



“Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression”

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Thank you Senator Sullivan and Congressman Smith for holding today’s hearing on the political warfare the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is waging against Taiwan and for giving me the opportunity to testify. Many of the same CCP organizations and methods used to pressure Taiwan and squeeze its international space are the same ones used to monitor Chinese diaspora communities, to interfere in foreign political processes, and to steal technology and recruit expertise.

Awareness has grown of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee in recent years, but the CCP’s concept of united front work remains poorly understood despite its critical role in shaping the Party’s statecraft. As a concept, united front work is about identifying and rallying allies and neutrals to one’s cause, and then using them to isolate one’s adversaries or even to strike at them. Beijing’s political warfare against Taiwan is united front work playing out on a global scale. Just as the CCP is trying to cultivate local Taiwanese politicians to serve its interests on the island, the Party also is cajoling and cultivating countries to support its “One-China Principle” and unification to isolate Taiwan and its partners in the UN system. This is the same playbook that Beijing has employed to legitimize the CCP’s human rights abuses, such as those against Uyghurs, and to push back against any negative implication that the coercive labor transfer programs, the vast prison system, destruction of cultural icons and architecture, and putting Uyghur children in orphanages or state boarding schools are illegitimate or abusive.

I. The CCP’s Ambition and Commitment to Annex Taiwan

The CCP has a longstanding, stated commitment to unification with Taiwan. The Party’s leaders have stated this commitment to do so repeatedly to the Chinese people, foreign governments, and to international organizations. Beijing holds to a “One-China Principle” that relentlessly pushes foreign parties to accept. That principle, as stated in a white paper, “there is only one China in the world,

Taiwan is a part of China, and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.” From Mao Zedong to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the rhetoric on Taiwan consistently states the Party’s goal and reinforces the historical inevitability of Beijing’s annexation. Quotes like the following from Xi routinely feature in government communications: “The motherland must be unified, and it inevitably will be.” “The historic trend of national reunification and national rejuvenation is unstoppable. The complete reunification of the motherland must be achieved and will surely be achieved!” (See Table 1 for a selection of quotes.)

The CCP acts as if it already owns Taiwan and that any rhetorical or material support for Taiwan’s sovereignty or that of the Republic of China is a violation of the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As Hu Jintao put it when discussing his four-point guidelines for Taiwan policy, “Safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity is where a country’s core interest lies. On no account shall the 1.3 billion Chinese people allow anyone to undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The long-term consistency of Beijing’s position belies the danger of the current moment. Xi Jinping has diverged from his predecessors by emphasizing that Taiwan’s unification cannot be left for future generations. CCP officials also have taken to discussing the resolution of the Taiwan question in Xi’s “new era” construct. The “new era” refers to the new international situation in which Beijing finds itself as one of the world’s two leading powers and capable of deploying comprehensive national power to pressure Taiwan, its supporters, and others to accede to Beijing’s demands. The use of “new era” also can be read as Xi making Taiwan’s annexation a legacy issue. Finally, the U.S. Government made public that Xi gave orders to the CCP’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), to achieve readiness to fight and win a war subjugating Taiwan by 2027.

Table 1. Select Quotes From PRC Leaders	
Name, Title, Location, Date	Quote
Zhou Enlai (Premier) Report to the National People’s Congress July 30, 1955	“The Chinese people have two possible means to liberate Taiwan, namely by war or by peaceful means.”

