

III. Development of the Rule of Law

CIVIL SOCIETY

Findings

- The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) outbreak was a pivotal event for Chinese civil society. The civil society response revealed Chinese citizens’ capacity for grassroots organizing and voicing dissent even while Chinese government policies continued to centralize control and suppress information challenging official narratives. During the coronavirus outbreak, large numbers of Chinese citizens worked collectively through civil society organizations and grassroots volunteer efforts to assist vulnerable and impacted groups, as well as to disseminate and archive information about the epidemic. Informal volunteer groups were especially responsive to regions, groups, and issues that were overlooked or de-prioritized in the official response. After the death of COVID–19 whistleblower **Dr. Li Wenliang**, Chinese citizens expressed anger on a massive public scale at the government’s handling of the epidemic.
- The official response to grassroots civil society efforts has varied widely throughout the course of the epidemic. Chinese government authorities initially attempted to commandeer aid distribution, resulting in bottlenecks and controversies that generated significant public criticism. Later, government actions showed that grassroots aid from both registered charities and unregistered informal groups was necessary to the epidemic relief effort. At the same time, public security was used to target religious groups engaged in grassroots actions, emergency service volunteers suspected of having potentially compromising information about fatality rates, and those challenging government censorship or critical of the government’s epidemic response. Overall, government decisionmaking during the epidemic was dominated by political concerns and geared toward centralizing control.
- Chinese citizens have participated in diverse forms of collective organization for mutual and public interest that include popular protest, issue-based grassroots advocacy, and professionalized charities and social enterprises with varying degrees of independence from state management. Even those involved in successful campaigns or projects can face government warnings, harassment, and sometimes detention. In recent years, rights advocates working on a broad range of issues, from gender equality to labor to disability rights, have been targets of government repression and exclusion. For example, several rights advocates who gathered informally to discuss civil society developments in December 2019 were detained and charged with “inciting subversion of state power.”
- Organizations aligned with official priorities have become integral to providing public services. In recent years, the Chinese government has emphasized that it needs to lean more heavily on providing services through civil society in order to modernize governance. This means a broader scope of operation for

Civil Society

some organizations, while more independent, advocacy-based groups have increasingly been driven underground.

- Chinese government authorities restricted and censored the activities of LGBTQ organizations—as they have with other civil society organizations—and reports of discrimination against and harassment of LGBTQ individuals continued. There is no law that criminalizes same-sex relationships among adults, and acceptance of LGBTQ persons is increasing in China, including steps taken in the past year by some government officials in two municipalities to provide legal rights to same-sex couples. Nevertheless, new rules restricting “negative content” harming “social mores” were issued last year that could also bar LGBTQ content on television and the internet. Despite ongoing restrictions and censorship, advocacy organizations remain active in their public outreach, pushing for reforms to protect the rights of members of the LGBTQ community.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment and arbitrary detention of civil society advocates and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers and provide adequate procedural due process for those individuals subject to criminal investigation and trial. In particular, call on the Chinese government to release **Cheng Yuan, Liu Yongze, and Wu Gejianxiong**, who were criminally detained while working for Changsha Funeng, an NGO conducting policy and legal advocacy for disadvantaged groups. Also call on the Chinese government to release rights advocates **Ding Jiayi** and **Xu Zhiyong** and lift charges against **Dai Zhenya, Li Yingjun, and Zhang Zhongshun**, all of whom were detained after gathering informally to discuss civil society developments in December 2019. Finally, also call on the Chinese government to release **Chen Mei, Cai Wei, and Xiaotang**, who were detained in connection with an online anti-censorship archiving project that included information related to the COVID-19 outbreak.
- Call on the Chinese government to stop censoring and shutting down social media accounts and internet-based platforms of civil society organizations working on rights advocacy.
- Urge the Chinese government to revise or repeal the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China and revise the PRC Charity Law to reflect the principles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, especially with regard to the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression.
- Integrate civil society issues into bilateral discussions and agreements with Chinese officials to promote reciprocity in the approach and implementation of civil society exchanges between the United States and China.

Civil Society

- Continue to fund, monitor, and evaluate foreign assistance programs in China that support democracy promotion, the rule of law, and human rights advocacy.
- Facilitate the participation of Chinese civil society advocates in relevant international conferences and forums and support international training to build their leadership capacity in non-profit management, public policy advocacy, and media relations.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

Chinese citizens participate in diverse forms of collective organization for mutual and public interest, and people engaging in this spectrum of activities seek and sometimes do achieve just compensation and policy change. Even those involved in successful campaigns or projects can face government warnings, harassment, and sometimes detention. In recent years, independent rights advocates have been targets for government repression and exclusion, while organizations aligned with official priorities have become integral to providing public services. The lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) community faces ambivalent government rhetoric and policy.

The COVID-19 outbreak was a pivotal event for Chinese civil society. Chinese people expressed a lack of faith in government on a massive public scale when mourning the death of whistleblower Dr. **Li Wenliang**, and they demonstrated solidarity through a grassroots mobilization of material aid and support services. Some grassroots efforts were incorporated into local government responses, but a number of volunteers were interrogated or detained because of their involvement.

