

IV. Xinjiang

Security Measures and Conflict

During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, central and regional authorities continued to implement repressive security measures targeting Uyghur communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In October 2015, Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau, said authorities should focus on counterterrorism in order to achieve stability in the XUAR.¹ Reports from international media and rights advocates documented arbitrary detentions,² oppressive security checkpoints³ and patrols,⁴ the forcible return of Uyghurs to the XUAR from other provinces as part of heightened security measures,⁵ and forced labor as a means to "ensure stability."⁶ Meng Jianzhu, head of the Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission, repeatedly stressed the need for authorities to "eradicate extremism," in particular "religious extremism," in the XUAR in conjunction with security measures.⁷ The U.S. Government and international observers have asserted that XUAR officials have justified restrictions on Uyghurs' religious freedom by equating them with efforts to combat extremism.⁸

The Commission observed fewer reports of violent incidents involving ethnic or political tensions in the XUAR in the 2016 reporting year than in previous reporting years,⁹ though it was unclear whether less violence occurred, or Chinese authorities prevented public disclosure of the information. International media and rights advocates raised concerns about Chinese authorities' failure to report and attempts to suppress information regarding deadly clashes involving Uyghurs, including information about a September 2015 attack in Aksu prefecture.¹⁰ [See the Freedom of Expression sub-section below for more information on these concerns.]

On September 18, 2015, in Bay (Baicheng) county, Aksu prefecture, more than 50 people died, and dozens more were injured, during an attack by assailants with knives at a coal mine complex.¹¹ Chinese official media confirmed the attack in November 2015, but indicated that the attackers killed only 16 people.¹² The attackers were reportedly Uyghurs, and most of those they attacked were Han Chinese workers; five others killed were reportedly security personnel.¹³ According to official media and international reports, authorities conducted a 56-day operation to find the attackers, ending in a raid in which police killed 28 people.¹⁴ According to an international news report, 11 of those whom police killed were women and children traveling with the suspected attackers.¹⁵ A front-page People's Liberation Army Daily article reported that police had used a flamethrower in the November 2015 raid on the group that included the suspected attackers.¹⁶ State media later reported that a senior public security official died in the raid.¹⁷

Legal and Counterterrorism Developments

On December 27, 2015, the National People's Congress passed the PRC Counterterrorism Law.¹⁸ The legislation, which took effect on January 1, 2016, contains provisions that expanded police au-

thority, including the authority to use weapons.¹⁹ In addition, the law seeks to define what constitutes terrorist activity, and lays out a framework for establishing counterterrorism institutions, enhancing security, and coordinating intelligence gathering and emergency response, among other areas.²⁰ Human rights organizations and other observers criticized the law as excessively broad and repressive, and expressed fears that it expanded officials' authority to punish peaceful activities and target ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs.²¹ A U.S. State Department spokesperson stated that the "broad, vaguely phrased provisions and definitions" in the law "could lead to greater restrictions on the exercise of freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion within China."²² In February 2016, XUAR officials launched region-wide activities to study and publicize the new legislation, and directed officials to make use of entertainment and media networks throughout the XUAR in order to bring about "social stability."²³

On July 29, 2016, the XUAR People's Congress adopted regional measures to implement the PRC Counterterrorism Law,²⁴ which contain more detailed definitions than the national legislation regarding terrorist activities and how to punish religious extremists.²⁵ The implementing measures include the following provisions that were not contained in the national legislation:

- Solitary confinement can be used for prisoners or individuals held at police detention centers who lead a terrorist or extremist organization, incite other prisoners to commit crimes, or resist education and reform programs as well as display "violent tendencies";²⁶
- The use of cell phones, the Internet, or other media devices to disseminate terrorism or extremism or to teach terrorist methods is considered a terrorist activity;²⁷ and
- Those organizing, forcing, instigating, encouraging, or enticing minors to participate in religious activities may be detained between 5 and 15 days and fined up to 10,000 yuan (approximately US\$1,500).²⁸

A human rights advocate, cited in an international news report, expressed concern that under the new regional measures, authorities could label Uyghurs' ordinary religious activities as extremism and terrorism.²⁹