<p>Lin Biao 9th Party Congress April 1, 1969</p>	<p>“The hundreds of millions of Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, armed with Mao Zedong Thought and tempered through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, are determined and full of confidence in victory. They are resolved to liberate their sacred territory of Taiwan and to resolutely, thoroughly, completely, and entirely wipe out any aggressors who dare to invade!”</p>
<p>Zhou Enlai (Premier and Vice chairman) 10th Party Congress August 24, 1973</p>	<p>“Taiwan must be liberated. Our great motherland must be [re-]unified. This is the common aspiration and sacred duty of all the people of our nation, including our compatriots in Taiwan.”</p>
<p>Hua Guofeng (Chairman and Premier) October 1, 1978</p>	<p>“The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan and accomplish the great task of national [re-]unification.”</p>
<p>Deng Xiaoping (Chairman of the CMC) June 22, 23, 1984</p>	<p>“Achieving national [re-]unification is the aspiration of the Chinese nation. If it cannot be accomplished in 100 years, it will be in 1,000 years.”</p>
<p>Zhang Wannian (Vice-chairman of CMC) Interview with U.S. News & World Report October 21, 1995</p>	<p>“If Taiwan declares independence, the PRC will certainly resort to force.”</p>
<p>Chi Haotian (Defense Minister) 70th Anniversary of the PLA Founding Event August 1, 1997</p>	<p>“The PRC would never renounce the use of force, specifically against the Taiwan independence movement, movement to split the motherland, and intervention by foreign forces.”</p>

<p>Zhu Rongji (Premier)</p> <p>Press Conference after the Ninth People's Congress</p> <p>March 15, 1999</p>	<p>“Our consistent approach to resolving the Taiwan issue is ‘peaceful [re-]unification and one country, two systems,’ but we will never commit to giving up the use of force.”</p>
<p>Jiang Zeming (Chairman)</p> <p>Speech at the Celebration of the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China</p> <p>July 2, 2001</p>	<p>“Taiwan’s status as a part of China is not subject to change. The Chinese Communists’ position on safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity is firm and unwavering.”</p>
<p>Hu Jintao (General Secretary)</p> <p>Report at the 18th National Congress</p> <p>November 8, 2012</p>	<p>“Any separatist attempt for Taiwan independence, which undermines the common interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, is doomed to fail.”</p>
<p>An Fensghan (PRC Taiwan Affair Office Spokesperson)</p> <p>Interview with the Wall Street Journal</p> <p>October 6, 2016</p>	<p>“Our position is steadfast on opposing any ‘Taiwan-independence’ activities. Any forces and any people should not underestimate the resolution of more than 1.3 billion people on the mainland.”</p>
<p>Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary)</p> <p>90th Anniversary of the PLA Founding Event</p> <p>August 1, 2017</p>	<p>"We will never allow any people, organization, or political party to split any part of Chinese territory from the country at any time, in any form...No one should expect us to swallow bitter fruit that is harmful to our sovereignty, security, or development interests.”</p>
<p>Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary)</p> <p>19th Party Congress</p> <p>October 18, 2017</p>	<p>“All activities of splitting the motherland will be resolutely opposed by all the Chinese people. We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot. We will never allow any person, any organization, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form.”</p>

Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary) Speech at a Meeting Marking the 110th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 October 9, 2021	“The Taiwan question arose out of the weakness and chaos of our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality. This is determined by the general trend of Chinese history, but more importantly, it is the common will of all Chinese people. As Dr. Sun [Yat-sen] said, ‘The tide of history is mighty. Those who follow it will prosper, while those who go against it will perish.’”
Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary) 20th Party Congress October 22, 2022	“Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete [re-]unification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakable commitment. It is also a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary) 20th Party Congress October 22, 2022	“The wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Complete [re-]unification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized!”
Xi Jinping (CCP General Secretary) New Year’s Speech December 31, 2023	“The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family. No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop the historical trend of national [re-]unification.”

Many people—including many Taiwanese—misread the above statements or dismiss them as meaningless propaganda rather than genuine signals of intent toward Taiwan. Such dismissals are unwarranted. First, many of these statements are given in speeches and documents intended for CCP audiences. They provide policy guidance and the process through which they are produced serve to mobilize the Party around that guidance. That guidance also has repeatedly included statements that the CCP will not renounce the use of force and that the Party reserves the right to use all necessary measures.

