II. Human Rights

Freedom of Expression

International Standards on Freedom of Expression

During the Commission's 2015 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to restrict expression in contravention of international human rights standards, including Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[1] According to the ICCPR—which China signed[2] and has stated its intent to ratify[3]—and as reiterated by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, countries may impose certain restrictions or limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions are provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of respecting the "rights or reputations of others" or protecting national security, public order, public health, or morals.[4] The UN Human Rights Committee specified in a 2011 general comment that restrictions on freedom of expression specified in Article 19(3) should be interpreted narrowly and that the restrictions "may not put in jeopardy the right itself."[5] An October 2009 UN Human Rights Council resolution, moreover, stated that restrictions on the "discussion of government policies and political debate," "peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy," and "expression of opinion and dissent" are inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.[6]

Legislative Developments

Significant legislative developments took place in China during this reporting year, including the passage of the PRC Counterespionage Law in November 2014,[7] the PRC National Security Law in July 2015,[8] and the Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law in August.[9] Commentators raised concerns about the government and Party's potential use of vaguely worded legal provisions to restrict and jeopardize the right to freedom of expression[10] and the press,[11] and the free flow of information.[12] Examples of such provisions include:

- Article 13 of the PRC Counterespionage Law, which allows national security agencies to seize telecommunications equipment and to shut down or confiscate such equipment if an organization or individual found to be "harming national security . . . refuses to change or makes changes that do not comply" with the agencies' requests;[13]
- Article 76 of the PRC National Security Law, which calls for the nation to "strengthen press publicity and public opinion guidance on national security,"[14] a provision that violates press freedom, according to press advocacy organizations;[15]
- Article 25 of the PRC National Security Law, which allows for the punishment of the "dissemination of unlawful and harmful information on the Internet."[16] Similarly, the amended version of Article 291 in the PRC Criminal Law punishes the fabrication and dissemination of certain types of false in-

formation—including regarding "dangerous situations," "epidemics," and "disasters"—on the Internet and other media with up to seven years' imprisonment; [17] and

• Draft cybersecurity legislation issued for public comment in July 2015,[18] which contains a provision allowing authorities to temporarily suspend Internet services to "maintain national security and social order or to deal with sudden incidents." [19]

PROMOTING "INTERNET SOVEREIGNTY"

Chinese officials promoted national control of the Internet, or "Internet sovereignty" (*wangluo zhuquan*),[20] in domestic legislation and international standards for Internet governance this past year. The draft PRC Cybersecurity Law advanced the principle that "Internet sovereignty is . . . an extension of national sovereignty in cyberspace." [21] In November 2014, delegates representing international businesses at an Internet conference in China convened by the Cyberspace Administration of China, also known as the State Internet Information Office,[22] reportedly did not sign a draft declaration disseminated among participants by the conference host that called on the international community to "respect Internet sovereignty of all countries." [23] In addition, China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization submitted a revised draft of the International Code of Conduct for Information Security (ICCIS) to the UN General Assembly in January 2015 that establishes "multilateral, transparent and democratic international Internet governance mechanisms." [24] Commentators raised concerns that the draft emphasized state control of the Internet and is contrary to a multistakeholder model of Internet governance [25] that includes civil society and business interests.[26] According to a U.S. legal expert, the revised ICCIS draft may reflect the Chinese government's reluctance to "[apply] existing international law to cyberspace." [27]

Abuse of the PRC Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression

The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to exploit provisions within international standards, as stated above, as well as to use vague provisions in the PRC Criminal Law to prosecute citizens for exercising their right to freedom of speech. Examples documented during this reporting year included Article 293 ("picking quarrels and provoking trouble"), Article 225 ("illegal business activity"), and Article 105(2) ("inciting subversion of state power").[28] Chinese legal experts continued to criticize a 2013 judicial interpretation that expanded "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" to penalize online speech, noting the interpretation goes beyond the provision's scope of tangible acts of disorderly conduct.[29]

