

III. Development of the Rule of Law

CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) vary in scope and focus, and illustrate complex levels of organization in an evolving regulatory environment. Government-registered NGOs are one subset of Chinese NGOs. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, at the end of 2015, China had 661,861 registered “social organizations” (*shehui zuzhi*)—the official term for NGOs—that consisted of 329,122 non-governmental, non-commercial organizations (*minban feiqiye danwei*), a 12.6-percent increase from the previous year; 4,762 foundations (*jjinhui*); and 327,977 social associations (*shehui tuanti*).¹ Whereas many registered NGOs in China are government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs),² organizations founded by citizens who have few or no ties with the state, nevertheless, make up a significant subset of Chinese NGOs.³ Many of these NGOs remain unregistered or are registered as business entities due to restrictions and barriers to registration.⁴ In 2010, a Chinese scholar estimated that 90 percent of NGOs are unregistered,⁵ while more recent estimates from 2014 range from 40 to 70 percent.⁶ The number of unregistered NGOs in China reportedly ranges from 1 million to 8 million.⁷ While recent regulatory developments have strengthened the legal basis for public participation in some ways,⁸ the Chinese government continued to limit the space in which civil society groups are permitted to work.⁹

Continued Crackdown and the “Chilling Effect” on Civil Society

During the Commission’s 2016 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to deepen a crackdown that began in 2013 on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society advocates¹⁰ working on labor,¹¹ women’s rights,¹² and rights defense advocacy.¹³ In addition to the government’s “unprecedented attack” on more than 300 rights lawyers and advocates beginning in and around July 2015,¹⁴ the international NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reported that authorities detained 22 human rights defenders for “political” crimes in 2015 on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power,” equal to the number of individuals reportedly detained under the same charge from 2012 to 2014.¹⁵ [For more information and updates on cases from the July 2015 crackdown on Chinese lawyers, see Section III—Access to Justice.] CHRD also recorded 11 cases of human rights defenders arrested on suspicion of “subversion of state power” in January 2016, “surpassing the documented number from 2012 to 2014 combined.”¹⁶ The intensified pressure from central and local government authorities reportedly had a “chilling effect”¹⁷ on the media,¹⁸ labor NGOs,¹⁹ charity workers,²⁰ and academics,²¹ as well as on international NGOs.²² As one international labor expert noted, the crackdown on civil society appears to be “specifically aimed at the pillars of civil society that have been most effective in pushing the government to do things.”²³

During the reporting year, authorities targeted some domestic NGOs and their staff, as illustrated in the following examples:

- In December 2015, public security officials harassed or detained at least 25 labor advocates affiliated with labor NGOs in Guangdong province,²⁴ including staff from the Panyu Workers' Services Center,²⁵ the Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services Center,²⁶ Haige Labor Services Center,²⁷ and the Panyu Workers' Mutual Assistance Group.²⁸ In January 2016, authorities formally arrested Zeng Feiyang,²⁹ Zhu Xiaomei,³⁰ Meng Han,³¹ and He Xiaobo³² reportedly for their organizing work and activities; and released Zhu Xiaomei and He Xiaobo on bail in February³³ and April 2016,³⁴ respectively.
- In January 2016, public security authorities from Beijing municipality reportedly ordered the Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service Center (Zhongze) to close.³⁵ Zhongze, founded by lawyer Guo Jianmei in 1995 as the Center for Women's Law Studies and Legal Services of Peking University, pioneered impact litigation in domestic violence, sexual harassment, and other women's rights issues.³⁶ Zhongze also implemented projects in rural women's land rights³⁷ and submitted reports to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women that reviewed the Chinese government's compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.³⁸ Despite ongoing difficulties over the years,³⁹ such as in 2010 when Peking University rescinded its sponsorship of the organization, Guo's work is recognized domestically and internationally.⁴⁰

Chinese authorities also targeted an international staff member of a legal rights advocacy group during this reporting year. In January 2016, authorities detained Peter Dahlin, a Swedish rights advocate who cofounded the Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, an organization based in Beijing municipality that trained and supported Chinese rights defenders,⁴¹ for three weeks under suspicion of "funding criminal activities harmful to China's national security" before expelling him from the country.⁴² On January 19, while Dahlin was in detention, state television aired a prerecorded confession of him admitting to "[violating] Chinese law" and "[causing] harm to the Chinese government."⁴³ Dahlin later stated in an interview with the New York Times that Chinese authorities had scripted the confession.⁴⁴ Officials accused Dahlin's group of receiving foreign funding to train "agents" to "endanger state security."⁴⁵ Chinese state media highlighted Dahlin's partnership with Wang Quanzhang,⁴⁶ a lawyer at the Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing,⁴⁷ whom authorities detained during the crackdown on lawyers and rights advocates that began in and around July 2015.⁴⁸ Official state media also linked Dahlin's detention to Xing Qingxian, a rights advocate accused of aiding human rights lawyer Wang Yu's son in his attempt to leave China.⁴⁹

