

## V. Tibet

### *Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives*

Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has remained stalled since the January 2010 ninth round,<sup>1</sup> the longest interval since such contacts resumed in 2002.<sup>2</sup> The Commission observed no indication during the 2016 reporting year of official Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into account the concerns of Tibetans who live in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.<sup>3</sup>


### *Tibetan Self-Immolation*

The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly focusing on political and religious issues during the 2016 reporting year declined substantially.<sup>4</sup> The 138th and 139th such self-immolations<sup>5</sup> were on:

- **February 29, 2016.** Monk Kalsang Wangdu, age 18, of Retsokha Monastery, self-immolated in Xinlong (Nyagrong) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.<sup>6</sup>
- **March 23, 2016.** Wife and mother Sonam Tso, about 50 years old, self-immolated in Ruo'ergai (Dzoege) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan.<sup>7</sup>

The approximately seven-month period between monk Sonam Tobyal's self-immolation in July 2015<sup>8</sup> and monk Kalsang Wangdu's self-immolation is the longest since the period between the first two such self-immolations in February 2009<sup>9</sup> and March 2011.<sup>10</sup> [See the Commission's 2012–2015 Annual Reports for information on self-immolations 1–137.<sup>11</sup>]

Government provisions imposing collective punishment on self-immolators' family members or communities—instances of which local governments issued in 2012<sup>12</sup> and 2013<sup>13</sup>—may have deterred potential self-immolators from putting persons close to them at risk.<sup>14</sup> Human Rights Watch noted in November 2012, for example, that “. . . officials have in recent weeks employed forms of collective punishment to discourage immolations,”<sup>15</sup> and the Commission's 2014 Annual Report stated that the Commission had “observed for the first time reports of county-level governments turning to collective punishment in apparent attempts to deter individuals from engaging in prohibited behavior.”<sup>16</sup>





## FOCUS ON THE DALAI LAMA

Party and government objectives in managing Tibetan Buddhist affairs prioritize isolating Tibetan Buddhists living in China from the current Dalai Lama,<sup>20</sup> Tenzin Gyatso, who reached the age of 81 in July 2016<sup>21</sup> and has lived in India since he fled into exile in 1959.<sup>22</sup> Developments this past year continued to demonstrate Party and government prioritization of managing the selection and education of the next Dalai Lama—a power the government created by issuing the 2007 Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism<sup>23</sup> (MMR) and that it exercises via the state-controlled Buddhist Association of China (BAC).<sup>24</sup>

- **The golden urn.**<sup>25</sup> A September 2015 State Council white paper<sup>26</sup> reiterated the government's assertion that a 1793 Qing Dynasty imperial edict (the Twenty-Nine Article Imperial Ordinance<sup>27</sup>) “established the system of lot-drawing from the golden urn to confirm the reincarnated soul boy of a deceased Living Buddha”<sup>28</sup>—i.e., to choose what Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations (*trulkus*) of high-ranking teachers, including the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama.<sup>29</sup> Language in the white paper showed that selecting *trulkus* by lot-drawing was a convention imposed on Tibetan Buddhists by the non-Tibetan Manchu<sup>30</sup> empire then ruling China.<sup>31</sup> A 2014 University of London doctoral dissertation noted that “there is consensus that the Golden Urn was introduced as a consequence of the emperor Qianlong being drawn into a costly and complex campaign against the Gurkhas on behalf of Tibet,”<sup>32</sup> and that the Qing court subsequently used it as “a method of intervention in Tibetan affairs.”<sup>33</sup>

- **The Panchen Lama precedent.**<sup>34</sup> The September 2015 white paper focuses on an important example of Party and government supervision of the selection of a high-ranking *trulku* using the golden urn.<sup>35</sup> In November 1995, Luo Gan, a senior Party and government official, “presided” at the selection of Gyaltzen Norbu’s name from the urn.<sup>36</sup> Chinese authorities previously had declared the Dalai Lama’s May 14, 1995, recognition of six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama to be “illegal and invalid”<sup>37</sup> and have held him and his parents incommunicado in one or more unknown locations since May 17, 1995.<sup>38</sup> In September 2015, a Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party official reiterated a claim that Gedun Choekyi Nyima “is being educated, living a normal life, growing up healthily and does not wish to be disturbed.”<sup>39</sup>

- **The Dalai Lama’s position.** The Dalai Lama issued a signed “declaration” in September 2011 noting that Tibetans sought to avoid implementing the Qing edict because “[t]his system was imposed by the Manchus” and because “Tibetans had no faith in it because it lacked any spiritual quality.”<sup>40</sup> He rejected the Party’s “brazen meddling” and asserted that “it will be impossible for Tibetans . . . to acknowledge or accept it.”<sup>41</sup> In his declaration, the Dalai Lama emphasized that reincarnation cannot be compelled:

[T]he person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth and how that reincarnation is to be recognized. It is a reality that no one else can force the person concerned, or manipulate him or her. It is particularly inappropriate for Chinese communists, who explicitly reject even the idea of past and future lives, let alone the concept of reincarnate Tulkus [*trulkus*], to meddle in the system of reincarnation and especially the reincarnations of the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas.<sup>42</sup>

- **The Party and government position.** In November 2015, Zhu Weiqun, currently Chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee<sup>43</sup> and formerly a senior Party official<sup>44</sup> and counterpart in dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s envoys,<sup>45</sup> described reincarnation as “first and foremost an important political matter in Tibet and an important manifestation of the Chinese central government’s sovereignty over Tibet.”<sup>46</sup> Zhu said, “[T]he central government has never given up, and will never give up, the right to decide the reincarnation affairs of the Dalai Lama.”<sup>47</sup>

- **Implications for protest.** The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contains records on the disappeared Panchen Lama and his parents<sup>48</sup> and, as of August 1, 2016, more than 40 other Tibetans<sup>49</sup>—detained as recently as September 2015<sup>50</sup>—whose PPD record summaries included a reference to the Panchen Lama.<sup>51</sup> News media reports indicated that at least four Tibetan self-immolators have carried out some type of activity or expression focused on Gedun Choekyi Nyima.<sup>52</sup> In comparison, 643 PPD records of Tibetans detained as recently as July 2016<sup>53</sup> included a reference to the Dalai Lama.<sup>54</sup> With respect to self-immolation, CECC Annual Reports cited sources identifying at least 56 Tibetan self-immolators who reportedly expressed religious devotion to the Dalai Lama or called for his return.<sup>55</sup> Tibetan protest history<sup>56</sup> suggests that Party and government intervention in the Dalai Lama’s succession may result in heightened levels of protest activity.<sup>57</sup>

- **Disappearing the Dalai Lama.** The Party and government continued this past year to attempt to remove the Dalai Lama from Tibetans’ lives by means including denying his status as a religious leader,<sup>58</sup> cracking down on Party members,<sup>59</sup> preventing or punishing display of his image,<sup>60</sup> and hindering Tibetan travel to India.<sup>61</sup> Representative examples follow.

- **Denial.** In March 2016, the Party-run Global Times<sup>62</sup> quoted Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee and Executive Chairperson of the TAR People’s Congress Standing Committee Pema Choling<sup>63</sup> stating that the Dalai Lama was “no longer a religious leader after he defected [from] his country and betrayed its people.”<sup>64</sup>

- **Crackdown.** In November 2015, TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo reportedly launched a campaign to identify and punish cadres who “pretend not to be religious” but “secretly believe” and “follow the clique of the 14th Dalai Lama.”<sup>65</sup> Chen called on the Party to “severely punish

those party members and cadres who don't have firm beliefs and ideals.”<sup>66</sup>

- **Ban.** In March 2016, officials in Tongren (Rebgong) county, the capital of Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai province, reportedly banned the display of images of the Dalai Lama in religious venues.<sup>67</sup> In January 2016, government offices in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, reportedly ordered shops that sold or displayed images of the Dalai Lama to “surrender” them by February 2.<sup>68</sup>

- **Punishment.** Religious institutions in Tongren failing to adhere to the March 2016 ban on images could face closure, and individual monastic violators could face expulsion and criminal prosecution.<sup>69</sup> In early February, officials detained Abbot Paga and Geshe<sup>70</sup> Orgyen of Chogri Monastery,<sup>71</sup> located in Luhuo, for organizing a “mass prayer ceremony”<sup>72</sup> where Tibetans prayed for the Dalai Lama’s health “before a large image [of him]”<sup>73</sup> as he received medical treatment in the United States.<sup>74</sup> In February 2016, the Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court sentenced monk Choephel of Rongbo Monastery to two years’ imprisonment for possessing and sharing an image of the Dalai Lama.<sup>75</sup>

#### ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Additional reports this past year demonstrated Party and government disregard of Tibetans’ right to religious freedom, but one report detailed instances of tolerance to which Tibetans responded positively.

- **“Authentic” Buddhas.** According to state- and Party-run media reports, in April 2016, the BAC announced that a database including 1,311 *trulkus* (“living Buddhas”) it deemed to be “authentic” was “nearly complete.”<sup>76</sup> The Dalai Lama reportedly was not included in the database,<sup>77</sup> and reports implied that few additions would be forthcoming.<sup>78</sup> Zhu Weiqun asserted in April that “the system will strike a heavy blow to the Dalai Lama.”<sup>79</sup>

- **“Purge and reform.”** The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that in September 2015<sup>80</sup> the Biru (Driru) County People’s Government,<sup>81</sup> in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, issued a “notice”<sup>82</sup> directing “purge and reform”<sup>83</sup> of monastic leadership<sup>84</sup> and religious<sup>85</sup> and financial<sup>86</sup> affairs, and specifying punishment for non-compliance.<sup>87</sup> Days later, authorities expelled at least 100 nuns and demolished residences at a local nunnery.<sup>88</sup>

- **“Renovation.”** In July 2016, demolition commenced at the renowned<sup>89</sup> Larung Gar Buddhist Institute, in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province,<sup>90</sup> to reduce Tibetan Buddhist lay and monastic practitioners living there from “more than 20,000”<sup>91</sup> to 5,000 by September 2017, according to a Human Rights Watch translation of an official document.<sup>92</sup> Only 1,000 of the 5,000 persons could come from outside Sichuan.<sup>93</sup> “Correction and rectification obligations”<sup>94</sup> include demolition to create a 30-meter (98.4 feet) “gap” between lay

and monastic areas by July 2016,<sup>95</sup> installing surveillance cameras and establishing “entrance screening” by August 2016,<sup>96</sup> and constructing a barrier wall in the “gap” by September 2016.<sup>97</sup> An official reportedly described the “goal” as making Larung Gar “more orderly, beautiful, safe and peaceful,” and “accelerating the urbanization and construction of Larung town.”<sup>98</sup>

• **“Resilience.”** The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) published remarkable<sup>99</sup> images of Tibetans in their thousands gathered at principal monasteries in Qinghai,<sup>100</sup> Gansu,<sup>101</sup> and Sichuan<sup>102</sup> provinces, and the TAR<sup>103</sup> to observe an important religious date in February 2016.<sup>104</sup> Security forces were present<sup>105</sup> but less visible and intrusive than in recent years.<sup>106</sup> ICT described the gathering as “testimony to Tibetan resilience and the determination to express their religious identity.”<sup>107</sup>

### *Status of Tibetan Culture*

Tibetans continued to face Chinese Communist Party and government pressure on Tibetan culture and language.<sup>108</sup> Reports emerged showing that officials at times treated Tibetan efforts to sustain their culture and language as illegal<sup>109</sup> or as a threat to social stability,<sup>110</sup> leaving Tibetans with uncertain recourse. In a Foreign Policy article, a Columbia University professor observed:

Although China’s constitution and ethnic autonomy laws create the appearance of progress, there are no mechanisms for enforcing the vision of equality put forward by those texts. Put simply, there is no Chinese Department of Justice or Chinese Supreme Court to which Tibetans can appeal to fight discriminatory practices.<sup>111</sup>

The Commission has not observed any recent Party or government statements supporting the legitimacy of maintaining the distinctiveness of the Tibetan culture and language. To the contrary, President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed in the August 2015 Sixth Tibet Work Forum the requisite promotion of a common culture and identity that would serve “social stability”:

Key efforts in the work for Tibet should be spent on ensuring national unity and consolidating ethnic unity, with realizing long-term and comprehensive social stability as an obligatory task.<sup>112</sup>

Tibetans continued either to attempt to arrange for Tibetan language training—sometimes successfully—or to protest the lack of it. Examples follow.

• **Daofu.** During the winter school holiday, “around 200” students reportedly attended an intensive 20-day Tibetan language course, apparently with government approval, in Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province.<sup>113</sup> Students reportedly “warmly embraced this crash course and were very attentive.”<sup>114</sup>

• **Hualong.** In January 2016, Tibetan and Muslim residents of Hualong (Bayan Khar) Hui Autonomous County, Haidong municipality, Qinghai province, reportedly gathered in Xining, the Qinghai capital, “to demand better funding for the education of

minority groups.”<sup>115</sup> Tibetan language skills reportedly had declined under the county’s current administration.<sup>116</sup>

- **Banma.** Statements by officials in Banma (Pema) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai, described as “recent” in January 2016, reportedly led locals to believe that Tibetan language study groups sponsored over the past seven years could be deemed “illegal associations.”<sup>117</sup> Residents feared that attending the study groups could result in “detention or arrest.”<sup>118</sup>

- **Nangqian.** A week-long Tibetan language proficiency contest in January 2016 hosted by a language-promotion association in Nangqian (Nangchen) county, Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai, proceeded with “apparent” official approval.<sup>119</sup> Participants included school students as well as laypersons who had not attended school.<sup>120</sup>

Security officials continued to detain Tibetans who advocated on behalf of Tibetan culture and language, or who sought to publish their views. Representative examples follow.

