

III. Development of the Rule of Law

CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to view civil society's primary role as "cooperating with" (*xietong*) the Party's agenda for social governance under one-party rule.¹ At the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Party General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated the role of Chinese civil society in the context of Party and government leadership: "Party committees exercise leadership, government assumes responsibility, non-governmental actors provide assistance, and the public get involved."² While Xi's speech made reference to public participation of "social organizations" in a "consultative" manner,³ his vision for civil society in China continued to be ancillary to the government's agendas,⁴ such as aiding in service provision, welfare activities, and development goals in the areas of poverty alleviation, child education, and the environment.⁵

Ever since Xi's ascendance to the Party's top leadership role in late 2012, advocacy organizations operating in previously tolerated "gray areas" experienced what experts describe as a "chilling effect."⁶ In conjunction with the continued implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms passed in 2016⁷ and the increased role and purview of the Party over all aspects of Chinese society,⁸ the space in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had to carry out human rights advocacy activities continued to shrink this past year.⁹ [See Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance for more information on the expansion of the Party's power over government and society.] The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law called these recent regulatory developments a "top-down effort by the party-state to mold 'civil society' in its own image," that is, a "civil society" without "a strong value preference for what the government perceives as Western-style individual freedoms and rights."¹⁰ On March 23, 2018, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution sponsored by the Chinese government that said NGOs should "contribute actively" to "promote mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights."¹¹ The United States voted against the resolution, calling it an effort by the Chinese government to weaken the UN human rights system, while other countries such as Australia, Japan, and Switzerland said the resolution included vague and ambiguous language such as "mutually beneficial cooperation" and "community of shared future."¹² International human rights observers asserted the resolution "rang hollow" in the face of the Chinese government's crackdown on NGOs and rights advocates in China as well as its harassment of NGOs and activists at the United Nations.¹³

The number of Chinese NGOs is difficult to determine, in part because of the complex regulatory framework, the existence of unregistered NGOs and informal associations, the quick pace of growth of the non-governmental and non-profit sector, and the range of different types of such organizations.¹⁴ According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, at the end of 2017, China had 755,323

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registered “social organizations” (*shehui zuzhi*)—the official term for NGOs¹⁵—that consisted of 397,000 non-governmental, non-commercial organizations (*minban feiqiye danwei*), or what the government now calls social service organizations (*shehui fuwu jigou*); 6,323 foundations (*jijinhui*); and 352,000 social associations (*shehui tuanti*).¹⁶ Many social associations are government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) and therefore have close ties to the government.¹⁷ Many grassroots NGOs, with few or no ties to the government, remain unregistered or are registered as business entities due to restrictions and barriers to registration imposed by the government.¹⁸

NGOs Report on Worsening Conditions for Civil Society Since Last UPR

Many international NGO reports submitted in advance of the November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government’s human rights record described worsening conditions in China for civil society since the last UPR in 2013, and indicated the Chinese government had not implemented any of the recommendations on civil society it previously accepted.¹⁹ In its UPR submission, Human Rights in China noted that “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”—newly enshrined in the Party Constitution during the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 and in China’s Constitution in March 2018—“treats an uncontrolled civil society as a threat under its all-encompassing approach to national security” and stresses “absolute Party leadership.”²⁰ CIVICUS and the Asian Human Rights Commission jointly reported that the freedoms of assembly, association, and speech were severely hindered in China,²¹ violating international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²² and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).²³

Suppression of Grassroots Advocacy

This past year, the government continued to suppress the rights of Chinese human rights defenders working on human rights advocacy and to treat certain rights advocates and political groups as a threat to state security.²⁴ These advocates included the following:

- On September 1, 2017, public security officials from Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province, took **Zhen Jianghua** into custody from his home,²⁵ and criminally detained him the next day on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power,” holding him at the Zhuhai No. 1 Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention Center.²⁶ On August 10, 2018, the Zhuhai Intermediate People’s Court reportedly tried Zhen without informing either Zhen’s defense lawyers or his family members.²⁷ Zhen is the executive director of Human Rights Campaign in China, which reports on cases involving rights advocacy and provides aid for people who are involved in, or have reported on, these cases.²⁸ Zhen has advocated for rights defenders for over a decade.²⁹
- In April 2018, authorities detained at least eight members of a group organized via the social media platform WeChat called the National Tourism Chat Group, which provided humani-

tarian support and funding to families of political prisoners.³⁰ Authorities in Changchun municipality, Jilin province, detained **Guo Qingjun**, one of the administrators of the WeChat group, on April 11, 2018, after which authorities detained at least seven more group administrators from other parts of China, including **Liao Yongzhong, Lu Bi, Liu Chunlin, Dai Xiangnan, Sun Wenke, Li Xiaohong, and He Meijing**.³¹ Prior to the April detentions, Chinese authorities reportedly interviewed over 100 other members of the WeChat group.³²

- This past year, Chinese authorities continued to persecute at least three human rights advocates from China Human Rights Watch—**Xu Qin, Qin Yongmin, and Zhao Suli**. PSB officials in Jiangsu province held Xu in incommunicado detention at the Yangzhou PSB Detention Center in Yangzhou municipality, Jiangsu, after detaining her in February 2018 on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”³³ In March 2018, authorities changed Xu’s charge from “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” to “inciting subversion of state power,” reportedly for articles she had written in connection to another rights advocacy group and her support of other human rights advocates.³⁴ Authorities from Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, continued to hold Qin, founder of China Human Rights Watch who was originally detained in January 2015, in Wuhan on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power.”³⁵ On May 11 and 12, 2018, the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court tried Qin,³⁶ and on July 11, sentenced him to 13 years in prison and 3 years’ deprivation of political rights on the charge of “subversion of state power.”³⁷ Authorities from Wuhan reportedly released Qin’s wife, Zhao Suli, temporarily in February 2018, after holding her in an unknown location since her disappearance in January 2015.³⁸ As of July 2018, however, Zhao is believed to be under residential surveillance.³⁹

The Chinese government also intensified its efforts to limit and censor the online activities of rights advocacy organizations on social media platforms, such as Sina Weibo and WeChat.⁴⁰ [For more information, see Section II—Freedom of Expression, Worker Rights, Status of Women, and The Environment.]

Overseas NGOs’ Activities Law Implementation

This past year, the government continued to carry out the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China (Overseas NGOs’ Activities Law) which took effect in January 2017.⁴¹ While some international NGOs (INGOs) have successfully registered representative offices in China, including philanthropic organizations that had relationships with local governments,⁴² at least four organizations that have long worked on training lawyers and projects to promote the protection of women and LGBT rights reported that they were unable to obtain temporary activity permits.⁴³ Other organizations that work on human rights and rule of law chose to suspend their operations or leave China.⁴⁴ By August 2018, 404 INGOs had successfully registered representative offices in China and 976 temporary activity permits had been filed, according to official data

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posted to the Ministry of Public Security's Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Service Platform.⁴⁵ The majority of U.S. NGOs with representative offices registered to conduct activities in the areas of trade, poverty alleviation, and health.⁴⁶ From January 2018 through July 2018, the number of INGO representative offices that registered in China each month remained mostly steady, at around 15 per month, based on analysis from the Asia Society's China NGO Project.⁴⁷ The China NGO Project further disaggregated official data, finding that, as of August 2018, INGOs from the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Germany have the most representative offices in China, while INGOs from Hong Kong and the United States filed the most temporary activities between January 2017 and July 2018.⁴⁸ Public data indicate that most INGO representative offices registrations have taken place in Beijing and Shanghai municipalities, while the most temporary activity permit filings have taken place in Beijing and Guangdong, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou provinces.⁴⁹