In February 2016, state media reported authorities' pledge to offer up to 100,000 yuan (approximately US\$15,000) for tip-offs regarding online "terrorist" content, and said authorities had given out more than 2 million yuan (approximately US\$300,000) in rewards in 2015.³⁰ In April 2016, Radio Free Asia reported that XUAR officials had begun offering rewards of up to 5 million yuan (approximately US\$750,000) for information about terrorist activity, as well as cash rewards for reporting "illegal religious activity."³¹

XUAR officials used Party rules and regulations combating corruption in the Party to target "terrorism" and Party members' opposition to Party and government policy. In January 2016, Xu Hairong, the Secretary of the XUAR Commission for Discipline Inspection, reported that some Party officials in the region had "supported, participated in and organized terror acts" in 2015, and that authorities would take measures against these officials.³² Xu had

made similar comments in November 2015, when he stated that some Party officials in the XUAR had “criticised high-level policies” and openly expressed opinions that differed from those mandated by the Party.³³ The November comments followed the Party’s removal earlier that month of Xinjiang Daily editor-in-chief Zhao Xinyu from his post and expulsion of Zhao from the Party³⁴ after he had opposed government policy in the XUAR³⁵ and had disagreed with Party views on “ethnic separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism.”³⁶ [See the Freedom of Expression sub-section for more information on Zhao Xinyu.] XUAR Commission for Discipline Inspection officials punished a number of senior Party officials for corruption during the reporting year, including Zhao’s predecessor at the Xinjiang Daily, Alimjan Maimaitiming, who had served as secretary general of the XUAR government as well as in a Party leadership group.³⁷

“ENDANGERING STATE SECURITY” CASES

According to research the Dui Hua Foundation published in April 2016³⁸ and the XUAR annual work report on the region’s courts for 2015,³⁹ the number of “endangering state security” (ESS) trials the region’s courts heard in 2015 decreased by approximately two-thirds from the previous two years, from about 300 to about 100 trials. Dui Hua Foundation analysis indicated that a corresponding rise in trials in the region for crimes related to “cults” and “terrorism” in the latest XUAR annual work report showed that these trials were previously handled as ESS trials.⁴⁰

Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti remained in prison, where he is serving a life sentence on the charge of “separatism,”⁴¹ which falls under the category of ESS.⁴² According to a U.S.-based news and advocacy website, in February 2016, authorities did not give Tohti’s brother permission to visit him.⁴³ Some observers expressed concern that Tohti may have been in ill health, and that this caused authorities to deny a visit, since Tohti’s brother had reportedly planned to visit him that month.⁴⁴

Other political prisoners who remained in detention during the reporting year include:

- **Tudaxun Hoshur.**⁴⁵ Tudaxun Hoshur, the brother of Uyghur-American Radio Free Asia (RFA) reporter Shohret Hoshur, is serving a five-year sentence on a charge involving “endangering state security.”⁴⁶ In December 2015, authorities released two other Hoshur brothers, Shawket and Rexim, from detention, reportedly following international advocacy on their behalf.⁴⁷ In January 2015, international reports cited a statement from RFA that Chinese authorities had sentenced Tudaxun Hoshur to prison in 2014 on “state security” charges, likely in retaliation for Shohret’s coverage of news in the XUAR, though RFA did not release Tudaxun’s name at that time.⁴⁸

- **Huseyin Celil.**⁴⁹ Officials in Uzbekistan detained Uyghur-Canadian imam Celil in March 2006 when he was traveling there, and in June 2006 extradited him to China.⁵⁰ In April 2007, a court in Urumqi municipality reportedly sentenced Celil to life in prison⁵¹ for “the crime of separating the country and organizing and leading a terrorist organization.”⁵² In Feb-

ruary 2016, judicial authorities reportedly reduced Celil’s sentence to between 19 years and 6 months, and 20 years.⁵³

In addition, authorities reportedly released Uyghur **Patigul Ghulam**⁵⁴ from detention in May 2016.⁵⁵ Authorities detained Ghulam in May 2014, and subjected her to a closed trial on April 7, 2016, for “leaking state secrets” in an interview she gave to RFA.⁵⁶ Ghulam had unsuccessfully pressed officials in Urumqi for information about her son, Imammemet Eli, whom authorities detained in July 2009, following demonstrations and riots that took place in Urumqi.⁵⁷ Fellow detainees reportedly said authorities had “severely tortured” Eli.⁵⁸