- **Drukar Gyal.** In February 2016, the Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court<sup>121</sup> sentenced writer Drukar Gyal (or Druglo, pen name Shogjang) to three years in prison for what reports described as inciting ethnic “discord”<sup>122</sup> (or “hatred”<sup>123</sup>), harming “social stability,” and having contact with “splittists” outside China.<sup>124</sup> Security officials detained him in March 2015.<sup>125</sup> High Peaks Pure Earth previously reported other Tibetan writers’ response to his detention.<sup>126</sup>

- **Tashi Wangchug.** In January 2016, security officials reportedly detained Tashi Wangchug in Yushu (Kyebugdo) city, Yushu TAP,<sup>127</sup> and in March charged him with “inciting separatism.”<sup>128</sup> Prosecutors reportedly were reviewing the case as of late August.<sup>129</sup> He had posted a microblog message urging “the legislature and legislative advisory committee of Qinghai Province . . . to enhance bilingual education and hire more bilingual civil servants.”<sup>130</sup> In 2015 he travelled to Beijing to try “to file a lawsuit to compel the authorities to provide more Tibetan education.”<sup>131</sup> He described his objective as “to change things a little bit, to push to preserve some of our nation’s culture.”<sup>132</sup>

- **Konchog Gyatso.** In late 2015, security officials reportedly detained monk Konchog Gyatso of Lhamo Dechen Monastery, located in Jianzha (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai,<sup>133</sup> in connection with a book he wrote and was ready to publish.<sup>134</sup> In it, he recounted the experiences of travelling without documentation to India, studying at a monastery, and returning home.<sup>135</sup> Police released him after a week, warning that he could face imprisonment if he published the account.<sup>136</sup>

### *Economic Development and Urbanization*

The Commission observed no evidence during its 2002 to 2016 period of reporting that the Party or government solicited systematic or representative input from the Tibetan population on economic development in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.<sup>137</sup> Instead, Commission Annual Reports have documented implementation of a development model—“Chinese characteristics with Ti-

betan traits”<sup>138</sup>—that prioritizes economic growth<sup>139</sup> and boosts household income.<sup>140</sup> At the same time, officials deny Tibetans adequate rights to protect their culture,<sup>141</sup> language,<sup>142</sup> religion,<sup>143</sup> and environment,<sup>144</sup> and prosecute as criminals Tibetans who question or protest against official policies.<sup>145</sup> Examples of developments related to economic initiatives that could increase pressure on Tibetan culture follow.

- **Railways.**<sup>146</sup> Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) officials speaking at the March 2016 National People’s Congress meeting<sup>147</sup> asserted that the Sichuan-Tibet railway, which the government approved in October 2014<sup>148</sup> and upon which construction began in December 2014,<sup>149</sup> would bring “even more prosperity”<sup>150</sup> and denied that it would result in environmental harm.<sup>151</sup>

- **Urbanization.** On November 28, 2015, the State Council reportedly approved changing the status of Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) from a county in Lhasa municipality to an urban district of Lhasa.<sup>152</sup> Duilongdeqing—traversed by the Qinghai-Tibet railway<sup>153</sup>—became the second urban district in the TAR along with Lhasa’s Chengguan district.<sup>154</sup>

- **Population.** Commission access this past year to Chinese 2010 ethnic census data showed a 50-percent increase in the Han population of Lhasa municipality from 2000 to 2010<sup>155</sup>—a period that included the 2006 completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railway.<sup>156</sup> Lhasa’s Chengguan district total population increased by about 25 percent<sup>157</sup> while its Han population increased by 40 percent.<sup>158</sup> Duilongdeqing’s total population increased by about 29 percent<sup>159</sup> while its relatively low Han population increased by about 269 percent.<sup>160</sup> TAR total population increased by about 15 percent<sup>161</sup> while its Han population increased by about 55 percent.<sup>162</sup> During the same period, Tibetan population in the TAR increased by about 12 percent,<sup>163</sup> in Lhasa municipality by about 11 percent,<sup>164</sup> in Lhasa’s Chengguan district by about 17 percent,<sup>165</sup> and in Duilongdeqing by about 16 percent.<sup>166</sup> Commission access to such information has become more difficult as the Han population increased.<sup>167</sup>

Location / Census Year	Total Pop.	Total Tibetan	Total Han
Tibet Autonomous Region			
1990 <sup>168</sup>	2,196,010	2,096,718	80,837
2000 <sup>169</sup>	2,616,329	2,427,168	158,570
2010 <sup>170</sup>	3,002,165	2,716,388	245,263
Lhasa municipality			
1990 <sup>171</sup>	375,968	327,882	44,945
2000 <sup>172</sup>	474,499	387,124	80,584
2010 <sup>173</sup>	559,423	429,104	121,065
Chengguan district			
1990 <sup>174</sup>	139,816	96,431	40,387
2000 <sup>175</sup>	223,001	140,387	76,581
2010 <sup>176</sup>	279,074	163,725	107,607
Duilongdeqing county			
1990 <sup>177</sup>	41,210	38,337	2,794
2000 <sup>178</sup>	40,543	38,455	1,868
2010 <sup>179</sup>	52,249	44,768	6,886

- **Housing.** According to an advocacy organization report, officials in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, appropriated Tibetan residential property,<sup>180</sup> enforced residential demolition,<sup>181</sup> and, in some cases, enforced specific renovation.<sup>182</sup> A news media report described enforced replacement of Tibetan-style homes in Lhasa municipality with “Chinese-style” replacements.<sup>183</sup> According to a series of Radio Free Asia reports, in October 2015, authorities in Gonghe (Chabcha) county, Hainan (Tsolho) TAP, Qinghai, reportedly demolished a total of more than 500 homes and shops in two locations,<sup>184</sup> leaving more than 900 Tibetans homeless.<sup>185</sup> Officials said construction in one location caused crowding and pollution;<sup>186</sup> in the other location authorities provided Tibetans no opportunity to challenge the action and forbade them to approach or photograph demolished homes.<sup>187</sup> In early June 2016, authorities in Heimaha (Tanagma) township,<sup>188</sup> Gonghe, reportedly characterized “over 600 homes and shops” built by Tibetans, Muslims, and Han as “illegal” and had them demolished.<sup>189</sup> On June 23, security officials arrived in villages in Shinaihai (Tralnag) township and reportedly beat Tibetans protesting against official threats to demolish shops and guesthouses.<sup>190</sup> Police reportedly detained five protesters the next day.<sup>191</sup>
- **Land.** In September 2015, officials detained at least 12 Tibetans<sup>192</sup> who petitioned for the return of land seized in 2010<sup>193</sup> in Ruo’ergai (Dzoegge) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan province, for “development” that did not eventuate.<sup>194</sup> In April 2016, the Ruo’ergai County People’s Court sentenced four of them to suspended imprisonment.<sup>195</sup> The rest were released.<sup>196</sup> In Biru county, officials reportedly demolished homes and seized land for “development” that Tibetans had used “for generations.”<sup>197</sup>
- **Environment.** Reports in 2015 and 2016 by a scientific journal<sup>198</sup> and two international advocacy organizations<sup>199</sup> focused on the declining environmental state of the Tibetan plateau.<sup>200</sup> The reports examined issues including flawed grasslands policies<sup>201</sup> that adversely affect nomadic pastoralists,<sup>202</sup> mining,<sup>203</sup> and the risks that extensive dam-building may pose.<sup>204</sup>
- **Mining.** In two unusual developments this past year, after Tibetans protested against mining they regarded as harmful to the environment in one instance<sup>205</sup> and as destructive to a mountain they viewed as sacred in another instance,<sup>206</sup> officials suspended the mining operations.<sup>207</sup> In one instance, lithium mining that had been twice halted<sup>208</sup> then restarted in April 2016<sup>209</sup> reportedly caused a fish-kill in Tagong (Lhagang) township, Kangding (Dartsedo) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan.<sup>210</sup> Following Tibetan protests on May 4,<sup>211</sup> the prefectural and county governments suspended mining “until the relevant remaining issues have been resolved.”<sup>212</sup> In the other instance, on May 20, officials warned Tibetan protesters in Akeli (Akhorri) township, Jinchuan (Chuchen) county, Aba T&QAP, of “serious consequences” if they continued to block road construction near the mountain.<sup>213</sup> In June, authorities halted the work “temporarily.”<sup>214</sup>

In a third development, in June security officials beat Tibetans in Amuqu (Amchog) township, Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, who protested against open-pit mining near another sacred mountain.<sup>215</sup> The township government issued a document linking protesters to “anti-China forces” and warned of “severe consequences.”<sup>216</sup>

*Summary: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment*

As of August 1, 2016, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,894 records—a figure certain to be far from complete—of Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008, the beginning of a period of mostly peaceful political protests that swept across the Tibetan plateau.

Among the 1,894 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions reported since March 2008 are 27 Tibetans ordered to serve reeducation through labor (all believed released) and 461 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to imprisonment (296 are believed released upon sentence completion).<sup>217</sup> Of the 461 Tibetan political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008, sentencing information is available for 433 prisoners, including 426 with fixed-term sentences averaging approximately 5 years and 1 month, based on PPD data as of August 1, 2016.

CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT


As of August 1, 2016, the PPD contained records of 650 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 640 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008;<sup>218</sup> 10 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete.

Of the 640 Tibetan political prisoners who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, and who were believed or presumed to remain detained or imprisoned as of August 1, 2016, PPD data indicated that:

- 277 (43 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or *trulkus*.<sup>219</sup>
- 560 (88 percent) are male, 53 (8 percent) are female, and 27 are of unknown gender.
- 276 (43 percent) are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province and 201 (31 percent) in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The rest are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in Qinghai province (95), Gansu province (67), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1).
- Sentencing information is available for 156 prisoners: 148 reportedly were sentenced to fixed terms ranging from 2 years to 19 years and 11 months,<sup>220</sup> and 7 were sentenced to life imprisonment or death with a 2-year reprieve.<sup>221</sup> The average fixed-term sentence is approximately 8 years and 7 months. Sixty-nine (44 percent) of the prisoners with known sentences are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or *trulkus*.

Sentencing information for 7 of the 10 Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed imprisoned as of

August 1, 2016, indicates sentences from 9 years to life imprisonment. The average fixed-term sentence is 14 years and 5 months.



## TORTURE

The UN Committee against Torture released its Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China in February 2016.<sup>222</sup> The observations stated:

[T]he Committee has received numerous reports from credible sources that document in detail cases of torture, deaths in custody, arbitrary detention and disappearances of Tibetans. . . . In view of this information, the Committee remains seriously concerned at the State party's failure to provide information on 24 out of the 26 Tibetan cases mentioned in the list of issues (CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.1, para. 27), despite the questions posed by the Committee during the dialogue (arts. 2, 11, 12 and 16).<sup>223</sup>

With respect to torture, and specifically to death believed to have resulted from abuse while detained or imprisoned, as of August 1, 2016, the PPD contained records of 23 Tibetans taken into police custody on or after March 10, 2008, who reportedly died as a result of such circumstances. The following information is likely to be incomplete.

- Eighteen of the 23 Tibetans reportedly died while in police custody.<sup>224</sup>
- Four of the 23 reportedly died while imprisoned.<sup>225</sup>
- One of the 23 Tibetans reportedly was tortured in custody, escaped, and committed suicide rather than be recaptured.<sup>226</sup>

A former Tibetan political prisoner, monk Jigme Gyatso,<sup>227</sup> testified at an April 2016 Commission hearing<sup>228</sup> on the torture officials inflicted on him, including the use of a "tiger chair"<sup>229</sup> during interrogation in 2008.

### Notes to Section V—Tibet

<sup>1</sup>Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Press Statement,” 25 January 10. According to the January 25 press statement, the Dalai Lama’s envoys would arrive in China “tomorrow” (i.e., January 26, 2010). For information in Commission Annual Reports in years with more recent examples of dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Chinese Communist Party and government officials, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 219–20; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 273–77; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 187–88.

<sup>2</sup>“Press Conference on Central Govt’s Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text),” China Daily, 11 February 10. After the ninth round of dialogue, Zhu Weiqun referred to the gap between the eighth and ninth rounds as “the longest interval after we resumed contact and talks in 2002.”

