Human Rights Defenders, some government reports refer to ‘‘three examinations,’’ instead of two. The third examination in these references is an examination for the presenceof a gynecological disease or illness.

49 For an official government report enumerating the ‘‘four procedures,’’ see Yancheng DistrictPeople’s Government, ‘‘The Four Surgeries in Family Planning’’ [Jihua shengyu sixiang shoushu], last visited 20 June 13.

50 See, e.g., Zhang Miaohui, Hongfenghu Town Party and Government Administration Office, ‘‘Storm the Fortifications and Overcome Difficulties, Strongly Grasp the Ten Links of Work,Spare No Efforts To Promote Achievement of the ‘Three Years Three Strides’ Goals in Family Planning Work’’ [Gongjian ke’nan zhashi zhuahao shi huanjie gongzuo fenli tuijin jisheng gongzuo ‘‘sannian san kuayue’’ mubiao shixian], 19 April 13; Lechang City Population and Fam­ily Planning Bureau, ‘‘Lechang City Pingshi Town Sound a Mobilization Order for the Spring Family Planning Concentrated Services Activities’’ [Lechang shi pingshi zhen chuixiang chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong dongyuan ling], 22 March 13.

51 Chongyang County People’s Government, ‘‘Gangkou Township Uses All Its Strength To Pro­mote Family Planning Work’’ [Gangkou xiang quanli tuijin jihua shengyu gongzuo], 28 March

13. 52 Ibid. 53 The term ‘‘late-term abortion’’ (dayuefen yinchan) is commonly used to refer to abortions

performed between gestational weeks 14 to 28. See, e.g., ‘‘What are the Consequences of Late Term Abortion? Can Women Who Have Aborted Still Get Pregnant? ’’ [Dayue yinchan de houguo you naxie? yinchan hou nuren hai neng zai huaiyun ma?], Sina Lady, reprinted in Xinhua, 19 June 12.

54 All Girls Allowed published a report documenting the use of varieties of the phrase ‘‘pro­hibit’’ (jinzhi or yanjin) or ‘‘put an end to’’ (dujue) ‘‘late-term abortions’’ (dayuefen yinchan) in statements dating between July 5 and September 12, 2012, from governments in 23 of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions, including Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, InnerMongolia Autonomous Region, Qinghai, Shandong, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang. Provincial-level jurisdictions not included on this list are: Guangxi Zhuang Autono­mous Region, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Shanghai, Tianjin, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. See All Girls Allowed, ‘‘ChineseProvinces That Banned Late-Stage Abortion Following Feng Jianmei’s Forced Abortion,’’ 25 Sep­tember 12.

55 ChinaAid, ‘‘Guizhou Jinsha County Family Planning Committee Forcibly Aborts, Mother Critically Ill’’ [Guizhou jinsha xian jisheng wei qiangzhi duotai yunfu shengming chuiwei], 18July 13; ChinaAid, ‘‘Family Planning Committee in Jinsha County, Guizhou Province, Forces Woman To Undergo Abortion, Leaving Her in Critical Condition,’’ 18 July 13.

56 ChinaAid, ‘‘Li Fengfei Arrested After Exposing Forced Abortion, Guizhou Province Law Firm Provides Defense,’’ 9 September 13.

57 ChinaAid, ‘‘Hubei Jiayu—Pregnant Woman Forced To Abort on May 23 Dies’’ [Hubei jiayu— yunfu 5 yue 23 ri bei qiangzhi yinchan siwang], 25 May 13; Steven Ertelt, ‘‘China: Mother DiesAfter Forced Abortion at Six Months,’’ LifeNews, 29 May 13.

58 ‘‘Anhui Fengyang Seven-Month Fetus Forcibly Aborted, Shocking Bloody Photo’’ [Anhuifengyang 7 yue da taier bei qiangzhi liuchan xielinlin tupian chumu jingxin], Sound of Hope, 25 March 13.

59 ChinaAid, ‘‘Another Bloody One-Child Case in China: Seven-Months Pregnant Mother in Anhui Forcibly Aborted by Lethal Injection (Warning: Graphic Photo),’’ 25 March 13.

60 Women’s Rights in China, ‘‘Women’s Rights in China: Forced Abortion Phenomenon in Chi­na’s Rural Areas Still Serious’’ [Zhongguo fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiangyiran yanzhong], 28 October 12; Kat Lewis, All Girls Allowed, ‘‘Chinese Officials Force Abortion on 6-Month Pregnant Woman,’’ reprinted in LifeNews, 24 October 12.

61 ChinaAid, ‘‘In Tears, Victim Denounces the Violence Committed by Family Planning Offi­cials in Guizhou in Early 2013,’’ 26 February 13.

62 ChinaAid, ‘‘Mother of Two in Hubei Province Dies From Forced Sterilization Operation Or­dered by Family Planning Officials Against Doctor’s Advice,’’ 6 April 13; Zhan Caiqiang, ‘‘HubeiTongshan Woman ‘Sterilized to Death,’ Officials Pay 1,000,000 To Buy Out [Victims’] ‘Right To Hold [Them] Accountable’ ’’ [Hubei tongshan—funu ‘‘jieza zhisi’’ guanfang 100 wan maiduan ‘‘zhuize quanli’’], Yunnan Info Daily, 9 April 13. According to these reports, local officials prom­ised Shen’s family 1 million yuan (US$161,755) in compensation on the condition that they ‘‘vol­untarily give up the pursuit of accountability.’’ According to the Yunnan Info Daily report, fam­ily planning efforts in Shen Hongxia’s home county intensified after the county had received thelowest score in the province on the previous year’s population planning work report.

63 ‘‘Henan—Nursing Mother Failed To Pay 6,000 Yuan Protection Fee, Forcibly Sterilized’’[Henan—buru qi funu wei jiao 6 qian yuan baohu fei bei qiangzhi jieza], China Net, reprinted in Southern Daily, 24 April 13.

64 ‘‘Chinese Man Dies After Attempted Forced Sterilization,’’ Radio Free Asia, 13 August 13.

65 PRC Measures for Administration of Collection of Social Maintenance Fees [Shehui fuyangfei zhengshou guanli banfa], issued 2 August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7.

66 All Girls Allowed, ‘‘One-Child Policy Fines Relative to Income Levels in China,’’ 1 November

12. See, e.g., Shaanxi Provincial Implementing Measures for Collection and Management of So­cial Maintenance Fees [Shanxi sheng shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli shishi banfa], issued8 June 04, effective 1 August 04, art. 5(1). In Shaanxi province, individuals in violation of local population planning regulations can each be fined three to six times the amount of the averageincome of a resident in their locality, sometimes more, based on their income compared to the average income of rural residents the previous year. ‘‘Fengdu County Population and FamilyPlanning Administrative Fines, Administrative Penalties Program and Standards’’ [Fengdu xian renkou he jihua shengyu xingzheng zhengshou, xingzheng chufa xiangmu ji biaozhun], FengduCounty Population and Family Planning Network, 27 November 11. As noted in this document, residents of Fengdu county, Chongqing municipality, are subject to fines amounting to two tonine times the local average annual income from the previous year if they have an out-of-plan child or illegally adopt (two to six times the local average annual income) or have a child outof wedlock (six to nine times the local average annual income).