Popular Protest: In-Person and Online

In recent years, Chinese citizens have participated in acts of popular resistance that scholars estimate number in the tens of thousands every year.¹ Although data is hard to gather, scholars find that most in-person protests are small and localized, with fewer than 100 participants demonstrating over specific, local grievances.² Common reasons for protests occurring all across China include migrant worker labor issues, property issues such as land expropriations, forced evictions, malfeasance by property developers, and hospital bills.³ Environmental protests tend to be larger and to draw participants from a greater cross-section of society.⁴ These protests are often aimed at preventing the construction of chemical plants or incinerators nearby⁵—like the week-long protests against a waste disposal plant in July 2019 in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province,⁶ or against the construction of a crematorium near a water supply in Wenlou township, Huazhou city, Maoming municipality, Guangdong province, in November 2019.⁷ In both instances, local governments used police to disperse and detain participants but also announced the suspension of construction plans.⁸

As Chinese social media platforms have developed into viable, if still restricted, spaces for citizens to share information, organize, and demand changes from government,⁹ Chinese citizens have taken to protest online in ways that resemble in-person “mass incidents.”¹⁰ In recent years, online activism has become increasingly decentralized, with internet users spontaneously mobilizing in response to critical events without clear leaders or fixed platforms—an adaptation to reduce the risk of repression.¹¹ During the 2020 reporting year, one significant example of online mass protest occurred after the death of coronavirus whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang¹²—posts and hashtags mourning his death and mistreat-

ment garnered more than 500 million online engagements on the social media platform Weibo alone before being censored.¹³

Rights Advocacy and Independent Civil Society Groups: Repression and Adaptation

Rights advocacy and independent civil society groups have been targeted by successive government crackdowns and restrictions.¹⁴ Organizations have been shuttered,¹⁵ while individual advocates face harassment, surveillance, detention, and arrest.¹⁶ As of January 2020, nearly 40 labor rights advocates were still missing or detained following their participation in unionization protests in July 2018,¹⁷ and as of June 2020, three labor advocates were still being held without trial since being detained in March 2019 for supporting migrant workers with occupational lung disease.¹⁸ **Cheng Yuan, Liu Yongze, and Wu Gejianxiong**—three staff members of Changsha Funeng, one of a few remaining anti-discrimination advocacy organizations—were detained incommunicado and charged with “subverting state power” in August 2019.¹⁹ The targeting of rights defense lawyers and other rights advocates also continued, with **Ding Jiayi, Xu Zhiyong, Dai Zhenya, Li Yingjun, and Zhang Zhongshun** detained after a private gathering in December 2019.²⁰

Rights advocates expressed that such pressures have isolated them from one another and the communities they serve and have also seriously diminished their capacity for advocacy.²¹ To adjust, remaining organizations have shifted to less politically sensitive work, such as community development,²² and individual organizers have been forced to scale back and reduce in-person activities due to elevated risk.²³ Some have adapted by pursuing lower-profile, decentralized activities such as providing support for individual victims of rights violations and also by relying heavily on online networks and mobilization.²⁴ Young Chinese people living overseas have also made significant contributions to advocacy.²⁵ Even in the face of increasing harassment and pressure from authorities, some groups such as those engaging in feminist and LGBTQ advocacy were still able to mobilize large-scale advocacy campaigns.²⁶ Environmental advocacy has also progressed through environmental public interest litigation authorized under the PRC Environmental Protection Law revised in 2014.²⁷

Registered Organizations: Increased Government Funding and Scrutiny

In contrast to rights advocates and independent groups, registered social organizations complementing official policy priorities are being given more resources and latitude for development. In recent years, top Chinese government policy has called for government and society to share responsibility for “administering to society,”²⁸ and local governments have come to rely increasingly on contracted social organizations to provide social services.²⁹ Government contracts have become a major force shaping civil society—one researcher observes that organizations have a tendency to shift their focus to providing services that meet government procurement needs (e.g., poverty alleviation, education, disability services)

Civil Society

in order to access government funding.³⁰ Further intensifying this trend is Chinese corporate giving, which closely tracks government priorities,³¹ and the decline of foreign funding due to increased restrictions and China's improving economic conditions.³² At the same time, organizations are also developing their own more independent funding sources through means legalized by the PRC Charity Law passed in 2016.³³

Registered social organizations face burdensome reporting requirements about their operations,³⁴ and the government personnel administering social organizations are now evaluated according to their deference to central Chinese Communist Party authority and demonstrations of political reliability following policy changes in June 2019.³⁵ After the passage of the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China (Overseas NGOs' Activities Law) in 2016,³⁶ foreign NGOs and funding have been effectively shut out of sectors such as labor, LGBTQ issues, and rights advocacy,³⁷ and an increasing number of foreign NGOs have de-registered; one researcher expects the civil society environment to become even more hostile to international NGOs over time.³⁸ Asia Catalyst, an international NGO that works with local partners on public health issues, among others,³⁹ closed its China office early in 2020⁴⁰ not long after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that authorities in Beijing municipality planned to administratively discipline the organization for alleged violations that took place in 2018.⁴¹ According to civil society experts, the disciplinary sanctions marked the first case in which the government publicly acknowledged the use of the Overseas NGOs' Activities Law against an international NGO.⁴²

Chinese Civil Society Responses to COVID-19

During the coronavirus outbreak, large numbers of Chinese citizens worked collectively to assist vulnerable and impacted groups, as well as to disseminate and archive information about the epidemic. Chinese government authorities initially attempted to commandeer aid distribution, but grassroots organizations and informal volunteer groups persisted in organizing, in some cases at great personal cost, and demonstrated that their efforts were crucial to addressing the epidemic.

GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF COVID-19 AID: CENTRALIZING CONTROL

As quarantine restrictions were imposed in Wuhan municipality, provincial and municipal government officials originally sought to control the collection and distribution of all charitable donations for epidemic relief. The Hubei and Wuhan "COVID-19 command centers" coordinating the epidemic response together designated five state-managed charities as the sole recipients of all donations; their orders were reinforced at the national level by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA).⁴³ This policy created severe delays⁴⁴ and gave rise to accusations of mismanagement.⁴⁵ This prompted individual donors to seek ways around donating to the state-managed charities,

Civil Society

giving instead to informal groups connected to frontline doctors⁴⁶ and overwhelming smaller registered charities.⁴⁷

CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILIZATION DURING COVID-19 OUTBREAK

Such charities and informal groups of grassroots volunteers provided critical support during the outbreak, alleviating capacity limitations and bottlenecks in the implementation of the government response.⁴⁸ Unregistered, informal groups collected donations and sourced supplies and services without official approval.⁴⁹ One network of individual volunteers and civil society organizations managed to raise money for and deliver around 3,000 oxygen concentrators to infected individuals in their own homes.⁵⁰ Within Wuhan, after officials shut down public transit, more than a thousand volunteer drivers organized to provide transportation for medical workers, patients, and medical supplies.⁵¹

