

POPULATION CONTROL

Findings

- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or “Party”) and PRC government continued to implement population planning policies that violate international standards by seeking to control family size, including the application of the three-child policy, which permits and seeks to incentivize families to have up to but no more than three children.
- The National Bureau of Statistics of China’s 2024 data revealed that, while the total number of births in China increased for the first time in eight years, likely due to the auspicious “Year of the Dragon,” the overall population declined for the third consecutive year. Marriage rates also fell to the lowest rate since public records began in 1986.
- PRC central authorities announced a variety of pro-natal initiatives this year, including a survey to identify family and childbearing attitudes, increased support for infrastructure related to childrearing, and a proposed national childcare subsidy. Local authorities also attempted to boost birth rates through financial incentives, pro-natal messaging, and calling young women to ask about their family planning and menstrual cycles.
- The Commission observed reports of the discriminatory effects of centrally led family planning policies, including the likely continuation of birth suppression of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
- The legacy of the one-child policy (1980 to 2015) continues to have an impact on Chinese society, including the continued sex ratio imbalance and increased socio-economic precarity for China’s elderly population.
- In September 2024, the PRC announced the end of international adoptions originating in China, to which the one-child policy era’s social engineering abuses had often been linked. The sudden decision included the halting of hundreds of cases of families who had already been matched and had communicated with a child and spurred particular concern for the thousands of children remaining in Chinese orphanages, often with disabilities.

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Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PRC government continued to implement population planning policies that violate international standards. The one-child policy, in force from 1980 through 2015, restricted most couples to one child,¹ with exceptions permitted in some cases, most commonly for those in rural areas or for ethnic minority groups.² Enforcement of the one-child policy included the use of birth permits and fines to punish couples for exceeding birth limits, intrusive monitoring of women's fertility, and coercive measures such as forced placement of intrauterine devices, forced sterilizations, and forced abortions.³ In December 2015, due to weak population growth, the PRC government modified the birth limit policy to allow all couples to have two children.⁴ In subsequent years, however, PRC authorities intensified measures such as forced abortion and sterilization to significantly decrease the fertility of ethnic minority women in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).⁵ [For more information on human rights abuses in the XUAR, see Chapter 15—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

To address the “great challenge” of the PRC's aging population and decreasing fertility rate, the National People's Congress Standing Committee adopted a policy in August 2021, allowing couples to have up to three children (“three-child policy”).⁶ The previous use of fines for exceeding birth limits was also abolished.⁷ The shift to the two- and now three-child policy, however, did not alter the basic premise of PRC authorities' “claim [of] sovereignty over childbearing” of Chinese citizens, as observed by political scientist Tyrene White.⁸ In a comprehensive report on the PRC's various population planning policies published this past year, one civil society organization stated, “Whether China implements the one-child policy or the three-child policy, it is ‘national family planning’ led and controlled by the government, and the question of how many children are allowed to be born is [thus] . . . not a decision made within the family.”⁹

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Attempting to control family size, both through the official three-child limit and by coercing women to bear more children, violates standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development.¹⁰ Harsh measures taken against ethnic minority groups to reduce their population size contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Genocide Convention.¹¹

Population Decline and Official Responses

In January 2025, the National Bureau of Statistics of China announced that in 2024, China's overall population continued to decline¹²—the third year in a row of officially reported population

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decline in China.¹³ Births, however, increased for the first time in eight years.¹⁴ Some attributed the rise in births to 2024 being the auspicious “Year of the Dragon” in the lunar calendar,¹⁵ with observers noting that this rise likely will not be a continuing trend.¹⁶ Also in 2024, marriages fell to the lowest number since public records began in 1986.¹⁷

Throughout the past year, the CCP and PRC government discussed and introduced several new policy measures in an attempt to boost the birth rate. In October 2024, official media announced the launch of a national survey to identify public attitudes towards childbearing in order to address reluctance through new policies.¹⁸ In the same month, the State Council General Office issued *Several Measures to Accelerate the Improvement of the Fertility Support Policy System and Promote the Construction of a Fertility-Friendly Society*, which include 13 measures aimed at increasing nationwide support for maternity, childbirth, and childcare services, as well as for general public services such as education, housing, and employment.¹⁹ Additionally, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) members offered proposals related to marriage and childbearing at the annual meeting of the CPPCC in March 2025.²⁰ These included proposals to eliminate the current three-child limit, mandate paternity leave of at least 30 days to encourage shared childcare responsibilities, and increase work recruitment events for mothers, and one especially controversial proposal to lower the legal marriage age from 22 for men and 20 for women to 18 to “unleash reproductive potential.”²¹ Premier Li Qiang also proposed a national childcare subsidy at the March 2025 National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting, and the National Health Commission later confirmed that it was drafting detailed plans for the policy and conducting research on similar measures.²²

