

## HUMAN TRAFFICKING

### *Findings*

- The government of Brazil accused China's BYD Company Ltd. of employing at least 163 workers in "slave-like conditions" at a construction site in Bahia. The Brazilian government said that the workers were "victims of international trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation." Brazilian authorities identified forced labor indicators including the withholding of the workers' passports and salaries.
- The Commission continued to observe reports of forced labor linked to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In December 2024, Adrian Zenz and I-Lin Lin of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation asserted that the PRC government's heightened agricultural production policies have resulted in coercive forms of work that "constitute state-imposed forced labor as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and operationalized in its updated handbook on the measurement of forced labor."
- In February 2025, the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) documented the presence of North Korean workers on a fleet of Chinese tuna fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean between March 2019 and June 2024. At least five vessels showed indicators of forced labor, including deception related to wages, withholding of documents, physical and verbal abuse, and excessive overtime.

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### *China's Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Obligations under International Law*

The Chinese government is obligated to combat human trafficking and enact legislation criminalizing human trafficking as a State Party to the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol),<sup>1</sup> and has also committed to obligations to combat forced labor under the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Forced Labour Convention of 1930<sup>2</sup> and Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957.<sup>3</sup>

In 2024, the ILO released an updated framework to identify forced labor of adults, specifying conditions of involuntary work and coercion.<sup>4</sup> While there is no set list of indicators that guarantee the existence of either condition, according to the ILO, several practices could point to the use of involuntary and/or coerced work.<sup>5</sup> The revised ILO guidelines strengthen methodologies for identifying non-internment forms of state-imposed forced labor, allowing researchers to more accurately capture the complexities of systemic coercion in regions such as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).<sup>6</sup>

### *Cross-Border Trafficking*

During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, China remained<sup>7</sup> both a source of, and destination country for, human trafficking across international borders. Examples of cross-border trafficking during this reporting year include the following:

- **Brazil accuses BYD of trafficking Chinese nationals at local factory.** Brazilian authorities announced in December 2024 that they would conduct probes of BYD Company Ltd. ("BYD"), a Chinese company that has deep ties to and receives financial support from the PRC government, and one of its Chinese contractors, who were suspected of trafficking Chinese workers building a local factory.<sup>8</sup> Labor inspectors discovered that 163 Chinese workers were living in "slave-like conditions" at a construction site in Bahia.<sup>9</sup> A statement issued by the Brazilian government said that the workers, who were employed by BYD contractor Jinjiang Open Engineering, were "victims of international trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation."<sup>10</sup> The workers lived in four different facilities in the city of Camaçari, including one where prosecutors claim some workers were forced to sleep on beds without mattresses.<sup>11</sup> Brazilian authorities identified the presence of forced labor indicators, such as the withholding of workers' passports and salaries.<sup>12</sup> Aaron Halegua, a lawyer and fellow at New York University Law School, said that a labor contract signed by one of the workers had "textbook 'red flags' of forced labor," and asserted that withholding passports as well as requiring performance bonds or security payments is not allowed under Chinese law.<sup>13</sup> Mao Ning, a spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the PRC's embassy and consulates were working with Brazil to "verify the situation and handle the issue properly."<sup>14</sup>

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In January 2025, *Reuters* reported that a Brazilian labor inspector said BYD would be fined and also noted that, in order to comply with Brazilian labor laws, BYD agreed to adjust the conditions of the workers who will remain in Brazil.<sup>15</sup>

- **Forced labor indicators identified at Chinese companies in Serbia.** In 2024, China Labor Watch (CLW) published a report detailing in-person and online interviews held between July and October 2024 with foreign migrant workers at the Linglong Tire Factory in Zrenjanin, Serbia and the Chinese state-owned Zijin Mining Group's copper mine in Bor, Serbia.<sup>16</sup> Foreign workers from not only China, but also India, Nepal, Zambia, and Indonesia, were subject to conditions matching at least six ILO indicators of forced labor.<sup>17</sup> Under a 2018 bilateral deal between China and Serbia, Serbian labor law is suspended for Chinese nationals during their first five years in the country, with Chinese labor laws applying to the workers instead.<sup>18</sup> The Labor Inspectorate of Serbia is thus prohibited from reviewing Chinese workers' contracts or checking to see if they are being paid.<sup>19</sup>

