INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Context for Governance: Political Power and Ideological Reach of the Communist Party

In China’s one-party, authoritarian political system, the Chinese Communist Party dominates the state and society. The Party continues to grow and is known to penetrate and exert its influence on politics and society at all levels through Party groups in governmental agencies and in a variety of organizations, including many businesses. International experts asserted that under Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, there is less separation of Party and government. During the Commission’s 2015 reporting year, central Party authorities emphasized “rectifying” weak grassroots-level Party organizations and stressed the goal of further strengthening Party leadership over the government’s administrative, judicial, legislative, and other institutions. Central Party leaders also expressed the intention to use the law as a tool to achieve those goals and impose the Party’s will, saying: “... the Party ... acting within the scope of the Constitution and the law ... [will] be effective at making the Party’s standpoints become the national will through statutory procedures, be effective at ensuring that the candidates recommended by Party organizations become leaders in State political bodies through statutory procedures, be effective at implementing Party leadership over the country and society through State political bodies, and be effective at utilizing democratic centralist principles to safeguard the authority of the center.” In addition, they stressed “strengthen[ing] Party leadership over legislative work” and maintaining the Party’s role in coordinating “all sides with people’s congresses, governments, consultative conferences, trial bodies and prosecutorial bodies.”

During the reporting period, central Party leaders also further emphasized adherence to Party ideology. Party authorities, recalling the important role Party branches played during China’s “revolution, construction, and reform” periods, stressed requirements to establish Party branches in all state-affiliated agencies and organizations, as well as in “economic, cultural, social, and other organizations” in order “to ensure the implementation of the Party’s ideology, principles, and policy directions through these important channels.” Party leaders particularly underscored the Party’s leadership and control over, or the demand for, adherence to Party ideology by state-owned enterprises, universities, the military, the courts, the media, and think tanks. Authorities reportedly also encouraged programs for artists to uphold the “correct view” of art. In addition, articles documented a “hardening” of political discourse, a tightening of ideological control, and an emphasis on “ideological security.”

Reports described the Party’s insistence on drawing clear distinctions between Chinese and Western ideology, norms and values, and notions of judicial independence. State-run media reportedly emphasized that China’s “governing in accord with the constitution” is not the same as “constitutional democracy” in Western nations. Reports also noted an upswing in demonizing the West and blaming overseas forces for China’s domestic problems.
The definition of national security in the new PRC National Security Law passed in July 2015 is very broad and includes “political,” “economic,” and “international” security, as well as “cultural and social security.” One Chinese security expert reportedly explained that to ensure “cultural security” Chinese authorities needed to promote traditional Chinese culture while repelling other perspectives including some Western values incompatible with Chinese core values.

The Party made efforts to enforce prescribed ideological norms within academic and research circles, and repel Western ideals. These efforts included mandating quotas for student Internet propaganda workers and issuing directives to report on ideological trends among students. News reports noted attacks on academics and social commentators for voicing their opinions. An official internal document—“Document No. 30”—reportedly called for a purge of “Western-inspired liberal ideas” from universities. There has been some pushback against the Party’s efforts. Chinese lawyers, for example, inquired into the legal basis of the restrictions on teaching materials, and students, academics, and others raised questions about imposing ideological restrictions and launching attacks on Western ideology.

Central authorities provided more details about the government-controlled “social credit” system first introduced in 2014. Authorities intend the “social credit” scheme to be part of China’s socialist market economic and “social governance” systems, to “strengthen sincerity in government affairs,” and to improve commercial and social “sincerity” and “judicial credibility.” One journalist commented that by making information available to the public regarding legal compliance, the new system may be “a proxy for an underdeveloped legal system.” The “social credit” system will include a numerical index to evaluate individuals and organizations, including companies, on their financial standing, and social and moral behavior. It also will include an information database linked to citizen identification cards tracking citizens’ financial data, criminal records, travel history, and perhaps even Internet purchases and online behavior. An international China expert asserted that this system is similar to one formerly employed by the East German government that was intended to prevent a revolt against the state, but “the Chinese aim is far more ambitious: it is clearly an attempt to create a new citizen” by “incentivizing specific behaviors.”

