

## FREEDOM OF RELIGION

### *Findings*

- The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to constrain individuals and groups from freely forming and practicing their religious beliefs, instead seeking to order religious observance around loyalty to the Party and state.
- During the 2025 reporting year, the Commission observed a coordinated campaign, led by the United Front Work Department, to train religious personnel in the “strict governance of religion.”
- The Party sought to exert control over theological education and institutions across religious groups to ensure the political reliability of future religious leaders.
- The National Religious Affairs Administration published new regulations governing the religious activities of foreigners in China that create a more restrictive environment for non-PRC citizens to practice their own religion or interact with Chinese believers.
- The Party and government have continued their efforts to co-opt Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese folk religion while also pushing for further “sinicization” of these groups.
- This past year, PRC authorities continued to suppress dissent and inculcate ideological conformity in ethnic minority Muslim communities, including in Yunnan province, following tensions over mosque “rectifications” and other sinicization efforts.
- The Party continued to assert its ultimate authority over the Chinese Catholic Church, despite the renewal of the Sino-Vatican Agreement. In the interregnum period after the death of Pope Francis, local authorities conducted “elections” to select two bishops when papal approval would have been impossible.
- Authorities continued to raid unregistered Protestant “house” churches and detain their members, using fraud charges, exit bans, censorship, and surveillance to suppress and intimidate clergy and laity from exercising their religious beliefs.
- The Party and government have continued to direct considerable resources and attention toward the suppression and persecution of Falun Gong, often detaining, charging, and prosecuting practitioners under Article 300 of the *PRC Criminal Law*. The Falun Gong-affiliated website *Minghui* reported the deaths of dozens of Falun Gong practitioners due to mistreatment while in custody and hundreds of cases of practitioners being sentenced by authorities, apparently for their connection with Falun Gong.
- In addition to Falun Gong, the Party and government have designated 22 religious groups to be “cult organizations” or *xiejiao* (邪教), a historical term used by the Party to refer to new religious movements it perceives as threatening, and continue to subject them to persecution. Among these groups, authorities have engaged in a protracted and apparently nationwide crack-down against the Church of Almighty God, launching consecutive campaigns to eradicate the religious group.
- In at least two cases this past year, authorities detained Taiwanese citizens for participation in religious activities associated with supposed *xiejiao*.

## FREEDOM OF RELIGION

### *Introduction*

The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to constrain individuals and groups from freely forming and practicing their religious beliefs, instead seeking to order religious observance around loyalty to the Party and state. Since 2015, Xi has touted “sinicization” (*zhongguohua*, 中国化)—which emphasizes the need for PRC-based religious groups to “actively guide religion to adapt to socialist society”—as a major policy priority for religious affairs management.<sup>1</sup> To this end, during the 2025 reporting year, PRC authorities pursued several policy initiatives focused on more closely controlling religious groups, such as launching trainings in the “strict governance of religion” for clergy in the official or “patriotic” religious associations and imposing new and invasive restrictions on foreign religious believers based in China. Consistent with the *Patriotic Education Law* of 2024,<sup>2</sup> religious affairs officials also continued to emphasize the necessity of ideological and national identity formation in state- and Party-run religious higher education. As in previous years, while the Party and government closely supervised official groups, they also worked to suppress unsanctioned expressions of religious faith, including unregistered Protestant “house” churches, underground Catholic bishops, and members of groups that the government designates as “cult organizations,” or *xiejiao* (邪教) a historical term used by the Party to refer to new religious movements it perceives as threatening.

### *International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom*

International law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), protects the right to form, hold, and change beliefs without restriction while allowing such limited constraints on their outward manifestation as are “prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”<sup>3</sup> Additionally, Article 36 of China’s Constitution guarantees “freedom of religious belief” and protects “normal religious activities” but leaves “normal” undefined, allowing the government to stipulate what constitutes “normal” and to circumscribe religious activity that would otherwise be protected under the UDHR and the ICCPR.<sup>4</sup>

Since 2018, the Party and government have issued several key legal provisions to tighten control over religious activities, including the revised *Regulations on Religious Affairs* (2018),<sup>5</sup> *Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel* (2021),<sup>6</sup> *Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services* (2022),<sup>7</sup> and *Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities* (2023).<sup>8</sup>

### *Regulatory and Policy Developments*

#### STRICT GOVERNANCE OF RELIGION

During the 2025 reporting year, the Commission observed the launch of a coordinated campaign, led by the United Front Work Department (UFWD), to train religious personnel in the “strict

governance of religion.” According to one former unregistered Protestant or “house” church pastor, the UFDW<sup>9</sup> instituted the “strict governance” training program based on a December 2021 conference on religious affairs work, where Xi Jinping proposed that religious groups should “comprehensively and strictly govern religion.”<sup>10</sup> Since that time, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference chair Wang Huning, whom PRC observers and experts have characterized as highly influential,<sup>11</sup> has promoted the “strict governance” of religion across official religious groups.<sup>12</sup> UFDW head Shi Taifeng emphasized the importance of the “strict governance of religion” and called for strengthening ideological and political education during his visits to two ethnic minority regions in Gansu province: Linxia City, Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, and Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.<sup>13</sup>