<sup>3</sup>For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC, “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” 22 October 09, 22–24. In China, there are 1 provincial-level area of Tibetan autonomy, 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy, and 2 county-level areas of Tibetan autonomy. The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) (approximately 1.02 million square kilometers), and the 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TACs) (approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately 2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. Steven Marshall and Susetee Cooke, *Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics* (Washington, DC: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region (1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai province: Haibei (Tsojiang) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901 square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444 square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushu) TAP (197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (153,870 square kilometers, or 59,409 square miles), Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP (86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles), and Muli (Mili) TAC (11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). The table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the website of the U.S. Geological Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. For population data, see *Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China* [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10–1, 10–4. According to China’s 2010 ethnic census data, the total Tibetan population in China was 6,282,187. The Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.72 million), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.97 million), and the 2 TACs (approximately 0.096 million) totaled approximately 5.78 million Tibetans living in areas of Tibetan autonomy. Approximately 0.498 million Tibetans lived outside of the areas of Tibetan autonomy. *Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1* [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Tables 10–1, 10–2.

<sup>4</sup>As of August 1, 2016, two self-immolations focusing on political and religious issues had occurred during the Commission’s 2016 reporting period. The Commission has posted under Resources, Special Topics, on its website ([www.cecc.gov](http://www.cecc.gov)) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See, e.g., “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 May 16. The summary contains a list showing that self-immolation numbers 138 and 139 took place during the period September 2015–April 2016.

<sup>5</sup>This enumeration does not include the following six self-immolation protests: Yushu TAP property protests by females Dekyi Choezom and Pasang Lhamo on June 27 and September 13, 2012, respectively; Yushu property protest by female self-immolator Konchog Tsomo in March 2013; Gannan TAP property protest by female Tashi Kyi on August 28, 2015; and the April 6, 2012, deaths of a Tibetan Buddhist abbot, Athub, and a nun, Atse, in a Ganzi TAP house fire initially reported as accidental and later as self-immolation. The Commission continues to monitor reports on their deaths. See, e.g., “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 May 16.

<sup>6</sup>See, e.g., “Tibetan Monk Burns to Death in Kardze Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 1 March 16 (“called out for Tibet’s complete independence”); Free Tibet, “Monk Dies in First Self-immolation in Tibet Since 2015,” 2 March 16; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Two Tibetan Youths Stage Self-immolation Protests in Tibet and India,” 3 March 16 (called for the Dalai Lama to “live for 10,000 years”).

<sup>7</sup>See, e.g., “Tibetan Mother of Five Burns to Death To Protest Chinese Rule,” Radio Free Asia, 6 May 16 (“call out for the return of the Dalai Lama and for freedom for Tibet”); Free Tibet, “Mother of Five Dies in Self-Immolation Protest,” 7 May 16 (“calling for the return of the Dalai Lama and freedom for Tibet”).

<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Monk Self-immolates as Security Tightened for Dalai Lama’s Birthday,” 10 July 15; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Monk Stages Burning Protest in Remote Tibetan Town as China Imposes Internet Blockade,” 10 July 15. See also “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 May 16.

<sup>9</sup>See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Monk in Tibet Sets Himself on Fire; Shot by Police During Protest,” 27 February 09; “Self-Immolating Tibet Monk Recovering—Xinhua,” Reuters, 5 March 09.

<sup>10</sup>See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Monk Immolates Himself; Major Protests at Tibetan Monastery Violently Suppressed,” 16 March 11; Kalsang Rinchen, “Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown,” Phayul, 16 March 11.

<sup>11</sup>CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 304; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 175; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 174–78; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 157–60.

<sup>12</sup>Human Rights Watch, “China: Tibetan Immolations, Security Measures Escalate,” 29 November 12. The HRW report included a translation of a November 14, 2012, notice issued jointly by the Communist Party and the local government in Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, that included collective punishment.

<sup>13</sup>See, e.g., Ruo’ergai County People’s Government, Notice of Interim Anti-Self-Immolation Provisions [Guanyu fan zifen gongzuo zanxing guiding de tongzhi], 8 April 13, reprinted and translated in China Digital Times, “Community Punished for Self-Immolations,” 18 February 14.

<sup>14</sup>See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “New Solo Protest by Young Man in Ngaba Is Part of Emerging Trend,” 21 December 15. The ICT report observes, “The desire to protect families and friends from repercussions may be a factor in the new wave of solo protests compared to self-immolation.”

<sup>15</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Tibetan Immolations, Security Measures Escalate,” 29 November 12.

<sup>16</sup>CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 176.

<sup>17</sup>For Commission analysis of Chinese government regulatory intrusion upon Tibetan Buddhist affairs, see, e.g., “Special Report: Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of Freedom of Religion,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 23 December 11; “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11; “New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 07. For measures issued by China’s central government, see, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Evaluating the Credentials of and Appointing Monastic Teachers in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao simiao jingshi zige pingding he pinren banfa], issued 25 November 12, effective 3 December 12; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], issued 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofu zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07, effective 1 September 07.

<sup>18</sup>See, e.g., “Text of Yu Zhengsheng’s Speech at the Meeting Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region” [Yu zhengsheng: zai xizang zizhiq chengli 50 zhounian qingzhu dahui shang de jianghua], Xinhua, 8 September 15 (translated in Open Source Center, 9 September 15) (“use rule of law mentality and rule of law methods to . . . help maintain the normal order of the Tibetan Buddhism”); Shi Lei and Xiao Tao, “TAR Communist Party Standing Committee Listen to Situation Report on Cadre-Stationing in Villages, Model Harmonious Monasteries and Patriotic, Law-Abiding, and Progressive Monks and Nuns’ Creative Selection Activities, and ‘Advancing Double-Link Households’ Creative Selection Work Summary and Preparation for Commendations’ Event; Firmly Deepen Successful Practice of Managing the Border and Stabilizing Tibet, Lay Solid Foundation for Economic and Social Development and Long-Term Peace and Stability; Chen Quanguo Presided Over Meeting” [Zizhiq dangwei changweihui tingqu ganbu zhucun—hexie mofan simiao ji aiguo shoufa xianjin sengni chuanguo pingxuan huodong, “xianjin shuanglianhu” chuanguo pingxuan gongzuo zongjie ji biao Zhanghui choubei qingkuang huibao, jiangding buyi ba zhibian wenzang de chengong shijian yinxiang shenru wei jingji shehui fazhan he changzhi jiu’an daxia jichu, chen quanguo zhuchi huiyi], Tibet Daily, 13 November 15, reprinted in China Tibet News (summarized in Open Source Center, 13 November 15) (“safeguarding . . . the maintenance of normal Tibetan Buddhist order”). See also “Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference” [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juegui anquan—si lun renzhen guan che quan qu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13) (citing Chen Quanguo: “the 14th Dalai . . . is the biggest obstacle to the establishment of normal order in Tibetan Buddhism”).

<sup>19</sup>See, e.g., “Tibet Monks Hail Living Buddha Check System,” Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 29 January 16 (“ensure the authority and rights of verified living Buddhas and the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism”); State Council Information Office, (White Paper) “Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,” reprinted in Xinhua, 6 September 15, sec. VII (“ensure normal religious activities and religious beliefs are protected according to law”).

<sup>20</sup>For Commission Annual Report information on Chinese Communist Party and government efforts to isolate Tibetan Buddhists from the Dalai Lama, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 304–5; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 177–79; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 181–82; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 161–63; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 208–9; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 215, 218, 220–22; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 277–82; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 185, 188–90; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 191–92, 196–97; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 83–85; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 47–48, 111; CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 5 October 04, 38–39; CECC, 2003 Annual Report, 2 October 03, 30–31; CECC, 2002 Annual Report, 2 October 02, 38–39.

<sup>21</sup>Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “A Brief Biography,” last visited 17 March 16. According to biographical information on the Dalai Lama’s official website, he was born on July 6, 1935.

<sup>22</sup>Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “From Birth to Exile,” last visited 2 June 16.

<sup>23</sup>State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofu zhuanshi guanli banfa] [hereinafter MMR], issued 13 July 07, effective 1 September 07, arts. 5–11.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., arts. 5–7, 10, 12. The Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism name the Buddhist Association of China as the authority that interacts directly with Tibetan Buddhist entities in matters regarding reincarnation.

<sup>25</sup>See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Reincarnation of the Living Buddhas,” 15 November 00. The MFA article provided the following explanation for use of the golden urn: “The Gelug Sect of Tibetan Buddhism came to power in Tibet in the 17th century and the Living Buddha reincarnation system became a bone of contention with the upper class in Tibet. In 1793, as part of an effort to turn the tide by overcoming drawbacks characteristic of soul boys nominated from the same tribes, the Qing government promulgated the 29-Article Ordinance for the More Efficient Governing of Tibet. Article one of the Ordinance stipulates: In order to ensure the Yellow Sect continues to flourish, the Grand Emperor bestows it with a golden urn and ivory slips for use in confirming the reincarnated soul boy of a deceased Living Buddha.”

<sup>26</sup>State Council Information Office, (White Paper) “Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,” reprinted in Xinhua, 6 September 15.

<sup>27</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Did Tibet Become an Independent Country After the Revolution of 1911?” 15 November 00. “In 1792 the twenty-nine-article Imperial Ordinance was issued. It stipulated in explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas in Tibet as well as the administrative, military and foreign affairs.” (The edict sought to impose Qing control over religious, administrative, military, fiscal, commercial, and foreign affairs. The edict demanded that the Amban, “Resident Official” representing the imperial court, would have equal status to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, and function as the supervisor of the Tibetan administration.)

<sup>28</sup>State Council Information Office, (White Paper) “Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,” reprinted in Xinhua, 6 September 15, sec. III.

<sup>29</sup>Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Reincarnation,” 24 September 11. The statement was published initially with the title, “Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His Reincarnation.” The Dalai Lama stated: “This proposal included the suggestion of picking lots from a Golden Urn to decide on the recognition of the reincarnations of the Dalai Lamas, Panchen Lamas and Hutuktus, a Mongolian title given to high Lamas.” See also “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3. The CECC article describes this as “one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most important features—lineages of teachers (*trulkus*), whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations, that can span centuries.” For information on the Panchen Lama, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 189 (Box titled “The Panchen Lama and the Golden Urn: China’s Model for Selecting the Next Dalai Lama”).

<sup>30</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 1–1. Table 1–1 lists “Manchu” as one of China’s “nationalities” and provides the total Manchu population in 2000 as 10,682,262.

<sup>31</sup>State Council Information Office, (White Paper) “Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,” reprinted in Xinhua, 6 September 15, sec. III (Qing Dynasty: 1644–1911).

<sup>32</sup>Amy Kellam, “Foreign Devils: Law’s Imperial Discourse and the Status of Tibet (PhD thesis submitted to the Department of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2014), 249. In her dissertation, Kellam observes: “Although the implications of the urn’s existence remain controversial, there is consensus that the Golden Urn was introduced as a consequence of the emperor Qianlong being drawn into a costly and complex campaign against the Gurkhas on behalf of Tibet.”

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>See, e.g., “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3.

<sup>35</sup>State Council Information Office, (White Paper) “Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,” reprinted in Xinhua, 6 September 15, sec. VII. The White Paper notes: “[I]n 1995 Tibet Autonomous Region sought out and identified the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Erdeni, and conferred and enthroned the 11th Panchen Erdeni, with the approval of the State Council.”

<sup>36</sup>“Selection of 10th Panchen Lama Announced,” Xinhua, 29 November 95 (Open Source Center, 29 November 95) (“... presided over jointly by State Councilor Luo Gan, . . .”); “Luo Gan—Politburo Standing Committee Member of CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, 15 November 02. The Xinhua biography on Luo Gan contained an entry that brackets 1995, when Luo Gan was present at the ceremony installing Gyaltzen Norbu as the Panchen Lama: “1993–1997 State councilor, secretary-general of the State Council, secretary of the Leading Party Members’ Group of the Government Offices of the State Council, secretary of the State Organs Work Committee of the CPC, and deputy secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the CPC Central Committee.”

<sup>37</sup>Guo Xin, “It Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama To Universally Identify the Reincarnated Soul Boy of the Panchen Lama,” People’s Daily, 1 December 95 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 December 95); “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3.

<sup>38</sup>“Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3. See also UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: China (including Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions), adopted by the Committee at its 1080th Meeting (30 September 2005), CRC/C/CHN/col2, 24 November 05, paras. 44–45. The report observed under paragraphs 44–45: “The Committee notes the information provided about the Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, but remains concerned that it has not yet been possible to have this information confirmed by an independent expert. . . . In particular, the Committee recommends that the State party: . . . e) allow an independent expert to visit and confirm the well-being of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima while respecting his right to privacy, and that of his parents.”

<sup>39</sup>Edward Wong, “Communist Party Warns Secret Dalai Lama Followers in Its Ranks,” New York Times, 11 November 15. The article identified the official as “Norbu Dondrub” (Norbu Dondrub), with the TAR United Front Work Department. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189.

<sup>40</sup>Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Reincarnation,” 24 September 11. The statement was published initially with the title, “Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His Reincarnation.” In it, the Dalai Lama states, “The Golden Urn system was actually used only in the cases of the Eleventh and Twelfth Dalai Lamas. However, the Twelfth Dalai Lama had already been recognized before the procedure was employed. Therefore, there has only been one occasion when a Dalai Lama was recognized by using this method. Likewise, among the reincarnations of the Panchen Lama, apart from the Eighth and the Ninth, there have been no instances of this method being employed. This system was imposed by the Manchus, but Tibetans had no faith in it because it lacked any spiritual quality.” See also “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofu zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07.

