

VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings

- During the Commission’s 2023 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party and government officials championed the “integration” of ethnic minorities, continuing the implementation of policies contravening the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures. The October 2022 election of Pan Yue to the Party Central Committee, following his June 2022 appointment to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, indicated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s policies of assimilation and “ethnic fusion” would likely be maintained.
- In May 2023, Hui Muslims in Yunnan province protested over official plans to forcibly remove Islamic features from a 13th-century mosque, plans that reflected authorities’ intentions to “sinicize” their community. Authorities cracked down on protesters, detaining dozens at the scene and subsequently urging others to surrender to authorities. Hui Muslims interviewed by international media expressed the belief that, following authorities’ demolition of domes and minarets of the mosques where they worshipped, authorities would begin to impose tighter restrictions on Muslims’ ability to practice their faith.
- In a case exemplifying the risks facing Mongols fleeing China to escape surveillance and persecution, on May 3, 2023, Chinese police officers detained 80-year-old Mongol historian and writer **Lhamjab Borjigin** in Mongolia and forcibly returned him to China.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to take the following actions:

- Develop programming, both in the United States and around the world, to preserve threatened cultures and languages. The Administration should expand grant programs to assist Uyghur, Mongol, and other ethnic and religious minorities in cultural and linguistic preservation efforts. The Administration should prioritize, and Congress should fund, research, exhibitions, and education related to these efforts.
- Urge the PRC government to abide by the protections guaranteed to ethnic minorities to speak, use, and receive an education in their mother tongue, under China’s Constitution, the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Urge Chinese authorities to repeal policies that infringe upon the rights of ethnic minorities to teach and learn in their own language. Press Chinese officials to release

Ethnic Minority Rights

political prisoners who were detained for their advocacy of language education rights.

- Urge Chinese authorities to allow Hui and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations to freely engage in Islamic religious rituals, as a matter of their right to religious freedom, and in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, as well as China's Constitution, which prohibit discrimination based on religion.

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Introduction

Authorities based the framework for the PRC's ethnic classification system, which divides the country into 56 ethnic groups (*minzu*), on an "Ethnic Classification Project" carried out by ethnologists and linguists primarily in the 1950s.¹ PRC authorities officially recognize 55 ethnic minority groups (*shaoshu minzu*), influenced by the Stalinist definition of "nationality," and nominally grant them a form of territorial autonomous governance in prescribed regions.² Anthropologist Gerald Roche of La Trobe University described the framework as a hierarchy that not only prioritizes the Han Chinese ethnicity and the Mandarin Chinese language but also subordinates other ethnic groups and languages, including unrecognized languages.³ [For more information on Chinese authorities' suppression of ethnic minority languages, see Chapter 17—Tibet.]

Party and Government Policy toward Ethnic Minorities

During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party and government authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law⁴ and international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.⁵ Chinese leader Xi Jinping promoted a historical narrative centering Han Chinese cultural identity and maintaining that all ethnic groups originated from a single Chinese nation.⁶ Party and government officials also championed the "integration" of ethnic minorities, continuing the implementation of policies contravening the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures.⁷ The October 2022 election of Pan Yue to the Party Central Committee, following his June 2022 appointment to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, indicated that Xi's policies of assimilation and "ethnic fusion" would likely be maintained.⁸ Pan has long endorsed such policies and has emphasized the need for different ethnic groups and religions to integrate into "Chinese civilization."⁹

Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture

During this reporting year, authorities implemented campaigns in Hui religious communities that were aimed at "sinicizing" Islamic practices,¹⁰ a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to practice their religion and culture.¹¹ Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques throughout China which serve Hui communities in order to "sinicize" the mosques and eradicate elements viewed as "Arabic" or "Middle Eastern."¹² According to U.S.-based Hui rights advocate Ma Ju, in Yunnan province alone, authorities have removed the domes and minarets from over two hundred mosques.¹³

In a report released in March 2023, Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation documented

Ethnic Minority Rights

a wide range of Party and government persecution of Hui Muslims in recent years.¹⁴ The report described how Party and government authorities carried out the mass detention of Hui Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the name of counterterrorism; closed mosques and detained Hui religious leaders as part of “sinicization” efforts; and displaced Hui communities as part of “poverty alleviation” programs.¹⁵ In addition, the report documented the harassment and detention of lawyers representing or seeking to represent Hui individuals detained for religious reasons.¹⁶

