II. Human Rights

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Introduction

During the 2014 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to strengthen controls over freedom of expression, particularly online expression, violating international standards and protections for freedom of expression in China’s Constitution and other domestic legislation. As a result, people ranging from independent journalists and media professionals to local organizers and rights lawyers faced censorship, official harassment, and detention amid ongoing crackdowns, in some cases due to sensitivity surrounding the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Government and Party officials showed heightened, high-level concern regarding their ability to control the Internet and signaled renewed efforts to strengthen their control over the Internet. Such efforts appeared to target the online activity of rights and democracy advocates, as well as others who used the Internet to express peaceful criticism of the government or Party.

International Standards on Free Expression

This past year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to restrict expression in ways that contravened international human rights standards. According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which China has signed and stated its intent to ratify—and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, expression may be restricted only if such restrictions are (1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting national security, public order, public health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve the purported aim. Regarding requirement (1), an October 2009 UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution stated that restrictions on “discussion of government policies and political debate,” “peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy,” and “expression of opinion and dissent” are inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. At the October 2013 session of the UNHRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government’s human rights record, member states expressed concerns over restrictions on freedom of expression in China, including expression online, and urged China to ratify the ICCPR. In its official response to the UPR recommendations, the Chinese government stated that China’s Constitution, laws, and government protect freedom of expression in China but it did not provide further information on any specific protections for freedom of expression.

Some government and Party sources appealed to the concept of “Internet sovereignty” to defend the claim that China has sole authority to set standards for governance of the Internet within its borders. For example, a June 2014 article in the People’s Daily—the official news media of the Communist Party—asserted that...
“the concept of ‘Internet sovereignty’ conforms to the rules of international law” and that “other countries do not have the right to interfere.”9 The UNHRC, to which China was reelected in November 2013,10 has emphasized that international standards for freedom of expression online apply to all countries, regardless of state borders. In a June 2012 resolution, the UNHRC affirmed that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice.”11

Growth and Control of the Internet and Mobile Communications

EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS

China’s Internet landscape has experienced dramatic growth in recent years, particularly in the number of Internet users accessing the Web through mobile devices. According to the China Internet Network Information Center, which operates under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT),12 there were 632 million Internet users in China by the end of June 2014, bringing Internet users to 46.9 percent of the total population.13 Also by late June 2014, 527 million people in China reportedly accessed the Internet from mobile devices, amounting to 83.4 percent of all Internet users in China.14

Amid this growth, the Chinese government continued to take steps to expand the country’s telecommunications infrastructure and provide greater Internet access. For example, in December 2013, MIIT issued 4G licenses to three Chinese telecom operators,15 one of which—China Telecom—reportedly announced it would establish the world’s largest 4G network16 and offer commercial 4G services in 340 Chinese cities in 2014.17 In a March 2014 government work report to the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang stated the government would extend broadband connectivity to rural villages, increase Internet speeds, and develop 4G mobile communications.18

MAINTAINING GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CONTROL OF ONLINE CONTENT

The government and Party expressed heightened, high-level concerns regarding their ability to control the Internet and signaled a renewed effort to strengthen their control over the Internet. For example, the November 2013 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Third Plenum Decision on Certain Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reforms called explicitly for the “management”19 and “supervision”20 of the Internet, as well as the “supervision” of online public opinion,21 themes government and Party sources have emphasized in recent years.22 The Commission observed documents from government and Party Web sites this past year that echoed these themes.23 For example, in February 2014, during the first meeting of the newly established Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group, a high-level group chaired by President Xi Jinping, Xi reportedly “called for innovative methods to spread mainstream values and stimulate positive energy while maintaining proper guidance of online opinions in terms of timing, intensity and impact.”24
Some reports described the Internet or online public opinion as a “struggle,” 25 “battleground,” 26 or “new challenge and new test” 27 for authorities. A People’s Liberation Army Daily report stated:

Enemy forces use the Internet to advocate forcefully for Western values such as “constitutional democracy” and “universal values,” wantonly discrediting our country’s social system . . . . [We] absolutely cannot let erroneous ideological trends tarnish the image of the country and the Party. 28

Such reports cited as their basis remarks that Xi made at an August 2013 “national propaganda and ideology work meeting” 29 and interpreted Xi’s remarks to include strengthening control over the Internet. 30