Several other government entities implemented policies this past year aimed at boosting China’s birth rate. Examples include:

- **Local financial incentives.** Local governments continued to offer financial incentives to promote births,²³ such as monthly cash payouts during infancy, childcare subsidies, and covering medical expenses for childbirth.²⁴ The government of Tianmen city, Hubei province, caught the attention of national officials, boasting a 17 percent increase in births in 2024, one year after introducing some of the highest subsidies nationwide for second and third children.²⁵ Officials visited Tianmen to study its “fertility secret” for national replication, while state media praised the Tianmen government for its subsidies and pro-natal propaganda led from “high levels.”²⁶ When interviewed, however, Tianmen residents who planned to have two or three children stated that, while helpful, the local subsidies were not the deciding factor for their family’s size.²⁷ Observers noted that most babies born in Tianmen in 2024 were conceived before authorities announced the cash incentives, and that the share of childbearing-aged citizens in the city recently increased due to young workers moving from more expensive cities.²⁸ Experts continued to debate such incentives’ efficacy more broadly, as research suggests that while some state investments in maternity and child subsidies are linked to modest increases in birth

rates, such effects appear temporary or too small to change an entire population's demographic trajectory.²⁹ Large cash incentives in other localities, such as Hohhot municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, have not appeared effective in boosting birth rates.³⁰

- **Government employees.** A leaked draft policy document from the Quanzhou municipality, Fujian province Municipal Health Commission revealed internal discussions about encouraging Party members and government employees to “take the lead” in implementing the three-child policy by having three children themselves.³¹ Online observers drew parallels between the memo and a famous open letter from PRC central authorities that launched the one-child policy in 1980, calling on Party members to “take the lead” in having one child.³²

- **Calling women.** Young women across China received calls from local government officials asking them if they were pregnant, whether they planned to have children, and for details about their menstrual cycle.³³ Most calls came from local family planning associations, which report to the central government and previously enforced the one-child policy.³⁴ While some women reported appreciating the support, many took to social media to complain about the “invasive” questioning.³⁵

- **Pro-natal messaging.** Party and government officials continued to push pro-natal messaging³⁶ through essays, banners, publicity campaigns, and public artwork, promoting “positive perspectives on marriage, childbirth, and family.”³⁷ Such efforts are often carried out by local family planning associations, although central government entities such as the National Health Commission also announced more focused efforts on advocating for marriage and childbirth.³⁸ Central authorities also suppressed viewpoints counter to official pro-natal messaging, censoring netizens “deliberately playing up anti-marriage and anti-fertility topics.”³⁹ [For more information on the PRC's control of messaging and the media, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression.]

Discriminatory Effects

FORCED POPULATION CONTROL OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES

The Commission observed reports of discriminatory effects of centrally led family planning policies. PRC leader Xi Jinping's rhetoric this past year calling for “high-quality population development” implies the existence and judgment of a “low-quality” counterpart, as argued by one Chinese economist.⁴⁰ Observers expressed concern with regard to population control policies directed at Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where authorities have long sought to lower high growth rates, particularly since 2017, while at the same time the central government has sought to boost the birth rate of the majority Han population.⁴¹ Since 2020, the PRC has suppressed local-level population data in the XUAR, limiting researchers' ability to estimate population growth rates.⁴² The most recent available data, the 2023

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XUAR birth and death rates, indicate severely diminished population growth rates; Turkic minority birth rates used to be some of the highest in China but now approach a growth rate of zero.⁴³ According to one Uyghur history scholar, “the state likely continues to achieve its goals of birth suppression among minorities in the XUAR.”⁴⁴ [For more information on population control measures directed against Uyghur women, see Chapter 15—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION

Without direct clarification from authorities, the tone of pronatalism set at top levels of the Party-state apparatus can lead to workplace discrimination, as seen this past year. In a January 2025 notice widely shared on social media, Shuntian Chemical Group in Shandong province instructed unmarried employees between the ages of 28 and 58 to get married and start families by September 30, or else face termination.⁴⁵ After online backlash, local government officials intervened, and Shuntian Chemical Group withdrew the announcement.⁴⁶ Lu Pin, a Chinese feminist scholar and activist, suggested that the company likely “thought the orders would be well received,” given the PRC government’s promotion of a broader pro-natal atmosphere.⁴⁷

Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy

The legacy of the one-child policy continues to have an impact on Chinese society and beyond.⁴⁸ Multiple news stories this year highlighted the “collective trauma” of the one-child policy, including the grief and fear of parents who desired, and in some cases bore, additional “illegal” children, and the painful memories of hiding unauthorized children from authorities.⁴⁹ Reports linked this trauma to young people’s reluctance to have children of their own, citing deep fear and distrust of government family planning policies.⁵⁰ Other lingering effects of the one-child policy include:

- **Sex imbalance.** Throughout the one-child policy era, due to the combination of the cultural preference for sons, and couples only being allowed to have one child, a surge in sex-selective abortions led China’s population to suffer “the worst imbalance in its sex ratio at birth” compared to other countries.⁵¹ The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported in January 2025 that in 2024, there were 29.9 million more males than females in China, with a sex ratio of 104.34 males to 100 females.⁵² Observers link this sex imbalance to human trafficking, as the struggle of young men to find spouses in China leads to the “importing” of foreign women into the country for marriage.⁵³ [For more information on human trafficking in China, see Chapter 9—Human Trafficking.]
- **Abandoned disabled children.** The one-child policy prompted many families in China to put children up for adoption, especially girls and children with disabilities.⁵⁴ Chinese orphanages heavily relied on international adoptions due to overwhelming capacity, granting overseas adoptions of more than 160,000 Chinese children since 1992.⁵⁵ As of 2022, reportedly more than 50,000 children remain in Chinese state orphan-

ages, with approximately 98 percent of them living with severe illnesses or disabilities.⁵⁶ In August 2024, however, the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs suddenly announced the end of China's international adoption program.⁵⁷ The policy shift halted the majority of international adoptions in progress, including those of hundreds of families who had already been matched and had established relationships with a child.⁵⁸ Observers expressed particular concern for Chinese children with disabilities who now may not be adopted at all, as international families have been the most likely to adopt these children.⁵⁹ The PRC government offered a vague explanation for ending the program.⁶⁰ Observers speculated that the adoption suspension may be due to the slowing birth rate, nationalistic pride, deteriorating relations with Western countries, concerns about systemic abuse within the international adoption system, or following the global trend of ceasing international adoptions.⁶¹

• **Pressures on the elderly.** Chinese authorities' enforcement of population control policies has contributed to increasing socio-economic precarity for China's elderly population. In particular, as China faces an increasingly aging population due to the effects of the one-child policy,⁶² the elderly struggle to find sufficient healthcare, especially in rural areas.⁶³ Structural changes to families, propelled by the one-child policy, also weaken the traditional reliance on adult children to care for elderly parents.⁶⁴ Chinese lawmakers addressed some related challenges of the rapidly aging population this past year, including by pledging to raise old age benefits and expand elderly care services, and implementing a decision to gradually increase the statutory retirement age, despite vocal disapproval from the citizenry.⁶⁵ [For more information on changes to the retirement age in the PRC, see Chapter 10—Worker Rights.]

Notes to Chapter 8—Population Control

¹ “中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法” [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, effective September 1, 2002, art. 18; Gu Baochang, Wang Feng, Guo Zhigang, and Zhang Erli, “China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,” *Population and Development Review*, vol. 33, no. 1, March 7, 2007, 130–36.

² Gu Baochang, Wang Feng, Guo Zhigang, and Zhang Erli, “China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,” *Population and Development Review*, vol. 33, no. 1, March 7, 2007, 131–36.

³ Martin King Whyte, Wang Feng, and Yong Cai, “Challenging Myths about China’s One-Child Policy,” *China Journal*, vol. 74, 2015, 150–52; Massimo Introvigne, “The Rise and Fall of China’s One-Child Policy. 2. From ‘Later, Longer, and Fewer’ to ‘One Child,’” *Bitter Winter*, April 2, 2025; Elijah R. Biji, “China’s Aging Crisis: The Lasting Impact of the One-Child Policy,” *Modern Diplomacy*, January 25, 2025; Andrew Mullen, “Explainer | China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2021.