According to a June 18, 2016, RFA report, authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, detained at least 10 Uyghur students on June 9 on terrorism-related charges.⁵⁹ A spokesperson for a Uyghur rights organization expressed concern that authorities had not provided any details regarding the students’ whereabouts.⁶⁰ The students, who were originally from the southern part of the XUAR, had reportedly finished taking their college entrance examinations the day before their detentions, and were studying in Guangzhou as part of “Xinjiang classes,” a government program to send Uyghur students to schools in the eastern part of China.⁶¹

UYGHURS DEPORTED FROM THAILAND

An international media report supported rights groups’ concerns that Chinese authorities would persecute Uyghurs whom authorities had forcibly deported from Thailand in July 2015.⁶² In October 2015, RFA reported that authorities in Awat county, Aksu prefecture, had forced 2 of the 109 Uyghurs forcibly deported from Thailand to participate in a film “as a deterrent to others in the area not to flee the country and seek asylum elsewhere.”⁶³ Although it is unclear how widely the film was distributed, it follows a pattern of authorities’ use of filmed or televised confessions across China, a tactic many in the legal profession have criticized as being in violation of Chinese law.⁶⁴ [For more information on the use of televised “confessions” in China, see Section II—Criminal Justice.] RFA cited a local Party official as saying that an Awat county court had tried the two Uyghurs, who he suggested had “illegally cross[ed] borders to join the holy war,” and who he said “would likely receive long prison sentences.”⁶⁵ In November 2015, Human Rights Watch expressed concern over the Chinese government’s failure to provide information about the location or health of the group of deported Uyghurs.⁶⁶

Development Policy

During this reporting year, central and regional officials continued to focus on the role of economic growth and development initiatives in promoting stability in the XUAR.⁶⁷ Through the “Silk Road” and “One Belt, One Road” development strategies they introduced in recent years, government authorities sought to attract overseas investment and investment from other areas of China, and to develop the XUAR as a production and logistics hub.⁶⁸ Critics of XUAR development strategies outlined authorities’ failure to

address persistent tensions involving socio-economic inequality, ethnic tension, and assimilation.⁶⁹

Criticism of regional development ventures also included concern over their ecological effects.⁷⁰ An April 2016 Greenpeace briefing on air quality in China for the first quarter of 2016 reported that the five cities with the highest average PM_{2.5} concentration, an air quality indicator, were all located in the XUAR.⁷¹ According to Greenpeace's analysis, increasing pollution in western areas of China, including the XUAR, is due to the shift of industries, such as the coal-power industry, from eastern areas subject to pollution limits to western areas not yet subject to the same restrictions.⁷² Kashgar city, Kashgar prefecture, which Greenpeace ranked as having the highest average PM_{2.5} concentration out of more than 360 cities analyzed,⁷³ has been a focus of industrial and economic development for XUAR officials for the past several years.⁷⁴ A July 2016 report issued by a U.S.-based Uyghur rights organization also raised concerns about air pollution and the coal industry in the XUAR, noting that the coal industry had also brought about soil degradation, desertification and sandstorms, and groundwater depletion in the region.⁷⁵

In early 2016, XUAR authorities announced plans for the creation of new cities in the region, with officials highlighting the role of urbanization in both development and the maintenance of stability.⁷⁶ In January 2016, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), an entity under the administration of both the central government and the XUAR government⁷⁷ that plays a key role in development and urbanization in the XUAR,⁷⁸ announced the State Council had approved its plan to establish the city of Kunyu in Hotan prefecture, in order to “fight separatism, stabilize the border and promote economic development.”⁷⁹ According to a February 2016 state media report, XPCC authorities planned to transform the headquarters of each of the XPCC's 14 divisions into cities “so they can better contribute to local social stability and development.”⁸⁰

Freedom of Religion

Following XUAR authorities' November 2014 amendment of regional regulations governing religious affairs,⁸¹ central and XUAR officials continued to use new legislation and other measures that narrowed the scope of Uyghur Muslims' ability to peacefully practice their religious faith and express their Muslim cultural identity. In January 2016, state media reported that the regional legislature would begin to draft, within the year, regulations specifically targeting “religious extremism.”⁸² An amendment to the PRC Criminal Law that took effect in November 2015⁸³ prohibits individuals from “forcing others to wear clothes or symbols associated with terrorism and extremism,” and provides for a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment.⁸⁴ Officials also promoted other policies and regulations in the previous reporting year that restricted Uyghur Muslims' attire, appearance, and behavior.⁸⁵