<sup>41</sup>Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Reincarnation,” 24 September 11. The statement was published initially with the title, “Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His Reincarnation.” See also “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3. The Commission article stated, “[The Dalai Lama] summed up his basis for rejecting Party interference in identifying *trulkus* and outlined measures he intends to take to protect the legitimacy of a possible 15th Dalai Lama.”

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>China Directory 2014 (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 154.

<sup>44</sup>China Directory 2012 (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2011), 7, 17, 27. Prior to Zhu Weiqun’s current Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference post, he held senior Party positions including membership on the Communist Party Central Committee, Executive Deputy Head of the Party’s United Front Work Department, and Director of the Party’s General Office of the Central Coordinating Group for Tibet Affairs.

<sup>45</sup>“United Front Work Department Executive Deputy Head Reveals Inside Story of Communist Party-Dalai Talks” [Tongzhanbu changwu fubuzhang jiemi zhonggong yu dalai tanpan neimul], Phoenix Net, 23 December 08 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 December 08) (“Since 2003, Zhu Weiqun has participated in all the subsequent engage-and-talk interactions with the Dalai side.”); “Press Conference on Central Govt’s Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text),” China Daily, 11 February 10 (demonstrates participation in 2010 round of dialogue). For information in previous Commission annual reports on Zhu Weiqun’s involvement in the dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Party and government officials, see, e.g., CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 219–20; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 274–75; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 187.

<sup>46</sup>Sui-Lee Wee, “China Sticks to Right To Decide Reincarnation of Dalai Lama,” Reuters, 30 November 15. Reuters attributed Zhu’s remarks to an article published in the Party-run Global Times. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2004-00835 on Gedun Choekyi Nyima, 2004-01336 on Konchog Phuntsog (Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s father), and 2004-01274 on Dechen Choedron (Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s mother).

<sup>49</sup>The statement is based on an August 1, 2016, query for the term “Panchen Lama” in the “short summary” field of the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD). The PPD is available to the public at [ppdcecc.gov](http://ppdcecc.gov).

<sup>50</sup>See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00156 on Samdrub Gyatso. See “Recently Freed Tibetan Detained for Carrying Leaflets Calling for Dalai Lama’s Return,” Radio Free Asia, 12 October 15. According to the RFA report, officials previously detained Samdrub Gyatso in May 2010 for protest activity that included calling for the Panchen Lama’s release; he served five years’ imprisonment.

<sup>51</sup>The statement is based on an August 1, 2016, query for the term “Panchen Lama” in the “short summary” field of the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD). Of 43 records identified, 41 referred to Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, and 2 referred to his predecessor, the 10th Panchen Lama. The PPD is available to the public online at [ppdcecc.gov](http://ppdcecc.gov) and is available for query. Information on the number of Tibetan political and religious protesters and the details of their protests are certain to be far from complete. Tibetans who attempt to share such information may face detention, criminal charges, and imprisonment.

<sup>52</sup>See, e.g., “Tibetan Man Dies in Second Self-Immolation Protest This Month,” Radio Free Asia, 16 April 15; “Respected Tibetan Monk Burns Himself to Death in Gansu,” Radio Free Asia, 19 December 13; “Tibetan Self-Immolations Continue, 25-Year-Old Dies in Protest,” Voice of America, 19 November 12; “Another Tibetan Self-Immolates in Rebkong,” Voice of America, 17

November 12. Information on the number of Tibetan political and religious protesters and the details of their protests are certain to be far from complete. Tibetans who attempt to share such information may face criminal charges, imprisonment, or other forms of abuse.

<sup>53</sup>For information on more recent detentions, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00210 on Konchog Drolma, 2016-00167 on Lobsang Tsering, 2016-00110 on Lobsang Thubten, 2016-00080 on Mangga, 2016-00065 on Jamyang Dorje, 2016-00039 on Orgyen, and 2016-00040 on Paga.

<sup>54</sup>The statement is based on an August 1, 2016, query for the term "Dalai Lama" in the "short summary" field of the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD). Commission staff did not analyze each record individually to determine the nature of the reference to the Dalai Lama. The PPD is available to the public online at [ppdcecc.gov](http://ppdcecc.gov) and is available for query. Information on the number of Tibetan political and religious protesters and the details of their protests are certain to be far from complete. Tibetans who attempt to share such information may face criminal charges, imprisonment, or other forms of abuse.

<sup>55</sup>For information on Tibetan self-immolations, see tables in CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 157–60 (on self-immolations 1–50); CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 174–78 (on self-immolations 51–116); CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 175 (on self-immolations 117–26); CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 303–4 (on self-immolations 127–37). Previous Annual Report lists included the following self-immolators who reportedly expressed religious devotion to the Dalai Lama or called for his return: 2012 Annual Report (6–12, 14–17, 23, 30, 41, 45); 2013 Annual Report (51–55, 62–66, 68, 69, 72, 74–76, 79–81, 84, 86, 87, 92–95, 98); 2014 Annual Report (117–20); and 2015 Annual Report (131, 133, 134, 136, 137).

<sup>56</sup>As of August 1, 2016, the PPD contained 1,894 records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008. Information on the number of Tibetan political and religious protesters and the details of their protests are certain to be far from complete. Tibetans who attempt to share such information may face criminal charges, imprisonment, or other forms of abuse. See also International Campaign for Tibet, "Tibet at a Turning Point," 6 August 08; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2008," last visited 20 April 16, 126–63.

<sup>57</sup>The statement is based on Commission staff analysis of Tibetan political protest and imprisonment during the period from 1987 onward. For the period 2008 onward, see, e.g., CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 180–82; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 179–81; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 212–13, 216–17, 219–20; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 224–29; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 290–99; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 183–85, 194–99; CECC, "Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009," 22 October 09, 56–86; The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace, Hearing of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Testimony of Steven Marshall, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Senior Advisor and Prisoner Database Program Director. For analysis on Tibetan political detention from 1987–2001, see, e.g., Steven D. Marshall, *In the Interests of the State: Hostile Elements III—Political Imprisonment in Tibet, 1987–2001* (London: Tibet Information Network, 2002); Steven D. Marshall, *Rukhag 3: The Nuns of Drapchi Prison* (London: Tibet Information Network, 2000); Steven D. Marshall, *Hostile Elements—A Study of Political Imprisonment in Tibet: 1987–1998* (London: Tibet Information Network, 1999). See also U.S. Policy Considerations on the 40th Anniversary of the Tibetan Uprising and the Dalai Lama's Flight Into Exile, Hearing of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 11 March 99, Testimony of Steven Marshall, Tibet Information Network.

<sup>58</sup>See, e.g., Jiang Jie and Li Ruohan, "Dalai Lama Not Religious Leader: Official," *Global Times*, 8 March 16; "China Official Says Dalai Lama 'Making a Fool' of Buddhism," *Reuters*, 28 March 16. For additional information on Zhu Weiqun, see *China Directory 2012* (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2011), 7, 17, 27. Prior to Zhu Weiqun's current Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference post, he held senior Party positions including membership on the Communist Party Central Committee, Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United Front Work Department, and Director of the Party's General Office of the Central Coordinating Group for Tibet Affairs.

<sup>59</sup>See, e.g., Edward Wong, "Communist Party Warns Secret Dalai Lama Followers in Its Ranks," *New York Times*, 11 November 15; Simon Denyer, "China Accuses Party Members of Support for Dalai Lama and Even Terrorism," *Washington Post*, 4 December 15.

<sup>60</sup>See, e.g., "Deadline Nears in County in China's Sichuan for Surrender of Dalai Lama Photos," *Radio Free Asia*, 2 February 16; Emily Rauhala, "China's Plan To 'Liberate' a Cradle of Tibetan Culture," *Washington Post*, 14 December 15.

<sup>61</sup>See, e.g., Edward Wong, "Communist Party Warns Secret Dalai Lama Followers in Its Ranks," *New York Times*, 11 November 15; "China Says Graft Fight in Tibet Also Aimed at Religion," *Reuters*, 9 November 15.

<sup>62</sup>"English Edition of Global Times Launched," *People's Daily*, 20 April 09. The *People's Daily* article describes the *Global Times* as "[o]perating under the *People's Daily*." *China Directory 2014* (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 3, 21. *China Directory* shows the *People's Daily* as directly subordinate to the Communist Party Central Committee.

<sup>63</sup>*China Directory 2014* (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 6, 432–33. *China Directory* provides the name "Padma Choling," rather than Pema Choling.

<sup>64</sup>Jiang Jie and Li Ruohan, "Dalai Lama Not Religious Leader: Official," *Global Times*, 8 March 16.

<sup>65</sup>Edward Wong, "Communist Party Warns Secret Dalai Lama Followers in Its Ranks," *New York Times*, 11 November 15 ("pretend not to be religious"; "follow the clique"); Simon Denyer, "China Accuses Party Members of Support for Dalai Lama and Even Terrorism," *Washington Post*, 4 December 15 ("secretly believe"). See also "China Says Graft Fight in Tibet Also Aimed at Religion," *Reuters*, 9 November 15.

<sup>66</sup>Edward Wong, “Communist Party Warns Secret Dalai Lama Followers in Its Ranks,” *New York Times*, 11 November 15. See also Simon Denyer, “China Accuses Party Members of Support for Dalai Lama and Even Terrorism,” *Washington Post*, 4 December 15; “China Says Graft Fight in Tibet Also Aimed at Religion,” *Reuters*, 9 November 15.

<sup>67</sup>“Chinese Authorities Slap New Constraints on Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries,” *Radio Free Asia*, 29 March 16.

<sup>68</sup>“Deadline Nears in County in China’s Sichuan for Surrender of Dalai Lama Photos,” *Radio Free Asia*, 2 February 16;

<sup>69</sup>“Chinese Authorities Slap New Constraints on Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries,” *Radio Free Asia*, 29 March 16. According to the report, one of the restrictions required that “all statues and photos of the Dalai Lama be removed from shrines and temples” and warned that violators “could be handed over to authorities for prosecution.”

<sup>70</sup>Mandala, “What Is a Geshe?” April–May 2007. According to the article, a Geshe degree is “a scholastic degree in large monastic universities that can take two decades or more to complete.”

<sup>71</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Abbot and Senior Monk Detained for Holding Prayer for Dalai Lama’s Health,” 8 February 16. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00039 on Orgyen and 2016-00040 on Paga.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.* See also Richard Finney, “Two Monks Detained in Sichuan Over Dalai Lama Prayers,” *Radio Free Asia*, 11 February 16. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00039 on Orgyen and 2016-00040 on Paga.

<sup>73</sup>“Over a Thousand Tibetans Gather in Kardze To Pray for Dalai Lama’s Health,” *Radio Free Asia*, 27 January 16.

<sup>74</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Abbot and Senior Monk Detained for Holding Prayer for Dalai Lama’s Health,” 8 February 16. See also “Over a Thousand Tibetans Gather in Kardze To Pray for Dalai Lama’s Health,” *Radio Free Asia*, 27 January 16. RFA reported “hundreds of Tibetan men, women, and children seated before a large shrine at the monastery and praying before a large image of the Dalai Lama,” and noted that as of the report date there had been no “crackdown” as a result of the gathering.

<sup>75</sup>“Tibetan Monk Jailed for Two Years Over Dalai Lama Photo,” *Radio Free Asia*, 22 February 16. RFA reported that security officials detained Choephel (“Gomar Choephel”) on July 10, 2015, for having an image of the Dalai Lama in his personal possession and sharing one via social media. See also Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Monk Sentenced to Two Years for Keeping and Sharing Dalai Lama’s Photos,” 24 February 16. TCHRD reported that prosecutors charged him with having “threatened social stability” and “engaged in separatist activities.” For more information on Choephel, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00340.

<sup>76</sup>“China Publishes Living Buddhas’ Bios for Authentication,” *Xinhua*, 28 April 16; “China Living Buddha Database Nearly Complete,” *Global Times*, 29 April 16. For a detailed discussion of the “living Buddha” database, see International Campaign for Tibet, “The ‘Poisonous Fruit’ of Tibet’s Religious Policy as China Publishes ‘Living Buddha’ Database,” 2 May 16.

<sup>77</sup>Olivia Geng and Josh Chin, “China Launches Living-Buddha Authentication Site, Dalai Lama Not Included,” *Wall Street Journal*, *China Real Time Report* (blog), 19 January 16. As of August 1, 2016, Commission staff observed no subsequent reports indicating that the Buddhist Association of China subsequently added the Dalai Lama to the database.

<sup>78</sup>“China Living Buddha Database Nearly Complete,” *Global Times*, 29 April 16. According to the *Global Times* report, “The [BAC] said that there will not be major changes to the database’s inquiry system in the near future. . . .” For a detailed discussion of the database, see International Campaign for Tibet, “The ‘Poisonous Fruit’ of Tibet’s Religious Policy as China Publishes ‘Living Buddha’ Database,” 2 May 16.

<sup>79</sup>“China Living Buddha Database Nearly Complete,” *Global Times*, 29 April 16.

