

## IV. Xinjiang

### *Security Measures and Conflict*

Against a backdrop of escalating security controls targeting the broader Uyghur population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the frequency and scope of violent clashes and attacks in the region increased during the Commission's 2014 reporting year. High-level central and regional Chinese Communist Party and government officials highlighted the need to "maintain stability" by strengthening the XUAR's anti-terrorism security capacity and combating "illegal religious activities" or "religious extremism."<sup>1</sup> Overseas rights advocates and analysts raised concerns that authorities had used excessive force against Uyghur protesters.<sup>2</sup> They also voiced concern that authorities' overly broad security measures and crackdowns, ongoing economic marginalization, restrictions on peaceful religious activity, and constraints on expressions of Uyghur cultural identity have exacerbated tensions in the XUAR.<sup>3</sup> In addition, they expressed concern that Chinese officials failed to distinguish between violence or terrorism and peaceful dissent.<sup>4</sup> Domestic and international observers and international media reports also raised questions about the government's reported versions of violent events and the denial of access to foreign journalists to areas linked to violent clashes or attacks, underscoring the government's lack of transparency and failure to release key details about violent conflict and subsequent criminal procedures.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout this reporting year, authorities implemented repressive security measures targeting Uyghur communities inside and outside the XUAR. Such measures included arbitrary detentions,<sup>6</sup> domestic repatriation of migrant communities to the XUAR,<sup>7</sup> crackdowns on peaceful religious practices,<sup>8</sup> police and paramilitary patrols and searches of the general Uyghur population,<sup>9</sup> restrictions on Uyghurs' access to hotels in areas outside of the XUAR,<sup>10</sup> and requests to citizens living outside of the XUAR to report on the presence of any Uyghur tenants or other Uyghurs or "people from Xinjiang" within their communities.<sup>11</sup>

At a December 2013 meeting, President Xi Jinping reportedly told the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) that officials should focus on "maintaining stability" in the XUAR, marking a strategic shift from an official emphasis on promoting regional development that had been in place since 2010.<sup>12</sup> In January 2014, the XUAR government released plans to increase regional public security spending by 24 percent to 6.1 billion yuan (US\$1 billion), which included a 100 percent rise in the XUAR public security bureau's budget to fight terrorism.<sup>13</sup> In late April 2014, during a visit to military and paramilitary posts in Kashgar city, President Xi stated that the Kashgar region formed the "front line" against terror.<sup>14</sup>

At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, held in Beijing municipality in November 2013,<sup>15</sup> central government officials reportedly established a new Central State Security Committee, which will focus heavily on domestic security measures, including in the XUAR.<sup>16</sup> At the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in

March 2014, central legislators also considered drafting the nation's first anti-terrorism law.<sup>17</sup> Also in March, a Chinese legal expert urged lawmakers to use caution when drafting anti-terrorism legislation in order to achieve a balance between combating extremism and protecting civil rights.<sup>18</sup>

Both domestic and overseas media and rights defenders criticized Chinese officials' lack of transparency regarding violent events involving Uyghurs that took place during this reporting year.<sup>19</sup> Journalists and rights groups reported on authorities' detention of reporters,<sup>20</sup> refusal to allow foreign reporters to visit areas linked to violent clashes or attacks,<sup>21</sup> restrictions on social media comments,<sup>22</sup> and issuance of official directives to media organizations to proscribe reporting that strayed from the official narrative.<sup>23</sup>

During this reporting year, deadly incidents and attacks that likely involved political or ethnic tensions and that took place in the XUAR or involved Uyghurs outside of the XUAR led to more than 300 fatalities. Violence that took place on July 28, 2014, in Yarkand (Shache) county, Kashgar prefecture, likely resulted in more deaths on a single day than at any time since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the regional capital of Urumqi.<sup>24</sup> [For more information on the July 28 violence, see the text box below.] On July 30, 2014, three Uyghur attackers allegedly killed Jume Tahir, the imam of the historic Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar city<sup>25</sup> and deputy president of the Islamic Association of China<sup>26</sup> who was reportedly unpopular among many Uyghurs due to his support of government and Party policy and official restrictions on the practice of Islam in the XUAR.<sup>27</sup> On May 22, 2014, Uyghur attackers allegedly drove through a vegetable market in Urumqi city, killing 39 people and injuring more than 90.<sup>28</sup> Central government officials responded by launching a year-long crackdown on terrorism<sup>29</sup> and heightening security in the XUAR and in major cities in eastern China.<sup>30</sup> In May, President Xi Jinping called for "nets spread from the earth to the sky" to fight terrorism in the XUAR, and stressed the need to ensure long-term stability in the region, as well as to foster patriotism among religious clergy and deter "illegal and extreme" religious activities.<sup>31</sup> Also in May, XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian pledged a "people's war" against terrorism in the region, encompassing security measures and "special campaigns to regulate illegal religious activities."<sup>32</sup>