The Chinese government's crackdown on NGOs and staff violates rights guaranteed in China's Constitution,⁵⁰ as well as international standards on freedom of speech and association set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights⁵¹ and the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.⁵² In response to China's crackdown on civil society, in February 2016, the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein raised concerns and sought clarification from the Chinese government about the recent arrests of lawyers and harassment of NGO workers.⁵³ In March 2016, the United States and 11 other nations issued a joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council that expressed concern regarding “China’s deteriorating human rights record.”⁵⁴ A U.S. Department of State spokesperson reportedly remarked that the joint statement was “the first collective action taken regarding China at the Human Rights Council since its inception in 2007.”⁵⁵

Legislative Developments

In the past year, the National People’s Congress passed two major laws that pertain to civil society—the PRC Charity Law and the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in Mainland China. A labor expert called the new laws “the most consequential nonprofit laws passed in the history of the PRC.”⁵⁶ Observers noted that the Charity Law may promote philanthropy in China and foster better accountability and credibility as the charity sector develops.⁵⁷ Yet, they also expressed concerns that the laws’ tighter restrictions⁵⁸ will likely limit NGOs’ access to domestic and international funding, thereby jeopardizing the survival of some NGOs.⁵⁹

PRC Charity Law

The National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the PRC Charity Law in March 2016⁶⁰ after issuing two drafts for public comment in October 2015 and January 2016.⁶¹ Chinese officials released the law against the backdrop of several highly publicized charity-related scandals.⁶² Chinese leaders expressed hope that the law will help fight poverty⁶³ and encourage charitable giving.⁶⁴ Chinese experts have expressed hope that it may improve governance and transparency.⁶⁵

Key provisions include the following:

- **Registration.** While observers noted that the Charity Law removes the requirement for charities to find a supervisory organization to register with civil affairs departments,⁶⁶ Article 20 defers the authority to stipulate specific registration management methods to the State Council.⁶⁷
- **Fundraising.** Articles 22 and 23 permit registered charities to engage in public fundraising, including through radio, television, newspapers, and the Internet, after obtaining a public fundraising qualification certificate, which organizations can apply for after being lawfully registered for two years.⁶⁸
- **Transparency.** Articles 72 and 73 require organizations to publicly disclose information on the organization’s charter, members, plans, activities, fundraising, and the use of funds.⁶⁹
- **Preventing misconduct.** Provisions prohibit and provide punishment for embezzlement and misuse of funds, including revocation of registration, by any organization or individual associated with an organization.⁷⁰

PRC Charity Law—Continued

International human rights organizations and media reports have highlighted concerns over certain provisions of the law, as follows:

- **Endangering state security.** Article 104 provides the legal basis for authorities to criminally prosecute and shut down groups deemed to “endanger state security,”⁷¹ a vague charge human rights groups say authorities can use to crack down on human rights advocacy⁷² and limit sources of funding for independent groups.⁷³
- **Registration.** One media report suggested that some charitable organizations may choose not to register due to authorities’ suspicions regarding their activities.⁷⁴
- **Implementation.** Some reports noted that while the law includes positive provisions, implementation at the local level will determine its impact on Chinese civil society groups.⁷⁵
- **Tax benefits.** Articles 79 to 84⁷⁶ provide what experts worry are vaguely defined rules entitling beneficiaries, organizations, and donors to tax benefits.⁷⁷

PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in Mainland China⁷⁸

On April 28, 2016, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in Mainland China,⁷⁹ scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2017,⁸⁰ after much deliberation and two drafts.⁸¹ The final version of the law appeared to address some concerns expressed during the public comment process.⁸² Revisions included more specificity in the definition of “overseas NGOs,”⁸³ which an expert interpreted to encompass “industry and trade associations, chambers of commerce, [and] development and human rights NGOs . . .”;⁸⁴ allowing more than one representative office per organization in China;⁸⁵ and extending the length of time that a representative office’s registration is valid.⁸⁶

International observers, nevertheless, continued to raise concerns with several of the new law’s provisions, including:

- **Registration authority given to Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and provincial-level public security offices.** Whereas the Ministry of Civil Affairs has management authority over domestic NGOs,⁸⁷ Article 41 authorizes public security officials to manage registration, conduct annual inspections, and investigate “illegal activities” of international NGOs (INGOs).⁸⁸ Article 11 requires the formal consent of a government-approved professional supervisory unit (PSU) in order for INGOs to register with MPS.⁸⁹ Articles 46 and 47 provide for public security officials—under specific conditions—to shut down INGO activities, confiscate property, detain INGO personnel, and criminally prosecute “illegal activities.”⁹⁰

**PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in
Mainland China—Continued**⁷⁸

- **Endangering national security.** Article 5 prohibits INGOs from carrying out activities that “endanger China’s national unity, security, [or] ethnic unity” or “harm China’s national interests and the public interest . . .”⁹¹ It also prohibits INGOs from engaging in or funding “for-profit” or “political” activities, as well as “illegally engaging in and funding religious activities.”⁹²
- **Additional registration requirement.** Article 9 requires that INGOs set up and register a representative office or, if they want to carry out temporary activities, they must “file a record according to law” (*yi fa bei’an*).⁹³ Foreign organizations that have not registered or “filed a record” are forbidden from funding or partnering with domestic NGOs.⁹⁴
- **Restrictions on temporary activity.** Articles 16 and 17 require INGOs without representative offices in China to partner with “Chinese partner units,” which include state agencies, mass organizations, public institutions, or social organizations, in order to “file a record.”⁹⁵ The duration of temporary activities is limited to one year, and extensions are dependent on making new filings.⁹⁶
- **Reporting requirement.** Articles 19 and 31 require that representative offices of INGOs submit an annual activity plan for the following year by December 31⁹⁷ and work reports on the previous year—including financial information, activities, and personnel and institutional changes—by January 31 to their PSUs for annual inspections by the relevant public security offices.⁹⁸
- **Possible exemptions.** Article 53 provides ambiguous language for how “overseas schools, hospitals, science and engineering technology research institutions, and academic organizations” are treated under the law, and places them under the authority of “relevant national provisions.”⁹⁹ Experts questioned whether this exempts these organizations from the provisions of the law.¹⁰⁰

International observers called on the Chinese government to repeal the legislation, and warned that the law could be used as a tool of intimidation and suppression of dissenting views;¹⁰¹ a mechanism for exerting greater control over civil society;¹⁰² and an intensified effort to “stifle” groups in certain civil society sectors.¹⁰³ The U.S. Government expressed concern that the law may constrain U.S.-China people-to-people exchanges and relations.¹⁰⁴ A Chinese lawyer called the law a form of “national security legislation,” and said it signaled a “fundamental change” in China’s regulation of INGOs to a “national-security focused model” that discourages INGOs’ “presence and activity.”¹⁰⁵ A Chinese professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management cautioned that the concentration of approval authority and the new and complex approval process within the public security bureaucracy could result in a “stagnation effect” on INGO activity in China.¹⁰⁶

Other Regulatory Developments

During the past year, the Chinese government released plans and draft revisions to the three major regulations that pertain to the registration and management of civil society organizations as

part of a broad decision on revising regulations.¹⁰⁷ The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) released revised drafts for public comment of all three regulations.¹⁰⁸ Following the February 2016 State Council administrative revision of the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations,¹⁰⁹ the MCA released a revised draft of the same regulation for public comment in August 2016 which would permit direct registration for business associations, research organizations, charities, and service organizations.¹¹⁰ Drafters changed the title of the Regulations on the Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises to Regulations on the Management of Social Service Organization Registration, renaming “non-governmental, non-commercial units” as “social service organizations.”¹¹¹ Provisions in the draft Regulations on the Management of Foundations specify how charitable foundations should be classified and regulated.¹¹² In addition, Article 4 of all three draft regulations stipulates that Communist Party groups must be established within organizations.¹¹³ In August 2016, the Party Central Committee and State Council jointly released an opinion on reforming social organization management, emphasizing the Party’s leadership over civil society and setting 2020 as the target year for establishing a uniform registration and management system throughout the country.¹¹⁴

Regulatory Environment

The regulatory environment for Chinese NGOs continues to be challenging to navigate. Authorities continue to require some NGOs to secure the sponsorship of a governmental or quasi-governmental organization in order to be eligible for registration at civil affairs bureaus.¹¹⁵ This “dual management system”¹¹⁶ subjects NGOs to differentiated treatment based on authorities’ perception of a group’s political sensitivity.¹¹⁷ Facing strict government control and barriers to registering as social organizations,¹¹⁸ many Chinese NGOs register instead as business entities or remain unregistered.¹¹⁹ Without registered status, NGOs have difficulty obtaining government funding or receiving donations from the private sector¹²⁰ and often rely more heavily on international funding, which has become more difficult to secure in the new regulatory environment.¹²¹

Experts noted that NGOs without government affiliation are at a disadvantage compared to quasi-governmental or government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) with respect to public fundraising and government procurement. A 2014 China Academy of Social Sciences report highlighted GONGOs’ monopoly over fundraising as one of the reasons independent NGOs receive little funding.¹²² According to a government official, government procurement of services may contribute to the uneven development of government-affiliated and grassroots NGOs.¹²³ Amid the concern about the lack of a fair assessment mechanism for procurement,¹²⁴ in February 2016, officials in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, reportedly released the first guidelines in China for the evaluation of government procurement of public services.¹²⁵