Chinese authorities used criminal charges to target dozens of mainland Chinese supporters of the fall 2014 Hong Kong pro-democracy protests for detention and harassment.[30] For example, of the 117 cases that the international non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) documented of mainland Chinese citizens detained in connection to the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong,[31] many were on suspicion of "picking quar-

rels and provoking trouble."[32] Some of the detained individuals had posted online or sent via social media photos of themselves holding printed signs and, in at least one case, holding an umbrella[33]—one of the symbols associated with the protests[34]—to demonstrate their support for the Hong Kong protesters' aspirations.[35] Authorities arrested some of the detainees, including poet Wang Zang,[36] housing rights advocate Han Ying,[37] activist Xu Chongyang,[38] and rights defender Song Ze.[39] Prosecutors in Guangdong province charged some local protest supporters, including democracy advocates Xie Wenfei[40] and Wang Mo,[41] with "inciting subversion of state power"—a crime of "endangering state security" under the PRC Criminal Law.[42] In addition, officials detained Yu Wensheng[43] and Xia Lin,[44] lawyers who attempted to protect the rights of clients in detention for their support of the pro-democracy protests.[45]

The government and Party also continued to use the charge of "illegal business activity" to prosecute individuals who published unauthorized accounts of Chinese history[46] and other material that authorities deemed to be politically sensitive. These individuals included 82-year-old journalist Huang Zerong (also known as Tie Liu),[47] documentarian Shen Yongping,[48] and writer Fu Zhibin.[49] In September 2014, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention censured the Chinese government for "exploit[ing] the vagueness of Article 225 to justify the prosecution" of Wang Hanfei, the mainland Chinese publisher of a Hong Kong-based periodical, "for the peaceful exercise of his fundamental rights protected by international law."[50] In 2012, authorities in Hunan province sentenced Wang to three years and six months' imprisonment on the charges of "illegal business activity" and "fraud."[51]

According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, by late 2014, Chinese authorities "returned to using more explicitly political charges" against rights defenders and activists as demonstrated by the use of the charge of "inciting subversion of state power," in contrast to the frequent use of "public order" charges between 2012 and 2014.[52] For example, Guangdong security officials arrested bloggers Liang Qinhui in February 2015,[53] and Zheng Jingxian[54] and Huang Qian in April,[55] on the charge of "inciting subversion of state power" for posting comments about government and Party leaders. They detained Zheng after he reportedly posted a microblog comment about the July 2014 detention of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Public Security, three hours prior to the Party's formal announcement of it.[56]

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo remains in prison, serving year 6 of an 11-year sentence on the charge of "inciting subversion of state power" for several of his essays and his co-authorship of Charter 08.[57] Foreign government leaders and advocacy organizations continued to call for his release from prison[58] and for the release of his wife, poet and artist Liu Xia, from extralegal detention at their home in Beijing municipality.[59]

Pu Zhiqiang and the Criminalization of Speech

Authorities in Beijing detained and then arrested lawyer Pu Zhiqiang[60]—well-known for his work on freedom of speech,[61] his representation of defendants in politically sensitive cases,[62] and his public criticism of the reeducation through labor system[63]—amid a nationwide crackdown in China prior to the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and their violent suppression.[64] At the time of Pu's detention in May 2014, the Party-run media outlet Global Times editorialized that the private gathering Pu attended to commemorate the Tiananmen anniversary that month was an event that "clearly crossed the red line of law" because the "June 4th incident" is "the most sensitive political issue in China."[65]

A year after Pu's detention, in May 2015, the Beijing Municipal People's Procuratorate indicted him on the charges of "inciting ethnic hatred" and "picking quarrels and provoking trouble,"[66] based on several microblog posts Pu made between 2011 and 2014 that either criticized the Chinese government's ethnic policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region[67] or mocked officials.[68] Domestic commentators raised concerns that the authorities' prosecution of Pu criminalizes speech protected under China's Constitution.[69] One of the commentators, moreover, questioned the premise that Pu's posts incited ethnic hatred, arguing instead that Pu's condemnation of terrorist acts and his calls for authorities to improve ethnic minority policies served to "promote ethnic reconciliation and unity."[70] In August 2015, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court reportedly notified Pu's defense counsel that his trial would be delayed an additional three months.[71]

