V. Tibet

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has been stalled since the January 2010 ninth round,¹ the longest interval since such contacts resumed in 2002.² The Commission observed no indication during the 2014 reporting year of official Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into account Tibetan concerns in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.³

Tibetan Self-Immolation: Steep Decline

The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly focusing on political and religious issues declined steeply during the Commission’s 2014 reporting year, and followed an increase in Party and government security and punitive measures. During the 12-month period September 2012–August 2013, the Commission recorded 66 self-immolations focused on political and religious issues;⁴ during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014, the Commission recorded 10 such self-immolations.⁵ The Commission has not observed any sign that Party and government leaders intend to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any accountability for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies.
The general character of self-immolations—acts committed public-
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return and featuring calls for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama's
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6 remains consistent with previous years and events
6 remains consistent with previous years and events
and concurrent with government use of regulatory measures to control and repress
and concurrent with government use of regulatory measures to control and repress
and concurrent with government use of regulatory measures to control and repress
principal elements of Tibetan culture and religion, including Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions, and with the apparent col-
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lapse of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue. Since 2009, Tibetans
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lapse of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue. Since 2009, Tibetans
have self-immolated in 10 of 17 Tibetan autonomous prefectures and 1 ordinary prefecture during the 12-month period September
2013–August 2014, Tibetans self-immolated in 5 Tibetan autonomous prefectures located in 3 provinces.\textsuperscript{10}

Since the first Tibetan self-immolation in February 2009,\textsuperscript{11} the profile of Tibetan self-immolators shifted from an initial pattern of less frequent self-immolations mainly in Sichuan province by a majority of current or former monastics,\textsuperscript{12} to a pattern of more frequent self-immolations mostly outside Sichuan by a majority of laypersons.\textsuperscript{13} Concurrent with recently declining self-immolation, however, Sichuan monastics resumed the majority: during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014, of 10 self-immolators, 6 were monastics\textsuperscript{14} and 4 were laypersons;\textsuperscript{15} 6 were in Sichuan\textsuperscript{16}
and 4 were in Qinghai or Gansu provinces.\textsuperscript{17} Overall, the proportions of monastic and lay self-immolators, and of Sichuan and non-Sichuan residents, were similar as of April 15, 2014, when 126 Tibetan self-immolations reportedly focused on political and religious issues had occurred.\textsuperscript{18}

**TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2013–AUGUST 2014)**

See CECC 2012 and 2013 Annual Reports for Self-Immolations 1–116 \textsuperscript{19}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date of Self-Immolation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex / Approx. Age</th>
<th>Occupation Affiliation</th>
<th>Self-Immolation Location (Prov./Pref./County)</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>September 28</td>
<td>Shichung M/41</td>
<td>Farmer, tailor, husband, father</td>
<td>Sichuan / Aba T&amp;QAP / Aba county</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{20}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>November 11</td>
<td>Tsering Gyal M/20</td>
<td>Monk Akyong Monastery</td>
<td>Qinghai / Guoluo TAP / Banma county</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{21}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>December 3</td>
<td>Konchog Tseten M/30</td>
<td>Nomad, husband, father</td>
<td>Sichuan / Aba / Aba</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{22}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>December 19</td>
<td>Tsultrim Gytso M/43</td>
<td>Monk Achog Monastery</td>
<td>Gansu / Gannan TAP / Xiahe county</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{23}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>February 5</td>
<td>Phagmo Samdrub M/late 20s</td>
<td>Tantric Buddhist practitioner, husband, father</td>
<td>Qinghai / Huangnan TAP / Zeku county</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{24}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>February 13</td>
<td>Lobsang Dorje M/25</td>
<td>Former monk Kirti Monastery</td>
<td>Sichuan / Aba / Aba</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{25}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>Lobsang Palden M/early 20s</td>
<td>Monk Kirti Monastery</td>
<td>Sichuan / Aba / Aba</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{26}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>March 16</td>
<td>Jigme Tenzin M/29</td>
<td>Monk Sonag (Shador) Monastery</td>
<td>Qinghai / Huangnan / Zeku</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{27}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>March 29</td>
<td>Drolma F/31</td>
<td>Nun</td>
<td>Sichuan / Ganzi TAP / Batang county</td>
<td>Hospitalized \textsuperscript{28}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>April 15</td>
<td>Trinle Namgyal M/32</td>
<td>Layperson</td>
<td>Sichuan / Ganzi / Daofu county</td>
<td>Deceased \textsuperscript{29}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Collective Punishment

This past year, the Commission observed for the first time reports of county-level governments turning to collective punishment in apparent attempts to deter individuals from engaging in prohibited behavior.

RUO’ERGAI COUNTY

In the initial and best-documented of two reports, on April 8, 2013, the Ruo’ergai (Dzoegê) County People’s Government, in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, issued provisions imposing collective punishment intended to deter Tibetans from self-immolating. The Interim Anti-Self-Immolation Provisions (the Provisions), first reported on in February 2014, could place at risk access to housing, livelihood, or financial security of a family, community, village, or monastic institution if a member of that group committed self-immolation or was deemed to be associated with an act of self-immolation.

The Provisions target groups classified as “immediate family”, a “household” or “residence”, a “village” or “community”, a monastery or nunnery (“temple”); and the monks and nuns who reside within a monastic institution. The following summary provides examples of how the Provisions would punish such groups collectively by targeting their ability to remain functional and establishing an intimidating political environment.

- **Housing.** Obstructing the ability to maintain housing for persons officials deem to have been “actively involved” in a self-immolation by canceling household benefits for three years and social benefits for one year.
- **Livelihood.** Preventing or obstructing the ability of a self-immolator’s family members to secure a livelihood by revoking the right to use land for farming or grazing; and preventing or obstructing the ability of residents of a village where a self-immolator lived to secure a livelihood by freezing the right of villagers to use land for farming or grazing.
- **Employment.** Restricting career, employment, and housing opportunities for a self-immolator’s family members by canceling their eligibility to apply for national-level government, worker or service positions, or military employment.
- **Business.** Preventing or obstructing the ability of a self-immolator’s family members and the households of persons deemed to have been “active participants” in a self-immolation to secure a livelihood by withholding approval to conduct business activity for three years; and by imposing financial hardships and imperiling function in monastic institutions associated with a self-immolator by ordering them to “halt all business activities.”
- **Property.** Preventing the ability of a self-immolator’s family members and the households of persons deemed to have been “active participants” in a self-immolation from accessing full use of real estate by only “confirming” (household) land and building rights (que quan), but not issuing “certification” (zheng).
• **Finance.** Imposing financial and other hardships on a community, village, or monastic institution associated with a self-immolator by designating them as “untrustworthy” and withholding the granting of new loans for three years, and by only receiving payments on existing loans but not disbursing funds from the loans; and by imperiling financial status by requiring a community, village, or monastic institution where a self-immolation takes place to pay a “security deposit” of 10,000 to 500,000 yuan (US$1,600 to 80,000) that would be returned only if another self-immolation does not occur within two years.