Notes to Section III—Civil Society

- ¹ Pan Yue, “MCA Registered a Total of 661,861 Social Organizations,” *People’s Daily*, 15 April 2016.
- ² Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,” in *NGO Governance and Management in China*, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 48.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 52–53; Deng Guosheng, “The State of and Obstacles to Chinese Grassroots NGO Development” [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de xianzhuang yu zhang’ai], *Social Outlook*, reprinted in *Shanda* 960, Vol. 5 (June 2010). These organizations are often referred to as grassroots (*caogen*) organizations.
- ⁴ Isabel Hilton et al., “The Future of NGOs in China: A ChinaFile Conversation,” *Asia Society, ChinaFile* (blog), 14 May 15; Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,” in *NGO Governance and Management in China*, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 52–53.
- ⁵ Deng Guosheng, “The State of and Obstacles to Chinese Grassroots NGO Development” [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de xianzhuang yu zhang’ai], *Social Outlook*, reprinted in *Shanda* 960, Vol. 5 (June 2010).
- ⁶ Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,” in *NGO Governance and Management in China*, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 53.
- ⁷ Deng Guosheng, “The State of and Obstacles to Chinese Grassroots NGO Development” [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de xianzhuang yu zhang’ai], *Social Outlook*, reprinted in *Shanda* 960, Vol. 5 (June 2010). In 2010, Tsinghua University professor Deng Guosheng estimated that there were 1 to 1.5 million grassroots NGOs in China, of which 90 percent were unregistered. “Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier,” *Economist*, 12 April 14; Kristie Lu Stout, “People Power in the People’s Republic of China,” *CNN*, 26 June 14. In 2014, the *Economist* estimated that there were 1.5 million unregistered groups while *CNN* reported 2 million. Li Fan, “The Current State of Civil Society in China” [Woguo gongmin shehui de xianzhuang], *Tianze Economic Research Institute (Unirule), Biweekly Forum*, 12 September 14. Li Fan, director of World and China Institute, a Chinese NGO research center, claimed that China has 8 million unregistered NGOs, while Hu Xingdou, an economics professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology, and Xu Xin, a law professor at Beijing Institute of Technology, both questioned Li’s claim, saying that Li’s definition of what constitutes an NGO was too broad. His calculations included groups such as quasi-governmental mass organizations, spin-off government units, business associations, recreational clubs, virtual groups, and rural mutual aid groups.
- ⁸ Karl Bourdeau and Daniel Schulson, “‘Citizen Suits’ Under China’s Revised Environmental Protection Law: A Watershed Moment in Chinese Environmental Litigation?” *JD Supra Business Advisor*, 10 March 16; Shawn Shieh, “Grassroots NGOs Win Landmark Environmental Public Interest Lawsuit,” *NGOs in China* (blog), 17 November 15; Cui Zheng and Kong Lingyu, “Progress for NGOs Battling Polluters in Court,” *Caixin*, 3 December 15. Despite potential progress for environmental grassroots NGOs to bring public interest lawsuits, few NGOs have the capacity and resources to file cases and courts have rejected more cases than they have accepted.
- ⁹ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Too Risky To Call Ourselves Defenders’: CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2015),” February 2016.
- ¹⁰ “China Steps Up Crackdown on Civil Society, Rights Advocates,” *Democracy Digest*, 13 January 16.
- ¹¹ “Chinese Police Raid Labor Rights Groups, Detain at Least Five Activists,” *Radio Free Asia*, 7 December 15; *China Labour Bulletin*, “Labour Activists Detained for Doing the Job of the Trade Union,” 5 December 15; “Guangdong Authorities Arrest Labor Rights Advocates,” *Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, 21 January 16.
- ¹² Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “China Is Said To Force Closing of Women’s Legal Aid Center,” *New York Times, Sinosphere* (blog), 29 January 16.
- ¹³ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Too Risky To Call Ourselves Defenders’: CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2015),” February 2016.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, “[‘709 Crackdown’] Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 4 July 2016,” 4 July 16. See also CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 272.
- ¹⁵ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Too Risky To Call Ourselves Defenders’: CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2015),” February 2016.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ Timothy Hildebrandt, *Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58. Hildebrandt explains use of the term “chilling effect” in the context of civil society as the internalization of the fear of a negative state response to the point that civil society actors do not contemplate taking actions that might put themselves in jeopardy.
- ¹⁸ Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2015: China Report,” October 2015.
- ¹⁹ Mimi Lau, “Mother of Detained Labour Activist Takes on State Media—And Forced Into Hardest Decision of Her Life,” *South China Morning Post*, 1 May 16.
- ²⁰ Verna Yu, “Charity Workers in China Say NGOs Being ‘Pulled Out by the Roots,’” *South China Morning Post*, 22 January 16.
- ²¹ Orville Schell, “Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,” *New York Review of Books*, 21 April 16.
- ²² Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China: Repeal Overseas NGO Law & Protect Freedom of Association,” 28 April 16.
- ²³ James Griffiths, “China on Strike,” *CNN*, 29 March 16.
- ²⁴ “Guangdong Police ‘Root Out’ Labor NGOs, Provoking Serious Concern” [Guangdong jingfang “saodang” laogong NGO yinfa yanzhong guanzhul], *Voice of America*, 6 December 15; Yaxue Cao, “Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Ar-

resting Leaders,” China Change, 10 December 15; “Guangdong Authorities Arrest Labor Rights Advocates,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 January 16.

²⁵“Four Detained Labor Rights Defenders Arrested, Two Out on Bail, Attack Aimed at Panyu Workers’ Services Center” [Bei zhua lao wei renshi si pibu liang qubao maotou zhi zhi panyu dagongzu], Radio Free Asia, 10 January 16.

²⁶“Guangdong Police ‘Root Out’ Labor NGOs, Provoking Serious Concern” [Guangdong jingfang “saodang” laogong NGO yinfa yanzhong guanzhu], Voice of America, 6 December 15.