67 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihuashengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 39. According to Article 39, officials are to be punished either criminally or administratively for the following acts: ‘‘(1)infringing on a citizen’s personal rights, property rights or other legitimate rights and interests;

(2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malpractices for personal gain; (3) de­manding or accepting bribes; (4) withholding, reducing, misappropriating or embezzling funds for family planning or social maintenance fees; or (5) making false or deceptive statistical data on population or family planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or refusing to provide such data.’’

68 The threat of job termination specifically applied to civil servants. See, e.g., ‘‘Fujian Civil Servants Who Have Extra Births, or Births Out of Wedlock Will Be Expelled From Their Posi­tions’’ [Fujian gongwuyuan duo shengyu, hunwai shengyu jiang kaichu gongzhi], China Daily, 15 December 12.

69 See, e.g., ‘‘Guangdong: Party Members, State Employees Who Go Abroad and Have an Extra Child Will Be Expelled From the Party and Fired’’ [Guangdong: dangyuan, guojia gongzuo renyuan fu guo (jing) wai chaosheng jiang bei kaichu dangji gongzhi], Xinhua, 17 January 13.

70 Women’s Rights in China, ‘‘Women’s Rights in China: Forced Abortion Phenomenon in Chi­na’s Rural Areas Still Serious’’ [Zhongguo fuquan: zhongguo nongcun qiangzhi liuchan xianxiang yiran yanzhong], 28 October 12; ChinaAid, ‘‘Mother of Two in Hubei Province Dies From Forced Sterilization Operation Ordered by Family Planning Officials Against Doctor’s Advice,’’ 6 April 13; ‘‘Chinese Man Dies After Attempted Forced Sterilization,’’ Radio Free Asia, 13 August 13.

71 See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 19–23. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 97.

72 See, e.g., Huang Xiuli, ‘‘ ‘Illegal Residents’ Born in Excess [of Family Planning Policies]: Liv­ing Like Shadows’’ [Chaosheng ‘‘heihu’’ de rensheng: xiang yingzi yiyang huozhe], SouthernWeekend, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 4 June 13; Mu Guangzong, ‘‘The Travails of Having a Sec­ond Child,’’ China Daily, 28 May 13. See also, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t HaveControl Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 13, 26. According to the CHRD report, ‘‘The man­agement of the hukou system is the domain of the Ministry of Public Security and it refusesto issue hukous to children without birth permits, children of unmarried parents, and children whose parents for some reasons have not completed the required procedures. Without a hukou, a child cannot apply for an ID card and thus does not have a legal identity, is not a citizen and consequently is deprived of the rights accorded to other Chinese citizens.’’

73 Huang Xiuli, ‘‘ ‘Illegal Residents’ Born in Excess [of Family Planning Policies]: Living Like Shadows’’ [Chaosheng ‘‘heihu’’ de rensheng: xiang yingzi yiyang huozhe], Southern Weekend, re­printed in Phoenix Net, 4 June 13.

74 Ibid.; ‘‘Separate and Unequal,’’ China Economic Review, 5 April 12; Yan Hao and Li Yanan,‘‘Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant Workers Face Dilemma,’’ Xinhua, 10 March 10; Tao Ran, ‘‘Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way To Reform,’’ China Daily, 22 March 10.

75 Peony Lui, ‘‘Outcry Over Blunders of China’s One-Child Policy,’’ South China Morning Post, 19 December 12.

76 ‘‘Total Population, CBR, CDR, NIR and TFR in China (1949–2000),’’ China Daily, 20 August

10.

77 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘The World Factbook,’’ last visited 12 September 13. While China’s National Bureau of Statistics estimated China’s fertility rate at 1.8 in 2007, inMay 2011, a group of Chinese academics publicly disputed the number, stating that it had been ‘‘grossly overestimated.’’ These academics estimated in 2011 that China’s total fertility rate moreaccurately stood anywhere from 1.63 to below 1.5. See ‘‘China’s Total Fertility Rate Grossly Overestimated: Academic,’’ Caijing, 17 May 11.

78 ‘‘China’s Working-Age Population Drops in 2012,’’ Xinhua, 18 January 13; Deirdre Wang Morris, ‘‘China’s Aging Population Threatens Its Manufacturing Might,’’ CNBC, 24 October 12.

79 State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Children (2011–2020) [Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao (2011–2020 nian)], issued 30 July 11, sec. 3(5)5. State Council Information Of­fice, ‘‘National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015),’’ 11 June 12, sec. III(3). The National Human Rights Action Plan states, ‘‘Discrimination against girls will be eliminated. The state . . . bans identification of the sex of a fetus for other than medical purposes and termi­nation of pregnancy in the case of a female fetus.’’ See also ‘‘Ban on Sex Testing To Help Bal­ance Girl-Boy Ratio,’’ Global Times, reprinted in People’s Daily, 25 May 12.

80 Liang Chen, ‘‘Boys Preferred, Lucrative Trade Remains in Illegal Fetus Gender Identifica­tion,’’ Global Times, 21 March 13; Wang Qingyun, ‘‘Crackdown Begins on Illegal Reproductive Clinics,’’ China Daily, 26 March 13.

81 For discussion of the continued practice and its impact, see ‘‘Liang Chen, ‘‘Boys Preferred, Lucrative Trade Remains in Illegal Fetus Gender Identification,’’ Global Times, 21 March 13.See also PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 22. According to Arti­cle 22, ‘‘Discrimination against, maltreatment, and abandonment of baby girls are prohibited.’’ For regulations prohibiting the practices of non-medically necessary gender determination testsand sex-selective abortion, see State Commission for Population and Family Planning, Ministry of Health, State Food and Drug Administration, ‘‘Regulations Regarding the Prohibition of Non-Medically Necessary Gender Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy’’ [Guanyu jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de taier xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie derengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 29 November 02, effective 1 January 03. For dis­cussion of these regulations, see ‘‘China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion,’’ Xinhua, reprinted inChina Net, 22 March 03.

82 Shan Juan, ‘‘Gender Imbalance Set To Ease,’’ China Daily, 30 March 12. According to ZhaiZhenwu, head of the social population college at Renmin University, there is a deeply rooted tradition of son preference, and this tradition remains in some areas, such as Guangdong prov­ince. Zhai also noted that ‘‘as fertility rates declined due to the family planning policy, the figure for male births surged ahead.’’ See also ‘‘Preference for Boys by Migrants,’’ China Internet Infor­mation Center, 15 December 11.

83 ‘‘China’s Sex Ratio at Birth Declines 4 Years in a Row,’’ Xinhua, 5 March 13. Accordingto Xinhua, China’s sex ratio at birth in 2012 was 117.7 males for every 100 females.

