

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Political Power of the Chinese Communist Party Under General Secretary Xi Jinping

In China's one-party, authoritarian political system,¹ the Chinese Communist Party plays a leading role in the state and society.² Observers note that the central role of the Party in governing the state appears to have strengthened since Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping came into power in November 2012,³ a development that has further "blurred" the lines between Party and government, according to some experts.⁴ During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, under Xi's leadership, the Party demanded absolute loyalty⁵ and continued to direct and influence politics and society at all levels, including in the military,⁶ economy,⁷ media,⁸ civil society,⁹ and family life.¹⁰ State-run media outlets reported that President Xi emphasized the Party's claims to leadership over "political, military, civil, and academic—east, west, south, north, and center" at a senior-level Party meeting in January 2016.¹¹ After the 18th Party Central Committee approved the Proposal on Drafting the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development at its Fifth Plenum in October 2015,¹² the government adopted the plan during the annual legislative and political advisory sessions in March 2016.¹³ The 13th Five-Year Plan reiterates a vision to "spur a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" in line with the "Chinese dream."¹⁴ Xi introduced the concept of the "Chinese dream" in 2013,¹⁵ promoting a Party- and government-centric model of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" in economics, politics, and society¹⁶ that rejects so-called "Western values"¹⁷ and "hostile forces."¹⁸

XI JINPING'S LEADING ROLE

This past year, the Commission observed a continued emphasis on Xi's leading role in guiding decisionmaking in Party, government, and military affairs. Reports suggested that Xi used the ongoing anticorruption campaign,¹⁹ intensified Party disciplinary measures,²⁰ promoted his speeches as ideological guidance,²¹ and continued his chairmanship of at least six leading small groups (*lingdao xiaozu*) in the Party Central Committee to strengthen his power within the Party.²² Following central Party meetings that featured calls to strengthen the Party's role as the "core" (*hexin*) of Chinese government and society,²³ several provincial and local Party leaders referred to Xi as the "core" of Party leadership²⁴—a term previously used to characterize Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, former Party General Secretaries.²⁵ In a development that observers assert further signals Xi's increased power over the military,²⁶ in April 2016, Xi gained a new title as the commander-in-chief of the Central Military Commission's Joint Battle Command Center and urged the command system to be "absolutely loyal."²⁷ Reports this past year noted official propaganda efforts focusing on Xi's leadership style and policies that some observers found reminiscent of Chairman Mao Zedong's "cult of personality,"²⁸ highlighting Xi's efforts to amass personalized power.²⁹ An Australian academic characterized Xi as the "chairman of everything," noting

that Xi's leadership style represented a departure from previous leaders' adherence to the concerns of Party elders and the post-Mao model of collective decisionmaking.³⁰ Xi's restrictive media policies reportedly elicited criticism from property tycoon and popular social media commentator Ren Zhiqiang,³¹ Chinese media outlet Caixin,³² and anonymous sources.³³ [For more information on critiques of Xi's media policy, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.] Moreover, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Party institution that has spearheaded the anticorruption campaign closely associated with Xi,³⁴ published an essay in March 2016 on its website titled, "A Thousand Yes-Men Cannot Equal One Honest Advisor,"³⁵ which appeared to criticize Xi's suppression of dissent within the Party, according to observers.³⁶

Party-Building in Civil Society Organizations

The Communist Party continued to prioritize expanding its presence in civil society through "Party-building,"³⁷ a policy of establishing groups of Party members within civil society organizations.³⁸ A Party Central Committee opinion from September 2015 guided local-level Party committees to ensure that Party groups in non-governmental social organizations (*shehui zuzhi*) "guarantee the political direction" of such organizations by promoting the Party line, implementing Party decisions, studying Xi's important speeches and thought, and ensuring that social organizations follow national law.³⁹ Provincial Party committees and officials in Anhui,⁴⁰ Guizhou,⁴¹ Gansu,⁴² and Liaoning provinces⁴³ released plans that assign greater personal responsibility to Party officials to develop active Party groups in social organizations.⁴⁴