In addition to implementing the Overseas NGOs' Activities Law, several developments indicated the government viewed foreign NGOs as potential threats to national security. In April 2018, several government agencies, including the Ministry of State Security, jointly published a cartoon on "National Security Education Day" that portrayed a foreign NGO worker who is implied to be spying and courting Chinese workers to organize strikes.⁵⁰ In a sign that officials are more broadly targeting foreign influence, government posters on public transportation in Beijing warned Chinese citizens against being tricked into spying for foreign governments, urging them to report activities to relevant national security authorities.⁵¹ A Deutsche Welle article reported that the government planned to score foreign NGOs based on the model of the social credit system, which would punish organizations that conduct activities the government deems unwelcome or that may damage "national interests" or harm "national security and peace."⁵² In December 2017, the State Council issued implementing rules⁵³ for the 2014 PRC Counterespionage Law,⁵⁴ which give the government power to punish "foreign institutions and organizations" or "hostile groups" it deems harmful to national security.⁵⁵

Developments in Lee Ming-cheh's Case

Chinese authorities continued to detain and prosecute Taiwan human rights NGO volunteer Lee Ming-cheh this past year. In March 2017, authorities detained Lee, a manager at Wenshan Community College in Taipei, Taiwan, while he was traveling to Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province, via Macau.⁵⁶ The State Council Taiwan Affairs Office subsequently confirmed that Chinese authorities were investigating Lee for “endangering state security”⁵⁷ and had formally arrested him on suspicion of “subversion of state power” in May 2017.⁵⁸ On September 11, 2017, the Yueyang Municipal Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan province tried Lee on the charge of “subversion of state power”⁵⁹—to which he pleaded guilty and for which he expressed remorse⁶⁰—and on November 28, sentenced Lee to five years in prison.⁶¹ Observers from international human rights organizations suspected that authorities coerced Lee into confessing, calling the trial “outrageous” and “politically motivated.”⁶² They argued, moreover, that his case served as a warning to pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong and elsewhere.⁶³

Overall Regulatory Environment for Domestic NGOs

This past year, the government focused on cracking down on “illegal social organizations” that do not possess proper government registration or that perform activities outside of the scope for which they have registered,⁶⁴ targeting those that “threaten state security and social stability.”⁶⁵ A February 2018 circular stipulated that NGOs conducting illegal political activities will have their eligibility for tax exemption canceled.⁶⁶ A Chinese political science professor expressed concern that the drive to target and identify “illegal social organizations” is part of the Chinese government’s concern that giving more space to civil society could lead to potential democratization.⁶⁷ In January 2018, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the Measures for Social Organizations Credit Information Management (Measures), which authorizes the government to create an official list of organizations that are “severely illegal [and] not trustworthy.”⁶⁸ The Measures target organizations for disciplinary action and potential inclusion in a government list of organizations deemed as engaging in “irregular” activities, such as not submitting annual activity reports to authorities, failing to establish Party groups within their organizations, and not operating at the address listed in their registration.⁶⁹ The Measures were used this past year to levy punishments against at least one social organization that was found to be “untrustworthy.”⁷⁰ [For more on the Chinese government’s use of social credit through information technology and surveillance, see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.]

Two years after the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) released draft revisions to the three major regulations for civil society organizations,⁷¹ the MCA released new draft regulations for public comment in early August 2018, combining the three regulations that form the core of the regulatory system for domestic social service organizations, foundations, and social associations into one document.⁷² The new draft Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations lower the barriers to registration

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for four types of social organizations—business organizations, research organizations, social welfare providers, and service organizations—and allow these organizations to directly register with the MCA or at county-level and higher civil affairs bureaus without requiring a professional supervisory unit.⁷³ Provisions in the draft regulations stipulate that Party groups must be established in organizations⁷⁴ and prohibit certain Chinese individuals from registering or being the “legal person” for social organizations, including individuals whose political rights were suspended, who had been criminally detained or served a criminal punishment in the last five years, or who were listed in the government’s “untrustworthy” list with regard to their “social credit” score.⁷⁵