<sup>80</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Document Exposes Intensification of State-Sanctioned Religious Repression in Troubled Tibetan County,” 9 November 15. An image of an official stamp on the document displays the date September 9, 2015.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.* An image of the first page of the notice displays Tibetan and Chinese text for Biru (Driru) County People’s Government.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.* A TCHRD caption for an image on the first page of the Tibetan-language “Document No. 224” refers to the document as “the Notice.”

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.* According to the TCHRD report, the document “identifies and targets 24 activities” to be “purged and reformed” at county monastic institutions.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.* According to the TCHRD report, the notice asserted the local government’s “sole right to recognize and appoint reincarnate or other prominent religious personalities.”

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.* According to the TCHRD report, the measures would: “[intensify] attempts to replace religious vows of monks and nuns with state ideology by making political education mandatory”; provide “easier” admission for monastic applicants demonstrating “support and loyalty” toward the Communist Party and government; mandate “political education” for monks and nuns every Thursday; and apply “restrictions” on monastic travel for religious study beyond a “hometown.”

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.* According to the TCHRD report: “Chinese authorities will control all financial activities of religious institutions”; and “restrictions” will apply to donations or loans that monastic institutions and senior monastic figures could give to “victims of natural disasters” or “poor Tibetans.”

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.* According to the TCHRD report, possible punitive measures resulting from noncompliance or inadequate compliance with the measures could include the following: shutdown of a monastic institution; decreasing the number of monks and nuns permitted at a monastic institution and a four-year ban on new enrollment; salary reductions for reincarnated teachers (*trulhus*), abbots, and senior teachers; salary cuts for six months and political education for two months for members of Monastery Management Committees; warning, blacklisting, firing, and a ban for two years on harvesting *cordyceps sinensis* for heads of village committees or village

Party committees if lay residents of villages are “lenient” in implementing the measures; and six months’ political education, a ban for two to three years on harvesting *cordyceps sinensis*, and loss of government subsidies and welfare benefits for parents or families of monks or nuns who “break the regulation.” For additional information on banning harvesting *cordyceps sinensis* see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 305; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 178.

<sup>88</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Mass Expulsion of Nuns and Land Grabbing in Tibet’s Diru County,” 13 October 15. According to the TCHRD report, officials expelled 100 nuns from Jada Gaden Khachoeing during a three-day period beginning on September 27, 2015. TCHRD did not explicitly state that the nuns were unregistered. “Chinese Authorities Expel Nuns From Jada Convent in Tibet,” Radio Free Asia, 10 November 15. According to RFA, officials expelled 106 nuns from “Jada Garden Khacheoling” during the period September 30–October 5 “on the pretexts of not possessing the proper documents and exceeding the number of nuns that authorities permitted to live in the nunnery.”

<sup>89</sup>Edward Wong, “Tibetan Groups Upset Over China’s Demolition Work at Buddhist Institute,” New York Times, 27 July 16. According to the NYT report, “In the Tibetan regions ruled by China, one religious institute stands out—Larung Gar . . . It has been described as the largest Buddhist institute on the planet.” Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16. TCHRD described the “Serthar Larung Gar Buddhist Institute” as a “famed Tibetan Buddhist encampment.” International Campaign for Tibet, “Demolitions Begin at Larung Gar, ‘Monastery for the World,’ as Religious Teachers Urge Calm,” 25 July 16. ICT described Larung Gar as “one of the most important centers of Tibetan Buddhism worldwide.”

<sup>90</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16; “Massive Cuts Planned for Tibetan Buddhist Center in Sichuan,” Radio Free Asia, 7 June 16. See also International Campaign for Tibet, “Demolitions Begin at Larung Gar, ‘Monastery for the World,’ as Religious Teachers Urge Calm,” 25 July 16.

<sup>91</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16. According to the TCHRD report, “More than 20,000 monastic and lay practitioners live permanently at Larung Gar.” Multiple Radio Free Asia reports described the scale of the reduction as “about half to a maximum of 5,000.” See, e.g., “Larung Gar Monks, Nuns Forced To Return to Their Family Homes,” Radio Free Asia, 11 August 16; “Tibetan Nun Commits Suicide at Buddhist Complex in China’s Sichuan Province,” Radio Free Asia, 8 August 16; “Destruction Proceeds at Larung Gar, With at Least 600 Structures Torn Down So Far,” Radio Free Asia, 29 July 16.

<sup>92</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Serta County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,” 9 June 16. The HRW report provides what it entitles as a “Provisional translation of extracts from ‘Correction and rectification obligations for the Larung monastery Buddhist Institute in Serta county.’” According to the HRW translation, the document states: “The limit of 5,000 total members of the camp must be maintained . . .” and that the limit must be attained by September 30, 2017. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16.

<sup>93</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Serta County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,” 9 June 16. The HRW report provides what it entitles as a “Provisional translation of extracts from ‘Correction and rectification obligations for the Larung monastery Buddhist Institute in Serta county.’” According to the HRW translation, the document states: “The limit of 5,000 total members of the camp must be maintained, of whom not more than 1,000 can come from other provinces,” and that the limit must be attained by September 30, 2017. For information on the Tibetan autonomous areas that are not in Sichuan province, see CECC, “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” 22 October 09, 22, 24. The areas include the Tibet Autonomous Region; Haibei (Tsojjang) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP, Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, and Yushu (Yushul) TAP in Qinghai province; Gannan (Kanlho) TAP and Tianzhu (Pari) Tibetan Autonomous County in Gansu province; and Diqing (Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.

<sup>94</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Serta County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,” 9 June 16. The HRW report provides what it entitles as a “Provisional translation of extracts from ‘Correction and rectification obligations for the Larung monastery Buddhist Institute in Serta county.’” The incomplete document lists several tasks with completion dates that are characterized in the title as “Correction and Rectification Obligations.”

<sup>95</sup>Ibid. The HRW report provides what it entitles as a “Provisional translation of extracts from ‘Correction and rectification obligations for the Larung monastery Buddhist Institute in Serta county.’” According to the HRW translation of “Responsibility Six,” a “main duty” is to “divide the [monastic] camp from the lay practitioners and demolish any construction within 30 [meters], to make a gap,” and to complete the task by July 31, 2016. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16.

<sup>96</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Serta County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,” 9 June 16. The HRW report provides what it entitles as a “Provisional translation of extracts from ‘Correction and rectification obligations for the Larung monastery Buddhist Institute in Serta county.’” The HRW translation of “Responsibility Five” stipulates as a “main duty” to establish “camera surveillance and entry screening procedures and putting them to use,” and to complete the task by August 31, 2016. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16.

<sup>97</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Serta County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,” 9 June 16. The HRW report provides what it entitles as a “Provisional translation of extracts from ‘Correction and rectification obligations for the Larung monastery Buddhist Institute in Serta county.’” The HRW translation of “Responsibility Six,” item 2, refers to the 30-meter “gap” and stipulates:

“The gap must be sealed with ladders of notched logs [?],” and to complete the task by September 30, 2016. (Commission staff familiar with traditional Tibetan construction interprets “ladders of notched logs [?]” as a possible reference to very steep, narrow wooden steps; such steps could be used to cross over a barrier wall.) For a description that refers to constructing a “wall” within the “gap,” see Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Demolition Order on World’s Largest Religious Town in Tibet,” 15 June 16. “The sixth point in the demolition order calls for the separation of lay practitioners from the monastics . . . Before 31 July 2016, the houses built between the monastics and lay practitioners, an area of 30 meters, will be demolished. Before 30 September 2016, walls will be constructed between them.”

<sup>98</sup>Edward Wong, “Tibetan Groups Upset Over China’s Demolition Work at Buddhist Institute,” *New York Times*, 27 July 16.

<sup>99</sup>Commission staff analysis. A Commission staffer who traveled widely in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s and visited several of the monasteries featured in the ICT report regarded the images of gatherings depicted in the ICT report as remarkable in the context of current Communist Party policy and government regulations. For information on Tibetan autonomous areas outside the Tibet Autonomous Region in the mid-1990s, see Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, *Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics* (Washington, DC: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997).

<sup>100</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Thousands of Tibetans Gather Across Tibet To Mark Prayer Festival; Lockdown of TAR to Foreign Tourists,” 25 February 16. The ICT report provided images of Qinghai province monasteries including Kubum Monastery (“Kumbum”), located in Huangzhong (Rushar) county, Xining municipality; Rongbo Monastery, located in Tongren (Rebgong) county, Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP); Ragya Monastery, located in Maqin (Machen) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP; Dragkar Traldzong Monastery (“Drakar Tredzong”), located in Xinghai (Tsigorhang) county, Hainan (Tsolho) TAP; and Tashi Choekorling Monastery, located in Xunhua (Yadzi) Salar Autonomous County, Haidong prefecture.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.* The ICT report provided images of Gansu province monasteries including Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery, located in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) and “Chone Monastery” (or Tingdzing Dargyeling), located in Zhuoni (Chone) county, Gannan TAP.

<sup>102</sup>*Ibid.* The ICT report provided an image of Kirti Monastery, located in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.* The ICT report provided images of Drepung Monastery, located in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region.

<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.* The ICT report identifies the day as Monlam Chenmo. For a Tibetan calendar identifying the date as the 15th day (full moon) of the 1st Tibetan month, see Men-Tsee-Khang, “Calendar,” last visited 6 May 16.

<sup>105</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Thousands of Tibetans Gather Across Tibet To Mark Prayer Festival; Lockdown of TAR to Foreign Tourists,” 25 February 16. The ICT report noted: “Police in camouflage uniforms were visible amidst the gathering of pilgrims at ceremonies . . .”

<sup>106</sup>*Ibid.* According to the ICT report, “Massed ranks of armed troops in riot gear with shields and helmets, and guns strapped against their chests, have been visible at the forefront of images of Monlam Chenmo in the last few years, but did not appear in the pictures received by ICT this week.”

<sup>107</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup>For an example involving an official who formerly was a senior Communist Party official and currently is the Chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, see Zhu Weiqun, “Some Thoughts on Existing Problems in the Field of Nationalities” [Dui dangqian minzu lingyu wenti de jidian sikao], *Study Times*, 13 February 12 (translated in Open Source Center, 20 February 12). In the article, Zhu stated: “Touching on the issue of ethnic development trend, we must talk about the issue of ethnic mingling and amalgamation. . . . Whether from the perspective of benefiting the development and progress of minority nationalities, or from the perspective of benefiting the Chinese Nation’s unanimity, it is imperative to popularize the state’s common spoken and written languages without fail.” See also *China Directory 2014* (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 154.

<sup>109</sup>See, e.g., Edward Wong, “Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally Detained, Family Says,” *New York Times*, 10 March 16 (“Mr. Tashi said that he was not advocating Tibetan independence and that he was mainly concerned about cultural preservation.”); Emily Rauhala, “China’s Plan To ‘Liberate’ a Cradle of Tibetan Culture,” *Washington Post*, 14 December 15 (“. . . Tibetan calls for ‘protecting the mother tongue,’ . . . are merely a ‘pretext’ for separatism . . .”); “New Controls on Tibetan Language Study in Qinghai’s Pema County,” *Radio Free Asia*, 20 January 16 (“taking classes in secret due to fear of arrest”).

<sup>110</sup>See, e.g., “Xi Stresses Unity for Tibet, Vows Fight Against Separatism,” *Xinhua*, 25 August 15.

<sup>111</sup>Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem—How Beijing Represses Minorities,” *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2015; Columbia University, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, “Gray Tuttle,” last visited 22 March 16. According to the Columbia University bio, Gray Tuttle is the Leila Hadley Luce Associate Professor of Modern Tibetan Studies.

<sup>112</sup>“Xi Stresses Unity for Tibet, Vows Fight Against Separatism,” *Xinhua*, 25 August 15.

<sup>113</sup>“State-Approved Tibetan Language Classes Held Unhindered in Tawu,” *Radio Free Asia*, 27 January 16 (“series of classes promoting the study of the Tibetan language . . . has gone ahead with apparent state approval”).

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup>“Tibetan, Muslim Students Join in Protest for Equal Education,” *Radio Free Asia*, 28 January 16.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup>“New Controls on Tibetan Language Study in Qinghai’s Pema County,” Radio Free Asia, 20 January 16.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>“Top Competitors in Tibetan Language Contest in Qinghai Win Car, Cash Awards,” Radio Free Asia, 1 February 16 (“week-long competition testing Tibetan language skills has gone ahead with apparent approval from authorities”).

<sup>120</sup>Ibid. The RFA report identified the association as the “Dzanyin Mother Tongue Promotion Association.”

<sup>121</sup>“Tibetan Writer Sentenced to Three Years in Prison in China’s Qinghai Province,” Radio Free Asia, 19 February 16 (“People’s Intermediate Court in Rebgong (in Chinese, Tongren) of Malho (Huangnan) prefecture”). For more information on Druglo (Shogjang (“Shokjang”)), see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.

<sup>122</sup>“Tibetan Writer Sentenced to Three Years in Prison in China’s Qinghai Province,” Radio Free Asia, 19 February 16 (citing “material the government said could incite discord among nationalities”). For more information on Druglo (Shogjang (“Shokjang”)), see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.