Informal volunteer groups were especially responsive to regions, groups, and issues that were overlooked or de-prioritized in the official response.⁵² For example, volunteers organized direct donations to hospitals in smaller municipalities in Hubei province experiencing acute shortages.⁵³ Some volunteer groups focused on the needs of vulnerable groups, such as pregnant women,⁵⁴ the hearing impaired,⁵⁵ sanitation workers,⁵⁶ and those with HIV/AIDS.⁵⁷ One China policy expert observed that these volunteer networks were characterized by a “bottom-up and decentralized approach” and high levels of trust, and that social media platforms, particularly WeChat, were important to the organization and effectiveness of these volunteer networks.⁵⁸

Other informal grassroots networks addressed issues of information accessibility, transparency, and censorship during the outbreak. Some online volunteer groups provided a direct interface for people with questions about the virus and quarantine measures—an important conduit of information because, as one volunteer pointed out, the government’s top-down method of information sharing made it difficult for local residents to communicate with the government about their individual circumstances.⁵⁹ Online volunteer networks shared fact-checked information and advice about the virus, providing direct assistance at a time when public services were overwhelmed;⁶⁰ one group of 2,000 online volunteers responded to more than 20,000 requests.⁶¹ Journalism students at Nanjing University in Jiangsu province monitored and reported on discrepancies in health officials’ statements about the virus,⁶² and other groups of volunteers systematically archived social media posts and reporting related to the virus while such content was being quickly censored.⁶³

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILIZATION

Some government actions showed that grassroots aid was necessary to the epidemic relief effort: the MCA modified its rule to encourage all registered “charity organizations” to directly collect and deliver donations and to cooperate with unregistered groups in fundraising.⁶⁴ Also, some local officials incorporated grassroots volunteers into their relief efforts: in Wuhan some officials relied on volunteer drivers to ferry protective equipment to hospitals⁶⁵ and the government of Huanggang municipality, Hubei province,

Civil Society

worked with online volunteers to provide psychological and medical advice to local residents.⁶⁶

Despite such instances, experts noted that overall government decisionmaking was dominated by political concerns.⁶⁷ During the outbreak, government interaction with civil society was geared toward centralizing control, from the initial orders directing all public donations to five designated state charities⁶⁸ to prohibitions⁶⁹ on medical supply manufacturers selling to buyers other than government procurement—thus forcing out grassroots groups supplying hospitals.⁷⁰ Officials also obstructed volunteer efforts and took over control of donated supplies.⁷¹ The aid efforts of Protestant house churches—considered politically sensitive by authorities—were viewed with suspicion, and several church leaders in Beijing municipality were ordered to halt their activities after their congregations shipped donated supplies to Wuhan.⁷² Volunteers operating an emergency hotline locating open hospital beds for Wuhan residents during the outbreak were questioned by public security about whether they had passed on information about fatalities to U.S. intelligence.⁷³ Three young people in Beijing associated with a GitHub account archiving censored reporting and essays, **Chen Mei** and **Cai Wei**, along with Cai Wei’s partner “**Xiaotang**” (nickname), were held incommunicado on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”⁷⁴

Other targets included a group of Wuhan residents seeking legal action against local officials for the delayed public notification about the outbreak; the group was monitored by authorities, who pressured their attorneys to drop the action.⁷⁵ In Yingcheng municipality, Hubei province, around 100 people joined collective protests against price gouging on government-controlled food supplies during the lockdown; local authorities responded by criminally detaining a protest leader.⁷⁶

Acts of Discrimination, Censorship, and Other Abuses Against the LGBTQ Community

Chinese government authorities restricted and censored the activities of organizations supporting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) individuals—as they have with other civil society organizations—and reports of discrimination against and harassment of members of the LGBTQ community continued. There is no law that criminalizes same-sex relationships among adults,⁷⁷ and acceptance of LGBTQ persons is increasing in China, including steps taken in the past year by some government officials in two municipalities to provide legal rights to same-sex couples. Nevertheless, new rules restricting “negative content” harming “social mores” were issued last year that could bar LGBTQ content on television and the internet.⁷⁸ Despite ongoing restrictions and censorship, advocacy organizations remain active in their public outreach, pushing for reforms to protect the rights of members of the LGBTQ community.

**Acts of Discrimination, Censorship, and Other Abuses Against
the LGBTQ Community—Continued**

Civil Society

As with others active in rights advocacy, grassroots LGBTQ advocates faced increasing harassment and pressure from authorities, including being required to meet with officials.⁷⁹ For example, less than half of college LGBTQ student groups were able to register with their universities, and students reported that they were summoned for meetings with Party-affiliated school authorities for their advocacy.⁸⁰ Many LGBTQ advocacy groups have gone “underground,” organizing lower profile, smaller-scale events and gatherings.⁸¹

Grassroots organizations and individuals continued to engage in advocacy campaigns on issues such as the removal of negative portrayals of members of the LGBTQ community in school textbooks.⁸² The level of support for members of the LGBTQ community within the mental health profession has also reportedly increased due to the outreach and advocacy of grassroots LGBTQ activists, scholars, and supportive practitioners.⁸³

In January 2020, a Beijing court ruled in favor of an individual who underwent sex reassignment surgery in a wrongful termination lawsuit against the individual’s employer following the surgery. The court found the employer’s actions constituted gender discrimination.⁸⁴ In December 2019, the Binjiang District People’s Court in Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, heard a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination due to a transgender employee’s gender identity.⁸⁵ Existing legal provisions allow for gender recognition⁸⁶ and sex reassignment surgery,⁸⁷ though barriers exist to the latter, as transgender persons are required to gain familial consent⁸⁸ regardless of age and to meet other non-medical conditions such as being unmarried and without a criminal record,⁸⁹ all of which may constitute arbitrary interference with privacy.⁹⁰