Growth and Control of the Internet and Mobile Communications

EXPANDING ACCESS

The Chinese government continued to take steps to expand the country's telecommunications infrastructure and provide greater Internet access in rural and less developed areas of China.[72] Government spending on Internet infrastructure reportedly is set to reach 430 billion yuan (US$69.4 billion) in 2015 and 700 billion yuan (US$112.9 billion) in total for 2016 and 2017.[73] According to the China Internet Network Information Center, there were 649 million Internet users in China by the end of 2014, close to 48 percent of the total population.[74] Also by the end of 2014, 557 million people in China accessed the Internet from mobile phones, amounting to 85.8 percent of Internet users in China, according to official data.[75] The telecommunications company Tencent reported that in 2014, active accounts for its messaging services WeChat (also known as Weixin) and QQ had already reached 500 million and 815 million, respectively.[76] Since 2012, WeChat's public accounts platform reportedly has gained popularity—and increasing government scrutiny—by "empower[ing] users to reach mass audiences . . . ."[77]

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CENSORSHIP OF ONLINE CONTENT

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued the Internet User Account Name Management Regulations (2015 Regula-

tions) in February 2015.[78] Commentators believe that the 2015 Regulations hold the potential to be a more effective tool for monitoring Internet users than prior real-name account registration regulations.[79] The 2015 Regulations require real-name account registration for individuals and entities using a range of Internet services, including "blogs, microblogs, instant-messaging tools, online forums, [and] online commentary . . .," among others.[80] Internet service providers, moreover, are required to "implement security management"[81] over prohibited content that the government deems harmful to national security, or that incites "ethnic hatred" or "destroys" national policies on religion.[82] Internet service providers are also required to cancel accounts that use purportedly false information or misuse the names of celebrities or organizations.[83] In preparation for the implementation of the 2015 Regulations, which took effect on March 1, 2015, Chinese Internet companies reportedly deleted more than 60,000 Internet accounts in February.[84] In March, state- and Party-run news agencies, such as Xinhua and People's Daily, shut down more than 7,000 Internet accounts that violated the 2015 Regulations.[85] Government agencies, including the CAC and the Ministry of Culture, reportedly investigated, threatened punishment for, fined, or shut down websites with content that included sexual content,[86] violence,[87] anime cartoons,[88] and online dating services.[89] The South China Morning Post reported that the CAC also shut down dozens of social media accounts that shared unofficial versions of Chinese and Communist Party history.[90] Domestic websites deleted "more than one billion pornographic and harmful posts . . . as part of a clean-up of the [I]nternet."[91] In addition, the Communist Party Youth League issued a document[92] in February 2015 calling for the recruitment of more than 10 million "online youth civilization volunteers" tasked with spreading "positive energy," the "Chinese dream," and "promoting rule of law" online and via social media outlets.[93]

"Great Cannon" Cyberattacks

International media reported on unprecedented, massive cyberattacks in March 2015[94] against GreatFire.org, a site that monitors Web-based censorship in China,[95] and GitHub, a program-sharing repository.[96] Web pages for GreatFire.org and the New York Times' Chinese-language site hosted at GitHub were specifically targeted.[97] According to Citizen Lab, a human rights and information technology research center at the University of Toronto, the tool used for the cyberattacks—a so-called "Great Cannon"—hijacked traffic from overseas users to the domestic Chinese website Baidu and injected malicious code that was redirected against the targeted websites, thus overwhelming their servers and preventing user access.[98] Citizen Lab found that the Great Cannon appears to share some of its code with and was housed in the same infrastructure as the Great Firewall,[99] the Chinese government's primary tool to prevent users from within China from accessing foreign websites that contain content the government deems politically sensitive.[100] Citizen Lab concluded that such an attack "would require the approval of high-level authorities within the Chinese government."[101]