Authorities in locations throughout the XUAR also enforced controls on Uyghur Muslims in mosques and in their homes, and sought to restrict Islamic teaching outside of state control and prevent minors from participating in religious activities.⁸⁶ In January

2016, authorities in Awat (Awati) county, Aksu prefecture, reportedly checked the identification documents of Uyghurs entering mosques for Friday prayers, in order to ensure they were either a local resident or registered as a local resident's guest.⁸⁷ On January 1, 2016, an overseas Uyghur rights advocate said authorities in Kashgar city had recently detained at least 16 Uyghurs for collecting religious publications for children in their homes.⁸⁸ In March 2016, Party-run media cited an official with the Xinjiang Islamic Association as saying that religious leaders had shut down all "underground preaching sites" in the XUAR.⁸⁹ The official stressed the importance of religious leaders learning about political affairs in addition to religion, noting that clerics in one location taught "government policies on religion" in addition to the Quran.⁹⁰

Some Uyghur Muslims continued to serve prison sentences for the peaceful observance of their religious beliefs. In March 2016, residents and officials in Aksu prefecture reportedly told Radio Free Asia (RFA) that local authorities had sentenced an imam and eight farmers to prison in 2015 for "illegally practicing religion."⁹¹ According to RFA, authorities sentenced the government-designated imam, Eziz Emet, to nine years in prison in September 2015 on charges related to "teaching religion illegally" in a local village, after he had "taught some teenagers how to read the Quran and some Quranic verses for praying."⁹² The report stated that officials sentenced each of the farmers to seven years' imprisonment in February 2015 on charges of "religious extremism" related to "praying together in places that authorities had not designated for Muslim worship."⁹³ In addition, RFA reported in March that security personnel in Ghulja (Yining) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, detained 41 Uyghurs for being "religious extremists" after they failed to attend the funeral of a "prominent" local member of the Chinese Communist Party.⁹⁴

In June 2016, the State Council Information Office released a white paper on religious freedom in the XUAR stating that authorities "fully respected . . . citizens' freedom of religious belief."⁹⁵ According to the white paper, "[n]o Xinjiang citizen has been punished because of his or her rightful religious belief."⁹⁶ The white paper further stated that during Ramadan, the decision regarding whether or not restaurants serving halal food would remain open "is completely determined by the owners themselves without interference."⁹⁷

As in previous reporting years, local government officials throughout the XUAR reportedly maintained restrictions on Uyghurs' observance of Ramadan, forbidding government employees,⁹⁸ students,⁹⁹ and teachers¹⁰⁰ from fasting. According to international media reports, authorities in some locations in the XUAR ordered restaurants and other food establishments to stay open during fasting hours.¹⁰¹ An international media report, citing a Uyghur rights advocate, said authorities in Qaghiliq (Yecheng) county, Kashgar prefecture, detained 5 Uyghurs, and authorities in Kuqa (Kuche) county, Aksu prefecture, detained 12 Uyghurs for encouraging people to fast during this year's Ramadan period.¹⁰²

Freedom of Expression

During the reporting period, central and regional officials placed restrictions on journalists covering XUAR-related issues, detained Uyghurs who wrote for websites, enforced controls on online communications tools in the XUAR, and restricted public information on violent incidents in the XUAR.

- In one example of officials restricting news media from opposing the state’s narrative on the XUAR and counterterrorism, in December 2015, authorities failed to renew the press credentials of Beijing-based French reporter Ursula Gauthier, effectively expelling her from China.¹⁰³ Gauthier reportedly was the first foreign journalist Chinese authorities expelled since Al Jazeera reporter Melissa Chan in 2012.¹⁰⁴ Gauthier had refused Chinese officials’ requests to apologize for an article she wrote for French publication *L’Obs* in November 2015,¹⁰⁵ in which she criticized Chinese counterterrorism policies and authorities’ “pitiless repression” of Uyghurs.¹⁰⁶ In November¹⁰⁷ and December 2015,¹⁰⁸ the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China issued statements criticizing what it viewed as Chinese officials’ and official media’s intimidation of Gauthier.
- In another example, an ABC News journalist reported being a target of state surveillance for at least a day and a half while investigating conditions in the southern part of the XUAR for a March 2016 report.¹⁰⁹ According to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, foreign journalists may lawfully travel in the XUAR without a special permit,¹¹⁰ but in the past officials in Kashgar municipality reportedly have enforced “local regulations” requiring “interview permits.”¹¹¹
- In November 2015, official media reported that Communist Party authorities had removed former Xinjiang Daily editor-in-chief Zhao Xinyu from his post and expelled him from the Party,¹¹² after he had “improperly discuss[ed], and publicly oppos[ed], government policy” in the XUAR,¹¹³ and had differed from the Party on “issues including ethnic separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism.”¹¹⁴