84 Ibid. According to Xinhua, China’s sex ratio at birth in 2012 was 117.7 males for every 100 females, down from 117.78 in 2011, 117.94 in 2010, and 119.45 in 2009. See also ‘‘China’s Sex Ratio at Birth Dropping,’’ North Side Net, translated in Women of China, 12 July 12. According to the North Side Net report, China’s sex ratio at birth in 2008 was 120.56.

85 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, ‘‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision,’’ June 2013; According to United Nations Population Division statistics, China’s sex ratio at birth (SRB) from 2005–2010 was the highest in the world at 117 males per 100 females born. Equally as high was Azerbaijan’s sex ratio at 117, followed by Armenia’s at 115, and India’s and Georgia’s at 111. ‘‘China’s Sex Ratio at Birth Dropping,’’ North Side Net, translated in Women of China, 12 July 12. According to the North Side Net report, which cites a 2012 National Population and Family Planning Com­mission Bulletin, ‘‘China’s sex ratio at birth in 2011 was 117.78, representing a drop of 0.16 compared to 2010. . . . The ratios of 2008, 2009 and 2010 were respectively 120.56, 119.45 and 117.94.’’

86 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ‘‘Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch’’ [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 10.

87 See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Trafficking in Persons Report 2013—China,’’ 19 June 13, 129; World Health Organization, Of­fice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Population Fund, United Na­tions Children’s Fund, and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, ‘‘Preventing Gender-Biased Sex Selection,’’ 14 June 11, 5; Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, ‘‘Gendercide and the Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China,’’ 32 Fordham International Law Journal 731, 752 (2009); Therese Hesketh et al., ‘‘The Effect of Chi­na’s One-Child Family Policy After 25 Years,’’ New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 353, No. 11 (2005), 1173; Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘‘A Global War Against Baby Girls: Sex-Selective Abor­tion Becomes a Worldwide Practice,’’ Handbook of Gender Medicine, reprinted in All Girls Al­lowed, 1 May 11. According to the Eberstadt article, ‘‘Some economists have hypothesized that mass feticide, in making women scarce, will only increase their ‘value’—but in settings where the legal and personal rights of the individual are not secure and inviolable, the ‘rising value of women’ can have perverse and unexpected consequences, including increased demand for prostitution and an upsurge in the kidnapping and trafficking of women (as is now reportedly being witnessed in some women-scarce areas in Asia)[.]’’

88 For Global Times reference, see Zhu Shanshan, ‘‘Shandong Baby Trafficking Ring Taken Down,’’ Global Times, 4 November 11. For recent domestic reports, see, e.g., ‘‘Xinhua Investiga­tion: Resold Several Thousand Miles Away, Changed Hands 7 Times—Tracing the Chain of Black [Market] Baby Trafficking Driven by Huge Profit’’ [Xinhua diaocha: zhuanmai shu qianli, daoshou da 7 ci—zhuizong baoli qudong xia de heise fanying lian], Xinhua, 24 December 12; Zhou Ping, ‘‘Two Officials Also Detained for Human Trafficking,’’ Global Times, 26 December

12. For international reports, see, e.g., Chen Weijun, ‘‘One Child Policy Leads to Baby Selling,’’ Asia News, 4 January 13; ‘‘What Is Fuelling Child Abduction in China? ’’ Al Jazeera, 27 Decem­ber 12.

89 ‘‘Xinhua Investigation: Resold Several Thousand Miles Away, Changed Hands 7 Times— Tracing the Chain of Black [Market] Baby Trafficking Driven by Huge Profit’’ [Xinhua diaocha: zhuanmai shu qianli, daoshou da 7 ci—zhuizong baoli qudong xia de heise fanying lian], Xinhua, 24 December 12; Zhou Ping, ‘‘Two Officials Also Detained for Human Trafficking,’’ Global Times, 26 December 12. See also, Malcolm Moore, ‘‘Chinese Family Planning Official Caught Traf­ficking in Children,’’ Telegraph, 4 January 13.

90 ‘‘Xinhua Investigation: Resold Several Thousand Miles Away, Changed Hands 7 Times— Tracing the Chain of Black [Market] Baby Trafficking Driven by Huge Profit’’ [Xinhua diaocha: zhuanmai shu qianli, daoshou da 7 ci—zhuizong baoli qudong xia de heise fanying lian], Xinhua, 24 December 12; Zhou Ping, ‘‘Two Officials Also Detained for Human Trafficking,’’ Global Times, 26 December 12.

91 ‘‘Jiangxi Guixi Welfare Institution Exposed, Suspected of Being Involved in ‘Reselling of In­fants’ ’’ [Jiangxi guixi fuliyuan bei pu shexian ‘‘daomai yinger’’], Shenzhen Consumer Online, 25 January 13. For an English translation of this article, see C. Custer, ‘‘Translation: Guixi Or­phanage Implicated in Re-Selling of Babies,’’ China Geeks, 13 February 13.

92 Ma Lie and Lei Lei, ‘‘Doctor Suspected of Child Trafficking,’’ China Daily, 3 August 13.

93 ‘‘China Vows To Seriously Punish Newborn Traffickers,’’ Xinhua, 6 August 13.

94 Ibid.

95 See, e.g., ‘‘Left Behind Children Become High Risk Group for Trafficking, Expert Suggests ‘Criminal Punishment for Child Buying’ ’’ [Liushou ertong cheng bei guai gaowei qunti zhuanjia jianyi ‘‘maitong ruxing’’], Southern Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily, 27 May 13; Liu Baijun, ‘‘Representative Chen Xiurong Suggests Punishing the Buyer Market in the Trafficking of Women and Children’’ [Chen xiurong daibiao jianyi chengzhi guaimai funu ertong maifang shichang], Legal Daily, 12 March 12; Zhu Shanshan, ‘‘Shandong Baby Trafficking Ring Taken Down,’’ Global Times, 4 November 11; ‘‘China Babies ‘Sold for Adoption,’ ’’ BBC, 2 July 09; Patri­cia J. Meier, ‘‘Small Commodities: How Child Traffickers Exploit Children and Families in Adop­tion and What the United States Must Do To Fight Them,’’ Journal of Gender, Race & Justice, Vol. 12, No. 1, 16 September 08, 10–11; Beth Loyd, ‘‘China’s Lost Children,’’ ABC News, 12 May 08; Peter S. Goodman, ‘‘Stealing Babies for Adoption,’’ Washington Post, 12 March 06.

96 See, e.g., Rao Dehong, ‘‘7 Female Primary School Students From Liangshan Lured to Work in Dongguan Will Be Returned to School’’ [7 ming liangshan xiaoxue nusheng bei you zhi dongguan wugong jiang bei jiehui fanxiao shangxue], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 6 December 12; ‘‘8 Sentenced for Abducting, Murdering Children in China as Govt Tries To Combat Traf­ficking,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 15 August 11.

