

VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings

- During the Commission's reporting year, authorities suppressed the expression of Islamic beliefs in Hui religious communities, including through actions aimed at "sinicizing" Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to practice their religion and culture.
- In December 2024, hundreds of local Muslims gathered in front of the municipal government building in Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province to protest the detention of well-known imam **Ma Yuwei** and call for his release. Ma's detention and the ensuing protests followed a period in which authorities detained other Hui imams and targeted other Hui figures, and came in the wake of a May 2023 demonstration involving thousands of residents of Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi, over the planned demolition of a local mosque.
- In January 2025, security personnel in Hohhot municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, brought veteran Mongol rights advocate **Hada** to a hospital, where he was placed on a respirator in intensive care. During his hospitalization, state security personnel failed to provide information on Hada's condition to his wife, Xinna, and their son, Uiles. Hospital staff later moved Hada from intensive care to another part of the hospital, but police forbade them from disclosing where they had transferred him within the hospital.

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Party and Government Policy toward Ethnic Minorities

During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party and government authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the *PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law*¹ and international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.² During a December 2024 meeting of the Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo), PRC leader Xi Jinping called for the increased use of Mandarin Chinese in border regions, prompting international observers to voice concern that the promotion of Mandarin would marginalize ethnic minorities.³ At the meeting, Xi called on officials to guide ethnic minority groups in these regions to strengthen their identification with "the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, and the Chinese Communist Party."⁴ During China's annual meetings of the legislative body, the National People's Congress, and the advisory body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference ("Two Sessions") in March 2025, PRC officials echoed Xi's emphasis on the importance of all ethnicities' identification with the "Chinese nation" and highlighted the importance of ensuring "ethnic unity."⁵ Party officials also continued to implement a campaign, launched in 2023, to change the terminology used to describe the culture and history of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR).⁶ The Australian Strategic Policy Institute said the use of the new term *bei jiang wen-hua*, or "northern frontier culture," "appears to be part of the CCP's growing campaign to weaken Mongolian ethnic identity and instead push a Han Chinese-centric national identity through the elimination of Mongolian language education and other measures."⁷ The launch of the campaign to promote the new terminology took place as officials in the IMAR completed the transition to a region-wide policy, begun in 2020, of enforcing instruction in Mandarin Chinese for all subjects from kindergarten through senior high school.⁸

Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture

During this reporting year, authorities suppressed the expression of Islamic beliefs in Hui religious communities, including through actions aimed at "sinicizing" Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to practice their religion and culture.⁹ According to scholars Hannah Theaker and David Stroup, the sinicization of Islam in China "reflects an increasingly authoritarian crackdown on both expression and practice of identity across the PRC" and includes such measures as arrests of imams and other "key individuals," mosque renovations and closures, and heightened control over scriptural interpretation.¹⁰

On December 15, 2024, police in Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province, detained well-known imam **Ma Yuwei** at a local restaurant, accusing him of having engaged in "illegal preaching."¹¹ According to *Radio Free Asia* (RFA), Ma had been living for several months for safety reasons at Yuxi's Daying Mosque, where he served as imam.¹² He had been surveilled by unknown individuals, and local

religious authorities warned in May 2024 that mosque practitioners were engaging in “illegal religious activities.”¹³ According to *Voice of America* (VOA), police also detained Ma’s parents, wife, and children at the same time as Ma, releasing his wife and children a short time later.¹⁴ In addition, police in Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, briefly detained or attempted to detain Ma’s brother, Ma Yuqing, at around the same time, but a crowd of protesters prevented them from holding him in custody.¹⁵ Beginning in the afternoon of December 15, hundreds of local Muslims gathered in front of Yuxi’s municipal government building, protesting Ma Yuwei’s detention and calling for his release.¹⁶ Military and police personnel from Yuxi and Kunming municipality, Yunnan, arrived to disperse the protesters, set up communication jammers, block the highway into Yuxi, and set up local checkpoints to question Hui Muslims.¹⁷