The UFDW reportedly pioneered the “strict governance” trainings in the official Protestant church context, holding its first training in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province for 100 head pastors of 100 “major churches” from around the country in July 2024.<sup>14</sup> According to the China Christian Council and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (the joint governing bodies of the registered Protestant church in the PRC), the training focused on implementing the five-year plan for the sinicization of Christianity, including rooting out Western “colonial” influences from the Chinese Christian church, and on the importance of “strict governance of religion” to a Chinese model of church management.<sup>15</sup> Additional regional trainings were held throughout the reporting year, including in August, by the Ningde Municipal Taoist Association in Fujian province;<sup>16</sup> in February, by the Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province Catholic Patriotic Association;<sup>17</sup> and in April, by the Sichuan province Islamic Association.<sup>18</sup>

### Party Control of Seminaries and Religious Education

During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the Chinese Communist Party sought to exert control over theological education and institutions across religious groups in an effort to ensure the political reliability of future religious leaders.<sup>19</sup> Scholars Peitong Jing and Karrie J. Koesel point out that, while patriotic education is required in all PRC educational institutions, the percentage mandated in seminaries is “more than double of what is required in non-religious colleges and universities,” which they argue reflects PRC authorities’ securitization of religion.<sup>20</sup> Examples of Party involvement in theological education from this year include:

- **China Taoist College.** In September 2024, China Taoist College in Beijing municipality held its 2024 fall semester opening ceremony at Baiyun Temple.<sup>21</sup> Chinese Taoist Association President Li Guangfu gave a speech emphasizing the importance of patriotism and ideological alignment in Taoist education.<sup>22</sup> Speakers called on students to uphold the principles of the “sinicization of Taoism” and to integrate socialist values into their studies and future religious service.<sup>23</sup>

**Party Control of Seminaries and Religious Education—  
Continued**

- **China Islamic Institute.** In September 2024, the China Islamic Institute, which provides theological education and training for imams associated with the official Islamic Association of China (IAC), held a week of military training for students.<sup>24</sup> In an opening speech for the training, IAC vice-president Mu Kefa told students that military training was an important component of patriotic education and would increase their “national defense consciousness.”<sup>25</sup>
- **Jiangsu province theological institutions.** In August 2024, the Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission announced that authorities in the province had completed drafting syllabi for a series of courses at provincial theological schools meant to ensure that religious personnel are “politically reliable,” among other goals, and that leaders of Party-controlled religious associations and theological institutions had reviewed the materials.<sup>26</sup>

DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION RULES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF  
FOREIGNERS’ RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

In April 2025, the National Religious Affairs Administration published the *Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities* (hereafter, “*Rules*”),<sup>27</sup> new comprehensive regulations governing the religious activities of foreigners in China that may create an even more restrictive environment for non-PRC citizens to practice their own religion or interact with Chinese believers.<sup>28</sup> The *Rules* focus on several areas—religious interaction between foreigners and PRC citizens,<sup>29</sup> facilities used for, and personnel involved in, religious activities,<sup>30</sup> and oversight of foreigners participating in official religious exchanges.<sup>31</sup>

The *Rules* institute a series of provisions to ensure all religious interaction between foreigners and Chinese citizens takes place in environments subject to government monitoring and control. According to the new regulations, foreigners may only hold “collective” religious activities in designated registered religious facilities, such as official churches, temples, or mosques,<sup>32</sup> and activities must be led by an approved Chinese officiant, unless the organizers can demonstrate a need for a foreigner to preside.<sup>33</sup> If no registered religious facility exists in a given locality, foreigners may apply to use an alternative temporary location; the *Rules* stipulate that, in general, there should only be one temporary location approved per belief system in a given county-level jurisdiction.<sup>34</sup> Even if a Chinese clergyperson is presiding over the religious activity, no other Chinese citizens are permitted to attend religious ceremonies organized by foreigners.<sup>35</sup> Speaking to a U.S.-based Catholic publication, one PRC-based cleric said that the regulations are likely intended to serve as a “protective” tool for authorities; i.e., not all foreigners who attend a religious service with Chinese citizens will be legally sanctioned, but the *Rules* give authorities recourse to legal sanctions, if they deem them necessary.<sup>36</sup> Another clergyperson told the same outlet that the *Rules* make it “dangerous” for local religious

believers, especially in underground communities, to have contact with foreigners, with the effect of “cutting the Chinese [Catholic] Church off from the outside world.”<sup>37</sup> The *Rules* also target participants in religious exchanges, regulating the type and amount of religious materials that participants may bring into the PRC.<sup>38</sup> In the Party-run media outlet *Global Times*, the deputy director of a Zhejiang province-based research institute claimed that the new regulations would not restrict foreigners’ “normal” religious activities and were meant to prevent “extremism.”<sup>39</sup>

*Buddhism (non-Tibetan), Taoism, and Folk Religion*

Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party and government have worked to balance their efforts to control Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese folk religion with efforts to co-opt and leverage these supposedly more “sinicized” religious groups to their benefit.<sup>40</sup> Authorities reportedly view Taoism, a faith indigenous to China, as less susceptible to foreign influence, while Xi has lauded Buddhism as a successful model of “sinicization” and a “repository of China’s traditional culture.”<sup>41</sup> Yet the authorities have nevertheless insisted that these groups undertake ongoing efforts to more fully “sinicize,” often by participating in various “red” activities, cultural events, or political trainings.<sup>42</sup> Examples of sinicization initiatives in the Buddhist and Taoist contexts from the Commission’s 2025 reporting year include:

- The Hangzhou Municipal Taoist Association in Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, organized a group of core figures from affiliated temples to travel to Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province for a “Red Education” study tour, in response to a Zhejiang province patriotic education campaign.<sup>43</sup> The delegation visited revolutionary sites intended to instill appreciation for the “red spirit” and urge them forward in the sinicization of religion.<sup>44</sup>
- To celebrate the PRC’s 75th anniversary, the Jiangsu Provincial Taoist Association hosted a patriotic concert titled “Glorious 75 Years—Ode to the Motherland.”<sup>45</sup> The concert, co-organized by the Wuxi Municipal and Jiangyin City Taoist Associations, featured traditional Taoist music troupes from Jiangsu and a repertoire blending cultural pieces with overtly patriotic content, including the recitation of a work titled, “Love the Country, Love Religion.”<sup>46</sup>
- The Buddhist Association of Wuxi municipality, Jiangsu province, led its leadership on a patriotic study tour of revolutionary and Confucian sites in Qufu municipality, Shandong province,<sup>47</sup> the birthplace of Confucius.<sup>48</sup> Participants were directed to “cherish the revolutionary martyrs, boost cultural confidence, and enhance patriotic feelings” in an apparent effort to synthesize political, religious, and cultural identity.<sup>49</sup> [For more information on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists, see Chapter 14—Tibet.]

*Islam*

This past year, PRC authorities continued to suppress dissent and inculcate ideological conformity in ethnic minority Muslim communities, including in Yunnan province, following tensions over mosque

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“rectifications” and other sinicization efforts.<sup>50</sup> In December 2024, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province public security officials took into custody Imam **Ma Yuwei**, apparently in connection with his preaching.<sup>51</sup> According to a U.S.-based Muslim activist, authorities had designated Ma’s Yuxi mosque as a “site of illegal religious activity” and directed the mosque to shut down its long-running Quranic study class.<sup>52</sup> [For more on Ma Yuwei and protests over his detention, see Chapter 6—Ethnic Minority Rights.]

Authorities have continued their efforts to limit the number and autonomy of mosques in Hui Muslim communities.<sup>53</sup> The Party-affiliated Islamic Association of China (IAC) has tightened control over mosque management committees, which 2023’s *Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities* require be formed at all mosques, and which provide a conduit for Party and government messaging to and oversight of Muslim communities.<sup>54</sup> Also, scholars Hannah Theaker and David Stroup documented a campaign to reduce the overall number and concentration of mosques through mergers, often under the pretense of urbanization and cost savings.<sup>55</sup> In Qinghai and Gansu provinces, officials were reportedly told to aim for only a single mosque per village.<sup>56</sup>

In March 2025, the *South China Morning Post* (SCMP) reported that just prior to Ramadan the IAC removed the traditional mosque dome and stars from its logo and website, revealing a new logo featuring only Chinese characters.<sup>57</sup> The rebranding also included a change in the logo’s background color from green, which one expert called “integral to Islam,” to blue.<sup>58</sup> According to SCMP, the IAC had already taken down all Islamic imagery from its official website.<sup>59</sup> [For more information on Uyghur, Hui, and other Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and other locations, please see Chapter 6—Ethnic Minority Rights and Chapter 15—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

### Christianity—Catholic

#### THE SINO-VATICAN AGREEMENT AND THE STATUS OF BISHOPS

The Chinese Communist Party continued to assert its ultimate authority over the Chinese Catholic Church, in particular by appointing bishops without papal approval,<sup>60</sup> despite the renewal of the Sino-Vatican Agreement, which established a process for appointing bishops mutually recognized by both parties.<sup>61</sup> In October 2024, the Holy See announced that it would provisionally extend the Agreement for four more years.<sup>62</sup> During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China ordained two bishops under the terms of the Agreement: Bishop Zhen Xuebin, coadjutor bishop of Beijing diocese, Beijing municipality in October 2024,<sup>63</sup> and Bishop Ji Weizhong, bishop of Luliang diocese, Luliang municipality, Shanxi province in January 2025.<sup>64</sup>

PRC officials also ordained two bishops in apparent contravention of the Agreement during the period following Pope Francis’s death and preceding the appointment of a new pope, making Vatican approval impossible.<sup>65</sup> In April, the Asia-focused Catholic website *AsiaNews* said that, according to its sources, leaders in the Shanghai municipality Party-controlled official Church “summoned” local clergy and religious figures to ratify the “election” of Father Wu Jianlin



as auxiliary bishop.<sup>66</sup> In Xinxiang municipality, Henan province, officials reportedly facilitated the unopposed “election” of Father Li Jianlin as bishop, also during the interregnum period between popes.<sup>67</sup> Senior clerics in the PRC told another Catholic outlet that the decision to proceed with Father Li’s “election” after the death of Pope Francis reflected the PRC’s “policy of not officially acknowledging Rome in relation to episcopal appointments.”<sup>68</sup> The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) offered little acknowledgment of Pope Francis’s death, removing its brief condolence message from its home page after four days, and in Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, authorities prevented even CCPA clergy from offering a Mass in memory of Pope Francis.<sup>69</sup>

### ONGOING REPRESSION OF CATHOLIC CHURCHES

During the Commission’s 2025 reporting year, authorities continued to harshly suppress bishops in the unregistered Catholic Church who have refused to join the CCPA.<sup>70</sup> Authorities have repeatedly targeted Bishop **Peter Shao Zhumin**, appointed bishop of Wenzhou diocese in Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang province by Pope Benedict XVI.<sup>71</sup> In March 2025, Wenzhou public security officials reportedly took Bishop Shao into custody in connection with a December 2024 Mass he celebrated for the Catholic Church’s “Jubilee Year,” which authorities said was illegal.<sup>72</sup> Local officials initially fined Shao for the Mass and ordered the demolition of his building, later detaining him after he refused to pay the fine.<sup>73</sup> Authorities have maintained ongoing pressure on both registered and unregistered Catholic churches, clergy, and laity in Wenzhou; in August 2024, Wenzhou public security officers raided a CCPA church, preventing priest Father Jin Mengxiu from celebrating Mass there.<sup>74</sup> In a letter protesting the raid, Father Jin—who was not the parish’s priest—said that he wanted to provide the community with access to the sacraments after a diocesan reorganization left the church without a priest.<sup>75</sup> Public security officers have conducted regular surveillance of unregistered churches in Wenzhou, and Wenzhou religious affairs officials reportedly prevented local Catholics from participating in a planned pilgrimage.<sup>76</sup>