Hui Muslims in Yunnan Protest over Planned Partial Demolition of Mosque

In May 2023, Hui Muslims in Yunnan protested over official plans to forcibly remove Islamic features from a 13th-century mosque,¹⁷ plans that reflected authorities’ intentions to “sinicize” their community.¹⁸ On May 27, following the morning prayer, construction vehicles entered the courtyard of Najiaying Mosque, which is located in Nagu township, Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan, an area with a predominantly Hui Muslim population.¹⁹ Hundreds of police officers in riot gear also surrounded the mosque and blocked its entrance.²⁰ Authorities reportedly planned to demolish four minarets and a domed roof of the mosque—Arabic-style features that authorities approved in 2004 when the current mosque was constructed but that a court ruled illegal in 2020.²¹ Official plans called for the replacement of these features with traditional Chinese architectural features.²² Thousands of residents took to the streets to protest, with some residents throwing objects, such as water bottles and bricks, at police.²³ Police officers hit some members of the crowd with batons when they demanded to enter the mosque for noon prayers, escalating the clash.²⁴ Authorities also detained dozens of protesters at the scene.²⁵ Among those detained was imam **Ma Zichang**, who had led a crowd of protesters in prayer at the gate of the mosque.²⁶ Police retreated hours later, allowing the protesters to temporarily return to the mosque.²⁷

On May 28, Tonghai authorities issued a notice saying that the protests had “seriously disrupted social order” and that those who surrendered themselves by June 6 would be given a lighter punishment.²⁸ By May 29, authorities deployed drones to surveil residents, used loudspeakers to urge protesters to turn themselves in, and blocked internet and phone services with signal jammers.²⁹ Residents told Agence France-Presse on May 29 that several hundred police officers remained in Nagu.³⁰ Residents in the nearby town of Shadian, in Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan—where authorities had announced similar plans to destroy Islamic features of the town’s Grand Mosque—said that security personnel patrolled the town’s streets on May 28.³¹

Hui Muslims in Yunnan Protest over Planned Partial Demolition of Mosque

In June, international observers posted online an official notice issued on June 15, indicating that authorities would resume demolition work at the Najiaying Mosque on June 17.³² Bitter Winter, an online magazine that covers religious freedom in China, reported on June 28 that local police had recently called many residents living near the Najiaying and Shadian mosques to instruct them not to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to access international social media platforms or to take or post pictures or videos related to the “sinicization” of the mosques.³³

Nagu and Shadian are two important centers for Muslim worship and the education of imams, and Hui Muslims there have historically protested against official religious persecution.³⁴ The Najiaying Mosque in Nagu and the Grand Mosque in Shadian are among the last mosques serving Hui worshippers that have not had their Islamic features removed by authorities.³⁵ Local officials attempted to coerce residents of Nagu and Shadian into showing they agreed with plans for the “alteration” of Najiaying Mosque and the Grand Mosque, visiting residents’ homes to pressure them into agreement, and, in Shadian, threatening to reduce teachers’ pay and investigate business owners’ tax returns.³⁶ As Harvard anthropologist Ruslan Yusupov observed, since residents were not willing to say they agreed, authorities “attempt[ed] to resolve the emergent stalemate through a show of force and intimidation.”³⁷ Hui Muslims in Nagu interviewed by international media expressed the belief that, following authorities’ demolition of domes and minarets, authorities also would begin to impose tighter restrictions on Muslims’ ability to practice their faith.³⁸ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion and Chapter 18—Xinjiang.]

Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in the IMAR

During this reporting year, officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) continued to implement policies suppressing the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction in schools in the region.³⁹ The right of ethnic minorities to receive an education in their mother tongue is protected under international law⁴⁰ and is also protected under the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.⁴¹ In April 2023, the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC) reported that, according to the principal of a middle school in Hohhot municipality, IMAR, central government authorities had directed schools throughout the region to adopt Mandarin Chinese as the language of instruction for all subjects beginning in September 2023.⁴² SMHRIC published an audio recording it said was provided by the parent of a student at the middle school, during which the principal can also be heard telling parents that their school would implement the new policy beginning in May 2023.⁴³ SMHRIC’s report followed protests that took place in the IMAR in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian language instruction in several subjects in schools⁴⁴ as well as regional regulations that took effect in January 2022 regarding language, education, and ethnic unity that solidified official control and assimilation efforts.⁴⁵