<sup>123</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Tibetan Writer Sentenced to Three Years Maintains His Innocence,” 22 February 16 (“inciting ethnic hatred during the 2008 uprising”). For more information on Druglo (Shogjang (“Shokjang”)), see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.

<sup>124</sup>“Tibetan Writer Sentenced to Three Years in Prison in China’s Qinghai Province,” Radio Free Asia, 19 February 16; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Tibetan Writer Sentenced to Three Years Maintains His Innocence,” 22 February 16. For more information on Druglo (Shogjang (“Shokjang”)), see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.

<sup>125</sup>“Tibetan Writer Believed To Be Jailed in Northwest China Province,” Radio Free Asia, 8 April 15; “Tibetan Writer Shokjung Arrested in Rebkong,” Voice of America, 8 April 15. For more information on Druglo (Shogjang (“Shokjang”)), see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.

<sup>126</sup>For information on the reaction from other Tibetan writers, see, e.g., High Peaks Pure Earth, “Tashi Rabten Remembers Detained Writer Shokjang,” 9 April 15; High Peaks Pure Earth, “My Friend Is Innocent. Return Him! More From Netizens on Detained Writer Shokjang,” 9 April 15. For more information on Druglo (Shogjang (“Shokjang”)), see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.

<sup>127</sup>Edward Wong, “Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally Detained, Family Says,” New York Times, 10 March 16. See also Edward Wong, “Tibetans Fight To Salvage Fading Culture in China,” New York Times, 28 November 15; Edward Wong, “A Showcase of Tibetan Culture Serves Chinese Political Goals,” New York Times, 19 December 15.

<sup>128</sup>Edward Wong, “China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With Inciting Separatism,” New York Times, 30 March 16. According to the New York Times report, a “police document” specified the charge of “inciting separatism.” See PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], issued 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 103. According to Article 103(2), “Whoever incites others to split the State or undermine unity of the country shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, . . .”

<sup>129</sup>Edward Wong, “Police in China Push for Trial of Tibetan Education Advocate,” New York Times, 30 August 16. According to the report, “Mr. Tashi’s case entered a new phase on Thursday, when the police concluded an additional investigation at the prosecutors’ request and handed over those results.”

<sup>130</sup>Edward Wong, “Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally Detained, Family Says,” New York Times, 10 March 16. See also Edward Wong, “Tibetans Fight To Salvage Fading Culture in China,” New York Times, 28 November 15; Edward Wong, “A Showcase of Tibetan Culture Serves Chinese Political Goals,” New York Times, 19 December 15.

<sup>131</sup>Edward Wong, “Tibetans Fight To Salvage Fading Culture in China,” New York Times, 28 November 15. See also Edward Wong, “Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally Detained, Family Says,” New York Times, 10 March 16; Edward Wong, “A Showcase of Tibetan Culture Serves Chinese Political Goals,” New York Times, 19 December 15.

<sup>132</sup>Edward Wong, “Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally Detained, Family Says,” New York Times, 10 March 16.

<sup>133</sup>“Tibetan Monk Detained, Warned Over Plans To Publish Book,” Radio Free Asia, 6 January 16 (“taken into custody on Nov. 7”); “Tibetan Monk Arrested, Warned Against Publication of Book,” Phayul, 6 January 16 (“arrested on the morning of Dec 18”).

<sup>134</sup>Ibid.

<sup>135</sup>“Tibetan Monk Detained, Warned Over Plans To Publish Book,” Radio Free Asia, 6 January 16; “Tibetan Monk Arrested, Warned Against Publication of Book,” Phayul, 6 January 16 (book “documents his experience of his escape to India in 1994 over 54 days”).

<sup>136</sup>Ibid.

<sup>137</sup>For information in recent Commission Annual Reports on the Chinese Communist Party and government approach to economic development in autonomous Tibetan areas of China, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 298–300; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 182–83; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 184; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 165–66; and CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 214–19.

<sup>138</sup>See, e.g., “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau Convenes Meeting To Study, Promote Work on Tibet’s Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Order and Stability—Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Hu Jintao Presides Over the Meeting” [Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju zhaokai huiyi—yanjiu tuijin xizang kuayueshi fazhan he changzhi jiu’an gongzuo—zhonggong zhongyang zongshuji hu

jintao zhuchi huiyi], Xinhua, 8 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 January 10); Qin Jiaofeng, Gama Duojin, and Quan Xiaoshu, “Make Every Effort To Promote Leapfrog Development in Tibet Through Adherence to ‘Chinese Characteristics and Tibetan Traits’—Interview With National People’s Congress Deputy and Tibet Autonomous Region Chairman Baima Chilin” [Jianchi “zhongguo tese, xizang tedian” licu xizang kuayueshi fazhan—fang quanguo renda daibiao, xizang zizhi qu zhuxi baima chilin], Xinhua, 10 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 March 10). For information on developments at the January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum, see “Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ Priorities at Fifth Forum,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10.

<sup>139</sup>“China Focus: Tibet Targets Double-Digit Growth in 2016,” Xinhua, 27 January 16. According to the report, the Tibet Autonomous Region GDP (gross domestic product) grew 11 percent in 2015 and maintained “double-digit growth over the past 22 years.”

<sup>140</sup>Ibid. According to the report, the [average] “per capita disposable income” of “farmers and herdsmen” in the Tibet Autonomous Region was 7,359 yuan, an increase of 10.9 percent over the previous year; the [average] “per capita disposable income” of urban residents was 22,016 yuan. The report did not provide a percent increase over 2014 for the rise in urban residents’ income.

<sup>141</sup>See, e.g., Edward Wong, “China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With Inciting Separatism,” *New York Times*, 30 March 16 (Tashi Wangchug (“Tashi Wangchuk”): “Tibetans need to protect their culture”); International Campaign for Tibet, “New Solo Protest by Young Man in Ngaba Is Part of Emerging Trend,” 21 December 15 (religious leaders “urged Tibetans to protect their lives so that they can protect their culture and religion”); Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem—How Beijing Represses Minorities,” *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2015 (referring to protection of “cultural traditions”: “such protections . . . are rarely honored”).

<sup>142</sup>See, e.g., Edward Wong, “China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With Inciting Separatism,” *New York Times*, 30 March 16 (Tashi Wangchug (“Tashi Wangchuk”): “Mr. Tashi has been most vocal about language education, . . .”); International Campaign for Tibet, “Hotel Restaurant Closed Down by Authorities After Staff Threatened With Fine for Speaking Tibetan,” 14 January 16 (“netizens . . . were making a broader point on concern for their language”); Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem—How Beijing Represses Minorities,” *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2015 (“although the government putatively seeks to preserve and respect the Tibetan language, in practice Beijing has sought to marginalize it”).

<sup>143</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Document Exposes Intensification of State-Sanctioned Religious Repression in Troubled Tibetan County,” 9 November 15 (Biru (Driru) county regulation: “identifies and targets 24 activities through which religious institutions . . . will be ‘purged and reformed’”); Li Ruohan, “Fake Buddhas Back Separatists: Official,” *Global Times*, 7 December 15 (Some [trulkus] “bypass the official approach . . . without applying for permission from the country’s department of religious affairs”); Shi Lei and Xiao Tao, “Tibet CPC Standing Committee Listen to Report on Cadre Stationing in Village, Campaign for Model Harmonious Monastery, Patriotic, Law-Abiding, Advanced Monks and Nuns, ‘Advanced Double-Link Household’ and Preparation for Recognition Conference; Firmly Deepen Successful Practice of Managing Border and Stabilizing Tibet, Lay Solid Foundation for Economic and Social Development and Long-Term Peace and Stability; Chen Quanguo Presides Over Meeting” [Zizhiqu dangwei changweihui tingqu ganbu zhu cun—hexie mofan simiao ji aiguo shoufa xianjin sengni chuanguan pingxuan huodong—“xianjin shuang lian hu” chuanguan jian pingxuan gongzuo zongjie ji biao Zhang hui choubei qingkuang huibao—jianding buyi ba zhi bian wen zang de chengong shijian yinxiang shenru—wei jingji shehui fazhan he changzhi jiu’an daxia jianshi jichu], *Tibet Daily*, 13 November 15 (summarized in Open Source Center, 13 November 15) (describes status of “campaign of striving to become a model harmonious monastery and law-abiding monks and nuns”).

<sup>144</sup>Jane Qiu, “Trouble in Tibet,” *Nature*, Vol. 529, No. 7585, 13 January 16, 143 (“policies are harming the environment and the herders”); International Campaign for Tibet, “New Report Reveals Global Significance of Tibet, Earth’s Third Pole, and Challenges China’s Policies,” 8 December 15 (“China’s policies are re-shaping the landscape of the earth’s highest and largest plateau with devastating consequences.”); International Campaign for Tibet, “Blue Gold From the Highest Plateau: Tibet’s Water and Global Climate Change,” last visited 26 February 16, 10 (“Large-scale mining . . . , signaling the remote region’s integration into the Chinese industrial economy, is having a devastating impact, . . .”). The ICT report does not provide a publication date but the ICT press release does so.

<sup>145</sup>For examples of Tibetans reportedly detained or imprisoned as a result of questioning Chinese government and Party policies during the Commission’s 2016 reporting year, see, e.g., the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2010-00153 on Drukar Gyal (or Druglo, Shogjang (“Shokjang”), sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in February 2016 for his writing); 2016-00077 on Tashi Wangchug (“Tashi Wangchuk”; detained in January 2016 for criticizing government language and education policy); and 2015-00340 on Choephel (reportedly sentenced in February 2016 to two years’ imprisonment for keeping and sharing images of the Dalai Lama via his cell phone). For examples of Tibetans who reportedly staged solitary political protests during the Commission’s 2016 reporting year, see, e.g., records 2016-00080 on Mangga (detained in March 2016); 2016-00065 on Jamyang Dorje (detained in February 2016); 2015-00480 on Tashi Dondrub (detained in December 2015); 2015-00153 on Gedun Phuntsog (sentenced in December 2015 to four years’ imprisonment for protesting in March 2015); 2015-00159 on Lobsang Kalsang (sentenced in November 2015 to three years and six months’ imprisonment for protesting in March 2015); 2015-00411 on Jampa Sengge (detained in November 2015); and 2015-00376 on Tashi (detained in October 2015).

<sup>146</sup>For additional information on the Sichuan-Tibet railway and other railway construction in Tibetan autonomous areas, see “Sichuan-Tibet Railway Work To Start, Impact May Far Surpass Qinghai-Tibet Railway,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 1; CECC, “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” 22 October 09, 46–53; CECC, 2015 Annual Re-

port, 8 October 15, 299; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 165–66; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 217–18; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 223; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 193.

<sup>147</sup> Christopher Bodeen, “Tibet’s Governor Praises Plans for 2nd Railway Line to Lhasa,” Associated Press, 7 March 16, reprinted in Washington Post.

<sup>148</sup> “China Approves New Railway in Tibet,” Xinhua, 31 October 14.

<sup>149</sup> “Construction Begins on Chengdu-Ya’an Section of Sichuan-Tibet Railway,” Xinhua, 6 December 14. According to the report, work on the Sichuan province portion of the railway began on the report’s publication date: Saturday, December 6, 2014. “Construction of Lhasa-Nyingchi Railway Begins,” Xinhua, 19 December 14. According to the report, work on the Tibet Autonomous Region portion of the railway began on the report’s publication date: Friday, December 19, 2014.

<sup>150</sup> Christopher Bodeen, “Tibet’s Governor Praises Plans for 2nd Railway Line to Lhasa,” Associated Press, 7 March 16, reprinted in Washington Post. According to the report, Lobsang Gyaltsen (“Losang Jamcan”), Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Government, stated that completion of the railway will bring “even more economic benefits, even more prosperity.” China Directory 2014 (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 9, 432–33. According to the China Directory, Lobsang Gyaltsen (Losang Gyaltsen, *Luosang Jiangcun*) was an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a Deputy Secretary of the TAR Communist Party Committee, and the Chairperson of the TAR People’s Government.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. According to the report, Pema Choling (“Padma Choling”), Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress, dismissed “worries about the environment” and said the Tibetan environment was “well protected.” China Directory 2014 (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 6, 37, 432–33. According to the China Directory, Pema Choling (Padma Choling, *Baima Chilin*) was a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a Vice-Chairperson of the Nationalities Committee of the National People’s Congress, a Deputy Secretary of the TAR Communist Party Committee, and the Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the TAR People’s Congress.

<sup>152</sup> Huang Xing, “State Council Approves and Agrees to Removal of Duilongdeqing’s County Status and Confers District Status” [Guowuyuan pifu tongyi lasa shi duilongdeqing xian che xian she qu], Xinhua, 28 November 15.

<sup>153</sup> International Campaign for Tibet, “Crossing the Line: China’s Railway to Lhasa, Tibet,” last visited 29 March 16, 60. The map shows that the railway would enter Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) county through its northwest corner and exit from the southeast corner. The ICT website indicates that the report’s publication date was September 1, 2003, but the report does not contain a publication date. For a dated press release, see International Campaign for Tibet, “New ICT Report Finds Tibet Railway Built for Political, Not Economic Reasons,” 2 September 03.