Party and government authorities also continued to restrict the unregistered Catholic bishop of Mindong diocese, Fujian province, **Guo Xijin**, to his residence, sealing his chapel.<sup>77</sup> According to local sources, authorities have increased restrictions on Guo since Christmas as part of an effort to pressure clergy to join the CCPA.<sup>78</sup>

### *Christianity—Protestant*

Authorities continued to raid unregistered Protestant “house” churches and detain their members this reporting year, including:<sup>79</sup>

- **Beijing Zion Church.** In July 2024, authorities in Beijing municipality took into custody Preacher **Zhou Sirui** of Zion Church and held her in administrative detention for 14 days for the crime of “illegally carrying out activities in the name of an association with voided registration.”<sup>80</sup> In September, authorities raided Zion Church again, detaining Zhou for another 15 days, along with Elders **Cai Jing** and **Wu Qiong**.<sup>81</sup> In October, authorities once again raided multiple meeting locations of Zion

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Church and held Elder **Qin Guoliang** in administrative detention for 14 days for “illegally organizing a gathering.”<sup>82</sup>

- **Early Rain Covenant Church.** In September 2024, authorities in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, raided Early Rain Covenant Church and administratively detained Elder **Li Yingqiang**, Elder **Li Youhong**, also known as Yan Hong, Preacher **Wu Wuqing**, and Deacon **Zeng Qingtao** for 14 days.<sup>83</sup> Local police accused them of “illegally carrying out activities in the name of an association.”<sup>84</sup>

- **Xinyi Village Church.** In February 2025, authorities in Panji district, Huainan municipality, Anhui province, criminally detained pastor **Zhao Hongliang** and three members of Xinyi Village Church.<sup>85</sup> Although Xinyi Village Church is registered with the official Three-Self Patriotic Movement, the church reportedly had refused to comply with requirements issued by local officials.<sup>86</sup>

This past year, PRC authorities continued to employ charges of “fraud” and “illegal business operations” to project a veneer of criminality onto activities that fall within the scope of normal religious activities, including establishing church-affiliated institutions and fundraising.<sup>87</sup> For example, in August 2024, the Yijiang District People’s Court in Wuhu municipality, Anhui, held a closed trial for three Christians from Mount Carmel Church charged with “illegal business operations” for running an affiliated school.<sup>88</sup> The court sentenced both **Han Yanlei** and **Xie Zhifeng** to nine months in prison and sentenced **Lu Zhaojin** to nine months’ imprisonment with a one year suspended sentence.<sup>89</sup> In June 2025, the Yaodu District People’s Court in Linfen municipality, Shanxi province, handed down harsh sentences in two major “fraud” cases against house church clergy and laypeople, both premised upon donations made by church members.<sup>90</sup> While the court has not yet sentenced Linfen Golden Lampstand pastors **Yang Rongli** and **Wang Xiaoguang**, it sentenced 10 lay members of the church to sentences ranging from 1 year and 10 months to 9 years and 2 months in prison.<sup>91</sup> On the same day, the court also sentenced Linfen Covenant Church pastors **Li Jie** and **Han Xiaodong** to three years and eight months in prison.<sup>92</sup>

This reporting year, PRC authorities also employed exit bans to restrict the freedom of movement of Protestants associated with “house” churches, including:

- In July 2024, customs police in Macau intercepted Pastor Jin Mingri of Beijing Zion Church, preventing him from going abroad to visit his family in the United States.<sup>93</sup> Jin had previously been under a five-year border control period which should have ended in March 2024.<sup>94</sup>

- In September 2024, authorities in Dongguan municipality, Guangdong province, harassed unregistered house church pastor Xing Jinfu, asking him whether he had plans to go abroad.<sup>95</sup> They also pressured him to hand over his passport.<sup>96</sup> One leader of a U.S.-based religious freedom nongovernmental organization (NGO) speculated that this was related to worries that Xing intended to attend the Lausanne Congress, an international



Christian gathering focused on missionary work, which took place later that month.<sup>97</sup>

Also this year, the Commission observed PRC authorities employing various methods to censor and surveil Protestants' online expression of their religious beliefs. For example, in August 2024, authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong, took into custody Christian **Xin Ruoyu**, reportedly holding her in extrajudicial detention.<sup>98</sup> Xin had been involved in the development of the app "Song of Songs," which provides Chinese language hymns and sheet music.<sup>99</sup> Also in August 2024, Christian lawyer Xie Qida posted a Christian hymn onto his TikTok account.<sup>100</sup> The Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau of Xishan district, Kunming municipality, Yunnan province, issued him a notice requiring him to "delete videos of singing Christian hymns on all online media."<sup>101</sup> In April 2025, authorities in Song county, Henan province, issued a "Notice on the Reward for Reporting Illegal Religious Activities."<sup>102</sup> The Notice offered rewards for anyone reporting on people disseminating religious trainings through online platforms.<sup>103</sup>