**July 28 Deadly Violence in Yarkand (Shache) County,  
Kashgar Prefecture**

On July 28, 2014, at the end of Ramadan, violent clashes took place in Yarkand county, Kashgar prefecture, involving local residents and security personnel. In the wake of the clashes, officials prevented any independent assessment of the violent events by reportedly heightening the local security presence,<sup>33</sup> shutting down or censoring online communications forums,<sup>34</sup> and blocking foreign reporters from entering the area.<sup>35</sup> State media first reported the violence on July 29, describing it as a terrorist attack in which a “mob” armed with knives and axes attacked government offices and a police station, burned vehicles, and killed dozens of civilians, and stating that police shot and killed dozens of attackers.<sup>36</sup> State media later reported that police had shot and killed 59 “terrorists” and arrested 215 people, and that the attackers had killed 37 civilians.<sup>37</sup> Overseas Uyghur rights advocates and Uyghur sources cited by overseas media, however, disputed the official account, reporting that police had shot and killed 20 or more Uyghur residents who were protesting against a harsh official crackdown during Ramadan.<sup>38</sup>

On May 20, 2014, police in Kucha county, Aksu prefecture, reportedly fired on a group of Uyghurs protesting in front of local government offices, after the protesters assaulted the principal of a local middle school and the head of the local township government.<sup>39</sup> Eyewitnesses stated the gunfire killed at least two protesters and wounded several others.<sup>40</sup> Local residents had gathered to protest the detention of up to 25 Uyghur women and girls who had violated government instructions not to wear headscarves,<sup>41</sup> which one local resident reportedly said was part of an ongoing crackdown on men wearing beards, women wearing headscarves, and schoolgirls wearing “Islamic dress.”<sup>42</sup> Police reportedly detained more than 100 people in security sweeps in the days following the protest.<sup>43</sup>

On April 30, 2014, two Uyghurs allegedly set off an explosive device at a train station in Urumqi city, killing themselves and a bystander and injuring at least 79 others.<sup>44</sup> The attack took place at the end of President Xi’s four-day visit to the region, during which he had underscored the need to fight terrorism and maintain stability in the XUAR.<sup>45</sup> Dozens of additional fatal clashes or attacks took place within the XUAR during the reporting year, many in locations in Aksu, Kashgar, and Hotan prefectures.<sup>46</sup> These incidents reportedly included attacks committed by Uyghurs<sup>47</sup> and clashes involving authorities’ deadly force against Uyghurs in instances rights groups said were excessive or unwarranted.<sup>48</sup>

Government officials attributed to Uyghurs at least two major violent incidents that took place beyond the XUAR during the reporting year, indicating a possible expansion of conflict outside of XUAR borders. A March 1, 2014, knife attack, allegedly carried out by 8 Uyghurs at the Kunming Railway Station in Kunming city, Yunnan province, left 29 dead and more than 140 injured.<sup>49</sup> On October 28, 2013, a Uyghur drove an SUV through a crowd of people, crashing into a bridge in Tiananmen Square in Beijing city, killing

himself, his wife, and his mother, who were with him in the vehicle, and 2 bystanders, and injuring 40 bystanders.<sup>50</sup>

*Criminal Law and Access to Justice*

During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR detained hundreds of Uyghurs on terror-related charges,<sup>51</sup> sentenced hundreds of Uyghurs to prison terms or death for terror-related crimes,<sup>52</sup> and executed at least 13 people convicted of terror-related crimes,<sup>53</sup> in criminal and judicial procedures that rights groups criticized for lack of due process.<sup>54</sup> In one case including Uyghurs sentenced on terror-related charges, on May 27, 2014, following central and regional authorities' pledges to crack down on terrorism in the XUAR,<sup>55</sup> authorities in Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture held a mass sentencing rally for 55 people that was attended by more than 7,000 local residents and officials.<sup>56</sup> State media reported that at the event, authorities also announced the arrests of 38 criminal suspects and the criminal detentions of 27 criminal suspects.<sup>57</sup> The names provided of those sentenced, arrested, and criminally detained all appear to be Uyghur.<sup>58</sup> Those arrested and criminally detained reportedly included terrorists, separatists, rapists, and people who had "illegally read the *Nikah*,"<sup>59</sup> an important part of Uyghurs' Islamic wedding ceremony.<sup>60</sup>

Research into trials in the XUAR involving charges of "endangering state security" (ESS) in 2013 suggests an increase in the prosecution of Uyghurs on ESS charges compared to 2012.<sup>61</sup> XUAR authorities have used ESS charges to punish people for peaceful activism, free expression of ethnic identity, and independent religious activity.<sup>62</sup> According to estimates provided by the Dui Hua Foundation, an international human rights advocacy organization, based on statistics reported by the XUAR government,<sup>63</sup> the number of ESS trials held in the XUAR rose by 10 percent to nearly 300 in 2013.<sup>64</sup> According to Dui Hua's research, ESS trials are concentrated in certain areas of the XUAR, with courts in Kashgar prefecture trying more than 60 percent of the XUAR's ESS cases.<sup>65</sup> Dui Hua also noted that while the XUAR High People's Court had provided the exact number of ESS trials concluded every year since 2008, it did not provide this information for 2013.<sup>66</sup>