China Promotes Its Development Model in the International Sphere

This past year, as part of reform efforts directed by the Party Central Committee,⁷⁶ the National People’s Congress approved a State Council reform plan that included the establishment of a new government agency focused on international development.⁷⁷ The new International Development Cooperation Agency will integrate foreign aid and development assistance efforts, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).⁷⁸ In November 2017, the Director of the International Department of the Party Central Committee—a key Party department charged with extending the Party’s influence and advancing its interests overseas⁷⁹—opened the first Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network Forum, a gathering designed to strengthen cooperation between NGOs among participating BRI countries.⁸⁰ Two hundred delegates in total from Chinese organizations⁸¹ and NGOs from more than 50 countries attended the forum.⁸² The forum was organized by the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, which is headed by Sun Jiazheng,⁸³ Vice Chairman of the 11th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,⁸⁴ a body that is connected to the Party’s United Front Work Department.⁸⁵ Scholars observed this past year that the Chinese government, through its international development efforts, is offering an alternative global development model favorable to its political goals.⁸⁶

Notes to Section III—Civil Society

¹Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” [Xi Jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27 October 17, sec. 8(6); Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 8(6); International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: China,” last updated 22 February 18, last visited 17 April 18. The official translation published by Xinhua translates *xietong* as to “provide assistance to,” but the word is better translated as “cooperate with” or “collaborate with.”

²Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” [Xi Jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27 October 17, sec. 8(6); Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 8(6); Jessica Batke, “Social Organizations and the 19th Party Congress,” Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 30 November 17.

³Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” [Xi Jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27 October 17, sec. 6(3); Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 6(3).

⁴Matt Schiavenza, “The Uncertain Future of Civil Society in China,” Asia Society, 29 January 18; Narada Foundation, “The Two Sessions Came to a Close, What Did Delegates Say About Philanthropy and the Public Interest?” [Lianghui luomu, guanyu cishan gongyi, daibiao weiyuanmen zenme shuo?], 21 March 18.

⁵Narada Foundation, “The Two Sessions Ended, What Did Delegates Say About Philanthropy and the Public Interest?” [Lianghui luomu, guanyu cishan gongyi, daibiao weiyuanmen zenme shuo?], 21 March 18. See also Jessica Batke, “Social Organizations and the 19th Party Congress,” Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 30 November 17.

⁶Timothy Hildebrandt, *Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58. Hildebrandt explains use of the term “chilling effect” in the context of civil society as the internalization of the “fear of a negative state response” to the point that civil society “actors do not contemplate taking actions that might put them in jeopardy.” See e.g., Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2015—China,” October 2015; Mimi Lau, “Mother of Detained Labour Activist Takes on State Media—And Forced Into Hardest Decision of Her Life,” South China Morning Post, 1 May 16; Verna Yu, “Charity Workers in China Say NGOs Being ‘Pulled Out by the Roots,’” South China Morning Post, 12 June 17; Orville Schell, “Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,” New York Review of Books, 21 April 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China: Repeal Overseas NGO Law & Protect Freedom of Association,” 28 April 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Repression and Resilience: Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2017),” 26 February 18, 24–26.

⁷PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17; PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16. See also Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for Public Comment) [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16.

⁸Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jue ding], Xinhua, 4 March 18; “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues ‘Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies’” [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa “shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang’an”], Xinhua, 21 March 18. In March 2018, the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference unveiled reforms of Party and government structures to elevate the role of the Party over government and society. For similar efforts prior to March 2018 that elevated the Party above government agencies, see Michael Martina, “Exclusive: In China, the Party’s Push for Influence Inside Foreign Firms Stirs Fears,” Reuters, 24 August 17; Choi Chi-yuk and Eva Li, “Lawyers in Chinese Megacity the New Front in Communist Party’s Push for Greater Control,” South China Morning Post, 18 May 17.

⁹Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Repression and Resilience: Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2017),” 26 February 18, 2.

¹⁰International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: China,” last visited 17 April 18.

¹¹UN Human Rights Council, “[Draft Resolution] Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Develop-

ment,” A/HRC/37/L.36, 19 March 18; UN Human Rights Council, “Human Rights Council Adopts 10 Texts, Requests a High-Level Panel Discussion on Genocide and a Study on the Role of Capacity Building in the Promotion of Human Rights,” 23 March 18; “UN Rights Body Adopts China-Sponsored Resolution on Mutually Beneficial Cooperation,” Xinhua, 24 March 18.