• **Development.** Imposing financial and other hardships on a village, community, or monastic institution associated with a self-immolator by canceling or postponing national-level investment in that village, community, or monastic institution; and by imposing financial and other hardships on a village or community associated with a self-immolator by halting “all investment and civil society capital projects.”

• **Religion.** Imposing a reduction in religious function in monastic institutions associated with a self-immolator through temporary “strict limitations” on monks’ and nuns’ activities, and on large-scale Tibetan Buddhist activities across an undefined broader “area.”

• **“Education.”** Requiring family members and others linked to a self-immolation by “minor evidence” or “actions [that] do not constitute a crime” to attend a minimum of 15 days’ “legal education classes” located at a “separate locality”; and requiring residents of villages, communities, and monastic institutions where a self-immolation takes place to attend “legal study sessions.”

• **Intimidation.** Implementing “the strictest comprehensive administrative enforcement possible” anywhere that a self-immolation takes place, and imposing the “strictest” comprehensive administrative law enforcement and corrective punishment.

**BIRU COUNTY**

In the more recent instance involving apparent collective punishment, a Tibetan advocacy organization obtained a partial copy of a Tibetan-language manual titled to indicate that it explained “a temporary regulation” issued in June 2014 by the Biru (Driru) County People’s Government in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region. [See Biru Crackdown in this section.] A copy of the actual regulations was unavailable as of August 2014. The regulations in certain cases could impose significant financial hardship collectively on an entire family if a single family member engaged in prohibited behavior. Examples of types of behavior and punishment follow.

• **Behavior.** Attending a specific religious teaching by the Dalai Lama in India in July 2014; traveling beyond one’s residential area for “illegal acts of religious education; “having strong nationalistic fervor;” “propagating harmful information” over the Internet; “propagating videos or songs”
praising the Dalai Lama; and failure to “hoist the Chinese flag” when required.

- **Punishment.** An individual or family (collective) ban for one to five years on harvesting *cordyceps sinensis* (“caterpillar fungus”)—a principal source of cash income for many Tibetan families; loss of welfare benefits; cancelation of household registration; periods of legal education of up to six months; and, in the case of monks and nuns, expulsion from a monastic institution.

**COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT UNDER CHINESE LAW**

Available information about the Ruo’ergai and Biru measures raises questions regarding their application and consistency with China's Constitution and laws.

- **Has either measure resulted in actual application of collective punishment?** As of August 2014, the Commission had not observed a report of specific collective punishment of a family, household, community, village, or monastic institution.

- **Does China’s Constitution provide support for collective punishment?** Commission research failed to locate any article within the Constitution that appears either to explicitly permit the collective punishment of families, households, communities, villages, or monastic institutions irrespective of individual activity; or that explicitly protects citizens from collective punishment.

- **Are collective punishments in line with relevant Chinese laws?** Based on Commission research, the PRC Criminal Law and PRC Criminal Procedure Law do not contain language explicitly addressing collective punishment of families, households, communities, villages, or institutions based solely on proximity to an action the government treats as illegal, or based solely on a family relationship with a person who committed such an act. The Ruo’ergai measures contain no reference to any means by which a punished entity could appeal against a punishment; information is incomplete on the Biru measures.

**Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists**

Pressure on Tibetan Buddhists to accept Communist Party and government control of the religion remained high. Party leadership continued to characterize the Dalai Lama as a threat to Tibetan Buddhism’s “normal order” instead of as a principal teacher, and urged that he be “separated” from the religion and the title “Dalai Lama.” Representative developments this past year included the following examples.

- **“Healthy” Buddhism.** Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, stated that strengthening the motherland and boosting social and economic development are preconditions for the “healthy development” of Tibetan Buddhism.
• **Cadre deployment.** State-run media reported that a deployment of Party cadres to every Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) village, monastery, and nunnery, completed in March 2012, involved 60,000 cadres, according to a September 2013 report—nearly triple the 21,000 initially reported in March 2012. An official described the cadres’ deployment as the most extensive since the 1951 “peaceful liberation of Tibet.”

• **Heightened control.** Qinghai province officials reportedly pressured monks and monasteries in Yushu (Yulshul) and Guoluo (Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures to accept greater Party and government control. In Yushu, where Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations took effect in September 2013, authorities ordered some monasteries to replace monastic members of management committees with “government and Party appointees” by June 2014. In Guoluo, officials launched a campaign in May 2014 requiring monks and residents to “demonstrate their support” for the Party, obey laws and regulations, and not engage in protest activity.

• **Targeting leaders.** Officials detained, imprisoned, or beat to death monastic leaders, including: Abbot Gyurme Tsultrim (detained November 2013; under home confinement after urging promotion of Tibetan religion, language, and ethics); Abbot Karma Tsewang (detained December 2013; a Tibetan culture advocate accused of harboring “fugitive” monks); chant master Thardoe Gyaltse (detained December 2013; sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for “inciting splittism” by possessing copies of the Dalai Lama’s teachings); Geshe Ngawang Jamyang (detained November 2013; beaten to death in custody in December; attained Geshe status in India; previously imprisoned for “leaking state secrets”); and Abbot Khedrub (detained April 2014; suspected of “links” to prayers for Tibetans who self-immolated).

• **Reincarnation identification.** A report emerged of the July 2013 closure of Shag Rongpo Monastery in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, over resentment of government attempts to “enthrone its own choice” of a teacher Tibetan Buddhists regard as a reincarnation. A mother of two children reportedly attempted suicide in protest and authorities allegedly beat and detained up to 50 Tibetans. In 2010, a court reportedly sentenced the monastery’s senior monastic, Dawa Khyenrab Wangchug, to imprisonment for contacting the Dalai Lama during the search for the reincarnation. In August 2014, officials apparently allowed him to leave the site where he served medical parole and resume teaching at Shag Rongpo.

• **Preventing pilgrimage.** In late May 2014, People’s Armed Police reportedly imposed a ban on travel for religious purposes to Mount Kailash (Gang Rinpoche), one of Tibetan Buddhism’s principal pilgrimage sites. The ban coincided with Tibetan Buddhism’s most sacred month and day, and in 2014 (the Wood Horse year) coincided with the most propitious year for such pilgrimage in the 60-year Tibetan astrological cycle. The ban immediately preceded the period when the Dalai Lama provided a public Kalachakra teaching in a Himalayan
area of northern India. [See Biru County in this section for information on punishment linked to attending the teaching.]

Status of Tibetan Culture

The Commission observed no indication this past year that Party and government leaders intend to develop a “harmonious society” inclusive of Tibetan preferences toward their culture and language. The Party accepted no accountability for Tibetan grievances contributing to protests and blamed them on external factors, especially the Dalai Lama—“the ultimate cause of social unrest” in Tibetan areas of China, according to Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. Examples of Party intentions to increase political pressure on Tibetans to accept and adhere to Party policies on culture, education, and the notion of unity follow.