<sup>154</sup> Huang Xing, “State Council Approves and Agrees to Removal of Duilongdeqing’s County Status and Confers District Status” [Guowuyuan pifu tongyi lasa shi duilongdeqing xian che xian she qu], Xinhua, 28 November 15. The Commission has not observed any report of a third urban district established in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and, specifically, has not observed any report of an urban district established in Changdu (Chamdo), Rikaze (Shigatse), or Linzhi (Nyingtri), the other three municipalities in the TAR. See CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 299; Wang Shoubao and Zhang Jingpin, “Tibet Qamdo Prefecture Revocation and Establishment of Municipality Obtains State Council Approval” [Xizang changdu diqu che di she shi huo guowuyuan pifu], Xinhua, 3 November 14; “New City Inaugurated in China’s Tibet,” Xinhua, 19 December 14 (“Xigaze . . . the third prefecture-level city in the region”); “New City To Be Established in China’s Tibet,” Xinhua, 3 April 15 (“Nyingchi . . . the fourth prefecture-level city in the region”).

<sup>155</sup> Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Han population in Lhasa municipality increased 50.2 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10–1, 632 (Han population of Lhasa municipality in 2000: 80,584); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10–1, 975 (Han population of Lhasa municipality in 2010: 121,065).

<sup>156</sup> See, e.g., CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 166–69; “Qinghai-Tibet Railway Statistics Add to Confusion, Mask Impact on Local Population,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 4 March 10; “First Passenger Trains to Lhasa Sold Out,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 15–18.

<sup>157</sup> Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the total population in the Chengguan district of Lhasa municipality increased 25.1 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10–1, 632 (total population of Chengguan district in 2000: 223,001); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10–1, 975 (total population of Chengguan district in 2010: 279,074).

<sup>158</sup> Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Han population in the Chengguan district of Lhasa municipality increased 40.5 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population

Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-1, 632 (Han population of Chengguan district in 2000: 76,581); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-1, 975 (Han population of Chengguan district in 2010: 107,607).

<sup>159</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the total population in Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) county increased 28.9 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-1, 632 (total population of Duilongdeqing in 2000: 40,543); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-1, 975 (total population of Duilongdeqing in 2010: 52,249).

<sup>160</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Han population in Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) county increased 268.6 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-1, 632 (Han population of Duilongdeqing in 2000: 1,868); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-1, 975 (Han population of Chengguan district in 2010: 6,886).

<sup>161</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the TAR total population increased 14.7 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-1, 632 (total population of TAR in 2000: 2,616,329); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-1, 975 (total population of TAR in 2010: 3,002,165).

<sup>162</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Han population in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) increased 54.7 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-1, 632 (Han population of the TAR in 2000: 158,570); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-1, 975 (Han population of the TAR in 2010: 245,263).

<sup>163</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Tibetan population in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) increased 11.9 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-2, 682 (Tibetan population of the TAR in 2000: 2,427,168); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-2, 1035 (Tibetan population of the TAR in 2010: 2,716,388).

<sup>164</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Tibetan population in Lhasa municipality increased about 10.8 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-2, 682 (Tibetan population of Lhasa municipality in 2000: 387,124); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-2, 1035 (Tibetan population of Lhasa municipality in 2010: 429,104).

<sup>165</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Tibetan population in Lhasa's Chengguan district increased about 16.6 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department

of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-2, 682 (Tibetan population of the Chengguan district in 2000: 140,387); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-2, 1035 (Tibetan population of the Chengguan district in 2010: 163,725).

<sup>166</sup>Based on 2000 and 2010 ethnic census data, the Tibetan population in Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) county increased about 16.4 percent. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-2, 682 (Tibetan population of Duilongdeqing in 2000: 38,455); Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-2, 1035 (Tibetan population of Duilongdeqing in 2010: 44,768).

<sup>167</sup>Two factors have made accessing ethnic census data more difficult. One is that Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) statistical yearbooks after 2009 ceased reporting population data at prefectural or county levels. The other is that the Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, as accessed by the Commission, provided data tables only in Chinese. The Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China provided a bilingual Chinese and English edition. As of April 2016, the Commission had not located a bilingual edition of the 2010 ethnic census. See also box on “TAR Statistics Show Little Increase in Non-Tibetan Population After Qinghai-Tibet Railway Startup” in CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 45–46.

<sup>168</sup>China Population Statistics Yearbook 1991 [Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian], National Bureau of Statistics of China, Division of Population Statistics (Beijing: China Statistics Publishing House, April 1992), Table 1-77, 223. Total national population data are available in Table 1-77. Tabulation on China's Nationality (Data of 1990 Population Census) [Zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao (1990 nian renkou pucha shuju)], Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, and Department of Economics, State Nationalities Affairs Commission (Beijing: China Statistics House, May 1994), Tables 2-1, 2-4, 241, 359. Ethnic census data for Han population are available in Table 2-1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 2-4.

<sup>169</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10-1, 10-2, 632, 682. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10-1; data for the Tibetan population are available in Table 10-2.

<sup>170</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Tables 10-1, 10-2, 975, 1035. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10-1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 10-2.

<sup>171</sup>China Population Statistics Yearbook 1991 [Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian], National Bureau of Statistics of China, Division of Population Statistics (Beijing: China Statistics Publishing House, April 1992), Table 1-77, 223. Total national population data are available in Table 1-77. Tabulation on China's Nationality (Data of 1990 Population Census) [Zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao (1990 nian renkou pucha shuju)], Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, and Department of Economics, State Nationalities Affairs Commission (Beijing: China Statistics House, May 1994), Tables 2-1, 2-4, 241, 359. Ethnic census data for Han population are available in Table 2-1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 2-4.

<sup>172</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10-1, 10-2, 632, 682. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10-1; data for the Tibetan population are available in Table 10-2.

<sup>173</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Tables 10-1, 10-2, 975, 1035. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10-1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 10-2.

<sup>174</sup>China Population Statistics Yearbook 1991 [Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian], National Bureau of Statistics of China, Division of Population Statistics (Beijing: China Statistics Publishing House, April 1992), Table 1-77, 223. Total national population data are available in Table 1-77. Tabulation on China's Nationality (Data of 1990 Population Census) [Zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao (1990 nian renkou pucha shuju)], Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, and Department of Economics, State Nationalities Affairs Commission (Beijing: China Statistics House, May 1994), Tables 2-1, 2-4, 241, 359. Ethnic census data for Han population are available in Table 2-1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 2-4.

<sup>175</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State

Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10–1, 10–2, 632, 682. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10–1; data for the Tibetan population are available in Table 10–2.

<sup>176</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Tables 10–1, 10–2, 975, 1035. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10–1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 10–2.

<sup>177</sup>China Population Statistics Yearbook 1991 [Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian], National Bureau of Statistics of China, Division of Population Statistics (Beijing: China Statistics Publishing House, April 1992), Table 1–77, 223. Total national population data are available in Table 1–77. Tabulation on China's Nationality (Data of 1990 Population Census) [Zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao (1990 nian renkou pucha shuju)], Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, and Department of Economics, State Nationalities Affairs Commission (Beijing: China Statistics House, May 1994), Tables 2–1, 2–4, 241, 359. Ethnic census data for Han population are available in Table 2–1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 2–4.

<sup>178</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10–1, 10–2, 632, 682. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10–1; data for the Tibetan population are available in Table 10–2.

<sup>179</sup>Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Tables 10–1, 10–2, 975, 1035. Ethnic census data for the national total population and Han population are available in Table 10–1; data for Tibetan population are available in Table 10–2.

<sup>180</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Mass Expulsion of Nuns and Land Grabbing in Tibet’s Diru County,” 13 October 15. The TCHRD report did not provide information about the purpose of the appropriation or the date when it took place.

<sup>181</sup>Ibid. According to the TCHRD report, in Biru (Diru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, “Tibetan families who own big houses are subjected to severe criticisms, following which their houses are destroyed . . . Moreover, Tibetans are ordered to pay for the demolition of their houses and courtyards.” See also “Tibetan Homes Near Lhasa To Be Replaced by Chinese-Style Dwellings,” Radio Free Asia, 4 December 15.

<sup>182</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Mass Expulsion of Nuns and Land Grabbing in Tibet’s Diru County,” 13 October 15. According to the TCHRD report, in Biru (Diru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, “Tibetan families who own big houses are subjected to severe criticisms, following which their houses are destroyed. They are then told to rebuild their houses in accordance to the standards set by the local government.”

<sup>183</sup>“Tibetan Homes Near Lhasa To Be Replaced by Chinese-Style Dwellings,” Radio Free Asia, 4 December 15. According to the RFA report, officials in three counties located in Lhasa municipality—Dazi (Tagtse), Linzhou (Lhundrub), and Mozhugongka (Maldro Gongkar)—ordered the mandatory demolition of “traditional” (i.e., Tibetan style) homes and their replacement with “Chinese-style” homes during a five-year period starting in 2016. Based on the report, in at least one county (Mozhugongka), the government would pay part of the cost and residents would pay the rest.

<sup>184</sup>“Chinese Authorities Destroy ‘Over 300’ Tibetan Houses and Shops Near Qinghai Lake,” Radio Free Asia, 21 October 15. According to the October 21 RFA report, between October 16 and the report’s October 21 publication date, authorities demolished “about 300” homes, dwellings, and shops in Trelnag (“Trelnak”) township, Gonghe (Chabcha) county, Hainan (Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province. The RFA report did not provide information on whether officials characterized the structures as “illegal.” “Destruction of Tibetan Homes Near Qinghai Lake Leaves Over 900 Homeless,” Radio Free Asia, 27 October 15. According to the October 27 RFA report, beginning on October 22, authorities allegedly demolished “over 240” homes in Trelnag township.

<sup>185</sup>“Destruction of Tibetan Homes Near Qinghai Lake Leaves Over 900 Homeless,” Radio Free Asia, 27 October 15.

<sup>186</sup>“Chinese Authorities Destroy ‘Over 300’ Tibetan Houses and Shops Near Qinghai Lake,” Radio Free Asia, 21 October 15.

<sup>187</sup>“Destruction of Tibetan Homes Near Qinghai Lake Leaves Over 900 Homeless,” Radio Free Asia, 27 October 15.

<sup>188</sup>“Chinese Police Tear Down More Than 600 ‘Illegal Structures’ at Qinghai Lake,” Radio Free Asia, 3 June 16. The RFA report identified the township as Tanagma (“Tanakma”). Commission map research indicates that the township’s Chinese name is Heimaha.

<sup>189</sup>Ibid. See also “Tibetan Homes, Shops Are Torn Down by Police Near Qinghai Lake,” Radio Free Asia, 1 June 16.

<sup>190</sup>“Police Attack, Beat Tibetan Protesters at Qinghai Lake,” Radio Free Asia, 23 June 16.

<sup>191</sup>“Five Tibetan Protesters Are Detained in Chinese ‘Show of Force’ at Qinghai Lake,” Radio Free Asia, 24 June 16. The RFA report named four of the five detainees. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00179 on Lhachen Kyab, 2016-00180 on Jigje Deleg Gyatso (Jigje Delek Gyatso), 2016-00181 on Rinchen Bum, and 2016-00182 on Tashi Drolma.

<sup>192</sup>The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contains 12 records of Tibetans detained in connection with petitioning for the return of land: records 2010-00233 on Jigje Kyab,

2015-00112 on Tsepag, 2015-00359 on Rinchen Dorje, 2015-00360 on Yeshe (or Magyug), 2015-00361 on Phurkho (or Phurgur), 2015-00362 on Sonam Gyatso, 2015-00363 on Shetrug, 2015-00364 on Tsering Kyab, 2015-00365 on Tsering Tashi, 2015-00366 on Patra (or Phagtag), 2015-00367 on Dobe, and 2015-00368 on Tabe.

<sup>193</sup>The September and October 2015 Radio Free Asia reports do not refer to the year “2010” but state that the detentions were “five years ago.” See, e.g., “Two Tibetans Detained in Sichuan After Petition Over Land Grab,” Radio Free Asia, 14 October 15; “A Dozen Tibetans Detained in Sichuan After Reoccupying Grabbed Land,” Radio Free Asia, 24 September 15. According to the September 24 and October 14, 2015, RFA reports, security officials in Ruo’ergai (Dzoegge) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, took “at least 12 residents of Dzoegge’s Thangkor town into custody.” See also “Five Tibetan Land Protesters Are Freed in Sichuan, With Five Others Held Back,” Radio Free Asia, 6 October 15.

<sup>194</sup>See, e.g., “Tibetans Sentenced for Attempt To Retake Community Land,” Radio Free Asia, 11 April 16; “Two Tibetans Detained in Sichuan After Petition Over Land Grab,” Radio Free Asia, 14 October 15.

<sup>195</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Four Tibetan Land Rights Petitioners Given Suspended Sentence,” 14 April 16. The TCHRD report states, “In accordance with the law on suspended jail sentence, the court added six months each to their sentence terms.” The Commission interprets the statement as possibly indicating that the period of suspension is six months longer than the sentence period. See also “Tibetans Sentenced for Attempt To Retake Community Land,” Radio Free Asia, 11 April 16. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2010-00233 on Jigje Kyab (or Jigme Kyab), 2015-00359 on Rinchen Dorje, 2015-00360 on Yeshe (or Magyug), and 2015-00361 on Phurkho (or Phurgur).