- **PRC complicity in the trafficking of North Korean workers and refugees.** In February 2025, the ILO reported that Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nationals working abroad were placed in coercive and exploitative conditions and threatened with repatriation for poor performance or rule violations.<sup>20</sup>

- Recent reporting has shed light on the PRC government's disregard for U.N. sanctions, as North Korean workers have been discovered on a number of Chinese fishing vessels.<sup>21</sup> The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) released a report in February 2025 that documented the presence of North Korean workers on 12 Chinese-flagged tuna longliners in the Indian Ocean between March 2019 and June 2024.<sup>22</sup> According to the EJF, the presence of North Korean workers on Chinese vessels likely breaches U.N. sanctions.<sup>23</sup> Ship captains made concerted efforts to hide the presence of North Koreans on these vessels and forced some of them to remain at sea for as long as 10 years.<sup>24</sup> The EJF said that "[t]his would constitute forced labor of a magnitude that surpasses much of that witnessed in a global fishing industry already replete with abuse."<sup>25</sup> At least five vessels showed indicators of forced labor, including deception related to wages, withholding of documents, physical and verbal abuse, and excessive overtime.<sup>26</sup>

- **Trafficking of women and girls.** Reports continued in this reporting year of women and girls trafficked into China to meet the growing demand for brides as a result of the gender imbalance fueled by the PRC's previous one-child policy.<sup>27</sup> In November 2024, state-run media reported that two traffickers were sentenced in Xiajin county, Shandong province, for taking men across borders illegally in search of brides.<sup>28</sup> In December 2024, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held a meeting with experts where they discussed "illegal cross-border marriages," and said that the

management of cross-border marriages had become a “difficult problem.”<sup>29</sup> Madagascar authorities arrested eight PRC nationals and three others in March 2025 as part of a trafficking ring that was uncovered after one Malagasy family reported their daughter had been lured to China under false pretenses and was “forced to bear children” and prohibited from going out.<sup>30</sup> The PRC Embassy in Bangladesh issued a document in May 2025 that warned Chinese citizens not to believe short-form videos that promote cross-border blind dates and marriages, and not to “buy a foreign wife” or get married in Bangladesh.<sup>31</sup>

**Human Trafficking in Scam Centers and Other  
Criminal Enterprises in Southeast Asia**

During this reporting year, the PRC government accelerated its efforts to crack down on scam centers and other criminal enterprises in Southeast Asia. Chinese criminals operating in Southeast Asia have lured citizens from at least 40 countries to participate in various scams, promising well-paying jobs and travel perks.<sup>32</sup> Many Chinese nationals are lured into the scam centers, where they are abused and forced to conduct scam operations.<sup>33</sup> PRC authorities ramped up prosecution of suspects involved in telecom fraud in 2024, with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate announcing that over 67,000 people had been indicted on telecom fraud charges between January and November, an increase of 58.5 percent from the previous year, and that more than 40,000 individuals who were “suspected of involvement in cross-border telecom fraud operations” in northern Burma (Myanmar) had been repatriated.<sup>34</sup> The head of the economic crimes division within the Supreme People’s Procuratorate said that overseas cases of telecom fraud have risen despite China’s intensified crackdown.<sup>35</sup>

The PRC government previously acknowledged domestic dissatisfaction over the scam centers.<sup>36</sup> In May 2023, Qin Gang, then-PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, said “Telecommunications and internet fraud gangs have long been entrenched in Burma’s border areas, seriously infringing on the interests of Chinese citizens, and the Chinese people hate this,” and pledged that the PRC government would crack down on the organizations.<sup>37</sup>