Ma’s detention and the ensuing protests followed a period in which authorities detained other Hui imams and targeted other Hui figures, and came in the wake of a May 2023 demonstration involving thousands of residents of Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi, over the planned demolition of a local mosque.¹⁸ In 2023, authorities in Wenshan city, Wenshan Zhuang and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, reportedly sentenced imam **Ma Ao** to five years in prison on unknown charges, and police forbade his relatives from publicizing information about his verdict.¹⁹ Around October 2024, police detained imam **Ma Simin**, who was the principal of an Arabic language school in Gejiu city, after which nothing was heard from him.²⁰ During a May 2024 meeting in Yuxi, local religious authorities criticized imam Ma Cunguang of Yuxi’s Daying mosque, who held several Communist Party representative positions, accusing him of being a “fake” religious figure.²¹ In addition, in or around October 2024, the Gansu Province Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision opened an investigation into Hui Muslim scholar Li Zongyi, former vice president of Lanzhou Jiaotong University in Lanzhou municipality, Gansu province, accusing him of “serious violations of discipline and law.”²² In November, state-run media outlet *Xinhua* reported that the same commission had found that Li had committed numerous offenses, including illicitly accepting gifts and cash and “believing in religion for a long period of time,” and therefore expelled him from the Party and transferred his case to the procuratorate.²³

Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in the IMAR

Mongol Rights Advocate Hada Hospitalized, Cut Off from Family Members Following Nobel Nomination

On January 25, 2025, security personnel in Hohhot municipality, IMAR, brought veteran Mongol rights advocate **Hada** to a hospital, where he was placed on a respirator in intensive care.²⁴ Hada's wife, Xinna, told *RFA* that he was suffering from organ failure, had lost control of his bowels and bladder, and had bruises on one of his legs.²⁵ Hada had reportedly been under home confinement since 2014, living in an apartment under the strict surveillance of security personnel, following 4 years of extrajudicial detention and 15 years' imprisonment.²⁶ Authorities detained him in 1995 after he organized peaceful protests for the rights of ethnic Mongols in Hohhot.²⁷ Just prior to his hospitalization, four Japanese parliamentarians nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his dedication to Mongol rights advocacy.²⁸ During his hospitalization, state security personnel failed to provide information on Hada's condition to Xinna and their son, Uiles, including what illness he suffered from.²⁹ After hospital staff moved Hada from intensive care to another part of the hospital, a doctor at the hospital informed his wife that police had forbidden him from providing specific details about Hada's condition or disclosing which ward he had been transferred to, thereby cutting off contact with his family members.³⁰ During the reporting year, authorities also subjected Xinna to surveillance and restricted her internet access, and the family's only income came from Uiles' job at a restaurant.³¹

HERDERS PROTEST LACK OF COMPENSATION

On two separate days in the fall of 2024, Mongol herders in Heshigten (Keshenketeng) Banner,³² Chifeng municipality, IMAR, demonstrated over the local government's failure to provide them with promised compensation for bans on livestock grazing occurring in the past two years.³³ Local herders said the most recent livestock grazing ban had been particularly strict, lasting for 75 days and causing difficulty for those who could not afford to buy fodder for their fenced-in animals.³⁴ *VOA* reported that "grazing ban teams" kept watch over grasslands, punishing herders who, unable to afford hay and feed, had put livestock out to pasture.³⁵ Punishments included fines, confiscation of livestock, beatings, and detention.³⁶ Local herders posted and circulated videos voicing their discontent over the lack of compensation on social media networks serving hundreds of subscribers, even after authorities ordered them to delete such content.³⁷ The herders discussed hiring lawyers to sue the local government for their withheld compensation.³⁸ Observers have noted that state control over livestock grazing and interference with herders' economic traditions in recent years have resulted in environmental damage, financial difficulties, and the loss of herders' cultural traditions.³⁹

PARENTS EXPRESS OUTRAGE AFTER TEACHER INJURES
NINE-YEAR-OLD MONGOL STUDENT

In November 2024, news that a Han Chinese teacher at a grade school in Uushin (Wushen) Banner, Ordos (E'erdusi) municipality, IMAR, had seriously injured a nine-year-old Mongol student sparked outrage among parents, who vowed to keep their children out of school until the teacher was held accountable.⁴⁰ The teacher struck the student and pulled her ear because she did not finish her homework, glued the resulting tear on her ear, and warned the student not to tell her family what had happened.⁴¹ According to *RFA* and *VOA*, some Mongols connected the teacher's actions with policies suppressing the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction in schools.⁴² *VOA* reported that according to participants in a WeChat group discussing the incident, the teacher involved had carried out corporal punishment on students many times and had frequently warned students not to tell their families what had happened.⁴³

Notes to Chapter 6—Ethnic Minority Rights

¹ “中华人民共和国民族区域自治法” [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 53. The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas.