Second, the CCP’s treatment of those who it considers Chinese, especially those who do not accept the Party’s right to rule, has been marked by brutality. The CCP has been responsible for tens of

millions of unnatural deaths with a range from 40 to 80 million, counting those who died of famine during the Great Leap Forward.¹ **The Party's so-called "liberation" of Sichuan, Tibet, and East Turkestan (today's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, XUAR) does not suggest that it holds back or rapidly moves toward reconciliation. The Party killed hundreds of thousands of people in the recently conquered territories, and arguably Sichuan suffered more than the minority areas despite having an ethnic Chinese majority. Mao Zedong also unleashed the Chinese people against the central CCP and state bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution, killing at least another one to two million people. Despite the CCP's record, General Secretary Xi Jinping still brazenly noted that "Chinese people do not fight Chinese people (中国人不打中国人)" in his speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Letter to Taiwan Compatriots.**² It would be fairer and more historically accurate to suggest that no one knows more about fighting Chinese people than the CCP—and no other political party has proven as willing to do so as the CCP.

Third, the CCP has been willing to pay costs far higher than external observers would consider acceptable or rational. Over the last two decades in the XUAR, the CCP has put into place invasive human and technical surveillance systems; processed millions people in the form of incarceration, re-education, and coerced migration; and started re-engineering local society to be more acceptable to CCP norms. The ostensible causes were a few, relatively small terrorist attacks. Internationally, Western observers tend to believe that Vietnam won the 1979 war with the PRC, because of the high casualties inflicted on the People's Liberation Army. Yet, Hanoi learned the political lessons that Beijing wanted Vietnam to learn, and Deng Xiaoping benefitted domestically and in U.S.-PRC relations.

The CCP's clear intentions and threat to annex Taiwan make CCP political warfare against Taiwan far more serious than those operations conducted in the context of a strategic rivalry, such as the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather than sparring for strategic advantage, the CCP is trying to disrupt Taiwan's political, economic, and social order, to demoralize Taiwanese society, and to isolate Taiwan. Pushing back on the CCP's political warfare requires a society with a shared understanding of the threat, debating how to respond but not debating whether such a threat exists.

¹ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/>

² http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-02/27/c_1124171945.htm

II. The Range of Political Warfare Operations Against Taiwan

The CCP's political warfare against Taiwan is a key strategy in its goal of annexation, complementing its military aggression. It extends beyond traditional intelligence gathering to undermine Taiwan's societal cohesion, institutional integrity, and will to resist. Key components include united front activities, intelligence operations and cyber operations, each serving to shape perceptions, exploit vulnerabilities, and weaken resistance from within.

United Front: Mao Zedong described the purpose of united front work as mobilizing the Party's friends to strike at the Party's enemies. In Taiwan's case, Wang Huning, the head of CPPCC, described the general activities of united front work as "uniting the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots, firmly supporting pro-reunification forces on the island, resolutely cracking down on 'Taiwan independence' provocations, and shaping the momentum toward the inevitable reunification of the motherland."³

The CCP's united front work in Taiwan is broad and far-reaching. It generally falls into four categories: local-level exchanges, youth exchanges, cultural exchanges, and economic exchanges. The CCP uses every available opportunity, whether it's hosting or participating in events, private meetings, or other interactions, to build up the connection and convey the intended messages to the participants.

The following are some recent examples:

- Local-level exchanges: In 2024, delegations from the local city and county councils, including from Penghu and Kinmen, visited the PRC. The head of TAO asked them to "recognize that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one country" and "commit to promoting cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation, and deepening integrated development across various sectors."⁴ A range of other local exchanges took place in 2024, including delegations led by borough chiefs of Taoyuan,⁵ the head of Miaoli County,⁶ and the deputy head of Nantou County.⁷
- Youth: Last week, the Cross-Strait Youth Development Forum was hosted in Hangzhou. The deputy head from the Taiwan Affairs Office encouraged participants to "contribute their youthful energy to the peaceful and integrated development of cross-Strait relations and the cause of national reunification."⁸ It was reported that 700 individuals from Taiwan participated in the event.⁹ Former Chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chairwoman of

³ http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/headline/202502/t20250226_12686339.htm

⁴ http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/news/202410/t20241024_12658559.htm; http://www.news.cn/mrdx/2024-08/23/c_1310785007.htm

⁵ http://www.taiwan.cn/local/dfkx/202412/t20241231_12675063.htm

⁶ <https://www.shou.edu.cn/2024/1217/c147a336883/page.htm>

⁷ <https://gd.huaxia.com/c/2024/10/22/1970964.shtml>

⁸ <http://www.news.cn/politics/20250711/c9e5889e77c24a45a9014ae603a41743/c.html>

⁹ <https://www.52hrtt.com/klln/n/w/info/F1752028657318>

the Chinese Cyan Geese Peace Education Foundation Hung Hsiu-chu also attended the event.