*Domestic Violence Laws Lack Clear Legal Protection for Members of the
LGBTQ Community*

A UN Development Programme survey found that domestic and other forms of physical violence are a “reality” for members of the LGBTQ community in China.⁹¹ A Chinese official indicated in 2015 that the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law would likely not cover those in same-sex relationships⁹² even as a provision in the law states that the law applies to domestic violence between cohabitating persons without family ties.⁹³ Notary public offices in Nanjing⁹⁴ and Beijing⁹⁵ municipalities in July 2019 and August 2019, respectively, posted announcements publicizing the approval of same-sex couples’ mutual guardianship agreements, which grant power of attorney, inheritance rights, and other rights and responsibilities overlapping with those conferred by marriage.⁹⁶ Although both announcements were later deleted, reporting indicated that guardianship agreements granted to same-sex couples remained valid.⁹⁷ As of July 2020, it is unclear whether the Anti-Domestic Violence Law applies to individuals with such agreements.

Civil Society

Acts of Discrimination, Censorship, and Other Abuses Against the LGBTQ Community—Continued

Censorship of LGBTQ Content

Censorship rules and negative public portrayals reinforce stigma against members of the LGBTQ community. Since 2016, authorities have banned depictions of “abnormal sexual relationships” on television and film, prohibiting same-sex relationships alongside other topics “exaggerating the dark side of society,”⁹⁸ and vague rules to restrict illegal or “negative content” were released in December 2019.⁹⁹ This follows last year’s social media crackdown on discussions of LGBTQ-related topics¹⁰⁰ and 10- and 4-year criminal sentences for two writers who wrote popular homoerotic stories.¹⁰¹ Such official pressure has reportedly led to self-censorship by platforms and users about LGBTQ topics.¹⁰²

Chinese Government Compliance With UN Recommendations on LGBTQ Issues

The Chinese government has not followed a UN Committee against Torture recommendation made specifically to China to ban its particular practice of “‘conversion therapy’ and other forced, involuntary or otherwise coercive or abusive treatments.”¹⁰³ Conversion therapy, as practiced in Chinese medical facilities, does not meet the medical standard of “free and informed consent,” according to Human Rights Watch.¹⁰⁴ A Chinese court stated in 2014 that a clinic had violated the PRC Mental Health Law by administering conversion therapy, stating that homosexuality was not a mental disorder;¹⁰⁵ the Chinese Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder in 2001.¹⁰⁶ LGBTQ advocacy groups reported that they knew of only four jurisdictions that had taken action against institutions reported for offering conversion therapy between 2017 and 2018, but the punishments were based on a lack of appropriate credentials.¹⁰⁷ The Commission did not observe efforts to seek accountability for other improper or illegal medical practices in connection with conversion therapy or for offering the therapy under coercive or involuntary conditions.¹⁰⁸

As of July 2020, the Commission had not observed the Chinese government acting on last year’s UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review recommendations, which the Chinese government accepted and supported, to prohibit discrimination against members of the LGBTQ community,¹⁰⁹ who lack specific legal protections against discrimination, which is widespread¹¹⁰ and exacerbates the difficulties faced by transgender individuals accessing healthcare and education in China.¹¹¹

Notes to Section III—Civil Society

¹ Teresa Wright, “Introduction,” in *Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China*, ed. Teresa Wright (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 1.

² Teresa Wright, “Introduction,” in *Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China*, ed. Teresa Wright (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 1; Christian Göbel, “Social Unrest in China: A Bird’s Eye View,” in *Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China*, ed. Teresa Wright (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 27–28, 37; Berthold Kuhn, “Civil Society in China: A Snapshot of Discourses, Legislation, and Social Realities,” *DOC Research Institute* (blog), June 11, 2019.

³ Christian Göbel, “Social Unrest in China: A Bird’s Eye View,” in *Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China*, ed. Teresa Wright (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 32–35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁶ Bonnie Au, “Chinese Protest against Waste-to-Energy Plant Project,” *South China Morning Post*, July 5, 2019.

⁷ “Chinese City Backs Down after Protests (No, It’s Not Hong Kong),” *Inkstone, South China Morning Post*, December 2, 2019.

⁸ Bonnie Au, “Chinese Protest against Waste-to-Energy Plant Project,” *South China Morning Post*, July 5, 2019; “Chinese City Backs Down after Protests (No, It’s Not Hong Kong),” *Inkstone, South China Morning Post*, December 2, 2019.

⁹ Louisa Chiang, “China’s New Media Dilemma: The Profit in Online Dissent,” Center for International Media Assistance, June 2019, 1, 3, 19.

¹⁰ Teresa Wright, “Introduction,” in *Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China*, ed. Teresa Wright (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 6–7; Guido Alberto Casanova and Giulia Sciorati, “China’s Civil Society after COVID–19: A Matter of Agency,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 20, 2020.

¹¹ Louisa Chiang, “China’s New Media Dilemma: The Profit in Online Dissent,” Center for International Media Assistance, June 2019, 14.

¹² Li Wenliang: Coronavirus Death of Wuhan Doctor Sparks Anger,” *BBC News*, February 7, 2020; Li Yuan, “Widespread Outcry in China Over Death of Coronavirus Doctor,” *New York Times*, February 7, 2020.

¹³ Lu Fakui, “Yuqing guancha: Li Wenliang qushi hou huliaiwang shang de yi ye” [Public opinion monitor: a night on the internet after Li Wenliang’s passing], *Initium Media*, February 6, 2020.

¹⁴ Emily Feng, “Inside China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Advocates,” *NPR*, September 6, 2019; Shawn Shieh, “Remaking China’s Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, August 2, 2018.

¹⁵ Young Activists Alliance, “Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019),” February 14, 2020, 7.

¹⁶ Young Activists Alliance, “Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019),” February 14, 2020, 18–19; Joyce Huang, “Rights Group Demands Immediate Release of ‘iLabour Three’ as China Deepens Crackdown on Labor Activists,” *Voice of America*, August 12, 2019.