- **Political culture.** Chen called for establishing Party “propaganda, ideology, and culture teams,” and placing a full-time cadre responsible for propaganda in every town or township.

- **Political education.** Chen called for extensive implementation of “thematic educational activities” and a “patriotic revolutionary history and culture exploration project” prioritizing younger Tibetans.

- **Political unity.** Chen instructed cadres to “deeply conduct the national unity propaganda and education . . . to firmly establish the ‘three inseparables’ mindset.” At the same time, security officials detained Tibetans who called for unity among themselves.

BIRU CRACKDOWN

Consistent with such policies, authorities compelled Tibetans to engage in displays of patriotism toward China and imposed crackdowns if Tibetans were noncompliant. In September–November 2013, a prominent example developed in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, in the run-up to China’s October 1 National Day. As of September 1, 2014, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database contained records of 58 Biru detentions related to the crackdown including 15 resulting in prison sentences of up to 18 years. Authorities reportedly disabled communication systems locally, ensuring that information is incomplete. [See Collective Punishment—Biru County in this section.] The sequence of events in the Biru crackdown follows.

- **September 3, 2013: Elderly villager detained.** Sixty-eight-year-old Dayang staged a political protest after a “political propaganda team and dance troupe” arrived. Security officials detained, beat, and hospitalized him.

- **September 24: Sentencing.** The Biru County People's Court sentenced Dayang to two years and six months' imprisonment.

- **September 27: Compulsory flag display.** Preceding National Day, “thousands” of government officials and workers arrived in Naqu and forced residents to raise the Chinese national flag above their residences.
• **September 28: Disposing of flags.** In one Biru village, Tibetans threw Chinese flags into a river rather than display them. People’s Armed Police (PAP) may have fired at villagers (possibly with anti-riot projectiles\(^\text{109}\)), leading to “open confrontation.”\(^\text{110}\)

• **September 29: Police beat protesters.** In another village, security officials beat and detained about 40 villagers who appealed against forceful suppression of protests. Police beat and hospitalized “main splitivist” Tsering Gyaltsen.\(^\text{111}\)

• **October 3: Another protest leader detained.** Police detained Dorje Dragtsal for participating in the protests against compulsory flag display. He reportedly had been “especially vocal” in disapproving political education campaigns.\(^\text{112}\)

• **October 6: Weapons fire, injuries.** PAP reportedly used tear gas, batons, and weapons fire (possibly anti-riot projectiles\(^\text{113}\)) against Tibetans who gathered to “confront” police searching Dorje Dragtsal’s residence.\(^\text{114}\) “At least 60” Tibetans were “wounded.”\(^\text{115}\)

• **October 8: Weapons fire, fatalities.** PAP (“security forces”) reportedly opened fire on Tibetan protesters in Biru. Weapons fire allegedly killed 4 Tibetans and wounded about 50 (none identified).\(^\text{116}\) The Commission has not observed published corroboration of the report.

• **October 11: Social media user detained.** Police detained Biru resident Kalsang, a mother of three young children, for expressing “anti-China” views on social media and having “Tibetan patriotic” songs and the Dalai Lama’s image on her mobile phone.\(^\text{117}\)

• **October 11: Writer detained.** Public security officials detained writer Tsultrim Gyaltsen, seized his mobile phone, computer, and documents, and accused him of “separatist activities.”\(^\text{118}\) School students staged a hunger strike in protest.\(^\text{119}\)

• **October 12: Former policeman detained.** Police detained Tsultrim Gyaltsen’s friend, Yulgyal, and accused him of “separatist activities.” From 2005–2012 he worked as a Biru policeman and reportedly was “frustrated by the political nature” of the work.\(^\text{120}\)

• **October 15: Nun, villager detained.** Police detained nun Jampa and layperson Dawa Lhundrub for allegedly “revealing state secrets through mobile phones and other means.”\(^\text{121}\)

• **October 17: Biru monks detained in Lhasa.** Police in Lhasa city detained Shugding Monastery monks Jampa Legshe and Kalnam on suspicion of “leaking state secrets.” They arrived in Lhasa a month prior to detention.\(^\text{122}\)

• **October 18: Father detained.** Police detained and “disappeared” Tenzin Rangdrol after he walked his children to a village school. The report implied that locals regarded the detention as politically motivated.\(^\text{123}\)

• **October 19: Tibetans protest father’s detention.** At least 40 Tibetans gathered on October 19 outside a township government office to protest Tenzin Rangdrol’s detention.\(^\text{124}\) Overnight, their number increased by at least 100.\(^\text{125}\)

• **October 20: Police detain protesters.** PAP surrounded Tibetans protesting outside the government office against Tenzin
Rangdrol’s detention, detained 10, and later released them. An official told protesters they were like “eggs hitting a rock.”

• **October 28: Lengthy sentences.** An unidentified court sentenced writer Tsultrim Gyaltse and ex-policeman Yulgyal to 13 and 10 years’ imprisonment respectively following their October 11 and 12 detentions.

• **November 3: Tibetans detained after “education.”** Tibetans attending a compulsory “political education” session pressed officials to release Tsultrim Gyaltse and Yulgyal. That evening, officials detained 15 persons. All were released by December.

• **November 20: Activists detained.** Police detained environmental activists Choekyab and Tselha in late November and activist-singer Trinle Tsekar on November 20, and reportedly charged them with leading a large-scale May 2013 anti-mining protest.

• **December 19: Activists sentenced.** The Biru County People’s Court reportedly sentenced Choekyab and Tselha to 13 and 3 years’ imprisonment respectively, and Trinle Tsekar to 9 years.

• **January 14, 2014: Village leaders sentenced.** A court sentenced Ngangdrag and Rigsal, village leaders detained in November when Tibetans protested against mandatory display of the Chinese flag, to 10 years’ imprisonment.

**TIBETAN LANGUAGE**

The government asserted that learning and using Tibetan language is “protected by law” but officials closed non-government-run programs and detained Tibetans who promoted use of the language. Representative examples follow.

• **Observance canceled.** Authorities reportedly forced the cancellation of a February 21, 2014, Tibetan language “competition” coinciding with International Mother Language Day, claiming the event had “political implications.”

• **Programs pressured.** Officials reportedly ordered local Tibetan “leaders” to “monitor and discourage” community programs underway in May 2014 at which Tibetans studied language and religion. Authorities planned “to impose restrictions.”

• **School shut.** Authorities reportedly shut down in April 2013 a school for poor Tibetan students that had operated since 2003. Officials provided no explanation for the shutdown; “security” reportedly delayed emergence of the report.

• **Singer detained.** Security officials detained singer Gebe on May 24, 2014, as he left a concert where he performed a song before cheering Tibetans warning, among other things, “we will be perished if we ignore our mother tongue.”