Chinese officials continued campaigns to control the expanding reach of microbloggers. In the latter half of 2013, authorities reportedly began to investigate hundreds of Sina Weibo microbloggers, detaining over 100 31—including prominent microbloggers known as “Big V” users because of their large followings and verified status 32—as part of what some international media described as a crackdown. 33 For example, in July 2014, the social media accounts of “Big V” and outspoken political commentator Li Chengpeng were closed. 34 Following these developments, the total number of Weibo posts dropped 35 as much as 70 percent from early 2011 to late 2013, according to a study conducted at East China Normal University. 36 On March 13, 2014, authorities closed an unspecified number of accounts on WeChat, a mobile social media platform owned by Tencent that reportedly gained users who left Weibo. 37 In August 2014, the State Internet Information Office released the Interim Provisions for the Management of the Development of Instant Messaging Tools in Providing Public Information Services, 38 which prohibits public microblog accounts that have not received approval from posting or reposting political news. 39

CENSORSHIP OF ONLINE CONTENT

Chinese authorities continued to block and filter sensitive online content, in some cases through censorship campaigns. For example, officials blocked online reports regarding protests against the construction of a paraxylene (“PX”) plant in Maoming city, Guangdong province. 40 Officials also blocked online reports regarding corruption investigations of Zhou Yongkang, former Minister of Public Security and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission; Zhou’s son Zhou Bin; and Li Dongsheng, former Vice Minister of Public Security. 41 Censorship initiatives included a “Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down False Media” campaign, 42 which some commentators noted gave authorities leeway to strengthen government and Party control over the Internet more broadly. 43 The campaign’s leadership included a joint government-Party entity under the Party’s Central Propaganda and Ideology Work Leading Group, 44 which itself was chaired by Liu Yunshan, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee. 45 In April 2014, authorities revoked some of Sina’s online publication licenses after reportedly finding pornographic content on Web sites run by Sina. 46

Some
commentators noted the revocations appeared to be connected to the growing influence of Sina Weibo, which filed for an initial public offering in the United States shortly before the revocations.

In the months preceding June 4, 2014—the 25th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests—authorities blocked and filtered a range of online content related to the protests. For example, in June 2014, the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab verified more than 60 Tiananmen-related keywords censored on Weibo, 9 of which were new additions in 2014. Authorities also deleted online discussion of and blocked online searches for content related to former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, whose death in 1989 triggered the Tiananmen protests.

Authorities also increased content restrictions on Internet television content providers. In or shortly before mid-July 2014, China's media regulator, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), met with China's seven licensed Internet television content providers and instructed them to filter unapproved content, including “content from commercial video websites,” as well as “unauthorized foreign movies, short movies and other video products.” SAPPRFT reportedly also instructed Internet television content providers to remove third-party apps from their devices and barred Internet television content providers from entering into business agreements with companies under investigation by SAPPRFT. As of mid-July 2014, SAPPRFT reportedly ordered Internet television content providers not to work with LeTV, a licensed Internet television content provider suspected of violating content restrictions. All these actions followed requirements issued by SAPPRFT in 2011 that reportedly restrict content provided through Internet television services.

Censorship of U.S. Companies’ Online Content

According to international media reports, U.S. company LinkedIn—which began operating in China in 2014—began censoring sensitive content that originated in China. Censorship reportedly extended to both Chinese- and English-language versions of the site, as well as to users based in Hong Kong or outside of China. For example, a United Kingdom-based artist previously based in China reported some of her LinkedIn posts were censored. A student in Hong Kong reported LinkedIn censored a link he posted for a video that reportedly “express[ed] support for relatives and friends of those killed during the Tiananmen crackdown.”
Censorship of U.S. Companies' Online Content—Continued

Shortly before the 25th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, U.S. company Google began experiencing online service disruptions in China.\textsuperscript{63} GreatFire.org, an organization that monitors online censorship in China,\textsuperscript{64} reported on June 2, 2014, that “all Google services in all countries, encrypted or not, are now blocked in China . . . . [T]he block covers Google Hong Kong . . ., Google.com and all other country specific versions . . . .”\textsuperscript{65} Chinese authorities did not claim responsibility for the disruptions, but international media reports linked the disruptions to broader attempts by authorities to censor online content, as well as sensitivity surrounding the Tiananmen anniversary.\textsuperscript{66} Reuters quoted a Google spokesman as saying “We’ve checked extensively and there’s nothing wrong on our end.”\textsuperscript{67}