- Culture: In June, the second Cross-Strait Chinese Culture Summit was hosted in Beijing. Wang Huning met with the Taiwanese participants, including famous lyricist Vincent Fang, singer Chyi Yu, and writer Yang Du, and stated that “Chinese culture is the root and soul of people on both sides of the Strait... must stand together on the foundation of Chinese culture, ...and firmly take our nation’s future into us Chinese people's own hands.”¹⁰
- **Economics: In April this year, a delegation of the Third Wednesday Association (中華民國三三企業交流會) whose 79 members include TSMC, Foxconn, and other big companies in Taiwan, visited Guangdong. The governor asked the organization to “uphold the One–China principle and the ‘1992 Consensus,’ firmly oppose ‘Taiwan independence,’ and act as a bridge and link to the fullest extent.” The chairman of the organization gave a positive response by saying that they have “always upheld the stance that ‘both sides of the strait are one family,’” and will “continue to promote cross–Strait economic and trade exchanges and cooperation.”¹¹**
- Politics: The CCP tries to cultivate relationships with all political parties in Taiwan. With the DPP, the ruling party, the engagement is usually more opaque. Recent espionage cases involving DPP members demonstrate that the CCP, although criticizing its pro-independence stance, still has been trying to build relationships with individuals within the party.¹² With the main opposition party, the KMT, along with other smaller fringe parties like the New Party, the People First Party, and the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union, the CCP claims to have established communication and consensus on “support for the ‘1992 Consensus,’ opposition to ‘Taiwan independence’ and foreign interference, promotion of cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, advancement of integrated development, well-being for people on both sides, and the joint rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”¹³ The Taiwan People’s Party, the relatively new political party established in 2019, was also a target of the CCP.

¹⁰ <http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/20250528/a523a2f890f04a9c9c57d1d38d6da6c8/c.html>;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ubphN1D5Fc>

¹¹ https://www.gd.gov.cn/xxts/content/post_4701075.html

¹²

https://www.storm.mg/article/5353486?mode=whole&fbclid=IwY2xjawLnoLNleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFGdDZsVG8wVFdqVXZ5WFU0AR6lUPfdl8yU3zXnHX-Bz6RUH1UsdyYaqFTxOo3siubh8iALp8XUNmmBv1kYdQ_aem_u0MW4SFDQlrLaN5joRuXpw

¹³ http://www.gwytyb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202401/t20240117_12594364.htm

Jamestown has identified at least 150 Taiwanese organizations connected to the CCP's united front system, including business associations, religious groups, media, and other types of organizations.

Intelligence operations: The CCP's intelligence activities in Taiwan are not merely about information collection but also tools aimed at weakening Taiwan's institutions and morale. Taiwan's counterintelligence faces significant pressure, with 64 cases prosecuted in 2024 alone. It's likely that it's just a glimpse of the CCP intelligence iceberg. The CCP increasingly exploits financial vulnerabilities, offering cash bonuses for recruiting sub-sources and targeting operational-level military officers. Among the 64 cases in 2024, 43 cases were related to military personnel.¹⁴ Recruited agents are sometimes asked to swear loyalty oaths or record surrender pledges, reinforcing the psychological dimension of these operations.

The case of Lee Huei-hsin, the deputy leader of the Sun Alliance's Baoyang chapter, reportedly linked to the gangster group "Thento" union, touched on all recent features of the CCP's intelligence operations. She was recruited by the CCP in 2023 to develop organizations in Taiwan. She used her gangster network and a temple in New Taipei City as an espionage hub for the CCP. She specifically targeted financially vulnerable active-duty and retired military personnel.