**Human Trafficking in Scam Centers and Other  
Criminal Enterprises in Southeast Asia—Continued**

Recent reporting has revealed details about the PRC’s links to some of the criminal networks operating in Southeast Asia. In January 2024, Burmese authorities handed over the bosses of three crime families to China, including Bai Suocheng, Wei Chaoren, and Liu Zhengxiang, accusing them of being involved in the organized cyberfraud industry.<sup>38</sup> The *Washington Post* reported in June 2024 that the criminal networks run by the three families benefited from close relations with Chinese officials in Yunnan province, the PRC government, and the military government in Burma for over a decade.<sup>39</sup> Through their alliances, the families created a “profitable criminal ecosystem” across the Kokang region of Burma comprising both legal and illegal businesses.<sup>40</sup> The criminal networks cooperated on numerous economic projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars with PRC and Burmese authorities.<sup>41</sup> The families were able to establish companies in China and obtain identity papers in part due to their Han Chinese background and ran operations involving “illegal gambling, human trafficking[,] and narcotics.”<sup>42</sup> Chinese nationals and ethnic Chinese people were trafficked and “beaten, tortured or killed” if they tried to escape or failed to reach monetary targets.<sup>43</sup>

*Domestic Trafficking*

During this reporting year, the Commission continued to observe reports concerning cases of domestic human trafficking in China:<sup>44</sup>

- **Trafficking case of Bu Xiaohua.** In December 2024, reporting emerged that Bu Xiaohua, a woman residing in Heshun county, Shanxi province who was missing for 13 years, was allegedly trafficked and abused.<sup>45</sup> From 2011 to 2024, Bu lived in a village approximately 100 miles from her hometown with a man named Zhang Ruijun and reportedly gave birth to several children.<sup>46</sup> When found, Bu showed signs of neglect, including “matted hair, severe malnourishment, as well as being deprived of eyeglasses and unable to see well.”<sup>47</sup> Zhang, who asserted that he “gave shelter” to Bu, was eventually detained by local authorities on suspicion of rape.<sup>48</sup> Despite Chinese state media downplaying the possibility that Bu was trafficked, one WeChat commentator argued that the use of the term “sheltering” could be used to “mask serious criminal activities against vulnerable people such as victims of trafficking or those suffering from mental illness.”<sup>49</sup> As of March 2025, the case involving Bu Xiaohua was in the prosecution stage.<sup>50</sup> [For more information on the trafficking case of Bu Xiaohua, see Chapter 7—Status of Women.]

**FORCED LABOR IN AND FROM THE XINJIANG UYGHUR  
AUTONOMOUS REGION**

The forced labor of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in and from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained a concern during the Commission’s 2025 reporting year.<sup>51</sup> A December 2024 report by Adrian Zenz and I-Lin Lin of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation asserted that the PRC government’s

heightened agricultural production policies have resulted in coercive forms of work that “constitute state-imposed forced labor as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and operationalized in its updated handbook on the measurement of forced labor.”<sup>52</sup> Officials have applied this coercive pressure on Turkic ethnic minority groups through forced agricultural production mandates, the mandated transfer of rural land-use rights, labor transfers, and other means.<sup>53</sup> In its *Application of International Labour Standards 2025* report, citing the research of the International Trade Union Confederation, the ILO reported that the PRC government has engaged in a system of transferring “surplus” rural workers in the XUAR into industries including the processing of raw materials for the production of vehicle components, seafood processing, and seasonal agricultural work.<sup>54</sup> [For more information on the PRC government’s use of Uyghur forced labor and forced land transfers, see Chapter 15—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and Chapter 12—Business and Human Rights.]

## Notes to Chapter 9—Human Trafficking

<sup>1</sup>“Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” *United Nations Treaty Collection*, Chapter XVIII Penal Matters; “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” adopted November 15, 2000, entry into force December 25, 2003, arts. 5.1, 9.1. China acceded to the Palermo Protocol on February 8, 2010. See also, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,” *Human Rights Council*, A/HRC/35/37, March 28, 2017, para. 14.

<sup>2</sup>“Ratifications of C029—Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),” *International Labour Organization*; “Forced Labour Convention, 1930,” *International Labour Organization*, No. 29, adopted June 28, 1930, arts. 1, 2, 25.

<sup>3</sup>“Ratifications of C105—Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105),” *International Labour Organization*; “Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957,” *International Labour Organization*, No. 105, adopted June 25, 1957, art. 1(a), (e). The ILO’s Abolition of Forced Labour Convention prohibits China from using forced labor “as a means of political coercion or education” or “as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.”

<sup>4</sup>International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, ix, 4.

<sup>5</sup>International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, 8–18.

<sup>6</sup>Adrian Zenz, “Updated ILO Forced Labor Guidelines Directly Target Uyghur Forced Labor,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, April 14, 2024, 28–30.