¹² UN Human Rights Council, “Human Rights Council Adopts 10 Texts, Requests a High-level Panel Discussion on Genocide and a Study on the Role of Capacity Building in the Promotion of Human Rights,” 23 March 18. See also U.S. Department of State, “Key Outcomes of U.S. Priorities at the UN Human Rights Council’s 37th Session,” 23 March 18.

¹³ John Fisher, Human Rights Watch, “China’s ‘Win-Win’ Resolution Is Anything But,” 5 March 18; Andrea Worden, “With Its Latest Human Rights Council Resolution, China Continues Its Assault on the UN Human Rights Framework,” China Change, 9 April 18. See also Human Rights Watch, “The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,” 5 September 17, 13–25.

¹⁴ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: China,” last visited 17 April 18.

¹⁵ Karla W. Simon and Holly Snape, “China’s Social Organisations After the Charity Law,” Made in China, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (January–March 2017), 26–27.

¹⁶ Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Social Service Statistics Quarterly Report (Fourth Quarter of 2017)” [Shehui fuwu tongji jibao (2017 nian 4 jidu)], 13 March 18, sec. 3(1).

¹⁷ Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society: A Model Analysis of Trends in the NGO Sector,” in NGO Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 48; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: China,” last visited 17 April 18.

¹⁸ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: China,” last visited 17 April 18; Shawn Shieh, “Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society: A Model Analysis of Trends in the NGO Sector,” in NGO Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 52–53. See also Isabel Hilton et al., “The Future of NGOs in China: A ChinaFile Conversation,” Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14 May 15.

¹⁹ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, “Stakeholder Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People’s Republic of China,” April 2018, item 3; CIVICUS and Asian Human Rights Commission, “Stakeholder Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People’s Republic of China,” 29 March 18, item 1.4; Front Line Defenders, “Stakeholder Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People’s Republic of China,” 29 March 18, items 1–2.

²⁰ Zhao Chao and Chen Weiwei, “Glorious Guide To Building a Marxist Ruling Party—Story of the Birth of the ‘Chinese Communist Party Constitution (Amendment)’” [Jianshe makesi zhuyi zhizhengdang de guanghui zhiyin—zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng (xiuzheng’an) dansheng jil], Xinhua, 28 October 17; Amendment to the PRC Constitution [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng’an], Xinhua, 11 March 18, art. 32; Human Rights in China, “Stakeholder Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People’s Republic of China,” April 2018, item 18.

²¹ CIVICUS and Asian Human Rights Commission, “Stakeholder Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People’s Republic of China,” 29 March 18, item 1.4.

²² Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 19, 20.

²³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 19(2), 21, 22.

²⁴ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Repression and Resilience: Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2017),” 27 February 18, 24–26.

²⁵ “Zhen Jianghua Not Released 37 Days After Criminal Detention, Many Rights Defenders Subjected to Stability Maintenance Measures Due to 19th Party Congress” [Zhen jianghua xingju 37 tian qiman wei huoshi duo wei weiquan renshi yin shijiu da bei weiwen], China Free Press (blog), 9 October 17. For more information on Zhen Jianghua, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00360.

²⁶ Human Rights Campaign in China, “In Case Concerning Zhen Jianghua, Whom Zhuhai Government Detained on Inciting Subversion of State Power Charge, Sister Summoned by Jiangmen PSB, State Security Officials Warned Her, Saying Her Article Affected Police Efforts To Gather Evidence” [Bei zhuhai dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui jiya de zhen jianghua qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong’anju chuanxun guobao jinggao shuo ta wenzhang yingxiang jingfang souzheng], 29 September 17.

²⁷ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “Authorities Secretly Tried Zhen Jianghua, Netizens Say It Shows [Authorities’] Guilty Mind” [Dangju mimi shenpan zhen jianghua wangyou zhihu xinxi], 5 September 18.

²⁸ Human Rights Campaign in China, “In Case Concerning Zhen Jianghua, Whom Zhuhai Government Detained on Inciting Subversion of State Power Charge, Sister Summoned by Jiangmen PSB, State Security Officials Warned Her, Saying Her Article Affected Police Efforts To Gather Evidence” [Bei zhuhai dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui jiya de zhen jianghua qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong’anju chuanxun guobao jinggao shuo ta wenzhang yingxiang jingfang souzheng], 29 September 17.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ “Eight Detained for Organizing Humanitarian Assistance for Political Prisoners and Their Families,” China Change, 15 April 18.