- Exchange for information: Lee used money to lure military officers to obtain flight path maps, exercise schedules, and other classified military information. The higher the classification level, the more money the officers received. The information was valued between \$30,000 and over \$100,000 NTD, depending on the type of information.
- Incentives for recruiting sub-sources: If they successfully recruited active-duty personnel, they were paid extra.
- Loyalty pledges: If the recruits were active-duty personnel, Lee would ask them to film surrender videos pledging allegiance to the CCP with PRC flags and in military uniform, and shout lines like "Chinese don't fight Chinese—I oppose war!"¹⁵

Cyber operations: The CCP conducts persistent and sophisticated cyber operations against Taiwan, making it the most targeted country in the Asia-Pacific region. PRC-backed hackers use advanced techniques like "living off the land" to evade detection and maintain long-term access to networks. These attacks focus on government systems, diplomatic missions, critical infrastructure, and key industries such as semiconductors. Some operations also involve co-opting university networks and working with private sector proxies. The CCP's effort in cyber operations aims to prepare for

¹⁴ <https://ppg.ly.gov.tw/ppg/SittingAttachment/download/2025040112/10834825000010021002.pdf>

¹⁵

<https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E9%BB%91%E5%B9%AB%E5%85%B1%E8%AB%9C%E5%AE%8C%E4%BA%86%E5%A4%AA%E9%99%BD%E8%81%AF%E7%9B%9F%E8%AA%98%E8%BB%8D%E5%AE%98%E6%8F%E4%BA%94%E6%98%9F%E6%97%97%E6%8B%8D-%E6%8A%95%E9%99%8D%E7%89%87%E5%A4%A7%E5%A7%8A%E9%A0%AD%E5%88%A4%E5%B9%B4%E6%9C%88%E5%AE%9A%E8%AE%9E-090626876.html>

potential conflict, disrupt Taiwan's systems, and shape the information environment through coordinated propaganda and disinformation.

Recent examples:

- In 2024, Taiwan's National Security Bureau reported a sharp rise in cyberattacks, with daily incidents reaching 2.19 million, doubling from the previous year. These attacks, largely attributed to PRC-linked actors, targeted government agencies, defense, telecom, and transport infrastructure, and often coincided with PLA military exercises and events like Taiwan's Inauguration Day and the PRC's Two Session.¹⁶
- Between March and June 2025, four China-aligned hacker groups carried out coordinated spear-phishing campaigns targeting Taiwan's semiconductor firms, supply chain companies, and investment analysts. These campaigns used malware and phishing pages to harvest login credentials and implant spyware.¹⁷

III. International Dimensions of Political Warfare

Beijing's political warfare against Taiwan also is conducted internationally to constrict Taiwan's space and recognition, to legitimate its current and future actions, and to ensure that the Taiwanese people see a CCP-dominated world and future. The CCP cares little about whether Taiwan's contributions would be generally welcome or beneficial, simply whether Taiwan receives recognition in any meaningful way. One of the best examples of this came during the global COVID-19 pandemic in which Taiwan was repeatedly frozen out of the global health conversation as Taiwanese warnings went unheeded and, in one tragicomical episode, a World Health Organization official pretended to have connectivity issues when asked by a reporter about Taiwan.

Over the last decade, Beijing has steadily ramped up the pressure on Taiwan's international space and standing. The approach has been systematic in trying to get countries to support unification of Taiwan without reference to peaceful means; to switch official recognition from the ROC to PRC, stripping Taiwan of its official diplomatic relations; and to remove Taiwanese involvement from international organizations. All of these efforts are attempts to strip Taiwan of its *de facto* sovereignty and international role.

