Written Statement Submitted to CECC Hearing

Urging China’s President Xi Jinping to Stop State-Sponsored Human Rights Abuses

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Part One. Engaging China with Moral and Strategic Clarity
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Part One
Engaging China with Moral and Strategic Clarity

26 years ago, after the bloody massacre in Beijing in 1989, we came to Washington DC to plea the U.S. government to impose an economic sanction against the China Communist regime, in particular, to link China’s most favorite nation (MFN) status with human rights. We argued that continuing the normal trade with China would like a blood transfusion to the Communist regime, making it more aggressive and harming the interests of both American and Chinese people.

But our warning fell on deaf ears. After a lengthy debate, the U.S. government decided to continue its engagement policy, granting permanent MFN to China and contending economic growth would eventually bring democracy to the country.

Today, with money and technologies pouring in from the U.S. and other Western countries, with their free markets wide open for the Chinese-made goods, the Chinese Communist regime not only survived the 1989 crisis, it has catapulted into the 21st century. The country’s explosive economic growth has brought it from near the bottom of the world in GDP per capita to become the number two economy in the world; but democracy remains yet a far-fetched dream.

The Chinese Communist regime has instead grown into a Frankenstein’s monster, terrorizing peoples both domestically and internationally.

China uses its economic power gained with the help of the West to build a formidable, fully modernized military, that has reached every corner of the earth. With this unprecedented power, China is now forcefully demanding a re-write of international norms and rules. China wants to create a new international order with Beijing’s dominance in the Asia-Pacific region as the centerpiece. This new order has threatened world peace and the current balance of power put into place since the World War II.

What went wrong with the America’s engagement policy?

In our view, the failure lies primarily lacked any moral and strategic clarity in its design and implementation.
The origin of the error can trace back to the early 1970s when then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger claiming that by integrating Beijing into the international community economically and politically, China would behave responsibly, abiding by international norms and rules.

This amoral, geo-political and short-term pragmatic strategy fails to see the evil nature and hegemonic ambition of the communist regime as reiterated in President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” of a great red empire, to replace the western civilization with its socialist civilization.

Washington Policy makers also fail to understand that economic growth may be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one, for cultivating democracy. Consequently, this policy has fundamentally undermined America’s national interests and security.

The alternative is to engage China with a moral strategic compass: China under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule cannot rise peacefully, and its transition to a democratic country that respects human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, is in everyone’s best interest, including China’s own. In other words, the U.S. must push for a peaceful regime change in China.

The reason for this is simple:

To support China’s totalitarian regime, a regime that ruthlessly represses its own people, denies universal values to justify its dictatorship, and that challenges the existing international order to seek its dominance, is both morally corrupt and strategically stupid.

Like Frankenstein’s monster, China is now seeking revenge against its creator -- the West. It will destabilize and endanger the world, for the so-called China model, an amoral and monstrous political system and the corrupt way of life, like the black plague, has been spread and infected the international community, and will eventually ruin it, but most people in the world are not aware of it, and many even being fooled to believe it is the future.

China’s communists has hijacked 1.3 billion Chinese people, imposing a political system on them by force and coercion, running the country like a slave-owner of the past, obliterating their self-governance, and controlling their life without their consent. To continue support of this anti-humanity regime runs contrary to universal values and international law to which America has long been committed.

While many policymakers in Washington have now realized that it is time to get tough on China, some still elude that the present and future conflicts between the US and China can be managed. Our view is, without China’s democratization, the US and China will unavoidably collide, because the two countries’ strategic goals are fundamentally different and core interests are uncompromisable.

The only way to prevent future wars with China is to pursue its democratic transformation now.

To start, the Congress should pass a China Democracy Act, directing the Federal government and all its agencies to make democracy and human rights advocacy as the core policy when engaging China, and requires the President to report to the Congress every year on the specific successes.
The engagement policy allowed and even encouraged too many government departments to assist China just for engagement sake, and with no regard to any effort to promote political reform and freedom. The act will serve as America’s grand strategy on China, and the government will take coordinated actions to achieve the goal.

But is a peaceful regime change possible in China?

Absolutely. Despite restrictions, the Internet and free flow of information have changed China, particular the younger generations. Civic society is awakening; religions are flourishing, with rapidly increasing number of believers; the rising middle class, as well as disadvantaged groups, are longing for a political system that ensures equal opportunity and fairness for all. Even the upper class wants rule of law to protect their wealth, because without it no one is safe in China.

China’s power elite knows this insecurity very well. The recent anti-corruption campaign under President Xi Jinping has turned into a life-or-death power struggle among the regime’s power elites, which has split the regime. The power elite face the choice of either destroying each other or find a Godfather-type solution where they give up their gangster way of life and become legitimate via a constitutional democracy. With sufficient pressure from the international community and from within, such a transformation is not entirely unlikely.

Immanuel Kant and modern-day social science has shown that democracies are less disposed to go to war with each other. Long-lasting peace and friendship between the U.S. and China means that China must transition to a democracy.

If the U.S. takes no action, we worry that China will continue down the perilous path of achieving its world dominance through militarism and aggression, which easily lead to another war that the world can not afford.

Part Two
Xi Jinping’s Foolish “Confidence” Leads to Unstoppable Decline

Prelude/Introduction

China’s disastrous stock storm and unprecedented crackdown on defenders of human rights have been well recorded during my three-year observations of the Xi Jinping Administration.