Anticorruption Campaign and Challenges

This past year, President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's wide-reaching anticorruption campaign⁴⁵ to reduce graft and strengthen Party discipline⁴⁶ continued snaring so-called "tigers" and "flies"—high- and low-level Party officials⁴⁷—in a manner that one scholar called selective in enforcement, non-transparent, and politicized.⁴⁸ The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) targeted officials in the government,⁴⁹ military,⁵⁰ state security apparatus,⁵¹ media,⁵² and business⁵³ this past year. By the end of 2015, CCDI authorities had reportedly investigated at least one high-level official from every provincial-level administrative area⁵⁴ and, according to Xinhua, administered disciplinary penalties for nearly 300,000 officials.⁵⁵ The Supreme People's Procuratorate investigated a total of 40,834 cases of professional misconduct involving 54,249 people in 2015,⁵⁶ numbers comparable to the previous year.⁵⁷ The CCDI announced plans to boost the efficiency of discipline inspection within central Party and government entities⁵⁸ by expanding the scope of monitoring to lower levels,⁵⁹ strengthening intra-Party accountability mechanisms,⁶⁰ and setting up more "resident supervisor offices" within central, provincial-, and local-level departments.⁶¹ Reports in domestic and international media outlets during this reporting year raised allegations of torture⁶² and the unnatural deaths of officials,⁶³ including alleged suicides.⁶⁴ The CCDI also continued to administer the

non-transparent and extralegal disciplinary process of *shuanggui* (“double designation”), which requires Party members to appear for interrogation at a designated time and place.⁶⁵ Following its November 2015 review of China’s compliance with the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern in its concluding observations that Party members held under *shuanggui* may be denied access to counsel and are at risk of torture, and recommended that the system be abolished.⁶⁶

Despite the anticorruption efforts directed by central Party officials, corruption remains a major problem.⁶⁷ In April 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published internal documents from a Panamanian law firm containing information on offshore companies tied to nine families of high-level Party officials, including President Xi Jinping.⁶⁸ In the same month, Xi announced that a pilot program banning business operations of family members of senior Party officials will be expanded from Shanghai municipality to Beijing and Chongqing municipalities, Guangdong province, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as part of the anticorruption campaign.⁶⁹

*“Rule by Fear”: Continued Crackdown on Free Speech and
Assembly and Democracy Advocacy*

Officials continued a broad ideological and political crackdown on the Party and bureaucracy, human rights lawyers, business leaders, and bloggers, generating what one scholar called a climate of “rule by fear.”⁷⁰ The Chinese government employed the use of “fear techniques” by televising and “advertising”⁷¹ the suppression of both Chinese and foreign nationals.⁷² Notable televised confessions in this past year include those of legal advocacy non-governmental organization (NGO) cofounder and Swedish human rights advocate Peter Dahlin;⁷³ lawyers Zhang Kai and Wang Yu;⁷⁴ elected village Party committee chief Lin Zulian;⁷⁵ and four Hong Kong booksellers—Swedish citizen Gui Minhai,⁷⁶ Cheung Chi-ping,⁷⁷ Lam Wing-kei,⁷⁸ and Lui Bo.⁷⁹ In addition to what observers believed were forced confessions,⁸⁰ the alleged cross-jurisdiction abductions and arbitrary detentions of Chinese and foreign nationals during this past year⁸¹ violated Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”⁸² [For more information on the cases of the Hong Kong booksellers, see Section VI—Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.]

Chinese authorities also continued to harass, detain, and impose prison sentences on democracy advocates who exercised their rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and demonstration. Representative cases of advocates whom authorities targeted this past year included:

- **Qin Yongmin and Zhao Suli.** In January 2015, authorities in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, detained Qin, a founder of the banned China Democracy Party and the domestic NGO China Human Rights Watch, and his wife Zhao.⁸³ In May 2016, another rights advocate confirmed Qin’s detention in Wuhan.⁸⁴ As of June 2016, Zhao’s whereabouts and the

charges against her, if any, remained unknown.⁸⁵ After holding Qin incommunicado for 17 months, authorities indicted Qin on the charge of “subversion of state power” in June 2016.⁸⁶

- Authorities in Beijing municipality detained protesters gathered outside the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court during public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang’s trial in December 2015.⁸⁷ Authorities reportedly detained **Zhang Zhan**,⁸⁸ **Wang Su’e**,⁸⁹ **Qu Hongxia**,⁹⁰ **Ran Chongbi**,⁹¹ **Li Meiqing**,⁹² **Wen Rengui**,⁹³ and **Sheng Lanfu**⁹⁴ on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,”⁹⁵ and released them in January 2016.⁹⁶

- **Xu Qin**. In January 2016, authorities in Beijing detained and arrested Xu, acting secretary-general of China Human Rights Watch and member of an affiliated group, Rose China,⁹⁷ on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” ahead of a planned gathering of hundreds of petitioners in Beijing.⁹⁸ Authorities released Xu on February 2.⁹⁹