²⁷Rights Defense Network, “Police Suddenly Crack Down on Four Guangdong Labor NGOs, ‘Haige Labor Services Center,’ ‘Panyu Workers’ Services Center,’ ‘Sunflower Women Workers’ Center,’ ‘Nan Fei Yan,’ Leaders and Workers Disappear After Being Taken Away” [Guangdong si laogong NGO “haige laogong fuwu bu”, “panyu dagongzu”, “xiangyanghua nugong zhongxin”, “nan fei yan” turan zaodao jingfang daya, fuzeren ji yuangong bei daizou hou shilian], 3 December 15.

²⁸Yaxue Cao, “Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,” China Change, 10 December 15.

²⁹Rights Defense Network, “12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Cases’ Arrests Approved Today for Four Individuals, One Released, Two Disappeared” [“12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an” jin si ren bei pi daibu, yi ren huoshi, liang ren wuxialuo], 8 January 16. For more information on Zeng Feiyang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00427.

³⁰Ibid. For more information on Zhu Xiaomei, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00428.

³¹Ibid. For more information on Meng Han, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00026.

³²Ibid. For more information on He Xiaobo, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00431.

³³China Labour Bulletin, “Labour Activist Zhu Xiaomei Released After Two Months in Detention,” 4 February 16.

³⁴Guo Rui, “One of Those Arrested in Guangdong Labor NGO Case, He Xiaobo Released on Bail” [Guangdong laogong NGO an beibu ren zhi yi he xiaobo yi qubao houshen], Phoenix News, 8 April 16.

³⁵Rights Defense Network, “Authorities Force China Women’s Rights NGO ‘Zhongze Women’s Legal Aid Center’ To Shut Down” [Zhongguo nuquan NGO “zhongze funu falu zixun fuwu zhongxin” zao dangju qiangpo xuangao jiesan], 29 January 16; Jiang Jie and Chen Heying, “Women’s Legal Aid Center in Beijing Closed,” Global Times, 2 February 16.

³⁶Hai-Ching Yang, “An Alternative to Impact Litigation in China: The Procurator as a Legal Avenue for Cases in the ‘Private Family Sphere’ of Domestic Violence,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 2011), 244–45.

³⁷Yaxue Cao, “Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of Women in China,” China Change, 14 February 16.

³⁸See, e.g., Anti-Domestic Violence Network/Beijing FanBao, Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Consulting Services Center, and China Women’s University, “The Shadow Report of Chinese Women’s NGOs on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report Submitted by China under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Violence Against Women (General Recommendation No. 19),” September 2014; Beijing Zhongze Legal Consulting Services Center, China Association for Employment Promotion, and Women’s Studies Institute of China, “The Shadow Report of Chinese Women’s NGOs on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report Submitted by China under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” September 2014; Women Human Rights Defenders International Coalition, “China: WHRDIC Condemns Closure of Women’s Legal Aid Center in China,” reprinted in World Organisation Against Torture, February 2016.

³⁹Human Rights in China, “Women’s Rights NGO Responds to Cancellation by Peking University,” 7 April 10.

⁴⁰Yaxue Cao, “Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of Women in China,” China Change, 14 February 16; Lu Congcong and Chen Rui, “Guo Jianmei, Alumna From Entering Class of ’79: I’m Very Happy To Be a Public Interest Lawyer” [79 ji xiaoyou guo jianmei zuo gongyi lushi, wo hen kuaile], Peking University Law School, Alumni Affairs, last visited 25 July 16.

⁴¹Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, “Urgent Action: Statement on the Detention of Peter Dahlin,” China Change, 12 January 16.

⁴²Ibid.; Chris Buckley, “China To Expel Peter Dahlin, Swedish Human Rights Advocate,” New York Times, 25 January 16.

⁴³Edward Wong, “China Uses Foreigners’ Televised Confessions To Serve Its Own Ends,” New York Times, 21 January 16; Chris Buckley, “China To Expel Peter Dahlin, Swedish Human Rights Advocate,” New York Times, 25 January 16.

⁴⁴Edward Wong, “Inside China’s Secret 23-Day Detention of a Foreign Nonprofit Chief,” New York Times, 9 July 16.

⁴⁵“China Tamps Dissent With Trumped Up ‘State Security’ and ‘Terrorism’ Charges,” Radio Free Asia, 17 March 16.

⁴⁶“Police Smashes Illegal Organization Jeopardizing China’s National Security,” Xinhua, 19 January 16; Simon Lewis, “Swedish Activist Peter Dahlin Concerned Over Colleagues in Chinese Prisons,” Time, 26 January 16.

⁴⁷Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Too Risky To Call Ourselves Defenders: CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2015),” February 2016, 12; Edward Wong, “Inside China’s Secret 23-Day Detention of a Foreign Nonprofit Chief,” New York Times, 9 July 16. For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.

⁴⁸Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Too Risky To Call Ourselves Defenders: CHRDA Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2015),” February 2016.

⁴⁹“Police Smashes Illegal Organization Jeopardizing China’s National Security,” Xinhua, 19 January 16; Simon Lewis, “Swedish Activist Peter Dahlin Concerned Over Colleagues in Chinese Prisons,” Time, 26 January 16. For more information on Xing Qingxian, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2009-00113.

⁵⁰PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.