**Economic Development**

The Communist Party and government continued to prioritize economic development as a prerequisite for “social stability” even though some official initiatives have resulted in Tibetan pro-
tests and alleged harm to the environment. Representative developments included the following examples.

- **Mining, environment.** Authorities reportedly detained or imprisoned Tibetans who protested against mining activity, seizure or forced sale of land related to mining, or development projects that allegedly damaged the environment. The Commission observed such reports on the Tibet Autonomous Region (November–December 2013), and on Qinghai (September, December 2013), Gansu (March–April 2014), Sichuan (April 2014), and Yunnan (June 2014) provinces.

- **Railroad construction.** The westward railway segment from Lhasa city to Rikaze (Shigatse) city, initially slated for completion in 2010, reportedly was "put into use" in August 2014 and provided the first extension since the Xining-Lhasa segment of the Qinghai-Tibet railway opened in 2006.

- **Population data withheld.** Tibetans reportedly expressed anxiety about increasing non-Tibetan population in Lhasa following the 2006 Qinghai-Tibet railway startup, a concern that could develop in Rikaze. The Commission published a 2009 analysis noting that official statistics indicated substantial increase in the TAR Tibetan population after 2006, but little increase in non-Tibetan population. TAR statistics indicated fewer Han Chinese in 2007 than the national census recorded in 2000. After 2009, TAR yearbooks ceased to report county-level population data, hindering demographic analysis.

**Summary: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment**

As of September 1, 2014, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,733 records—a figure certain to be far from complete—of Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008, the beginning of a period of mostly peaceful political protests that swept across the Tibetan plateau.

Among the 1,733 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions reported since March 2008 are 28 Tibetans ordered to serve reeducation through labor (26 are believed released) and 385 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to imprisonment ranging from six months to life (198 are believed released upon sentence completion). Of the 385 Tibetan political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008, sentencing information is available for 370 prisoners, including 363 with fixed-term sentences averaging 4 years and 11 months, based on PPD data as of September 1, 2014.

**CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT**

As of September 1, 2014, the PPD contained records of 639 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 621 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008; 18 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete.

Of the 621 Tibetan political prisoners who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, and who were believed or presumed to re-
main detained or imprisoned as of September 1, 2014, PPD data indicated that:

- 273 (44 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus.\(^{168}\)
- 540 (87 percent) are male, 52 (8 percent) are female, and 29 are of unknown gender.
- 251 (40 percent) are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province and 202 (32 percent) in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The rest are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in Qinghai province (103), Gansu province (64), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1).
- Sentencing information is available for 174 prisoners: 167 reportedly were sentenced to fixed terms ranging from 1 year and 6 months to 20 years,\(^{169}\) and 7 were sentenced to life imprisonment or death with a 2-year reprieve.\(^{170}\) The average fixed-term sentence is 7 years and 6 months. Seventy-three (43 percent) of the prisoners with known sentences are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus.

Sentencing information is available for 15 of the 18 Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed imprisoned as of September 1, 2014. Their sentences range from 8 years to life imprisonment; the average fixed-term sentence is 12 years and 4 months.
Notes to Section V—Tibet

1 Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Press Statement,” 25 January 10. According to the January 25 press statement, the Dalai Lama’s envoys would arrive in China “tomorrow” (i.e., January 26, 2010).

2 “Press Conference on Central Gov’t’s Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text),” China Daily, 11 February 10. After the ninth round of dialogue, Zhu Weiqun referred to the gap between the eighth and ninth rounds as “the longest interval after we resumed contact and talks in 2002.”

China there are 1 provincial-level area of Tibetan autonomy, 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy, and 2 county-level areas of Tibetan autonomy. The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) (approximately 1.02 million square kilometers), and the 2 Tibet autonomous counties (TACs) (approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately 2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region (1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles), Qinghai province: Hainan (Tsojag) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square miles), Hai-nan (Tsolmo) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square miles), Haixi (Tsushub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901 square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guizhou (Golog) TAP (78,442 square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushul) TAP (197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: Ganuan (Kanhol) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles), Tongtianhu TAP (57,236 square kilometers, or 22,654 square miles), and Qinghai province: Gansu (Kardzhe) TAP (153,870 square kilometers, or 59,490 square miles), Ama (Nagachinery) Mongol and Tibetan and Qiang AP (58,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles), and Muul (Milit) TAP (11,434 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). The table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. For population data, see Tables on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), pp. 13–15. The 10 TAPs made up approximately 49 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total Tibetan population as of 2000. See also Table 7 on the Population Census of the People’s Republic of China, National Bureau of Statistics, Department of Population and Employment Statistics, Population Census Office Under the State Council, 23 April 13, Table 2–1. The title "Population by Age, Sex, and Nationality" listed the national Tibetan population as 6,292,187. As of June 2014, the Commission had not observed detailed data based on the 2010 census for ethnic population in provincial-, prefectural-, and county-level administrative areas.


For reports providing specific detail on self-immolators’ protests during the period beginning on September 25, 2013 (in chronological order), see, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Father of Two Setsa Fire to Himself and Dies in Ngaba,” 29 September 13 (Shichung “set himself on fire and ran along the road shouting in protest against the Chinese authorities”); Free Tibet, “Tibetan Farmer Self-Immolates and Dies at Prayer Festival,” 29 September 13 (prior to self-immolation, Shichung “lit butter lamps in front of a photo of [the Dalai Lama]”); “Tibetan Protester Dies of His Burns,” Radio Free Asia, 12 November 13 (prior to death, Tsuring Gyatso “stated that he was sacrificing his body for the sake of the unity of Tibetans”); International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetans Gather at Monastery in Golog After Self-Immolation of Young Monk,” 11 November 13 (Tsering Gyatso “was heard calling the name of the Dalai Lama”); International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Father of Two Setsa Fire to Himself in Ngaba,” 4 December 13 (Konchog Tseten “was heard . . . calling for the long life of the Dalai Lama, [and his] return to Tibet”); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Tibetan Monk Dies of Self-Imolation, Calls for Unity Among Tibetans in Last Note,” 19 December 13 (Tseultrim Gyatso died calling for unity among Tibetans and the return of the [Dalai Lama]”); International Campaign for Tibet, “Security Intensified in Ngaba After Former Kirti Monk Self-Immolates,” 14 February 14 (as police drove Lobsang Dorje away, “he sat up and joined his palms”); Phuntsok Yangchen, “Tibetan Self-Immolator Lobzang Padam Dies,” Radio Free Asia, 23 March 14 (as police drove Phuntsok Yangchen, a Tibetan self-immolating Lobzang Padam left a text message calling for, among other things, “unity among Tibetans”); “Tibetan Self-Immolation Protesters Die of Their Burns,” Radio Free Asia, 25 March 14 (Jigmé Tenzin “died shortly after self-immolating on a path circling the local Sonam monastery”).

The Commission continues to monitor reports on their deaths.