Rules regarding censorship of online content in China remained opaque. Internet regulations contain vague and broad prohibitions on content that “harms the honor or interests of the nation,”\textsuperscript{68} “spreads rumors,”\textsuperscript{69} or “disrupts national policies on religion,”\textsuperscript{70} but they do not define these concepts or contain criteria to determine when content has violated one of these prohibitions.\textsuperscript{71} On March 1, 2014, the Implementing Regulations of the PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets (Implementing Regulations)—which extends to information on the Internet\textsuperscript{72}—entered into force\textsuperscript{73} but did not clarify what could be classified as state secrets.\textsuperscript{74} For example, the Implementing Regulations stipulated that authorities should not classify as state secrets “matters that should be public in accordance with the law”\textsuperscript{75} but did not explain what kinds of information the law entitles the public to access.\textsuperscript{76}

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\textbf{Punishment of Citizens for Free Expression} \\
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Authorities continued to detain and harass rights and democracy advocates, Internet writers, human rights lawyers, citizen journalists, and others who exercised their constitutional right to freedom of speech,\textsuperscript{77} in a crackdown that some international media and individuals in China described as the worst in recent decades.\textsuperscript{78} Authorities used vaguely worded criminal charges and extralegal harassment to punish citizens for free expression, as the following selected cases illustrate:

- In September 2013, officials in Tianshui city, Gansu province, criminally detained 16-year-old microblog user Yang Zhong (aka Yang Hui) on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for online posts.\textsuperscript{79} Yang had posted comments urging people to protest an allegedly hasty investigation by local authorities that had ruled the death of a karaoke club worker to be a suicide.\textsuperscript{80} Police released Yang a week later, following an outcry among Weibo users protesting Yang’s detention.\textsuperscript{81}
- In February 2014, officials in Beijing municipality summoned for questioning human rights advocate Hu Jia on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and interrogated him regarding allegedly sensitive Twitter postings.\textsuperscript{82} At the time, Hu reportedly was under home confinement.\textsuperscript{83} Au-
authorities released Hu from home confinement in June 2014, and in July 2014, Hu was beaten on the street by men he believed to be plainclothes police.

- In late February 2014, Chinese artist and poet Liu Xia was reportedly hospitalized and later discharged. Authorities have held Liu under illegal home confinement since October 2010, following the December 2009 conviction of her husband, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. According to Reuters, she suffered from “heart problems, possibly severe depression, and other ailments made worse during her time under guard.” On February 27, Radio Free Asia reported authorities discharged Liu Xia from the hospital after her condition improved, according to friend He Jian. Following her hospitalization, her lawyer Mo Shaoping reported he had “very little information” regarding her condition or location. Chinese officials have said “there are no charges” against her and officials “[have] taken no legal enforcement measures” against her.

- In March 2014, public security officials in Beijing criminally detained “citizen journalists” Liu Xuehong, Xing Jian, and Wang Jing on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” after they reported on a self-immolation and other protests in Tiananmen Square.

- In April 2014, a Beijing court sentenced Qin Zhihui to three years in prison for allegedly “defam[ing] celebrities and the government.” A September 2013 joint interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate authorizes officials to imprison online authors if “defamatory” content is reposted at least 500 times or visited at least 5,000 times online. According to Xinhua, one of Qin’s posts was reposted 11,000 times.

### Criminal Punishment and Harassment Surrounding the 25th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Protests

The crackdown on free expression spanned June 4, 2014—the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests—during which time authorities harassed, imprisoned, and detained a variety of individuals who sought to commemorate the protests in private meetings, memorial services, or online spaces. The following are sample cases:

- Authorities placed Ding Zilin, former leader of the advocacy group Tiananmen Mothers, under surveillance at her home in Beijing. When filmmaker He Yang attempted to visit Ding in March 2014, authorities reportedly detained him on suspicion of “endangering national security” and released him after he agreed not to film subject matter related to the 1989 protests. After Ding passed leadership of Tiananmen Mothers to successor You Weijie, authorities reportedly disconnected You’s phone line. Later, authorities forced Ding to stay out of Beijing until after June 4.
Criminal Punishment and Harassment Surrounding the 25th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Protests—Continued

- On March 24, 2014, a district court in Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, sentenced Gu Yimin to one year and six months in prison for “inciting subversion of state power.” Gu’s lawyers reportedly were assailed by unknown assailants outside the court. Officials detained Gu in June 2013 after he posted a cartoon online referencing the 1989 protests.