⁵¹International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 19, 21, 22. China signed the ICCPR in 1998 and the Chinese government has stated its intent to ratify it. During the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s human rights record in October 2013, China stated it is “making preparations for the ratification of ICCPR and will continue to carry out legislative and judicial reforms.” UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/25/5, 4 December 13, para. 153.

⁵²Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society To Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on Human Rights Defenders), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 53/144 of 8 March 99, art. 5(a–c).

⁵³Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN Human Rights Chief Deeply Concerned by China Clampdown on Lawyers and Activists,” 16 February 16.

⁵⁴Joint Statement on China’s Human Rights Situation,” reprinted in HumanRights.gov, 10 March 16. The joint statement was read aloud at the UN Human Rights Council meeting on March 10, 2016, by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council, Keith Harper, on behalf of Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See also Simon Denyer, “Is China Heading in the Wrong Direction? For Once, the West Calls Beijing Out,” Washington Post, 23 March 16.

⁵⁵Nike Ching, “Unprecedented UNHRC Joint Statement Condemns China’s Problematic Violations,” Voice of America, 10 March 16.

⁵⁶Shawn Shieh, “2016: The Year of Regulation and a New Future for Civil Society,” NGOs in China (blog), 11 June 16.

⁵⁷See, e.g., Mark Sidel, “Permissive or Restrictive? A Mixed Picture for Philanthropy in China,” Alliance Magazine, 14 March 16; Louis Thivierge, “China’s New Charity Law: A Legal Framework To Incentivise Philanthropy and Achieve a ‘Moderately Prosperous Society,’” Tsinghua China Law Review, 24 March 16; Reza Hasmath, “The Pros and Cons of China’s NGO Laws,” The Diplomat, 23 March 16; Narada Foundation, “Charity Law: 8 Major Advances and 10 Major Expectations” [Cishan fa: 8 da jinbu yu 10 da qidai], 9 March 16.

⁵⁸See, e.g., Reza Hasmath, “The Pros and Cons of China’s NGO Laws,” The Diplomat, 23 March 16; Yimei Chen, “An Interview With Mark Sidel: Engaging With Chinese Philanthropy From a Global Perspective,” China Development Brief, 23 February 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21–31/2016),” 31 March 16.

⁵⁹See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21–31/2016),” 31 March 16; Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch Letter to China NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang,” 3 March 16.

⁶⁰“China Adopts Charity Law,” Xinhua, 16 March 16; PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16. See also the following unofficial translation “2016 Charity Law,” translated in China Law Translate (blog), 16 March 16.

⁶¹National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Charity Law (Draft) [Cishan fa (cao’an)], 31 October 15; National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Charity Law Draft Second Review Revised Draft [Cishan fa cao’an erci shenyi gao xiugai gao], 11 January 16.

⁶²“Parties Hotly Discuss Six Main Issues of Charity Law Draft” [Gefang reyi cishan fa cao’an liu da jiaodian], Xinhua, 30 October 15; Josh Chin, “China Charity Law Seeks To Make Giving Easier,” Wall Street Journal, 14 March 16.

⁶³See, e.g., “Xinhua Insight: NPC Hopes Charity Law Can Help Poverty Fight,” Xinhua, 9 March 16. See also “China Hopes To Improve Philanthropy Through Charity Law: Spokeswoman,” Xinhua, 4 March 16.

⁶⁴See, e.g., “NPC Passes China’s First Charity Law To Encourage Participation,” China Radio International, 16 March 16.

⁶⁵See, e.g., Shi Rui et al., “China Builds Legal Basis for Charitable Giving,” Caixin Net, 18 December 15; “NPC Passes China’s First Charity Law To Encourage Participation,” China Radio International, 16 March 16.

⁶⁶PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 8–20. See, e.g., Xu Yongguang, “Highlighting China’s First Charity Law,” CCTV, 10 March 16; Shawn Shieh, “Charity Law FAQs,” NGOs in China (blog), 29 March 16.

⁶⁷Dong Zijin, “Five Considerations Regarding the Charity Law” [Dong zijin: guanyu cishan fa de wu ge tixing], Caijing, 15 April 16; PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, art. 20.

⁶⁸PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 22–23.

⁶⁹Ibid., arts. 71–75.

⁷⁰Ibid., arts. 52, 98, 108.

⁷¹Ibid., art. 104. In addition, Articles 4 and 15 prohibit activities and funding for activities that “endanger state security” and “social public interests.” Megha Rajagopalan, “China Charity Law To Forbid Activity That ‘Endangers National Security,’” Reuters, 9 March 16; Shawn Shieh, “Charity Law FAQs,” NGOs in China (blog), 29 March 16; Chinese Human Rights De-

enders, “[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21–31/2016),” 31 March 16.

⁷² See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China: State Security, Terrorism Convictions Double,” 16 March 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21–31/2016),” 31 March 16.

⁷³ Shawn Shieh, “Charity Law FAQs,” NGOs in China (blog), 29 March 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21–31/2016),” 31 March 16.

⁷⁴ Josh Chin, “The Good—And Bad—About China’s New Charity Law,” Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 March 16.