According to a June 2016 RFA report, authorities in various locations in the XUAR detained five Uyghur website administrators and writers between March and May 2016, in order to prevent them from criticizing official restrictions on Uyghurs’ activities during the Ramadan period.¹¹⁵ Authorities from Aksu prefecture reportedly detained one of the five, Tursunjan Memet, on March 29 in Korla city, Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, and later arrested him on the charges of “inciting ethnic hatred” and “separatism,” saying he had “use[d] the Misranim website as his platform to publish illegal writings.”¹¹⁶ Authorities in Aksu prefecture reportedly detained another Uyghur, Omerjan Hesén, prior to May 31.¹¹⁷ Officials announced on May 31 that they had expelled Hesén, a forestry bureau official who had also written for the Misranim website, from the Communist Party, and said he had written essays “attacking the party and government’s ethnic or religious policies in Xinjiang,” among other activities.¹¹⁸ Authorities in Urumqi municipality reportedly detained Ababekri Muhtar, another of the five Uyghurs and the founder of Misranim, a week

after authorities detained Tursunjan Memet, and released him on June 10.¹¹⁹ Muhtar previously had visited the United States with the support of the U.S. Embassy in China.¹²⁰

XUAR officials also limited access to online forums during the reporting year, and punished those seeking to bypass official Internet restrictions. In November 2015, authorities suspended mobile phone services for individuals who had used software to circumvent the Great Firewall, which Chinese authorities use to filter the Internet.¹²¹ Security personnel required affected individuals to visit local police stations to request the restoration of their phone services.¹²² Security personnel in Hotan, Kashgar, and Aksu prefectures reportedly increased monitoring of Uyghurs' electronic devices, including smart phones, for "extremist" religious content, in order to "ensure stability."¹²³ Police in some cases detained individuals if their phones contained such content.¹²⁴ In addition, in January 2016, XUAR authorities shut down two websites that served a predominantly Uyghur audience, which officials accused of "damaging ethnic unity" and transmitting "illegal content."¹²⁵

Continuing the pattern of a lack of transparency in reporting violent incidents,¹²⁶ Chinese officials and official media failed to report on a deadly attack on workers at a coal mine on September 18, 2015, in Bay (Baicheng) county, Aksu prefecture, until around two months after the attack occurred.¹²⁷ Radio Free Asia was the first to report news of the attack, citing, among others, a security guard working for the local township government who said authorities were "strictly controlling information" about the incident.¹²⁸ Following a November 2015 raid on the alleged perpetrators of the Bay county attack, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reportedly published a statement on social media lauding the raid that authorities apparently later deleted without explanation.¹²⁹ Authorities also reportedly deleted an image originating from the MPS, and published by several media outlets, of a journal entry written by an officer who participated in the raid, indicating that he knew women and children were among the group of people targeted in the raid.¹³⁰

Freedom of Movement

As in past reporting years,¹³¹ officials continued to limit Uyghurs' access to travel freely. In June 2016, authorities in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, issued new rules requiring residents applying for passports and other documents to provide DNA samples, fingerprints, and voice prints.¹³² In Guma (Pishan) county, Hotan prefecture, police reportedly restricted the visits of non-local residents by confiscating their identification documents, and officials required local residents seeking to travel to visit relatives or obtain medical treatment within the XUAR to "first obtain a letter from village police describing past political involvements."¹³³ In addition to official restrictions, in August 2016, ahead of the G20 Summit in September, an international media organization reported that a notice posted by a local property management group in Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, said residents must report any Uyghur they saw to police, and if the person was confirmed to be Uyghur, the individual reporting him or her would receive a 500-yuan (approximately US\$75) reward.¹³⁴