### *Falun Gong*

The Chinese Communist Party and government have continued to direct considerable resources and attention toward the suppression and persecution of Falun Gong, which they have designated a "cult organization" or *xiejiao* (邪教), a historical term that the Party has appropriated to refer to new religious movements it deems threatening to its rule.<sup>104</sup> Authorities have most often detained, charged, and prosecuted Falun Gong practitioners under Article 300 of the *PRC Criminal Law*, which criminalizes "organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law."<sup>105</sup> The Falun Gong-affiliated website *Minghui* reported the deaths of dozens of Falun Gong practitioners due to mistreatment while in custody and hundreds of cases of Falun Gong practitioners being sentenced by authorities in 2024.<sup>106</sup> Examples of detentions during the reporting year follow:

- In February 2025, *Minghui* reported that **Zuo Hongtao** of Qinhuangdao municipality, Hebei province, had died in prison the previous year while serving a 13-year sentence, reportedly for his involvement with Falun Gong.<sup>107</sup> In July 2024, prison officials at Baoding Prison, Hebei, brought Zuo to the hospital after he became critically ill, returning him to the prison after he was discharged.<sup>108</sup> In August, Zuo died, with *Minghui* reporting that prison officials prevented his family from seeing the body and cremated Zuo without their consent.<sup>109</sup>
- According to international human rights NGO Rights Defense Network (RDN), the Qindu District People's Court in Qindu county, Xianyang municipality, Shaanxi province, sentenced food inspector **Gao Xiaoying** to seven years in prison for propagating information about Falun Gong online.<sup>110</sup> Gao's family reported being turned away multiple times while attempting to visit him in detention and were ultimately only allowed to see him briefly before his March 2024 trial, which they were prevented from attending.<sup>111</sup>
- In November 2024, *Minghui* reported that the Haizhu District People's Court in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong

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province, sentenced **Zhao Ying**, a Falun Gong practitioner in her eighties, to three years and six months in prison despite her age and serious health conditions, including bladder cancer, a heart condition, and diabetes.<sup>112</sup> RDN additionally reported that Zhao is dying in prison.<sup>113</sup>

### *Other Religious Communities*

In addition to Falun Gong, the Chinese Communist Party and government have designated 22 religious groups to be *xiejiao* and continue to subject them to persecution.<sup>114</sup> Authorities have engaged in a protracted and apparently nationwide crackdown against one of these groups, the Church of Almighty God (CAG), also called Eastern Lightning, launching consecutive campaigns to eradicate the religious group.<sup>115</sup> According to a report issued by CAG, in 2024 the Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission coordinated the launch of a three-year “Tough Battle” campaign targeting CAG, following on the heels of its previous “General Battle” campaign.<sup>116</sup> In the year since the “Tough Battle” was launched, CAG reported a more than 50 percent rise in arrests.<sup>117</sup>

In at least two cases this past year, authorities detained Taiwanese citizens for participation in religious activities associated with supposed *xiejiao*. In October, police in Guangdong province raided a gathering of Yiguandao, a Chinese religious group with elements of Taoism, Buddhism, and folk religion, taking people into custody, including three Taiwanese participants.<sup>118</sup> In January 2025, police in Xiamen municipality, Fujian province, took into custody Unification Church members **Lu Chia-chen** and her husband **Chang Pi-shian** as they were holding a worship service at home.<sup>119</sup> On January 13, police criminally detained them on suspicion of “organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law,” holding them at the Xiamen Public Security Bureau Detention Center.<sup>120</sup> On February 12, authorities released Chang on bail.<sup>121</sup>

### Notes to Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion

<sup>1</sup> “习近平：巩固发展最广泛的爱国统一战线” [Xi Jinping: Strengthen and develop the broadest patriotic united front], *Xinhua*, May 20, 2015; “习近平在全国宗教工作会议上强调 坚持我国宗教中国化方向 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应，李克强主持 栗战书王沪宁赵乐际韩正出席 汪洋讲话” [At the National Conference on Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: persevere on the path of [China's] sinicization of religion and actively lead religion in the adaptation of religion to socialist society; Li Keqiang presided over the meeting, Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng attended, and Wang Yang delivered a speech], *Xinhua*, December 4, 2021; Richard Madsen, “Faith Under Party Rule: The Sinicization of Religion in China” *ChinaSource Journal*, vol. 27, no. 1, March 24, 2025, 24–25; Chit Wai John Mok, “(En)countering State-Led Sinicization: Critical Discursive Responses from Roman Catholics in China,” *China Quarterly*, vol. 261, March 2025, 166–67.

<sup>2</sup> “中华人民共和国爱国注意教育法” [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024. For more on the PRC Patriotic Education Law's implications for freedom of religion in China, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 81.

<sup>3</sup> “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 10, 1948, art. 18; “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. The PRC signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) on October 5, 1998, but has not yet ratified it, despite stating repeatedly its intent to ratify including in the National Human Rights Action Plan for 2016–2020. The U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, §§301–309 requires the CECC to use the ICCPR's provisions to monitor compliance with human rights standards in the PRC. See also State Council Information Office, “国家人权行动计划（2021–2025 年）” [National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2021–2025)], September 2021, sec. 2(4).

<sup>4</sup> “中华人民共和国宪法” [PRC Constitution], passed December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 36; “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 10, 1948, art. 18; “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18.

<sup>5</sup> “宗教事务条例” [Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, amended June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018.