Ethnic Minority Rights

Mongols Fleeing China Face Transnational Repression, Repatriation

In a case exemplifying the risks facing Mongols fleeing China to escape surveillance and persecution, on May 3, 2023, PRC police officers took into custody 80-year-old Mongol historian and writer **Lhamjab Borjigin** in Mongolia and forcibly returned him to China.⁴⁶ It is unclear whether security authorities criminally detained Lhamjab Borjigin and, if so, what the criminal offense is for which he was detained.⁴⁷ In a statement he wrote in March 2023 after he fled to Mongolia, Lhamjab Borjigin noted that authorities in the IMAR had required him to report regularly to the local public security bureau.⁴⁸ Public security officials restricted Lhamjab Borjigin's activities and movement after he was sentenced by a court in Xilinhot city, Xilingol (Xilinguole) League, IMAR, in or around August 2019, to one year in prison, suspended for two years.⁴⁹ In April 2019, the court had tried him on charges related to "national separatism," "sabotaging national unity," and "illegal publication and illegal distribution," according to the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center.⁵⁰ In July 2018, an official from the Xilinhot City People's Procuratorate reportedly told Lhamjab Borjigin that the criminal charges against him were connected to his Mongolian-language history of the Cultural Revolution.⁵¹

In another case of a Mongol from China experiencing transnational repression, in October 2022, Mongol language advocate Adiyaa⁵² was harassed by individuals sent by the PRC embassy in Thailand while he was held in a Thai immigration detention center.⁵³ Adiyaa arrived in Thailand in February 2021 after fleeing China with seven family members.⁵⁴ The individuals sent by the PRC embassy reportedly comprised Chinese police and public security personnel who attempted to make Adiyaa sign documents admitting to violating Chinese laws and agreeing to return to China, which he refused to do.⁵⁵ At the time of his detention, Adiyaa had obtained refugee status from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁵⁶ Thai immigration authorities released Adiyaa on bail around early November 2022,⁵⁷ and the UNHCR subsequently resettled Adiyaa in Canada.⁵⁸ [For more information on Adiyaa, see Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

Notes to Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights

¹Thomas Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (University of California Press, 2011), 3–12.

²See, e.g., Uradyn Bulag, “Nationality/Minzu,” China Columns, *Made in China Journal*, September 4, 2020. Uradyn Bulag discusses the complex historical and political forces that have influenced Chinese leaders’ use and promotion of the concepts of nation, nationality, race, and ethnicity denoted by the term “minzu.” See also “Minzu,” Xinjiang Documentation Project, University of British Columbia, accessed September 30, 2022; State Ethnic Affairs Commission, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, “Zhongguo minzu” [China’s ethnic groups], accessed June 13, 2023; Thomas Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (University of California Press, 2011), 11–12.

³Gerald Roche, “Articulating Language Oppression: Colonialism, Coloniality and the Erasure of Tibet’s Minority Languages,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 53, no. 5 (2019): 490, 493–501, 514.

⁴The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa* [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 53.

⁵Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 4; James Millward, “China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 23, 2023; “Interview: ‘They Are Away from Their Families, Language, Religion and Culture,’” *Radio Free Asia*, February 8, 2023.

⁶Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2022. See also “Xi Jinping zai Wenhua Chuancheng Fazhan Zuotanhui shang qiangdiao dan fu qi xin de wenhua shiming nuli jianshe Zhonghua minzu xiandai wenming” [Xi Jinping emphasized at the Symposium on Cultural Inheritance and Development [the need to] take up the new cultural mission and strive to build the modern civilization of the Chinese nation], *People’s Daily*, June 3, 2023.

⁷Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2022; James Millward, “China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 23, 2023; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “New Details Confirm China’s Goal of Total Erasure of Mongolian Language Education in Southern Mongolia,” April 11, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Will the Hui be Silently Erased?— A groundbreaking report on the Chinese government’s campaign to eliminate Hui Muslim identity and the crisis of survival for the Hui and Islam in China,” March 22, 2023; The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa* [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 53; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 4. For a discussion of officials’ implementation of policies contravening the rights of ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures during the 2022 reporting year, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2022 Annual Report* (Washington: November 2022), 162–165. See also “Ma Rong: Jinyibu zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi” [Further forge the common consciousness of the Chinese nation], *Global Times*, July 10, 2022.

⁸Aaron Glasserman, “Touting ‘Ethnic Fusion,’ China’s New Top Official for Minority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural Difference,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, February 24, 2023; Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2022; “(CPC Congress) List of Members of 20th CPC Central Committee,” *Xinhua*, October 22, 2022. The term “ethnic fusion” (*minzu ronghe*) refers to non-Han ethnic groups’ adoption of the language and customs used by the Han Chinese ethnic group.