In a potentially positive development, in March 2016, official media reports indicated that XUAR authorities would abolish the “convenience contact cards” system in May 2016.¹³⁵ An official media report said the system, which authorities initiated in May 2014, required XUAR residents aged 16 and over to register with authorities before moving to another part of the XUAR.¹³⁶ Some international media reports said officials used the cards specifically to monitor and control Uyghurs.¹³⁷ In addition, official media reports stated that in 2016, officials plan to revise passport issuance procedures and facilitate travel for XUAR residents.¹³⁸ The reports followed a similar announcement by XUAR authorities in August 2015.¹³⁹

Other Social Policies

During the reporting year, XUAR authorities linked social policies in the areas of education and employment to political goals such as the “sinicization” of ethnic minority populations. In November 2015, XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian noted the importance of “bilingual education” in the region alongside “ethnic blending”¹⁴⁰ and students’ acceptance of the “five identifies,” that is, identifying with the country, Chinese nationality, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”¹⁴¹ Under “bilingual education,” class instruction for the general curriculum takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by ethnic minority groups, which are relegated to the status of a secondary course, if they are taught at all.¹⁴² According to Xinhua, 69 percent of ethnic minority children in elementary and secondary schools received “bilingual education” as of the end of 2014, compared to 34 percent in 2010.¹⁴³ During this reporting year, officials announced plans to further expand “bilingual education” in the region’s schools.¹⁴⁴ “Bilingual education” in the XUAR contravenes legal protections for non-Han groups to maintain and use their own languages, and is inconsistent with the model of education outlined in the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.¹⁴⁵

Reports indicated the existence of ethnic tensions amid an influx of Han Chinese workers in the XUAR,¹⁴⁶ and in spite of some official efforts to create jobs for Uyghur residents of the XUAR,¹⁴⁷ some government and private employers within the XUAR discriminated against non-Han job applicants. As in past reporting years,¹⁴⁸ the Commission observed employment advertisements that reserved positions exclusively for Han Chinese, including civil servant and private-sector positions, in contravention of Chinese labor law.¹⁴⁹ Private and public employers also continued to reserve some positions exclusively for men, leaving non-Han women to face both ethnic and gender discrimination in the hiring process.¹⁵⁰

Notes to Section IV—Xinjiang

¹“China Stresses Stability, Security on Xinjiang’s Founding Anniversary,” Xinhua, 1 October 2015. According to Yu, “Counterterrorism is the focus of our current work.”

²See, e.g., “Mother of Uyghur Who Disappeared in 2009 Faces Charges Over Interview,” Radio Free Asia, 30 March 16; “‘Strike Hard’ Hits Uyghur Family,” Radio Free Asia, 29 March 16; “China Detains 41 Uyghurs Who Skipped a Funeral of a Local Communist Functionary,” Radio Free Asia, 24 March 16.

³See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, “Xinjiang Seethes Under Chinese Crackdown,” *New York Times*, 2 January 16; “Police Increase Checks of Uyghur Smartphone Users in Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, 8 January 16; Alyssa Abkowitz, “China Doubles Down on Terrorism ‘Double Standards’ Accusation,” *Wall Street Journal*, China Real Time Report (blog), 3 December 15.

⁴“On the Eve of the New Year, Uyghurs From Various Regions Have Been Sent Back, While Urumqi City Enhances Security Measures To Counter Terrorism” [Xin nian qianxi gedu weizu ren bei qianfan wushi tisheng anbao cuoshi fankong], Radio Free Asia, 30 January 16; Tom Phillips, “‘A Brighter Future Beckons’: China Tries To Get Xinjiang To Join the Party,” *Guardian*, 9 October 15.

⁵“On the Eve of the New Year, Uyghurs From Various Regions Have Been Sent Back, While Urumqi City Enhances Security Measures To Counter Terrorism” [Xin nian qianxi gedu weizuren bei qianfan wushi tisheng anbao cuoshi fankong], Radio Free Asia, 30 January 16.

⁶“Authorities ‘Ensure Stability’ Through Forced Labor for Uyghurs in Xinjiang Township,” Radio Free Asia, 3 November 15.

⁷“Meng Jianzhu Stresses at Counterterrorism Work Meeting [the Need To] Comprehensively Raise the Capacity and Standards of the Counterterrorism Fight” [Meng jianzhu zai fan kongbu gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao quanmian tisheng fankong douzheng nengli shuiping], *People’s Daily*, 12 December 15. See also Ben Blanchard, “China Security Chief Calls for Greater ‘De-Radicalization’ Efforts,” *Reuters*, 16 November 15.