<sup>6</sup> “宗教教职人员管理办法” [Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021.

<sup>7</sup> “互联网宗教信息服务管理办法” [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], passed December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022.

<sup>8</sup> “宗教活动场所管理办法” [Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed June 29, 2023, effective September 1, 2023.

<sup>9</sup> Alex Joske, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work,” *China Brief, Jamestown Foundation*, May 9, 2019. The United Front Work Department has directly overseen religious affairs since 2018, when the National Religious Affairs Administration was dissolved and reorganized under the UFWD.

<sup>10</sup> Kai Di, “全面管控基督教会 中国办百堂百牧 ‘从严治教培训班’ ” [Comprehensive control of the Christian church; China holds ‘Strict Governance of Religion’ training classes for 100 pastors from 100 churches], *Radio Free Asia*, July 29, 2024.

<sup>11</sup> Chris Buckley, “The Man Who Shaped China's Strongman Rule Has a New Job: Winning Taiwan,” *New York Times*, October 26, 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Kai Di, “全面管控基督教会 中国办百堂百牧 ‘从严治教培训班’ ” [Comprehensive control of the Christian church; China holds ‘Strict Governance of Religion’ training classes for 100 pastors from 100 churches], *Radio Free Asia*, July 29, 2024.

<sup>13</sup> “石泰峰在甘肃调研时强调 扎实做好新时代党的民族宗教工作 推动铸牢中华民族共同体意识和我国宗教中国化工作走深走实” [During an investigation in Gansu, Shi Taifeng emphasized solidly doing the Party's ethnic and religious affairs work well in the new era to “forge a common consciousness of the Chinese nation” and more fully deepen and implement the country's sinicization of religion], *Xinhua*, July 13, 2024.

<sup>14</sup> Wang Rongwei, “中国基督教部分主要教堂主任牧师从严治教培训班在广州举行” [A training class in the strict governance of religion for pastors of some major Christian churches was held in Guangzhou], *China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Online*, July 26, 2024; Zhang Chunhua, “China, Three-Self Christians Start Training in ‘Strict Governance,’” *Bitter Winter*, August 22, 2024.

<sup>15</sup> Wang Rongwei, “中国基督教部分主要教堂主任牧师从严治教培训班在广州举行” [A training class in the strict governance of religion for pastors of some major Christian churches was held in Guangzhou], *China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Online*, July 26, 2024. For more on the five-year plan for the sinicization of Christianity, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 81–82.

<sup>16</sup> “宁德市道教协会2024年夏季座谈会暨‘坚持道教中国化方向，全面从严治教’培训活动举行” [Ningde Municipal Taoist Association held the 2024 summer conference and “Adhering to the Sinicization of Taoism and the Comprehensive and Strict Governance of Religion” training activities], *Fujian Taoist Association*, reprinted in *Taoist Association of China*, accessed July 11, 2025.

<sup>17</sup> Guangzhou Municipal Catholic Patriotic Association, “广东省广州市天主教举办2025年全面从严治教培训班” [Guangdong province Guangzhou municipality Catholic Church holds 2025 training class on comprehensive and strict governance of religion], *Guangdong Provincial Catholic Church Two Councils*, reprinted in *Catholic Church in China*, February 28, 2025.

<sup>18</sup> “全省伊斯兰教界全面从严治教专题培训班圆满结束-四川省民族宗教事务委员会” [The training course on the special topic of the comprehensive and strict governance of religion for the entire

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province successfully concluded], *Islamic Association of Sichuan Province*, reprinted in *Sichuan Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission*, April 30, 2025.

<sup>19</sup>Peitong Jing and Karrie J. Koesel, “Church and State in Contemporary China: Securing Christianity,” *Politics and Religion*, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2024, 107–37.

<sup>20</sup>Peitong Jing and Karrie J. Koesel, “Church and State in Contemporary China: Securing Christianity,” *Politics and Religion*, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2024, 107–37. Securitization, according to Jing and Koesel, is “the process by which an issue is elevated to the level of national importance to justify extraordinary state action.” In this framework, PRC authorities believe that religion is an “existential threat that needed to be secured,” and they do so in part by closely supervising the political education of future religious leaders.

<sup>21</sup>“中国道教学院举行2024级新生开学典礼” [Chinese Taoist College holds 2024 opening ceremony for new students], *China Taoist College*, September 12, 2024.

<sup>22</sup>“中国道教学院举行2024级新生开学典礼” [Chinese Taoist College holds 2024 opening ceremony for new students], *China Taoist College*, September 12, 2024.

<sup>23</sup>“中国道教学院举行2024级新生开学典礼” [Chinese Taoist College holds 2024 opening ceremony for new students], *China Taoist College*, September 12, 2024.

<sup>24</sup>“中国伊斯兰教经学院举行2024级新生军训开营仪式” [China Islamic Institute holds opening ceremony for military training for 2024 new students], *Islamic Association of China*, September 2, 2024; “China, Future Muslim Imams Submitted to ‘Patriotic’ Military Training,” *Bitter Winter*, September 11, 2024.

<sup>25</sup>“中国伊斯兰教经学院举行2024级新生军训开营仪式” [China Islamic Institute holds opening ceremony for military training for 2024 new students], *Islamic Association of China*, September 2, 2024.

<sup>26</sup>“江苏省开展宗教院校部分公共课程教学大纲编审工作” [Jiangsu Province launches work editing some public course syllabi for religious institutions], *Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission*, August 8, 2024; “Communist Party Ideology in Religious Education in China,” *ChinaAid Association*, August 26, 2024.