Under Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, Party repression reportedly has intensified and the ongoing crackdown is stronger than “anything since the Mao era.” Other reports assert that human rights abuses in China are “the cruelest we have seen since 1989.” that the “persecution of human rights defenders in 2014 was as severe as it has been since the mid-1990s,” and that there has been a narrowing of tolerance for civic activism. Under Xi Jinping, there reportedly has been “suppression of previously tolerated activities, topics, and individuals.” A disturbing trend is Chinese authorities’ increasing use
of retaliation against individuals who plan to or have reached out to UN human rights bodies, including preventing citizens from traveling abroad to attend UN treaty body reviews of China by confiscating their passports and other means.\textsuperscript{50} Those individuals include Wang Qiuyun, a member of the Women’s Network Against HIV/AIDS whom authorities prevented from attending a review of China before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,\textsuperscript{51} and Deng Chuanbin, who had planned to attend a human rights training session in Geneva, Switzerland, before authorities confiscated his passport.\textsuperscript{52} Chinese authorities also continued to harass, detain, and impose prison sentences on democracy advocates who exercised their rights to freedom of speech, assembly, association, and demonstration, including individuals who advocated for democracy in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{53} Representative cases of democracy advocates targeted by authorities are noted below:

- \textbf{Chen Shuqing.} In September 2014, authorities detained Chen on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” for participating in activities associated with the banned China Democracy Party.\textsuperscript{54}
- \textbf{Zhao Haitong.} In November 2014, authorities sentenced Zhao to 14 years’ imprisonment for “inciting subversion of state power” for participating in peaceful demonstrations and for advocating for democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{55}
- \textbf{Shen Yongping.} In December 2014, authorities sentenced Shen, a filmmaker, to one year’s imprisonment for “illegal business activity” for making available online for free his documentary about historical efforts to establish constitutional government in China.\textsuperscript{56}
- \textbf{Yao Lifa.} In late 2014, authorities held Yao in detention for over a month, possibly because he was invited to provide assistance to an election candidate in Shandong province, among other possible reasons.\textsuperscript{57}

Authorities persecuted individuals for participating in memorial events in remembrance of the victims of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. During the lead-up to the 26th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests, authorities questioned, held in custody,\textsuperscript{58} criminally detained,\textsuperscript{59} sent on forced “vacation,”\textsuperscript{60} or harassed\textsuperscript{61} individuals and warned or pressured artists and historians not to document the lives of Tiananmen protesters.\textsuperscript{62} Authorities also pursued criminal cases against people detained prior to the 25th anniversary in 2014.\textsuperscript{63} Below are some representative cases of people affected by the ongoing crackdown.

- \textbf{Pu Zhiqiang.} Authorities detained Pu on May 6, 2014, after he had attended a gathering in someone’s home during which participants discussed topics related to the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\textsuperscript{64} Pu also made videos of his interviews with officials under suspicion of corruption who allege they had been tortured during their detention.\textsuperscript{65} According to the May 2015 indictment, the charges against Pu were “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “inciting ethnic hatred.” Officials dropped two other charges.\textsuperscript{66}
• **Tang Jingling.** Authorities detained Tang in May 2014 and later charged him with “inciting subversion of state power” related to his role in a “June Fourth Meditation” activity commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen protests through meditation.\(^{67}\) His trial began on June 19, 2015, but ended after he dismissed his attorneys to protest procedural violations.\(^{68}\)

• **Yu Shiwen and Chen Wei (husband and wife).** Authorities detained Yu and Chen in May 2014 after the couple reportedly organized a memorial service in Henan province in February 2014 that commemorated former Party leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and victims of the crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\(^{69}\) Authorities later arrested them on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Officials released Chen on bail in September 2014 but continued to hold Yu.\(^{70}\)

• **Chen Yunfei.** Authorities detained Chen on March 25, 2015, and formally arrested him on April 30 on the charges of “inciting subversion of state power” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” following his visit to the burial site of a 1989 Tiananmen democracy protest crackdown victim.\(^{71}\)