¹⁷ Dui Hua Foundation, “Leftist Dissent Under Xi: The Young Leftists Part II, Who Are the Young Leftists?,” *Dui Hua Human Rights Journal*, January 9, 2020; Joyce Huang, “Rights Group Demands Immediate Release of ‘iLabour Three’ as China Deepens Crackdown on Labor Activists,” *Voice of America*, August 12, 2019.

¹⁸ Joyce Huang, “Rights Group Demands Immediate Release of ‘iLabour Three’ as China Deepens Crackdown on Labor Activists,” *Voice of America*, August 12, 2019. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2019-00127 on Wei Zhili, 2019-00128 on Ke Chengbing, and 2019-00129 on Yang Zhengjun.

¹⁹ Emily Feng, “Inside China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Advocates,” *NPR*, September 6, 2019.

²⁰ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China: Release Human Rights Lawyer Chang Weiping & End the Current Round of Arrests,” January 15, 2020.

²¹ Young Activists Alliance, “Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019),” February 14, 2020, 6, 15, 19, 21, 25–26, 28–29, 32.

²² *Ibid.*, 7.

²³ *Ibid.*, 16–18, 22, 28–29.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 16, 17, 22–24.

²⁵ Young Activists Alliance, “Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019),” February 14, 2020, 18; Shen Lu, “Thwarted at Home, Can China’s Feminists Rebuild a Movement Abroad?,” August 28, 2019; Han Zhang, “Grief and Wariness at a Vigil for Li Wenliang, the Doctor Who Tried to Warn China about the Coronavirus,” *New Yorker*, February 11, 2020.

²⁶ Young Activists Alliance, “Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019),” February 14, 2020, 16, 27; “LGBT Supporters Lobby for Same-Sex Marriage in Revised Civil Code,” *Sixth Tone*, December 20, 2019.

²⁷ Liu Jimmei, “Public Interest Litigations Are Pushing Environmental Charities to Professionalise,” China Development Brief, May 15, 2020; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa* [PRC Environmental Protection Law], passed April 24, 2014, effective January 1, 2015.

²⁸ Zhang Yang, Xu Jun et al., “Shehui zhili, gongjian gongzhi gongxiang” [Social governance: jointly building, administering, and sharing], *People’s Daily*, March 15, 2019; Ryan Etcorn, “Intermediary Nonprofits and the Rise of China’s Domestic Social Impact Ecosystem,” China Development Brief, August 30, 2019.

²⁹ Berthold Kuhn, “Changing Spaces for Civil Society Organisations in China,” *Open Journal of Political Science* 8, no. 4 (October 2018): 467–94; Ryan Etcorn, “Intermediary Nonprofits and

Civil Society

the Rise of China's Domestic Social Impact Ecosystem," China Development Brief, August 30, 2019.

³⁰Ryan Etcorn, "Intermediary Nonprofits and the Rise of China's Domestic Social Impact Ecosystem," China Development Brief, August 30, 2019.

³¹Ibid.

³²Shawn Shieh, "Remaking China's Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, August 2, 2018; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Cishan Fa* [PRC Charity Law], passed March 16, 2016, effective September 1, 2016.

³³Ryan Etcorn, "Intermediary Nonprofits and the Rise of China's Domestic Social Impact Ecosystem," China Development Brief, August 30, 2019.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Holly Snape, "Re-Writing the Rules: Assessing Civil Servants' 'Political Quality' Will Influence the Rules They Make for NGOs," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, August 1, 2019; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Fei Zhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei Huodong Guanli Fa* [PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities in Mainland China], passed April 28, 2016, effective January 1, 2017.

³⁶Jessica Batke, "'The New Normal' for Foreign NGOs in 2020," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, January 3, 2020; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Feizhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei Huodong Guanli Fa* [PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China], passed April 28, 2016, effective January 1, 2017.

³⁷Shawn Shieh, "Remaking China's Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, August 2, 2018.

³⁸Jessica Batke, "'The New Normal' for Foreign NGOs in 2020," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, January 3, 2020.

³⁹"Asia Catalyst," China Development Brief, accessed March 31, 2020; Gerry Shih, "China Announces Sanctions against U.S.-based Nonprofit Groups in Response to Congress's Hong Kong Legislation," *Washington Post*, December 2, 2019. See also Asia Catalyst, "What We Do," accessed March 31, 2020.

⁴⁰Shen Tingting, "A Rare Rights Victory in China," *The Diplomat*, March 17, 2020.

⁴¹Gerry Shih, "China Announces Sanctions against U.S.-based Nonprofit Groups in Response to Congress's Hong Kong Legislation," *Washington Post*, December 2, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "2019 nian 11 yue 25 ri wajiaobu fayanren Geng Shuang zhuchi lixing jizhe hui" [November 25, 2019 Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesperson Geng Shuang's regular press conference], November 25, 2019; Siodhbhra Parkin, "First U.S. NGO Accused of Breaking the Overseas NGO Law," *SupChina*, November 25, 2019; "Chinese Government Says It Has 'Punished' U.S. NGO under the Foreign NGO Law," *China NGO Project*, *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, November 25, 2019.

⁴²Siodhbhra Parkin, "First U.S. NGO Accused of Breaking the Overseas NGO Law," *SupChina*, November 25, 2019; "Chinese Government Says It Has 'Punished' U.S. NGO under the Foreign NGO Law," *China NGO Project*, *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, November 25, 2019.