The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab of its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. As of April 15, 2014, 126 Tibetan self-immolations reported or believed to focus on political and religious issues took place in the following 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy (arranged in descending order by number of self-immolations): Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, 55 self-immolations; Gannan (Kamtho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province, 27 self-immolations; Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, 18 self-immolations; Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, 12 self-immolations; Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 11 self-immolations; Lhasa municipality, TAR, 3 self-immolations; Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai, 3 self-immolations; Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai, 1 self-immolation. In addition, 2 Tibetans self-immolated in Haidong prefecture, Qinghai, which is not an area of Tibetan autonomy. (The preceding information does not include Yushu TAP self-immolation property protests by females Dekyi Choezom and Pasang Lhamo on June 27 and September 13, 2012, respectively, and an unidentified woman in March 2013; and the April 6, 2012, deaths of a Tibetan Buddhist abbot, Athub, and a nun, Atse, in a Ganzi TAP house fire initially reported as accidental and later as self-immolation. The Commission continues to monitor reports on their deaths.)

The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab of its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. A total of 10 self-immolations numbered 117–126 took place from September 2013–August 2014: Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province (117, 119, 122-123); Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan (125-126); Huangnan TAP, Qinghai province (121, 124); Gannan TAP, Gansu province (120); and Guoluo TAP, Qinghai (118).


See, e.g., “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 23 January 13. In the first of a series of summaries of information on Tibetan self-immolation, the update states: “51 of the 95 self-immolators reportedly were laypersons; 44 were current or former monks or nuns; and 36 were female. Of these, 44 were current or former monks or nuns; 27 were female; and 10 were female, female, and layperson.” In the second summary, the update states: “Of the 95 self-immolators, 11 were women; 27 were current or former monks or nuns; and 60 self-immolated in Sichuan province.” For information on the shift during 2012 of the profile of Tibetan self-immolations, see “Special Report: Tibetan Self-Immolation—Rising Frequency, Wider Spread, Greater Diversity,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 12.

The update contains a list of self-immolations. The six monastics who self-immolated during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: monk Tserung Gyatso (November 11, 2013; Akyong Monastery, Qianghai province); monk Tsaltrim Gyatso (December 19, 2013; Achog Monastery, Gansu province); monk Lobzang Dorje (February 13, 2014; Kirti Monastery); monk Lobzang Palden (March 16, 2014; Kirti Monastery); monk Tsering Gyal (November 11, 2013; Akyong Monastery, Qianghai province); and monk Jigme Tenzin (March 16, 2014; Sonag Monastery, Qinghai); and nun Drolma (March 29, 2014; unidentified nun, Sichuan).

The update contains a list of self-immolations. The four laypersons who self-immolated during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: male Shichung (September 28, 2013; Sichuan province); male Konchog Tseten (December 3, 2013; Sichuan); male Phagmo Sumdruk (February 5, 2014; Qinghai province); and female Trinle Namgyal (Trinle Namgyal, April 15, 2014; Sichuan).

The update contains a list of self-immolations. The six self-immolations in Sichuan province during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: male Shichung (September 28, 2013; Sichuan province); male Konchog Tseten (December 3, 2013; Sichuan); male Phagmo Sumdruk (February 5, 2014; Qinghai province); and female Trinle Namgyal (Trinle Namgyal, April 15, 2014; Sichuan).
January 30, 2015.

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Articles 2 and 14 appear to involve collective punishment of family members. Articles 3 and 6 provide for cancellation of welfare benefits. Articles 5, 13, 17, and 22 include periods of legal education ranging from two to six months. Of those, Articles 3 and 6 address attendance of the “Great Prayer Festival,” a reference to the Dalai Lama’s July 2014 Kalachakra teaching in India, according to TCHRD, contain language banning individuals who traveled to the event and “their parents, spouses, [and] children” from gathering *cordyceps sinensis* (“caterpillar fungus”) for a period of three to five years. Articles 2 and 10 address attendance of the “Great Prayer Festival,” a reference to the Dalai Lama’s July 2014 Kalachakra teaching in India, according to TCHRD.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 16 defines “illegal acts of religious education” as when “religious professionals, and those people who engage in religious pursuits in the society without any permanent status, as well as general masses who travel on their own to areas outside one’s locality without getting permission from the United Front and Religious Bureau office of their respective localities.” Article 17 provides for the expulsion of monks and nuns from monasteries and nunneries, the revocation of certificates permitting them to engage in religious study, and cancellation of their welfare benefits.


According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 2 and 3, which address attending the “Great Prayer Festival,” a reference to the Dalai Lama’s July 2014 Kalachakra teaching in India, according to TCHRD, contain language banning individuals who traveled to the event and “their parents, spouses, [and] children” from gathering *cordyceps sinensis* (“caterpillar fungus”) for a period of three to five years. According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 20 addresses attendance of the “Great Prayer Festival,” a reference to the Dalai Lama’s July 2014 Kalachakra teaching in India, according to TCHRD.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 16 defines “illegal acts of religious education” as when “religious professionals, and those people who engage in religious pursuits in the society without any permanent status, as well as general masses who travel on their own to areas outside one’s locality without getting permission from the United Front and Religious Bureau office of their respective localities.”

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, “having strong nationalistic fervor” is included in the first of eight categories of “illegal activities” listed in Article 10.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 11 includes using the Internet to spread “harmful information.” According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 12 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 13 includes using the Internet to spread “harmful information.” According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 14 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 15 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 16 defines “illegal acts of religious education” as when “religious professionals, and those people who engage in religious pursuits in the society without any permanent status, as well as general masses who travel on their own to areas outside one’s locality without getting permission from the United Front and Religious Bureau office of their respective localities.”

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, “having strong nationalistic fervor” is included in the first of eight categories of “illegal activities” listed in Article 10.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 11 includes using the Internet to spread “harmful information.”

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 12 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 13 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 14 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 15 stipulates cancellation of household registration.

According to TCHRD’s partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 16 defines “illegal acts of religious education” as when “religious professionals, and those people who engage in religious pursuits in the society without any permanent status, as well as general masses who travel on their own to areas outside one’s locality without getting permission from the United Front and Religious Bureau office of their respective localities.”
68. "Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference" [Quebao zizhi zizhe zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], Xinhua, 10 September 13. According to the article, Tibet Autonomous Region Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo characterized "the Dalai Lama" as "the biggest obstacle to the establishment of normal order in Tibetan Buddhism."

69. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Tibetan Philosophy," last visited 23 April 14. The Dalai Lama is the principal teacher of the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the dominant tradition from the 16th century (i.e., from the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama). The Nyingma, Sakya, and Kagyu traditions predate the Gelug and have their own spiritual leaders.