<sup>7</sup>For information on cross-border trafficking to and from China in previous reporting years, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 172; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 185; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2022,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, November 2022, 199; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2021,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, March 2022, 164–65.

<sup>8</sup>“Força-Tarefa Resgata 163 Trabalhadores e Interditada Obra da BYD em Camaçari (BA)” [Task Force Rescues 163 Workers and Closes BYD Construction Site in Camaçari (BA)], *Brazil Public Labor Prosecutor’s Office*, December 23, 2024; Agence France-Presse, “Brazil Views Labor Violations at BYD Site as Human ‘Trafficking,’” reprinted in *Voice of America*, December 27, 2024; Haley Nelson, “What China’s BYD Really Wants from EV Investments in Mexico,” *Atlantic Council*, January 29, 2025; Jasper Jolly, “BYD: China’s Electric Vehicle Powerhouse Charges into Europe,” *Guardian*, June 18, 2024; “What is China’s Jinjiang, the BYD Contractor Under Fire in Brazil?” *Reuters*, December 27, 2024.

<sup>9</sup>“Força-Tarefa Resgata 163 Trabalhadores e Interditada Obra da BYD em Camaçari (BA)” [Task Force Rescues 163 Workers and Closes BYD Construction Site in Camaçari (BA)], *Brazil Public Labor Prosecutor’s Office*, December 23, 2024; Agence France-Presse, “Brazil Views Labor Violations at BYD Site as Human ‘Trafficking,’” reprinted in *Voice of America*, December 27, 2024.

<sup>10</sup>Agence France-Presse, “Brazil Views Labor Violations at BYD Site as Human ‘Trafficking,’” reprinted in *Voice of America*, December 27, 2024.

<sup>11</sup>“Força-Tarefa Resgata 163 Trabalhadores e Interditada Obra da BYD em Camaçari (BA)” [Task Force Rescues 163 Workers and Closes BYD Construction Site in Camaçari (BA)], *Brazil Public Labor Prosecutor’s Office*, December 23, 2024; Agence France-Presse, “Brazil Views Labor Violations at BYD Site as Human ‘Trafficking,’” reprinted in *Voice of America*, December 27, 2024.

<sup>12</sup>“Força-Tarefa Resgata 163 Trabalhadores e Interditada Obra da BYD em Camaçari (BA)” [Task Force Rescues 163 Workers and Closes BYD Construction Site in Camaçari (BA)], *Brazil Public Labor Prosecutor’s Office*, December 23, 2024; Agence France-Presse, “Brazil Views Labor Violations at BYD Site as Human ‘Trafficking,’” reprinted in *Voice of America*, December 27, 2024.

<sup>13</sup>Fabio Teixeira, Luciana Novaes Magalhaes, and Lisandra Paraguassu, “Exclusive: Chinese Workers in BYD Brazil Factory Signed Contracts with Abusive Clauses, Investigators Say,” *Reuters*, January 31, 2025.

<sup>14</sup>Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on December 25, 2024,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, December 25, 2024.

<sup>15</sup>Fabio Teixeira and Luciana Novaes Magalhaes, “Exclusive: BYD Brought Hundreds of Chinese Workers to Brazil on Irregular Visas, Inspector Says,” *Reuters*, January 8, 2025.

<sup>16</sup>“Unseen Workers: Conditions of Foreign Workers in Serbia,” *China Labor Watch*, accessed June 25, 2025, 1, 24.

<sup>17</sup>“Unseen Workers: Conditions of Foreign Workers in Serbia,” *China Labor Watch*, accessed June 25, 2025, 1; International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, 10–18.

<sup>18</sup>“Zakon o Potvrđivanju Sporazuma o Socijalnoj Sigurnosti Između Vlade Republike Srbije i Vlade Narodne Republike Kine” [Law on the confirmation of the agreement on social security between the government of the Republic of Serbia and the government of the People’s Republic of China], *Government of the Republic of Serbia*, June 8, 2018, art. 7; Sasa Dragojlo, “Like Prisoners: Chinese Workers in Serbia Complain of Exploitation,” *Balkan Insight*, January 26, 2021; “Unseen Workers: Conditions of Foreign Workers in Serbia,” *China Labor Watch*, accessed June 25, 2025, 5–6.