⁴ “中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法” [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, art. 18; National Health and Family Planning Commission, “实施全面两孩政策，促进人口均衡发展” [Implement the universal two-child policy, promote balanced population development], October 29, 2015; National People’s Congress Standing Committee, “全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法》的决定” [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the “PRC Population and Family Planning Law”], passed December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016. See also Yidie Lin et al., “The Effect of Gradually Lifting the Two-Child Policy on Demographic Changes in China,” *Health Policy and Planning*, vol. 39, no. 4, May 2024, 364.

⁵ “China Cuts Uyghur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization,” *Associated Press*, June 29, 2020; Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, “Family De-Planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,” *International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, Policy Brief, Report no. 44, 2021, 11–17, 25; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” *Uyghur Tribunal*, February 10, 2022, 5; Rian Thum, “Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire: How China’s Policies in the Uyghur Region Have and Have Not Changed,” *Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, February 2025, 12–13; “Reproductive Rights and AI: The Uyghur Women’s Struggle,” *YouTube*, panel held by Campaign for Uyghurs, March 21, 2025, 10:50–11:05. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 171–72, 312–13; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2021,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, March 2022, 280–81.

⁶ “中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法” [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended August 20, 2021, art. 18; “权威快报 | 三孩生育政策来了” [Authoritative announcement: Three-child policy has arrived], *Xinhua*, May 31, 2021; “中共中央国务院关于优化生育政策促进人口长期均衡发展的决定” [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on optimizing the fertility policy and promoting the long-term balanced development of the population], *Xinhua*, July 20, 2021.

⁷ “中共中央国务院关于优化生育政策促进人口长期均衡发展的决定” [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on optimizing the fertility policy and promoting the long-term balanced development of the population], *Xinhua*, July 20, 2021, sec. 3(9); “国务院废止三部人口管理法规，《社会抚养费征收管理办法》在列” [State Council abolished three population management regulations, among which is recorded the “Measures for the Collection and Management of Social Support Fees”], *Jiemian*, September 26, 2021.

⁸ Tyrene White, “Policy Case Study: Population Policy,” in *Politics in China: An Introduction*, Third Edition., Oxford University Press, ed. William A. Joseph, 2019, 435.

⁹ Three Child Policy Monitoring Network, “中国三孩催生政策：对妇女生育权影响研究报告” [China’s Three-Child Policy: Research report on the impact on women’s reproductive rights], *Human Rights in China*, March 2025, 4.

¹⁰ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 10, 1948, art. 16. PRC government-imposed birth limits and stipulations on family size encroach on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family” (Article 16). “Cairo International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action,” *United Nations Population Fund*, adopted September 1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25; “Report of the International Conference on Population and Development,” *United Nations Population Fund*, A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, September 1994, 117. Although not a binding document, Paragraph 7.2 of the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, of which China was a state participant, states, “Reproductive health therefore implies that people... have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so.”

¹¹ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 10, 1948, art. 16; “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” *United Nations*, adopted December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 23; “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” *United Nations Treaty Collection*, Chapter IV Human Rights; “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” adopted May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 1980, art. 18. The PRC signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) on October 5, 1998, but has not yet ratified it, despite stating repeatedly its intent to ratify including in the National Human Rights Action Plan for 2016–2020. The U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, §§301–309 requires the CECC to use the ICCPR’s provisions to monitor compliance with human rights standards in the PRC. “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” *United Nations*, adopted December 10, 1984, entry

into force June 26, 1987, art. 1; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” *United Nations*, adopted December 9, 1948, entry into force January 12, 1951, art. 2(d).

¹²National Bureau of Statistics of China, “National Economy Witnessed Steady Progress Amidst Stability with Major Development Targets Achieved Successfully in 2024,” *National Bureau of Statistics of China*, January 17, 2025; Liyan Qi, “China Sees a Fresh Decline in Population, Despite a Rise in Births,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 2025; William Yang, “China Attempts to Boost Birth Rate amid Mounting Challenges,” *Voice of America*, November 4, 2024; Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Age of Depopulation: Surviving a World Gone Gray,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 10, 2024. Other societies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, are also experiencing record-low fertility rates, and though many have tried to implement birth-boosting policy measures, they have largely been unsuccessful.