³¹ Ibid.; Rights Defense Network, “RDN: Monthly Report on Detained Mainland Chinese Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience (5/31/2018) No. 32 (Total 761 Persons) (Part 2)” [Weiquan wang: zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhi fan, liangxin fan yuedu baogao (2018 nian 5 yue 31 ri) di 32 qi (gong 761 ren) (di 2 bufen)], 31 May 18. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00165 on Guo Qingjun, 2018-00222 on Liu Chunlin, 2018-00221 on Dai Xiangnan.

³²“Eight Detained for Organizing Humanitarian Assistance for Political Prisoners and Their Families,” *China Change*, 15 April 18.

³³“Detained Chinese Rights Group Spokeswoman Denied Visit From Defense Lawyer,” *Radio Free Asia*, 16 March 18; Rights Defense Network, “Chinese Human Rights Watch Member, Xu Qin, Confirmed To Be Criminally Detained” [*Zhongguo renquan guancha chengyuan xu qin zhengshi zao xingshi juliu*], 22 February 18. For more information on Xu Qin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00015.

³⁴“Chinese Police Charge Prominent Detained Rights Activist With Subversion,” *Radio Free Asia*, 22 March 18.

³⁵*Ibid.* For more information on Qin Yongmin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004-02138.

³⁶Rights Defense Network, “The Real Situation of Qin Yongmin’s Trial” [*Qin yongmin an tingshen zhenshi qingkuang*], 19 May 18.

³⁷“Wuhan Dissident Qin Yongmin Heavily Sentenced to 13 Years in Prison” [*Wuhan yiyi renshi qin yongmin zao zhongpan 13 nian*], *Radio Free Asia*, 11 July 18.

³⁸Rights Defense Network, “Zhao Suli, Wife of Well-Known Democracy Movement Figure Qin Yongmin, Returns Home After Over 3 Years of Forced Disappearance” [*Zhuming minyun renshi qin yongmin furen zhao suli zao qiangpo shizhong 3 nian duo hou huidao jiazhong*], 5 February 18. For more information on Zhao Suli, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00069.

³⁹“Chinese Police Charge Prominent Detained Rights Activist With Subversion,” *Radio Free Asia*, 22 March 18; Lily Kuo, “Chinese Dissident Qin Yongmin Jailed After ‘Show Trial,’” *Guardian*, 11 July 18.

⁴⁰See, e.g., “Muzzled China Feminist Group To Sue Over Online Censorship,” *Agence-France Presse*, reprinted in *Sino Daily*, 24 March 18; Grace Tsoi and Viola Zhou, “Feminist Campaign Gets Blocked in China on International Women’s Day,” *Inkstone*, 8 March 18; *China Digital Times*, “Minitrue: Do Not Report on PKU Open Letter,” 25 April 18.

⁴¹LAPRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland China [*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa*], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17. See also CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 225–26.

⁴²See, e.g., Liu Yanling, “Lines of Trust Blurred for NGOs Under China’s New Law,” *Global Times*, 14 December 17; World Resources Institute, “World Resources Institute Obtains Overseas NGO Registration in China,” 20 November 17; Ministry of Public Security, Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Service Platform, “Open Information—Public Information” [*Xinxi gongkai—xinxi gongshi*], last visited 17 April 18; “Registered Foreign NGO Representative Offices Interactive Map and Filterable Table,” *Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project*, last visited 17 April 18.

⁴³IA Tom Hancock, “China Law Puts Foreign NGOs Under Tighter Control,” *Financial Times*, 22 April 18.

⁴⁴Chongyi Feng, “The NGO Law in China and Its Impact on Overseas Funded NGOs,” *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2017), 102.

⁴⁵Ministry of Public Security, Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Service Platform, “Open Information—Public Information” [*Xinxi gongkai—xinxi gongshi*], last visited 20 August 18; “Registered Foreign NGO Representative Offices Interactive Map and Filterable Table,” *Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project*, last visited 20 August 18.

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