This past reporting year, authorities convicted Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, a professor at Minzu University and founder of the Web site Uyghur Online, of "separatism," a crime falling under the category of "endangering state security." On September 23, 2014, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court sentenced Tohti to life in prison and ordered the confiscation of his property.<sup>67</sup> Authorities had detained Tohti on January 15, 2014, at his home in Beijing municipality, in apparent connection with his public discussion of Uyghur rights issues.<sup>68</sup> Around the same time in January 2014, authorities also detained around eight or more young Uyghurs who reportedly either had been Tohti's students or had contributed to Uyghur Online.<sup>69</sup> In February 2014, Chinese authorities formally arrested Tohti<sup>70</sup> and four young Uyghurs who had contributed to Uyghur Online: Mutellip Imin,<sup>71</sup> Perhat Halmurat,<sup>72</sup> Shohret Tursun,<sup>73</sup> and Abduqeyum Ablimit.<sup>74</sup>

Other cases of Uyghurs reportedly detained or arrested on political charges during the reporting year include:

- **Akbar Imin**,<sup>75</sup> an HIV/AIDS advocate reportedly detained on January 15, 2014, in Urumqi city on charges of “endangering state security”;<sup>76</sup> and
- **Abduweli Ayup, Dilyar Obul, and Muhemmet Sidik**, whom authorities reportedly detained in August 2013 in separate locations in the XUAR after opening a Uyghur-language kindergarten in Kashgar and attempting to open a Uyghur-language school in Urumqi.<sup>77</sup> In May 2014, authorities reportedly issued a letter indicating Ayup had been formally charged with soliciting illegal donations for the kindergarten in Kashgar.<sup>78</sup> The Tianshan District People’s Court in Urumqi city reportedly tried Ayup, Obul, and Sidik on July 11, 2014, and sentenced them on August 21 to prison terms ranging from one year and six months to two years and three months on charges of “illegal fundraising.”<sup>79</sup>

#### **Life Sentence for Ilham Tohti; Abuses Reported in Tohti’s Case**

On September 23, 2014, an Urumqi court sentenced Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti to life in prison on the charge of “separatism.”<sup>80</sup> According to a September 23 Xinhua report, the court heard that Tohti had “spread lessons containing separatist thoughts” via Uyghur Online, “coerced students to work for the website and built a criminal syndicate,” and “incited ethnic hatred by distorting the causes of a number of riots and disputes that occurred in Xinjiang and Beijing.”<sup>81</sup> According to media reports regarding Tohti’s indictment, which Chinese authorities announced on July 30, 2014,<sup>82</sup> authorities charged him under Article 103 of the PRC Criminal Law.<sup>83</sup> Numerous overseas government bodies and rights groups criticized Tohti’s life sentence, raising concerns that Chinese authorities persecuted Tohti for peacefully exercising his rights under Chinese law.<sup>84</sup> The court reportedly refused to call any of the 10 witnesses Tohti’s defense lawyers had requested to testify at his trial.<sup>85</sup>

Overseas advocacy groups have criticized the lack of due process in Chinese authorities’ handling of Tohti’s case, including officials’ initial denial of access to his defense attorney.<sup>86</sup> During Tohti’s first meeting with his lawyers Li Fangping and Wang Yu on June 26, 2014—more than five months after he was first detained—he reportedly stated that detention center authorities had subjected him to abuse, including denying him food for 10 days and shackling him for nearly three weeks.<sup>87</sup> Wang Yu’s law firm withdrew her from Tohti’s case in late July, citing pressure from officials in Beijing.<sup>88</sup> Li Fangping and another lawyer, Liu Xiaoyuan, met with Tohti for about three hours on August 5, 2014.<sup>89</sup> Later in August, Li stated on social media that prosecutors had failed to provide complete evidence for Tohti’s defense team to review.<sup>90</sup>

<b>Life Sentence for Ilham Tohti; Abuses Reported in Tohti's Case— Continued</b>
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<p>In May 2014, Tohti's wife Guzelnur told Radio Free Asia (RFA) that security personnel had placed her and the couple's two sons under "heavy surveillance" at their Beijing home since Tohti's detention in January 2014, although they had recently reduced this surveillance.<sup>91</sup> In the same interview, Guzelnur said the couple's oldest son was suffering from heart problems due to the psychological stress of his father's detention.<sup>92</sup> In February 2014, Guzelnur told RFA that police stationed outside the family's apartment were preventing anyone from meeting with her, including Tohti's lawyer, Li Fangping.<sup>93</sup></p>
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*Development Policy*