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE MEDIA: "GUIDANCE," INTERFERENCE, AND REGULATION

International experts have identified media serving "as government mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the public interest" as a major challenge to free expression.[102] According to a 2015 Freedom House report, Chinese government and Communist Party "censorship and propaganda directives that are distributed to news outlets, websites, and portals . . . allow key state-run outlets to cover potentially damaging news in a timely but selective manner, then require other media to restrict their reporting to the established narrative."[103] The official term for this form of control is the "guidance of public opinion" (*yulun daoxiang*).[104] China Digital Times, a U.S.-based media aggregator, documented directives providing "guidance" for a wide range of events, political figures, and topics during this reporting year.[105] These included the 2014 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong;[106] the criminal case against Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Public Security;[107] and a ferry accident in June 2015 along the Yangtze River.[108] In March 2015, the Shanghai Propaganda Department Information Service noted that censorship activity was targeted against "speech that . . . cast doubt or attack[ed] the government" in a directive to discontinue coverage and public feedback about "Under the Dome,"[109] a documentary about air pollution that reportedly received over 100 million views in its first 48 hours online.[110]

Government and business interference in news coverage continued to hinder the news media from fulfilling a public function to serve as a watchdog.[111] As a result, the state of Chinese investigative and independent journalism has deteriorated further,[112] with one commentator asserting that, "At no point in the past 10 years have things been quite so impossible as they have been under [Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary] Xi Jinping."[113] The head editor of Southern Weekend, a market-driven newspaper based in Guangdong province that had been known for its investigative reporting, linked the newspaper's recent decline to several factors, including fewer readers, high production costs, the departure of talented staff, and competition from new online media.[114] A former staff journalist and a media scholar, however, ascribed Southern Weekend's decline to a provincial propaganda official's censoring of an editorial in support of constitutional rights in 2013[115] and aggressive censorship of the newspaper since that time.[116] In a March 2015 editorial, Beijing News asserted that government and business interference caused the Beijing News to withhold previous investigative reports, thus preventing it from exercising its "supervision of public opinion,"[117] a reference to the government's official term for journalism's watchdog function.[118] In the immediate aftermath of deadly chemical explosions in a facility near residential areas of Tianjin municipality in August 2015, Beijing News, China Youth Daily, and Caixin Media, among others, published reports that "were probing more deeply into the people and decisions behind the Tianjin explosion[s]."[119] Yet censorship

instructions indicated that Chinese authorities directed journalists to only use coverage from the state media agency Xinhua and refrain from posting "private" commentary through social media outlets about the Tianjin explosions.[120]

The pressures placed on Yanhuang Chunqiu (known in English as "China Through the Ages")[121]—one of China's most influential reform-oriented political magazines[122]—illustrated the government's use of regulatory measures to obstruct independent journalism.[123] In September 2014, the government reassigned the magazine to a more restrictive "supervisory unit" (*zhuguan danwei*), a move that a Yanhuang Chunqiu senior editor said might compromise editorial independence and force the magazine to become another voice of the state.[124] In April 2015, the State Administration for Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) warned the magazine that 37 articles published since the beginning of 2015 violated guidelines, including articles with content about former political leaders Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang.[125] Reports in October 2014[126] and April 2015[127] also pointed to ongoing interference in the selection and retention of the magazine's editorial leadership.