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement

1 PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.

2 Kam Wing Chan, ‘‘Crossing the 50 Percent Population Rubicon: Can China Urbanize to Pros­perity? ’’ Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2012), 67–68.

3 Ibid., 66–67.

4 Ibid., 67.

5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General As­sembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1),12(3), 26. China has signed and expressed intent to ratify the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1).

6 ‘‘Ma Jiantang: Resolutely Taking a Path of New Increase—National Statistics Bureau Chief Is Guest in Xinhua Interview’’ [Ma jiantang: jianjue zou yi tiao xin zengzhang zhi lu—guojia tongjiju juzhang zuoke xinhuawang fangtan], National Bureau of Statistics of China, 16 July 13; Wang Su, ‘‘Cracking the Hukou Code to Hasten Urbanization,’’ Caixin, 7 August 13.

7 Xu Xiaodan et al., ‘‘Survey on Rural Workers and Urbanization: Close to Half of Migrant Workers in Cities Have No Social Security’’ [Nongminhua yu chengzhenhua diaocha: jin ban jincheng nongmingong wu shehui baozhang], Ban Yue Tan, reprinted in China News Service, 9 July 13. The survey, conducted by Ban Yue Tan Social Conditions and Public Opinion Re­search Center at the behest of the National Development and Reform Commission, revealed that

54.81 percent of migrant workers in cities responded that they participated in social security programs.

8 ‘‘Work Units Must Hire More Workers, Which Aspects Show Employment Discrimination? ’’ [Danwei xuyao zhaoshou yuangong, jiuye qishi biaoxian zai na xie fangmian?], Fabang Net, 16 January 13; Fan Chunxu et al., ‘‘This Year’s Graduating Students Encounter Household Reg­istration and Age Restrictions While Seeking Employment’’ [Yingjie shengqiu zhi yu huji nianling xianzhi], Beijing News, 20 May 13; Wan Jing, ‘‘Enterprises and Work Unit Hiring No­tices Become Household Residence Discrimination Disaster Zones’’ [Shiye danwei cheng zhaopin huji qishi zhongzaiqu], Legal Daily, 29 May 13.

9 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Graduate Makes Formal Complaint Against Local Government for Hukou Discrimination,’’ 16 May 13; Cao Jingmei, ‘‘Scholar: Hukou Discrimination is Regrettably China’s Greatest Unfairness’’ [Xue zhe: huji qishi kong shi zhongguo jiuye zui da bu gongping], Sound of Hope, 15 May 13; ‘‘Employment Discrimination Inventory: Educational Background is Checked Back Three Generations, Requirements for Hukou and Appearance’’ [Jiuye qishi pandian: xueli cha sandai hukou xiangmao you yaoqiu], China Newsweek, reprinted in Sina, 22 May 13.

10 ‘‘China’s First Court Case of Hukou-Based Employment Discrimination’’ [Zhongguo huji jiuye qishi di yi an], Radio Free Asia, 15 May 13. The Nanjing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau passed over a recent female college graduate from Anhui province for a job opportunity due to her rural Anhui hukou. Dong Wanyu, ‘‘Woman From Anhui Blocked From Accepting Employment Position in Nanjing Because of Household Registration’’ [Anhui yi nu nanjing ying pin yin huji shou fang], Yangtse Evening Post, 15 April 13.

11 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 20 November 12.

12 Barbara Demick, ‘‘Red Tape Bars Many Students from China’s Top Colleges,’’ Los Angeles Times, 25 July 13; Wei Xue, ‘‘Non-Beijing Hukou Exam Students Who Returned Home to Take Test State Grades Changed From Excellent to ‘Poor,’ Their Spirits Have Dropped Significantly’’ [Fei jingji kaosheng huixiang gaokao: chengji youxiu bian ‘‘diandi’’ xinli luocha da], China Na­tional Radio, 7 June 13; Liu Jinsong, ‘‘ ‘Non-Household Registration’ Protester Zhan Haite’’ [‘‘Fei huji’’ kangzhengzhe zhan haite], Economic Observer, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 30 November 12; Zhan Haite, ‘‘Teen Girl Makes Case for Change,’’ China Daily, 7 December 12.

13 Koh Gui Qing, ‘‘Beatings, Evictions Reveal Ugly Side of China’s Local Debt Pile,’’ Reuters, 2 September 13; ‘‘Land Clashes Spring From ‘Colonial’ Spread of Cities,’’ Radio Free Asia, 11 March 13; ‘‘Chinese Voice Anger and Nostalgia Over Urbanization,’’ New York Times, 16 June

13.

14 ‘‘China Urbanization to Hit Roadblocks Amid Local Opposition,’’ Bloomberg, 12 August 13; Yin Yeping, ‘‘Locals Oppose Changes to Gaokao Policy,’’ Global Times, 22 October 12; Wei Xue, ‘‘Non-Beijing Hukou Exam Students Who Returned Home to Take Test State Grades Changed From Excellent to ‘Poor,’ Their Spirits Have Dropped Significantly’’ [Fei jingji kaosheng huixiang gaokao: chengji youxiu bian ‘‘diandi’’ xinli luocha da], China National Radio, 7 June

13.

15 Jin Hui, ‘‘Reform of Hukou, Land, and Financial Systems, Elimination of the Two Layered Structure’’ [Gaige huji tudi caizheng zhidu pochu er yuan jiegou], Economic Information Daily, 30 August 13; ‘‘New Urbanization Requires Participation from Corporations and Entrepeneurs’’ [Xinxing chengzhenhua xuyao qiye he qiyejia canyu], Beijing News, 12 August 13; ‘‘China Ur­banization To Hit Roadblocks Amid Local Opposition,’’ Bloomberg, 12 August 13.

16 ‘‘State Council: Residential Permit Administrative Measures To Be Released and Reform of Household Registration System To Be Advanced Within the Year’’ [Guowuyuan: nian nei chutai juzhuzheng guanli banfa tuijin huji gaige], Guandian Real Estate Net, 7 May 13; ‘‘China’s Hukou System Puts Migrant Workers at Severe Economic Disadvantage,’’ The World, Public Radio International, 1 May 13; ‘‘Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang Ph.D Theses Both Mention Hukou Re­form’’ [Xi jinping li keqiang boshi lunwen jun ti huji gaige], Chengdu Evening News, 20 May

13.

17 Zhou Yu, ‘‘National Development and Reform Commission: Next Year Will Accelerate Re­form of the Household Registration System’’ [Fagaiwei: ming nian jiang jiakuai huji zhidu gaige], Beijing Times, reprinted in The People’s Daily, 19 December 12; ‘‘Elimination of House­hold Registration Barriers Suggested,’’ Xinhua, 27 June 13.

18 ‘‘Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang Ph.D Theses Both Mention Hukou Reform’’ [Xi jinping li keqiang boshi lunwen jun ti huji gaige], Chengdu Evening News, 20 May 13.