During the Commission's 2014 reporting year, central government and XUAR officials launched large-scale development initiatives prioritizing the XUAR's integration with the rest of China and neighboring countries, including through the upcoming launch of the region's first high-speed railway,<sup>94</sup> a new desert expressway,<sup>95</sup> and projects designed to develop the region as an economic hub for the new "Silk Road."<sup>96</sup> Central and regional officials also made assurances to raise living standards<sup>97</sup> and address the unequal distribution of wealth in the region<sup>98</sup> that analysts continued to observe during the reporting year.<sup>99</sup> Officials pledged to provide employment for at least one person from every family,<sup>100</sup> abolished fees for high school students in southern areas of the XUAR,<sup>101</sup> ordered state-owned enterprises in the XUAR to hire 25 percent of staff from local ethnic minorities,<sup>102</sup> and issued a plan to develop the XUAR's textile industry.<sup>103</sup> Some commentators observed that authorities' launching of new development initiatives likely constituted tacit acknowledgement of the role economic and social inequality had played in exacerbating regional instability.<sup>104</sup> Some observers cautioned that new development policies would likely fail to engender stability or equitable regional development.<sup>105</sup>

At the second Xinjiang Work Forum, held in Beijing municipality in May 2014, President Xi Jinping prescribed policy measures to further assimilate Uyghurs and other non-Han groups in the XUAR into the Han Chinese cultural and economic spheres. Alongside recommendations for more state investment in promoting employment and reducing poverty in the region, President Xi stressed the importance of "ethnic unity" to bringing about stability in the XUAR.<sup>106</sup> Government and Party officials have historically used "ethnic unity" initiatives to impose state-defined interpretations of identity.<sup>107</sup> Toward the goal of supporting "ethnic unity," President Xi advocated the promotion of "bilingual education," as well as the expansion of programs to send ethnic minority XUAR residents to other regions of China to study, work, and live.<sup>108</sup> In addition, President Xi called for teachings by religious leaders to be grounded in patriotism.<sup>109</sup>

On February 14, 2014, regional officials launched a "Down to the Grassroots" campaign, which officials and state media billed as aiming to boost development, improve people's livelihoods, and enhance stability and "ethnic unity."<sup>110</sup> In March 2014, more than

70,000 XUAR officials assumed one-year “grassroots” positions in villages throughout the region,<sup>111</sup> as part of a three-year regional plan to dispatch 200,000 “grassroots” cadres.<sup>112</sup> State media articles and social media posts by “grassroots” cadres indicated that alongside efforts such as agricultural and environmental initiatives,<sup>113</sup> “grassroots” cadres had carried out projects that may be less well-received,<sup>114</sup> such as forums on “illegal religious activities,”<sup>115</sup> the partial demolition of a local mosque,<sup>116</sup> and the construction of shops selling alcohol and tobacco to counter local resistance to the sale of these products.<sup>117</sup> The “grassroots” campaign in the XUAR is part of the larger nationwide “mass line” campaign that began in June 2013.<sup>118</sup> XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian reportedly stated that the regional campaign “leaves no blanks” in its coverage of 10,000 XUAR villages and communities.<sup>119</sup>

#### *Demolitions in Kashgar’s Old City*

Authorities continued to tear down homes and other structures in the Old City section of Kashgar city<sup>120</sup>—an area with deep cultural and historic resonance for Uyghurs<sup>121</sup>—amid concerns that local authorities had failed to include Uyghur residents’ input into how or whether the Old City demolition project should be carried out.<sup>122</sup> Since 2009, officials have overseen the Old City’s demolition and redevelopment, together with the resettlement of the Old City’s 220,000 residents,<sup>123</sup> alongside broader state efforts to transform Kashgar into an economic development hub.<sup>124</sup> According to a November 2013 China Daily article, four square kilometers remained<sup>125</sup> out of the Old City’s original eight square kilometers.<sup>126</sup> The New York Times reported in March 2014 that most Uyghurs who have returned to live in the Old City have been relatively well-off government workers and merchants, with many less wealthy former residents unable to afford to return.<sup>127</sup> A British journalist wrote in January 2014 that authorities had razed much of Yar Beshi, a section of the Old City authorities had previously designated for preservation.<sup>128</sup>

#### *Labor*

Some government and private employers in the XUAR continued to discriminate against non-Han job candidates.<sup>129</sup> As in past reporting years,<sup>130</sup> the Commission continued to observe job announcements that reserved positions exclusively for Han Chinese, including civil servant and private-sector jobs, in contravention of Chinese labor and anti-discrimination law.<sup>131</sup> Private and public employers also continued to reserve more positions for men, leaving non-Han women to face both ethnic and gender discrimination in the employment process.<sup>132</sup>

#### *Freedom of Expression*

Government authorities continued to restrict media coverage and online expression over violent incidents involving Uyghurs during the reporting period.<sup>133</sup> Chinese officials moved quickly to suppress news and online discussion about violent incidents.<sup>134</sup> On October 28, 2013, an SUV driven by a Uyghur man crashed into a guardrail

next to Tiananmen Square after driving through a crowd of people, killing 2 and injuring 40.<sup>135</sup> Shortly thereafter, Chinese authorities detained a number of foreign and Hong Kong reporters who sought to cover the incident.<sup>136</sup> Security agents also threatened Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti on November 2 after he provided interviews to foreign media in which he questioned the government's portrayal of the Tiananmen crash as a terrorist attack and raised concerns about government policies in the XUAR.<sup>137</sup>