- Since the fall of 2023, Beijing has pushed countries that already supported the CCP's "One-China Principle" to support unification without the previous caveat of "peaceful reunification." Between bilateral engagements and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,

¹⁶ <https://ppg.ly.gov.tw/ppg/SittingAttachment/download/2025040112/10834825000010021002.pdf>

¹⁷

<https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E8%B7%AF%E9%80%8F%E6%9B%9D%E5%A4%9A%E7%B5%84%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E9%A7%AD%E5%AE%A2%E9%8E%96%E5%AE%9A%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E6%93%B4%E5%A4%A7%E8%A6%8F%E6%A8%A1%E5%B0%88%E9%96%80%E6%94%BB%E6%93%8A%E5%8D%8A%E5%B0%8E%E9%AB%94%E7%94%A2%E6%A5%AD-075800591.html>

the CCP has enlisted approximately 90 countries in signing a statement or issuing their own in support of unification.

- Over the last decade, more than 600 Taiwanese arrested overseas for criminal activities have been deported or extradited to the PRC. These deportations and extraditions have occurred at Beijing's requests and, at times, over Taipei's requests. The denial of Taiwan's responsibility for its citizens fundamentally undermines Taiwan's sovereignty.
- After the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 and continuing to the present day, Beijing aggressively courted countries that recognized Taiwan with bribes and blandishments. The CCP successfully turned 11 countries in this time period, halving the number of countries that recognized Taiwan. Many of these countries were courted through investment and graft that benefitted the leaders. Beijing promised investments, business deals, new construction, and more in exchange for switching recognition. Influential individuals around the leaders were cultivated through united front work to facilitate connections to the local political leadership.
- Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has launched an aggressive campaign around UN Resolution 2758, which handed the Republic of China seat at the United Nations to the People's Republic of China as China's seat. The CCP has misrepresented the resolution as providing a UN imprimatur to Taiwan or the Republic of China's being a part of the People's Republic of China. The apparent goal is to forestall any UN resolutions of support for Taiwan in the event of a war or other crisis by saying that the United Nations already has settled the question of Taiwan's status, its current and future status as a part of the People's Republic of China, and whether Taiwan's future is a domestic or international question. Beijing used its diplomatic engagements to solicit support for its position.

In international organizations, the CCP also has invested time, effort, and personnel to shape how they work. When Beijing is successful, the same internal power that allows the Party to redirect the organization's resources to benefit Beijing also can be used to pressure Taiwan. For example, during the crackdown on and mass imprisonment of Uyghurs in the late 2010s, the World Bank ran a vocational training program, supporting so-called vocational schools that were, in fact, makeshift prisons for incarcerating Uyghurs. (The CECC was the organization that identified this development in World Bank programs.) The CCP's ability to obfuscate the reality of the program inside the World Bank stemmed from its executive director gaining decisive influence over issues of risk and compliance, budget, and human resources. That same power also was used to prevent Taiwanese citizens from becoming full-time staff at the World Bank unless they had applied for and received a PRC identification card for Taiwanese compatriots.

The CCP also has escalated in ways that endanger the safety of Taiwanese citizens traveling or living abroad, especially if they visit countries with extradition agreements. In June 2024, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of

Justice issued the “Opinion on Punishing the Crimes of Secession and Incitement to Secession by “Taiwan Independence” Diehards According to Law (关于依法惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见).” The opinion criminalizes activities that can be construed as promoting Taiwanese independence, and mirrors elements of the Hong Kong National Security Law about working foreign or overseas organizations and individuals. The opinion authorizes the authorities to try Taiwanese separatists in absentia and to issue arrest warrants that the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security then execute. In Europe, at least 14 countries have extradition agreements with the PRC (or Hong Kong) that might be exploited. Moreover, the PRC’s willingness to kidnap individuals abroad and to pressure family members to force people to surrender themselves to the Party suggests cross-strait connections are soon to be weaponized on a larger and more personal level.

IV. Implications

All of these CCP efforts inside and outside of Taiwan are aimed at reinforcing a sense of inevitability about the Party’s ultimate victory over the ROC, over Taiwan, and over the people of Taiwan. The value for the CCP is creating a false choice for Taiwanese: fight against this historic inevitability and suffer, or accept this inevitability to find peace and prosperity. In the policy documents and speeches referenced in this statement, this point is made repeatedly. As Xi said, marking the 40th anniversary of the so-called “Letter to Taiwanese Compatriots, “The tide of our times — the cross-Straits situation moving toward peace and stability and cross-Straits relations continuing to move forward — is a tide that cannot be stopped by any force or anyone. The historical trend toward a stronger China, national rejuvenation, and reunification cannot be stopped by any force or anyone!”