- **Yin Weihe**. Authorities in Xiangxiang city, Xiangtan municipality, Hunan province, detained Yin in September 2013 on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” reportedly for sharing information on the 1989 Tiananmen protests and official corruption.¹⁰⁰ Authorities tried him in January 2014¹⁰¹ and released him on bail in October 2014,¹⁰² before detaining him again in December 2015.¹⁰³ In March 2016, the Xiangxiang Municipal People’s Court sentenced Yin to three years’ imprisonment for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”¹⁰⁴

- **Liu Shaoming**. Police in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, criminally detained labor rights advocate Liu in May 2015 and charged him in July 2015 with “inciting subversion of state power” for writing and sharing political essays online related to the 1989 Tiananmen protests.¹⁰⁵ The Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court heard Liu’s case in April 2016,¹⁰⁶ but as of July 2016 had not issued a verdict.¹⁰⁷

- In June 2016, a court in Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, convicted democracy advocates **Lu Gongsong** and **Chen Shuqing** of “subversion of state power” and sentenced them to prison terms of 11 years and 10 years and 6 months, respectively, for writing pro-democracy essays and for involvement with the China Democracy Party.¹⁰⁸

This past year, authorities persecuted individuals for participating in memorial events in remembrance of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. According to one report, authorities questioned, held in custody, criminally detained, sent on forced “vacation,” or harassed at least 53 individuals.¹⁰⁹ Cases included:

- On May 31, 2016, police in Beijing municipality criminally detained **Zhao Changqing**, **Zhang Baocheng**, **Xu Caihong**, **Li Wei**, **Ma Xinli**, and **Liang Taiping**¹¹⁰ after they had attended a private gathering at Zhao’s home on May 30 to commemorate the Tiananmen protests and call for the release of Guo Feixiong and Yu Shiwen.¹¹¹ The six were all subsequently released on bail in June and July.¹¹²

- **Fu Hailu.** Public security authorities in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, detained Fu on May 28, 2016,¹¹³ and formally arrested him on July 5 on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power”¹¹⁴ after he posted pictures online of satirically labeled liquor bottles commemorating the 1989 protests.¹¹⁵ Authorities also reportedly detained and formally arrested **Chen Bing, Luo Fuyu, and Zhang Juanyong** on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” in connection with Fu’s case.¹¹⁶

Authorities also pursued criminal cases against people detained in 2014, prior to the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and their violent suppression, including:

- In January 2016, the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Guangdong sentenced democracy advocates **Tang Jingling**,¹¹⁷ **Yuan Chaoyang**,¹¹⁸ and **Wang Qingying**¹¹⁹—nicknamed the “Three Gentlemen of Guangzhou”—to five years; three years and six months; and two years and six months in prison, respectively, for “inciting subversion of state power.”¹²⁰

- **Pu Zhiqiang.** In December 2015, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced prominent public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years, for “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”¹²¹ for seven microblog posts that criticized government officials and China’s ethnic policies.¹²²

Promoting “Socialist Political Democratic Consultative Processes”

This past year, central Communist Party authorities did not undertake any substantial political liberalization,¹²³ but instead pledged to continue improving China’s “socialist political democratic consultative system” with the aim of strengthening Party leadership.¹²⁴ Chinese officials have described China’s political system as a “socialist democracy” with “multi-party cooperation” and “political consultation” under the leadership of the Communist Party.¹²⁵ In the past, types of “consultation” have included intraparty input on decisions about Party cadre appointments, development projects at grassroots levels, and some draft laws, as well as discussions between Party representatives and the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the eight “democratic” minor parties under the CPPCC umbrella.¹²⁶ In March 2016, state-run media published commentary emphasizing the role of the CPPCC and promoting the CPPCC’s importance as the official channel for “democratic consultations” and increasing public trust.¹²⁷