**Reform: Pledge To Expand “Socialist Political Democratic Consultative Processes”**

During the reporting year, central Party authorities did not pledge to undertake any significant democratic political reforms.\(^{72}\) They did, however, pledge to improve and develop the existing “socialist political democratic consultative system”\(^{73}\) in order to strengthen Party leadership. Chinese officials describe China’s political system as a “socialist democracy” with “multi-party cooperation” and “political consultation” under the leadership of the Communist Party.\(^{74}\) Previously, types of “consultation” have included: input (intraparty) on decisions about Party cadre appointments; input on development projects at grassroots levels; input on some draft laws; and discussions between Party representatives and the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the eight “democratic” minor parties under the CPPCC umbrella.\(^{75}\)

In line with the pledge to improve China’s “socialist political democratic consultative system,” in February 2015, authorities issued an opinion stipulating improvement of vaguely defined Party-led\(^{76}\) “democratic consultation” channels while “using promotion of consultative democracy to improve and strengthen the Party’s leadership and consolidate the Party’s hold on power.”\(^{77}\) The opinion emphasized allowing mass organizations\(^{78}\) to fully develop as Party conduits to the public,\(^{79}\) and stipulated strengthening consultation between the CPPCC and eight “democratic” minor parties and the judiciary and government.\(^{80}\) The opinion also called for gradual exploration of the involvement of “social organizations”—non-governmental groups, professional associations, and non-profit groups able to register with the government\(^{81}\)—in undefined consultation processes.\(^{82}\)
Reform: Party Promotes “Administration According to Law”

During the reporting period, central Party leaders emphasized government reforms promoting “administration according to law” and “modernizing government and governing capacity” in the Decision on Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According to Law (Decision) passed at the Fourth Plenum of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in October 2014 (Fourth Plenum). The Fourth Plenum Decision emphasized components of “administration according to law,” such as strengthening legal enforcement; improving the organization of government and bolstering administrative procedure systems of law; and developing statutory procedures for incorporating public and expert participation, risk assessments, and collective discussion during certain administrative policy decisionmaking processes. The Decision also mandated improving administrative procedural transparency and tightening restraints on and supervision over the use of government administrative authority. In addition, it specified the establishment of top-down systems whereby government leaders would “assume lifelong accountability for major policy decisions and a mechanism for tracking down and investigating those responsible for the decisionmaking” even after they leave office.

Local Elections in China’s One-Party State

Chinese leaders continued to encourage some popular participation in elections at local levels, but China’s political institutions remain out of compliance with international human rights standards. In China, elections are held at the very lowest administrative levels for rural village and urban community residents’ committees. Elections for local people’s congresses exist but take place only at the county level and below. The Chinese Communist Party employs both “intraparty” elections and selection processes at local and national levels, but use of the term “intraparty democracy” in recent years reportedly has reached a low point in the media discourse of Chinese leaders. There are no national-level elections for government officials. Chinese political institutions do not meet the standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and declared an intention to ratify. Chinese political institutions also remain out of compliance with the standards set forth in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that the “will of the people” should be “expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.”

Chinese authorities claimed that, by the end of 2013, 98 percent of villages directly elected their Party committees, but this figure does not reflect the quality of those elections, which in some cases may not be free or fair. During the reporting year, for example, Party authorities in a prefecture in the Tibet Autonomous Region discriminated against certain types of individuals through codified restrictions on village committee and Party committee election candidates. Prefectural authorities mandated that village committee candidates be members or soon-to-be members of the Communist
Party and cannot have “practiced evil religions” or “attended overseas religious gatherings” organized by the Fourteenth Dalai,” among other restrictions. Other reports highlighted additional problems with local village committee elections, including interference from officials, gender inequality, irregular election procedures, failure to recognize election outcomes, silencing candidates whom Party authorities deem to be challenging, and physical violence.

Open Government Affairs and Citizen Access to Information

Chinese authorities reiterated their intent to improve “open government affairs” (proactive government transparency) and to aim for information disclosure as the norm. The Fourth Plenum Decision urged transparency, especially in government finances and budgets, distribution of public funding, approval and implementation of major construction projects, and public interest affairs. In November 2014, the State Council General Office issued an opinion calling on government agencies to improve their websites, strengthen public trust in the government, and make government websites the primary source of government information. In April 2015, the State Council issued a decision calling on government agencies to make available to the public lists itemizing their administrative powers—including compulsory enforcement, administrative fines, and other related information—in an attempt to improve transparency, promote administrative reform, and restrain arbitrary authority.