19 ‘‘Elimination of Household Registration Barriers Suggested,’’ Xinhua, 27 June 13; Wu Nan, ‘‘China Eases Household Registration Rules,’’ South China Morning Post, 28 June 13.

20 Kan Feng, ‘‘2012 Cities Bluebook: Development of China’s Cities Face Ten Major Chal­lenges’’ [2012 nian chengshi lanpishu: zhongguo chengshi fazhan mianlin shi da tiaozhan], China News Service, 14 August 12; Liu Rong, ‘‘City Bluebook: 500 Million Farmers Will Need To Be ‘Urbanized’ in the Next 20 Years’’ [Chengshi lanpishu: weilai 20 nian you jin 5 yi nongmin xuyao ‘‘shiminhua’’], People’s Daily, 15 August 12. The original report does not appear to be publicly available. Yu Qian, ‘‘More Than Half of All Chinese Live in Cities, As Rural Exo­dus Continues,’’ Global Times, 15 August 12.

21 Sun Xuemei, ‘‘Experts Say Household Registration System Reform Encounters Opposition from Local Governments Causing Difficulty in Implementation’’ [Zhuanjia cheng huji zhidu gaige zao difang zhengfu fandui zhi qi nan luoshi], Beijing Times, 12 November 12; ‘‘Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang Ph.D Theses Both Mention Hukou Reform’’ [Xi jinping li keqiang boshi lunwen jun ti huji gaige], Chengdu Evening News, 20 May 13; ‘‘China Urbanization to Hit Roadblocks Amid Local Opposition,’’ Bloomberg, 12 August 13; ‘‘Accounting for the Costs of Hukou Reform’’ [Huji gaige de chengben zhang], Caixin New Century, No. 30, 5 August 13.

22 State Council General Office, Circular Regarding the Active and Sound Implementation of Household Registration Management System Reform [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiji wentuo tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de tongzhi], issued 26 February 11; ‘‘State Council General Office Issues Circular Regarding the Active and Sound Implementation of Household Registra­tion Management System Reform’’ [Guowuyuan bangongting fabu guanyu jiji wentuo tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de tongzhi], Xinhua, 24 February 12; Jiang Yunxin, ‘‘China Puts Forward Clear Urbanization Pathway for the First Time; Guarantees Reasonable Housing Requirements’’ [Woguo shouci mingque chu chengzhenhua lujing baozhang heli zhufang xuqiu], Beijing News, 27 June 13.

23 The Commission observed implementation opinions and plans of the 2011 Circular and its related hukou reforms in several provinces, municipalities, prefectures and provincial-level au­tonomous regions. These include Ma’anshan Prefecture in Anhui province, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. See General Office of the Ma’anshan Prefectural People’s Government, General Office of the Ma’anshan Prefectural Peo­ple’s Government Implementing Opinion Regarding the Active and Sound Promotion of House­hold Registration Management System Reform [Ma’anshanshi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu jiji wentuo tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 7 March 13; Xinjiang Uyhgur Autonomous Region Public Security Bureau, Xinjiang Uyhgur Autonomous Region Pub­lic Security Bureau Implementation Details on Furthering Reform of the Household Registration Management System (Trial) [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu gong’anting guanyu tuijin huji guanli zhidu gaige de shishi xize (shixing)], effective 1 September 12; General Office of the Inner Mon­golia Autonomous Region People’s Government, General Office of the Inner Mongolia Autono­mous Region People’s Government Implementing Opinion on Deepening Reform of the House­hold Registration Management System [Neimenggu zizhiqu renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu shenhua huji guanli zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 29 May 11.

24 Chang Meng, ‘‘MOE Wants to Broaden Gaokao Access,’’ Global Times, 27 November 12.

25 Beijing Municipal People’s Government, Beijing Municipal Department of Education and Four Other Departments Circular Regarding the Dissemination of the ‘‘Work Plan for the Ac­companying Children of Migrant Workers to Take Entrance Examinations in Beijing After Re­ceiving Compulsory Education’’ [Guanyu zhuanfa shijiaowei deng si bumen zhiding de ‘‘jincheng wugong renyuan suiqian zinu jieshou yiwu jiaoyu hou zai jing canjia shengxue kaoshi gongzuo fang’an’’ de tongzhi], issued 29 December 12, reprinted in Beijing Education Services Research; Shanghai Municipal People’s Government General Office, Shanghai Municipal Department of Education and Four Other Departments Circular Regarding the Dissemination of the ‘‘Work Plan for the Accompanying Children of Migrant Workers to Take Entrance Examinations in Shanghai After Receiving Compulsory Education’’ [Guanyu zhuanfa shijiaowei deng si bumen zhiding de ‘‘jincheng wugong renyuan suiqian zinu jieshou yiwu jiaoyu hou zai hu canjia shengxue kaoshi gongzuo fang’an’’ de tongzhi], issued 27 December 12, reprinted in Central Peo­ple’s Government of the People’s Republic of China; Guangdong Provincial People’s Government General Office, Guangdong Province Department of Education and Other Departments Circular Pertaining to ‘‘How To Do a Good Job on Disseminating the Work Opinion on the Children of Migrant Workers Taking Entrance Examinations in Guangdong After Receiving Compulsory Education’’ [Guangdongsheng renmin zhengfu bangongting zhuanfa shengjiaoyuting deng bumen guanyu zuohao jincheng wu gongrenyuan suiqian zinu jieshou yiwu jiaoyu hou zai wo sheng canjia shengxue kaoshi gongzuo yijian de tongzhi], issued 29 December 12. See also ‘‘Au­thorities Issue New Education Policies for Children of Migrant Workers,’’ Congressional-Execu­tive Commission on China, 2 April 13.

26 Wei Xue, ‘‘Non-Beijing Hukou Exam Students Who Returned Home To Take Test State Grades Changed from Excellent to ‘Poor,’ Their Spirits Have Dropped Significantly’’ [Fei jingji kaosheng huixiang gaokao: chengji youxiu bian ‘‘diandi’’ xinli luocha da], China National Radio, 7 June 13; Yin Yeping, ‘‘Locals Oppose Changes to Gaokao Policy,’’ Global Times, 22 October 12; Barbara Demick, ‘‘Red Tape Bars Many Students from China’s Top Colleges,’’ Los Angeles Times, 25 July 13; ‘‘Migrants Banned From Beijing Exam,’’ Radio Free Asia, 23 November 12.

27 Wuhan Municipal People’s Government, Wuhan Municipal People’s Government’s Opinion on Further Encouraging Graduates to Work and Innovate in Wuhan [Wuhanshi renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu guli gaoxiao biyesheng zai han chuangxin chuangye de yijian], issued 10 April 13; ‘‘Restrictions on College Graduates Setting Up Residence in Wuhan, Hubei Again Relaxed’’ [Hubei wuhan biyesheng luohu zai fangkuan], Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily, 21 May 13; An Baijie, ‘‘Wuhan Lifts Hukou Restrictions on College Students,’’ China Daily, 10 May 13.