Democratic Governance in China’s One-Party State

Sources from this past year highlighted several instances in which officials interfered with or inhibited meaningful public participation in local elections,¹²⁸ undermining the ability of Chinese political institutions to meet the standards for “genuine” elections outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹²⁹ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.¹³⁰ Chinese advocates for fair elections called for the National People’s Con-

gress to guarantee judicial protection of voters' legal rights as defined by the PRC Organic Law of Village Committees.¹³¹ Reports from a human rights organization highlighted problems with local elections, including local officials' unlawful establishment of working groups to influence outcomes,¹³² lack of public participation in the nomination process,¹³³ and lack of official response to citizens' complaints regarding election malfeasance.¹³⁴ As an example of official harassment of an election participant, in June 2016, public security authorities in Yongjing county, Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, criminally detained rights advocate Qu Mingxue—along with Zhang Lujun, Liu Mingxue, and Wang Mingzhu, who were released on the same day—on suspicion of “disrupting elections”¹³⁵ for recommending Liu as an independent write-in candidate in a June 20 local people's congress election in Yongjing and supporting his independent candidacy on social media.¹³⁶ Authorities formally arrested Qu on July 2¹³⁷ but decided not to indict him, releasing him on July 28.¹³⁸ In addition, in August 2016, Zixi county, Fuzhou municipality, Jiangxi province, public security officials ordered Yang Wei to serve 10 days' administrative detention after he requested forms from local government offices to run as an independent candidate in the provincial people's congress elections.¹³⁹

A New Round of Protests in Wukan Village¹⁴⁰

In June 2016, international and Chinese official media outlets reported a new round of protests in Wukan, a village in Donghai subdistrict, Lufeng city, Shanwei municipality, Guangdong province, over the detention of the village committee's Communist Party Secretary Lin Zulian.¹⁴¹ Wukan was the site of major protests in 2011 over land expropriation issues and the death of a village protest leader while in custody.¹⁴² Provincial-level authorities subsequently allowed a village committee election in March 2012 in which protest leaders were directly elected to the committee, including Lin.¹⁴³ Further protest broke out in Wukan in 2014 when local villagers claimed government interference in village elections following the detention of two candidates who helped to organize the 2011 protests and who had been elected to the village committee in 2012.¹⁴⁴

According to an official notice from the Lufeng public security bureau, on June 17, 2016, Lufeng authorities imposed “coercive measures” against Lin for allegedly “accepting bribes.”¹⁴⁵ Media reports, however, indicated that authorities detained Lin after he announced a public meeting to protest the lack of official progress in the government's pledge to return farmland.¹⁴⁶ On June 21, Shanwei officials released a prerecorded confession of Lin admitting to taking bribes, which local residents reportedly found unconvincing,¹⁴⁷ and formally arrested him on July 21.¹⁴⁸ The Hong Kong-based newspaper South China Morning Post reported that authorities warned two prominent rights lawyers not to work on the case.¹⁴⁹ After Lin's detention, local authorities placed Lin's family members under 24-hour surveillance, conditions that reportedly led Lin's grandson to attempt suicide in early August.¹⁵⁰

Implementation of Open Government and Citizen Access to Information

Chinese authorities reiterated their intent to improve open government affairs and to aim for a higher level of information disclosure to the public.¹⁵¹ Following official guidance from the Communist Party¹⁵² and State Council¹⁵³ that called on government agencies to improve transparency, promote administrative reform, and restrain officials from arbitrarily exercising their authority, the Party Central Committee General Office and State Council General Office issued an opinion in February 2016 to further strengthen work on the open government information (OGI) system.¹⁵⁴ The opinion stipulated that government agencies must effectively improve disclosure, achieve a high level of civic participation, elevate access to information, and foster public trust.¹⁵⁵

Despite progress on policy and regulatory measures, transparency and access to government data are still lacking and implementation of the 2008 Open Government Information Regulations¹⁵⁶ remain problematic. Chinese authorities reportedly denied or ignored OGI requests, including in cases related to land dispossession and forcible relocation,¹⁵⁷ government spending,¹⁵⁸ and criminal matters.¹⁵⁹ Several rights advocates filed lawsuits against government agencies after officials denied their OGI requests for data submitted to the UN Committee against Torture.¹⁶⁰ Authorities also rejected OGI requests on the grounds of “state secrets.”¹⁶¹ Government agencies are required to develop “negative lists” that specifically enumerate the types of information that are not subject to disclosure, including information that may “endanger state security, economic security, public security, or social stability.”¹⁶² A lack of transparency in trade-related regulations¹⁶³ and clarity in policy regulating Chinese stock markets reportedly has contributed to difficulties for investors in China.¹⁶⁴ In addition to calls for improved transparency, reports noted that central authorities have admitted to publishing unreliable information in the past year.¹⁶⁵ [For more information on lack of transparency in China’s commercial environment, see Section III—Commercial Rule of Law.]