In March 2014, XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian told reporters that the Internet was the driving force behind terrorism in the XUAR, and that almost all terrorism in the XUAR was aided by the use of VPNs (virtual private networks).<sup>138</sup> XUAR authorities punished Internet users for online expression and online discussion of religious issues during the reporting year. In October 2013, state media reported that regional authorities had "punished 256 people for spreading online rumors that jeopardized social stability and another 139 for spreading extreme religious ideas during a recent crackdown on Internet crimes."<sup>139</sup> In spring 2014, state media articles reported that disciplinary inspection officials in Aksu prefecture had fired a Uyghur official for online activities that had "incited separatism and ethnic hatred."<sup>140</sup> In a separate case, in May 2014, the Aksu Intermediate People's Court sentenced Mehmetniyazi Ayni to five years in prison for "inciting ethnic hatred" and "inciting ethnic discrimination" in online chat groups as part of officials' efforts to stop the spread of violent terrorist audiovisual materials.<sup>141</sup>

The space for online Uyghur expression remained limited during the reporting year. A report released by a Uyghur human rights organization in June 2014 documented a marked increase in the degree of government- and self-censorship of Uyghur online expression in the years since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi, when authorities shut down a number of popular Uyghur-run Web sites and detained more than 100 Uyghur Web site administrators.<sup>142</sup> According to research cited by the report, moderators on at least one Chinese social media site censored a much higher proportion of postings by users in the XUAR than postings by users in Beijing municipality.<sup>143</sup>

### *Freedom of Religion*

During this reporting year, regional authorities monitored, controlled, and punished Uyghurs for peaceful Islamic practices.<sup>144</sup> In comments made during the reporting year, top central and regional officials underscored the need to combat "religious extremism" in order to maintain stability in the XUAR, and vowed to increase controls on religious activities carried out outside of government-sanctioned parameters.<sup>145</sup> Authorities enforced tight restrictions on religious aspects of Uyghur marriage customs,<sup>146</sup> tightened rules preventing civil servants and others from engaging in religious activities,<sup>147</sup> and enforced controls on Uyghurs' religious practices during Ramadan.<sup>148</sup>

This past year, local governments throughout the XUAR enforced rules and regulations prohibiting certain displays of peaceful religious expression.<sup>149</sup> In April 2014, authorities in Shayar (Shaya) county, Aksu prefecture, publicized a system of rewards, some ex-

ceeding more than 50,000 yuan (US\$8,015), for “whistle-blowers” who reported on a range of “illegal religious activities,” including the wearing of beards and the practice of *Nikah*, a key religious component of Islamic marriages.<sup>150</sup> During a public sports event in August, authorities in Qaramay (Kelamayi) city prohibited women wearing veils, men with long beards, and others wearing clothes with religious connotations from riding public transportation.<sup>151</sup> Local authorities throughout the XUAR also required welfare recipients, lawyers, and civil servants to sign pledges prohibiting them from engaging in “illegal religious activities,” including the wearing of beards and veils and the wearing of clothes with religious connotations.<sup>152</sup> For civil servants, some pledges reportedly required them to prevent family members from engaging in prohibited religious activities, with penalties including restrictions on access to higher education for their children.<sup>153</sup> In addition, local authorities led ideological campaigns and educational sessions encouraging students in the XUAR to refrain from engaging in “illegal religious activities.”<sup>154</sup>

Regional and local authorities trained female religious specialists, known as *büwi*, in how to educate other Muslim women to oppose illegal religious activities and dress in a “modern” fashion, without wearing a *jilbab* or covering their face.<sup>155</sup> XUAR officials and *büwi* promoted the “beauty project,” a campaign under which Muslim women are exhorted to “let their beautiful hair fly freely” instead of covering their hair according to religious or cultural beliefs.<sup>156</sup>

Some Uyghur Muslims and Christians continued to serve prison sentences as a result of exercising their faith.<sup>157</sup> Authorities sentenced Uyghur Muslim religious leader Abdukiram Abduveli<sup>158</sup> to a fifth consecutive extension of his prison term after detaining him for more than 23 years, beginning in 1990, for “organizing a counter-revolutionary group,” among other charges.<sup>159</sup>

As in the previous reporting year,<sup>160</sup> local government officials throughout the XUAR reportedly maintained restrictions over Uyghurs’ observance of Ramadan, forbidding government employees, students, and teachers from fasting.<sup>161</sup> According to an overseas Uyghur rights advocate, officials in Urumqi had stationed 10 to 18 security officials inside each of the city’s mosques for the Ramadan period, installed cameras in mosques, and ordered mosques frequented by Uyghurs to publicize an anti-terrorism campaign during Ramadan.<sup>162</sup>