Forcing countries to explicitly embrace the CCP’s “One-China Principle,” support efforts to “achieve national reunification,” or any of the other indignities with which countries must agree with Beijing is part of creating what Czech dissident Vaclav Havel called the “panorama of everyday life.” In his essay *The Power of the Powerless*, Havel wrote about a greengrocer who places a sign “workers of the world unite” in his shop window. Substitute countries or international organizations for greengrocer in Havel’s essay and the essence of the CCP’s political warfare becomes clear:

“It seems senseless to require the greengrocer to declare his loyalty publicly. But it makes sense nevertheless. People ignore his slogan, but they do so because such slogans are also found in other shop windows, on lampposts, bulletin boards, in apartment windows, and on buildings; they are everywhere, in fact. They form part

of the panorama of everyday life. Of course, while they ignore the details, people are very aware of that panorama as a whole. And what else is the greengrocer's slogan but a small component in that huge backdrop to daily life?

“The greengrocer had to put the slogan in his window, therefore, not in the hope that someone might read it or be persuaded by it, but to contribute, along with thousands of other slogans, to the panorama that everyone is very much aware of. This panorama, of course, has a subliminal meaning as well: it reminds people where they are living and what is expected of them. It tells them what everyone else is doing, and indicates to them what they must do as well, if they don't want to be excluded, to fall into isolation, alienate themselves from society, break the rules of the game, and risk the loss of their peace and tranquility and security.”

The CCP wants Taiwanese and others internationally to accept that PRC annexation of Taiwan or a final defeat of the Republic of China (which has been in continual existence since 1911) is the sole potential outcome. The Party wants everyone to ignore their own knowledge of historical contingency, of human agency and choice, and of the stubborn reality that Taiwan exists independent of the CCP and its totalitarian concept of China.

Countering political and cognitive warfare is a third element of defending Taiwan, both for the Taiwanese and for their partners. These CCP operations also highlight that the threat to Taiwan goes beyond conventional military operations and gray zone operations. Just as in these other areas, the CCP is able to bring to bear more resources and overwhelm Taiwan's ability to monitor and counter all of the different lines of effort.

V. U.S. Options

The United States has many options for how it can support Taiwan in countering the CCP's political warfare. Among them are the following:

- *Accept greater publicity for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation.* The United States cooperates with Taiwan a great deal outside of the public's view. Taiwan is a democracy, and its people need to know what its government is doing to protect them.
- *Support Taiwanese political leaders in frankly discussing the national security threats faced by Taiwan.* The United States has generally been ambivalent about Taiwanese leaders talking in clear and direct political terms about the threats Taiwan faces from the CCP and how to respond to them. Political warfare is a political problem that requires political solutions.
- *Provide more intelligence assistance for Taiwanese authorities to identify and disrupt CCP political warfare operations and collaborators.* The CCP's vast bureaucratic machine creates a kind of resiliency for their operations. Insight into one area or one unit is not the same as insight into another. In

all likelihood, U.S., Taiwanese, and other intelligence communities have different accesses into different parts of the CCP intelligence, influence, military, and other security systems.

- *Work with the Taiwanese on a new security clearance system.* To address the espionage threat, Taiwan needs a revamped security clearance system that is grounded in statute and provides the basis to remove untrustworthy individuals from sensitive positions. The current system is too ad hoc to serve as a useful deterrent.
- *Expand law enforcement collaboration to target Taiwanese organized crime and its involvement in narcotics trafficking and money laundering.* Taiwanese organized crime groups—like the Hong Kong triads—is a potential vector for causing chaos in Taiwan, and these groups often have the kind of personal or financial interests in the PRC that Beijing has historically been willing to exploit. The CCP's involvement in fentanyl precursor and other narcotics production as well as global money laundering offers an incentive for organized crime groups to collaborate with Beijing.