² “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” adopted December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),” *United Nations Treaty Collection*, Chapter IV Human Rights. The PRC signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) on October 5, 1998 but has not yet ratified it, despite stating repeatedly its intent to ratify including in the National Human Rights Action Plan 2016–2020. The U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, §§301–309 requires the CECC to use the ICCPR’s provisions to monitor compliance with human rights standards in the PRC. “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),” adopted December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” *United Nations Treaty Collection*, Chapter IV Human Rights. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001. The U.S. signed ICESCR in 1977, but has not ratified it. For reporting on the implementation of policies contravening domestic and international obligations, see, e.g., Hannah Theaker and David R. Stroup, “Making Islam Chinese: Religious Policy and Mosque Sinicisation in the Xi Era,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, reprinted in *Social Science Research Network*, February 2025, 7–8; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China’s Revised Religious Measures Tightens State Control over Tibetan Buddhism,” February 14, 2025; National Religious Affairs Administration, “藏传佛教寺庙管理办法” [Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhist Temples], passed November 5, 2024, effective January 1, 2025, arts. 4, 10, 11, 15, 30.

³ Wang Yun, “习近平边疆治理最新讲话 外界忧少数民族打压加剧” [Xi Jinping’s latest speech on border governance, the outside world is worried about the intensification of suppression of ethnic minorities], *Radio Free Asia*, December 10, 2024; Taejun Kang, “Xi Jinping Calls for Wider Use of Mandarin in China’s Border Areas,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 12, 2024.

⁴ Wang Yun, “习近平边疆治理最新讲话 外界忧少数民族打压加剧” [Xi Jinping’s latest speech on border governance, the outside world is worried about the intensification of suppression of ethnic minorities], *Radio Free Asia*, December 10, 2024; Taejun Kang, “Xi Jinping Calls for Wider Use of Mandarin in China’s Border Areas,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 12, 2024.

⁵ See, e.g., “China’s 2025 Two Sessions Show Tibetans Are Testing Ground for a New CCP ‘Ethnic Unity’ Policy,” *International Campaign for Tibet*, March 17, 2025; “李强在参加云南代表团审议时强调：发挥特色优势 加快转型升级 在深化改革开放中走出高质量发展新路子” [Li Qiang emphasized when participating in the deliberation of the Yunnan delegation: Give full play to the advantages of unique characteristics, accelerate transformation and upgrading, and find a new path of high-quality development in deepening reform and opening up], *Xinhua*, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, March 5, 2025; “中共中央、全国人大常委会、国务院等领导同志分别参加十四届全国人大三次会议代表团分组审议” [The leaders of the CCP Central Committee, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and the State Council and other leaders respectively participated in the group deliberation of the delegations of the Third Session of the 14th National People’s Congress], *Xinhua*, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, March 6, 2025.

⁶ Bethany Allen, Daria Impiombato, and Nathan Attrill, “‘Northern Frontier Culture’: How China Is Erasing ‘Mongolia’ from Mongolian Culture,” *Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, August 29, 2024. See also Zheng Xueliang, “‘领略非遗里的‘北疆文化’” [Experience the ‘Northern Frontier Culture’ of intangible cultural heritage], *Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Daily*, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, December 14, 2024; T.S., “Constructing a De-Ethnicised Inner Mongolia,” *Made in China Journal*, December 3, 2024.

⁷ Bethany Allen, Daria Impiombato, and Nathan Attrill, “‘Northern Frontier Culture’: How China Is Erasing ‘Mongolia’ from Mongolian Culture,” *Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, August 29, 2024. See also Bruce Humes, “The Battle over Politically Correct Designations for China’s Borderlands,” *Ethnic ChinaLit*, January 2, 2025.