Since taking over top leadership in China, Xi Jinping has become a crusader in both political and economic arenas with aims to consolidate personal power and create a personal cult. From within the Party to his broad social life, inside officialdom and in the market, from the Mainland to the Hong Kong Island - what Xi has achieved are four “triumphs”: power overwhelming anticorruption, political power overwhelming market forces, “One nation” state overwhelming the “two systems,” and party’s will overwhelming the rule of law. With these milestones, Xi Jinping has thus become an icon of “Red Guards Ruling China.”

Over the last three years, particularly this past year, Xi Jinping has exposed clearly the spare ribs of his administration whenever he lifted his fist to show off his power, with his reputation on
the decline, time and again. China’s public security forces stormed the markets under his orders in a bid to save the crashing stocks. Naturally, people wonder --- how can anyone stop the decline of the reputation of the regime? Despite the superficial power of Xi’s four “triumphs” and his willfulness, people are spotting cracks of the iron curtain and sensing the fear of losing power on the part of the top leadership under pseudo self-confidence.

Looking back at the economic and political conditions when Xi took power, and comparing them to those under his predecessor Hu Jintao, we did not notice many fundamental differences, with only one worthy note --- people overwhelmingly felt across all walks of life in the country, including those insiders, that Xi Jinping might be the last emperor of the Communist dynasty. Thus, a dying regime’s destiny is in his hands. With this sense spreading, Xi Jinping had an apparently strong sense of mission of saving the Party and Communist Dynasty, and even tried to restore its vigorous authority before drifting away, leaving a legacy of being a savior. Under such a political tone, the fear of losing personal power, its legitimacy, and eroding base have been among his constant and main themes and its variations, unless Xi wants to change fundamental political system.

During the tenure of Hu Jintao and his premier Wen Jiabao, China experienced the climax of what “power leads to corruption” means during the last decade, with many extreme cases on record. The past three years indicates that Xi Jinping administration has, and shall continue to show why fear of losing power not only leads to corruption but makes those in power mad and insanely ferocious. No matter how reluctant Xi Jinping is, being the last emperor of the Communist regime may well be his destiny. All extreme syndromes of a dying regime make China the spectacular stage of extravagance and brutality.

To date, many political analysts are still wondering about Xi’s political logic and motivations, and they debate about them. However, based on my observation of Xi’s three-year performance sense his taking power, I have come to conclude that his bare bones nature was exposed despite layers of disguise. With my glimpse into the so-called mystery of the administration formulating his personal cult for two years, I can say Xi presented himself before civil society a cult propaganda. Now we, the opposition, and the rest of the world, shall not be puzzled about his agenda, and need to exam Xi Jinping from a different perspective.

1.

Xi Jinping seems destined to experience a turbulent tenure, unlike that of his predecessor Hu Jintao, due to the strings of a political dramas abruptly unveiled on the eve of his taking power. Yet, I believe it is just a heavy punch that brought good luck for Xi Jinping during his first two years. And that punch on the face of Wang Lijun, municipal security chief in Chong Qing was like a gift of blessing from Bo Xilai, then Party chief of Chong Qing, in southwestern China, who was believed to be fighting for his spot on the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Then Xi Jinping adopted a strategy to retreat for a better bargaining position in power struggle just before the 18th Party Congress — and it worked like magic. Xi’s acts skillfully held the critical “private part” of the power structure of the Communist regime hostage to bargain with an upper hand, as if the whole system dysfunctional and failed to respond appropriately to the unexpected incident, particularly, during this non-emergency state of power struggle. It was just this incident that helped Xi Jinping consolidated all the power much faster than his two predecessors during his first few years. After such a round of struggle, a minimal worthy fight, Xi has got rid of all potential direct rivals within the Party.
So far, Xi has successfully avoided the awkward and weak position his predecessor Hu Jintao found himself in, in terms of power consolidation. This proves one of my views on Communist senior officialdom — that anyone, given the position and opportunity, can become a high-caliber handler in power struggle, just because, they have all been engaged and practicing the power struggle, trial and error, all their life, accumulating extraordinary wealth of experiences. And in addition, China’s rich history of emperor politics in the past several thousand years provides historical examples from which power grabbers can borrow. In a closed power structure, anyone on a vantage position may not need to be particularly bright or clever to succeed.

Chinese politics by nature has been long filled with risks. And complicated power manipulation in China makes outsiders unable to comprehend these risks. In the very beginning of his tenure, Xi Jinping had actually experienced a quite comfortable period given the mixed and often negative social reactions to Bo Xilai’s notorious performance. He appealed the “glory” of Mao era in the form of chanting the oldies and (illegally) cracking down the “underground gangs.” This provided perfect timing for Xi Jinping to restart the long-due political reforms for a new round of vital social development, if Xi intended to curb the coming back of the extreme left-wing. But the fact of the matter was, Xi took over the banner of the disgraced Bo Xilai, in disguise of swinging between the left and right, and ended up embracing dictatorship in alignment with the left-wing, and with omnipotence.

It is critical for us to understand that Xi Jinping is the party chief, not a democratically elected head of state. Xi, being not only the son (literally) of Xi Zhongxun (one of the revolutionary elders, famous for his open mindedness), but the captain of the Communist cruise (pirate) ship, and therefore, Xi had, to begin with, to keep balance of power among those surrounding him, consolidating power within the party to maintain his stable leadership position. From this position, and his logic, Xi must take the path of “political correctness” to minimize potential risks. Xi’s “red gene” confines his moves. The so-called “Red gene” still exists in the once-marginalized groups of Party apparatus and group of bootlickers during the market-oriented reform era, who obviously survived and now being revived by Xi Jinping, who has become their master and great leader. Naturally, when Xi Jinping has gradually become a de facto descendent of the disgraced Bo Xilai’s left-wing, these bootlickers are responsible to their masters and upper social elites, and they test the psychological tolerance of the general public by offering flattery remarks and praise hymns to Xi Jinping, while at the same time, state machinery increasingly tightened control of expression, and in curbing thought, politicizing almost everything in China.