#### *Language Policy and “Bilingual Education”*

During this reporting year, both central and XUAR government authorities broadened the scope of Mandarin-focused “bilingual education” in the region, a policy some Uyghur students and rights advocates fear is aimed at assimilating young Uyghurs into Han Chinese society at the expense of their Uyghur identity.<sup>163</sup> The expansion of the policy was carried out in line with targets set in 2010 to universalize and develop “bilingual education” in preschool through secondary school instruction throughout the region.<sup>164</sup> Under “bilingual education,” class instruction takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by ethnic minority groups.<sup>165</sup>

In June 2014, one month after President Xi Jinping highlighted the importance of “bilingual education” for “ethnic unity” in a speech at the second Xinjiang Work Forum,<sup>166</sup> the National Development and Reform Commission issued a total of 530 million yuan (US\$85.1 million) in “special funding” to support the development of “bilingual education” at primary and secondary schools in the XUAR.<sup>167</sup>

### *Population Planning Policies*

In December 2013 and January 2014, Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in Arish township, Keriya (Yutian) county, Hotan prefecture, forced at least four Uyghur women to undergo abortions, including a woman who was nine months pregnant.<sup>168</sup> The deputy chief of Arish township and the head of the local family planning department reportedly confirmed that authorities forced the women to undergo abortions,<sup>169</sup> but officials at the hospital where the women were taken denied that they had carried out any forced abortions.<sup>170</sup>

#### **Notes to Section IV—Xinjiang**

<sup>1</sup> Edward Wong, “Chinese Governor Signals Crackdown on Separatists,” *New York Times*, 7 March 14; “Xinjiang Chairman Pledges Firm Crackdown on Terrorism,” *Xinhua*, 5 March 14; “Xinjiang To Fight Terror,” *Global Times*, 24 March 14; “Senior Official Calls for Xinjiang Stability,” *Xinhua*, 31 March 14; Liu Ziyang, “During Nationwide Public Security Video Conference Guo Shengkun Stresses: Enhance Abilities, Strengthen Measures and Take Strict Responsibility for Thorough and Solid Anti-Terror and Stability Work” [Guo shengkun zai quanguo gongan jiguan shipin huiyi shang qiangdiao: tisheng nengli qianghua cuoshi yan’ge zeren shenru zhashi zuohao fankong weiwen gongzuo], *Legal Daily*, 16 June 14; Yang Ping, “Xinjiang Destroys More Than 330,000 Illegal Religious Publications To Curb Illegal Religious Activities” [Xinjiang xiaohui 33 wan yu jian feifa chubanwu ezhi feifa zongjiao huodong], *Xinjiang Daily*, reprinted in *China News Service*, 25 April 14.

<sup>2</sup> Uyghur American Association, “State Violence and Intimidation of Uyghurs Will Exacerbate, Not Ease, Tensions in East Turkestan,” 28 May 14; James Millward, “China’s Two Problems With the Uyghurs,” *Los Angeles Review of Books*, 28 May 14; Uyghur American Association, “UAA Condemns State Violence Against Uyghur Civilians in Elishku Township,” 29 July 14; “Uighur Congress Disputes Beijing’s Account of Xinjiang Clash,” *Deutsche Welle*, 30 July 14; Barbara Demick, “Dozens Die in Mass Attack in China’s Troubled Xinjiang Province,” *Los Angeles Times*, 29 July 14; “China Controls Narrative of Violence in Tense West,” *Associated Press*, reprinted in *Washington Post*, 4 August 14.

<sup>3</sup> Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Bombing an Atrocity, Restraint Needed,” 23 May 14; Scott Radnitz and Sean Roberts, “Why the Carrot Isn’t Working, Either,” *Foreign Policy*, 11 November 13; Enze Han et al., “Are Ethnic Tensions on the Rise in China?” *ChinaFile*, 13 February 14; “China’s Terrorism Problem,” *Wall Street Journal*, 5 May 14; Michael Forsythe, “Q & A: Nicholas Bequelin on Why Tensions Are Rising in Xinjiang and Beyond,” *New York Times*, 2 May 14.

<sup>4</sup> Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Bombing an Atrocity, Restraint Needed,” 23 May 14; Tania Branigan, “China Detains More Than 200 Suspected Separatists in Xinjiang, State Media Says,” *Guardian*, 26 May 14; Tom Phillips, “Beijing Assembles People’s Army To Crush China Terrorists With an Iron Fist,” *Telegraph*, 20 July 14; Dui Hua Foundation, “Xinjiang Obscures State Security Stats, Trials Likely Up 10 Percent,” *Dui Hua Human Rights Journal*, 10 February 14; Ellen Bork, “In China, an Irrational Indictment,” *Weekly Standard* (blog), 1 August 14.

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<sup>60</sup>For a discussion of the importance of the *Nikah* to Uyghur Muslims’ wedding traditions, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Briefing: China Attempts To Criminalize Every Aspect of Uyghur Religious Belief and Practice,” 8 May 14.