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Shannon Van Sant, “China Approves Comprehensive Law on Charities, Non-profits,” Voice of America, 23 March 16; Josh Chin, “The Good—And Bad—About China’s New Charity Law,” Wall Street Journal, China Real Time (blog), 16 March 16. See also Yimei Chen, “An Interview with Mark Sidel: Engaging With Chinese Philanthropy From a Global Perspective,” China Development Brief, 23 February 16.

⁷⁶ PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 79–84.

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Shannon Van Sant, “China Approves Comprehensive Law on Charities, Non-profits,” Voice of America, 23 March 16; Josh Chin, “The Good—And Bad—About China’s New Charity Law,” Wall Street Journal, China Real Time (blog), 16 March 16; Dong Zijin, “Five Considerations Regarding the Charity Law” [Dong zijin: guanyu cishan fa de wu ge tixing], Caijing, 15 April 16.

⁷⁸ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 227–28.

⁷⁹ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17; “China Releases Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China” [Woguo chutai jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], Xinhua, 28 April 16.

⁸⁰ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17, art. 54; “China Releases Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China” [Woguo chutai jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], Xinhua, 28 April 16.

⁸¹ “China Releases Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China” [Woguo chutai jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], Xinhua, 28 April 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “China Wrestles With Draft Law on Nongovernmental Organizations,” New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 11 March 16; National People’s Congress Standing Committee, PRC Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law (Draft) (Second Reading Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa (cao’an) (er ci shenyi gao)], 5 May 15. For an unofficial English translation of the draft version, see China Development Brief, “CDB English Translation of the Overseas NGO Management Law (Second Draft),” 21 May 15.

⁸² See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Submission by Human Rights Watch to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on the Second Draft of the Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law,” 2 June 15; Amnesty International, “China: Submission to the NPC Standing Committee’s Legislative Affairs Commission on the Second Draft Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law,” June 2015, 3–4; China Development Brief, “Feedback and Suggestions on the ‘Overseas NGO Management Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)’ (Second Reading),” May 2015, 2–7.

⁸³ “Draft Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China Submitted for Third Review” [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa cao’an tiquing san shen], Xinhua, 25 April 16; “Changes Anticipated in the New FNGO Law,” China Law Translate (blog), 25 April 16; PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17, art. 2; National People’s Congress Standing Committee, PRC Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law (Draft) (Second Reading Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa (cao’an) (er ci shenyi gao)], 5 May 15, art. 2. The definition of overseas NGOs in the final version of the law states overseas NGOs are “not-for-profit, non-governmental social organizations lawfully established outside of mainland China such as foundations, social associations, and think tanks.” The second draft law released for public comment in May 2015 defined overseas NGOs as “not-for-profit, non-governmental social organizations formed outside mainland China.”

⁸⁴ Shawn Shieh, “Overseas NGO Law FAQs,” NGOs in China (blog), 1 May 16; PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17, art. 2.

⁸⁵ “Draft Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China Submitted for Third Review” [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa cao’an tiquing san shen], Xinhua, 25 April 16; “Changes Anticipated in the New FNGO Law,” China Law Translate (blog), 25 April 16.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,” in *NGO Governance and Management in China*, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer. Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 51–52; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “NGO Law Monitor: China,” last updated 20 June 16.

⁸⁸ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17, art. 41; Simon Denyer, “China Passes Tough Law To Bring Foreign NGOs Under Security Supervision,” Washington Post, 28 April 16.

⁸⁹PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17, art. 11. Article 11 states that public security and government offices are tasked with publishing a directory of approved professional supervisory units (PSUs).

⁹⁰Ibid., arts. 46–47.

⁹¹Ibid., art. 5.

⁹²Ibid., art. 5.

⁹³Ibid., art. 9.

⁹⁴Ibid., art. 9.

⁹⁵Ibid., arts. 16–17.

⁹⁶Ibid., art. 17.

⁹⁷Ibid., arts. 6, 19, 31.

⁹⁸Ibid., arts. 6, 31.

⁹⁹Ibid., art. 53; Shawn Shieh, "Overseas NGO Law FAQs," NGOs in China (blog), 1 May 16.

¹⁰⁰Shawn Shieh, "Overseas NGO Law FAQs," NGOs in China (blog), 1 May 16; "Changes Anticipated in the New FNGO Law," China Law Translate (blog), 25 April 16.

¹⁰¹Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "China: Newly Adopted Foreign NGO Law Should Be Repealed, UN Experts Urge," 3 May 16.

¹⁰²Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China: Repeal Overseas NGO Law & Protect Freedom of Association," 28 April 16; Tom Phillips, "China Passes Law Imposing Security Controls on Foreign NGOs," Guardian, 28 April 16; Charlie Campbell, "China's New Foreign NGO Law Is Threatening Vital Advocacy Work," Time, 26 April 16; Mark Sidel, "It Just Got Harder To Make a Difference in China," Foreign Policy, Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 29 April 16.

¹⁰³Freedom House, "China's NGO Law Aims To Stifle 'Foreign' Influence, Basic Rights," 29 April 16.

¹⁰⁴The White House, "Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on China's Foreign NGO Management Law," 28 April 16; John Kerry, U.S. Department of State, "China's Passage of the Law on the Management of Foreign NGO Activities Inside Mainland China," 28 April 16.