70. "Ensure Ideological Security in Tibet With the Spirit of Daring To Go Into Battle—Earnestly Studying the Thorough Implementation of the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Special Speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference" [Xizang liang nian xuanpai yu 6 wan ganbu xia jiceng—jiancha zou you zhongguo tese xizang tedian de fazhan paizhu gongzuodui], China Net, 8 March 12, reprinted in Phoenix Net. According to the article, "The government’s ‘religious-related work’ to be ‘placed in a more important position to further bring the relationship between the Party and religious people closer,’ and said that the ‘rule of law’ must guide religious leaders "to correctly view the relationship between religious doctrine and national laws."

71. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.

72. "While Inspecting Tibet, Yu Zhengsheng Emphatically Says That It Is Necessary To Adhere to a Development Path With Chinese Characteristics and Tibetan Features, Promote Leap-Foward Economic and Social Development and Long-Lasting Stability in Tibet" [Yu zhengsheng zai xizang kascha dianyao shi qiangdiao—jiancha zou you zhongguo tese xizang tedian de fazhan paizhu gongzuodui], People's Daily, 26 November 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 15). Tibet Autonomous Region Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo characterized "the Dalai Lama" as "the biggest obstacle to the establishment of normal order in Tibetan Buddhism."

73. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.

74. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.

75. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.

76. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.

77. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.

78. "Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian zizhi zizhe tongyi qu tongyi] issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations. They were formally published in Yushu’s gazette.
and effective until September 2013. For additional information on Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations that took effect in other Tibetan autonomous prefectures, see CECC, Annual Report 2011, 10 October 11, 209–12; “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Expands New Measures To Direct Tibetan Monasteries,” 18 May 14. According to a TCHRD source, in Chenduo (Tridu) county ordered the replacement of “monastic staff and management committee members with government and party appointees by 7 June 2014.” The Commission has not observed information on whether or not such activity was underway in other Yushu counties.

Regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs took effect in Guoluo in September 2010. Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations (Guoluo zangzhu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 30 September 10. For additional information on Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations that took effect in other Tibetan autonomous prefectures, see CECC, Annual Report 2011, 10 October 11, 209–12; “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.

Chinese Authorities Impose New Restrictions on Restive Tibetan County,” Radio Free Asia, 20 May 14. According to the RFA report, officials conducted the campaign in Bamm (Pema) county. The Commission has not observed information on whether or not such activity was underway in other Guoluo counties.

Chinese Authorities Detain 16 Tibetans Rallying for Religious Leader’s Release,” Radio Free Asia, 26 December 13. According to an RFA source, “Another monk, Gyurme Tsaltrim, who was taken away from Takna monastery in Nangchen on Nov. 29, has been released from detention but placed under house arrest.” (Takna Monastery is in Nangqian (Nangchen) county, Yushu (Yushul) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.) “China Detains Two Senior Tibetan Monks,” Radio Free Asia, 17 December 13. According to an RFA source, “Local Tibetans suspect he was detained because of a speech he gave during a prayer festival in Nangchen in which he urged the promotion of Tibetan Buddhism, the Tibetan language, and moral ethics.” For more information on Gyurme Tsaltrim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00015.


“Driru Area Tibetans Sentenced in Secret,” Radio Free Asia, 1 April 14; “Chantleader of Drongna Monastery in Driru Sentenced to Eighteen Years,” Phayul, 1 April 14. According to the Phayul report, chant master Tsrho Gyaltsen (Driru) county, Naqu (Naqu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, possessed “pictures of the Tibetan religious leader the Dalai Lama and recordings of his speeches and teachings.” Officials reportedly closed Drongna in November 2013 and detained the monastery’s “debate master.” Kalsang Dondrub. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00141 on Thardoes Gyaltsen and 2014-00056 on Kalsang Dondrub.

“Driru Area Tibetans Sentenced in Secret,” Radio Free Asia, 1 April 14; “Chantleader of Drongna Monastery in Driru Sentenced to Eighteen Years,” Phayul, 1 April 14. According to the Phayul report, chant master Tsrho Gyaltsen (Driru) county, Naqu (Naqu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, possessed “pictures of the Tibetan religious leader the Dalai Lama and recordings of his speeches and teachings.” Officials reportedly closed Drongna in November 2013 and detained the monastery’s “debate master.” Kalsang Dondrub. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00141 on Thardoes Gyaltsen and 2014-00056 on Kalsang Dondrub.

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97Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Ancient Tibetan Monastery Under Siege Over Reincarnation Issue; Mother of Two Attempts Suicide Protest,” 10 September 13. According to the TCHRD report, the name of the teacher who Tibetans believe reincarnates is Rongpo Choepe (often used with the honorific “Rinpoche”).

98Ibid. According to the TCHRD report, the mother, Drolma Yangkyi (“Dolma Yangkey”), tried to kill herself by attempting to crash her motorcycle at high speed; instead, she fell off and injured herself seriously.

99Ibid. According to the TCHRD report, the court sentenced Dawa Kyenrab Wangchug “on charges that he contacted His Holiness the Dalai Lama during the search for (the reincarnation).” “at least one” TCHRD source reported that Dawa Kyenrab Wangchug had been released on medical parole. Phurbu Thimley, “Religious Oppression Forces Senior Monk To Commit Suicide,” Phayul, 27 July 10. For more information on Dawa Kyenrab Wangchug, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00263.

100“Chinese Authorities Allow Tibetan Spiritual Teacher To Return to Monastery,” Radio Free Asia, 13 August 14; “China Allows Banned Tibetan Lama To Visit His Monastery,” Tibet Express, 11 August 14; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Ancient Tibetan Monastery Under Siege Over Reincarnation Issue; Mother of Two Attempts Suicide Protest,” 10 September 13. See also “Government Policy on Tibetan Reincarnation Leads to Expulsions, Detentions, Suicide,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 2.


102“Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference” [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juedui anquan—si lun renzhen guanche quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13).

103Chen Quanguo, “Ensuring Ideological Security in Tibet With the Spirit of Daring To Go Into Battle—Earnestly Studying the Thorough Implementation of the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference” [Yi ganyu liang jian de jingshen quebao xizang yishixingtai lingyu anquan—renzhen xuexi guanche xi jingping zongshuji zai guomei jingping jingli jadeju quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Seeking Truth, 1 November 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 November 13). For more information on the Tibet Autonomous Region village-level deployment of Communist Party cadres, which began in 2011, see Li Yuan and Wu Tao, “Tibet Sends More Than 60,000 Cadres to the Grassroots Over Two Years, the Most Extensive in 60 Years” [Xizang liang nian xuanpai yu 6 wan ganbu xia jiceng—wei 60 nian lai zuo da guimo], Xinhua, 10 September 13.

104“Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference” [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juedui anquan—si lun renzhen guanche quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13). For an explanation of “the three inseparables,” see Yang Jing and Yang Chuantang, “Great Progress in Ethnic Minority Relations,” Seeking Truth Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010), updated 19 September 11. According to the article, “The third generation of the central collective leadership of the CPC with Jiang Zemin at the core advocated the important idea that ‘the Han ethnic group cannot be separated from the minority ethnic groups, the minority ethnic groups cannot be separated from the Han ethnic group and no minority ethnic group can be separated from the others (This became known as the ‘three inseparables’ in Chinese),’ stressing that all ethnic groups should share a common fate, should all be of one mind and should continuously work to strengthen the cohesive force of the Chinese nation.”


