

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong

During the Commission's 2014 reporting year, the Commission continued to observe developments that raised concerns about the state of democratic development, press freedom, and government transparency in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's Basic Law guarantees freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, promises Hong Kong a "high degree of autonomy," and affirms that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies to Hong Kong.¹ The Basic Law also states that the "ultimate aim" is the election by universal suffrage of Hong Kong's Chief Executive (CE) and Legislative Council (LegCo).² The CE is currently chosen by a 1,200-member Election Committee,³ largely consisting of members elected in functional constituencies made up of professionals, corporations, and trade and business interest groups;⁴ many functional constituencies reportedly have close ties to or are supportive of the Chinese government.⁵ Half the LegCo members are elected directly by voters and half by functional constituencies.⁶

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND AUTONOMY

Despite agreeing in principle to allow Hong Kong to elect the Chief Executive (CE) by universal suffrage in 2017, statements and actions by the Chinese government prompted concerns this past year that by controlling the CE nomination process, it would not allow genuinely free and fair elections. The Basic Law calls for electing the CE "by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures."⁷ The Hong Kong government has insisted that only a nominating committee similar to the current Election Committee⁸ can nominate the CE, and has claimed that "mainstream opinion" supports this view.⁹ Members of the pro-democratic opposition claimed the nominating process proposed by the Hong Kong and Chinese governments would deny voters a genuine choice in the election by "screening" out CE candidates unacceptable to the Chinese government.¹⁰ Instead, pro-democracy advocates pressed for allowing voters a more direct say in nominating CE candidates, for example, by directly electing part of the nominating committee¹¹ or submitting signatures to nominate candidates.¹²

Statements and actions by Chinese and Hong Kong government officials regarding reform proposals continued to raise concerns that the central government will restrict Hong Kong elections. In March 2014, National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) Chairman Zhang Dejiang reportedly warned that "Western-style democracy" in Hong Kong could produce "disastrous consequences."¹³ The head of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office rejected the possibility of CE candidates who

“confront the central government” or do not “love the country [China].”¹⁴ In April 2014, the head of the Central Government Liaison Office, China’s official representative in Hong Kong, participated in a fundraiser for the largest pro-Beijing political party.¹⁵ In June 2014, the State Council Information Office released a White Paper detailing the Chinese government’s position that Hong Kong’s autonomy is “subject to the level of the central leadership’s authorization.”¹⁶ In a July 2014 report to the NPCSC, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying wrote that “mainstream opinion” in Hong Kong supported a CE nomination process restricted to the nominating committee.¹⁷ Pro-democracy politicians and groups criticized the report as disregarding substantial pro-democratic viewpoints in Hong Kong.¹⁸

On August 31, 2014, the NPCSC issued a decision¹⁹ on Hong Kong’s electoral reform that restricted the ability of candidates to freely run for Chief Executive (CE). The NPCSC decision limits power of nomination to a committee reportedly dominated by members supportive of the central government, a majority of whose votes are needed for nomination.²⁰ Pro-democracy legislators²¹ and activists²² condemned the decision for failing to ensure “genuine” democracy, while some legal experts said the decision violated international standards on universal suffrage.²³ All 27 pro-democracy LegCo members pledged to veto any electoral reform proposal that follows the NPCSC decision’s framework.²⁴

Various political and professional groups continued to criticize Chinese government interference in Hong Kong and press for universal suffrage in electing the CE. In June 2014, hundreds of lawyers held a rare silent protest against the State Council White Paper, claiming that, by requiring judges to “love the country,” the White Paper threatened the rule of law and judicial independence in Hong Kong.²⁵ The Occupy Central movement held an unofficial referendum in June 2014 on several proposals for electoral reform that would have led to an open and liberal candidate nomination system;²⁶ nearly 800,000 people reportedly voted in the referendum, despite a massive cyber-attack on the referendum’s online voting systems just before voting began.²⁷ “Occupy” organizers planned to block traffic with civil disobedience protests in Hong Kong’s Central financial district as a last resort if the Hong Kong government presented an electoral reform proposal that does not comply with international standards.²⁸ On July 1, the anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover from Great Britain to China, hundreds of thousands of people marched through downtown Hong Kong, calling for “genuine” democracy and protesting the Chinese government’s perceived increasing interference in Hong Kong.²⁹ After the march, Hong Kong police arrested several hundred pro-democracy protesters at a sit-in in downtown Hong Kong; protesters criticized police for using “excessive force” in clearing the demonstration.³⁰ On August 17, tens of thousands of people marched against Occupy Central;³¹ Hong Kong and international media reported that organizers bussed in some marchers from mainland China and paid them for their participation.³²