Despite these policy and regulatory measures, transparency and access to government data is still lacking and government implementation of the 2008 Open Government Information Regulations remains problematic. A source noted that it is getting more difficult for Chinese scientists to obtain good-quality public data, most of which are held by government departments. The lack of regulatory transparency reportedly has contributed to the complexity of the environment for U.S. businesses in China. In August 2015, authorities called on the media to use only approved story lines, tried to censor news reports, and blocked journalists from reporting on the August 12 chemical fire and explosions in Tianjin municipality that reportedly caused the death of 173 people. Before and after restrictions took effect and government agencies issued statements, however, social media and mainstream media reported on the disaster.

Corruption

Widespread corruption continued to be a serious challenge facing China, alarming both Chinese leaders and members of the international community. News sources reported on corruption related to the procurement of government and military equipment and services, as well as corruption in the media, sports, art, and intelligence and security sectors. News reports also highlighted serious problems with the buying and selling of official positions and collusion between business and government officials.
During the reporting year, Chinese leaders’ wide-reaching anticorruption campaign continued snaring so-called “flies” and “tigers,” including high-level officials in the government, people’s congresses, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the military, state-owned enterprises, the media, the Party’s discipline inspection apparatus, and the state security apparatus. According to Xinhua, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s corruption probe data indicated that in 2014, procuratorates investigated a total of 55,101 people in 41,487 cases of violations related to their official jobs, an increase of 7.4 percent over the previous year.

The highest ranking official snared in the anticorruption campaign was Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and head of the Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission. On June 11, 2015, the Tianjin No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Zhou to life imprisonment and loss of political rights for life, and confiscated his personal assets for the crimes of accepting bribes, abuse of power, and intentionally leaking state secrets, following a closed trial that began on May 22. Other high-level officials suspected of corruption included Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, and Ling Jihua, a key aide to former Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao.

**ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES**

The anticorruption campaign in China continued, but authorities persisted in punishing citizen anticorruption advocacy efforts. The Fourth Plenum Decision called for “acceleration” of anticorruption legislation. Authorities reportedly announced that the anticorruption drive would become more “targeted and focused,” while other sources indicated authorities would focus on political factions and organized corruption within the Party. Anticorruption authorities reportedly called for more public participation in the campaign against corruption but emphasized that the campaign would not lead to “mass movements” that disrupt social stability. At the same time, anticorruption advocates Ding Jiaxi, Liu Ping, and Huang Wenxun remained imprisoned.

The anticorruption campaign also included several specific Party and governmental anticorruption measures and institutional changes. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) set up Party discipline inspection offices inside all of the approximately 140 central Party and government agencies as well as central legislative and consultative bodies. Central authorities also overhauled the anticorruption bureau under the SPP, elevating its status, and renaming it the General Office of Anticorruption. In addition, authorities instituted a national real estate registry and stepped up efforts to locate and bring to justice Chinese nationals living overseas who are corruption suspects. To ensure smooth development of corruption informant tip procedures, the SPP issued a revised version of the SPP Informant Tip Work Provisions. These rules further clarified the rights of informants, increased reward
amounts for informants, and toughened legal liabilities for individuals who threaten whistleblowers.

Despite the seriousness of anticorruption efforts at the central level, preventing corruption remains challenging, and reports highlighting the darker sides of the anticorruption drive continued to surface. One article noted President Xi Jinping’s vulnerability to claims that political motives may be driving decisions about corruption investigation targets. Other articles raised ongoing accounts of torture and abnormal deaths of officials, including alleged “suicides.” One Chinese news article reported that government institutions were ordered to collect data on officials who died “unnatural” deaths and noted that, based on a survey of news articles, an estimated 50 Party officials died unnatural deaths between November 2012 and December 2014. An opinion piece in China Daily reported an increase in the occurrence of suicides by officials over the last few years, approximately 30 percent of which have been linked to corruption investigations.
Notes to Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance


3. Ibid., 3–4; “Chinese Communist Party Has 87,793,000 Party Members and 4,360,000 Grassroots Organizations” [Zhongguo gongchandang you dangyuan 87793.0 wan ming jiceng dang zuzhi 436.0 wan ge], Xinhua, 29 June 15. By the end of 2014, there were reportedly 7,565 urban neighborhood Communist Party organizations, 32,753 township organizations, 92,581 community (residential) committees, and 577,273 village committees. In addition, by the end of 2014, the Party reportedly had over 87.7 million party members in total, compared with over 77.9 million at the end of 2009. For the 2009 figure, see Gao Lei, “At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Throughout the Country Reaches 77,995,000” [diewu 2009 niandu quanguo dangyuan tongshu 77995000], China Communist Party Information Net, 28 June 10. Party branches are within public institutions (including hospitals, schools, and research institutes) as well as within government departments.