28 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, Shanghai Municipality Residence Permit Admin­istrative Measures [Shanghaishi juzhuzheng guanli banfa], passed 20 May 13, effective 1 July13, chap. 2, art. 9, 18. The points system replaces Shanghai’s original classification system. Those non-Shanghai residents with steady employment who have participated in their workunit’s social security system for at least six months, or those who rely on or live with family members with a Shanghai hukou, or have attended school or undertaken advanced studies in Shanghai for six months or more are eligible to participate in this system and apply for a resi­dence permit (juzhu zheng). See also Li Xin and Tian Xiaodong, ‘‘Shanghai’s Residential PermitRegulation Point System To Replace Classification System in Determining Children’s Access to Education’’ [Hu juzhuzheng guanli banfa jifen zhi daiti fenlei, fenzhi jueding zinu jiuxue],Xinming Net, 19 June 13.

29 Guangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, Guangzhou Municipal Public Security Bu­reau Department of Residence Explanation on Main Questions Regarding the Handling of Changing Household Registration [Guangzhou gong’an huzheng bumen jieda banli huanfahukoubu yewu redian wenti], 6 May 13; General Office of the Guangzhou Municipal People’s Government, Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee, ‘‘Guiding Opinion Regarding the Accelera­tion of the Unification of the New Structure for Urban and Rural Economic and Social Develop­ment’’ [Guanyu jiakuai xingcheng chengxiang jingji shehui fazhan yitihua xin geju de shishiyijian], 18 May 09; Zheng Caixiong, ‘‘Guangzhou Moves to Abolish Rural Hukou,’’ China Daily, 10 May 13; ‘‘Guangzhou Household Registration Reform, A Single Urban/Rural Household Reg­istration Classification To Be Realized by 2014’’ [Guangzhou huji gaige 2014 nian jiang shixian chengxiang yige hukou], Guangzhou Local Treasure, 19 December 12.

30 General Office of the Guangdong Provincial People’s Government, ‘‘Work Plan To Further Promote the Equalization and Comprehensive Reform of Basic Public Services (2012–2014)’’[Shenru tuijin jiben gongong fuwu jundenghua zonghe gaige gongzuo fang’an (2012–2014 nian)], 17 April 12, sec. 2, art. 2; Hong Yiyi, ‘‘Household Registration System Reform Allows Residentsto Enjoy Equal Status’’ [Huji zhidu gaige rang jumin xiang tongdeng daiyu], Southern Daily, 8 January 13.

31 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly res­olution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2). A similar pro­tection granting ‘‘everyone . . . the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country’’ is provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A

(III) of 10 December 48, art. 13(2).32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly res­olution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12(3).

33 PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa], issued 29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 13(7); PRC Exit and Entry Control Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chujingrujing guanli fa] issued 30 June 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 12(5).

34 For examples of restrictions on international travel of rights advocates, see Chinese HumanRights Defenders, ‘‘Rights Lawyer Tang Jitian Was Blocked from Going to Hong Kong’’ [Weiquan lushi tang jitian chu guan qianwang xianggang bei zu], 15 January 13; ChineseHuman Rights Defenders, ‘‘Ding Hongfen Applies to Get a Passport, Wuxi City Public Security Office Denies Approval’’ [Ding hongfen shenqing qianfa huzhao, wuxi shi gonganju buyupizhun], 5 January 13; Gillian Wong, ‘‘Denied Passport, Tibet Poet Can’t Receive US Award,’’ Associated Press, 8 March 13. For examples of restrictions on international travel of familymembers of rights advocates, see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘The Wife of Famous Chi­nese Political Prisoner Liu Xianbin Has Been Unable To Obtain Her Passport With No Hopefor Visiting Her Daughter During Chinese New Year’’ [Dalu zhuming zhengzhifan liu xianbin qizi chen mingxian huzhao wufa banli chunjie tanwang nuer wuwang], 8 February 13;‘‘Shandong Police Deny Chen Family Passport Bid,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 February 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Daughter of Zhejiang Dissident Lu Gengsong Again Prevented fromTraveling to Hong Kong’’ [Zhejiang yiyirenshi lu gengsong nuer qu xianggang zaici bei zu], 9 July 13.

35 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political Cudgel,’’ New York Times, 22 February 13.

36 Ibid.; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2012, China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau), 19April 13; ‘‘Beijing Refuses To Issue Passports To Strictly Control Entry and Exit, 14 Million on the Blacklist’’ [Beijing ju fa zhengzhao yankong churujing 1400 wan ren shang heimingdan],Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13.

37 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2012, China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau), 19 April 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political Cudgel,’’ New York Times, 22 Feb­ruary 13; ‘‘Beijing Refuses To Issue Passports To Strictly Control Entry and Exit, 14 Million on the Blacklist,’’ [Beijing ju fa zhengzhao yan kong churujing 1400 wan ren shang heimingdan], Radio Free Asia, 25 February 13.

38 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political Cudgel,’’ New York Times, 22 February 13.

39 Gillian Wong, ‘‘Denied Passport, Tibet Poet Can’t Receive US Award,’’ Associated Press, 8 March 13; Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks at the International Women of Courage Awards, Dean Acheson Auditorium, 8 March 13.

40 Andrews Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit: China Uses Passports as Political Cudgel,’’ New York Times, 22 February 13.

41 Xu Zhiyong, ‘‘Cause and Effect—A Dialogue on the New Citizens’ Movement’’ [Yinguo—yici guanyu xin gongmin yundong de duihua], Xu Zhiyong Collected Works (blog), 24 April 13; Pat­rick Boehler, ‘‘Leading Citizen Movement Activist Xu Zhiyong Arrested,’’ South China Morning Post, 17 July 13. This international symposium to which Xu was invited commemorated the an­niversary of the beating death of Sun Zhigang, who died after being taken into police custody for registration permit questioning in 2003. After Sun’s death, Xu worked with other activists to abolish ‘‘custody and repatriation’’ centers. For more information, see Zan Aizong, ‘‘Rights De­fense and ‘Non-Violent Non-Cooperation,’ ’’ Human Rights in China, China Rights Forum, Issue 1, 2009; Keith J. Hand, ‘‘Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China,’’ Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45, 2006, 114–95. For more information on the case of Xu Zhiyong, see ‘‘Offi­cials Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling for Greater Government Accountability,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 August 13.

42 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘The Wife of Famous Chinese Political Prisoner Liu Xianbin Has Been Unable to Obtain Her Passport and Is Therefore Unable to Visit Her Daugh­ter During Chinese New Year’’ [Dalu zhuming zhengzhifan liu xianbin qizi chen mingxian huzhao wufa banli chunjie tanwang nuer wuwang], 8 February 13.

43 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Daughter of Zhejiang Dissident Lu Gengsong Again Prevented from Traveling to Hong Kong’’ [Zhejiang yiyirenshi lu gengsong nuer qu xianggang zaici bei zu], 9 July 13.