⁴³*Wuhan shi Xinguan Feiyan Fangkong Zhihui bu fabu di 4 hao Tonggao* [Wuhan Municipality Novel Pneumonia Prevention and Control Command Center issues notice no. 4], January 23, 2020, reprinted in *Xinhua*, January 23, 2020; *Hubei sheng Fabu Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran De Feiyan Fangkong Zhihui bu Tonggao* [Hubei Province issues notice from New Coronavirus Disease Pneumonia Prevention and Control Command Center], January 26, 2020; Ministry of Civil Affairs, *Minzhengbu Guanyu Dongyuan Cishan Liliang Yifa Youxu Canyu Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran De Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Gongzuo De Gonggao* [Announcement on Mobilizing Charities' Lawful and Orderly Participation in Efforts to Prevent and Control the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic], January 26, 2020; Holly Snape, "China Alters Civil Society Rules, Allowing More Groups to Respond to Coronavirus," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, March 5, 2020.

⁴⁴Holly Snape, "China Alters Civil Society Rules, Allowing More Groups to Respond to Coronavirus," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, March 5, 2020.

⁴⁵Li Yuan, "In Coronavirus Fight, China Sidelines an Ally: Its Own People," *New York Times*, February 18, 2020.

⁴⁶Yuan Ye, "In Virus-Stricken Hubei, Locals Keep Hospitals Supplied," *Sixth Tone*, February 12, 2020.

⁴⁷Holly Snape, "China Alters Civil Society Rules, Allowing More Groups to Respond to Coronavirus," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, March 5, 2020.

⁴⁸Li Yuan, "In Coronavirus Fight, China Sidelines an Ally: Its Own People," *New York Times*, February 18, 2020; Bu Dao Ke (@buyidao2016), "Yuanzhu Wuhan de wuzi, weihe chi chi song bu dao yixian?" [Why are supplies sent to aid Wuhan slow or unable to reach the front lines?], WeChat post, January 28, 2020.

⁴⁹Li Yuan, "In Coronavirus Fight, China Sidelines an Ally: Its Own People," *New York Times*, February 18, 2020; Holly Snape, "China Alters Civil Society Rules, Allowing More Groups to Respond to Coronavirus," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, March 5, 2020; Ministry of Civil Affairs, *Guanyu Jinfang Bufa Fenzi Jiajie Yiqing Cishan Mujuan Mingyi Jinxing Zhapian De Tishi* [Notice on Guarding against Law-breakers Scamming in the Name of Epidemic Charitable Donations], March 6, 2020.

⁵⁰Lin Hong (@nulishehui), "Yiqing zhong, minjian zijiu xingdong de lianyi xiaoying" [The ripple effect of civilian self-help operations during the epidemic], WeChat post, February 27, 2020; Ginkgo Fellows in COVID-19 Relief Action International Relief Team, "Practical Advice on COVID-19: Emergency Supply of Oxygen Concentrators," 6.

⁵¹Chu Hua, "Wuhan zhiyuanzhe siji: pa bingdu dan geng pa houhui shenme dou mei zuo" [Wuhan volunteer driver: Afraid of the virus, but more afraid of regretting doing nothing], *Kankan Xinwen*, February 7, 2020; Cai Yiwen, "Civic Groups Want to Help Fight COVID-19. So Why's It So Hard?," *Sixth Tone*, March 11, 2020; Yuan Ye, "In Virus-Stricken Hubei, Locals Keep Hospitals Supplied," *Sixth Tone*, February 12, 2020.

⁵²Yuan Ye, "In Virus-Stricken Hubei, Locals Keep Hospitals Supplied," *Sixth Tone*, February 12, 2020; Cai Yiwen, "Civic Groups Want to Help Fight COVID-19. So Why's It So Hard?," *Sixth Tone*, March 11, 2020.

⁵³Cai Yiwen, "Civic Groups Want to Help Fight COVID-19. So Why's It So Hard?," *Sixth Tone*, March 11, 2020.

⁵⁴Alexandra Stevenson, "'I Felt Like Crying': Coronavirus Shakes China's Expecting Mothers," *New York Times*, February 28, 2020.

⁵⁵Wei Furong, "Wusheng de zhan 'yi': Wuhan chengnei de longyaren" [Silent battle: the deaf and mute inside Wuhan], *Beijing News*, February 20, 2020.

⁵⁶China Labour Bulletin, "Yiqing xia quebao huanwei gongren fanghu, gonghui zuzhi da you ke wei" [Labor union organizations show promise in ensuring the protection of environmental sanitation workers during the epidemic], February 20, 2020.

⁵⁷Wang Lianzhang, "In a City under Lockdown, a Race to Deliver Anti-HIV Drugs," *Sixth Tone*, March 6, 2020.

⁵⁸"The Remarkable Online Volunteers of the COVID-19 Outbreak," China Development Brief, March 5, 2020.

⁵⁹Cao Li, "She Left Wuhan to Become a Journalist. She's Back in Time to Get the Story.," *New York Times*, April 7, 2020; He Huijuan, "Life on Wuhan's Virtual Front Lines," *Sixth Tone*, February 28, 2020; Emily Feng, "China Says It Contained COVID-19. Now It Fights to Control the Story.," *NPR*, May 7, 2020.

⁶⁰Lin Hong (@nulishhui), "Yiqing zhong, minjian ziju xingdong de lianyi xiaoying" [The ripple effect of civilian self-help operations during the epidemic], WeChat post, February 27, 2020; He Huijuan, "Life on Wuhan's Virtual Front Lines," *Sixth Tone*, February 28, 2020; Pien Huang and Huo Jingnan, "Life in Lockdown: From Shock to Panic to . . . Acceptance," *NPR*, March 18, 2020; Cao Li, "She Left Wuhan to Become a Journalist. She's Back in Time to Get the Story.," *New York Times*, April 7, 2020.

⁶¹He Huijuan, "Life on Wuhan's Virtual Front Lines," *Sixth Tone*, February 28, 2020.

⁶²Wu Haiyun, "China's Students Battle Coronavirus from behind Their Keyboards," *Sixth Tone*, February 4, 2020.

⁶³Christoph Koettl, Muye Xiao, Nilo Tabrizy, and Dmitriy Khavin, "China Is Censoring Coronavirus Stories. These Citizens Are Fighting Back.," *New York Times*, February 23, 2020; Emily Feng, "China Says It Contained COVID-19. Now It Fights to Control the Story.," *NPR*, May 7, 2020.