<sup>61</sup>Dui Hua Foundation, “Xinjiang Obscures State Security Stats, Trials Likely Up 10 Percent,” Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 10 February 14; Radio Free Asia, “State Security Trials on

the Rise in Xinjiang,” 11 February 14. Endangering State Security (ESS) crimes are defined in Articles 102–113 of the PRC Criminal Law to include acts such as splitting the state, subversion, espionage, and armed rebellion. Many ESS crimes carry the possibility of life imprisonment and capital punishment. For Commission Analysis, see “Number of State Security Cases Tried in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer Prison Sentences Increases,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 February 11.

<sup>62</sup>CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 244, 253–54. For the Chinese legal definition of Endangering State Security, see PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 102–13. Following its 2005 visit to China, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) noted that the vague definition of crimes of endangering national security, splitting the state, subverting state power, and supplying state secrets “leaves their application open to abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly.” WGAD recommended that political crimes “that leave large discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as ‘endangering national security,’ ‘subverting State power,’ ‘undermining the unity of the country,’ ‘supplying of State secrets to individuals abroad,’ etc. should be abolished.” Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.6, 10 March 06, paras. 34, 82(s).

<sup>63</sup>“Annual Work Report of Xinjiang’s Courts (2013)” [Xinjiang fayuan gongzuo niandu baogao (2013 nian)], Xinjiang Court Net, 17 January 14.

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>“Separatist Uyghur Teacher Jailed for Life,” Xinhua, 23 September 14; Steven Jiang, “China Sentences Prominent Uyghur Scholar to Life in Prison for ‘Separatism,’” CNN, 24 September 14.

<sup>68</sup>Tania Branigan, “Chinese Police Detain Leading Uighur Academic Ilham Tohti,” Guardian, 16 January 14. For more information on Ilham Tohti, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2009-00315.

<sup>69</sup>“No News on Ilham Tohti, One Student Is Detained in Urumqi” [Yilihamu reng wu yinxun yi xuesheng bei guan wulumuqi], Radio Free Asia, 29 January 14.

<sup>70</sup>Rights Defense Network, “Uyghur Professor Ilham Tohti Arrested on Charges of Inciting State Separatism” [Weizu jiaoshi yilihamu bei kong shexian fenlie guojia zui daibu], 25 February 14; Ben Blanchard, “China Charges Prominent Uighur Professor With Separatism,” Reuters, 25 February 14.

<sup>71</sup>“Uyghur Student Mutellip Arrested, Ilham Tohti’s Bank Accounts Frozen” [Weizu liuxuesheng mutalipu bei daibu yilihamu yinhang zhanghu zao dongjie], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 14; “Uyghur Exchange Student Mutellip’s Case Turned Over to the Procuratorate, Ilham Tohti, Detained for Three Months, Is Still Being Investigated” [Weizu liuxuesheng mutalipu an zhuan jianchayuan yilihamu bei ju zheng san yue reng zai zhencha], Radio Free Asia, 14 April 14. For more information on Mutellip Imin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00347.

<sup>72</sup>“Three Students of Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti Formally Arrested,” Radio Free Asia, 26 February 14. For more information on Perhat Halmurat, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00100.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid. For more information on Shohret Tursun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00133. According to sources quoted in the RFA report, Halmurat and Tursun have been charged with “separatism.” Under Articles 103 and 105 of the PRC Criminal Law, Halmurat and Tursun likely face punishments of 3 to 10 years’ imprisonment if convicted of “separatism.” PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 103, 105.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid. For more information on Abduqeyum Ablimit, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00134. According to sources quoted in the RFA report, Ablimit was charged with “revealing state secrets.” The maximum sentence that CL Article 398 provides for a person who “intentionally or negligently divulges state secrets” is 7 years, but Article 111 provides a 10-year minimum sentence in cases where “circumstances are especially serious.” PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 111, 398.

<sup>75</sup>For more information on Akbar Imin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00115.

<sup>76</sup>Michael Martina and Megha Rajagopalan, “China Detains Uighur AIDS Activist Amid Crackdown,” Reuters, 10 March 14; “Uyghur Rights Advocate Akbar Arrested on Same Day Ilham Taken Away and for Similar Charge” [Weizu weiquan renshi akebaier bei bu yu yue yu yilihamu tongri bei daizou kongzui xiangtong], Radio Free Asia, 9 March 14; “Beijing Aizhixing Issues Statement Regarding Arrest of Uyghur Akbar Imin” [Beijing aizhixing jiu weizu ren yiming bei bu fabiao shengming], Radio Free Asia, 7 March 14.

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<sup>79</sup>“Uyghur Linguist, Two Associates Sentenced After One Year Detention,” Radio Free Asia, 26 August 14.

<sup>80</sup>“Separatist Uyghur Teacher Jailed for Life,” Xinhua, 23 September 14; Steven Jiang, “China Sentences Prominent Uyghur Scholar to Life in Prison for ‘Separatism,’” CNN, 24 September 14.

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<sup>82</sup>“Ilham Tohti Charged With Separatism,” Global Times, 31 July 14; “Former Minzu University Lecturer Ilham [Tohti] Indicted on the Crime of Splitting the Nation” [Zhongyang minda yuan jiangshi yilihamu she fenlie guojia zui bei tiqi gongsu], People’s Daily, 30 July 14.