PRESS FREEDOM

Hong Kong journalists and media organizations reported continuing threats this past year to press freedom, citing violent attacks on individuals associated with the press, self-censorship among journalists, and pressure from the Hong Kong and central governments and mainland Chinese businesses.³³ Hong Kong dropped from 58 to 61 out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders' 2014 World Press Freedom Index.³⁴ Polls from 2013 and 2014 by Hong Kong University found that about half of respondents believed journalism in Hong Kong suffered from self-censorship.³⁵ In January 2014, the owner of Ming Pao, an independent newspaper, abruptly replaced Kevin Lau Chun-to as chief editor.³⁶ The following month, two men attacked and severely injured Lau with meat cleavers in public.³⁷ In March 2014, four men assaulted two executives from a soon-to-be launched newspaper.³⁸ Other cases of physical intimidation of media from recent years remain unresolved.³⁹ In July 2014, pro-democracy news Web site House News abruptly ceased operations.⁴⁰ Co-founder Tsoi Tung-ho cited a climate of fear, political pressure, and lack of advertising due to the site's criticism of the government as reasons for closing the site.⁴¹

Several pro-democracy media organizations said that companies with ties to mainland China withdrew their advertising from Hong Kong publications, reportedly at the behest of Chinese and Hong Kong officials.⁴² More than half of Hong Kong's major media owners are reportedly members of the National People's Congress (NPC) or Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).⁴³ In February 2014, Commercial Radio Hong Kong fired a popular radio host known for criticizing the government; the radio host previously alleged that the Hong Kong government made her dismissal a condition for renewing the radio station's broadcasting license.⁴⁴

TRANSPARENCY

During this reporting year, the Commission observed that access to government and public organizations' records continued to be impeded by ineffective management and the government's inability to enforce compliance with its open information guidelines. Hong Kong's Office of the Ombudsman issued reports criticizing the lack of legislation governing public records and access to information.⁴⁵ Hong Kong has no laws governing its public record archives and inadequate laws on access to information; additionally, there is no independent adjudicating agency nor are there penalties for not following the guidelines.⁴⁶

Macau

Unlike Hong Kong, Macau's Basic Law does not mention "universal suffrage," although it includes a provision ensuring the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in Macau.⁴⁷ The Commission has not observed developments during the 2014 reporting year consistent with the UN Human Rights Committee's 2013 recommendation that Macau "set timelines for the transition to an electoral system based on uni-

versal and equal suffrage”⁴⁸ The Commission observed reports of self-censorship and restrictions on freedom of the press in contravention of the ICCPR.⁴⁹

POLITICAL FREEDOM

Macau’s September 15, 2013, Legislative Assembly elections were the first held since the electoral system was reformed in 2012.⁵⁰ In that 2012 reform, the Legislative Assembly expanded by 4 members, 2 of whom are elected directly and 2 indirectly by functional constituencies, for a total of 33 members.⁵¹ In the September 2013 election, pro-democracy parties won 2 of 14 directly-elected seats, while the Chief Executive (CE) appointed 7 legislators, and functional constituencies, seen as pro-establishment and pro-Beijing, chose 12 legislators.⁵² Incumbent CE Fernando Chui Sai On won reelection on August 31, 2014; running unopposed, he received 380 of 400 possible votes in the Election Committee.⁵³ The election was the first held since the 2012 electoral reform increased the Election Committee by 100 members to 400.⁵⁴