⁶⁴Ministry of Civil Affairs, "Cishan zuzhi, Hongshizihui yifa guifan kaizhan yiqing fangkong cishan mujuan deng huodong zhiyin" [Charitable organizations, Red Cross standardize implementation of charitable donation and other activities for epidemic relief according to law], February 14, 2020; Ministry of Civil Affairs, *Guanyu Jinfang Bufa Fenzi Jiajie Yiqing Cishan Mujuan Mingyi Jinxing Zhapian De Tishi* [Notice on Guarding Against Law-Breakers Scamming in the Name of Epidemic Charitable Donations], March 6, 2020; Holly Snape, "China Alters Civil Society Rules, Allowing More Groups to Respond to Coronavirus," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, March 5, 2020.

⁶⁵Cai Yiwen, "Civic Groups Want to Help Fight COVID-19. So Why's It So Hard?," *Sixth Tone*, March 11, 2020.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Yuan Ye, "In Virus-Stricken Hubei, Locals Keep Hospitals Supplied," *Sixth Tone*, February 12, 2020; Yuen Yuen Ang, "When COVID-19 Meets Centralized, Personalized Power," *Nature Human Behaviour* 4, no. 5 (May 2020): 445-47.

⁶⁸Gabriel Corsetti, "Civil Society Finds New Paths in Wuhan," China Development Brief, February 29, 2020. See also Gabriel Corsetti, "New Controversy over the Handling of Public Health Donations," China Development Brief, February 17, 2020.

⁶⁹"Zhengfu doudi caigou shouchu yiqing zhongdian yiliao wuzi, guojia tongyi diaobo" [Government reveals its purchasing and stockpiling of key epidemic medical equipment, allocated evenly across the country], *Beijing News*, February 9, 2020.

⁷⁰Yuan Ye, "In Virus-Stricken Hubei, Locals Keep Hospitals Supplied," *Sixth Tone*, February 12, 2020.

⁷¹Li Yuan, "In Coronavirus Fight, China Sidelines an Ally: Its Own People," *New York Times*, February 18, 2020; Yuan Ye, "In Virus-Stricken Hubei, Locals Keep Hospitals Supplied," *Sixth Tone*, February 12, 2020.

⁷²Ian Johnson, "Religious Groups in China Step into the Coronavirus Crisis," *New York Times*, February 24, 2020.

⁷³Emily Feng, "China Says It Contained COVID-19. Now It Fights to Control the Story.," *NPR*, May 7, 2020.

⁷⁴Emily Feng, "China Says It Contained COVID-19. Now It Fights to Control the Story.," *NPR*, May 7, 2020; "Beijing 3 ming 90 hou yiqing zhiyuanzhe bei jingfang dai zou, muqian bei zhiding zhusuo jianzhi juzhu" [Three epidemic volunteers from the 90s generation taken away by police, currently under residential surveillance at a designated location], *Radio Free Asia*, April 25, 2020.

⁷⁵Emily Feng, "China Says It Contained COVID-19. Now It Fights to Control the Story.," *NPR*, May 7, 2020.

⁷⁶Kristin Huang, "Coronavirus Lockdown: Woman Charged with Organising Protests against Overpriced Food, Bad Management," *South China Morning Post*, April 19, 2020.

⁷⁷Wenqing Kang, "The Decriminalization and Depathologization of Homosexuality in China," in ed. Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen, *China In and Beyond the Headlines* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 237-39.

⁷⁸Rebecca Davis, "China's New Internet Censorship Rules Outline Direction for Content," *Variety*, January 3, 2020.

⁷⁹Young Activists Alliance, "Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019)," January 2020, 27.

Civil Society

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 28–29, 32.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 29, 31.

⁸² Young Activists Alliance, “Annual Report on Chinese Young Activists (2019),” January 2020, 27, 30–31; “LGBT Supporters Lobby for Same-Sex Marriage in Revised Civil Code,” *Sixth Tone*, December 20, 2019. See also LGBT Rights Advancement Association (@LGBTquancuhui), “Xia yici yao deng hen jiu! Women yao ba tongxing hunyin jiaru Minfa Dian,” [A long wait for the next time! We must add same-sex marriage to the Civil Code], WeChat, November 6, 2019; LGBT Rights Advancement Association (@LGBTquancuhui), “Ai cheng jia zhi Quanguo Renda Fagongwei de gongkai xin” [Love makes a family, public letter to the National People’s Congress Legislative Affairs Commission], WeChat, November 29, 2019.

⁸³ Darius Longarino, “Converting the Converters,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, October 18, 2019.

⁸⁴ Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, *Beijing dangdang wang xinxi jishu youxian gongsi deng laodong zhengyi ershen minshi panjueshu* [Civil judgment in second instance trial of labor dispute involving Beijing Dangdang Internet Information Technology Ltd. Co., etc.], (2019) Jing 02 Ming Zhong No. 11084, January 13, 2020, reprinted in *China Judgements Online*; Timmy Shen, “China’s Transgender Community Welcomes Court Ruling on Employment Discrimination,” *Caixin Global*, July 6, 2020.

⁸⁵ Fan Yiyang, “Zhejiang Court Hears Transgender Discrimination Case,” *Sixth Tone*, December 3, 2019.

⁸⁶ United Nations Development Programme and China Women’s University, “Legal Gender Recognition in China: A Legal and Policy Review,” United Nations Development Programme and China Women’s University, August 5, 2018, 21–22.

⁸⁷ United Nations Development Programme and China Women’s University, “Legal Gender Recognition in China: A Legal and Policy Review,” August 5, 2018, 25; Amnesty International, “China: ‘I Need My Parents’ Consent to Be Myself’: Barriers to Gender-Affirming Treatments for Transgender People in China,” ASA 17/0269/2019, May 9, 2019, 8.