⁹Aaron Glasserman, “Touting ‘Ethnic Fusion,’ China’s New Top Official for Minority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural Difference,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, February 24, 2023; Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2022; “Pan Yue: Yi Dang de Ershi Da jingshen wei zhiyin, fenli tuijin zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi gongzuo” [Pan Yue: Guided by the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, strive to promote the work of building the common consciousness of the Chinese nation], *Research on Agency Party-building*, no. 11, 2022, reprinted in Lanzhou University Party Committee United Front Work Department.

¹⁰Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023; Chen Tao, “Hui Mosques and Cemeteries ‘Sinicized’ in Qinghai, Yunnan, Beijing, and Shanghai,” *Bitter Winter*, September 23, 2022.

Ethnic Minority Rights

¹¹Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation, “Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?—A Groundbreaking Report on the Chinese Government’s Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,” March 22, 2023; James Jennion, “China’s Repression of the Hui: A Slow Boil,” *Diplomat*, June 15, 2021; Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” *NPR*, September 26, 2019; “Hui Muslims and the ‘Xinjiang Model’ of State Suppression of Religion,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, March 29, 2021.

¹²Chen Tao, “Hui Mosques and Cemeteries ‘Sinicized’ in Qinghai, Yunnan, Beijing, and Shanghai,” *Bitter Winter*, September 23, 2022; “China Remodels Major Mosque in Beijing to Remove Middle Eastern Influence,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 13, 2022; William Yang, “China’s Campaign to ‘Sinicize’ Islam Curbs Religious Freedom,” *Deutsche Welle*, June 7, 2023. See also Emily Feng, “Afraid We Will Become The Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” *NPR*, September 26, 2019; Jessica Batke, “Planting the Flag in Mosques and Monasteries,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, December 13, 2022.

¹³Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023.

¹⁴Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation, “Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?—A Groundbreaking Report on the Chinese Government’s Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,” March 22, 2023.

¹⁵Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation, “Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?—A Groundbreaking Report on the Chinese Government’s Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,” March 22, 2023.

¹⁶Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation, “Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?—A Groundbreaking Report on the Chinese Government’s Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,” March 22, 2023.

¹⁷Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, “Chinese Police Clash with Protesters over Plans to Demolish Mosque,” *Washington Post*, May 29, 2023.

¹⁸Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023.

¹⁹Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; “Hui Muslims and Police Clash in China’s Yunnan over Mosque Dome Demolition,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 30, 2023.

²⁰Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; “Hui Muslims and Police Clash in China’s Yunnan over Mosque Dome Demolition,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 30, 2023; Nicholas Yong, “Yunnan Protest: Mosque Closure Sees Clashes with Security Forces,” *BBC*, May 30, 2023.

²¹Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; Emily Feng, “The Plan to Remove a Mosque’s Domes in China Sparks Rare Protest,” *NPR*, May 31, 2023; Amy Hawkins and Chi Hui Lin, “Protesters Clash with Police in China over Partial Demolition of Mosque,” *Guardian*, May 30, 2023; Nicholas Yong, “Yunnan Protest: Mosque Closure Sees Clashes with Security Forces,” *BBC*, May 30, 2023.

²²Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023. See also Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023.

²³Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023.

²⁴Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023.

²⁵Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Emily Feng, “The Plan to Remove a Mosque’s Domes in China Sparks Rare Protest,” *NPR*, May 31, 2023.

²⁶Ma Ju (@majuismail1122), “!!Ju Najiaying renshi chongchu chongwei, maoxian chuan lai de xinxi . . .” [!According to the information from the Najiaying people who broke out of the siege], Twitter, June 2, 2023, 9:03 p.m. For more information on Ma Zichang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00137.

²⁷Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023.

²⁸Mingcheng Tonghai [Famous City Tonghai] (@lymbth), “Guanyu duncu xiangguan weifa fazui xianyi ren tou’an zishou de tonggao” [Notice urging relevant criminal suspects to surrender], WeChat post, May 28, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023.

²⁹Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Emily Feng, “The Plan to Remove a Mosque’s Domes in China Sparks Rare Protest,” *NPR*, May 31, 2023.

³⁰“Unspecified Numbers Arrested after Partial Mosque Demolition Sparks Protests in Southwest China,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *Hong Kong Free Press*, May 30, 2023.

³¹Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023.

³²Ma Ju (@majuismail1122), “Najiaying zuixin qingkuang!!” [The latest situation in Najiaying!!], Twitter, June 15, 2023, 7:35 a.m.; Wlodek Cieciora (@Frogdeck), “The administra-

Ethnic Minority Rights

tion of the Najiaying mosque announced yesterday . . .” Twitter, June 16, 2023, 1:57 p.m.; Chen Tao, “Yunnan, ‘Sinicization’ of Mosques, Temporarily Suspended After Protests, Started Again,” *Bitter Winter*, June 28, 2023.