Several pro-democracy groups in Macau held an unofficial referendum in late August to gauge public opinion on universal suffrage in future Macau elections.⁵⁵ The Chinese and Macau governments condemned the referendum as “invalid” and “illegal,”⁵⁶ with National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Zhang Dejiang saying that it “violates the Basic Law.”⁵⁷ On August 24, Macau police detained five referendum organizers on suspicion of “aggravated disobedience,” including Jason Chao Teng-hei, president of the pro-democracy Open Macau Society.⁵⁸ The Macau Office for Personal Data Protection said the referendum’s collection of voters’ official identification card numbers and phone numbers was “inherently illegitimate.”⁵⁹ On August 29, Macau police detained two journalists and later named Chao as a suspect in the illegal use of Judiciary Police insignia in relation to the referendum.⁶⁰ Chao accused the Macau government of “political persecution” for actions taken against the referendum and expressed fear for his safety.⁶¹

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The Commission observed continued reports of self-censorship by journalists and concern over government control of broadcast media.⁶² Although the government pledged to liberalize the telecommunications market, government-owned Teledifusão de Macau (TDM) retained a monopoly on broadcast television, while the Macau government and TDM together own 95 percent of the shares in Macau’s only cable television provider, Macau Cable TV.⁶³

Two cases this year raised concerns regarding freedom of expression in Macau after prominent university professors were dismissed. The rector of the University of Saint Joseph, a private Catholic school, said that professor Eric Sautéde’s contract was not renewed due to Sautéde’s pro-democracy political commentary.⁶⁴ Sautéde claimed that pressure from a Macau government education agency contributed in part to his firing.⁶⁵ In August 2014, the University of Macau (UM) fired professor Bill Chou Kwok-ping, who also serves as vice president of the pro-democratic New Macau Association.⁶⁶ Although UM claimed that Chou had “impos[ed] his po-

litical beliefs on students,”⁶⁷ Chou alleged that the university fired him due to his “political activism.”⁶⁸

CORRUPTION

Corruption and money laundering from mainland China in Macau’s gambling industry continued to be sources of concern. Tens of billions of yuan reportedly are routed illegally through Macau each year.⁶⁹ In addition to the “junket” system, which reportedly arranges gambling credit and debt collection for wealthy gamblers,⁷⁰ gamblers evaded Chinese currency-export restrictions by using state-backed UnionPay bank cards to make phony purchases and immediately return them in exchange for cash.⁷¹ Amid reports that mobile point-of-sale terminals are brought to Macau from mainland China to facilitate transferring cash to gamblers, UnionPay announced after meeting with Macau authorities that it would take steps to fight illegal money transfers.⁷² Following a May 2014 CCTV exposé on mainland visitors abusing third-country transit visas to illegally extend stays in Macau, Macau’s Public Security Police shortened the time allowed for mainland travelers holding transit visas to stay in Macau.⁷³

Notes to Section VI—Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

¹Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, arts. 2 ("high degree of autonomy"), 27 (freedoms of speech and assembly), 32 (freedom of religion), 39 (applicability of ICCPR).

²Ibid., arts. 45 (Chief Executive), 68 (Legislative Council).

³Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, art. 45, annex I, Instrument 2.

⁴Ibid., art. 45, annex I, Instrument 2; Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Legislative Council Ordinance, reprinted in Department of Justice Bilingual Laws Information Systems, 1 October 12, chap. 542, sec. 20; Tanna Chong, "Legco Election 2016: How a Handful of Voters Elect 30 Hong Kong Lawmakers," South China Morning Post, 6 February 14.

⁵Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2014—Hong Kong," last visited 6 September 14. See also Te-Ping Chen, "Beijing Debate Stirs Hong Kong Poll," Wall Street Journal, 6 September 12; "Hong Kong's Pro-Democracy Parties Fail To Capitalize on Anti-Beijing Mood in Key Vote," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 10 September 12.

⁶Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, art. 68, annex II; Tanna Chong, "Legco Election 2016: How a Handful of Voters Elect 30 Hong Kong Lawmakers," South China Morning Post, 6 February 14; Stuart Lau, "Can Trade-Based Seats Continue To Function?" South China Morning Post, 8 February 14.

⁷Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, art. 45.

⁸Gary Cheung, "Chief Executive Voting Method Could Change After 2017, Says Mainland Expert," South China Morning Post, 11 March 14; Jeffie Lam et al., "Scholars Call for Bigger Nominating Committee That Would Represent More Voters," South China Morning Post, 30 April 14.