⁸ Bethany Allen, Daria Impiombato, and Nathan Attrill, “‘Northern Frontier Culture’: How China Is Erasing ‘Mongolia’ from Mongolian Culture,” *Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, August 29, 2024. See also Qian Lang, “China Recruits Mandarin-Speaking Teachers to Move to Inner Mongolia,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 6, 2024; Gu Ting, “China Bans Mongolian-Medium Classes, Cuts Language Hours in Schools,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 5, 2023; Kasim Kashgar, “China Enforces Ban on Mongolian Language in Schools, Books,” *Voice of America*, September 13, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 137.

⁹ Hannah Theaker and David R. Stroup, “Making Islam Chinese: Religious Policy and Mosque Sinicisation in the Xi Era,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, reprinted in *Social Science Research Network*, February 2025, 7–8; “How China Is Tearing Down Islam,” *Financial Times*, November 27, 2023; Jeremy Goldkorn, “Xi Jinping Orders Officials to Persist with Hard-Line Xinjiang Policies,” *China Project*, August 27, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation, “Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?” March 22, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Hui Muslims and the ‘Xinjiang Model’ of State Suppression of Religion,” March 29, 2021.

¹⁰ Hannah Theaker and David R. Stroup, “Making Islam Chinese: Religious Policy and Mosque Sinicisation in the Xi Era,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, reprinted in *Social Science Research Network*, February 2025, 7–8.

¹¹ Qian Lang, “云南玉溪穆斯林抗议升级 马玉巍阿訇被捕引发对峙” [Muslim protests in Yuxi, Yunnan Province escalate, Ma Yuwei’s detention triggers confrontation], *Radio Free Asia*, De-

ember 16, 2024; Wu Yitong and Song Zijie, “雲南知名宣教師馬玉巍被捕當局鎮壓抗議活動 疑針對回族的集中營正內陸化” [Well-known Yunnan imam Ma Yuwei detained, authorities suppress protests. It is suspected that concentration camps targeting the Hui people are being set up in inner China], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024; “云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024; “CECC Record Number: 2025-00045, Ma Yuwei,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed September 15, 2025.

¹²Qian Lang, “云南玉溪穆斯林林抗议升级 马玉巍阿訇被捕引发对峙” [Muslim protests in Yuxi, Yunnan Province escalate, Ma Yuwei’s detention triggers confrontation], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024.

¹³Qian Lang, “云南玉溪穆斯林林抗议升级 马玉巍阿訇被捕引发对峙” [Muslim protests in Yuxi, Yunnan Province escalate, Ma Yuwei’s detention triggers confrontation], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024; Wu Yitong and Song Zijie, “雲南知名宣教師馬玉巍被捕當局鎮壓抗議活動 疑針對回族的集中營正內陸化” [Well-known Yunnan imam Ma Yuwei detained, authorities suppress protests. It is suspected that concentration camps targeting the Hui people are being set up in inner China], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024.

¹⁴“云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024. Reports did not indicate whether or not authorities had also released Ma’s parents.

¹⁵“云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024; Qian Lang, “云南玉溪穆斯林林抗议升级 马玉巍阿訇被捕引发对峙” [Muslim protests in Yuxi, Yunnan Province escalate, Ma Yuwei’s detention triggers confrontation], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024; Wu Yitong and Song Zijie, “雲南知名宣教師馬玉巍被捕當局鎮壓抗議活動 疑針對回族的集中營正內陸化” [Well-known Yunnan imam Ma Yuwei detained, authorities suppress protests. It is suspected that concentration camps targeting the Hui people are being set up in inner China], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024.

¹⁶Qian Lang, “云南玉溪穆斯林林抗议升级 马玉巍阿訇被捕引发对峙” [Muslim protests in Yuxi, Yunnan Province escalate, Ma Yuwei’s detention triggers confrontation], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024; “云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024; Wu Yitong and Song Zijie, “雲南知名宣教師馬玉巍被捕當局鎮壓抗議活動 疑針對回族的集中營正內陸化” [Well-known Yunnan imam Ma Yuwei detained, authorities suppress protests. It is suspected that concentration camps targeting the Hui people are being set up in inner China], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024.

¹⁷Qian Lang, “云南玉溪穆斯林林抗议升级 马玉巍阿訇被捕引发对峙” [Muslim protests in Yuxi, Yunnan Province escalate, Ma Yuwei’s detention triggers confrontation], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024; Wu Yitong and Song Zijie, “雲南知名宣教師馬玉巍被捕當局鎮壓抗議活動 疑針對回族的集中營正內陸化” [Well-known Yunnan imam Ma Yuwei detained, authorities suppress protests. It is suspected that concentration camps targeting the Hui people are being set up in inner China], *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2024.