<sup>27</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025.

<sup>28</sup>Zimo Hu, “Religious Activities by Foreigners in China: New Restrictions from May 1,” *Bitter Winter*, April 8, 2025; Malo Tresca, “China Tightens Control over Foreign Religious Activity,” *La Croix International*, April 10, 2025; Giorgio Bernardelli, “China Adds New Restrictions on Foreigners’ Religious Activities,” *AsiaNews*, April 2, 2025.

<sup>29</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 16.

<sup>30</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 6, 7, 10, 13.

<sup>31</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 23, 28.

<sup>32</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 6.

<sup>33</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 10.

<sup>34</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 6, 13.

<sup>35</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 16.

<sup>36</sup>“China’s New Religion Laws a ‘Pretext’ for Arrests, Clerics Say,” *Pillar*, April 10, 2025.

<sup>37</sup>“China’s New Religion Laws a ‘Pretext’ for Arrests, Clerics Say,” *Pillar*, April 10, 2025.

<sup>38</sup>“‘中华人民共和国境内外国人宗教活动管理规定实施细则’公布 2025年5月1日起施行” [“Detailed Implementation Rules for the Provisions on the Administration of Foreigners’ Religious Activities” announced and will take effect May 1, 2025], *National Religious Affairs Administration*, March 31, 2025, art. 23.

<sup>39</sup>Shen Sheng, “China Revises Rules on Foreigners’ Religious Activities to Strengthen Regulation and Exchange,” *Global Times*, April 1, 2025.

<sup>40</sup>Ian Johnson, “China Is Reversing Its Crackdown on Some Religions, but Not All,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, May 14, 2024; Weishan Huang, “The Sinicization of Buddhism and Its Competing Reinventions of Tradition,” chapter in “The Sinicization of Chinese Religions from Above and Below,” *Brill*, ed. Richard Madsen, 2021, 64–65, 67; André Laliberté, “The Two Tracks of Xi Jinping’s Religious Policy,” *Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs*, March 16, 2020.



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<sup>42</sup> See, e.g., “杭州市道教协会组织开展红色教育‘五百行动’参学活动” [Hangzhou Municipal Taoist Association organizes launch of red education “500 actions” participation and study activities], *Hangzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau*, December 10, 2024; “无锡市佛教协会组织班子成员赴山东曲阜参访学习” [Wuxi Municipal Buddhist Association organizes group members to visit Qufu, Shandong for participation, visits, and study], *Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau*, November 8, 2024; Meng Yaoting, “‘Strict Governance of Religion’ Implemented Among Taoists Too,” *Bitter Winter*, August 29, 2024; Zhang Chunhua, “‘Strict Governance of Religion’ Extends to Hui Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists,” *Bitter Winter*, July 26, 2024.

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<sup>44</sup> “杭州市道教协会组织开展红色教育‘五百行动’参学活动” [Hangzhou Municipal Taoist Association organizes launch of red education “500 actions” participation and study activities], *Hangzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau*, December 10, 2024.

<sup>45</sup> “江苏省道教界庆祝中华人民共和国成立75周年音乐会在无锡江阴举行” [Jiangsu Provincial Taoist Association Holds a Concert in Jiangyin, Wuxi for the 75th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China], *Jiangsu Provincial Taoist Association*, accessed April 1, 2025.

<sup>46</sup> “江苏省道教界庆祝中华人民共和国成立75周年音乐会在无锡江阴举行” [Jiangsu Provincial Taoist Association Holds a Concert in Jiangyin, Wuxi for the 75th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China], *Jiangsu Provincial Taoist Association*, accessed April 1, 2025.

<sup>47</sup> “无锡市佛教协会组织班子成员赴山东曲阜参访学习” [Wuxi Municipal Buddhist Association organizes group members to visit Qufu, Shandong for participation, visits, and study], *Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau*, November 8, 2024.

<sup>48</sup> Kristin Baird Rattini, “Who Was Confucius?,” *National Geographic*, March 26, 2019.

<sup>49</sup> “无锡市佛教协会组织班子成员赴山东曲阜参访学习” [Wuxi Municipal Buddhist Association organizes group members to visit Qufu, Shandong for participation, visits, and study], *Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau*, November 8, 2024.

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<sup>53</sup> Hannah Theaker and David R. Stroup, “Making Islam Chinese: Religious Policy and Mosque Sinicisation in the Xi Era,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, February 2025, 35–39, 73–83.

<sup>54</sup> Hannah Theaker and David R. Stroup, “Making Islam Chinese: Religious Policy and Mosque Sinicisation in the Xi Era,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, February 2025, 35–39.

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<sup>56</sup> Hannah Theaker and David R. Stroup, “Making Islam Chinese: Religious Policy and Mosque Sinicisation in the Xi Era,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, February 2025, 74.

<sup>57</sup> Xinlu Liang, “What Does China Islamic Association’s Rebrand Reveal about Beijing’s Integration Drive?,” *South China Morning Post*, March 15, 2025.

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<sup>66</sup>“Despite the Death of Pope Francis, Auxiliary Bishop Elected in Shanghai,” *AsiaNews*, April 29, 2025. *AsiaNews* also notes that Wu’s appointment is particularly controversial because Shanghai already has two auxiliary bishops, one of whom is Thaddeus Ma Daqin, who has not been permitted to exercise his ministry since publicly resigning from the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.

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<sup>68</sup>“Chinese Diocese ‘Elects’ New Bishop despite Sede Vacante,” *Pillar*, April 30, 2025.