Social Credit System

In an effort to address the lack of trust in Chinese society, in 2014, the State Council released a planning outline for the creation of a national social credit system to measure and improve the credibility of government agencies, organizations, and individuals in four main areas: administrative affairs, business, society, and justice.¹⁶⁶ According to the planning outline, laws, regulations, and a standard system of supervision and management for administering social credit should be in place by 2020.¹⁶⁷ Media reports speculate that by 2020 every individual will have a personalized social credit score.¹⁶⁸ Each individual’s score will reflect a wide range of information, including financial data, criminal records, traffic violations, social media activity, and consumer purchases.¹⁶⁹ While the State Council planning outline includes the goals of increasing government transparency and accountability and reducing official misconduct,¹⁷⁰ critics have raised concerns about negative privacy implications of this nationwide system,¹⁷¹ noting that the social

credit system is part of the Chinese government's ongoing efforts to counter perceived threats and shape citizens' behavior through massive data-gathering and surveillance.¹⁷²

The Chinese government continued plans to establish the national social credit system this past year.¹⁷³ In June 2016, the State Council issued a guiding opinion on building the social credit system, directing national and provincial government agencies to construct an "interregional and cross-departmental mechanism for encouraging trustworthiness and punishing dishonesty."¹⁷⁴ The opinion outlined four main areas of "dishonest" behavior punishable under a unified social credit mechanism: "severely endangering" public health and safety, including in medicine, the environment, industry, and manufacturing; "severely harming fair market competition and order and normal social order," including bribery, tax evasion, loan evasion, and wage payment violations; "refusal to fulfill legal obligations," including failing to comply with judicial sentences or administrative decisions; and "refusal to fulfill national defense obligations," including declining or evading military service.¹⁷⁵ The opinion also called for government and public organizations, financial institutions, credit and rating agencies, and professional associations to create and publish "red lists" of those who exhibit "model trustworthiness" and "blacklists" of those who are "severely dishonest," and provide them to government departments.¹⁷⁶

Notes to Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance

¹Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016—China,” last visited 7 July 16; Jidong Chen et al., “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April 2016), 383; David Shambaugh, *China’s Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 98. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 13 April 16, 1.

²David Shambaugh, *China’s Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 115, 121–22. See also Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, 20 March 13, summary; Chinese Communist Party Constitution [Gongchandang zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, General Program. For English translation, see “Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, 18 November 12. The Party Constitution states that, “Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding levels.” PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 37; PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, preface.

³“Xi Jinping’s Leadership: Chairman of Everything,” *Economist*, 2 April 16; Will Edwards, “The Chinese Communist Party Under Xi Jinping,” *Cipher Brief*, 21 June 16; “Xi Jinping: Party, Political, Military, Civil, and Academic; East, West, South, North, and Center; The Party Leads Everything” [Xi jingping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao yiqie de], *The Paper*, 30 January 16.

⁴Christopher K. Johnson and Scott Kennedy, “China’s Un-Separation of Powers: The Blurred Lines of Party and Government,” *Foreign Affairs*, 24 July 15.

⁵“Li Zhanshu: Agencies Should Always Maintain a High Degree of Consistency With Party Center” [Li zhanshu: zhong zhi jiguan yao shizhong tong dang zhongyang baochi gaodu yizhi], Xinhua, 27 January 16; Jun Mai, “‘Absolute Loyalty’: Top Xi Jinping Aide Demands Communist Party Units Toe the Line,” *South China Morning Post*, 27 January 16.

⁶“Xi Jinping: Full Implementation of Reform Strategy To Strengthen Military: Unswervingly Taking the Road To Build a Strong Army With Chinese Characteristics” [Xi jingping: quanmian shishi gaige qianjun zhanlue jianbing bu yizou zhongguo tese qiangjun zhilu], Xinhua, 26 November 15; Cheng Li, “Promoting ‘Young Guards’: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part II: Expansion and Escalation),” *China Leadership Monitor*, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, No. 49 (Winter 2016), 1. The Party used the military organizational reshuffle in early 2016 to elevate its leading role.

⁷National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua gongyao], issued 17 March 16, chap. 1; Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Fits and Starts of China’s Economic Reforms,” *Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound* (blog), 25 January 16.

⁸“Xi Completes Media Tour, Stresses Party’s Leadership,” Xinhua, 20 February 16.

⁹Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office, Opinion on Strengthening Party-Building Work in Social Organizations (Provisional) [Guanyu jiaqiang shehui zuzhi dang de jianshe gongzuo de yijian (shixing)], issued 28 September 15.