⁹CY Leung, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, "Report by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Whether There Is a Need To Amend the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016," 15 July 14, sec. 11(v); Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, "Hong Kong Leader Says 'Mainstream' Opposes Democracy Activists' Key Proposal," New York Times, 15 July 14; Carrie Lam, "The Rules for Hong Kong Electoral Reform," Wall Street Journal, 27 July 14.

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¹²Alliance for True Democracy, "Chief Executive Election Plan," last visited 15 August 14.

¹³James Pomfret, "China Parliament Head Warns of Western-Style Democracy for Hong Kong," Reuters, 6 March 14; Tony Cheung and Tanna Chong, "Beijing's Words Will Not Halt Occupy Central's Plan, Says Organiser Benny Tai," South China Morning Post, 10 March 14.

¹⁴"State Council Hong Kong-Macau Office Chief: Chief Executive Loving the Country and Hong Kong is Basic Political Principle" [Guowuyuan gang'ao ban zhuren: teshou ai guo ai gang shi jiben zhengzhi lunli], People's Daily, 15 April 14. See also Gary Cheung, "Beijing 'Set To Take Hard Line on Hong Kong's 2017 Chief Executive Election,'" South China Morning Post, 14 August 14.

¹⁵Fanny Fung, "HK\$13.8m Buys 'Successful Future' Calligraphy by Beijing's Top Representative in Hong Kong," South China Morning Post, 17 April 14.

¹⁶State Council Information Office, "White Paper on the Practice of 'One Country, Two Systems' in Hong Kong (Full Text)" ["Yiguo liangzhi" zai gang shijian baipishu (quanwen)], reprinted in Xinhua, 10 June 14; Hong Kong Information Services Department, "High Degree of Autonomy Assured: CE," 10 June 14; Chester Yung, "China Reminds Hong Kong of Its Control," Wall Street Journal, 10 June 14.

¹⁷CY Leung, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, "Report by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Whether There Is a Need To Amend the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016," 15 July 14, sec. 11(v); Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, "Hong Kong Leader Says 'Mainstream' Opposes Democracy Activists' Key Proposal," New York Times, 15 July 14.

¹⁸Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, "Hong Kong Leader Says 'Mainstream' Opposes Democracy Activists' Key Proposal," New York Times, 15 July 14; "Hong Kong's Report to Beijing on Democracy Sparks Anger," Radio Free Asia, 15 July 14; Michael C. Davis, "Public Opinion Hijacked in CY Leung's Electoral Reform Report," South China Morning Post, 17 July 14.

¹⁹Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016, reprinted in Xinhua, adopted 31 August 14.

²⁰Michael Martina and James Pomfret, "Hong Kong Braces for Protests as China Rules Out Full Democracy," Reuters, 31 August 14; Chris Buckley and Michael Forsythe, "China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong," New York Times, 31 August 14; Tania Branigan, "Hong Kong Activists Vow To Take Over Financial Centre in Election Protest," Guardian, 31 August 14.

²¹ Chris Buckley and Michael Forsythe, “China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong,” *New York Times*, 31 August 14; Tania Branigan, “Hong Kong Activists Vow To Take Over Financial Centre in Election Protest,” *Guardian*, 31 August 14; Joyce Ng et al., “Pan-Democratic Parties Threaten To Boycott Electoral Reform Consultation,” *South China Morning Post*, 6 September 14.

²² Michael Martina and James Pomfret, “Hong Kong Braces for Protests as China Rules Out Full Democracy,” *Reuters*, 31 August 14; “Official Statement of Occupy Central with Love and Peace in Response to the Decision of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform” [Heping zhan zhong huiying renda changweihui dui xianggang zheng gai de jue ding], *Occupy Central with Love and Peace*, 31 August 14; Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, “Democracy Backers in Hong Kong Face Tough Choices,” *New York Times*, 1 September 14.

²³ Michael Davis, “Beijing Has Failed To Honour Its Promise to Hong Kong,” *South China Morning Post*, 4 September 14; Jeffie Lam, “A Sad Day for Hong Kong and Democracy: Scholar Slams Beijing’s Reform Plan,” *South China Morning Post*, 2 September 14; Joyce Ng, “Barristers Question Legality of Beijing’s Model for Reform,” *South China Morning Post*, 3 September 14.