- On April 24, 2014, authorities criminally detained journalist Gao Yu on suspicion of “leaking state secrets” to a foreign Web site. According to a Xinhua report, Gao provided a central government document to an overseas Web site, but the report did not elaborate on the nature of the document. Gao reportedly was planning to attend a private meeting with others to commemorate the 1989 protests; authorities later detained some of those who attended the meeting.

- In May 2014, authorities in Zhengzhou city, Henan province, detained participants in a February 2014 memorial service commemorating former Communist Party leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and the victims of the violent suppression of the 1989 protests. Officials detained organizers Yu Shiwen and Chen Wei—a married couple—as well as participants Shi Yu, Fang Yan, and Hou Shuai, on suspicion of “gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public place.” Officials also criminally detained Shi, Fang, and Hou’s defense lawyer Chang Boyang as he prepared to visit them in detention.

- In late May or early June 2014, officials in Chaozhou municipality, Guangdong province, criminally detained Zhang Kunle on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” after Zhang called for online essay submissions regarding the 1989 protests. Previously, authorities reportedly “compelled” Zhang to leave Shenzhen municipality, where he was living, and return to his family home in Chaozhou, due to heightened sensitivity surrounding the 25th anniversary of the 1989 protests.

- On June 9, 2014, officials in Beijing reported that university student Zhao Huaxu had been criminally detained on suspicion of “teaching criminal methods.” In a May 24 Twitter post, Zhao uploaded a link to a document she had written called “June 4th Anniversary—A Conceptual Plan for Using Pseudo Base Station.” Pseudo base station technology allows users to broadcast information to mobile phones outside official communication networks.

Press Freedom

The government and Party continued to control the press in violation of international standards. In its 2014 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked China 175th out of 180 countries. It noted that “daily ‘directives’ to the traditional media from the Department of Propaganda, the constant online censorship, the growing number of arbitrary arrests and the detention of the largest number of journalists and netizens in the world . . . have made China a model of censorship and repression.” International experts have identified as a major challenge to free expression media serving “as government mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the public interest.”
The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), enhanced its system of strict controls and licensing requirements for media professionals. In order to report the news legally, domestic newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and journalists must obtain a license or accreditation from the government. In 2014, SAPPRFT began requiring the country’s 250,000 news reporters and staff to participate in a political training program as part of the annual press card renewal process. The program reportedly would include a test with content related to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the “Marxist view on the press.” On June 18, 2014, SAPPRFT released a circular instructing media organizations to forbid journalists from publishing reports that are critical without receiving approval from their employers, from reporting on issues outside of their designated issue areas, and from publishing critical reports through their own personal Web sites or publications.

SAPPRFT also issued the Measures on the Management of Information Obtained by Press Personnel in the Conduct of Their Duties (the Measures), which placed vague restrictions on the ability of journalists and other media professionals to release information obtained in the conduct of their work. For example, the Measures prohibit media professionals from “violating the terms of confidentiality agreements”—which the Measures require media professionals to sign with their employers—“by providing information obtained in the conduct of their work to other domestic or foreign media or websites.” The Measures’ definition of such information includes “various kinds of information and materials, and all journalistic products collected and processed, including state secrets, commercial secrets, and information that has not been publicly disclosed.” The Measures do not clarify what constitutes a state secret. [For more information on the regulation of state secrets, see Censorship of Online Content in this section.]

PUNISHMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS

Outspoken journalists and newspaper staff continued to face reprisals for making sensitive comments or conducting investigative reporting. For example, on September 30, 2013, authorities approved the arrest of journalist Liu Hu on defamation charges after he published information alleging official corruption. According to the Washington Post, Wang Qinglei, a journalist with state-run China Central Television, was fired after calling China’s media environment “stifling” online. Tencent journalist Zhang Jialong reported that he was fired in May 2014 after discussing press freedom in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and publishing an article in Foreign Policy in which he asked for U.S. assistance to “tear down . . . the Great Firewall” (i.e., China’s national system of Internet surveillance and censorship). According to a November 2013 South China Morning Post article, Caijing media group forced journalist Luo Changping to leave the magazine and move to Caijing’s research institute after he exposed information implicating a high-level official in corruption. In May 2014, public security officials in Bei-
jing reportedly detained Xin Jian, an employee of the Chongqing bureau of Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun, on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” after Xin reportedly helped journalists interview high-profile public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang.134 A November 2013 SCMP article quoted Luo Changping as saying, “The position real investigative journalism is in is not ideal. The environment is getting worse, the space is getting smaller . . . .”135 Journalists in Hong Kong also reported continuing threats to press freedom, citing violent attacks on media professionals, self-censorship among journalists, and pressure from the Hong Kong and central governments and mainland Chinese businesses.136 [For more information on press freedom in Hong Kong, see Section VI—Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.]