⁸See, e.g., Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,” 2 June 16, chap. 2, overview; Simon Denyer and Xu Yangjing, “China Jails a Muslim for Six Years—For Refusing To Shave His Beard,” *Washington Post*, WorldViews (blog), 30 March 15; UN Human Rights Council, Written Statement Submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples, a Non-Governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status, A/HRC/28/NGO/68, 20 February 15, 2, 3.

⁹See, e.g., CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 281–83; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 162–65; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 163–65.

¹⁰See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China: Allow Independent Investigations Into Xinjiang Violence,” 23 November 15; Chang Ping, “China’s Double Standard,” University of Hong Kong, China Media Project, 20 November 15; Andrew Jacobs, “In a Region Disturbed by Ethnic Tensions, China Keeps Tight Lid on a Massacre,” *New York Times*, 18 October 15.

¹¹“Death Toll in Xinjiang Coal Mine Attack Climbs to 50,” Radio Free Asia, 30 September 15; Andrew Jacobs, “In a Region Disturbed by Ethnic Tensions, China Keeps Tight Lid on a Massacre,” *New York Times*, 18 October 15.

¹²See, e.g., Tian Shan, “Xinjiang Destroys a Violent Terrorist Gang Under the Direct Command of Foreign Extremist Organizations, Wiping Out All Thugs” [Xinjiang dadiao yi jingwai jiduan zuzhi zhijie zhihui de baokong tuanhua jianmie quanbu baotu], Tianshan Net, 20 November 15.

¹³“Authorities Identify 17 Suspects in Deadly Attack at Xinjiang Mine,” Radio Free Asia, 16 October 15. See also Jun Mai, “Photos of Lead Suspects in China’s Xinjiang Coal Mine Attack Released,” *South China Morning Post*, 17 December 15.

¹⁴See, e.g., Tian Shan, “Xinjiang Destroys a Violent Terrorist Gang Under the Direct Command of Foreign Extremist Organizations, Wiping Out All Thugs” [Xinjiang dadiao yi jingwai jiduan zuzhi zhijie zhihui de baokong tuanhua jianmie quanbu baotu], Tianshan Net, 20 November 15; “China Says Kills 28 Suspects in Xinjiang Coal Mine Attack After 56-Day Manhunt,” Radio Free Asia, 20 November 15.

¹⁵“Eleven of 28 Suspects Killed in Xinjiang Manhunt Believed Women, Children,” Radio Free Asia, 24 November 15.

¹⁶Shu Chunping et al., “‘Counterterrorism Dagger’ Protects the People’s Safety—Commemorating the Xinjiang People’s Armed Police Corps Fourth Detachment Secret Squadron” [“Fankong jian dao” bao renmin ping’an—ji wujing xinjiang zongdui si zhidui teqin zhongdui], *People’s Liberation Army Daily*, 23 November 15. See also “Eleven of 28 Suspects Killed in Xinjiang Manhunt Believed Women, Children,” Radio Free Asia, 24 November 15; “China Used Flamethrowers To Hunt Xinjiang Terrorists” [Zhongguo wujing yi huoyan penshe qi yingdui “baokong fenzi”], *Voice of America*, 23 November 15.

¹⁷Yao Tong and Sui Yunyan, “Xinjiang Counterterrorism Commendation and Mobilization Meeting Held” [Xinjiang fankong biao zhang ji dongyuan bushu huiyi zhao kai], Tianshan Net, 12 December 15; “China Says Senior Uygur Official Killed During Raid in Xinjiang,” *Reuters*, reprinted in *South China Morning Post*, 14 December 15.

¹⁸“China Adopts First Counter-Terrorism Law,” Xinhua, 27 December 15. See also PRC Counterterrorism Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, chap. 7.

¹⁹Peter Mattis, “New Law Reshapes Chinese Counterterrorism Policy and Operations,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, Issue 2, 25 January 16, 3–6; PRC Counterterrorism Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 53, 62. For the January 1, 2016 date that the law took effect, see Article 97 in Chapter 10 (supplementary provisions).

²⁰PRC Counterterrorism Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 53, 62. See Chapter 1 for the definition of what constitutes terrorist activity, Chapters 1 and 3 for guidelines regarding establishing counterter-

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