As of September 1, 2014, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database contained the following 15 records of imprisonment linked to the Biru (Diru) county crackdown (arranged in descending order by sentence length and date of detention): records 2014-00141 on Thardroe Gyaltset (18 years), 2013-00010 on Choekyab (13 years), 2013-00318 on Tsultrim Gyaltset (13 years), 2010-00456 on Dorje Dragtsal (11 years), 2014-00137 on Ngangdrag (10 years), 2013-00135 on Rigsal (10 years), 2014-00024 on Kalsang Choqlang (10 years), 2013-00319 on Yulgyal (10 years), 2014-00070 on Tsultrim Nyandag (9 years), 2014-00069 on Trinle Tsekar (9 years), 2014-00047 on Konchog Choephel (6 years), 2014-00046 on Tobden (5 years), 2013-00327 on Tenzin Rangdrol (5 years), 2014-00011 on Tselha (3 years), and 2013-00294 on Dayang (2 years and 6 months).

See, e.g., “Tibetans Clash With Police Over Chinese Flag Campaign,” Radio Free Asia, 2 October 13 (Internet and other communication channels in the area are now blocked’’; “Chinese Police Fire on Unarmed Tibetan Protesters in Diru,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 13 (“confiscated Tibetans’ cell phones and blocked communications by phone and the Internet’’); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,’’ 19 October 13 (“all communication channels remain blocked’’; “Three More Arrests in Diru,’’ Phayul, 2 December 13 (“strictly monitoring all movements in and out of Diru, intercepting all communication lines’’); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Repression Escalates in Tibet’s Diru County: The Youth Beaten to Death, Two More Given Heavy Sentences and Another Disappeared,’’ 7 February 14 (“fate of many more remain unknown due to restrictions on communication lines’’).
“Chinese Police Fire on Unarmed Tibetan Protesters in Driru,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Driru Under Lockdown: One Tibetan Sentenced; More Injured by Gunshots and Disappeared,” 8 October 13; “Chinese Forces Fire Live Bullets at Tibetans in Nagchu,” Tibet Express, 7 October 13. See also Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13. An image in the TCHRD report provides a clear view of People’s Armed Police in Xiachu (Shagchu) township, Diru (Diru) county, Naqu (Nagchu), Tibet Autonomous Region, with what appear to be anti-riot guns slung across their backs, possibly on October 19, 2013. The image provides a basis for inferring that similar weaponry may have been used in other Biru communities.


“Four Tibetans Shot Dead as Protests Spread in Driru County,” Radio Free Asia, 11 October 13.

“WeChat Leads to Tibetan Woman’s Arrest in Diru,” Phayul, 17 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 ("Kelsang"). According to the TCHRD report, the “exact details” of accusations against Kalsang were unclear. For more information on Kalsang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00321.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Crackdown in Diru Widens: Tibetan Writer and a Former Policeman Detained,” 14 October 13. According to the TCHRD report, officials also accused Tsultrim Gyaltsen of “disrupting social stability by spreading rumours.” For more information on Tsultrim Gyaltsen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00318.

International Campaign for Tibet, “New Images of Deepening Crackdown in Nagchu, Tibet,” 15 October 13. For more information on Tsultrim Gyaltsen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00318.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Crackdown in Diru Widens: Tibetan Writer and a Former Policeman Detained,” 14 October 13 ("Yugyal"). According to the TCHRD report, officials also accused Vulgyal of “spreading rumours to harm social stability.” For more information on Vulgyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00319.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 ("Lhundup"). See also PRC Criminal Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa), passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 111. Based on TCHRD’s report, officials may have suspected Jampa and Dawa Lhundrub of sharing “state secrets or intelligence” with “an organ, organization or individual outside the territory of China.” For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00326 on Jampa and 2013-00325 on Dawa Lhundrub.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 ("Jampa Lekshay and Kelnam"). See also PRC Criminal Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa), passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 111. Based on TCHRD’s report, officials may have suspected monks Jampa Legshe and Kalnam of sharing “state secrets or intelligence” with “an organ, organization or individual outside the territory of China.” For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00323 on Jampa Legshe and 2013-00324 on Kalnam.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13 (“Tenzin Rangdrol”). According to TCHRD, Tibetans sought Tenzin Rangdrol’s release by criticizing “the Chinese government’s entrenched practice of criminalising Tibetan people’s peaceful means of expressing their grievances.” For more information on Tenzin Rangdrol, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00327.


Tusultrim Gyaltsen and 2013-00319 on Yulgyal. For information on Tusultrim Gyaltsen’s and Yulgyal’s detention, see Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Clawdown in Diru: Tibetan Writer and a Former Policeman Detained,” 14 October 13.


133 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Clawdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison,” 23 December 13 (TCHRD: sentenced for their roles in the protest against Chinese mining activities). For more information, see the TCHRD report, the three men were “charged of instigating one of [2013’s] largest protests against Chinese mining activities at the sacred Naglha Dzamba Mountain in Diru County”; the TCHRD report links the quoted text to a May 28, 2013, Radio Free Asia report, stating: “At least 70,000 people from six counties, including many as 5,000 Tibetans have protested against Chinese mining operations at a site considered sacred by local residents.” Thousands of Tibetans Protest Against Mine,” Radio Free Asia, 28 May 13. For more information on the protest, see CECC, Annual Report 2013, 10 October 13, 184. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2014-00011 on Tselha.

134 “China Jails Three Tibetans Over Anti-Mining Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 23 December 13 (RFA source: “sentenced for their roles in the protest against Chinese mining activities”); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Clawdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison,” 23 December 13 (TCHRD: sentenced for “allegedly attempting to split the Chinese nation”). The TCHRD report of sentencing for charges related to “separatist activities” may be inaccurate since the case was tried before the Biru (Diru) County People’s Court, which, by law, cannot try a case involving state security such as separatism. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 20. Article 20 requires an intermediate people’s court to “have jurisdiction as courts of first instance” in cases including “cases endangering State security.” PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 103 (“splitting the State or undermining unity of the country”). For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2014-00011 on Tselha.

135 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Sentences Two Tibetan Village Leaders to 10 Years’ Imprisonment in Diru County,” 5 April 14; “Tibetan Village Leaders Sentenced for Anti-Flag Campaign,” Radio Free Asia (RFA), 4 April 14. Neither the TCHRD nor RFA report identified the court or criminal charge(s) against the men. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2014-00011 on Tselha.


137 See United Nations, “International Mother Language Day: 21 February,” last visited 29 May 14. According to the UN Web site, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established International Mother Language Day in November 1999 in order “to promote the preservation and protection of all languages used by peoples of the world.” International Mother Language Day has been observed on February 21 since 2000.