Since taking office, Xi Jinping has intensified crackdown on opinion leaders of civil society, in the name of curbing “gossip mongering,” and the regime shamelessly utilized paid online bloggers, party-anointed writers in huge amounts to monitor domestic web-sphere, overwhelmed by brainwashing campaigns, highlighting Zhou Xiaoping-style official gossipers, just for the purpose of misleading the general public, to align with Party lines and catchy phrases.

Now the general public has become coldly silent. Their silence is much quieter than that of the silence of Hu Jintao era. Now we also know the reasons – suppression of Qing Huohuo, Xue Manzi, among others, arrests being made to crack down Xu Zhiyong, Guo Yushan, Gao Yu, Pu Zhiqiang, Guo Feixiong, Wu Gan, Wan Yu, etc. and even worse, the gun-down of innocent people like Xu Chunhe…
The era under Hu Jintao, along with his premier Wen Jiabao, experienced all-around social, economic and political crisis in China, and saw no progressive moves to address the issues. It was labeled “muddling along with a bomb on a timer.” When in power, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao were eager to pass such a bomb onto the next successor, and retreat peacefully in retirement. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, exposed a strong intention even in the very beginning of his term. Xi seems not to getting the “bomb” onto his successor, nor did he ever try to defuse such a bomb. Instead, XI Jinping wanted to make an even more powerful bomb, the Xi-style one, to destroy the inherited bombs, all in one.

The bomb in the hands of Hu-Wen Administration then was made within the Party itself – amid unprecedented epidemic corruption of government officials and party apparatchiks, and the social crisis caused by crony capitalism with Chinese characteristics in which the government officials and business elites have joined hand in hand in shameless and cruel exploitation of the voiceless public. Such a horrific matter of fact has been universally acknowledged including Xi Jinping himself, who must be more alert to the urgency than anyone else because of his self-claimed destiny to save the Party and the Communist regime from the unstoppable collapse. Naturally, overwhelming anti-corruption has been a main driving force of his administration since its start. For a newly installed ruler like Xi Jinping, who has embodied aggressive agendas, to consolidate personal power dominates his operations. His other goal is to disable potential rivals who tried in vain to steal power away from him, in the name of anti-corruption. With power grabbing being a constant struggle for Xi Jinping, social crisis caused by corruption receive relatively less attention as it is less of a headache for him.

What’s more, the Communist Party, as a whole system, is totally corrupted, anti-corruption is a de facto anti-Party itself. Xi Jinping certainly would not act like conducting suicide bombing against his own Party. XI never intends to push his Party for a fundamental change of system. Then anti-corruption features selective targets from the very start, serving his purpose to consolidate his personal power. Now that power struggle and anti-corruption have jointly moved his agenda into a “be or not to be” situation in which the Party and the regime need to answer. It is an integral part of political power struggle to have anti-corruption move forward just for his own political interests.

Lack of legitimacy has been raised when the ongoing anticorruption campaigns target certain selected groups, because none of the elements inside the Party are intrinsically clean. “Why me, not him?” they ask. Therefore, its legitimacy has been challenged after the New York Times reporter Michael Forsythe reported on the family wealth of Xi Jinping. As anti-corruption has been utilized for power struggle, those party factions and individuals under investigation or fallen officials of this struggle shall not lay down their arms. Strings of events highlight this ongoing internal struggle, such as the New York Times stories (there must be internal “Deep Throat” within the Party feeding information to the media), war of words between politically well-connected wealthy businessman Guo Wengui (who fled China) and his rivals on mainland China, to the mystery of the missing (believed to have fled to U.S., in hiding, perhaps in process of seeking political asylum) Ling Wancheng who is believed to have possession of lots of top classified information about the Communist regime (this wealthy businessman is a brother of Ling Jihua, then top aid to Hu Jintao), among some of the high-profile cases. All these dramas reveal that rivals within the top tier of the Communist Party hold in possession of vital, classified top security information as powerful as a nuclear device to destroy any other internal competitors. Therefore, for Xi Jinping, the ideal mode would be to maintain a kind of power
balance, like “nuclear deterrent” for his anti-corruption campaigns, drifting away from his “nuclear war” style against his rivals in the first few years.

On the economy, which has been experiencing slowdown since last year, the communist regime realizes its potential social crisis looming overhead because it is believe that legitimacy only depends on high growth of the economy, as it was in the past decades. Under current political environment, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption could face overwhelming challenges from his rivals, given any crisis arising soon. In the power struggle of the Communist Party of China, fabricating crimes is a well-known game serving for any power players. Xi Jinping’s crimes are prominent, readily available to the advantage of his rivals. As Xi himself knows this much better than any layman on the street, he has switched his anti-corruption back to the mode of “old norm” under the “new norm” economic situations.

To address a more fundamental issue regarding its legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party, Xi Jinping tried to bet his hope on the success of his anti-corruption campaign, which, on the contrary, has drifted away in the opposite direction, for its own inherent logic. Such a high-profile show earned him nothing more than some scattered hurrays from the disengaged, innocent grassroots. In other words, Xi Jinping is facing his own Catch-22, because anti-corruption means anti-Party itself. What’s next, will Xi have to reheat his cold, half-cooked rice meal?