¹⁰⁵Sebastian Heilmann et al., "How Should Global Stakeholders Respond to China's New NGO Management Law?" Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 5 May 16.

¹⁰⁶Jia Xijin, "Jia Xijin: Where Will the Second Boot Fall in the Legislation for Overseas NGOs?" [Jia xijin: lifa jingwai NGO, di er zhi xuezi ruhe luodi?], Caijing, 27 November 15.

¹⁰⁷State Council General Office, State Council's 2016 Legislative Work Plan [Guowuyuan 2016 nian lifa gongzuo jihual], 17 March 16, 1. See also CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 133.

¹⁰⁸Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16.

¹⁰⁹State Council, Decision on Amending Some Administrative Regulations [Guowuyuan guanyu xiugai bufen xingzheng fagui de jue ding], issued and effective 6 February 16, 18; "State Council Revises the Administrative Regulations for the Registration of Social Organizations," China Development Brief, 3 March 16; Wang Yong, "State Council Amends the 'Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations'" [Guowuyuan xiugai 'shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli'], China Philanthropy Times, reprinted in Syntao, 4 March 16. The revisions allow applicant organizations that have appropriate sponsors to apply directly for registration rather than first having to apply to prepare for registration at the relevant government agency.

¹¹⁰Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16, 20. See also Ben Blanchard, "China Proposes Tightening Grip on NGOs," Reuters, 1 August 16.

¹¹¹Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for Public Comment) [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, Introduction. According to Article 10, "social organizations" categorized as "non-governmental, non-commercial enterprises" under these regulations include science and technology research groups, philanthropic groups, and community service groups.

¹¹²Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, Explanations.

¹¹³Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, art. 4; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, art. 4; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16, art. 4.

¹¹⁴Party Central Committee General Office and State Council General Office Publish 'Opinion on Reforming Management System of Social Organizations To Promote Social Organizations' Healthy and Orderly Development' [Zhongban guoban yinfa "guanyu gaige shehui zuzhi guanli zhidu cujan shehui zuzhi jiankang youxu fazhan de yijian], Xinhua, 21 August 16, 2(2–3); Ben

Blanchard, “China To Strengthen Communist Party’s Role in Non-Govt Bodies,” Reuters, 21 August 16.

¹¹⁵ State Council, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued 25 October 98, amended and effective 6 February 16, art. 6; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zanzing tiaoli (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, art. 10.

¹¹⁶ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “NGO Law Monitor: China,” last updated 20 June 16; Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,” in *NGO Governance and Management in China*, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 52. Shieh refers to the management system of NGOs as “dual supervision” by relevant-level entities within the civil affairs bureaucracy and by professional supervisory units. Dong Zijin, “Five Considerations Regarding the Charity Law” [Guanyu cishan fa de wu ge tixing], *Caijing*, 15 April 16.

¹¹⁷ Teng Biao, “Assessment of the Drafts of the ‘Foreign NGO Management Law’ and ‘National Security Law’” [Ping “jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa” he “guojia anquan fa” cao’an], Independent Chinese PEN Center (blog), 30 June 15; Fengshi Wu and Kin-man Chan, “Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,” *China Perspectives*, 2012, No. 3, 10–11.

¹¹⁸ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “NGO Law Monitor: China,” last updated 20 June 16. Some other barriers to registration include extensive documentation requirements; broad prohibitions of certain activities such as advocacy, legal assistance, labor, religion, and ethnic minority affairs; and authorities’ extensive discretion to deny registration.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*; Wan Yanhai, “Wan Yanhai Special Column: Sounding the Alarm on Transition Institute’s Alleged Crime of ‘Illegal Business Activity’” [Wan yanhai zhuanlan: chuanzhixing “feifa jingying zui” qiaoxiang de jingzhong], Storm Media, 1 May 15. See also Teng Biao, “Assessment of the Drafts of the ‘Foreign NGO Management Law’ and the ‘National Security Law’” [Ping “jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa” he “guojia anquan fa” cao’an], Independent Chinese PEN Center (blog), 30 June 15.

¹²⁰ Nala, “Non-Profit Organizations in China and Their Future Prospects,” *Washington Institute of China Studies, Business and Public Administration Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2014), 30.

¹²¹ Verna Yu, “Overseas Funding: The ‘Original Sin’ of Mainland Independent NGOs?” [Jingwai zizhu neidi duli NGO de “yuanzui”?], *South China Morning Post*, 22 January 16.

¹²² Jiang Tao, “CASS Report: China’s Civil Society Groups Face Five Dilemmas” [Shekeyuan baogao: zhongguo minjian zuzhi mianlin wu da kunjing], *China News Service*, 25 December 14.

¹²³ Wang Changbao, “How Government Procurement of Services Can Effectively Advance” [Zhengfu goumai gonggong fuwu ruhe youxiao tuijin], *China Government Procurement Net*, 25 January 16.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Zhu Hong, “The First ‘Guidelines for the Evaluation of the Management of Government Services Procurement’ Released” [Quanguo shouge “zhengfu goumai shehui zuzhi fuwu xiangmu jixiao pinggu caozuo zhiyin” fabu], *People’s Daily*, 2 February 16.