⁸⁸ United Nations Development Programme and China Women’s University, “Legal Gender Recognition in China: A Legal and Policy Review,” August 5, 2018, 21.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 27–31.

⁹⁰ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 12. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 17; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed May 29, 2020. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. See also Amnesty International, “China: ‘I Need My Parents’ Consent to Be Myself’: Barriers to Gender-Affirming Treatments for Transgender People in China,” ASA 17/0269/2019, May 9, 2019, 39–42. See also Sonia Onufer Correa and Viti Muntarhorn, “The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” International Commission of Jurists and International Service for Human Rights, March 2007, principles 2, 6, 17; Mauro Cabral Grinspan et al., “The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10: Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles,” International Service for Human Rights and ARC International, November 10, 2017.

⁹¹ United Nations Development Programme, “Being LGBTI in China: A National Survey on Social Attitudes towards Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Gender Expression,” 2016, 8, 40. See also United Nations Development Programme and China Women’s University, “Legal Gender Recognition in China: A Legal and Policy Review,” August 5, 2018, 44.

⁹² “Zhongguo shoubu Fan Jia Bao Fa mianshi tongjuren deng canzhao zhixing” [China’s first Anti-Domestic Violence Law appears, applies to cohabitation], *Beijing Times*, reprinted in *Xinhua*, December 28, 2015; Rainbow China, “Submission to Universal Periodic Review of China (3rd Cycle) on Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in China,” March 15, 2018, para. 4.

⁹³ “Zhongguo shoubu Fan Jia Bao Fa mianshi tongjuren deng canzhao zhixing” [China’s first Anti-Domestic Violence Law appears, applies to cohabitation], *Beijing Times*, reprinted in *Xinhua*, December 28, 2015; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiating Baoli Fa* [PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law], passed December 27, 2015, effective March 1, 2016, art. 37.

⁹⁴ Xu Chen and Wilfred Yang Wang, “How China Is Legally Recognising Same-Sex Couples, but Not Empowering Them,” *The Conversation*, October 1, 2019.

⁹⁵ Cui Fandi, “Beijing Approves Mutual Guardianship for Gay Couple,” *Sixth Tone*, August 12, 2019.

⁹⁶ Xu Chen and Wilfred Yang Wang, “How China Is Legally Recognising Same-Sex Couples, but Not Empowering Them,” *The Conversation*, October 1, 2019; Cui Fandi, “Beijing Approves Mutual Guardianship for Gay Couple,” *Sixth Tone*, August 12, 2019.

⁹⁷ Xu Chen and Wilfred Yang Wang, “How China Is Legally Recognising Same-Sex Couples, but Not Empowering Them,” *The Conversation*, October 1, 2019; Cui Fandi, “Beijing Approves Mutual Guardianship for Gay Couple,” *Sixth Tone*, August 12, 2019.

⁹⁸ Shen Lu and Katie Hunt, “China Bans Same-Sex Romance from TV Screens,” *CNN*, March 3, 2016.

⁹⁹ Rebecca Davis, “China’s New Internet Censorship Rules Outline Direction for Content,” *Variety*, January 3, 2020.

¹⁰⁰ CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 228.

¹⁰¹ Aja Romano, “China Has Censored the Archive of Our Own, One of the Internet’s Largest Fanfiction Websites,” *Vox*, March 1, 2020; Rebecca Davis, “China’s Gay Rights Stance Can’t Derail Demand for LGBT Films,” *Variety*, June 5, 2020; Yang Rui and Teng Jing Xuan, “In Depth: Author’s Jailing Rocks China’s Online Gay-Themed Fiction Community,” *Caixin Global*, May 27, 2019.

Civil Society

¹⁰²Aja Romano, “China Has Censored the Archive of Our Own, One of the Internet’s Largest Fanfiction Websites,” *Vox*, March 1, 2020; Phoebe Zhang, “Chinese ‘Gay Fiction’ Website Told to Stop Publishing Obscene Content,” *South China Morning Post*, May 24, 2019; Yang Rui and Teng Jing Xuan, “In Depth: Author’s Jailing Rocks China’s Online Gay-Themed Fiction Community,” *Caixin Global*, May 27, 2019.

¹⁰³UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2–3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 2016, para. 56(a).

¹⁰⁴Human Rights Watch, “‘Have You Considered Your Parents’ Happiness?’ Conversion Therapy against LGBT People in China,” November 15, 2017.

¹⁰⁵“Shouli ‘tongxinglian jiaozheng zhiliao’ an yuangao shengsu hou jieshou bentai zhuanfang” [Exclusive interview with first “gay conversion therapy” case plaintiff], *Radio France Internationale*, December 19, 2014.

¹⁰⁶“Homosexuality Not an Illness, Chinese Say,” *Associated Press*, reprinted in *New York Times*, March 8, 2001; Liu Jingwen (@tom-liujingwen), “Quanguo ‘you tong’ ‘kong tong’ yiliao jigou mingdan: Zhege shidai de lupishu” [National list of homosexual-friendly and homophobic medical institutions: The Green Book of this era], *Duoyuan Wenhua* [Diverse Culture] (WeChat), May 21, 2019.

¹⁰⁷“Many LGBT People in China Forced into Illegal ‘Conversion Therapy’: Groups,” *Reuters*, November 21, 2019.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/40/6, Advance Unedited Version, December 26, 2018, paras. 28.83, 28.86–28.90; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, Addendum, Views on Conclusions and/or Recommendations, Voluntary Commitments and Replies Presented by the State under Review, A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, Advance Version, February 15, 2019, paras. 28.83, 28.86–28.90; Michael Taylor, “China Urged to Take Action on LGBT+ Rights after Backing U.N. Changes,” *Reuters*, March 7, 2019. See CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 228.

¹¹⁰Amnesty International, “China 2019,” 2020; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 25.

¹¹¹United Nations Development Programme, “Being LGBTI in China: A National Survey on Social Attitudes towards Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Gender Expression,” 2016, 17, 20–21, 24–26.