¹⁰“China To Adopt Universal ‘Two-Child’ Policy” [Woguo quanmian fangkai ‘erhai’ zhengce], *Beijing Youth Daily*, 30 October 15; National Health and Family Planning Commission, “To Implement Universal Two-Child Policy, To Promote Balanced Population Development” [Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng fazhan], 29 October 15.

¹¹“Xi Jinping Presides Over the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee Meeting” [Xi jingping zhuchi zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju changwei hui huiyi], Xinhua, 7 January 16; “Xi Jinping: Party, Political, Military, Civil, and Academic; East, West, South, North, and Center; The Party Leads Everything” [Xi jingping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao de yiqie de], *The Paper*, 30 January 16; Eva Pils et al., “Rule by Fear? A ChinaFile Conversation,” *Asia Society, ChinaFile* (blog), 18 February 16.

¹²Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 18th Party Central Committee Fifth Plenum Communiqué [Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi gongbao], 29 October 15.

¹³National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua gongyao], issued 17 March 16. See also State Council, “2016 Two Sessions: NPC & CPPCC: Annual Legislative and Political Advisory Sessions,” last visited 16 June 16.

¹⁴National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua gongyao], issued 17 March 16, chap. 1.

¹⁵“Profile: Xi Jinping: Pursuing Dream for 1.3 Billion Chinese,” Xinhua, 17 March 13; “Xi Jinping: Party, Political, Military, Civil, and Academic; East, West, South, North, and Center; The Party Leads Everything” [Xi jingping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao de yiqie de], *The Paper*, 30 January 16.

¹⁶Ibid. See also Liu Shaohua, “Xi Jinping Governing Ideological Keyword 2: Chinese Dream, 1.3 Billion People’s Dream of Rejuvenation” [Xi jingping zhiguo lizheng guanjianci 2: zhongguo meng 13 yi ren de fuxing mengxiang], *People’s Daily*, 16 January 16. Xi has reportedly mentioned “Chinese dream” more than 200 times in public speeches and interviews. “Chinese Road: Chinese Dream” [Zhongguo daolu: zhongguo meng], Xinhua, last visited 16 June 16.

¹⁷Liu Yizhan, “Yuan Guiren: College Teachers Must Observe the Political, Legal, and Moral Triple Baseline” [Yuan guiren: gaoxiao jiaoshi bixu shouhao zhengzhi, falu, daode santiao dixian], Xinhua, 29 January 15; Megha Rajagopalan, “China Is Waging a ‘Hidden War’ Against the West,” Reuters, reprinted in Business Insider, 20 May 15.

¹⁸“Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and State Council General Office Release Opinion on Further Strengthening and Improving Propaganda and Ideology Work in Higher Education Under New Circumstances” [Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, guowuyuan bangongting yinfa guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin xin xingshi xia gaoxiao xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo de yijian], Xinhua, 19 January 15. For an unofficial English translation of the opinion cited, see “Opinions Concerning Further Strengthening and Improving Propaganda and Ideology Work in Higher Education Under New Circumstances,” China Copyright and Media (blog), 16 February 15. See also “China Pledges New Crackdown on ‘Hostile Forces,’” Associated Press, reprinted in Al Jazeera, 16 March 16; Yu Zhiguo, “General Secretary Xi Jinping Emphasizes the Profound Meaning of ‘Grasping the Truth’” [Xi zongshuji qiangdiao “zhua shi” yu shenyi], People’s Daily, 29 June 16.

¹⁹Orville Schell, “Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,” New York Review of Books, 21 April 16; Minxin Pei, “The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China,” American Interest, Vol. 11, No. 4, 12 November 15; Robert Daly, “The Mixed Rationales and Mixed Results of Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Campaign,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 11 May 16. See CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 143–44; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 143–44; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 242–43.

²⁰Wei Pu, “Xi Jinping: Is China on the Road to Total Dictatorship?” Radio Free Asia, 8 February 16; Simon Denyer, “China’s Xi Tells Grumbling Party Cadres: ‘Don’t Talk Back,’” Washington Post, 29 December 15; Chun Han Wong, “China’s Xi Jinping Puts Loyalty to the Test at Congress,” Wall Street Journal, 16 March 16. For examples of intensified Party discipline, see Jiang Jie, “Party Rules Ban Groundless Comments on Major Policies,” Global Times, 23 October 15; “China’s Anti-Graft Body To Supervise More Central Organs,” Xinhua, 20 September 15.

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