²⁴ Joyce Ng et al., “Pan-Democratic Parties Threaten To Boycott Electoral Reform Consultation,” *South China Morning Post*, 6 September 14.

²⁵ Ada Lee et al., “Legal Sector Plans March To Protest Against Beijing’s ‘Worrying’ White Paper,” *South China Morning Post*, 19 June 14; “Lawyers To Hold ‘Silent March,’” *Radio Television Hong Kong*, 19 June 14; Edward Ngai and Chester Yung, “Hong Kong Lawyers March for Judicial Independence,” *Wall Street Journal*, 27 June 14.

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²⁷ Jeffie Lam, “Occupy Central’s Third ‘Deliberation Day’ Slated for May 6,” *South China Morning Post*, 4 April 14; “Hackers Frantically Attack Simulation of Referendum App” [Heike fengkuang gongji moni toupiao Appl], *Apple Daily*, 16 June 14; “Hackers Paralyse Web Voting Platform,” *Radio Television Hong Kong*, 17 June 14; Jeffie Lam, “Electoral Reform Referendum Voting Hours To Be Extended After Cyberattacks,” *South China Morning Post*, 18 June 14; Tony Cheung et al., “Alliance for True Democracy Proposal Wins Occupy Central Poll as Nearly 800,000 Hongkongers Vote,” *South China Morning Post*, 30 June 14; Chris Buckley, “Hong Kong Poll Turnout Buys Democracy Activists,” *New York Times*, 29 June 14.

²⁸ Tony Cheung and Tanna Chong, “Beijing’s Words Will Not Halt Occupy Central’s Plan, Says Organiser Benny Tai,” *South China Morning Post*, 10 March 14.

²⁹ “Annual March Biggest in Recent Years, With the Focus Democracy in 2017,” *South China Morning Post*, 2 July 14; Chester Yung et al., “Hong Kong Democracy Protest: Thousands March Through City,” *Wall Street Journal*, 1 July 14.

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³³ See, e.g., Hong Kong Journalists Association, “First Hong Kong Press Freedom Index Announced,” 23 April 14; Sarah Hoffman, PEN American Center, “Attacks and Censorship in Hong Kong,” 25 March 14; International Federation of Journalists, “Back to a Maoist Future: Press Freedom in China 2013,” January 2014, 38–39, 41–42, 44–47; Michael Forsythe and Neil Gough, “Hong Kong Media Worries Over China’s Reach as Ads Disappear,” *New York Times*, 11 June 14; Lin Yi and Li Zhen, “Heat Turned Up on Hong Kong’s *Apple Daily*, as Advertisers Withdraw,” *Epoch Times*, 29 January 14.

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³⁸ Austin Ramzy, “Assault on Hong Kong Media Executives Adds to Press Freedom Concerns,” *New York Times*, 20 March 14.

³⁹ Phila Siu and Lo Wei, “Attack on Ming Pao Editor Latest of Several on Hong Kong Journalists,” *South China Morning Post*, 27 February 14; Te-Ping Chen and Chester Yung, “Hong Kong Journalist’s Condition Stabilized Day After Attack,” *Wall Street Journal*, 27 February 14.

⁴⁰ Tsoi Tung-ho, “House News” [Zhuchang xinwen], *House News*, 26 July 14; Shirley Zhao and Gary Cheung, “Pro-Democracy Website House News Closes, Citing Political Pressure, Low Revenue,” *South China Morning Post*, 27 July 14.

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⁴²Jeffie Lam, “Beijing Trying To Curb Press Freedom, Says AM730 Founder Shih Wing-ching,” South China Morning Post, 15 January 14; Jeffie Lam, “AM730 Says Paper Will Suffer if All Mainland-Backed Firms Pull Adverts,” South China Morning Post, 17 January 14; Lin Yi and Li Zhen, “Heat Turned Up on Hong Kong’s Apple Daily, as Advertisers Withdraw,” Epoch Times, 29 January 14; Li Xueying, “Hong Kong Media Gives Beijing Poor Press,” Straits Times, 29 January 14; Stuart Lau, “Media Pundits Form Free Speech Group,” South China Morning Post, 21 February 14; Michael Forsythe, “Q. and A.: Anson Chan on Beijing’s Pressure Tactics in Hong Kong,” New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 12 June 14; Michael Forsythe and Neil Gough, “Hong Kong Media Worries Over China’s Reach as Ads Disappear,” New York Times, 11 June 14.