¹³Liyan Qi, “China Sees a Fresh Decline in Population, Despite a Rise in Births,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 2025.

¹⁴National Bureau of Statistics of China, “National Economy Witnessed Steady Progress Amidst Stability with Major Development Targets Achieved Successfully in 2024,” *National Bureau of Statistics of China*, January 17, 2025; Liyan Qi, “China Sees a Fresh Decline in Population, Despite a Rise in Births,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 2025.

¹⁵Austin Zhang, “Why There Are Fewer Babies Born in the Year of the Snake, and What It Means,” *South China Morning Post*, January 10, 2025; Katharina Buchholz, “Are ‘Dragon Babies’ Bumping Up China’s Birth Rate?” *Statista*, January 29, 2025; Liyan Qi, “China Sees a Fresh Decline in Population, Despite a Rise in Births,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 2025. More births are typically recorded during the “Year of the Dragon” every 12 years in China, likely due to traditional cultural belief that children born under the dragon zodiac sign “will grow into power and greatness.”

¹⁶Liyan Qi, “China Sees a Fresh Decline in Population, Despite a Rise in Births,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 2025; William Langley, “China Benefits from ‘Dragon Year’ Birth Boost but Population Falls Again,” *Financial Times*, January 17, 2025; Katia Dmitrieva, “China Population Set for 51 Million Drop as Pro-Birth Moves Fail,” *Bloomberg*, November 18, 2024; Austin Zhang, “Why There Are Fewer Babies Born in the Year of the Snake, and What It Means,” *South China Morning Post*, January 10, 2025.

¹⁷“China Marriages Hit Record Low as Population Crisis Worsens,” *Bloomberg*, February 10, 2025; Luna Sun, “More Chinese Leave the Knot Untied as Marriage Registrations Drop,” *South China Morning Post*, April 28, 2025.

¹⁸Liu Caiyu, “National Population Survey Launched to Help Optimize Fertility Support Policies,” *Global Times*, October 17, 2024.

¹⁹PRC State Council General Office, “国务院办公厅印发《关于加快完善生育支持政策体系推动建设生育友好型社会的若干措施》的通知” [State Council General Office issued a notice on “Several Measures to Accelerate the Improvement of the Fertility Support Policy System and Promote the Construction of a Fertility-Friendly Society”], October 28, 2024.

²⁰“Viral Two Sessions Proposals of 2025,” *World of Chinese*, March 11, 2025.

²¹“Viral Two Sessions Proposals of 2025,” *World of Chinese*, March 11, 2025; Farah Master, “China Adviser Pushes to Lower Legal Marriage Age to 18 to Boost Birthrate,” *Reuters*, February 24, 2025.

²²Mandy Zuo, “Why China Is Betting on Birth Subsidies to Solve Its Population Crisis,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2025.

²³For information on local governments’ efforts to offer financial incentives to promote births in previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 158–159.

²⁴Qian Lang, “Remote Chinese County Offers Cash for Babies to Boost Population,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 20, 2024; Mandy Zuo, “Why China Is Betting on Birth Subsidies to Solve Its Population Crisis,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2025.

²⁵Mandy Zuo, “Why China Is Betting on Birth Subsidies to Solve Its Population Crisis,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2025; Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, “This Chinese City Grew Its Birth Rate. It Won’t Be Easy to Copy,” *Washington Post*, March 26, 2025.

²⁶Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, “This Chinese City Grew Its Birth Rate. It Won’t Be Easy to Copy,” *Washington Post*, March 26, 2025; “瞭望 | 湖北天门探寻‘生育密码’” [Outlook | Hubei’s Tianmen Explores the ‘Fertility Secret’], *Xinhua*, reprinted in *QQ*, March 4, 2025.

²⁷Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, “This Chinese City Grew Its Birth Rate. It Won’t Be Easy to Copy,” *Washington Post*, March 26, 2025.

²⁸Yoko Kubota and Liyan Qi, “Inside the Chinese City that Said Cash Rewards Brought a Baby Boom,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 9, 2025.

²⁹Mandy Zuo, “Why China Is Betting on Birth Subsidies to Solve Its Population Crisis,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2025; Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, “This Chinese City Grew Its Birth Rate. It Won’t Be Easy to Copy,” *Washington Post*, March 26, 2025.

³⁰“China’s \$38,000 Baby Formula,” *Economist*, April 24, 2025.