PUNISHMENT OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

International media organizations and U.S. Government officials expressed heightened concerns over the ability of foreign journalists to report independently in China.137 In a May 2014 survey conducted by the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC), 99 percent of respondents “[did] not think reporting conditions in China [met] international standards,” and zero respondents believed conditions had improved since the previous year.138 Respondents to FCCC surveys also reported official harassment of reporters, news assistants, and sources; attempts to block coverage of issues authorities deemed “sensitive”; restrictions on travel to the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas of China; cyber attacks and the blocking of foreign media Web sites in China; and visa delays and denials.139 In December 2013, Chinese authorities delayed visa renewals for approximately two dozen journalists working for the New York Times (NYT) and Bloomberg.140 Some reports linked the late renewals to prominent 2012 reports by the NYT and Bloomberg on the overseas assets of Chinese leaders’ family members.141 In a December 2013 statement, then NYT Executive Editor Jill Abramson acknowledged that Chinese officials “pointedly objected” to investigative reports by the NYT about China’s leaders.142 Chinese authorities reportedly also warned foreign reporters against reporting on the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.143 The following cases highlight some of the ongoing challenges foreign journalists faced during the reporting year:

- On November 9, 2013, the NYT reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declined to grant journalist Paul Mooney a resident journalist visa to begin a new reporting job for Thomson Reuters.144 The MFA reportedly did not provide a reason for their decision.145
- On January 22, 2014, Time reported that Chinese authorities and “plainclothes thugs” harassed reporters with the Cable News Network, British Broadcasting Corporation, and Sky News as they attempted to cover the trial of rights advocate Xu Zhiyong.146
- On January 30, 2014, NYT correspondent Austin Ramzy departed China after officials declined to issue him press credentials.147
• On February 9, 2014, the China Law & Policy blog reported that NYT correspondent Chris Buckley and NYT Beijing bureau head Philip Pan were still awaiting press credentials, which they had been waiting for since 2012.148

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression


7 Ibid.

8 The Commission has not observed an official or uniform definition of the term “Internet sovereignty,” but Fang Binxing offers his own explanation of the term in Wang Yuan, “Internet Sovereignty: An Issue Difficult To Avoid” (Wangluo zhuquan: yi ge bu rong huibi de wenti), People’s Daily, 23 June 14. Fang Binxing reportedly developed key components of China’s national system of surveillance and censorship, commonly known as the Great Firewall. See, e.g., “Great Firewall Father Speaks Out,” Global Times, 18 February 11.

9 Wang Yuan, “Internet Sovereignty: An Issue Difficult To Avoid” (Wangluo zhuquan: yi ge bu rong huibi de wenti), People’s Daily, 23 June 14.


14 Ibid.


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20 Ibid., sec. 10(36).

21 Ibid.

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30 Lan Zhengyan, “Military’s Propaganda and Ideological Work Must Be at the Forefront” [Jundui xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo yao zou zai qianlie], People’s Liberation Army Daily, 29 October 13.


32 For background information on Xi’s August 2013 speech, see Qian Gang, “Parsing the ‘Public Association for Culture Construction, reprinted in State Council Information Office, 9 September 13; Sun Shougang, “Having a Responsibility To Defend the Country, and Defending the Country With Utmost Responsibility” [Shou tu youze, shou tu fuze, shou tu jinze], China Association for Culture Construction, reprinted in State Council Information Office, 9 September 13.

33 Zou Jixiang et al., “Chairman Xi’s ‘Eight Emphases’ Specify Direction” [Xi zhuxi “ba ge qiangdiao” zhiming fangxiang], Seeking Truth, 17 January 14; Lan Zhengyan, “Military’s Propaganda and Ideological Work Must Be at the Forefront” [Jundui xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo yao zou zai qianlie], People’s Liberation Army Daily, 29 October 13; Sun Shougang, “Having a Responsibility To Defend the Country, and Defending the Country With Utmost Responsibility” [Shou tu youze, shou tu fuze, shou tu jinze], China Association for Culture Construction, reprinted in State Council Information Office, 9 September 13.

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44 “Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down False Media” Working Group, “About Us” [Guanyu women], last visited 23 June 14.


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