3.

It may be too early to conclude that Xi Jinping will be a flash in a pan, just like then the “great leader” Hua Guofeng (who helped topple the Mao’s wife and her “Gang of Four”). Xi’s power struggle and his temporary triumphs over his rivals so far reminds people of those television episodes adapted from a historical novel authored by Er Yuehe. As Xi has delivered too many awe-inspiring performances, for example, Xi recently cited “house rule” in place of rule of law, depending on informers and his own imperial-appointed special envoys, usually undercover, to carry out his anti-corruption campaigns. All these dirty games are just like the same old, already disappeared Chinese dynasties. The very nature of his imperial-style actions indicates Xi Jinping’s political thinking and mindset which are so backward as imperial palace coup of the old days. It must be acknowledged that politics is never merely about power or power struggle. More essential contents do exist beyond rim of power struggle in politics. What can be said about Xi is that he is a doomed politician based on his performances up to date, which clearly bears the symptom of a dying political system.

It is as easy as ABC to list challenges facing the Xi Administration: ethnic issues in Tibet and Xin Jiang Autonomous Regions, universal ballot in Hong Kong, maritime disputes in East and South China Seas, housing bubble, stock market turbulence, overwhelming debts, increasing pressure on currency exchange rate, rising unemployment, difficult job market facing graduating college students, rights abuses, massive rights self-defenders, and huge number of mass-incidents involving protesters and demonstrators, all across the country, etc., and etc.

Ironically, we see a “self-confident” Xi Jinping wearing on the track of a superficially robust Communist Party with its so-called “three confidences” theory. Xi seems to have good reasons to have such “confidence,” just from the perspective of a inflated powerful political party. Therefore, he has been aggressive on all sides.

On Hong Kong, the Communist Cabinet, through its State Council Information Office, issued a white paper on The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, in June of 2014, stating that “As a unitary state, China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions, including the HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership.” Furthermore, “(it is necessary to stay alert to) prevent and repel the attempt made by a very small number of people who act in collusion with outside forces to interfere with the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong.” Such aggressive rhetoric pronounced just before the schedule referendum in the middle of June initiated by grassroots “Occupy Central” movement was indeed intended to suppress the growing popular demand for a “universal suffrage” in Hong Kong. As a result, local populace was thus angered and mobilized to support “Occupy Central.” This foolish communist move further led to the fiasco at the Hong Long Legislature ballot on June 18, defeating the central government proposal for a fake democracy in selecting its Chief Executive in Hong Kong by a stunning 28 to 8, to the surprise of many observers.

Xi Jinping has been so aggressive to take actions suppressing civil society in China. Xi’s predecessors normally were defensive in dealing with domestic dissidents over the past two decades since Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. The Communist regime realized its disillusion of the Communist ideology that has been put aside by the general populace, as well as its own ruling class. However, all Communist rulers, such as Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, has been rights abusers when they had to deal with and eventually cracked down dissidents, including the underground Library Democratic Party (1992), open fight for registration of a newly established Democratic Party (1998), Falungong activists (1999), Charter ’08 signatory movement (2008). These ferocious crackdowns severely violated the legitimate rights of the Chinese citizens. Such suppression reflects an overwhelming fear of the Communist regime for losing its control of power, and would definitely show no mercy or any hesitation to take immediate action to curb any dissidents. A recent example was the crackdown on “Jasmine Movement” in 2011, which was seen as instinct of any authoritarian regime, and perhaps under the directive of then Vice President Xi Jinping. After Xi became the top leader, he has conducted series of suppression, much more severe than ever, leading to large-scale arrests of rights defense lawyers before the 25th commemoration of Tiananmen Massacre (1989), and hundreds of cases of detention and arrests of human rights lawyer (2014).

From these campaigns, we can see the difference between the Xi regime and his predecessors in dealing with dissidents. Xi has been more aggressive in demonizing grassroots opinion leaders. This backward step was the result of directives from Xi Jinping regime under the self-blown “Three Confidences” in defiance of historic current. It is a worthy note that Xi Jinping has been more relentless to suppress relatives and family members of those involved dissidents, even after he took down his political rival Zhou Yongkong whose suppression machinery had earned him not only the title “Szard,” but also billions of dollars in personal and family wealth.

With more than 200 human rights activists and defense lawyers under attack, the “Great Leader” Xi Jinping anchored as a high tightrope walker amid skyrocketing stock markets that crashed his reputation, perhaps his self-confidence. The Chinese stock market itself is a government-run scam, with little real link to China’s real economy. When it rose so dramatically by the end of 2014, that Chinese official media admitted that such a stock phenomenon was propped up by government policy ONLY. So many naïve, often first-time stock buyers believed that this was the high time for Xin Jinping regime to start distributing “bonuses.” In May 2015 the official Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily and the state news agency Xinhua jointly bragged “New Beginning of a Bull Market.” What a beautiful sovereign scam! Soon after the holy hymn came the crash of 1700 points on Shanghai Index, as flashy as it was rising. Now the Big Brother again confidently heavy handed the markets, with a string of confidence-building
measures, like freezing IPOs, handing over tons of cash for mandatory purchase of stocks by large brokers, even worse, dispatching security agents to “investigate” any short-selling manipulation, in collaboration with “foreign forces.” All these efforts failed to drive any rebounding effect, thus prompting financial crisis and regime crisis in the face of the Xi regime. Now his image of omnipotence is in crisis again, following his humiliating defeat of Hong Kong ballot plan at local legislature on June 18.