44 ‘‘Shandong Police Deny Chen Family Passport Bid,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 February 13; Ed­ward Wong, ‘‘Family of China Rights Advocate Given Passports,’’ New York Times, 7 June 13.

45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly res­olution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12(1). Similar protec­tion granting ‘‘everyone . . . the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state’’ is provided for in the See Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Universal Dec­laration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A

(III) of 10 December 48, art. 13(1).

46 See, e.g., ‘‘Zhang Lin and Daughter Successfully Flee Anhui to Start New Life’’ [Zhang lin funu chenggong taoli anhui guo xin shenghuo], Radio Free Asia, 19 June 13; ‘‘Ilham Tohti Again Placed Under Home Confinement, Uyghur Students Who Posted Online Are Detained’’ [Yilihamu zaidu zao ruanjin weizu xuesheng wangluo fa wen bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 31 July

13.

47 See, e.g., ‘‘Chen Guangfu Forced to Return Home From Shanghai Visit,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 August 13; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ‘‘Hada and Family Mem­bers Still Missing,’’ 24 February 13. For more information on the case of Hada and his family, see ‘‘Authorities Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights Advocate’s Wife and Son,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 December 12.

48 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘In the Name of ‘Stability,’ 2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,’’ March 2013, 1, 4–6.

49 Jared Genser, ‘‘In China, Repression is a Family Affair,’’ Wall Street Journal, 25 April 13. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010–00629 for information on Liu Xia’s case.

50 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘In the Name of ‘Stability,’ 2012 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,’’ March 2013, 4–5; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: End Unlawful Practice of House Arrest,’’ 24 October 12. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2008–00228 for information on Feng Zhenghu’s case.

51 Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Detains a Leading Human Rights Advocate,’’ New York Times, 17 July 13; Xu Zhiyong, ‘‘Cause and Effect—A Dialogue on the New Citizens’ Movement’’ [Yinguo— yici guanyu xin gongmin yundong de duihua], Xu Zhiyong Collected Works (blog), 24 April 13. For more information on the case of Xu Zhiyong, see ‘‘Officials Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a Crackdown on Individuals Calling for Greater Government Accountability,’’ Congressional-Exec­utive Commission on China, 1 August 13.

52 ‘‘Activists Released After Congress,’’ Radio Free Asia, 16 November 12.

53 ‘‘As National CPPCC Opens Many Rights Activists Faced With Different Degrees of Soft De­tention’’ [Quanguo zhengxie kaimu duoming weiquan renshi zaodao butong chengdu de ruanjin], Radio Free Asia, 3 March 13.

54 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Anhui Dissident Wang Yixiang Has Dealt with Re­stricted Movement as June 4th Approaches’’ [Anhui yiyirenshi wang yixiang yin liusi linjin bei xianzhi renshen ziyou], 2 June 13; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘As June 4th Approaches Zhejiang Democracy Party Members Receive Stricter Controls’’ [Liusi linjin zhejiang minzhudang ren shou yan kong], 1 June 13.

55 ‘‘Activists Released After Congress,’’ Radio Free Asia, 16 November 12.

56 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Anhui Dissident Wang Yixiang Has Dealt with Re­stricted Movement as June 4th Approaches’’ [Anhui yiyirenshi wang yixiang yin liusi linjin bei xianzhi renshen ziyou], 2 June 13.

Notes to Section II—Status of Women

1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 September 81. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last vis­ited 14 September 12. Under Article 7 of CEDAW, China is committed to ensuring the right of women, on equal terms with men, ‘‘to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government.’’

2 The PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the PRC Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses stipulate that an ‘‘appropriate number’’ of female deputies should serve at all levels of people’s congresses. PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 6.

3 State Council Information Office, ‘‘National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012– 2015),’’ 11 June 12, sec. III(2); State Council, ‘‘PRC Outline for the Development of Women (2011–2020)’’ [Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao (2011–2020)], issued 30 July 11, sec. 3(4).

4 Christophe Bahuet, ‘‘The Importance of Women’s Leadership,’’ China Daily, 6 November 12.

5 The target of 30 percent female representation in leadership positions by 1995 was set by the UN Commission on the Status of Women at its 34th session in 1990. ‘‘Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to Women by 1995—United Nations Commission on the Status of Women,’’ UN Chronicle, June 1990, reprinted in Popline.

6 China’s Politburo Standing Committee decreased from nine members in the prior two Party Congresses to seven members in the 18th Party Congress. See Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘Changing of the Guard: Grabs for Power Behind Plan to Shrink Elite Circle,’’ New York Times, 1 November 12.

7 Jaime A. FlorCruz and Jethro Mullen, ‘‘After Months of Mystery, China Unveils New Top Leaders,’’ CNN, 16 November 12. Prior to the appointment of China’s new leadership, some po­litical observers had speculated that Liu Yandong might have become the first woman promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee. See Zhuang Pinghui, ‘‘Breaking the Glass Ceiling in the Politburo Standing Committee,’’ South China Morning Post, 19 September 12.

8 State Councilor Sun Chunlan reportedly joined State Councilor Liu Yandong as the second woman to hold a position on the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee. See Benjamin Kang Lim and Michael Martina, ‘‘China’s Politburo Has More Women, Is Young­er—But Barely,’’ Reuters, 15 November 12.

9 ‘‘Members of the 18th CPC Central Committee,’’ Xinhua, 14 November 12; Kerry Brown, ‘‘Chinese Politics—Still a Man’s World,’’ CNN, Global Public Square (blog), 27 August 12. Ac­cording to the Global Public Square blog report, the number of women on the previous (17th) Communist Party Central Committee was 13 out of 204 members. See also Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘‘Chinese Women’s Progress Stall on Many Fronts,’’ New York Times, 6 March 12.

10 He Dan and Zhu Zhe, ‘‘Women Assume Bigger Role,’’ China Daily, 8 November 12. Accord­ing to the China Daily, 521 of 2,270 (22.95 percent) of the delegates to the 18th Party Congress were female, up from 20 percent at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and 18 percent at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. See also National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘Number of Depu­ties to All the Previous National People’s Congresses’’ [Lijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao renshu], China Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2012, Table 23–1. According to the 2012 China Statistical Yearbook, female representation in China’s parliament has stayed around 21 percent since the late 1970s.

11 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘‘Number of Deputies to All the Previous National People’s Congresses’’ [Lijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao renshu], China Statistical Yearbook 2012, 2012, Table 23–1.

12 Li Bin (Minister of the new National Health and Family Planning Commission) and Wu Aiying (Minister of Justice) are reported to be the only female members of China’s newly ap­pointed State Council. The number used to be 4 out of 35. See ‘‘China Unveils New Cabinet Amid Function Reform,’’ Xinhua, 17 March 13. See also Jen-Kai Liu, ‘‘The Main National Lead­ership of the PRC,’’ China Data Supplement, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3; Michael Forsythe and Yidi Zhao, ‘‘Women Knowing China Men Rule Prove Mao’s Half the Sky Remains Unfulfilled,’’ Bloomberg, 23 June 11.