¹⁸For more information on the May 2023 demonstration, see, e.g., Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” *CNN*, June 2, 2023; Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,” *New York Times*, June 8, 2023; Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” *China Project*, May 30, 2023; Emily Feng, “The Plan to Remove a Mosque’s Domes in China Sparks Rare Protest,” *NPR*, May 31, 2023. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 148–49.

¹⁹“云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024.

²⁰“云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024. See also “CECC Record Number: 2025-00102, Ma Simin,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed September 15, 2025.

²¹“云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024.

²²“蘭州交通大學原黨委常委、副校長李宗義被開除黨籍” [Li Zongyi, former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee and vice president of Lanzhou Jiaotong University, expelled from the Party], *Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission*, reprinted in *Xinhua*, November 28, 2024; “蘭交大前副校長李宗義被開除黨籍 紀委：受賄及[長期信仰宗教]” [Li Zongyi, former vice president of Lanzhou Jiaotong University, was expelled from the Party (The Discipline Inspection Commission said he accepted bribes and had long-held religious beliefs)], *Sing Tao Daily*, November 30, 2024; “云南伊斯兰学者频遭逮捕 各界担心中国按新疆模式建‘回族集中营’” [Yunnan Islamic scholars frequently detained; people from all walks of life worry that China will build ‘Hui concentration camps’ based on the Xinjiang model], *Voice of America*, December 18, 2024.

²³“蘭州交通大學原黨委常委、副校長李宗義被開除黨籍” [Li Zongyi, former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee and vice president of Lanzhou Jiaotong University,

Ethnic Minority Rights

expelled from the Party], *Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission*, reprinted in *Xinhua*, November 28, 2024.

²⁴“Hada Rushed to Hospital for Urgent Care as Nobel Peace Prize Nomination Confirmed,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, January 30, 2025; Qian Lang, “内蒙异议人士哈达病危 妻子新娜向外界发出求助” [Inner Mongolia dissident Hada is critically ill, his wife Xinna asks for help from the outside world], *Radio Free Asia*, February 3, 2025; “CECC Record Number: 2004-02045, Hada,” *CECC Political Prisoner Database*, accessed March 13, 2025.

²⁵Qian Lang, “内蒙异议人士哈达病危 妻子新娜向外界发出求助” [Inner Mongolia dissident Hada is critically ill, his wife Xinna asks for help from the outside world], *Radio Free Asia*, February 3, 2025.

²⁶“Hada Rushed to Hospital for Urgent Care as Nobel Peace Prize Nomination Confirmed,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, January 30, 2025; “Freed Mongol Dissident Hada Says He Was Tortured in Jail, Remains under House Arrest,” *Reuters*, reprinted in *South China Morning Post*, December 16, 2014.

²⁷Andrew Jacobs, “Ethnic Mongolian Dissident Released by China Is Missing,” *New York Times*, December 13, 2010.

²⁸“Hada Rushed to Hospital for Urgent Care as Nobel Peace Prize Nomination Confirmed,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, January 30, 2025; Han Qing, “Ethnic Mongolian Dissident Hada Gets Nobel Peace Prize Nomination,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 29, 2025.

²⁹Qian Lang, “Police Stop Family Members Visiting Ethnic Mongolian Dissident Hada,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 10, 2025; “Hada Rushed to Hospital for Urgent Care as Nobel Peace Prize Nomination Confirmed,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, January 30, 2025.

³⁰Qian Lang, “Police Stop Family Members Visiting Ethnic Mongolian Dissident Hada,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 10, 2025; Qian Lang, “内蒙古异议人士哈达再度失踪” [Inner Mongolian dissident Hada disappears again], *Radio Free Asia*, February 6, 2025.

³¹Qian Lang, “内蒙异议人士哈达和新娜仍受监视 一家三口靠儿子微薄收入度日” [Inner Mongolian dissidents Hada and Xinna are still under surveillance; the family of three lives on their son's meager income], *Radio Free Asia*, September 20, 2024.