In the meantime, we now see the spectacular omnipotence of the Communist regime’s power organs – this time, on stock market, the security agents are performing a role in full swing to save the stock market, again under the directive of Xi Jinping, demanding that “No sale but purchase only” in plain language exposed on official websites. Xi’s omnipotent measures cost dearly, not only in term of money, more importantly, the confidence in the Chinese stock markets, because people now see clearly what is left out is nothing about market forces but market of power games, the white-knuckled political power intervention in market. What is left in the market is billions of dollars sovereign fund, drifting along, with no sense of destination, while millions of tiny ordinary stock buyers are left holding the bag. It is the government who has successfully turned a “Reform Bull” into a monster sucker of ordinary people’s lifelines. This intervention has one more byproduct, that is, the Xi regime has been under great restraint in dealing with other urgent economic and social issues after its billions of dollars fund being held like a hostage on the dysfunctional Chinese stock market.

From my observations in the course of nearly three years, I see a very clear choice made by Xi Jinping who prioritizes stabilizing his regime, and takes decisive measures to achieve his political goals. His overall strategy is to demanding obedience, curbing limited freedom, avoiding discussing any inherent flaws in its fundamental system, and strengthening control of thoughts and expressions. In addition, he brags of ethics and morality.

Let’s examine several cases in hand, such as corruption, crashing stock markets, among others, which are organically produced by the Communist regime itself, and as an inevitable results of its political and economic systems. Xi’s answers are far from addressing these fundamental issues, rather trying to seek answers from the same old stuffs, like a late Party apparatchik named Jiao Yulu, and even worse, Xi resorted to ridiculous intervention demanding certain social groups to buy-into the stocks, which naturally worsened the disastrous situation. With no clue in dealing with the complicated market economic function, like stocks, Xi believes in his only magician recipe, or wrong description, i.e., too much power, omnipotent power of an authoritarian regime, to make him look like omnipotent. His nonsense running a government with lack of transparency has already driven people of conscience to adopt “non-cooperation” strategy to engage in a underground movement, even among his officialdom, not to mention, the general populace. Similarly, in Hong Hong, those pro-Beijing legislators achieved their unwanted results on the local Legislature floor this past June, when a bunch of the robot members failed to cast their ballots due to what was later nicknamed awaiting “Uncle (Liu Huang) Fa” who failed to show up on the floor because of illness on June 18, thus dooming their attempted fake democracy scheme.

I must point out that I particularly chose the special incidents like Hong Kong’s failed ballot, suppression of rights defenders, and government intervention in stock markets, just for the pure sake of Xi Jinping’s mindset and his regime after successfully consolidating his power. In other words, we can see clearly that Xi Jinping has successfully destroyed the limited elements of democracy, rule of law and free market in China, in a systematic, aggressive way. Xi pushed his “One Country” regime to abuse the “Two Systems” in Hong Kong. Xi applied his Party will to
replace rule of law, and infringed the principles of market with his state power. All these episodes present clear images of Xi’s historic backward step in China.

4.

For a while, Xi Jinping seems to have won support from the general populace, for two reasons, one is the anti-corruption campaigns, and the other propping-up stock prices. Now you see his once bubbling stock market has become a hot potato, bearing his infamous trademark of “Uncle/Papa Xi.” Regarding his anti-corruption, ordinary people have gradually changed their minds, a subtle process though. Anti-corruption has brought no tangible benefits to the mass, who, on the contrary, have to bear rising costs of gas, highway tolls, and rising retirement age, etc., and etc. When Xi positions himself against democracy, free market, and rule of law, he would never have the real courage to take on corruption. And now we are perhaps on the brink of experiencing a backward step, after his short-lived anti-corruption show. This will also lead to huge increase of dissatisfaction of the discontent public who was once pumped with high-hope for a somehow clean government that serves the interests of the people.

In today’s China, economic problems looming large before our eyes include increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and the systematic bottleneck in dealing with these problems. Now is the high time for Xi to make choices. What Xi has been pushing so far is to pouring funds to feed the state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), strengthened by the paramount presence of the Party in these SOEs. Xi also has taken steps to pressure NGOs, from virtual space to real life, demanding real name registration as a new norm. We can predict that the above development and Xi’s follow-up measures, such as anti-corruption which has brought nothing tangible for the general populace, but tax collection outpaced GDP growth rate. To share minimal benefit with ordinary people out of the pockets of elites has tuned out to be unbearably painful.

Regarding wealth (re)distribution in China, power has the final say, and ordinary people have always been ignored, powerless. When economic slowdown gets worse, so does widening gap between the rich and the poor. It is just the people on the bottom of the social ladder that suffers most in hard times. Social unrest shall flourish. For those elites who have insiders’ economic intelligence understand where the future troubles will be arising. Therefore, we believe that Xi Jinping’s reckless performance so far has been a warming-up for the future disasters, in case he loses control. This can be demonstrated by his policy making, i.e. he has been utilizing all available resources to further control all social sectors. Does he know by doing so he has presented himself and his regime as the enemy of the people? Surely, he does, and he does not have the power or political will to reverse the course.