13 Only four women since 1949 have served in this high-ranking position; of these, Wu Yi served most recently, and retired in 2008. See All-China Women’s Federation, ‘‘China’s Four Fe­male Vice Premiers Since 1949,’’ 22 March 13. See also Jen-Kai Liu, ‘‘The Main National Lead­ership of the PRC,’’ China Data Supplement, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3.

14 Christophe Bahuet, ‘‘The Importance of Women’s Leadership,’’ China Daily, 6 November 12; Julie Makinen, ‘‘Where are China’s Women Leaders? ’’ Los Angeles Times, reprinted in Christian Science Monitor, 14 November 12.

15 Rangita de Silva de Alwis, ‘‘Women Leading in Lawmaking in China—Introduction,’’ Global Women’s Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center, February 2013, 7.

16 Li Huiying, ‘‘Women Leading in Lawmaking in China—The Pain of Chinese Urbanization: Strengthening of Gender Layering,’’ Global Women’s Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center, Feb­ruary 2013, 14–18.

17 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, ‘‘Asia-Pacific Calls for Urgent Increase to Low Participation of Women in Politics,’’ 4 February 13.

18 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, art. 11. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980. See United Nations Treaty Collection, ChapterIV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited 14 September 12.

19 Liu Xiaonan, ‘‘Women Leading in Lawmaking in China—Research Report on Employment Discrimination in 2011 Civil Service Recruitment,’’ Global Women’s Leadership Initiative, Wil­son Center, February 2013, 20, 22–23. For additional examples of gender discrimination in hir­ing, see Chen Xin, ‘‘Gender Bias Seen in Job Fair Ads,’’ China Daily, 25 February 13; PeterKuhn and Kailing Shen, ‘‘Gender Discrimination in Job Ads: Evidence From China,’’ Depart­ment of Economics, University of California Santa Barbara, 6 June 12; Zhou Xiangyi, Zhang Jie,and Song Xuetao, ‘‘Gender Discrimination in Hiring: Evidence from 19,130 Resumes in China,’’ Xi’an Jiaotong University, Texas A&M University, North Carolina State University, 3 January

13. 20 Rangita de Silva de Alwis, ‘‘Women Leading in Lawmaking in China—Introduction,’’ GlobalWomen’s Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center, February 2013, 2–3.

21 Guo Huimin, ‘‘Women Leading in Lawmaking in China—Pregnancy Discrimination: Abroga­tion and Restoration of Rights,’’ Global Women’s Leadership Initiative, Wilson Center, February 2013, 56.

22 Amy Li, ‘‘Job-seekers in Wuhan Protest Government-Imposed Gynaecological Tests,’’ South China Morning Post, 28 November 12.

23 Raef Lawson, Institute of Management Accountants, ‘‘Salary Survey,’’ October 2012, 41. Ac­cording to the IMA report, Chinese women’s salary is on average about 58.6 percent that ofmen’s, and their total compensation is on average about 54 percent that of men’s.

24 Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and Party officials are 60 and55, respectively, while retirement ages for male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, respectively. For regulations on retirement ages for most workers, see State Council ProvisionalMeasures on Workers’ Retirement and Withdrawal from Office [Guowuyuan guanyu gongren tuixiu, tuizhi de zanxing banfa], 24 May 78, art. 1. For regulations on extended retirement agesfor cadres, see State Council Provisional Measures on the Settlement of Elderly, Weak, Sick, and Disabled Cadres [Guowuyuan guanyu anzhi lao ruo bing can ganbu de zanxing banfa], 2June 78, art. 4. See also, ‘‘China’s Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Chal­lenged for Violating Constitution’’ [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding bei tiqing weixianshencha], Legal Morning Post, reprinted in China Law Education Net, 16 March 06. For infor­mation on the current debate about raising the retirement age, see Chen Xin, ‘‘Retirement AgeWill Be Pushed Back: Minister,’’ China Daily, 22 March 11; Mark W. Frazier, ‘‘No Country for Old Age,’’ New York Times, 18 February 13.

25 Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion Regulations [Shenzhen jingji tequ xingbie pingdeng cujintiaoli], passed 28 June 12, issued 10 July 12, effective 1 January 13. See also ‘‘Shenzhen Passes China’s First Anti-Gender Discrimination Law,’’ China Briefing, 23 August 12.

26 Chen Xin, ‘‘Gender Bias Seen in Job Fair Ads,’’ China Daily, 25 February 13.

27 Ibid. ‘‘Huang Yizhi of Beijing Ruifeng Law Firm said labor laws have made gender discrimi­nation in employment illegal but they lack language on fines for violations . . . Huang said labor authorities’ efforts to design codes to fine violators could serve as a deterrent to employersand also help encourage victims to seek protection of their rights.’’

28 Zhuang Qinghong and Zhang Yiting, ‘‘First Successful Compensation in Gender Discrimina­tion Case’’ [Xingbie qishi an shouci chenggong huopei], China Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 31 January 13.

29 PRC Education Law [Zhongguo renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], issued 18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, art. 9.

30 China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 20 November 12; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘‘Women in China Face Rising University Entry Barriers,’’ New York Times, 7October 12. According to one woman cited in The New York Times, universities ‘‘make it harder for women to get in to study Arabic’’ because university administrators ‘‘believe that Arab na­tions don’t want to deal with women.’’

31 Luo Wangshu, ‘‘Ministry Defends Gender Ratios for Colleges,’’ China Daily, 17 October 12.For additional information on the use of gender-based quotas by Chinese universities, see China Labour Bulletin, ‘‘Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 20 November 12.

32 Luo Wangshu, ‘‘Ministry Defends Gender Ratios for Colleges,’’ China Daily, 17 October 12.

33 PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], passed 10 September 80, effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 234, 236, 237, 260.

34 Legal Daily reported in January 2013 that one in three families have experienced domestic violence, and statistics released by the All-China Women’s Federation in the same month sug­gest one in four women have experienced domestic violence. Zhou Bin, ‘‘Plans To Issue Stand­ardized Document Guiding Domestic Violence Criminal Trials’’ [Ni chutai guifanxing wenjian zhidao jiabao xing’an shenpan], Legal Daily, 13 January 13; Zhao Wen, ‘‘Domestic Violence Oc­curs in 1/4 Chinese Homes,’’ Shanghai Daily, 23 January 13. According to the All-China Wom­en’s Federation statistics cited in Shanghai Daily, of the women surveyed who reported experi­encing domestic violence, around 5 percent reported physical violence, and a large majority of these cases affected rural women. See also Lin Zhiwen and Wang Biaochen, All-China Women’s Federation, ‘‘Domestic Violence and Family Issues in Guangdong Province,’’ 11 April 13.

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