⁴³Committee to Protect Journalists, “Journalists in Hong Kong and Taiwan Battle Beijing’s Influence,” last visited 19 June 14; Asia Sentinel, “Hong Kong: China’s Obstreperous Adoptee,” 7 April 14.

⁴⁴Stuart Lau et al., “Former Commercial Radio Host Li Wei-ling Blames CY Leung for Her Dismissal,” South China Morning Post, 14 February 14; Stuart Lau, “Commercial Radio Refutes Sacked Host Li Wei-ling’s Political Pressure Claim,” South China Morning Post, 15 February 14; Tanna Chong, “Commercial Radio Boss Plays Down Threat To ‘Fire’ Presenter Li Wei-ling,” South China Morning Post, 13 February 14; Stuart Lau, “No Backing Down for Fiery Radio Host Amid Reshuffle,” South China Morning Post, 9 December 13.

⁴⁵Office of the Ombudsman, “The Access to Information Regime in Hong Kong,” March 2014, 2; Office of the Ombudsman, “Public Records Management in Hong Kong,” March 2014, 2.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, passed 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 40 (“... the provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [. . .] as applied to Macao shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Macao Special Administrative Region”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25. Although Macau made a reservation to Article 25(b) of the ICCPR, which guarantees the rights “to vote and to be elected . . . by universal and equal suffrage . . .” the UN Human Rights Committee urged Macau “to consider steps leading to withdrawing the reservation.” See UN Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Macao, China, Adopted by the Committee at its 107th Session (11–28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN–MAC/CO/1, 29 April 13, para. 15; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Macao, China, Addendum, Information Received from Macao, China on Follow-up to the Concluding Observations, CCPR/C/CHN–MAC/CO/1/Add.1, 9 April 14, para. 1.

⁴⁸UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 107th Session (11–28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN–MAC/CO/1, 29 April 13, para. 7.

⁴⁹International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2220A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2); UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Macao, China, Adopted by the Committee at its 107th Session (11–28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN–MAC/CO/1, 29 April 13, para. 15; New Macau Association, “Human Rights Issues in Macau 2013,” December 2013, 2–4; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Abuses—2013, China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 27 February 14; International Federation of Journalists, “Back to a Maoist Future: Press Freedom in China 2013,” January 2014, 51–53; “TDM Presenters Reprimanded for Wearing Black Clothing” [Ao shi zhuchi chuan hei yi zao zhao fei], Apple Daily, 6 June 14.

⁵⁰“Beijing Gives Political Reform the Thumbs Up,” Macau Business, 2 July 12.

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⁵²International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide, “Macao Legislative Council 2013,” 15 September 13; “Democrats Lose Out in Macau Elections,” Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Fox News, 16 September 13.

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⁵⁸ Catarina Pinto and João Pedro Lau, “Jason Chao and Referendum Volunteers Detained Over Alleged Privacy Breach,” *Macau Daily Times*, 25 August 14; Stephanie Lai, “Pro-Democrats Detained,” *Macau Business Daily*, 25 August 14; “Macau Police Arrest 5 Over Informal Democracy Poll,” Associated Press, 25 August 14.

⁵⁹ Edward Ngai, “Five Arrested After Macau Attempts Hong Kong-Style Democracy Poll,” *Wall Street Journal*, *China Real Time* (blog), 25 August 14; João Pedro Lau, “GPDP Roasted for Explanation of Alleged Law Violation,” *Macau Daily Times*, 25 August 14.

⁶⁰ International Federation of Journalists, “Political Motive Suggested in Arrest of Macau Journalists,” 3 September 14; Viviana Chan, “Jason Chao Is Also Suspect in ‘Macau Concealers’ Case” [Jason Chao também é suspeito no caso “macau concealers”], *Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 2 September 14. As cause for the journalists’ detentions, the Judiciary Police cited the posting to Facebook of a photograph of a Judiciary Police (PJ) officer’s ID card (with the name not visible) in front of the civil referendum Web site and a statement from the unnamed PJ officer in support of the referendum.

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