Anticorruption Investigations of Media Personnel

The Chinese government and Communist Party targeted individuals working in the media industry for investigation for alleged corruption and fraud during this reporting year,[128] including staff from China Central Television (CCTV)[129] and the 21st Century Business Herald.[130] Widespread government and business misconduct[131] and the lack of a free market for information[132] reportedly contribute to a media environment in China where corruption, such as payments to publish favorable stories and to expunge negative ones,[133] is rampant[134] and systemic.[135] According to an official from the Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection who conducted investigations at SAPPRFT, in 2014, the highest number of media industry officials in five years were found to be in violation of Party "discipline,"[136] and investigations reportedly were to increase in 2015.[137] In addition, in 2014, the "Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications" Task Force Office reportedly investigated 212 cases of suspected extortion, operating as a journalist without an official press card, or involvement in illegal publications.[138]

Anticorruption Investigations of Media Personnel—Continued

The government and Party's charges against some senior executives at state-run and commercial media outlets, however, may have been motivated by political concerns. For example, authorities sentenced former Liaoning province television executive Shi Lianwen to life imprisonment for corruption in 2014.[139] A more critical problem, according to David Bandurski of the University of Hong Kong's China Media Project, was Shi's alleged emphasis on the media market's commercial demands rather than on government and Party priorities.[140] Simon Denyer of the Washington Post wrote that authorities targeted Shen Hao, the founding editor of the 21st Century Business Herald, because under Shen's leadership, the publication had "stepped on many powerful toes in its reporting of the business dealings of China's Communist elite."[141] In August 2015, the Shanghai Municipality People's Procuratorate brought indictments against Shen and 29 others, as well as 15 business entities, associated with the 21st Century Business Herald on charges of extortion and forced transactions.[142]

HARASSMENT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA STAFF

The Committee to Protect Journalists reported an increase in the number of journalists and Internet writers imprisoned in China to 44 in 2014 from 32 in 2013, making China "the world's worst jailer of the press" in 2014.[143] Representative cases of imprisonment and detention of journalists include:

- **Ilham Tohti's Seven Students.** In December 2014, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region imposed prison sentences of between three and eight years[144] on Atikem Rozi, Mutellip Imin, Perhat Halmurat, Shohret Nijat, Luo Yuwei, Abduqeyum Ablimit, and Akbar Imin on the charge of "separatism"[145] for alleged work on the Uyghur-language news website Uyghur Online.[146] The seven had been students of Ilham Tohti,[147] a university professor and founder of Uyghur Online who was sentenced to life imprisonment in September 2014 on the same charge.[148]
- **Gao Yu.** In April 2015, the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People's Court sentenced 71-year-old journalist Gao Yu to seven years' imprisonment for "leaking state secrets."[149] According to People's Daily, the court reportedly alleged that Gao provided a central government circular to a foreign website in July 2013.[150] The media website in question denied receiving the document from Gao,[151] and her lawyer, Mo Shaoping, asserted that authorities did not show evidence that Gao was the source.[152] Commentators further noted the contents of the circular had already been distributed among government and Party officials and in state media;[153] one commentator rejected the premise that the document should even be classified as "secret."[154]
- **Zhang Miao.** Public security officials from Beijing municipality detained Zhang Miao, a news assistant for the German newspaper Die Zeit, from October 2014 through July 2015 on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble."[155] In the

days prior to her detention, she accompanied Die Zeit's Beijing correspondent to Hong Kong to cover the 2014 pro-democracy protests.[156] Zhang's detention demonstrates the risks involved for Chinese nationals assisting foreign correspondents in China.[157]

HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND NEWS MEDIA

The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to use a range of methods to restrict and harass foreign journalists and news media in an attempt to silence independent reporting in China. According to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC) annual report on working conditions in 2014, these methods included official harassment of reporters, news assistants, and sources; attempts to block coverage of issues that authorities deemed "sensitive"; restrictions on travel to areas along China's border and ethnic minority regions; visa delays, denials, and threats of denial;[158] and blockage of foreign media websites[159] and social media accounts in China.[160]

Physical and psychological intimidation. Authorities harassed foreign journalists on assignments covering mainland supporters of the 2014 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong,[161] ethnic rights advocates,[162] and striking workers.[163] Some examples from this past year included:

- **October 2014.** Security officials in Beijing municipality repeatedly interrogated Angela Köckritz, then the Beijing-based correspondent for the German newspaper Die Zeit, in connection to the October detention of her news assistant Zhang Miao.[164] According to the FCCC, Köckritz "felt so intimidated by the experience that she resigned her job as her paper's Beijing correspondent and left China."[165]
- **May 2015.** Police in Beijing stopped CNN correspondent David McKenzie and his cameraman from covering a peaceful street protest in which migrant workers were demonstrating for access to education for their children.[166] In a video segment aired on CNN, the police are shown shoving McKenzie, covering the camera lens with a hand, and temporarily detaining the reporting team.[167]
- **May 2015.** Al Jazeera reported that police from Chongqing municipality pointed assault rifles at an Al Jazeera reporter and crew while they were reporting on the aftermath of a protest over a proposed railway in Sichuan province, "despite having official approval from the local government to film in the area."[168]

Visa delays and denial. The FCCC remained concerned that "Chinese authorities are continuing to abuse the press card and visa renewal process in a political manner."[169] Representative trends and examples observed during this reporting year include the following:

- **2014.** The FCCC reported that the end-of-year visa renewal process in 2014 improved in comparison to delays experienced in 2013.[170] Some journalists faced "extreme delays" in 2014 when trying to obtain short-term J-2 visiting journalists visas.[171]

• **November 2014.** Nicholas Kristof, a columnist and former Beijing bureau chief for the New York Times, wrote in November 2014 that Chinese authorities would not issue him a visa.[172]

• **November 2014.** When a New York Times reporter asked Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping about easing visa restrictions for foreign correspondents at a press conference held during the November 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing,[173] Xi reportedly responded with metaphors that some commentators interpreted as "plac[ing] the blame with the journalists" and their media organizations for the visa problems.[174]

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression

[1] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 48, art. 19.

[2] United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), last visited 26 July 15. China signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1998.

[3] See, e.g., State Council Information Office, "Progress in China's Human Rights in 2012," reprinted in Xinhua, 14 May 13, sec. 6. The State Council did not mention the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its most recent human rights white paper, "Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014." State Council Information Office, "Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014," reprinted in Xinhua, 8 June 15.

[4] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/27, 16 May 11, para. 24.

[5] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para. 21.

[6] UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i).

[7] PRC Counterespionage Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fanjiandie fa], passed and effective 1 November 14.

[8] PRC National Security Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa], passed and effective 1 July 15.

[9] National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa xiuzheng'an (jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15.

[10] See, e.g., Verna Yu, "Legal Experts Fear China's National Security Law Will Stifle Freedoms," South China Morning Post, 11 March 15; "UN Human Rights Chief Says China's New Security Law Is Too Broad, Too Vague," UN News Centre, 7 July 15.

[11] See, e.g., International Federation of Journalists and Hong Kong Journalists Association, "New National Security Law in China Suppresses Media Freedom," 2 July 15, reprinted in IFEX, 7 July 15; Yaqiu Wang, Committee to Protect Journalists, "How China's National Security and Cybersecurity Laws Will Further Curb Press Freedom," Committee to Protect Journalists (blog), 22 July 15.

[12] See, e.g., Verna Yu, "Legal Experts Fear China's National Security Law Will Stifle Freedoms," South China Morning Post, 11 March 15; Edward Wong, "Chinese Security Laws Elevate the Party and Stifle Dissent. Mao Would Approve.," New York Times, 29 May 15.

[13] PRC Counterespionage Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fanjiandie fa], passed and effective 1 November 14, art. 13.

[14] PRC National Security Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa], passed and effective 1 July 15, art. 76.