<sup>19</sup>Sasa Dragojlo, “Like Prisoners: Chinese Workers in Serbia Complain of Exploitation,” *Balkan Insight*, January 26, 2021; “Unseen Workers: Conditions of Foreign Workers in Serbia,” *China Labor Watch*, accessed June 25, 2025, 6.

<sup>20</sup>“Application of International Labour Standards 2025: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,” *International Labour Organization*, February 10, 2025, 364.



- <sup>21</sup>“Trapped at Sea: Exposing North Korean Forced Labour on China's Indian Ocean Tuna Fleet,” *Environmental Justice Foundation*, February 22, 2025, 2–3, 5, 22.
- <sup>22</sup>“Trapped at Sea: Exposing North Korean Forced Labour on China's Indian Ocean Tuna Fleet,” *Environmental Justice Foundation*, February 22, 2025, 2–3, 5, 22.
- <sup>23</sup>“Trapped at Sea: Exposing North Korean Forced Labour on China's Indian Ocean Tuna Fleet,” *Environmental Justice Foundation*, February 22, 2025, 2, 5, 22.
- <sup>24</sup>“Trapped at Sea: Exposing North Korean Forced Labour on China's Indian Ocean Tuna Fleet,” *Environmental Justice Foundation*, February 22, 2025, 5, 14, 22.
- <sup>25</sup>“Trapped at Sea: Exposing North Korean Forced Labour on China's Indian Ocean Tuna Fleet,” *Environmental Justice Foundation*, February 22, 2025, 22.
- <sup>26</sup>“Trapped at Sea: Exposing North Korean Forced Labour on China's Indian Ocean Tuna Fleet,” *Environmental Justice Foundation*, February 22, 2025, 18–19, 22.
- <sup>27</sup>Ming Gao, “China's Dwindling Marriage Rate is Fuelling Demand for Brides Trafficked from Abroad,” *Conversation*, March 14, 2025; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, 185, May 2024.
- <sup>28</sup>Liang Pingni, “‘跨境媒人’组织多人出国相亲结婚获利” [“Cross-border Matchmakers” sentenced for organizing travel for blind dates and marriages], *Legal Daily*, reprinted in *ChinaNews*, November 24, 2024.
- <sup>29</sup>Zeng Yuxin, “综合施策，破解跨境婚姻治理难题” [Implementing comprehensive measures, resolving the difficult problem of managing cross-border marriages], *Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference*, December 21, 2024.
- <sup>30</sup>Tang Ailin and Kelly Wang, “Madagascar Busts Ring Smuggling Brides Into China,” *Caixin Global*, March 21, 2025.
- <sup>31</sup>“我使馆提醒：消除‘买外国媳妇’错误思想 谨慎赴孟娶妻” [Reminder from the embassy: Eliminate the incorrect idea of “buying a foreign wife” and exercise caution when going to Bangladesh to marry a wife], *CCTV News*, reprinted in *China Daily*, May 26, 2025.
- <sup>32</sup>Hannah Beech, “On a Lawless Tropical Border, the Global Scam Industry Thrives,” *New York Times*, February 27, 2025; “Inside Xi's Crackdown on Scams with China's Huge Surveillance State,” *Bloomberg*, March 7, 2025.
- <sup>33</sup>Patpicha Tanakasempit and Khine Lin Kyaw, “China Flies Home First Nationals from Myanmar ‘Scam Centers,’” *Bloomberg*, February 20, 2025; Isabelle Qian, “7 Months inside an Online Scam Labor Camp,” *New York Times*, December 19, 2023.
- <sup>34</sup>“Prosecutors to Intensify Fight against Telecom Fraud,” *China Daily*, reprinted in *Supreme People's Procuratorate*, February 14, 2025.
- <sup>35</sup>“Prosecutors to Intensify Fight against Telecom Fraud,” *China Daily*, reprinted in *Supreme People's Procuratorate*, February 14, 2025.
- <sup>36</sup>Shibani Mahtani, Christian Shepherd, and Pei-Lin Wu, “China Cultivated High-Rolling Crime Families before Turning on Them,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 2024; “秦刚：希望缅方严厉打击网络诈骗” [Qin Gang: I hope Burma will crack down on online fraud], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, May 3, 2023; “陈海大使就打击电信诈骗等犯罪活动同缅甸外长丹穗进行协调” [Ambassador Chen Hai coordinates with Burmese Foreign Minister Than Swe on combating telecom fraud and other criminal activities], *Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar*, July 25, 2023.
- <sup>37</sup>“秦刚：希望缅方严厉打击网络诈骗” [Qin Gang: I hope Burma will crack down on online fraud], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, May 3, 2023.
- <sup>38</sup>“Myanmar Arrests Alleged Chinese Scammers, Former MP,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 31, 2024; James Reddick, “Crime Bosses behind Myanmar Cyber ‘Fraud Dens’ Handed Over to Chinese Government,” *Recorded Future*, January 31, 2024.
- <sup>39</sup>Shibani Mahtani, Christian Shepherd, and Pei-Lin Wu, “China Cultivated High-Rolling Crime Families before Turning on Them,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 2024.
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- <sup>42</sup>Shibani Mahtani, Christian Shepherd, and Pei-Lin Wu, “China Cultivated High-Rolling Crime Families before Turning on Them,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 2024.
- <sup>43</sup>Shibani Mahtani, Christian Shepherd, and Pei-Lin Wu, “China Cultivated High-Rolling Crime Families before Turning on Them,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 2024.
- <sup>44</sup>Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 173; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 186–87; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2022,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, November 2022, 199–201.
- <sup>45</sup>Cindy Carter, “Translations: Shanxi Woman's 13-Year Ordeal Evokes Disturbing Parallels with Xiaohuamei Trafficking Case,” *China Digital Times*, December 23, 2024.
- <sup>46</sup>Cindy Carter, “Translations: Shanxi Woman's 13-Year Ordeal Evokes Disturbing Parallels with Xiaohuamei Trafficking Case,” *China Digital Times*, December 23, 2024; “Personnel Involved in Missing Woman's Case in North China Under Criminal Coercive Measures: Report,” *Global Times*, December 10, 2024.
- <sup>47</sup>Cindy Carter, “Translations: Shanxi Woman's 13-Year Ordeal Evokes Disturbing Parallels with Xiaohuamei Trafficking Case,” *China Digital Times*, December 23, 2024.
- <sup>48</sup>Cindy Carter, “Translations: Shanxi Woman's 13-Year Ordeal Evokes Disturbing Parallels with Xiaohuamei Trafficking Case,” *China Digital Times*, December 23, 2024; Phoebe Zhang, “13 Years After Mentally Ill Woman Went Missing in China, Man Held on Suspicion of Rape,” *South China Morning Post*, December 10, 2024.