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<sup>84</sup>See, e.g., Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the Conviction and Sentencing of Ilham Tohti,” 23 September 14; Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, “Conviction and Sentencing of Ilham Tohti,” 23 September 14; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, “Foreign Office Concerned at Sentence of Ilham Tohti,” 24 September 14; European Union External Action, European Union, “Statement by the Spokesperson on the Sentencing of Respected Uyghur Academic Ilham Tohti,” 23 September 14; Uyghur American Association, “Uyghur American Association Condemns Harsh Sentencing of Ilham Tohti,” 23 September 14; Amnesty International, “China: Deplorable Life Sentence for Uyghur Academic,” 23 September 14; Rights Defense Network, “Rights Defense Network Editorial: Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti’s Life Sentence Tramples on Conscience, Rule of Law, and Human Rights” [Weiquan wang shelun: dui weizu xuezhe yilihamu de wuqituxing panjue shi dui liangzhi, fazhi he renquan de jianta], 23 September 14.

<sup>85</sup>Ting Shi and Shai Oster, “Uyghur Scholar Tohti Jailed for Life for Inciting Separatism,” Bloomberg, 23 September 14.

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<sup>141</sup>Sui Yunyan, “Our Region Jointly Sentences in 16 Criminal Cases Involving the Spread of Violent Terrorist Audiovisual Materials” [Woqu jizhong xuanpan 16 qi she chuanbo baoli kongbu yinshipin fanzui anjian], *Xinjiang Court Net*, 21 May 14; “China Jails 39 in Far West for Terror Materials,” *Associated Press*, reprinted in *Washington Post*, 21 May 14.

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<sup>143</sup>*Ibid.*, 2, 11. See also David Bamman et al., “Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese Social Media,” *First Monday*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2012).

<sup>144</sup>For information on various legal restrictions on Islamic practices in the XUAR, see CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 169–70.

<sup>145</sup>Dilmurat Kasim, “Religious Extremist Ideology Is a Malignant Tumor Seriously Affecting Social Stability in Xinjiang” [Zongjiao jiduan sixiang shi yanzhong yingxiang xinjiang shehui wending de duli], *Xinjiang Daily*, reprinted in *China National Radio*, 10 December 13; Jonathan Kaiman, “Xinjiang Steps Up Fight Against Religious Extremists in China,” *Guardian*, 17 January 14; “Xinjiang Chairman Vows To Stop Religious Extremism,” *Xinhua*, 7 April 14; Michael Martina, “China Official Seeks Tougher Rules on Religion After Xinjiang Blasts,” *Reuters*, 27 January 14; Parezhati, “Xinjiang Launches Campaign To Deal With Illegal Religious Activities, Attack Religious Extremist Illegal Crimes” [Xinjiang kaizhan zhili feifa zongjiao huodong daji zongjiao jiduan weifa fanzui], *People’s Daily*, reprinted in *Xinhua*, 11 February 14; “Islamists Threaten Xinjiang Stability, Says Chinese Newspaper,” *Reuters*, reprinted in *Guardian*, 29 November 13; Cui Jia and Gao Bo, “Xinjiang Doubles Terror Fight Budget,” *China Daily*, 17 January 14.

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<sup>148</sup>“China Bans Xinjiang Officials From Observing Ramadan Fast,” *BBC*, 2 July 14; “Kashgar College in Xinjiang Threatens Fasting Muslim Students With Expulsion,” *Radio Free Asia*, 8 July 14; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Xinjiang Hospital Asks Staff Not To Fast During Ramadan,” *New York Times*, *Sinosphere* (blog), 5 June 14; Yining County Health Bureau, *Sina Weibo* post, 4 June 14, 10:26 a.m.

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<sup>157</sup> For representative examples, see the following records in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2009-00328 on Kurbanjan Semet, 2009-00314 on Merdan Seyitakhun, 2011-00549 on Qurbanjan Abdusemet, and 2008-00014 on Alimjan Yimit.

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<sup>160</sup> CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 169.

<sup>161</sup> “China Bans Xinjiang Officials From Observing Ramadan Fast,” BBC, 2 July 14; “Kashgar College in Xinjiang Threatens Fasting Muslim Students With Expulsion,” Radio Free Asia, 8 July 14; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Xinjiang Hospital Asks Staff Not To Fast During Ramadan,” New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 5 June 14; Yining County Health Bureau, Sina Weibo post, 4 June 14, 10:26 a.m.

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<sup>164</sup> For additional analysis, see “Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.

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<sup>166</sup> “Xi Jinping Delivers an Important Speech at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum” [Xi jinpingsai di er ci zhongyang xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua], People’s Daily, 30 May 14.

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<sup>168</sup> “Four Uyghur Women Forced To Abort Their Babies in Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, 30 December 13; “Uyghur Woman Forced To Abort Six-Month Pregnancy While Ill,” Radio Free Asia, 13 January 14.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> “Uyghur Woman Forced To Abort Six-Month Pregnancy While Ill,” Radio Free Asia, 13 January 14.