³¹Zhao Meng, “福建泉州号召党员干部生三孩？泉州市卫健委回应” [Quanzhou, Fujian calls on party members and cadres to have three children? Quanzhou Municipal Health Commission responds], *Jiemian News*, reprinted in *Sina Finance*, July 20, 2024; Chen Zifei, “Leaked Plan Reveals Bid to Get Chinese Officials to Have More Kids,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 23, 2024.

³²Vivian Wang, “Chinese Company to Single Workers: Get Married or Get Out,” *New York Times*, March 4, 2025; Zhao Meng, “福建泉州号召党员干部生三孩？泉州市卫健委回应” [Quanzhou, Fujian calls on party members and cadres to have three children? Quanzhou Municipal Health Commission responds], *Jiemian News*, reprinted in *Sina Finance*, July 20, 2024.

³³“China’s Government Is Badgering Women to Have Babies,” *Economist*, November 28, 2024; Vivian Wang, “So, Are You Pregnant Yet? China’s In-Your-Face Push for More Babies,” *New York Times*, October 8, 2024; Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, “This Chinese City Grew Its Birth

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Rate. It Won't Be Easy to Copy," *Washington Post*, March 26, 2025; Alexander Boyd, "Local Officials Call Women to Ask: 'Are You Pregnant?'" *China Digital Times*, October 23, 2024; Arthur Kaufman, "As Marriage Registrations Drop, Local Officials Text Women: 'How Has Your Period Been Recently?'" *China Digital Times*, April 30, 2025.

³⁴China's Government Is Badgering Women to Have Babies," *Economist*, November 28, 2024; Vivian Wang, "So, Are You Pregnant Yet? China's In-Your-Face Push for More Babies," *New York Times*, October 8, 2024.

³⁵Vivian Wang, "So, Are You Pregnant Yet? China's In-Your-Face Push for More Babies," *New York Times*, October 8, 2024; Alexander Boyd, "Local Officials Call Women to Ask: 'Are You Pregnant?'" *China Digital Times*, October 23, 2024; "China's Government Is Badgering Women to Have Babies," *Economist*, November 28, 2024; Xing Dandi, Xu Wen, and Kelly Wang, "Women Across China Say They Are Getting Calls about Their Pregnancy Plans," *Caixin*, October 25, 2024.

³⁶For information on officials' pro-natal messaging in previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, "Annual Report 2024," *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 157–158.

³⁷Three Child Policy Monitoring Network, "中国三孩催生政策：对妇女生育权影响研究报告" [China's Three-Child Policy: Research report on the impact on women's reproductive rights], *Human Rights in China*, March 2025, 15–17; Du Qiongfang, "Top Health Authority Urges Greater Efforts to Build a Childbearing-Friendly Society," *Global Times*, September 12, 2024; "China's Government Is Badgering Women to Have Babies," *Economist*, November 28, 2024; Vivian Wang, "So, Are You Pregnant Yet? China's In-Your-Face Push for More Babies," *New York Times*, October 8, 2024.

³⁸Vivian Wang, "So, Are You Pregnant Yet? China's In-Your-Face Push for More Babies," *New York Times*, October 8, 2024; Du Qiongfang, "Top Health Authority Urges Greater Efforts to Build a Childbearing-Friendly Society," *Global Times*, September 12, 2024; Three Child Policy Monitoring Network, "中国三孩催生政策：对妇女生育权影响研究报告" [China's Three-Child Policy: Research report on the impact on women's reproductive rights], *Human Rights in China*, March 2025, 16.

³⁹Three Child Policy Monitoring Network, "中国三孩催生政策：对妇女生育权影响研究报告" [China's Three-Child Policy: Research report on the impact on women's reproductive rights], *Human Rights in China*, March 2025, 16–17; "中央网信办启动'清明·2025年春节网络环境整治'专项行动" [Cyberspace Administration of China launches 'Clear and Bright 2025 Spring Festival Network Environment Improvement' special campaign], *Cyberspace Administration of China*, January 19, 2025.

⁴⁰Lizzi C. Lee, "Xi Jinping Doesn't Have an Answer for China's Demographic Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, November 28, 2024; Xi Jinping, "以人口高质量发展支撑中国式现代化" [Supporting Chinese-style modernization with high-quality population development], *Qiushi*, November 15, 2024.

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