4. “Chinese Communist Party Has 87,793,000 Party Members and 4,360,000 Grassroots Organizations” [Zhongguo gongchandang you dangyuan 87793.0 wan ming jiceng dang zuzhi 436.0 wan ge], Xinhua, 29 June 15. By the end of 2014, there were Party organizations in 184,000 “social organizations” (shehui zuzhi), covering about 41.9 percent of all “social organizations.”

5. Ibid. By the end of 2014, there were reportedly 194,900 publicly-owned enterprises and over 1,579,000 private enterprises with Party organizations, amounting to over 91 percent and 53 percent of such enterprises, respectively.


7. Sheng Ruswei, “More Than 60,000 Weak and Lax Grassroots Party Organizations Rectified” [Liuan duo ge ruanruo huamei jiceng dang zuzhi bei zhengdun], People’s Daily, 31 May 14.

8. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanguo jiaoyu he gaijin xinxing shi (shixing)], issued 23 October 14, items 1(8), 2(2). See also Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensive Governing the Country According to the Law Forward,” translated in China Copyright and Media (blog), 28 October 14, item 2(2).

9. Ibid., item 1(8); Ibid., item 1(8).

10. Ibid., item 2(2); Ibid., item 2(2).

11. Ibid., item 1(8); Ibid., item 1(8).


17. “China’s Xi Urges Young, New Media Workers To Lead Rejuvenation of Nation,” Reuters, 21 May 15; Bob Dietz, Committee to Protect Journalists, “In China, Mainstream Media as Well as Dissidents Under Increasing Pressure,” 17 December 14; “Central United Front First-Ever Training for New Media Professionals, Including Chen Tong, Zhang Yiming, Deng Fei, and Others” [Zhongyang touxianzhu shou du lundian mei congfei renyuan, shehui tong zhang yiming deng fei tong zai lie], The Paper, 19 May 15.


32. “PRC National Security Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa), passed and effective 1 July 15, art. 3.
39. Ibid., paras. 3, Ibid., para. 3.
40. Sara Hsu, “China’s New Social Credit System,” The Diplomat, 10 May 15.
41. Michelle FlorCruz, “China To Use Big Data To Rate Citizens in New ‘Social Credit System,” International Business Times, 28 April 15; Sara Hsu, “China’s New Social Credit System,” The Diplomat, 10 May 15.
43. Michelle FlorCruz, “China To Use Big Data To Rate Citizens in New ‘Social Credit System,” International Business Times, 28 April 15.
49 Sarah Cook, “The Risks of Expanding Repression in China,” The Diplomat, 8 April 15.


52 Rights Defense Network, “Sichuan’s Deng Chuanbin, Because of Participating in International Rights Organization’s Rights Knowledge Training, Illegally Summoned, Passport, HK-Macau Travel Permit, Communications Equipment Confiscated” [Sichuan deng chuanbin yin canjia guoji renquan renqun jiazhu zhi jia xin ren bu jia cha huanhu shang hao, gang ao tongxingzheng, tongxin shebei bei kou], 6 June 15.

53 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Individuals Detained in Mainland China for Supporting Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Protesters” 9 July 15.


55 Rights Defense Network, “Zhao Haitong Sentenced to 14 Years for Inciting Subversion of State Power” [Zhao haitong bei yi shadiang diaofu guojia zhengquan zu panxing shisi nian], 7 November 15; “Zhao Haitong Arrested for Inciting Subversion of State Power” [Zhao haitong diaofu guojia qisushu], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 15; “Pu Zhiqiang Indicted” [Pu zhiqiang qisushu], 20 May 15.


57 Rights Defense Network, “Hubei Election Expert Yao Lifa Returns Home After Being Taken Away and Detained for Over a Month” [Hubei xuanzhu zuiju yao li fai dai zhou kongzhi yi ge yu yue hou fan jia], 18 November 14. For more information on Yao Lifa, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00509.