We noticed that Xi Jinping has utilized the similar tactics against civil society as he did to his rivals and corrupted officials. Technically, this works well to a certain degree, which in turn poses the serious problems. Few of these suppressed civil leaders never surrender, nor are they lonely in fighting against injustices in China. They are never like those lonely corrupted officials who have been isolated from the Chinese society, politically and psychologically, indulged in abusing their positions. Economy works on its own, following its own rules. Now we have a rather clear idea of how Xi Jinping has been haunted by nightmares when he tried to trap pocket money from the general populace to pump into the low-efficient, often scandal-rocked, scam-filled companies listed on the stock markets, and more importantly, Xi tried to release huge amounts of local government debts with stolen money through their stock scams.
Crackdown on rights defenders has not produced any effective intimation among dissidents, nor has it silenced them. Hong Kong ballot issues shall continue haunting the Communist regime in the years to come. Paid gossip-mongers and other propaganda machinery have failed to achieve their goals, prompting civil society to adopt more subtle measures to counter the regime, in more coordinated ways. Power, no matter how powerful, cannot overpower the human spirit, despite ups and downs, when huge numbers of the voiceless in desperate situation, begin forming invisible power, and they shall be prevail in the end. This is what I believe in. And that is also my prediction for the future.

Part Three
64 Questions for Xi Jinping

I.

1. Mr. Xi Jinping, as chief of Party, State and the Military, from where do you get your paycheck? From the Party, or government, or military? Are all the budgets for the Party, Government and the military collected from taxpayers?

2. You have consistently emphasized that the PLA cannot be nationalized, because it belongs to the Party. If so, then why is the army paid by government budget, which come from taxpayers?

3. Why is the Communist Party and its organs at all levels, which are said to be social groups, then still paid by the taxpayers?

4. As a whole, how much does the Communist Party cost to taxpayers?

5. How much of the taxpayers’ money did you spend on the 9/3 military parade? How much will the 2022 Winter Olympics cost taxpayers?

6. DO you believe that the Chinese taxpayers (citizens) have the right to know where their tax money has gone or will be spent? Do you think Chinese taxpayers are entitled to get involved in the decision-making process regarding their tax money?

II.
7. With great stride, you even risk losing life in a potential coup to carry out anti-corruption campaigns. Why then do you order your subordinates of the Communist Party to make public their private family wealth? As world history proves that officials' announcement of their private wealth is one of the most effective mechanisms to curb corruption, why have you punished citizens demanding such announcement?

8. In addition, freedom of expression, press freedom, and open competition among different political parties for public offices are effective mechanisms in fighting against corruption. So if you are genuine about concerns of anti-corruption, why don't you let these freedoms flourish?

9. Why don't you let citizens get involved in your anti-corruption campaigns? Some people comment that in today's China, anti-corruption is tantamount to anti-the Party (CPC). Is that true?

10. Do you believe that epidemic corruption of the Communist Party comes as a result of individual members’ corruption and degeneration? Do you think their corruption correlates to the authoritarian system? After your taking down an impressive number of “Tigers,” how can you assure that your newly appointed officials will not follow suit and also become corrupted? Do you think you have more orders than your predecessors such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to restrain subordinates themselves from corruption? Except for this, are you any different from those two predecessors?

11. Do you think that such a large-scale number of Communist members of your party are influenced by Western bourgeoisie ideology? How do you explain that in Western governmental systems where they receive total Western education their level of corruption is much less?

12. Can the Chinese taxpayers/citizens learn the facts about your family wealth? Is it true information revealed in the report by the New York Times report about your family wealth? Are you planning to take legal actions against the NYT?

III.
13. Do you still believe in the validity of the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China” on June 27, 1981, in which the Great Cultural Revolution was totally negated and labeled as “A Decade of Turmoil.” Your statement suggests that the first thirty years of history (1949-1979) cannot be used to negate the subsequent thirty years (1979-2009). Does this statement apply to the Cultural Revolution? What's your view about the Cultural Revolution?

14. After the Communist Party seized power in China, it saw the great famine, great turmoil, and horrific massacre. Do you know the number of abnormal and unexpected deaths that happened in China over the period of 66 years (since 1949)? What do you think are the causes of these tragedies? Over a half century since its occurrence, is it possible to announce the archived data of those deaths during the great famine in early 1960's?

15. As your family, including your father and yourself, experienced suppression and injustices and persecution both during and before the Cultural Revolution, what kind of lessons have been learned from your experiences?

16. After Bo Xilai was arrested, there were people who believed that you do not agree to his Chongqing Path in the name of Chanting Red Old Melodies and Oppressing the gangsters. But it turned out to be otherwise. Is it only corruption that led Bo Xilai to a disgraceful fall? What is your view on Bo Xilai's practice of "Chanting and Oppressing"?

17. Since your taking power, China's central television has aired a series of public confession of the “crimes” by suspects (before they were justifiably defended in court. Is this practice a kind of renaissance of the Cultural Revolution?

18. After taking power, you have established and led a number of so-called “small groups.” Are you worried about making “mistakes” like what Mao Zedong did after consolidating overwhelming power? Do you think your personal power needs some checks? Are there any effective checks in place?

19. After you came to power, there were people who proposed eliminating the influence of Western Culture, particularly the foundation and principles of Western social sciences and
humanities. Now if without any importing Western concepts, does China ever produce its own political science, sociology, economics, among other fundamental social sciences? Does Marxism and Leninism belong to Western thoughts and ideology? If you cancel or stop these western social sciences, what kind of new ones do you have to replace them? Are you going to switch back to the Mao-Mode of “high institutions of science and engineering” as Mao himself did?

IV.

20. Now we see that you depend on the so-called social stability maintaining a system inherited from Hu Jintao and Zhou Yongkang and suppressing human rights lawyers and other dissidents. Do you believe that Zhou Yongkang has made great contributions to maintaining the Communist system?