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<sup>49</sup>“Personnel Involved in Missing Woman’s Case in North China Under Criminal Coercive Measures: Report,” *Global Times*, December 10, 2024; Cindy Carter, “Translations: Shanxi Woman’s 13-Year Ordeal Evokes Disturbing Parallels with Xiaohuamei Trafficking Case,” *China Digital Times*, December 23, 2024; “返璞ReSeT | ‘收留’之恶：女性何时不被剥削？” [Back to Original ReSeT | The evil of “sheltering”: When are women not exploited?], *ReSeT*, December 6, 2024, reprinted in *China Digital Times*, December 10, 2024.

<sup>50</sup> “山西女硕士失踪案进入审查起诉阶段，涉嫌罪名或包括强奸罪” [Missing female master’s student case in Shanxi enters prosecution stage, suspected crimes may include rape], *Dawan News*, March 17, 2025.

<sup>51</sup> Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2024,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, December 2024, 171–72; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2023,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, May 2024, 188–89; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report 2022,” *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, November 2022, 201–3.

<sup>52</sup> Adrian Zenz and I-Lin Lin, “Forced Labor, Coercive Land-Use Transfers, and Forced Assimilation in Xinjiang’s Agricultural Production,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, December 12, 2024, 8.

<sup>53</sup> Adrian Zenz and I-Lin Lin, “Forced Labor, Coercive Land-Use Transfers, and Forced Assimilation in Xinjiang’s Agricultural Production,” *International Network for Critical China Studies*, December 12, 2024, 8–10.

<sup>54</sup> “Application of International Labour Standards 2025: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,” *International Labour Organization*, February 10, 2025, 362–363.