<sup>69</sup>“Despite the Death of Pope Francis, Auxiliary Bishop Elected in Shanghai,” *AsiaNews*, April 29, 2025.

<sup>70</sup>Nina Shea, “Ten Persecuted Catholic Bishops in China,” *Hudson Institute*, October 2024, 9; “Bishop Shao Arrested over ‘Illegal’ Jubilee Opening Mass,” *AsiaNews*, March 7, 2025; “Mindong: Bishop Guo Celebrates the 40th Anniversary of His First Mass behind a Gate,” *AsiaNews*, January 28, 2025.

<sup>71</sup>Nina Shea, “Ten Persecuted Catholic Bishops in China,” *Hudson Institute*, October 2024, 32–35; “Wenzhou: Fine and Demolition Order, the New Weapons against Bishop Shao,” *AsiaNews*, February 14, 2025; “Bishop Shao Arrested over ‘Illegal’ Jubilee Opening Mass,” *AsiaNews*, March 7, 2025. For more information on Shao Zhumin, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2017,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, October 2017, 131–32; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2022,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, November 2022, 102; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 84; and the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00232.

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<sup>73</sup>“Bishop Shao Arrested over ‘Illegal’ Jubilee Opening Mass,” *AsiaNews*, March 7, 2025; Wenzhou: Fine and Demolition Order, the New Weapons against Bishop Shao,” *AsiaNews*, February 14, 2025.

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<sup>78</sup>“Mindong: Bishop Guo Celebrates the 40th Anniversary of His First Mass behind a Gate,” *AsiaNews*, January 28, 2025.

<sup>79</sup>For coverage of PRC authorities’ violation of the religious freedom of Protestant Christians in previous years, see, e.g. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 86–7; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 94–5.

<sup>80</sup>Ning Meng, “北京当局同时冲击锡安教会多个堂点主日敬拜，带走数人，秦国良长老被拘留” [Authorities in Beijing simultaneously raided multiple campuses of Zion Church’s Sunday worship, took several people away, and detained Elder Qin Guoliang], *ChinaAid Association*, October 21, 2024. For more information on Zhou Sirui, see “CECC Record Number: 2025-00110, Zhou Sirui,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed August 21, 2025.

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<sup>82</sup>Ning Meng, “北京当局同时冲击锡安教会多个堂点主日敬拜，带走数人，秦国良长老被拘留” [Authorities in Beijing simultaneously raided multiple campuses of Zion Church’s Sunday worship, took several people away, and detained Elder Qin Guoliang], *ChinaAid Association*, October 21, 2024; Qi Junzao, “Beijing Zion Church Raided Once Again,” *Bitter Winter*, October 28, 2024. For more information on Qin Guoliang, see “CECC Record Number: 2025-00100, Qin Guoliang,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed August 21, 2025.

<sup>83</sup>Ning Meng, “秋雨圣约教会李英强长老等四位长执因带领主日敬拜被拘留期满获释” [Early Rain Covenant Church Elder Li Yinqiang and four others were released after their detention for leading Sunday worship], *ChinaAid Association*, September 16, 2024; For more information on these cases, see CECC Record Number: 2018-00616, Li Yinqiang,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed May 30, 2025; CECC Record Number: 2024-00164, Li Youhong,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed May 30, 2025; CECC Record Number: 2021-00386, Wu Wugang,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed May 30, 2025; CECC Record Number: 2024-00165, Zeng Qingtao,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed May 30, 2025.

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<sup>85</sup>Gao Zhensai, “安徽省淮南市当局打砸潘集区新一村教会，抓捕赵宏亮牧师等九位基督徒” [Huainan municipality, Anhui province authorities raided Xinyi Village Church in Panji district, taking pastor Zhao Hongliang and nine other Christians into custody], *ChinaAid Association*, March 5, 2025; CECC Record Number: 2025-00113, Zhao Hongliang,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed August 21, 2025.

<sup>86</sup>Gao Zhensai, “安徽省淮南市当局打砸潘集区新一村教会，抓捕赵宏亮牧师等九位基督徒” [Huainan municipality, Anhui province authorities raided Xinyi Village Church in Panji district, taking pastor Zhao Hongliang and nine other Christians into custody], *ChinaAid Association*, March 5, 2025.

<sup>87</sup>“中华人民共和国宪法” [PRC Constitution], passed December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 36; “Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,” United Nations, adopted November 25, 1981, arts. 6(b), 6(f). Article 36 of China’s Constitution claims to protect “normal religious activities” but leaves “normal” undefined. The non-binding U.N. General Assembly “Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,” lists soliciting and receiving financial contributions among protected religious activities. For past coverage of “fraud charges” against house church leaders, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 86–7; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 94–5.

<sup>88</sup>“Three Christians from Wuhu Mount Carmel Church Tried for ‘Illegal Business Operations,’” *ChinaAid Association*, August 12, 2024.

<sup>89</sup>Ning Meng, “安徽芜湖宣德学堂被控 ‘非法经营罪’ 的韩燕雷等三位基督徒被判刑并处罚款” [Han Yanlei and three other Christians from Xuande School in Wuhu, Anhui were sentenced and fined for “Illegal Business Operations”], *ChinaAid Association*, August 17, 2024; For more information on these cases, see “CECC Record Number: 2022-00149, Han Yanlei,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed August 21, 2025; “CECC Record Number: 2022-00150, Xie Zhifeng,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed August 21, 2025; “CECC Record Number: 2025-00115, Lü Zhaojin,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed August 21, 2025.

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