21. Can you explain or elaborate on the So-called “7-NOs” that was said of originally your ideas. Were these approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party? Can you explain reasons for pushing the “7-NOs” (including universal values, press freedom, civil society, civil rights, historical mistakes in Communist Party rein, crony capitalism, and judicial independence)?

22. What kind of “state secrets” were leaked in the article by Gao Yu, a famous journalist in her 70’s? What kind of harm did her writing cause to citizens? Or is it a crime if her writing helps Chinese citizens learn what they are entitled to know?

23. Liu Xiaobo has been sentenced to 11 years on the basis of his 6 pieces of writing. Do you think his sentence was based on his legitimate freedom of expression? Liu Xiaobo’s sentence terminates on June 22, 2020. If you ate still in power, will you let him be freed then? In your opinion, what are the differences among the political environment in which Liu Xiaobo, Nelson Mandela, Václav Havel, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. experienced?

24. Since this past July 10, more than 100 human rights lawyers, and activists have been detained, arrested, disappeared, and harassed. Most were released later, with a small number
still in custody. We know such a campaign is conducted under the unified order. Who is responsible for this campaign? What kind of orders have you issued?

25. Are you going to stop suppressing Falungong during your tenure? What is your view on the global movement by Falun Gong to persecute Jiang Zemin?

26. During the Hu Jintao-era, official data shows that China’s expenditure for maintaining social stability surpassed that for national defense. Is it still the same under your administration? If not, have you decreased your expenditures for social maintaining projects or increased national defense budget?

V.

27. Do you think the June 4 movement was a violent anti-revolutionary turmoil? Or was it a civil disorder? Or just a political turmoil? Did you agree that it is acceptable to send tanks and machine guns to suppress peaceful students and civilians?

28. Do you support your father’s position against suppressing students on Tiananmen Square?

29. If there were students coming to Tiananmen Square for peaceful demonstration and protest, are you going to adopt the same measures as the CPC did 26 years ago? If not, what are you going to do?

30. Why has the Communist regime been working hard to cover the truth of the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989?

31. “Tankman” is well known throughout the world, and is said to be Wang Weilin. What is his real identity? What is his status now? Why has he simply disappeared?

32. Do you support or oppose the abrupt actions in 1987 to remove Hu Yaobang from his position of the Secretary-General of the so-called “Democratic Life Session”?
33. Before your taking over the position of Secretary-General of the Communist Party, rumors spread that you were to reverse the Party decision on 1989 student movement. What is the possibility of that happening?

VI.
34. Seventy years ago, both Japan and Germany pushed patriotism and nationalism. As you commemorated the victory of Anti-Japanese War and Anti-Fascism, you similarly emphasized both patriotism and nationalism, on the same platform as the Nazi-German military parade. Have you noticed the inherent identical problems?

35. In the Nazi-era, Hitler allowed his subjects on the street to watch from their balcony and even on roofs of buildings, why have you banned such viewer-rights in Beijing? None of the world leaders has banned everything else to serve their military parade, such as shutdown of stock markets, factories, hospitals, air flights, vehicles, schools, as well as no entertainment on TV, can you image anything more fascist than your behavior?

36. In your speech on September 3 military parade, you shrewdly avoided touching historical details of China’s anti-Japanese war and anti-Fascism. We cannot forget the rivalry between the KMT and Communist party in China at the time, and that between freedom and democracy and authoritarian Communism. It was just these debates of the two ideologies that delayed the final triumph over Fascism. Following surrender of Germany, Italy and Japan, civil war in China broke out between KMT and the Communist party, followed by the Korea War, and Vietnam war. Apparently, you did not follow Mao’s suit to express appreciation of Japanese aggression in China that helped bring the Communist Party to power. You did not define the historic issue of leadership of genuine resistance against Japanese aggression, either by KMT or the Communist Party. What’s your view on the role of the Communist Party of China during the Cold War? Any reflections?

37. How come the KMT veterans who fought against Japanese aggression and Communist forces during the Civil War have never received any benefits to support their lives? Even following your rhetoric that these veterans were wrong in the civil war fighting by against
Communist forces, they deserve amnesty based on their 30-year long humiliation, as victims of slaughter, forced labor camps, custody, and family members who suffered from the mistreatment. Given their role in anti-Japanese aggression, these veterans deserve some recognition from the regime, yet none has been offered. How can the regime present the most basic fairness and humanity?

38. What's your view on the fallout of Lien Chan (Taiwan's former vice president) when he returned from your military parade to Taiwan where even the pro-reunification allies showed no respect for him?

39. How come most of the WWII anti-Fascism allies did not join you for the military parade on September 3?

40. Do you think patriotism and (communist)Party-love are of the same issue?

VII.

41. In dealing with maritime disputes with neighboring countries, the international community is concerned about your regime becoming more militaristic. What is your view on the role of armed forces when addressing the disputes?

42. China’s propaganda insists on promoting China’s soft power, however, when universal values, press freedom and civil society, among other principles that are universally acceptable, are prohibited from public discussion in China, then, what can you utilize to present your soft power if not for the opening wallets, and therefore, how can you persuade global community to learn from you, to give you a nod?