<sup>196</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Four Tibetan Land Rights Petitioners Given Suspended Sentence,” 14 April 16; “Two Tibetans Detained in Sichuan After Petition Over Land Grab,” Radio Free Asia, 14 October 15; “Five Tibetan Land Protesters Are Freed in Sichuan, With Five Others Held Back,” Radio Free Asia, 6 October 15; “A Dozen Tibetans Detained in Sichuan After Reoccupying Grabbed Land,” Radio Free Asia, 24 September 15.

<sup>197</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Mass Expulsion of Nuns and Land Grabbing in Tibet’s Diru County,” 13 October 15.

<sup>198</sup>Jane Qiu, “Trouble in Tibet,” *Nature*, Vol. 529, No. 7585, 13 January 16.

<sup>199</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “New Report Reveals Global Significance of Tibet, Earth’s Third Pole, and Challenges China’s Policies,” 8 December 15; International Campaign for Tibet, “Blue Gold From the Highest Plateau: Tibet’s Water and Global Climate Change,” last visited 26 February 16. The ICT press release (“New Report Reveals Global Significance . . .”) provides a publication date but the ICT report does not. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Wasted Lives: A Critical Analysis of China’s Campaign To End Tibetan Pastoral Lifeways,” May 2015.

<sup>200</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Blue Gold From the Highest Plateau: Tibet’s Water and Global Climate Change,” last visited 26 February 16, 10. The ICT report observed: “A combination of urbanization, intensified militarization linked to China’s strategic aims, infrastructure construction and warming temperatures are creating an ‘ecosystem shift’ in Tibet. This involves irreversible environmental damage, including the predicted disappearance of large areas of grasslands, alpine meadows, wetlands and permafrost on the Tibetan plateau by 2050, with serious implications for environmental security in China and South Asia.” Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Wasted Lives: A Critical Analysis of China’s Campaign To End Tibetan Pastoral Lifeways,” May 2015, 2, 27. The TCHRD report described itself as “an extended analytical essay, on the perverse outcomes of statist interventions into customary land management practices over a huge area that has been managed sustainably and productively by Tibetan pastoralists for 9000 years,” and offered a “primary recommendation” that “China listen to its pastoralists, and discern their customary strategies for living off uncertainty, in an extreme climate, where 9000 years of human use persisted sustainably until very recently.”

<sup>201</sup>See, e.g., Jane Qiu, “Trouble in Tibet,” *Nature*, Vol. 529, No. 7585, 13 January 16. The *Nature* report cited Tsechoe Dorje (“Tsechoe Dorji”), a Tibetan researcher based in Lhasa asserting, “Having a sweeping grazing policy regardless of geographical variations is a recipe for disasters,” and Wang Shiping, a researcher in Beijing municipality at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research observing, “A big part of the problem is that the policies are not guided by science, and fail to take account of climate change and regional variations.”

<sup>202</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Blue Gold From the Highest Plateau: Tibet’s Water and Global Climate Change,” last visited 26 February 16, 10. The ICT report observed: “The Chinese government has accelerated implementation of policies to displace nomadic pastoralists from the vast Tibetan grasslands, a massive social engineering campaign that threatens to eviscerate a sustainable way of life uniquely adapted to the harsh landscape of the high plateau.” See also Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Wasted Lives: A Critical Analysis of China’s Campaign To End Tibetan Pastoral Lifeways,” May 2015.

<sup>203</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Blue Gold From the Highest Plateau: Tibet’s Water and Global Climate Change,” last visited 26 February 16, 10. The ICT report asserts: “Large-scale mining in copper, gold, silver, chromium and lithium, signaling the remote region’s integration into the Chinese industrial economy, is having a devastating impact, leading to record levels of water pollution in Tibet. Tibetans who express even moderate concern about the impact of toxic wastes, deforestation, and large-scale erosion risk being imprisoned, tortured, or killed.”

<sup>204</sup>*Ibid.*, 32. The ICT report cites Wang Weilu, an engineer and geographer at the University of Dortmund stating, “Dam-building raises the water level of the river which increases the pressure of the water on the ground. This raises the number of geological catastrophes especially since the valleys [of the Himalayas] are so young; landslides or rockslides will already increase as has happened in the Three Gorges dam region.”

<sup>205</sup>“Chinese Police Clamp Down Tibetan Mining Protesters,” Voice of America, 7 May 16 (“investigation linked pollution from the operation with a mass die-off of aquatic life”); “Tibetans Protest Restart of Operations by Chinese Mining Company,” Radio Free Asia, 9 May 16 (“credible evidence of damage to the fish population”).

<sup>206</sup>“Tibetan Protests in Ngaba Bring Mining to a Halt ‘For Now,’” Radio Free Asia, 22 June 16 (“Authorities . . . have called a temporary halt to mining activities near a sacred mountain . . .”). See also “Tibetans in Ngaba Warned Over Anti-Mine Protests,” Radio Free Asia, 27 May 16 (“finished road may be used to support Chinese mining operations on nearby sacred mountains”).

<sup>207</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Temporary Halt to Mining After Protest in Eastern Tibet: The Rush To Invest in Tibet’s Lithium,” 9 May 16; “Tibetan Protests in Ngaba Bring Mining to a Halt ‘For Now,’” Radio Free Asia, 22 June 16.

<sup>208</sup>For information on a halt to mining in 2005, see “Temporary Respite as Mining Halted in Minyak County,” Phayul, 10 May 16 (“In 2005, after wide-spread protests in the same region, mining activities were halted.”). For information on a halt to mining in 2013, see “Chinese Police Clamp Down Tibetan Mining Protesters,” Voice of America, 7 May 16 (“Mining at the location had been postponed since 2013 . . .”); “Tibetans Protest Restart of Operations by Chinese Mining Company,” Radio Free Asia, 9 May 16 (“Activities at the mine were suspended again in 2013 . . .”).

<sup>209</sup>“Tibetans Protest Restart of Operations by Chinese Mining Company,” Radio Free Asia, 9 May 16 (“Protesters . . . demanded on May 4 that [the company] cease mining activities which it began in the area last month,” . . .).

<sup>210</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Temporary Halt to Mining After Protest in Eastern Tibet: The Rush To Invest in Tibet’s Lithium,” 9 May 16 (“the death of the fish occurred after a Chinese company re-started lithium mining”).

<sup>211</sup>“Tibetans Protest Restart of Operations by Chinese Mining Company,” Radio Free Asia, 9 May 16 (“Protesters . . . demanded on May 4 that [the company] cease mining activities which it began in the area last month,” . . .).

<sup>212</sup>International Campaign for Tibet, “Temporary Halt to Mining After Protest in Eastern Tibet: The Rush To Invest in Tibet’s Lithium,” 9 May 16 (“An official document dated May 6 . . . stated that the local authorities were calling a halt to the mining because of ‘environmental problems’” . . .).

<sup>213</sup>“Tibetans in Ngaba Warned Over Anti-Mine Protests,” Radio Free Asia, 27 May 16 (“On May 20, . . . police officers arrived . . . and warned residents over loudspeakers of ‘serious consequences’” . . .).

<sup>214</sup>“Tibetan Protests in Ngaba Bring Mining to a Halt ‘For Now,’” Radio Free Asia, 22 June 16 (“all work related to the project has been ‘temporarily halted’”).

<sup>215</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “TCHRD Calls on Chinese Government To Stop Mining at Sacred Mountain,” 7 June 16 (“Rampant open-pit mining activities conducted for more than a decade . . . have faced renewed and sustained protests . . .”); International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Protest Leaders Hospitalized as Chinese Police Suppress Demonstrations in Amchok,” 8 June 16 (“Chinese police beat and detained a number of Tibetan demonstrators . . .”); “Tibetan Anti-Mine Protesters Assaulted, Beaten in Gansu,” Radio Free Asia, 6 June 16 (“protest . . . followed 15 years of frustrated appeals to authorities to halt the mining”).

<sup>216</sup>Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “TCHRD Calls on Chinese Government To Stop Mining at Sacred Mountain,” 7 June 16. According to TCHRD’s translation of the June 3, 2016, Amuqu (Amchog) Township People’s Government circular, it stated in part: “Recently under the instigation of a few evil and corrupt people, a group of masses have illegally gathered to ostensibly protest against what they refer to as destruction of environment. Their protests have hindered gold mining at Nag Deu mine. They have also, in collusion with anti-China forces, indulged in lies and propaganda. These incidents have caused negative influence and serious consequences.”

<sup>217</sup>In addition to the 461 Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008, whom courts sentenced to imprisonment are 2 Tibetans believed charged with a crime and tried with an unknown result and 9 Tibetans believed charged (and who may have faced trial).

<sup>218</sup>In addition to the 640 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database recorded, as of August 1, 2016, another 1,244 Tibetan political prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are believed or presumed to have been released, or who reportedly escaped or died.

<sup>219</sup>Tibetan Buddhists believe that a *trulku* is a teacher who is a part of a lineage of teachers that are reincarnations.

<sup>220</sup>All of the 148 sentences to fixed-term imprisonment were judicial.

<sup>221</sup>PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], issued 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 50. A sentence of death with a two-year reprieve may be commuted to life imprisonment upon expiration of the two-year reprieve if a prisoner “commits no intentional crime” during the reprieve. If a prisoner “has truly performed major meritorious service,” then the sentence may be commuted to a fixed-term sentence of 25 years upon expiration of the two-year reprieve. If the prisoner “has committed an intentional crime” during the period of suspension, the death penalty “shall be executed upon verification and approval of the Supreme People’s Court.”

<sup>222</sup>UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2–3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16. See also International Campaign for Tibet, “Civil Society Sub-

mission for the 5th Cycle of the United Nations Committee against Torture, Review of the People's Republic of China," 26 October 15.

<sup>223</sup> UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2–3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16, 11.

<sup>224</sup> As of August 1, 2016, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained the following 18 records on Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008, and who reportedly died in police custody as a result of police abuse (arranged in reverse chronological order by the date of detention provided): records 2016-00194 on Yudrug Nyima (June 20, 2016); 2015-00035 on Karne (December 7, 2014); 2015-00048 on Bachen Gyalwa (November 2014); 2014-00273 on Jinpa Tharchin (August 12, 2014); 2014-00275 on Lodroe Pasang (August 12, 2014); 2014-00271 on Tsewang Gonpo (August 12, 2014); 2014-00272 on Yeshe (August 12, 2014); 2014-00164 on Tashi Paljor (February 28, 2014); 2014-00068 on Konchog Dragpa (December 2013); 2008-00570 on Ngawang Jamyang (November 23, 2013); 2013-00205 on Kaldo (April 21, 2013); 2014-00261 on Karwang (May 25, 2012); 2013-00200 on Gyarig Thar (March 2012); 2014-00232 on Tsering Gyaltsen (February 9, 2012); 2011-00749 on Tsultrim Gyatso (July 2011); 2009-00240 on Phuntsog Rabten (March 25, 2009); 2009-00037 on Pema Tsepag (January 20, 2009); and 2010-00519 on Kalden (March 10, 2008).

<sup>225</sup> As of August 1, 2016, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained the following four records on Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008, who courts sentenced to imprisonment, and who reportedly died either in prison or soon after release as a result of torture (arranged in reverse chronological order by the date of detention provided): records 2015-00273 on Lobsang Yeshe (May 12, 2014); 2016-00081 on Trigyal (November 24, 2013); 2016-00059 on Goshul Lobsang (June 2010); and 2010-00354 on Tenzin Choedrag (April 2008).

<sup>226</sup> As of August 1, 2016, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained record 2009-00156 on monk Tashi Zangpo, who police reportedly detained on March 10, 2009, and tortured in custody. He reportedly escaped on March 21, 2009, leaped into a river, and drowned.

<sup>227</sup> For more information on Jigme Gyatso ("Golog Jigme"), see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00587.

<sup>228</sup> China's Pervasive Use of Torture, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 April 16, Written Statement Submitted by Golog Jigme [Jigme Gyatso], Tibetan Buddhist monk, 2–3. In submitted testimony, Jigme Gyatso stated: "Unbelievably, when asked by the Committee about the 'tiger chair' used during police interrogations, a Chinese government official said the chair was for the protection and safety of the detainees. I spent days and nights in such a chair; it was horrific torture." Describing in his testimony how security officials used the device, Jigme Gyatso stated: "I was forced to sit in the 'tiger chair' (also known as the 'iron chair') day and night. This was the worst form of torture I experienced during my three detentions. My arms were handcuffed in front of me on a small metal table, and my legs were bent beneath the seat and strapped to the chair with iron cuffs. My joints suffered horribly and at one point my feet became so swollen that all my toenails fell off. I still have scars on my wrists and ankles from when I was turned backwards in the chair and suspended from the ceiling, for hours at a time."

<sup>229</sup> China's Pervasive Use of Torture, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 April 16, Written Statement Submitted by Sophie Richardson, China Director, Human Rights Watch, "Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police Torture of Criminal Suspects in China," May 2015, 56.