57 Rights Defense Network, “Hubei Election Expert Yao Lifa Returns Home After Being Taken Away and Detained for Over a Month” [Hubei xuanzhu zuiju yao li fai dai zhou kongzhi yi ge yu yue hou fan jia], 18 November 14. For more information on Yao Lifa, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00509.


64 “Pu Zhiqiang Arrested on Suspicion of Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, Illegally Obtaining Citizen Information” [Pu zhiqiang qisushu xin xin zhi, fei bu he hua gong min xin xi zu], China News Service, 16 June 14; “Families ‘Shocked’ Over Subversion Charges for Chinese Rights Lawyers,” Radio Free Asia, 23 June 14. For more information on Pu Zhiqiang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00174.


guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding, issued 23 October 14, prehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang yijian], reprinted in Xinhua, issued 9 February 15, para. 23.


item 1(1); Qian Gang, "Reading Chinese Politics in 2014," China Media Project, 30 December 14.

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item 2(4). See also Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, "CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward," translated in China Copyright and Media (blog), 28 October 14, item 2/4.

item 2(4).

item 2(4).

item 1(1); Qian Gang, "Reading Chinese Politics in 2014," China Media Project, 30 December 14.


item 1(1); Qian Gang, "Reading Chinese Politics in 2014," China Media Project, 30 December 14.
odic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will shall be expressed in peri-
periodic elections'' (para. 1). The language requires that: ''where citizens participate in the con-
sumption of the right to vote and must be fully protected . . . .'' (para. 12); and an ''independent electoral
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rights are essential conditions for the effective exercise
of the right to vote at elections and referenda must be established by law and may be subject
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92[PRC] Election Law of the National People’s Congress and the Various Levels of Local People’s Congresses [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji quanguo renmin daibiao dahui], passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 2; Liu Yawei, Carter Center, “China’s Town-
94[PRC] Organic Law of Village Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa], passed 4 November 98, amended 28 October 10, 2; Cheng Li, “China’s Village Elec-
tions and Political Climate in 2010,” in Final Report of the Carter Center Limited Assessment Mis-
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Commission on China, 8 July 02, Testimony of Elizabeth Dugan, Director, Asia Division, Inter-
95[Ibid., item 3(1); Ibid., item 3(2)]. See also [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “CCP Central
Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing
the Country According to the Law Forward,” translated in China Copyright and Media (blog),
28 October 14, item 3(3), 4).  
96[Ibid., item 3(1); Ibid., item 3(2)].  
97[Ibid., item 3(2)–3(6); Ibid., items 3(2), 3(5), 3(6)].  
98[Ibid., item 3(2); Ibid., item 3(2)].  
99[PRC] Organic Law of Village Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa], passed 4 November 98, amended 28 October 10, 2; Cheng Li, “China’s Village Elec-
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tion to the March 2010 Village Committee Elections in Yunnan Province, China, Carter Center,
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100[Qian Gong]; “Reading Chinese Politics in 2014,” China Media Project, 30 December 14.  
101[Ibid., item 3(3, 4). See also Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “CCP Central
Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing
the Country According to the Law Forward,” translated in China Copyright and Media (blog),
28 October 14, item 3(3), 4).
112 "Tibetan Youth Is Killed by Police During Election Clash in Golog," Radio Free Asia, 19 December 14; "Nearly 70 Tibetans Detained Following Clash Over Forced Vote," Radio Free Asia, 7 January 15.
115 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According to Law [zhonggong zhongyang guanli guoquan tongji de zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 23 October 14, 3(6.1); Jamie P. Horsley, “China’s Leaders Endorse Disclosure as the ‘Norm,’” Freedomsinfo.org, 4 November 14.
116 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According to Law [zhonggong zhongyang guanli guoquan tongji de zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 23 October 14, item 3(6.1). See also Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward,” translated in China Copyright and Media, 28 October 14, item 3(6.1).
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120 "Tibetan Youth Is Killed by Police During Election Clash in Golog," Radio Free Asia, 19 December 14; "Nearly 70 Tibetans Detained Following Clash Over Forced Vote," Radio Free Asia, 7 January 15.
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