138 “Tibetan Language Promotion Event Blocked by China,” Radio Free Asia, 22 April 14. According to the RFA report, the event was to have been held in Songpan (Zungchu) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

139 “Authorities Concerned Over Popular Tibetan Language, Religious Classes,” Radio Free Asia, 21 May 14. According to the RFA report, which used present progressive verb tenses to describe events underway in May 2014, the programs were operating in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.


141 “Tibetan Private School Ordered Shut in China’s Qinghai Province,” Radio Free Asia, 8 May 14. According to the RFA report (based on the school’s closure), the school was located in Jina (Jinggu) county, Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province. The report implied a link between the alleged political imprisonment of a teacher, Phagpa, and the school’s shutdown, but does not provide any details about Phagpa’s alleged crime or the reason for his school’s closure.


143 “Tibetan Singer Held After Belting Out Song Calling for Language Protection,” Radio Free Asia, 26 May 14. According to the RFA report, the concert where Gebe (or Gebhe) performed took place in Songpan (Zungchu) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00010 on Gebe.
who were protesting against copper mining on land they regarded as "sacred." Phuntsok 2014-00156 on Gade, 2014-00157 on Kyamo, and 2014-00158 on Jamyang. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00155 on Thubga, 2014-00048 on Tseten Dondrub and 2014-00049 on Dzumga.

For more information on Konchog Dragpa, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00068. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Diru Crackdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison," Radio Free Asia, 27 August 13. The TCHRD and RFA reports cite sources linking Konchog Dragpa's imprisonment to mining. For more information on Konchog Dragpa, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00193 on Gebe.

The New York Times article provides a translation of the song that allegedly resulted in the detention of Gebe (or Gebhe) and cites the translation to Free Tibet. Free Tibet, "Gaybay," last visited 29 May 14. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00045 on Tseten Dondrub and 2014-00049 on Dzumga.


"China Detains Four Tibetans for Refusing To Sell Land," Tibet Express, 25 April 14; "Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained in Palyul," Radio Free Asia, 24 April 14; "Tibetans Renew Protest Over Land Seized for Highway," Radio Free Asia, 2 April 14; "Hundreds of Tibetans Protest Land Seizure Over Gold Mining Activities," Radio Free Asia, 22 March 14. According to the March RFA report, citing local sources, Tibetans in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Ganmam (Kamho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, reportedly protested against "the seizure of farm land for the construction of highways catering to state-linked gold mining and industrial activities that are polluting the environment and destroying livestock."


"Tibetan Women Attacked, Beaten at Anti-Mine Rally," Radio Free Asia, 2 July 14. According to the RFA report, "armed police and paramilitary forces beat a group of Tibetan women who were protesting against copper mining on land they regarded as "sacred." Phuntsok Yangchen, "Nine Arrested in Anti-Mining Protests in Dechen County," Phayul, 2 July 14. Ac-
cording to the Phayul report, “around two hundred policemen” came to the protest site and “several Tibetans” were injured; some Tibetans reportedly alleged that the mining was “illegal.”

157 "Xinhua Insight: Tibet’s Second Railway Line Opens," Xinhua, 15 August 14. The August 15 Xinhua report stated that the first passenger train to Shigatse (Xigaze, Rikaze) would depart on “Saturday” (August 16). See also “China Finishes Railway Connecting Lhasa to Shigatse,” Xinhua, 15 August 14. The August 13 Xinhua report described the railway as “completed” and stated, “Testing on the line . . . is set to begin soon.” (Information was unavailable on whether passenger service was planned to begin before testing was completed.)

158 "Qinghai-Tibet Railway Ready for Operation on July 1," Xinhua, 29 June 06. According to the Xinhua report, “The Qinghai-Tibet railway stretches 1,956 km from Xining, capital of Qinghai Province, to Lhasa, capital of Tibet Autonomous Region. The 814 km section from Xining to Golmud began operation in 1984.” Zhu Zhensheng, the vice director of an office managing the railway, reportedly stated that the railway startup is one year ahead of schedule due to “good construction, environment, and safety conditions.”


161 According to Commission analysis, “Nearly all (89 percent) of TAR population growth from 2005 to 2007 was made up of Tibetans, according to the 2008 TAR yearbook.” Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, June 2008), Table 3–4, “Population Nationality,” 33. According to Table 3–4, in the period from 2005 to 2007, Tibetan population increased from 2,549,293 to 2,602,788, an increase of 53,495 Tibetans; Han population increased from 104,647 to 110,429, an increase of 5,782 Han. The total TAR population increased by 60,347 persons in the period from 2005 to 2007. Tibetans made up 53,495 (89 percent) of the increase. See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 45–46.

162 The national census and provincial annual statistical yearbooks do not use the same method of enumeration. Provincial annual statistical yearbooks rely on data compiled by the local public security bureau. See, e.g., Sichuan Statistical Yearbook 2006 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2005), Table 3–1, “Population and Its Composition,” 41. A note appended to Table 3–1 states: “Data in this table were taken from the annual reports of the Bureau of Public Security, which were different than from that of permanent residents.”

163 The national census and provincial annual statistical yearbooks do not use the same method of enumeration. The national census uses a method of enumeration (see below) that attempts to record more of the population as present in the locations where they actually are, rather than at the location recorded on their permanent residence registration certificates. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Measures for Fifth National Population Census,” 23 April 02, chap. 2, art. 7. Article 7 includes instructions that the following persons should be enumerated in the places where they are: “those who have resided in the townships, towns and street communities for more than half a year but the places of their permanent household registration are elsewhere”; “those who have resided in the townships, towns and street communities for less than half a year but have been away from the place of their permanent household registration for more than half a year”; and “those who live in the townships, towns and street communities during the population census but the places of their household registration have not yet settled.”


165 Commission staff verified that Tibet Statistical Yearbooks did not contain county-level population statistics after the 2009 edition.

166 In addition to the 385 Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008, whom courts sentenced to imprisonment, are 8 Tibetans believed charged with a crime (and who may face trial); 6 Tibetans believed charged and tried (and who may have been sentenced); and 1 Tibetan who was charged and released.

167 In addition to the 621 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database recorded, as of September 1, 2014, another 1,112 Tibetan political prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are believed or presumed to have been released, or who reportedly escaped or died.

168 Tibetan Buddhists believe that a trulku is a teacher who is a part of a lineage of teachers that are reincarnations.
27

PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 24 December 02, 29 February 05, 29 June 06, 29 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 50. A sentence of death with a two-year reprieve may be commuted to life imprisonment upon expiration of the two-year reprieve if a prisoner “commits no intentional crime” during the reprieve. If a prisoner “has truly performed major meritorious service,” then the sentence may be commuted to a fixed-term sentence of 25 years upon expiration of the two-year reprieve. If the prisoner “has committed an intentional crime” during the period of suspension, the death penalty “shall be executed upon verification and approval of the Supreme People’s Court.”