³²Christopher P. Atwood, “Bilingual Education in Inner Mongolia: An Explainer,” *Made in China Journal*, August 30, 2020. A banner is an administrative division in the IMAR and is equivalent to a county in a province.

³³“Herders Stage Protest Demanding Compensation,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, November 7, 2024; Naren Bilige, “内蒙古牧民抗议政府未果，准备起诉当局追究法律责任” [Inner Mongolian herders protest against the government to no avail, prepare to sue the authorities for legal responsibility], *Voice of America*, November 13, 2024.

³⁴Naren Bilige, “内蒙古牧民抗议政府未果，准备起诉当局追究法律责任” [Inner Mongolian herders protest against the government to no avail, prepare to sue the authorities for legal responsibility], *Voice of America*, November 13, 2024; “Herders Stage Protest Demanding Compensation,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, November 7, 2024.

³⁵Naren Bilige, “内蒙古牧民抗议政府未果，准备起诉当局追究法律责任” [Inner Mongolian herders protest against the government to no avail, prepare to sue the authorities for legal responsibility], *Voice of America*, November 13, 2024.

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³⁷“Herders Stage Protest Demanding Compensation,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, November 7, 2024; Naren Bilige, “内蒙古牧民抗议政府未果，准备起诉当局追究法律责任” [Inner Mongolian herders protest against the government to no avail, prepare to sue the authorities for legal responsibility], *Voice of America*, November 13, 2024.

³⁸Naren Bilige, “内蒙古牧民抗议政府未果，准备起诉当局追究法律责任” [Inner Mongolian herders protest against the government to no avail, prepare to sue the authorities for legal responsibility], *Voice of America*, November 13, 2024.

³⁹Mai Xiaotian, “专栏 | 绿色情报员：谁让内蒙古牧民成了韭菜和气候难民？” [Column | Green Intelligence: Who made Inner Mongolia herders become chives and climate refugees?], *Radio Free Asia*, October 23, 2024; Naren Bilige, “内蒙古牧民抗议政府未果，准备起诉当局追究法律责任” [Inner Mongolian herders protest against the government to no avail, prepare to sue the authorities for legal responsibility], *Voice of America*, November 13, 2024.

⁴⁰“Chinese Teacher Injures Mongolian Student, Sparking Outrage and Boycott by Parents,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, November 22, 2024; Qian Lang, “内蒙古汉族教师殴打蒙古族女童事件引发不满” [Ethnic Han teacher in Inner Mongolia beats Mongol girl, causing discontent], *Radio Free Asia*, November 28, 2024; Na Ran, “内蒙古汉族女教师殴打蒙古族女童致严重伤害，引起蒙古族民众强烈不满” [A female ethnic Han teacher in Inner Mongolia beat a Mongolian girl and caused serious injuries, which elicited strong dissatisfaction among the ethnic Mongolian people], *Voice of America*, November 27, 2024.

⁴¹Qian Lang, “内蒙古汉族教师殴打蒙古族女童事件引发不满” [Ethnic Han teacher in Inner Mongolia beats Mongol girl, causing discontent], *Radio Free Asia*, November 28, 2024; “Chinese Teacher Injures Mongolian Student, Sparking Outrage and Boycott by Parents,” *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center*, November 22, 2024; Na Ran, “内蒙古汉族女教师殴打蒙古族女童致严重伤害，引起蒙古族民众强烈不满” [A female ethnic Han teacher in Inner Mongolia beat a Mongolian girl and caused serious injuries, which elicited strong dissatisfaction among the ethnic Mongolian people], *Voice of America*, November 27, 2024.

⁴²Qian Lang, “内蒙古汉族教师殴打蒙古族女童事件引发不满” [Ethnic Han teacher in Inner Mongolia beats Mongol girl, causing discontent], *Radio Free Asia*, November 28, 2024; “Chinese Teacher Injures Mongolian Student, Sparking Outrage and Boycott by Parents,” *Southern Mon-*

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⁴³Na Ran, “内蒙汉族女教师殴打蒙古族女童致严重伤害，引起蒙古族民众强烈不满” [A female ethnic Han teacher in Inner Mongolia beat a Mongolian girl and caused serious injuries, which elicited strong dissatisfaction among the ethnic Mongolian people], *Voice of America*, November 27, 2024.