³³ Chen Tao, “Yunnan, ‘Sinicization’ of Mosques, Temporarily Suspended After Protests, Started Again,” *Bitter Winter*, June 28, 2023.

³⁴ Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; Emily Feng (@EmilyZFeng), “2/ In my years of reporting on faith communities in China . . .,” Twitter, May 31, 2023, 8:06 p.m.

³⁵ Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023.

³⁶ Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023.

³⁷ Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023.

³⁸ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023. See also William Yang, “China’s Campaign to ‘Sinicize’ Islam Curbs Religious Freedom,” *Deutsche Welle*, June 7, 2023.

³⁹ For a discussion of the official implementation of policies restricting the use of the Mongolian language in schools in the IMAR in recent years, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2022 Annual Report* (Washington: November 2022), 164–165; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2021 Annual Report* (Washington: March 2022), 117–120.

⁴⁰ Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts.2(1), 4(2-4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27. See also PEN America, “Decision to Ban Uyghur Language in Xinjiang Schools an Attack on the Minority Group’s Linguistic and Cultural Rights,” August 3, 2017.

⁴¹ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyue Zizhi Fa* [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 36, 37.

⁴² Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “New Details Confirm China’s Goal of Total Erasure of Mongolian Language Education in Southern Mongolia,” April 11, 2023. See also “China Orders Mongolian-Medium Schools to Switch to Mandarin by September,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 11, 2023.

⁴³ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “New Details Confirm China’s Goal of Total Erasure of Mongolian Language Education in Southern Mongolia,” April 11, 2023.

⁴⁴ James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021; Christopher P. Atwood, “Bilingual Education in Inner Mongolia: An Explainer,” *Made in China Journal*, August 30, 2020; Christian Shepherd and Emma Zhou, “Authorities Quash Inner Mongolia Protests,” *Financial Times*, September 9, 2020. For more information on the fall 2020 protests, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2021 Annual Report* (Washington: March 2022), 117–19.

⁴⁵ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Jiaoyu Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Regulations], passed September 29, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, arts. 8–10; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Shishi “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzhi Fa” Banfa* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Measures on the Implementation of the “PRC Standard Spoken and Written Language Law”], passed September 29, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, arts. 1–4, 7–15, 18–26; James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021. For more information on the regulations issued in January 2022, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2022 Annual Report* (Washington: November 2022), 164–65.

⁴⁶ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Chinese Police Makes Arrest on Mongolian Soil, Deporting Prominent Writer,” May 11, 2023; Safeguard Defenders, “Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in Mongolia,” June 12, 2023. For more information on Lhamjab Borjigin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00105 and Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2020 Annual Report* (Washington: December 2020), 131.

⁴⁷ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Chinese Police Makes Arrest on Mongolian Soil, Deporting Prominent Writer,” May 11, 2023.

⁴⁸ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “A Testimony by Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer Lhamjab Borjigin,” March 27, 2023.

⁴⁹ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “A Testimony by Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer Lhamjab Borjigin,” March 27, 2023; “Ethnic Mongolian Author Sentenced, Placed Under ‘Community Correction’ Order,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 16, 2019.

⁵⁰ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Writer Tried behind Closed Doors as ‘National Separatist’, Pending Sentence,” April 11, 2019.

⁵¹ “Neimeng qi xun zuojia jiu zuo fanyi Hanzi zao qingsuan, dangju niyi fenlie zui qisu” [Translation into Chinese of Inner Mongolian 70-year-old writer’s old work is condemned; authorities plan to prosecute for separatism], *Radio Free Asia*, July 23, 2018.

⁵² Adiyaa’s name is listed as Wu Guoxing on Chinese identification documents. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Tortured by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian Activist Faces Deportation,” November 1, 2022; “Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 3, 2022.

Ethnic Minority Rights

⁵³ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Tortured by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian Activist Faces Deportation,” November 1, 2022; “Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 3, 2022.

⁵⁴ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Tortured by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian Activist Faces Deportation,” November 1, 2022.

⁵⁵ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Tortured by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian Activist Faces Deportation,” November 1, 2022; “Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 3, 2022.

⁵⁶ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Tortured by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian Activist Faces Deportation,” November 1, 2022; “Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 3, 2022.

⁵⁷ “Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 3, 2022.

⁵⁸ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Chinese Police Makes Arrest on Mongolian Soil, Deporting Prominent Writer,” May 11, 2023.