[15] International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), "New National Security Law in China Suppresses Media Freedom," 2 July 15, reprinted in IFEX, 7 July 15. The IFJ and HKJA refer to Article 73 in their public statement rather than Article 76. Article 76 in the final version of the National Security Law is Article 73 in the second review draft of the National Security Law. PRC National Security Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa], passed and effective 1 July 15, art. 76; National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC National Security Law (Second Review Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa (cao'an erci shenyi gao), National People's Congress, 6 May 15, art. 73.

[16] PRC National Security Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa], passed and effective 1 July 15, art. 25.

[17] PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 291; National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa xiuzheng'an (jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, item 32.

[18] National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Cybersecurity Law (Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo anquan fa (cao'an)], issued 6 July 15. See also Adam Segal, "China's New Cybersecurity Law," Council on Foreign Relations, Net Politics (blog), 8 July 15.

[19] National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Cybersecurity Law (Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo anquan fa (cao'an)], issued 6 July 15, art. 50. See also "China Voice: Cyber Security High on China's Agenda," Xinhua, 9 July 15; Gerry Shih et al., "China's Draft Cybersecurity Law Could Up Censorship, Irk Business," Reuters, 8 July 15.

[20] Luo Yufan and Chen Fei, "China To Draft Cybersecurity Law To Protect Internet Sovereignty and National Security" [Woguo ni zhiding wangluo anquan fa weihu wangluo zhuquan guojia anquan], Xinhua, reprinted in National People's Congress, 25 June 15; Joel Simon, "The New Censorship: Inside the Global Battle for Media Freedom" (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 104. According to Joel Simon of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Internet sovereignty is " . . . the principle that within a state's territory the Internet should be under the jurisdiction of that country."

[21] National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Cybersecurity Law (Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo anquan fa (cao'an)], issued 6 July 15, Explanation [Shuoming], sec. 3(1). According to the explanatory section issued with the draft law, "Internet sovereignty" undergirds Article 2. See also Luo Yufan and Chen Fei, "China To Draft Cybersecurity Law To Protect Internet Sovereignty and National Security" [Woguo ni zhiding wangluo anquan fa weihu wangluo zhuquan guojia anquan], Xinhua, reprinted in National People's Congress, 25 June 15. For an English translation of this Xinhua article, see Rogier Creemers, "Cybersecurity Law Draft Under Discussion at NPC," China Copyright and Media (blog), 25 June 15.

[22] Li Yuxiao and Xu Lu, "China's Cybersecurity Situation and the Potential of International Cooperation," in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, eds. Jon R. Lindsay et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 236.

[23] Catherine Shu, "China Tried To Get World Internet Conference Attendees To Ratify This Ridiculous Draft Declaration," TechCrunch, 20 November 14. TechCrunch posted a link to the draft declaration. James T. Areddy, "China Delivers Midnight Internet Declaration—Offline," Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 21 November 14.

[24] UN General Assembly, "Letter Dated 9 January 2015 From the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General," A/69/723, 13 January 15, item 2(8). Item 2(8) of the draft states, "All States must play the same role in, and carry equal responsibility for, international governance of the Internet, its security, continuity and stability of operation, and its development in a way which promotes the establishment of multilateral, transparent and democratic international Internet governance mechanisms which ensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure the stable and secure functioning of the Internet."

[25] Kristen Eichensehr, "International Cyber Governance: Engagement Without Agreement?" Just Security (blog), 2 February 15; J. Michael Daniel et al., "China's Undermining an Open Internet," Politico, 4 February 15.

[26] J. Michael Daniel et al., "China's Undermining an Open Internet," Politico, 4 February 15.

[27] Kristen Eichensehr, "International Cyber Governance: Engagement Without Agreement?" Just Security (blog), 2 February 15. See also Henry Rõigas, "An Updated Draft of the Code of Conduct Distributed in the United Nations—What's New?" NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 10 February 15.

[28] PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], issued 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 293, 225, 105(2). For the distinction between the charge of "subversion" and "inciting subversion," see Joshua Rosenzweig, "What's the Difference Between Subversion and Inciting Subversion?" Siweiluozi Blog, 19 January 12.

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