43. Ling Jihua, a former senior official and chief of staff in the Communist Party’s headquarters, has been under custody, and his brother Ling Wancheng has fled China, now living in America. Your administration dispatched officers, as well as his daughter, to urge him to return, even coercing him to comply, which is illegal here in the United States. Without any legal agreement
between the two governments, China sent its law enforcement officers to try to catch someone in the US. What are your comments

44. USA or Russia—which one is likely to be China’s long-term ally, and why?

45. How many family members of your officials, including most senior-level (sitting and retired) have migrated to the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, and European countries? And what about their ill-gotten wealth? Do you have accurate information about them? Do you think USA and other countries know this information? In other words, China’s senior leadership and their subordinates and family members, along with their records of corruption, are all in the hand of these countries. How can you afford confrontation with them? Not to mention, in military conflicts. Can you bear the consequences? Your hard-line rhetoric seems to fool your domestic audience does it not?

46. China’s leaders, including you, often meet with protests and demonstration by the Chinese citizens wherever such a visit happens. Why is that?

VIII.

47. You often emphasized the “new norm” for the Chinese business community and ordinary people when the economy slows down. Meanwhile, government forces helped prop up stock prices, and in cracking down on “short-selling” following the market plunge, which had been reported by commentators and journalists, these voices have been silenced with arrests and those investment institutions and individuals threatened against any possible short-selling. Do you think this kind of scheme would work and save the stock markets?

48. Your government have finally found CaiJing journalist Li Xiaolu as a scapegoat for the recent stock market crisis and forced him to confess on CCTV. If Li Xiaolu had the capacity to short-sell the Chinese stocks with his mere reporting, then he is supposed to replace Premier Li Keqiang, given such a potential. What do you think?
49. On the 3rd plenary session of the 18th Party Congress, you promised to let market forces play a leading, even decisive role, how do you explain the government’s hand intervening in economic issues in a more aggressively manner?

50. China’s state banks possess huge bad debts. Are they loans to the state-owned enterprises, local governments, or private businesses?

51. Is Household Registration Law a kind systematic discrimination? One “People’s Deputy” in rural areas represents four times the number of a population than that of the urban areas, i.e., political rights of villagers equals a quarter of those in urban communities. Isn’t that blatant political discrimination? Migrant workers in cities pay their taxes, then why can they be denied any public services, such as their children’s rights to attend local public schools?

52. China’s public services don’t match its tax collection. Thus, its fragile, limited social security cannot support the general mass with affordable healthcare, basic schooling, aging care, yet ironically, your administration still call itself a socialist country. How can this be the case when the country’s citizens cannot be provided these basic, necessary social services?

53. As the Secretary General of the Communist Party of China, do you mean to realize the communism in China when you talk about your “China Dream?”

54. While visiting Russia, you said that only felt tall if the shoes fit, as rhetoric to hinder international community “interference” in the political system on your side. Why didn’t you say this inside China? Does this mean you fear people’s choice of an appropriate system to fit their own needs?

55. Why don’t you let Tibetans, Urghurs, Mongolians, and Hong Kong residents to tell you if their shoes fit their feet, and in doing so, you know well in your heart that they will achieve genuine self-rule in their autonomous regions?
56. You must know that His Holiness the Dalai Lama deserves high regards in global community. Do you think those who respect the Dalai Lama intend to confront China? Will you invite the Dalai Lama to a pilgrimage to Mount Wutai (Wutaishan)?

57. Why can’t the Uighurs keep their beards and whiskers? As you mentioned in your speech on military parade, the Communist ancestor was a man with great beard, so why do you comment on his spectacular beard?

58. In the past 5 years, more than 140 Tibetans have died of self-immolation. What do you know of the reasons? If you really believe in Marxism or Confucius, dare you engage in self-immolation if you are encouraged to do so?

59. The Communists of China claim to be atheists. Then why do you and your government insist in intervening in the reincarnation of a Living Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism?

60. Why has the Communist Party chief Xia Baolong of Zhejiang province ordered demolition of more than 1,500 churches and crosses in that province?

X.

61. In your first article published by the People’s Daily on December 7, 1984, entitled “Young and middle-aged cadres must respect the oldies” you said that the generational exchange of guards in power should be cooperation and replacement. “Respecting the old” is a prerequisite for cooperation, while the latter is the foundation for replacement. In contrast, the People’s Daily recently published a piece saying “cool off” like tea after guests leaving, referring that those officials after retirement should not interfere with the sitting leadership. What’s your current view on the old comrades? Do you think the elders like Jiang Zemin has become a hindrance on your path to power? The late Deng Xiaoping toppled the tenure of two chiefs of the Communist Party, committed the Tiananmen Massacre (the crime of slaughtering innocent people) in June 1989, followed by his “Southern Inspection Tour” in 1992. All these are perfect examples that demonstrate a consistent interference by the elders in China’s politics. Why didn’t you oppose him?
62. Are you willing to follow suit of Chiang Ching-kuo to end a ban of political parties, and open up to freedom of the press, embracing constitutional democracy and the rule of law? Or are you in tune with your wife’s famous song “Dynasty” which echoes the old regime that those founders pass on their dynasties to their offspring, i.e., in your case, RED Siblings like you and those offspring of the first Communist leadership taking control of China under communist rule. Some people say you worship Mao Zedong and Vladimir Putin. If so, do you want to become a lifetime leader.

63. If drawing a comparison between Mao Zedong thought and those of your father, which influenced you the most.

64. What is your ultimate goal? Multiple choice: A. To achieve ultimate personal power to make sure no obstacle or challenge exists while in power. B. To ride high, and maintain the Communist rule in the hands of red siblings. C. To seek appropriate opportunities to achieve a peaceful political evolution for China to look up to the most advanced countries for democracy. D. To restore the mental outlook of Mao-style leadership, and even surpass Mao himself and your predecessors.